Denver Law Review Volume 89 Issue 3 Special Issue - Constitutionalism and Article 6 Revolutions December 2020 Democracy and Dissent: Strauss, Arendt, and Voegelin in America Stephen M. Feldman Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr Recommended Citation Stephen M. Feldman, Democracy and Dissent: Strauss, Arendt, and Voegelin in America, 89 Denv. U. L. Rev. 671 (2012). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact
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[email protected]. DEMOCRACY AND DISSENT: STRAUSS, ARENDT, AND VOEGELIN IN AMERICA STEPHEN M. FELDMANt During the 1930s, American democratic government underwent a paradigmatic transformation.' From the framing through the 1920s, the United States operated as a republican democracy. Citizens and elected officials were supposed to be virtuous: in the political realm, they were to pursue the common good or public welfare rather than their own "par- tial or private interests."2 Intellectually, republican democracy had premodern roots stretching back to antiquity. 3 As such, republican demo- cratic theorists often conceptualized the common good in objectivist terms, as if there existed a distinct good that could be clearly ascer- tained.4 Equally important, for at least a century, republican democracy seemed to fit the agrarian, rural, and relatively homogenous American society. Thomas Jefferson, for one, insisted that the agrarian economy and widespread rural land ownership promoted a virtuous commitment to the common good.5 And given that, in the nation's early decades, an overwhelming number of Americans were Protestants who traced their ancestry to Western or Northern Europe, the people seemed sufficiently homogeneous to join together in the pursuit of the common good.6 Of course, some Americans did not fit the mold.