Ethnic Mobilization, Equality and Conflict in Multi-Ethnics States
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Research Collection Doctoral Thesis Ethnic mobilization, equality and conflict in multi-ethnics states Author(s): Vogt, Manuel Publication Date: 2013 Permanent Link: https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-a-010086689 Rights / License: In Copyright - Non-Commercial Use Permitted This page was generated automatically upon download from the ETH Zurich Research Collection. For more information please consult the Terms of use. ETH Library DISS. ETH NO.: 21624 Ethnic Mobilization, Equality and Conflict in Multi-ethnic States A thesis submitted to attain the degree of DOCTOR OF SCIENCES of ETH ZURICH (Dr. sc. ETH ZURICH) presented by Manuel Vogt lic. phil., University of Zurich born on 08.03.1981 citizen of Schönenwerd / SO Accepted on the recommendation of Prof. Dr. Lars-Erik Cederman (ETH Zurich), examiner Prof. Dr. Simon Hug (University of Geneva), co-examiner Prof. Dr. Matthijs Bogaards (Jacobs University Bremen), co-examiner 2013 Summary What are the effects of ethnic mobilization on ethnic equality and conflict? Most of the existing literature has seen ethnic mobilization as harmful to democracy and peace. In contrast, this study argues that the effect of ethnic political parties and civil society organizations depends on the type of multi-ethnic society at hand. Based on a theoretical and empirical analysis of the link between different ethnic markers and ethno-political inequality, this study develops a ty- pology of “ranked” and “unranked” ethnic systems. Ranked systems are defined as countries characterized by the dominance of a European or European-descendant group over other groups perceived to be racially distinct. The latter are based on other ethnic cleavages, such as language, and are characterized by more equal ethnic group relations without a historically determined hierarchy. The study argues that the patterns and effects of ethnic mobilization should differ significantly between these two types of multi-ethnic societies. It tests this claim with both quantitative and qualitative methods, combining statistical analyses with four case studies based on field research. Empirically, it presents two new datasets on ethnic and trans- ethnic civil society organizations in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. The empirical anal- yses reveal four main findings. First, ethnic group mobilization follows different motivations in ranked and unranked systems. Second, ethnic parties increase the risk of ethnic dominance and violence in unranked systems. Third, the processes of mobilization, inequality, and conflict in unranked systems often follow a vicious or virtuous cycle. Fourth, in ranked systems, ethnic parties and civil society organizations increase the level of peaceful collective action only. Yet, they enhance ethnic equality by empowering historically marginalized groups. The case studies reconstruct the mechanisms by which ethnic organizations influence equality and conflict. The study concludes by discussing both the theoretical and practical implications of these results. i ii Zusammenfassung Wie beeinflusst ethnische Mobilisierung das gleichberechtigte und friedliche Zusammenleben verschiedener Gruppen in multi-ethnischen Staaten? Der Grossteil der bestehenden Literatur sieht ethnische Mobilisierung als Gefahr für Demokratie und Frieden an. Im Gegensatz dazu macht diese Studie den Effekt von ethnischen Parteien und ethnischen Zivilgesellschaftsorga- nisationen vom Typ der multi-ethnischen Gesellschaft abhängig. Von einer theoretischen und empirischen Analyse des Zusammenhangs zwischen verschiedenen ethnischen Merkmalen und ethno-politischer Ungleichheit gelangt sie zu einer Typologie von hierarchisch geordneten und nicht-hierarchischen multi-ethnischen Gesellschaften. Als hierarchisch geordnet gelten jene Gesellschaften, in denen europäisch-stämmige Gruppen über andere Gruppen herrschen, die sie als „rassisch“ verschieden betrachten. Nicht-hierarchische Gesellschaften beruhen auf anderen ethnischen Unterschieden, wie zum Beispiel Sprache, und zeichnen sich durch gleich- berechtigtere Gruppenbeziehungen aus, die keiner historisch festgelegten Hierarchie unterlie- gen. Die Studie argumentiert, dass sich die Muster und Konsequenzen von ethnischer Mobili- sierung in diesen zwei Typen multi-ethnischer Gesellschaften signifikant voneinander unter- scheiden. Sie untersucht diese Annahme mit quantitativen und qualitativen Methoden, indem sie statistische Analysen mit vier auf Feldforschung basierenden Fallstudien kombiniert. Auf der empirischen Seite stellt sie zwei neue Datensätze zu ethnischen und trans-ethnischen Or- ganisationen in Lateinamerika und Afrika vor. Die empirischen Analysen ergeben vier funda- mentale Befunde: Erstens folgt ethnische Mobilisierung unterschiedlichen Motivationen in hierarchischen und nicht-hierarchischen Gesellschaften. Zweitens erhöhen ethnische Parteien in nicht-hierarchischen Gesellschaften das Risiko von ethnischer Dominanz und Gewalt. Drit- tens, die Prozesse von Mobilisierung, Ungleichheit und Konflikt in nicht-hierarchischen Gesell- schaften stellen häufig eine positive oder negative Spirale dar. Viertens, in hierarchisch geord- neten Gesellschaften erhöhen ethnische Parteien und Zivilgesellschaftsorganisationen ledig- lich das Niveau von friedlicher Mobilisierung. Hingegen haben sie einen positiven Einfluss auf ethnische Gleichheit, indem sie historisch marginalisierten Gruppen zu politischer Macht ver- helfen. Die Fallstudien zeichnen die Mechanismen nach, durch welche ethnische Organisatio- nen Gleichheit und Konflikt beeinflussen. Die Arbeit endet mit einer Diskussion der theoreti- schen und praktischen Implikationen dieser Resultate. iii iv Contents SUMMARY I ZUSAMMENFASSUNG III CONTENTS V TABLES VI TABLES IN APPENDICES VII FIGURES VIII FIGURES IN APPENDICES IX ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS X INTRODUCTION 1 PART I: THEORY 1. THE ARGUMENT: RACE, RANKED ETHNIC SYSTEMS, AND THE DIFFERENTIAL EFFECT OF ETHNIC MOBILIZATION 10 2. AGENTS OF ETHNIC MOBILIZATION: ETHNIC PARTIES AND CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS AS CATALYZERS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 71 PART II: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 3. GLOBAL ANALYSIS 88 4. SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: MOBILIZATION, ETHNIC EQUALITY AND CONFLICT IN UNRANKED ETHNIC SYSTEMS 127 5. EXAMINING THE MECHANISMS: ETHNIC MOBILIZATION AND CONFLICT VERSUS TRANS- ETHNIC ALLIANCES AND PEACE IN CÔTE D’IVOIRE AND GABON 156 6. LATIN AMERICA: ETHNIC MOBILIZATION IN RANKED SYSTEMS 182 7. EXAMINING THE MECHANISMS: ETHNIC MOBILIZATION, STATE REACTIONS, AND POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT IN GUATEMALA AND ECUADOR 211 PART III: CONCLUSION 8. CONCLUSIONS: TWO DIFFERENT FACES OF ETHNIC POLITICS 242 APPENDIX I. THE EPR-ETH DATASET IN DETAIL 259 APPENDIX II. DETERMINING COUNTRIES’ MAIN ETHNIC CLEAVAGES 261 APPENDIX III. LIST OF ETHNIC PARTIES 276 APPENDIX IV. SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR GLOBAL-LEVEL ANALYSES 289 APPENDIX V. SUMMARY STATISTICS AND ADDITIONAL ANALYSES FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 291 APPENDIX VI. SUMMARY STATISTICS AND ADDITIONAL ANALYSES FOR LATIN AMERICA 297 REFERENCES 307 LIST OF INTERVIEWS 329 v Tables Table 1-1: Type of ethnic cleavages and ethno-political inequalities 36 Table 1-2: Ranked ethnic systems 43 Table 1-3: Idealized distinction between ethnic systems, and the patterns and consequences of ethnic mobilization 45 Table 3-1: Ranked and unranked systems. Differences in conflict risk 95 Table 3-2: Ethnic system type and ethnic conflict onset. Regression results 97 Table 3-3: Ranked and unranked systems. Differences in levels of democracy and ethnic mobilization 98 Table 3-4: Ranked vs. unranked systems. Patterns of ethnic exclusion and mobilization at group level 103 Table 3-5: Ethnic mobilization at group level. Regression results 106 Table 3-6: Mobilization and ethnic equality. Regression results 110 Table 3-7: Mobilization and ethnic conflict in unranked systems. Regression results 116 Table 3-8: Conflict onsets with previous ethnic party mobilization in unranked systems, global sample 120 Table 3-9: Ethnic mobilization and civil conflict in ranked ethnic systems, 1990-2009. Table of frequencies 122 Table 3-10: Mobilization, institutional instability, and non-violent protest in ranked systems. Regression results 123 Table 4-1: Mobilization and ethnic dominance in Sub-Saharan Africa. Regression results 133 Table 4-2: Mobilization and ethnic conflict onset in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990-2009. Regression results 135 Table 4-3: Ethnic conflict onsets in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990-2009 140 Table 4-4: Conflict and control cases in Africa selected for comparison 144 Table 4-5: Ethnic mobilization and electoral violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990-2009. Regression results 150 Table 4-6: Africa's most violent elections, 1990-2009 152 Table 6-1: Ethnic mobilization and ethnic equality in Latin America. Regression results 192 Table 6-2: Successful cases of ethnic empowerment in Latin America 195 Table 6-3: Ethnic mobilization and legal empowerment in Latin America. Regression results 203 Table 6-4: Ethnic mobilization and civil conflict in Latin America. Table of frequencies 206 Table 6-5: Ethnic mobilization, conflict, and political stability in Latin America. Regression results 208 vi Tables in Appendices Table A 1: The structure of the EPR-Cleavages dataset 261 Table A 2: The estimation of the main ethnic cleavages. Two examples 264 Table A 3: Coding of main ethnic cleavages 265 Table A 4: Summary statistics, country level, global 289 Table A 5: Summary statistics, group level, global 290 Table A 6: Summary statistics, country level, Sub-Saharan Africa 291 Table A 7: Summary statistics, group level, Sub-Saharan Africa