ORF Issue Brief 23 P. K. Ghosh
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EARCH S F E O R U R N E D V A R T E I O S N B O ORF ISSUE BRIEF August 2010 ISSUE BRIEF # 22 India's Coastal Security Challenges and Policy Recommendations P. K. Ghosh “India is giving the highest priority to fight sea-based terrorism and necessary resources are being allotted” Shri Mullappally Ramachandran, Minister of State for Home, in a written reply in the Rajya Sabha on March 10, 2010 Introduction One of the first steps in addressing the challenges posed by the porous maritime boundary was to comprehend The November 2008 terrorist attacks on Mumbai—the the enormity of the problem: India has a 7,517 km-long commercial capital of an economically resurgent coastline of which 5,423 km covers the mainland and India—left a deep and indelible impact on the Indian 2,094 km encircles Andaman & Nicobar islands. security psyche. The attacks exposed the lackadaisical Besides, with the available state of resources (both attitude of the Government, at both the Central and technological and in terms of manpower) it is difficult state level, towards coastal security and the sheer ill- to guard the entire coastline in a fool-proof manner. preparedness of the country to combat such terror Hence, the realization by the authorities for the urgent threats from the seas . need to subscribe to capacity and infrastructure enhancement of the maritime agencies involved in Unfortunately, prior to the Mumbai attacks, coastal coastal security and, more importantly, creating security and any related debate on the subject had been seamless interaction between them . the exclusive preserve of the Indian Navy, the Coast Guard and some maritime specialists. For most policy In view of the above factors, it is necessary to evaluate makers, who suffered from varying degrees of “sea and classify the types of asymmetric threats emanating blindness”, securing the country's land borders from the seas. These can be classified into three threat remained the dominant discourse and priority on the levels, depending on the extent of immediate damage national security agenda. For them, the degree of threat that each is capable of causing: to national security posed by smuggling and refugee flows through the Indian coasts was not considered Threat Level 1: The highest amongst all the levels, it grave enough to merit much attention. It was only after would imply penetration by non-state actors and terror the terrorist onslaught on Mumbai that national attacks on population centres along the coast, vital consciousness awoke to the dire need for installations like atomic power plants, oil platforms, overhauling/rejuvenating the existing coastal security naval/ military/coast guard bases and industrial centres. system. Attacks on these areas would not only be financially Observer Research Foundation is a public policy think-tank that aims to influence formulation of policies for building a strong and prosperous India. ORF pursues these goals by providing informed and productive inputs, in-depth research and stimulating discussions. The Foundation is supported in its mission by a cross-section of India’s leading public figures, academics and business leaders. 1 | www.orfonline.org | August 2010 ISSUE BRIEF l India's Coastal Security Challenges and Policy Recommendations disastrous for the nation but due to the to the revelation that the explosives for the blasts were associated/collateral damage, they could create a fear smuggled through the Raigad coast of Maharashtra in psychosis amongst the people. connivance with Customs officials was to launch Operation Swan in September 1993. This operation, Level 2: Threats posed by organized gangs carrying out involving extensive patrolling by warships, was smuggling of narcotics, arms and explosives would fall primarily aimed at preventing the landing of in this category. These criminal groups and gangs, contraband and infiltration. However, its geographical operating for profit, would also cause serious domestic ambit was restricted to the coasts of Maharashtra and security concerns by their networking with terrorists Gujarat—thus leaving other coastal areas of the country and providing logistical support for terror operations vulnerable. ashore. This happened in the case of the 1993 serial bomb blasts in Mumbai when the explosives used were Much later, in 2005-06, the Kargil Review Committee's smuggled through the Raigad coast of Maharashtra with comprehensive recommendations prompted the the active connivance of the Indian customs officials. Central Government to launch the Coastal Security Scheme. This was a fairly comprehensive scheme with a Level 3: The third threat level would include budgetary allocation of Rs. 371 crore. The scheme consequential and indirect threats; its ambit would envisaged the establishment of a series of coastal police cover the vulnerability of the Indian coast to illegal stations along with check posts in all the nine coastal inflow of migrants and refugees from Bangladesh and states and union territories in the country. The Sri Lanka, especially along the Odisha and Tamil Nadu objective was provide overall security and strengthen coasts. Though such people do not pose a direct security patrolling along the entire coastal waters and shallow threat, the probability of terror operatives sneaking waters near the coast. into the country in the guise of refugees cannot be ruled out. Numerous fishing boats and dhows which operate Unfortunately, most coastal state governments from the coast could also be included in this level as, remained unenthusiastic to this important security apart from legal fishing, they could be diverted and used initiative. While some states cited financial constraints, for smuggling of arms, ammunition and infiltrators. others wanted the Centre to shoulder the entire responsibility for coastal security. Another hurdle was The situation is aggravated by the fact that it is added by the State police forces which took the stand impossible to check the thousands of boats for that they were essentially land based and should not be suspicious cargo. Hence the need for the Automatic burdened with coastal security issues. With policing Identification System (AIS), which is likely to be being a subject under the purview of the state, the introduced compulsorily for smaller boats (less than objections of the police forces dampened the initiative 300 tons). However, this may turn out to be a financial considerably. The result was that infrastructure burden for the poor fisherman who has to purchase the creation and acquisition for the scheme was minimal system for fitment1. (The fitment of AIS on fishing both on land and at sea, leading to the initiative lying vessels above 20 mts in length has already been made dormant in government files. compulsory by the Government.)2 Ironically, while on the one hand the fishing boats are viewed with a degree This lack of enthusiasm took a fatal turn and resulted in of apprehension, on the other, fishermen operating the brazen Mumbai terror attacks of November 2008. from the coast form the 'eyes and ears' of the security Once again, the dire need to re-invigorate the entire agencies and can be used to report suspicious process of establishing a robust coastal security system events/intruders to the security agencies; in fact, they was reiterated. Faced with a virtual onslaught of form one of the most important links in the entire criticism for inept handling of coastal security matters, coastal security intelligence apparatus. including lack of intelligence coordination, hence pre- emption, lack of maritime border control and handling Earlier Attempts at Coastal Security of the anti-terrorist operations, along with the controversial role of the media, the Government and its While there have been numerous attempts at 'securing' various departments, as well as the Indian Navy, the Indian coastline in the past, the first defining adopted a multi-pronged approach to tackle coastal maritime incident that led to enhanced awareness security at various levels. about the need for coastal security was the Mumbai serial bomb blasts in 1993. The government's response 2 | www.orfonline.org | August 2010 ISSUE BRIEF l India's Coastal Security Challenges and Policy Recommendations Figure 1: Coastal Security Scheme Apart from coordination, the process of creating infrastructure become equally paramount in that: Indian Navy: Beyond 200 · Each Marine Police Station is expected to have two Nautical Miles patrol boats, built in shipyards of Goa/Kolkata. Indian Coast · A total of around 200 specially trained police Guard: 12 to 200 Nautical Miles personnel are expected to man these stations. Marine Police Upto · Since 2007, police personnel in batches of 12 Nautical Miles approximately 20 each have undergone preliminary from the shore sea training from the Coast Guard in boat handling and basic navigation skills. Coastal Security · Quick Reaction Teams have been already been Scheme constituted in 14 centres, including Thanjavur, Ramanathapuram, Vellore and Villupuram, for counter-terrorism operations6. · The newly constituted Organised Crime Intelligence Source: Marine News, “Coastal Security Group: Marine Police Stations in Tamil Nadu, 13 Apr 2009 Unit (OCIU) is expected to help in gathering coastal intelligence in addition to the normal intelligence Several old and dormant proposals were hurriedly work. dusted and re-looked at. Then, with fresh inputs, the · A 12-tonne boat, imported from Greece at a cost of Government finally created a three-level Coastal Rs.2.15 crore with jet propelled twin engines, each Security Scheme (CSS) to safeguard the Indian coast. with a capacity of 575 hp that can attain a top speed Delineating the geographical ambit of the of 70 km (40 + knots) per hour, has been responsibilities, it stated that: operationalized by the Coastal Security Group. 11 · Marine Police would be responsible for patrolling more boats are expected by 2010. In addition, 12 five- upto 12 nautical miles from the coast. tonne boats are expected to be allocated to the CSG7.