Three Injured in Fresh Attacks on Hama.Pdf

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Three Injured in Fresh Attacks on Hama.Pdf

Three Injured in Fresh Attacks on Hama www.stj-sy.com Three Injured in Fresh Attacks on Hama In violation to Sochi Agreement, 18 attacks hit Hama Countryside between 16 and 23 October Page | 2 Three Injured in Fresh Attacks on Hama www.stj-sy.com The Regime forces continue to violate Sochi agreement1, by shelling Hama’s countryside leaving civilian causalities. As 2 children and a young man were injured in targeting Zayzoun and Al-Zyara villages by the Syrian Army stationed in Joreen camp on Oct. 20, according to Mohammed Howish, a local activist and the head of Hama Media Office. Agricultural lands around Atshan village and Morek town as well as al-Jissat village were attacked by heavy machine guns while Tell al-Sakhr village was shelled by artillery and tanks on Oct.16 and 17. Heavy machine guns hit also the agricultural lands surrounding al-Lataminah on 18, 19, 20 and 23 Oct. while they hit al-Arbaeen and Beit Jisr al-Ras villages on 18 and Tell al-Sakhr village on 19 as well as al-Hawash village on 21 and al-Sirmaniyah village on 22. While mortars struck the agricultural lands surrounding al-Lataminah on Oct. 21 and al- Sirmaniyah village on 22. The latest bombardment of agricultural lands caused no fires or injuries, unlike the one occurred during the harvest time when the regime forces attacked pistachios and wheat harvesters. STJ reported similar attacks on Hama after agreeing on de-militarized zone there.2 1Read: ”Erdoğan: We agreed with Russia to create a demilitarized zone in Idlb, Anadolu Agency, September 17. 2018; https://www.aa.com.tr/ar/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84- %D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9/%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%BA%D 8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D9%82%D9%86%D8%A7-%D9%85%D8%B9- %D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89- %D8%A5%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%82%D8%A9- %D9%85%D9%86%D8%B2%D9%88%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD- %D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A5%D8%AF%D9%84%D8%A8/1257268 2 "Regime forces Shell Hama Countryside after a de-militarized Zone Agreement", STJ, Sep. 20, 2018, 774https://stj-sy.com/ en/view/ "Hama’s Northern Countryside Still under Attack despite the Russian-Turkish Agreement on a Buffer Zone", STJ, Oct. 2, 2018. https://stj-sy.com/en/view/807 Page | 3 Three Injured in Fresh Attacks on Hama www.stj-sy.com Page | 4 .

Copy Link

Recommended publications

安全理事会 Distr.: General 25 February 2015 Chinese Original: English
联合国 S/2015/138 安全理事会 Distr.: General 25 February 2015 Chinese Original: English 2015 年 2 月 25 日秘书长给安全理事会主席的信谨随函转递禁止化学武器组织(禁化武组织)总干事根据安全理事会第 2118(2013)号决议第 12 段提交的第十七次月度报告(见附件)。该报告所述期间为 2015 年 1 月 23 日至 2 月 22 日。我欣慰地注意到，叙利亚阿拉伯共和国境内剩余的 12 个化学武器生产设施的销毁工作正在继续，第一个和第二个地下结构的销毁现已得到禁止化学武器组织核实。关于阿拉伯叙利亚共和国的初次申报和随后的修正，禁化武组织技术专家正在继续与叙利亚当局进行对话。自我上次写信(S/2015/56)以来，禁化武组织申报评估小组对阿拉伯叙利亚共和国进行了访问，以便与叙利亚当局举行进一步协商，并继续开展技术层面的讨论。如我此前所强调的那样，叙利亚当局与禁化武组织之间的持续合作对于解决这方面的悬而未决的问题仍然至关重要。阁下知道，2015 年 2 月 4 日我收到禁化武组织总干事转递了执行理事会所作决定的文函，决定涉及正在调查关于有毒化学品在阿拉伯叙利亚共和国境内被用作武器指控的实况调查团的报告。我于 2015 年 2 月 6 日写信(S/2015/95)，向安全理事会主席转递了这一文函。在该项决定中，执行理事会除其他外注意到总干事表示，他将把实况调查团的报告连同执行理事会内对调查团工作的讨论情况包括在其每月提交安全理事会的报告中。因此，谨附上迄今发布的实况调查团的三份报告(见附件，附录二至四)。关于执行理事会的相关讨论情况见总干事定期的每月报告。实况调查团的工作正在继续进行。我一如既往地借此机会重申，我坚决谴责冲突的任何一方将有毒化学品当作武器加以使用的行为。请紧急提请安全理事会成员注意本信及其附件为荷。潘基文(签名) 15-02871 (C) 020315 020315 *1502871* S/2015/138 附件谨递交我题为“消除叙利亚化学武器方案一事的进展”的报告，供转递安全理事会。我的报告是根据禁止化学武器组织执行理事会第 EC-M-33/DEC.1 号决定的有关规定和联合国安全理事会第 2118(2013)号决议(2013 年 9 月 27 日)而拟写的，报告期为 2015 年 1 月 23 日至 2015 年 2 月 22 日，其中还按照执行理事会第 EC-M-34/DEC.1 号决定(2013 年 11 月 15 日)的要求作了汇报。另外还随函附上了负责查明有关氯在阿拉伯叙利亚共和国被用作武器的指称的事实真相的事实调查组的三份报告。阿赫迈特·尤祖姆居(签名) 2/119 15-02871 (C) S/2015/138 附录一禁止化学武器组织总干事的说明消除叙利亚化学武器方案一事的进展 1. 根据执行理事会(下称“执理会”)第三十三次会议的决定(EC-M-33/DEC.1， 2013 年 9 月 27 日)第 2(f)分段，技术秘书处(下称“技秘处”)应每个月向执理会报告该决定的执行情况。根据联合国安全理事会第 2118(2013)号决议第 12 段，技秘处的报告还将通过秘书长向安全理事会提交。本文为第 17 份此种月度报告。 2. 执理会第三十四次会议通过了题为“叙利亚化学武器和叙利亚化学武器生产设施的具体销毁要求”的决定(EC-M-34/DEC.1，2013 年 11 月 15 日)。在该决定第 22 段中，执理会决定技秘处应“在按执理会 EC-M-33/DEC.1 号决定第 2(f)分段的规定提出报告的同时”，报告决定的执行情况。 3. 执理会第四十八次会议还通过了题为“禁化武组织派往叙利亚的事实调查组的报告”的决定(EC-M-48/DEC.1，2015 年 2 月 4 日)。 4.
[Show full text]
Glossaries of Words 30 1
ENG L I SH ARABI C P ERSI AN TU RK I SH ARM EN I AN K U RD I SH SY RI AC by the G eog rap hical Section of the Na z al 1a112 67206 " D vision N val St miralt i , a qﬁ , A d y LONDON PUBLI SHED BY ms M AJ ESTY ’S ST ION ERY FFICE AT O . To b e p urc h ased t h rough any B ookse lle r or d ire c t ly f rom E . S TI NERY FFICE a t h e f ollowi n ad d r sse M . TA O O t g e s I M P I AL HOU KI G WA D W 2 an Y LO O C . d ER SE , N S , N N , . , 28 A B I N D O N S T T N D W G E L O O N S. l R E , , . ; 37 P ETER STREET M ANCH ESTER ; ’ 1 ST. D W éRESCEN T CA D I F F AN RE S , R ; 23 F ORTH S T T E D I B U G H REE , N R ; or from E S ST EET D B LI . P N NBY LTD 116 G AFTO U O O , R N R , N 19 2 0 Print ed und e r t h e aﬁth ority of ’ H rs M AJ ESTY S STATI O NERY OF F I CE B F D I CK H AL L at t h e U nive sit P re ss Ox ford .
[Show full text]
SYRIA, YEAR 2020: Update on Incidents According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) Compiled by ACCORD, 25 March 2021
SYRIA, YEAR 2020: Update on incidents according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) compiled by ACCORD, 25 March 2021 Number of reported incidents with at least one fatality Number of reported fatalities National borders: GADM, 6 May 2018a; administrative divisions: GADM, 6 May 2018b; incid- ent data: ACLED, 12 March 2021; coastlines and inland waters: Smith and Wessel, 1 May 2015 SYRIA, YEAR 2020: UPDATE ON INCIDENTS ACCORDING TO THE ARMED CONFLICT LOCATION & EVENT DATA PROJECT (ACLED) COMPILED BY ACCORD, 25 MARCH 2021 Contents Conflict incidents by category Number of Number of reported fatalities 1 Number of Number of Category incidents with at incidents fatalities Number of reported incidents with at least one fatality 1 least one fatality Explosions / Remote Conflict incidents by category 2 6187 930 2751 violence Development of conflict incidents from 2017 to 2020 2 Battles 2465 1111 4206 Strategic developments 1517 2 2 Methodology 3 Violence against civilians 1389 760 997 Conflict incidents per province 4 Protests 449 2 4 Riots 55 4 15 Localization of conflict incidents 4 Total 12062 2809 7975 Disclaimer 9 This table is based on data from ACLED (datasets used: ACLED, 12 March 2021). Development of conflict incidents from 2017 to 2020 This graph is based on data from ACLED (datasets used: ACLED, 12 March 2021). 2 SYRIA, YEAR 2020: UPDATE ON INCIDENTS ACCORDING TO THE ARMED CONFLICT LOCATION & EVENT DATA PROJECT (ACLED) COMPILED BY ACCORD, 25 MARCH 2021 Methodology GADM. Incidents that could not be located are ignored. The numbers included in this overview might therefore differ from the original ACLED data.
[Show full text]
Public Auctions of Forcibly Displaced People's Lands Are Another Syrian
Public Auctions of Forcibly Displaced People’s Lands Are Another Syrian Regime Method to Seize Its Opponents’ Property in a Widespread and Deliberate Manner At Least 440,000 Dunums of Agricultural Land Seized by the Syrian Regime in the Suburbs of Hama and Idlib Sunday 14 February 2021 The Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), founded in June 2011, is a non-governmental, independent group that is considered a primary source for the OHCHR on all death toll-related analyses in Syria. R210204 Content I. The Syrian Regime’s Seizure of Political Opponents’ Property and Land Is a Form of Collective Punishment..........................................................................2 II. Confiscation of Agricultural Lands Is a New Form of Expropriation That Adds to the Regime’s Control of Buildings and Properties............................................6 III. Public Auctions Have Begun in the Suburbs of Hama and Idlib, Leading to the Seizure of Nearly 400,000 Dunams to Date, and We Fear That These Will Expand to Include All Syrian Regime-Held Areas................................................7 IV. Conclusions and Recommendations..............................................................15 Public Auctions of Forcibly Displaced People’s Lands Are 2 Another Syrian Regime Method to Seize Its Opponents’ Property in a Widespread and Deliberate Manner I. The Syrian Regime’s Seizure of Political Opponents’ Property and Land Is a Form of Collective Punishment: The Syrian regime has used various types of terrorism and repression against those
[Show full text]
132484385.Pdf
MAANPUOLUSTUSKORKEAKOULU VENÄJÄN OPERAATIO SYYRIASSA – TARKASTELU VENÄJÄN ILMAVOIMIEN KYVYSTÄ TUKEA MAAOPERAATIOTA Diplomityö Kapteeni Valtteri Riehunkangas Yleisesikuntaupseerikurssi 58 Maasotalinja Heinäkuu 2017 MAANPUOLUSTUSKORKEAKOULU Kurssi Linja Yleisesikuntaupseerikurssi 58 Maasotalinja Tekijä Kapteeni Valtteri Riehunkangas Tutkielman nimi VENÄJÄN OPERAATIO SYYRIASSA – TARKASTELU VENÄJÄN ILMAVOI- MIEN KYVYSTÄ TUKEA MAAOPERAATIOTA Oppiaine johon työ liittyy Säilytyspaikka Operaatiotaito ja taktiikka MPKK:n kurssikirjasto Aika Heinäkuu 2017 Tekstisivuja 137 Liitesivuja 132 TIIVISTELMÄ Venäjä suoritti lokakuussa 2015 sotilaallisen intervention Syyriaan. Venäjä tukee Presi- dentti Bašar al-Assadin hallintoa taistelussa kapinallisia ja Isisiä vastaan. Vuoden 2008 Georgian sodan jälkeen Venäjän asevoimissa aloitettiin reformi sen suorituskyvyn paran- tamiseksi. Syyrian intervention aikaan useat näistä uusista suorituskyvyistä ovat käytössä. Tutkimuksen tavoitteena oli selvittää Venäjän ilmavoimien kyky tukea maaoperaatiota. Tutkimus toteutettiin tapaustutkimuksena. Tapauksina työssä olivat kolme Syyrian halli- tuksen toteuttamaa operaatiota, joita Venäjä suorituskyvyillään tuki. Venäjän interventiosta ei ollut saatavilla opinnäytetöitä tai kirjallisuutta. Tästä johtuen tutkimuksessa käytettiin lähdemateriaalina sosiaaliseen mediaan tuotettua aineistoa sekä uutisartikkeleita. Koska sosiaalisen median käyttäjien luotettavuutta oli vaikea arvioida, tutkimuksessa käytettiin videoiden ja kuvien geopaikannusta (geolocation, geolokaatio), joka
[Show full text]
L:>Rs(Olf/Vof
ORGANISATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS Dirutor-Ctntral OPCW The lf<lgue, 18 December 2014 ?014 OEC 2 3 Johan de \V ittl.>"n 31 1./()!)(Jill)5480/14 I q--- II 8 J--i 2517 JR The Ha)!U< !:....... ...��4._�·; i/� ..,.. !.: t l t•l;_ �� Tht' Nethnbnds o:F 'i llc ;,t.Q.l;J:.:ut)'.GE.NERAI. Tdcphone:+ 31(0)704103702/o-t ht: + 31 (o)jo 410 37 91. E-mail: ahmct.uzumcu(t!)opcw.urg Excellency, I have the honour to transmit to you the Third Report of the Organisation t()r the Prohibition of I Chemical Weapons Fact-Finding Mission in Syria. As you know the Mission was mandated to J I establish the !acts surrounding allegations of the usc of toxic chemicals, reportedly chlorine, f()r I hostile purposes in the Syrian Arab Republic. I This repoti will be circulated today in ·nlC I !ague to States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention. IIY. Mr Ban K i-tn0l)l1 Sccrdary-Gcncral ol"the United Nations United Nations llcadquartcrs New York l:>rs(olf/vof ORGANISATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS Dirutor-General OPCW The Hague, 18 December 2014 Johan de Witdaan 32 1./0DG/195480/14 2517 )R The Hague The Netherlands Telephone: + 31 ( o )70 416 37 02/04 Fax:+ 31 (0)70 416 37 92 E-mail: [email protected] Excellency, I have the honour to transmit to you the Third Report of the Organisation for the Prohibiti on of Chemical Weapons Fact-Finding Mission in Syria.
[Show full text]
September 2016
www.rbs0.com/syria37.pdf 1 Oct 2016 Page 1 of 234 Syria & Iraq: September 2016 Copyright 2016 by Ronald B. Standler No copyright claimed for quotations. No copyright claimed for works of the U.S. Government. Table of Contents 1. Chemical Weapons U.N. Security Council begins to ask who used chemical weapons in Syria? ISIL used mustard in Iraq (11 Aug 2015) 2. Syria United Nations Diverted from Syria death toll in Syria now over 301,000 (30 Sep) Free Syrian Army is Leaderless since June 2015 Turkey is an ally from Hell U.S. troops in Syria Recognition that Assad is Winning the Civil War Peace Negotiations for Syria Future of Assad must be decided by Syrians Planning for Peace Negotiations in Geneva New Russia/USA Agreements (9 Sep) U.N. Security Council meeting (21 Sep) Syrian speech to U.N. General Assembly (24 Sep) more meetings and negotiations 22-30 Sep 2016 Friends of Syria meeting in London (7 Sep) ISSG meetings (20, 22 Sep 2016) occasional reports of violations of the Cessation of Hostilities agreement proposed 48-hour ceasefires in Aleppo siege of Aleppo (1-12 Sep} Violations of new agreements in Syria (12-19 Sep) continuing civil war in Syria (20-30 Sep) bombing hospitals in Syria surrender of Moadamiyeh U.N. Reports war crimes prosecution? 3. Iraq Atrocities in Iraq No Criminal Prosecution of Iraqi Army Officers No Prosecution for Fall of Mosul No Prosecution for Rout at Ramadi No Criminal Prosecution for Employing "Ghost Soldiers" www.rbs0.com/syria37.pdf 1 Oct 2016 Page 2 of 234 Iraq is a failed nation U.S.
[Show full text]
Weekly Conflict Summary
Weekly Conflict Summary September 14-20, 2017 During the reporting period, pro-government forces and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF, a Kurdish-led coalition backed by the US) both advanced around the ISIS-held city of Deir Ezzor, leading to a sharp increase in tension between the two as they maneuver close to one another. ISIS-held territory in Raqqa city continued to fall to SDF advances the reporting week and pro-government forces advanced against the group in eastern Homs/eastern Hama as well. Hai’yat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS, formerly Al-Qaeda-linked Jabhat al-Nusra) started another offensive for the northern countryside of Hama, to no real effect. A string of assassinations within Idleb targeted members of HTS. HTS formed an interim governing body to compete with the Syrian opposition’s Interim Government and a coalition of opposition forces expressed their discontent with the Astana process. Units in southern Syria have continued to develop their local police work and are aiding attempts to strengthen the Syrian opposition’s Interim Government that HTS opposes. Figure 1 - Areas of control in Syria by September 20, with arrows indicating advances since the start of the reporting period 1 of 6 Weekly Conflict Summary – September 09-14, 2017 Conflict around Deir Ezzor In the last two weeks, pro-government forces broke the ISIS siege around Deir Ezzor city, the offensive force has worked to expand its control over the city and surrounding area. This week, pro-government forces drove back ISIS fighters at least 10-15 km from the Deir Ezzor Military Airport, from which combat missions have been launched since.
[Show full text]
EDAM DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE SENTINEL: IDLIB on the VERGE of IMPLOSION Dr
EDAM Defense Intelligence Sentinel 2019/01 August 2019 EDAM DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE SENTINEL: IDLIB ON THE VERGE OF IMPLOSION Dr. Can Kasapoglu | Director of Security and Defense Research Program Emre Kursat Kaya | Researcher EDAM Defense Intelligence Sentinel 2019/01 EDAM DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE SENTINEL: IDLIB ON THE VERGE OF IMPLOSION Dr. Can Kasapoglu | Director of Security and Defense Research Program Emre Kursat Kaya | Researcher Greater Idlib Region and the Turkish (Blue), Russian (Red) and Iranian (Orange) observation posts - Modified map, original from Liveuamap.com What Happened? On August 19th, 2019, the Syrian Arab Air Force launched an have intensified around Maarat al-Nu’man, another M5 airstrike, halting the Turkish military convoy that was heading choke point. In the meanwhile, the Syrian Araby Army’s to the 9th observation post in Morek. (The observation posts maneuvers have effectively isolated the Turkish observation around Idlib were established as an extension of the Astana post. Furthermore, the Turkish convoy, which had been en process brokered by Russia, Turkey, and Iran). The attack route to Morek in the beginning, has set defensive positions took place along the M5 highway, north of Khan Sheikhun, in a critical location between Khan Sheikun and Maarat a critical choke-point. Subsequently, Assad’s forces have al-Nu’man. The Syrian Arab Army, supported by Russian boosted their offensive and captured the geostrategically airpower, is preparing for a robust assault in greater Idlib critical town. At present, the regime’s military activities that could exacerbate troublesome humanitarian problems. 2 EDAM Defense Intelligence Sentinel 2019/01 Significance: The regime offensive could displace millions of people Turkish forward-deployed contingents and the Syrian in Idlib and overwhelm Turkey’s security capacity to keep Arab Army’s elite units are now positioned dangerously Europe safe.
[Show full text]
SYRIA, FOURTH QUARTER 2018: Update on Incidents According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) Compiled by ACCORD, 26 February 2020
SYRIA, FOURTH QUARTER 2018: Update on incidents according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) compiled by ACCORD, 26 February 2020 Number of reported incidents with at least one fatality Number of reported fatalities National borders: GADM, November 2015a; administrative divisions: GADM, November 2015b; incid- ent data: ACLED, 22 February 2020; coastlines and inland waters: Smith and Wessel, 1 May 2015 SYRIA, FOURTH QUARTER 2018: UPDATE ON INCIDENTS ACCORDING TO THE ARMED CONFLICT LOCATION & EVENT DATA PROJECT (ACLED) COMPILED BY ACCORD, 26 FEBRUARY 2020 Contents Conflict incidents by category Number of Number of reported fatalities 1 Number of Number of Category incidents with at incidents fatalities Number of reported incidents with at least one fatality 1 least one fatality Explosions / Remote Conflict incidents by category 2 1993 304 1338 violence Development of conflict incidents from January 2017 to December 2018 2 Battles 717 428 3121 Strategic developments 433 2 3 Methodology 3 Violence against civilians 271 183 275 Conflict incidents per province 4 Protests 84 0 0 Riots 3 0 0 Localization of conflict incidents 4 Total 3501 917 4737 Disclaimer 7 This table is based on data from ACLED (datasets used: ACLED, 22 February 2020). Development of conflict incidents from January 2017 to December 2018 This graph is based on data from ACLED (datasets used: ACLED, 22 February 2020). 2 SYRIA, FOURTH QUARTER 2018: UPDATE ON INCIDENTS ACCORDING TO THE ARMED CONFLICT LOCATION & EVENT DATA PROJECT (ACLED) COMPILED BY ACCORD, 26 FEBRUARY 2020 Methodology GADM. Incidents that could not be located are ignored. The numbers included in this overview might therefore diﬀer from the original ACLED data.
[Show full text]
Breaking the Silence
BREAKING THE SILENCE Lessons from humanitarian access negotiations under counter-terrorism legislation in north-western Syria Lena Schellhammer March 2021 An institution of MAECENATA FOUNDATION 1 Abstract Access negotiations between humanitarian actors and Non-State-Armed Groups (NSAG) controlling a certain area are a necessary precondition for pro- viding humanitarian assistance to affected populations in that area. However, in practice, there has only been minimal support for humanitarians doing so, and the topic is rarely openly discussed, especially when humanitarian access needs to be negotiated with designated “terrorist” groups that are sanctioned by coun- ter-terrorism legislation. This working paper fills this transparency gap by show- casing the humanitarian access negotiations with Hay'at Tahrīr al-Shām (HTS) and its local governance institution, the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG), in north-western Syria. Based on a general analysis with the help of the micro-pol- itics theory by Michel Crozier and Erhard Friedberg (1979) and the power-de- pendence theory by Richard M. Emerson (1962), this paper outlines the implica- tions of counter-terrorism measures on humanitarian actors’ ability to pursue these negotiations. First and foremost, they trigger a culture of silence that re- sults in a generally weakened humanitarian negotiation position. However, they also foster problematic humanitarian negotiation strategies like the involvement of intermediaries and the threat to suspend humanitarian assistance. The paper concludes that, besides the use of so-called power networks, especially an en- hancement of information exchange and an open culture of debate on individu- al strategies to humanitarian negotiations, are the most promising solutions to overcome the dilemmas posed by counter-terrorism measures to humanitarian access negotiations.
[Show full text]
Idlib and Its Environs Narrowing Prospects for a Rebel Holdout REUTERS/KHALIL ASHAWI REUTERS/KHALIL
THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY ■ FEBRUARY 2020 ■ PN75 Idlib and Its Environs Narrowing Prospects for a Rebel Holdout REUTERS/KHALIL ASHAWI REUTERS/KHALIL By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi Greater Idlib and its immediate surroundings in northwest Syria—consisting of rural northern Latakia, north- western Hama, and western Aleppo—stand out as the last segment of the country held by independent groups. These groups are primarily jihadist, Islamist, and Salafi in orientation. Other areas have returned to Syrian government control, are held by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), or are held by insurgent groups that are entirely constrained by their foreign backers; that is, these backers effectively make decisions for the insurgents. As for insurgents in this third category, the two zones of particular interest are (1) the al-Tanf pocket, held by the U.S.-backed Jaish Maghaweer al-Thawra, and (2) the areas along the northern border with Turkey, from Afrin in the west to Tal Abyad and Ras al-Ain in the east, controlled by “Syrian © 2020 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. AYMENN JAWAD AL-TAMIMI National Army” (SNA) factions that are backed by in Idlib province that remained outside insurgent control Turkey and cannot act without its approval. were the isolated Shia villages of al-Fua and Kafarya, This paper considers the development of Idlib and whose local fighters were bolstered by a small presence its environs into Syria’s last independent center for insur- of Lebanese Hezbollah personnel serving in a training gents, beginning with the province’s near-full takeover by and advisory capacity.3 the Jaish al-Fatah alliance in spring 2015 and concluding Charles Lister has pointed out that the insurgent suc- at the end of 2019, by which time Jaish al-Fatah had cesses in Idlib involved coordination among the various long ceased to exist and the jihadist group Hayat Tahrir rebel factions in the northwest.
[Show full text]