JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment
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S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330421 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE 09360 JTF-GTMO-CDR 21 April 2008 MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue, Miami, FL 33172 SUBJECT: Recommendation for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000683DP (S) JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment 1. (S//NF) Personal Information: JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Fayad Akhmed Current/True Name and Aliases: Fayyad, Fayad Yahya Ahmed al-Rami Place of Birth: Aden, Yemen (YM) Date of Birth: 1977 Citizenship: Yemen Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9YM-000683DP 2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in overall good health. 3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment: a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) on 11 October 2007. b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is assessed to be a member of a Faisalabad, Pakistan (PK) cell created by senior al-Qaida member Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn, aka (Abu Zubaydah), ISN US9GZ-010016DP (GZ-10016), under direction of al-Qaida military operations commander Nashwan Abd al-Razzaq Abd al-Baqi, aka (Abd al-Hadi al- Iraqi), ISN US9IZ-010026DP (IZ-10026), with the purpose returning to Afghanistan (AF) to conduct attacks against US and Coalition forces using improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Detainee adopted and professed a false education cover story. Detainee possibly fled hostilities in Afghanistan along with the other members of the Martyrs Brigade with the CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C) DECLASSIFY ON: 20330421 S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330421 S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330421 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000683DP (S) assistance of the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT).1 Detainee was arrested at the Issa Safe House controlled by GZ-10016. Detainee admitted joining the Jamaat Tablighi (JT), which is assessed to be linked to an al-Qaida facilitation network.2 Although detainee has been cooperative while in detention status, he has provided no information of intelligence value since his capture. [ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THIS DETAINEE IS AVAILABLE IN AN SCI SUPPLEMENT.] JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be: A MEDIUM risk, as he is may pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies A MEDIUM threat from a detention perspective Of MEDIUM intelligence value c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee’s assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by ¡ next to the footnote.) Incorporated information about the activities at the GZ-10016 run safe houses Information was added in this assessment about detainee’s threats against JTF-GTMO personnel and possible support for jihad Added SCI Supplement 4. (U) Detainee’s Account of Events: The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee’s own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability. a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee graduated from al-Noor College (high school) in Aden in 1997. From 1997 until 2000, detainee worked with his brother Abdallah at the al-Kawthar Bottling Company, in Sanaa, YM. During 1998, detainee studied under Shaykh Muqbil Bin 1 Analyst Note: The LT is a National Intelligence Priority Framework (NIPF) Priority 1 Counterterrorism (CT) target. Priority 1 targets include issues, opportunities, or threats that rise to, or are expected to rise to, the level of interest of the President, Vice President, DNI, and NSC/HSC Principals and Deputies. This includes terrorist groups, countries that sponsor terrorism, or countries that have state organizations involved in terrorism that pose a clear and immediate danger to US persons or interests. This includes those preparing to employ Weapons of Mass Destruction. 2 Analyst Note: Variants for Jamaat Tablighi are Talique Jammat and Markez al-Tablighi. The JT is NIPF Priority 3 Terrorist Support Entity (TSE). Priority 3 TSE have demonstrated intent and willingness to provide financial support to terrorist organizations willing to attack US persons or interests, or provide witting operational support to Priority 1-2 terrorist groups. (Analyst Note: JT is a proselytizing organization and has been supporting Islamic terrorist groups in South and Southeast Asia under the cover of conducting religious activities. Affiliation with the JT, a proselytizing organization, has been identified as an al-Qaida cover story. Al-Qaida used the JT to facilitate and fund the international travels of its members.) 2 S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330421 S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330421 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000683DP (S) Hadi al-Wadii, at the Demaj Mosque in Sedah, YM. Shaykh al-Wadii suggested detainee travel to Pakistan with the JT. Detainee then worked for Abdallah’s masonry business until detainee departed for Pakistan. Detainee was exempt from military service because of asthma-like symptoms.3 b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: Detainee met JT member Mustafa Abd al-Haq, at the Abu Bakr al-Saddiq Mosque in Aden. Al-Haq talked to detainee about how to join JT and encouraged him to travel to Pakistan to study Islam. In approximately July 2001, after knowing al-Haq for three days, detainee decided to go to Pakistan and join the JT. Detainee used money saved for the past two years to purchase a visa from the Pakistan consulate and his airline ticket. Detainee already had a passport. In approximately August 2001, detainee traveled to Karachi, PK, via Sanaa. He stayed in an unknown hotel in Karachi for a week. Instructed by al-Haq, detainee attended the al-Makki Mosque, where he met a Pakistani named Manawar who arranged for his travel to Raiwind Center, the JT headquarters in Lahore, PK. Detainee’s passport was stolen while in Lahore.4 c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee resided at the Raiwind Center for four or five months while he studied the Koran and other Islamic books. During this time, an individual named Mansour convinced detainee he should study at the Jamia Salafia University in Faisalabad, PK. On 23 December 2001, Mansour drove detainee to Faisalabad.5 Detainee took four classes during his one and half months at the university. Around mid-February 2002, one of detainee’s instructors named Shaykh Zafar Yasin told detainee to leave student housing because Pakistan authorities were arresting Arabs without the proper papers. Detainee went from the university to this house with fellow Yemenis Yasir Ahmad Ali Tahar, ISN US9YM-000679DP (YM-679), Emad Abdalla Hassan, aka (Imad), ISN US9YM-000680DP (YM-680), Muhammad Muhammad Hassan, aka (Muhammad), ISN US9YM-000681DP (YM-681), Muhammad Ahmad Salam, aka (Muhammad), ISN US9YM-000689DP (YM-689), and Ali Abdullah Ahmed, aka (Ali), ISN US9YM-000693DP (YM-693, deceased). Detainee remained at this house, later referred to as the Issa Safe House, for approximately one and a half months until he was arrested.6 5. (U) Capture Information: 3 000683 302 19-JUN-2002, 000683 302 29-JUN-2002, 000683 SIR 07-JUL-2002 4 000683 302 19-JUN-2002, 000683 302 29-JUN-2002, 000683 SIR 07-JUL-2002, Analyst Note: Detainee also reported arriving in Karachi in 26 May 2001. According to CIR-316-10023-06, detainee had a Yemen passport, number 00232668, issued in Aden on 20 January 2000, and place of birth as Sanaa, YM. 5 Analyst Note: Detainee reported traveling to Faisalabad a week after Ramadan, which ended on about 16 December 2001. Variants for Jamia Salafia include Jamiyah Salfiyah, Jamea Salafeyah, Salafyah University, and Salafi University. 6 000683 KB 29-JUN-2002, 000683 302 29-JUN-2002, 000683 SIR 07-JUL-2002 3 S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330421 S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330421 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000683DP (S) a. (S//NF) Pakistani authorities conducted raids at two Faisalabad safe houses on 28 March 2002, arresting more than 30 suspected al-Qaida fighters under the command of GZ-10016 and killing one. At one location, referred to as the Issa Safe House, Pakistani police and intelligence officials arrested detainee and at least 15 other suspected al-Qaida members.7 At the other safe house, Pakistani officials arrested GZ-10016 and at least seven other suspected al-Qaida members, and seized manuals, tools and components consistent with the assembly of explosive detonators. The safe houses were operated by the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) and were part of a network of LT houses and operatives enlisted by GZ-10016 after the fall of Kandahar, AF, to help al-Qaida fighters escape Afghanistan.8 Detainee and others were held by Pakistani authorities first in a prison in Lahore and then at a prison in Islamabad, PK. They were transferred to US custody in May 2002, flown to Bagram, AF, and subsequently flown to Kandahar.9 b. (U) Property Held: None c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 19 June 2002 d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the following: JT and personnel associated with the organization Issa Safe House in Faisalabad where detainee was captured 6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee’s Account: Limited information is available to refute detainee’s story of being a JT member who traveled to Pakistan to study Islam. Membership in JT is a common al-Qaida cover story, and others in the Issa Safe House where detainee was captured claimed affiliation with JT to cover their involvement with extremists.