1. ( S// NF) Personal Information : JDIMS/NDRC Referencename
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SECRET // 20331031 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STATES COMMAND HEADQUARTERS , JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO U.S. NAVAL STATION , GUANTANAMO BAY , CUBA APOAE09360 JTF- GTMO- CDR 31October2008 MEMORANDUMFORCommander, UnitedStates SouthernCommand, 3511NW 91st Avenue, Miami, FL 33172 SUBJECT: Recommendationfor ContinuedDetentionUnder Control(CD) for GuantanamoDetainee, ISN 000680DP(S) JTF - GTMO Detainee Assessment 1. (S//NF) Personal Information : JDIMS/NDRC ReferenceName: Imad Abdallah Current/ True Name andAliases: Emad Abdallah Hassan, Abd Rahman Ba Lahaith, Zabadani, Sayfal- Jamry, Abdallah Emad Abdallah, Aimad, Emad Abdallah Hassan al-Qoraeich Place of Birth: Aden, Yemen (YM ) Date ofBirth: 26 June 1979 Citizenship: Yemen InternmentSerial Number (ISN) : 000680DP 2. (U //FOUO) Health: Detainee is on a list ofhigh-risk detainees from a health perspective but is inoverall fair health. Detainee has chronic but stable medical problems. He is a repeated hunger striker with subsequent complications and has a history of chronic pancreatitis for which he is receiving medication. 3. ( U ) JTF- GTMO Assessment : a. (S ) Recommendation : JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) . JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Continued Detention Under Control (CD) on 4 October 2007 . b . (S ) Executive Summary: If released without rehabilitation, close supervision, and means to successfully reintegrate into his society as a law abiding citizen , it is assessed detainee would likely reengage in extremist activities. Since transfer to JTF -GTMO, detainee has threatened to killthe guard staff, has expressed support for suicides and hunger CLASSIFIED BY : MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON : E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED , SECTION 1.4 ( C DECLASSIFY ON : 20331031 SECRET NOFORN 20331031 SECRET 20331031 JTF - GTMO -CDR SUBJECT : Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee , ISN - 000680DP (S) strikes, and has been mostly uncooperative during custodial interviews. Detainee is assessed to be a member ofal-Qaida, a facilitator, and recruiter of extremists who reportedly swore bayat (oath of allegiance) to Usama Bin Laden (UBL) and was selected to be a body guard for the al-Qaida leader. Detainee is associated with an al-Qaida cell in Pakistan (PK) previously controlled by senior al-Qaida facilitator Zayn al- Abidin Muhammad Husayn, aka (Abu Zubaydah), ISN - (GZ - 10016 ). This cell was reportedly preparing to conduct a terror campaign using improvised explosive device (IED) attacks against US and Coalition forces in Afghanistan (AF) . Detainee traveled to Afghanistan for the purpose of engaging in combat and trained at al- Qaida’s al-Faruq Camp. While inAfghanistan, detainee traveled to Tora Bora, where he probably participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces before fleeing to an al- Qaida safe house in Faisalabad, PK. Detainee and other suspected al-Qaida members were later captured in this safe house by Pakistani security forces. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THIS DETAINEE IS AVAILABLE INAN SCI SUPPLEMENT . -GTMO determined this detainee to be: A HIGHrisk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies A HIGHthreat from a detention perspective Of MEDIUMintelligencevalue . (S ) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee's assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes inthis assessment will be annotated by next to the footnote.) Updateddetainee's transfer to US custody information Includedreportingindicating detainee may have offeredtraining to an extremist Includedreporting that further provesdetainee probably participatedin hostilities Includedreporting on detainee's behavior and actions since transfer to JTF-GTMO Added new detainee alias: Emad Abdallah Hassan al-Qoraeich 4. ( U ) Detainee's Account of Events : The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account . These statements are included without consideration of veracity , accuracy , or reliability . a. ( S//NF) PriorHistory: In 1999, detaineegraduatedfrom highschoolin Aden, YM. From 1999to 2001, he harvestedand sold khat. 1 316-09038-08 2 000680KB22- JUN - 2002, AnalystNote: Thenarcotic leafkhat( alsokator qat), is anevergreenshrub( Catha edulis) nativeto theHornofAfricaandtheArabianPeninsula. Khat is classifiedby theDrugEnforcementAgency 2 SECRET// 20331031 SECRET 20331031 JTF- GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendationfor ContinuedDetentionUnderDoDControl(CD) for GuantanamoDetainee, ISN - 000680DP(S) b . (S ) Recruitment and Travel : On 8 August 2001, detainee traveled from Sanaa, YM, to Karachi, PK, via Dubai, United Arab Emirates. He then proceeded to Faisalabad, where he enrolled in the Jamea Salafia University c. (S NF) Training and Activities : Detainee stayed in the university dormitory for four or five months. While there, he had seven roommates, five Pakistani and two Asian (possibly Filipino). Detainee then moved to an off-campus house with approximately 15 other students . All of whom were Yemeni , with the exception of a Saudi, a Palestinian, a Libyan , and a Russian . Detainee identified the person who ran the house as a Pakistani named Issa. 5. ( U Capture Information : a. ( S //NF) Pakistani authorities conducted raids at two al-Qaida safe houses in Faisalabad, PK, 28 March 2002 , arresting more than 30 suspected al-Qaida fighters under the command of GZ- 10016, and killing one. At one location, referred to as the Issa safe house, Pakistani police and intelligence officials arrested detainee and at least 15 other suspected al Qaida members . At the other safe house, Pakistani officials arrested GZ- 10016 and at least seven other suspected al-Qaida members , and seized manuals, tools , and components consistent with the assembly of explosive detonators . The safe houses were operated by the Lashkar - e - Tayyiba (LT) and were part of a network of LT houses and operatives enlisted by GZ- 10016 after the fall of Kandahar, AF to help Arab al-Qaida fighters escape Afghanistan Detainee and other suspects were first held by Pakistani authorities in a prison near Lahore , PK, and then later at a prison in Islamabad, PK . was transferred to US custody no later than 23 May 2002.8 b (S) PropertyHeld: as a Schedule 1 ( controlled) narcotic. However, Khat is legal and commonly used in Yemen, detainee's country of origin . 3 000680KB 22- JUN- 2002 4 000680 KB22- JUN-2002 Note: LTis a NationalIntelligencePrioritiesFramework(NIPF) counterterrorism(CT) Priority 1 target. Priority 1 targets are defined as issues, opportunities, or threatsthat rise to , or are expectedto riseto the level of interest ofthe President, VicePresident, DNI, and NSC /HCS Principalsand Deputies. This includesterrorist groups, countriesthat sponsorterrorism, or countriesthat have state organizationsinvolvedin terrorismthat posea clear and immediatedangerto U.S.personsor interests. 6 / 18169-02, IIR 6 034 091104, SAP2002040800004808 -APR - 2002, SAP2002033000005130- MAR-2002, 010016FM4001- SEP-2005, 010016FM4001-SEP-2005( b), 000680SIR 26-DEC-2007, AnalystNote: The Issa safe housewas also calledthe Yemenihouse andthe CrescentTextile Millhouse. 7 034 0144 03 8 000680InitialScreening23-MAY-2002 3 SECRET NOFORN 20331031 SECRET 20331031 JTF - GTMO -CDR SUBJECT : Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee , ISN - 000680DP (S) 9 600Pakistanirupees 10 110 Saudi riyals $ 1 US . (S) Transferredto JTF- GTMO: 19 June 2002 d (S ) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO : To provide information on the following The recruitmentof Yemenimales who travelto Pakistanto study at the Jamea Salafia University The curriculum and make-up ofthe student body at the Jamea Salafia University A safe house in Faisalabad that was used to house foreign students attending the Jamea Salafia University 6. ( S //NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account Based on similar stories by various other individuals captured at the safe houses in Faisalabad, PK, detainee's version of accounts is assessed to be a cover story. Detainee claims that he has never been in Afghanistan and that he only traveled to Faisalabad, PK to study at the Jamea Salafia University. However, reporting from other sources indicate detainee was also present inAfghanistan, trained at the al- Faruq Camp, traveled to Tora Bora, and resided in al- Qaida affiliated guesthouses. 7. ( U ) Detainee Threat : a. (S) Assessment: Detaineeis assessedto be a HIGHrisk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies. b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: If released without rehabilitation, close supervision, and means to successfully reintegrate into his society as a law abiding citizen, it is assessed detainee would likely reengage in extremist activities. Since transfer to JTF GTMO, detainee has threatened to kill the guard staff, has expressed support forsuicides and hunger strikes, and has been mostly uncooperative during custodial interviews. Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-Qaida, a recruiter, and facilitator of extremist who reportedly swore bayat to UBL and was selected to be a bodyguard for the al-Qaida leader. Detainee is associated with an al-Qaida cell that was preparing to conduct a terror campaign against US and Coalition forces in Afghanistan by using IED attacks. Detainee traveled to Afghanistan with the intention of engaging incombat, was trained at al-Qaida’s al-Faruq 9 Analyst Note: Approximately equivalent to $ 10.50 US. 10 Analyst Note: Approximately equivalent