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S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330328 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE 09360 JTF-GTMO-CDR 28 March 2008 MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue, Miami, FL 33172 SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention in DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000692DP (S) JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment 1. (S) Personal Information: JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Hala Bin Ali Current/True Name and Aliases: Alaa Ali Bin Ali Ahmad, Ali Bin Ali Aleh, Alaa al-Adeni, Adel al-Adeni, Bilal, Bilal al-Adeni, Bilal al-Yemeni Place of Birth: Aden, Yemen (YM) Date of Birth: 15 April 1983 Citizenship: Yemen Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9YM-000692DP 2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health. 3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment: a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention in DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) on 1 March 2007. b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is assessed to be a committed member of al- Qaida who traveled to Afghanistan (AF) to receive training and participate in jihad. Detainee is further assessed to be a member of a Faisalabad, Pakistan (PK) cell created by senior al- Qaida facilitator Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn, aka (Abu Zubaydah), ISN US9GZ- 010016DP (GZ-10016), and al-Qaida military operations commander Nashwan Abd al- Razzaq Abd al-Baqi, aka (Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi), ISN US9IZ-010026DP (IZ-10026), with the purpose of returning to Afghanistan to conduct remote controlled and improvised explosive CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C) DECLASSIFY ON: 20330328 S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330328 S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330328 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention in DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000692DP (S) device (IED) attacks against US and Coalition forces. Detainee is reported to have received training at a camp near Kabul, AF in late 2001, and is assessed to have participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces. Detainee adheres to a known al-Qaida cover story and traveled to Afghanistan via an al-Qaida facilitation network. Detainee’s travel in Pakistan prior to his capture was facilitated by the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT)1 and his alias was found on a hard drive associated with Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, aka (KSM), ISN US9KU- 010024DP (KU-10024). [ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THIS DETAINEE IS AVAILABLE IN AN SCI SUPPLEMENT.] JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be: A HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies A MEDIUM threat from a detention perspective Of MEDIUM intelligence value c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee’s assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by ¡ next to the footnote.) Added alias Bilal al-Yemeni Added detainee’s training in Afghanistan Updated analysis of detainee’s activities and associates resulting in increase of detainees threat from MEDIUM to HIGH and subsequent recommendation for CD Incorporated information about the activities at GZ-10016 and Issa Safe Houses Revised capture information 4. (U) Detainee’s Account of Events: The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee’s own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability. a. (S//NF) Prior History: In 2000, detainee graduated from high school in Aden and reported no other activities to include employment.2 1 Analyst Note: The LT is a National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) Priority 2 counterterrorism (CT) target. Priority 2 targets includes issues, opportunities, or threats that rise to, or are expected to rise to, the level of interest of the Combatant Commanders or DNI EXCOM Principals, not already identified as Priority 1. This includes terrorist groups, especially those with state support, countries that sponsor terrorism, or countries that have state organizations involved in terrorism that have demonstrated both intention and capability to attack US persons or interests. 2 000692 302 20-JUN-2002, Analyst Note: Detainee alternately stated he graduated in 2001 – see 000692 SIR 06- APR-2006. 2 S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330328 S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330328 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention in DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000692DP (S) b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: Detainee wished to study Salafiah (a form of fundamentalist Islam).3 Detainee’s plan was to travel to Pakistan, locate a suitable school, return to Yemen to inform his mother, and then return to Pakistan to attend schooling. Detainee’s mother agreed to the plan and provided detainee with the equivalent of $800 US for detainee’s ticket and expenses.4 Approximately September 2001, detainee traveled from Aden, to Sanaa, YM. On 10 September 2001, detainee arrived in Karachi, PK, traveling via Dubai, United Arab Emirates (AE).5 c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee stayed at the Dubai Hotel in Karachi for approximately ten days where he met two Yemenis, Abdallah and Wabah. Detainee stayed with the men for a month and a half before moving in approximately November 2001 to the Issa Safe House in Faisalabad.6 Detainee remained at the Issa Safe House for up to four and a half months,7 passing the time by talking to other residents and playing badminton as there were no books or televisions present. Detainee left the house only a couple of times.8 Although detainee originally intended to enroll in classes, detainee squandered his money.9 Detainee explicitly denied entering Afghanistan.10 5. (U) Capture Information: a. (S//NF) Pakistani authorities conducted raids at two Faisalabad safe houses on 28 March 2002, arresting suspected al-Qaida fighters under the command of GZ-10016 and killing one. At the Issa Safe House, Pakistani police and intelligence officials arrested at least 15 suspected al-Qaida members including detainee. At the other safe house, Pakistani officials arrested GZ-10016 and at least seven other suspected al-Qaida members along with manuals, tools, and components consistent with the assembly of explosive detonators.11 These safe houses were operated by the LT12 and were part of a network of LT houses and operatives 3 000692 302 20-JUN-2002, Analyst Note: Detainee claimed he wanted to see Pakistan and obtain higher education, but in the same report, he claimed he did not decide to travel to Pakistan until he was at the Sanaa airport. Reporting in 000252 FM40 05-JAN-2005b disputes detainee’s reasoning for traveling to Pakistan to attend schooling. 4 000692 FM40 30-JUL-2003 5 000692 MFR 03-FEB-2003, Analyst Note: Detainee’s visa was valid for 45 days. 6 000692 FM40 30-JUL-2003, 000692 MFR 03-FEB-2003, Analyst Note: Numerous detainees used one of several hotels in this area including the Dubai, Mustafa, and Embassy hotels during their travel to Afghanistan. At least one of the 11 September 2001 hijackers used hotels in this area approximately four months before the attacks. 7 000692 FM40 12-DEC-2003 8 000692 FM40 05-AUG-2003, 000692 FM40 30-JUL-2003. 9 000692 FM40 12-DEC-2003 10 000692 SIR 29-JUL-2005 11 IIR 6 034 0286 05, 000694 KB 22-JUN-2002 12 Analyst Note: Issa’s safe house was also called the Yemeni house and the Crescent Textile Mill house. Suspected al-Qaida members captured at Issa’s safe house include (YM-679); (YM-680); (YM-681); (YM-683); 3 S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330328 S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330328 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention in DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000692DP (S) enlisted by GZ-10016 after the fall of Kandahar, AF to help al-Qaida’s Arab fighters escape Afghanistan.13 Detainee and other suspects were held by Pakistani authorities first in a prison in Lahore, PK and then at a prison in Islamabad, PK. All suspects were transferred to US custody sometime in May 2002.14 b. (S) Property Held: One watch and prayer beads Although not held at JTF-GTMO, the following item was reported in detainee’s possession at the time of capture: Yemeni Passport, No. 0046900915 c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 19 June 2002 d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the following: Individuals arrested at the Issa Safe House in Faisalabad 6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee’s Account: Detainee is currently non-responsive to questioning and his cover story is assessed to be false. Detainee provided conflicting details on his mode of travel, dates of travel, and duration of stay at various locations. Detainee denied ever entering Afghanistan; however, other JTF-GTMO detainees reported detainee was present in Afghanistan at a training camp and in areas of hostilities. Detainee has not admitted to any extremist activities in Pakistan or Afghanistan and his actions indicate continuing support to extremism. 7. (U) Detainee Threat: a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies. (WE-684); (AG-685); (YM-686); (LY-688); (YM-689); (YM-690); (YM-691); (YM-692); (YM-693, deceased); (LY-695); (RS-702) and (YM-728). See IIR 6 034 0979 03, 000684 SIR 14-Oct-2004. 13 TD-314/18169-02, IIR 6 034 0911 04, SAP20020408000048 08-APR-2002, SAP20020330000051 30-MAR- 2002, 010016 FM40 01-SEP-2005, 010016 FM40 01-SEP-2005b 14 IIR 6 034 0144 03, IIR 4 201 4063 05, IIR 6 034 0470 03, IIR 6 034 0911 04, IIR 6 034 0043 03, IIR 6 034 0872 02, TD-314/20711-02 15 000692 PASSPORT 29-APR-2000 4 S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330328 S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330328 JTF-GTMO-CDR SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention in DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000692DP (S) b.