BUILDING a NEW GLOBAL ORDER: EISENHOWER, SUEZ, and the PURSUIT of PEACE a Dissertation Submitted to the Temple University

BUILDING A NEW GLOBAL ORDER: EISENHOWER, SUEZ, AND THE PURSUIT OF PEACE

A Dissertation Submitted to the Temple University Graduate Board

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPY

By Daniel J. Cormier December 2017

Examining Committee Members:

Richard H. Immerman, Advisory Chair, Temple University, Department of History Petra Goedde, Temple University, Department of History Eileen Ryan, Temple University, Department of History Frank Jones, External Member, U.S. Army War College, Department of National Security Studies

2017

Daniel J. Cormier

ABSTRACT

This study illuminates Dwight D. Eisenhower’s efforts during his first term as

President to advance new global norms that would make peace a more enduring aspect of international relations. Between 1945 and 1952, Eisenhower was an engaged supporter of America’s efforts to move the world away from the “war-system” that characterized the early twentieth century. The venture included implementing the

Bretton Woods economic agreements, creating the United Nations, adopting the UN

Human Rights Convention and supporting collective security organizations, such as

NATO. Combined, these efforts mitigated the primary causes of war and advanced new standards of global statecraft. They also competed for influence over US foreign policy and for global support. Eisenhower’s election in 1952 represented a mandate to prevent an early failure of the undertaking. Within months of taking office, Ike implemented a comprehensive grand strategy that included the imaginative use of military and economic power, as well as the addition of moral power to guide US foreign policy. By

1956, this grand strategy had advanced America’s leadership in global affairs through the advocacy of new norms of conduct that produced mutually beneficial norms and standards. However, the Suez Crisis threatened to derail the American project.

Eisenhower understood the stakes and decided to oppose the British and French efforts to secure the Suez Canal Zone by force. Throughout the crisis, America upheld the new standards of nation-state conduct agreed to in the United Nations Charter. This decision consolidated the position of the free world and served the nation’s enduring interest of advancing a peaceful world order.

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my family. Thank you for providing the love and support that allowed me to successfully pursue and complete this project.

I also dedicate this work to those people who, like Ike, advance humanity through dialogue and education. These heroes do not enflame passions or turn to polemics. Instead, they bring to our world a healthy measure of clear and critical thinking. We need more martyrs for moderation.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This dissertation is the result of mentors who advanced my intellectual development by encouraging me to explore, to inquire, and to construct. They accepted my limitations and stimulated a desire in me to add my voice to a robust conversation. This journey made me a better person, critical thinker, and educator.

First among these teachers is Richard H. Immerman. I am indebted to him for the example he provides as a scholar and as an intellectual. He encouraged me to think deeply and creatively about issues, as well as doing this in ways that pushed me to grow as a person and toward self-sufficiency. He is a model of character, who was a constant reminder to me that there are good people in the world who want to truly understand challenges, assess issues critically, and work to make things better.

I would also like to recognize the faculty, staff, and students of Temple University’s History Department. I am grateful for the learning environment they provided and the commitment they have to the development of critical thinking. The Department fosters the passionate curiosity that is needed to address the complex issues of our world. They pushed me past my comfortable thoughts and provided a safe space to explore new perspectives. I was honored that they allowed this “old soldier” into their ranks.

This dissertation would not have been possible without the US Army War College. The institution allowed me a unique opportunity to develop and grow as a leader. I also want to thank the War College’s Library Staff. They are not only some of the kindest and responsive people with whom I have ever worked, they also epitomize professionalism. In particular, I would like to acknowledge the efforts of Margaret ‘Dianne’ Baumgardner and Travis Ferrell. They provided invaluable assistance, particularly during my mid-dissertation sabbatical to Africa. Additionally, I want to recognize the Ph.D. Commiseration Society of Carlisle. A spontaneous association of peers and their families who shared a common desire to succeed and to build friendships.

Finally, I would like to thank Dr. Frank L. Jones. Frank has been both a mentor and a friend. He encouraged my intellectual curiosity, shored up my resilience, and provided a model of complex and critical thinking that I aspire to emulate.

PREFACE

I chose the subject of this dissertation in response to an inquiry that has framed my adult life. In the middle of the summer of 1989, I visited the Federal Republic of

Germany as an US Army ROTC cadet. During the weeks of training, I toured the inner

German border that distinguished West from East Germany. As I hiked the boundary, delineated by barbwire, fences, minefields, and watchtowers, it struck me that ideas drove the efforts of both sides. Ideas distinguished the “Free” from the Soviet world, as well as the people’s [i.e., workers] world from the capitalist class. Both orientations stood in opposition to the other, requiring killing if needed. It was clear that beliefs are powerful.

At the time, this reality of competing views and the need for a military response that justified the separation of families, nations, and Europe seemed to me normal. My generation grew up under the shadow of the Cold War, and its artifacts were permanent fixtures in our minds. Mikhail Gorbachev’s efforts at openness (glasnost) and economic restructuring (perestroika) were in the news and taught in my courses. Yet I understood them as just novel factors, not necessarily determinative or revolutionary in significance.

After my summer of adventure, I returned to the University of New Hampshire and the easy pattern of undergraduate life. But just weeks later my worldview became unmoored. I watched with amazement as all over Eastern Europe peaceful protests emerged to end communist one-party rule. The governments that stood since World

War II began to fall and their citizens surged westward, moving across border crossings

vi all along the iron curtain. This included the opening of the Berlin Wall in November of

1989. I shared in these previously “captive peoples’” euphoria and knew something momentous was occurring. Still, I found it hard to reconcile these events with the narratives that informed my understanding of the world. I joined with many in thinking that a wave of change would follow that would create peace. I wondered if new ideas might emerge that would redefine the world. I pondered if the future would be more about the building of bridges instead of walls. At the time, my line of questioning was superficial. I remember naively asking a senior Army officer whether the United States would still need all of its military forces. My conception of reality remained fixated too neatly into the comfort of binary choices.

The following July, as a second lieutenant new to the US Army, I knew that I was in the midst of a changing international order. A key example of my evidence was the East

German government’s decision to demolish the Berlin Wall. The efforts of the men with sledgehammers to destroy first the barbed wire and then concrete edifice that stood since 1961 transcended the confines of the city. It became a symbolic gesture for

Europe and the world. Weeks later, this hopeful sound of change emanating from

Europe no longer carried as clearly. It became one note among many, as other events competed with it or drowned it out. One of these disrupting factors was Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in early August of 1990. I remember the shock clearly, as the aggression occurred immediately after I started my initial Army training in tactics and leadership. I watched with fascination and apprehension as events unfolded in the Middle East. The

America of President George H.W. Bush declared that it would not let this aggression

vii stand, and military units throughout the force began preparations to deploy to the region. The lieutenant in me gained a renewed sense of purpose, and I worked hard to prepare for the test.

In the background of my thoughts, the student of history and diplomacy tried to clarify the meaning of events. The attention of soldiers is often fickle, but unremarkably it remains focused on world events. Cable news coverage assisted my search, adding a consistent drumbeat of information to the equation. Through venues such as CNN, I watched the US president try to frame and clarify the stakes at play, as well as to build support for America’s solutions.

I remain struck by President Bush’s efforts to clarify and resolve the crisis. On

September 11, 1990, in an address to a Joint Session of Congress, he explained the significance of events in front of America’s elected representatives. He mentioned his immediate deployment of the 82d Airborne Division to the defense of Saudi Arabia, a move commonly seen as tactically insignificant. America’s chief executive sought to amplify the gesture, explaining that the division’s presence represented the resolve to defend “civilized values around the world.” He called for Iraq to reverse its aggression, highlighting a global determination to preserve a “peaceful international order.”

President Bush pointed out that a new period defined the world, as the United

States and the Soviet Union pledged to produce a United Nations’ response. He described this effort as “a new partnership of nations” and a “historic period of cooperation” that heralded “a new world order.” Cooperation and collaboration could usher in an era based upon the rule of law, in which nations recognized a shared

viii responsibility for freedom and justice. It would be a world where the strong respected the rights of the weak.1 For me, these lofty objectives gave meaning to the coalition of nations that formed to eject Iraq from Kuwait. They reframed my understanding of

America’s actions, placing them in line with adherence to global norms of behavior.

Neither Operation Desert Storm nor the ending of the Cold War created a new world order. The coalition operations to liberate Kuwait successfully reversed Iraq’s aggressive gains, but they did not resolve the debate surrounding how the world would function.

Instead, America became engaged in a domestic and global struggle to define global responsibilities and possibilities. Until recently, every US President understood this challenge. They all couched America’s efforts, in part, as working toward the creation of a new world order.2 President Donald Trump may depart from this outlook, as he expresses a willingness to disrupt this post-World War II consensus.

The recent rhetoric of advancing a new world order was also, partially, misleading; the world order was mostly well defined and established. The major structures that governed international behavior emerged during the early post-World War II period, such as America’s alliances, support for global economic systems and advocacy of the rule of law. They persisted after the Cold War and characterized the status quo, as the

1 George H. W. Bush, “Address Before a Joint Session of Congress, September 11, 1990, Miller Center, http://millercenter.org/president/bush/speeches/speech-3425 (accessed September 11, 2016).

2 For examples see William J. Clinton, "Remarks to the Crew of the U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt, March 12, 1993,” The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=4633 (accessed July 24, 2016); George W. Bush, "The President's News Conference With President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia in Moscow, May 24, 2002,” The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=73310 (accessed July 24, 2016); Barack Obama, "Remarks in Cairo, June 4, 2009,” The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=86221 (accessed July 24, 2016).

United States enjoyed the position of being the sole superpower and the leader of the current world order.3 Even the acceleration of globalization in the 1990s and beyond did less to revolutionize the existing world order than President Bush and contemporary pundits led many of us to expect. Within this framing, it is more accurate to say that since the end of the Cold War America’s foreign policy choices have often revolved around if and how it would preserve the current world order.

This conceptual insight caused me to understand the stakes of world events as existing within the efficacy of the status quo. It likewise led me to explore two fundamental questions. First, in what ways did adhering to existing norms of international conduct serve America’s enduring interests, and why? Second, could and should the United States accelerate the growth of the world order, such as by advocating the expansion of democracy and a more liberal economic model?

Throughout my adult life, I witnessed the nation struggle to resolve these questions. It was a challenge that touched on both domestic and international factors. It engaged notions of the nation’s purpose and its role in global affairs, as well as how far and how fast to expand the global system and to integrate more nations and peoples. It also brought to the foreground whether all nations, to include the United States, were constrained by its tenets.

3 It is important to note that the world order created global benefits. For example, “At the end of World War II, the United States produced and consumed nearly half the world's wealth. Over the next quarter-century, this share was reduced to a quarter, largely to the benefit of America's former adversaries and European allies.” James Dobbins, “Is the US Abandoning the World Order it Created?” November 2016, TheRANDblog, http://www.rand.org/blog/2016/11/is-the-us-abandoning-the-world- order-it-created.html (accessed December 20, 2016).

The ways in which American administrations answered these questions influenced their policy choices and global stability. For example, their responses shaped how the nation viewed its relationship with China and acted with NATO. They informed the decisions to send military forces to Kuwait, Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, as well as whether the nation should pursue new economic agreements and expand NATO. Within these decisions, US administrations have also determined how they would intervene, such as at what level or type of force to apply and whether the nation did them in multi- lateral or more unilateral ways. More recently, the differing views informed how the

United States interpreted and reacted to 9-11. Since the attacks on the US homeland, the actions of American administrations included the goal of accelerating the transformation of the world order. This was seen in the decision to invade Iraq and in the advocacy of President Obama’s Responsibility to Protect doctrine.4 This shift seeks to both maintain the world order, while also departing from some of its tenets. It contributed to a counter movement that has engaged a new era of great power competition and perhaps persistent conflict. It remains to be seen whether continuity or change will characterize Donald Trump’s foreign policies.

In recent years, I turned my internal debate into a deliberate inquiry. A quarter century after I walked the Cold War frontier and following my deployments to Kuwait,

Haiti and several tours in Iraq, I began graduate studies in History at Temple University.

4 John Lewis Gaddis, “A Grand Strategy of Transformation,” Foreign Policy, vol. 133 (Nov/Dec, 2002): 50-57; The Responsibility to Protect doctrine is most notably associated with Libya, but in Syria it was called into question. See Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, “The Responsibility to Protect,” Foreign Affairs (November/December, 2002); Michael Small, “An Analysis of the Responsibility to Protect Program in Light of the Conflict in Syria,” Washington University Global Law Studies Review, vol. 13, no. 1 (January, 2014): 179-200.

When it was time to determine a dissertation topic, my choice was easy. I decided to explore why and how the United States asserted its leadership into global affairs after

World War II. I sought to determine how earlier scholars and leaders understood global challenges, the solutions that they advocated for and the priorities they placed on different efforts. I circled around their debates, trying to assess the advantages and disadvantages of different positions.

I also knew I needed to limit my analysis to a manageable subject. I found that my experiences pushed this choice in particular directions. In addition to a diverse array of stateside assignments, during my service I lived and studied in Morocco and France.

These venues included leaders from several dozen nations and five continents, exposing me to a wide range of cultures and divergent worldviews. Referring to them helped focus my dissertation’s topic and the scope of my examination.

The Suez Crisis of 1956, in particular, captured my interest. I was drawn to it because it is an event that does not fit into traditional Cold War narratives and whose meaning remains disputed. For example, my French colleagues emphasized the crisis as a critical turning point in contemporary history. For them, America’s actions led to a significant setback in France’s global prestige and influence. It also revealed a United States’ willingness to assert world leadership. My classmates in Morocco and the Middle East presented a different perspective. They saw the event as representing Egypt’s stand against colonialism. They also explained America’s decisions as honorable and in accordance with the new rules of international law created after 1945. I decided to delve into this dichotomy.

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Reorientation

While investigating US policy during the Suez Crisis I discovered factors that reoriented my research. I found that Cold War interpretations of events are prevalent in the scholarship of the crisis and underemphasize the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration’s advocacy for creating a new world order. This lacuna caught my attention, as the crisis’ dénouement reveals some anomalies that depart starkly from the traditional Cold War framing of events. For example, after the invasion by Britain and France to secure the Canal Zone by force in collusion with Israel, the United States worked through the United Nations to resolve the issue. It was a decision that challenges a narrow characterization of events, such as placing the event within the superpower contest. It was also incongruent with how we often understand nation- state actions, as it pitted America against its strongest allies, put it in a de facto partnership with Moscow, muted its response to Soviet military intervention in Hungary, and empowered a recalcitrant Egypt.

Additionally, my research led me to conclude that the trend toward more partisan politics within the United States after the 1960s exacerbated the challenge. Specifically, it dilutes understanding of Eisenhower’s strategic calculations and his long-term vision toward global change. In combination, these divergences refocused the popular memory away from an understanding of how the United States perceived its interests before and during the crisis.

The discrepancies I observed caused me to refocus the research and periodization of my dissertation. My study pulled me back in time toward the threads of debates that

xiii emerged during the interwar years and that informed America’s rise to world leadership during and after World War II. I found I needed to expose these ideas, as they seemed to me both vital and buried in contemporary debates. In this inquiry, I actively sought original sources and interpretations of events from the period. This included

Eisenhower’s and then-Secretary of State John Foster Dulles’ papers, diaries, speeches, and meeting notes, as well as the early works by scholars and journalist. I combined and compared these with more contemporary interpretations.

These links led me away from focusing my research solely on 1956. Instead, I decided that explaining America’s actions during the Suez Crisis required establishing the context that informed them. Through these efforts, I wanted to reveal the strong line of continuity that existed between US efforts to create a new world order and

Eisenhower’s outlooks as president. Ike made his own assessments and developed his own approaches, but in ways that remained consistent with a project to assert US leadership to advance new norms of nation-state conduct. It sought to end the cycle of warfare that defined the early twentieth century. The backstory of US efforts to change global norms, Eisenhower’s efforts to advance them during his first term in office, and the pressures it added to the challenges of decolonization, became my focus.

While delving into this line of inquiry, I worked to assess the intensity of

Eisenhower’s commitment to the project. I explored the factors that competed for influence over his decisions and how he navigated among them. I tried to determine how important they were to actual policy choices. It quickly became apparent to me that Eisenhower’s approach was consistent with the new international standards of

xiv conduct that the United States championed after World War II. For example, it aligned with the prohibitions on using military force aggressively and with efforts to uphold international law.5 These restraints remain contested, but certainly challenged approaches to warfare and diplomacy seen prior to WWII, such as colonialism. They also continue to place limits on warfare and foreign affairs today.6 Additionally, Eisenhower’s actions as president adapted these efforts to global events. This included an appreciation for the changes that nuclear weapons brought to international relations.

I also found that Eisenhower is a difficult person to assess. He placed great emphasis on a better world order, while also doing things that appear inconsistent with it. This included a willingness to use covert operations, a guarded approach to the utility of the

United Nations, and a reliance on nuclear weapons to deter aggression. Scholars continue to wrestle with the enigma. Furthermore, my intention is not to depict

Eisenhower as a "peacenik" or any less of a cold warrior than was the norm for others of his generation. He remained hostile to the aggressive, often brutal efforts, of the Soviet

Union. He believed it was a threat to America and the world. Additionally, Ike was not a pacifist. He was a soldier, spent a lifetime learning how to manage violence, and

5 For a good summary of the long history of efforts to enshrine limits on warfare into international law see: Louise Doswald-Beck, “The Civilian in the Crossfire,” Journal of Peace Research, Special Issue on Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict, vol. 24, no. 3 (September, 1987): 251-262.

6 Traditionally, military power could reduce the enemy’s capability to resist or its will to continue a conflict. This effect often depended on the willingness to expand brutality as needed. The use of force as a bargaining mechanism in strategy, whether applied as warfare, surgical strikes, deterrence, or coercion, relied upon the possibility of the continued application of force or the escalation to more brutal methods. When this aspect is restrained, it becomes difficult to break the will of adversaries. See Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 1-34.

xv successfully led millions of soldiers into battle. As President, Eisenhower retained these aspects and acted in ways that preclude easy labels or that fit neatly into a theory.

Above all, Eisenhower practiced pragmatism. He assessed the nation’s challenges with open eyes. Eisenhower’s experiences led him to accept the contingent nature of events and to analyze issues in very deliberate and comprehensive ways. He weighed policy choices based on opportunities, risks, costs and benefits. For example, he sought to gain an appreciation for the prospects that existed within a particular circumstance or policy choice. This included assessing factors such as domestic political pressure, likelihood of success and global support. This approach allowed fluctuations in policy approaches, an appreciation of the difference between short and long-term efforts, as well as a willingness to compromise or be assertive.

Eisenhower also became a non-idealistic advocate of establishing a world order that would mitigate if not eliminate the kinds of destruction that the wars of the 20th century had produced and that he had observed so personally. He believed that the nuclear age made this type of devastation exponentially greater. While applying pragmatism to policymaking, Eisenhower accepted the reality that America could not force changes on the world and that creating new norms of statecraft required their voluntary acceptance. But he did believe that through a comprehensive grand strategy approach, the United States could use its power position in global affairs to advance a better world order. For example, he sought ways to deescalate global tensions, in order to create the necessary stability that would allow for the evolution of global standards of statecraft. This included using American power in positive ways, such as to inspire

xvi cooperation and to advance mutual interests. Eisenhower sought peace, but a peace that would endure.

This dissertation seeks to illuminate one of the major influences on America’s rise to world leadership. It emphasizes those aspects and efforts that focused on America’s enduring interest in creating a better world order. It explores the intellectual foundations that emerged during the interwar years to shift United States policy away from isolationism and toward efforts that sought to create enduring peace in global affairs. These goals informed Eisenhower’s intellectual development and influenced his actions during his first term in office. It led the 34th US President to design and implement a Grand Strategy that remained consistent with advancing new global norms. They sought to find ways that would allow the world to escape the early twentieth century cycle of violence that caused the loss of several generations. This investigation also offers a substantive reframing of the Suez Crisis, by emphasizing how the efforts to change global norms influenced American actions. It argues that the crisis exemplifies this historical context and provides a key example of Eisenhower’s determination to change the standards of statecraft in order to make peaceful conduct a standard of global statecraft.

Organization

This study begins with an introduction that summarizes the broad contours of subsequent chapters. It describes the ideas that gained influence during the interwar years and that informed Eisenhower’s foreign policy approach as president. Throughout

xvii his first term, Eisenhower worked to reorient US foreign policy to be more in line with the nation’s enduring interests of establishing new global norms. This mindset clarifies

US calculations during the 1956 crisis. The introduction also emphasizes that these factors remain in the shadow of the long Cold War, due to its historiography, bipartisan politics, and their effect on popular memory. Combined they obscure critical motives behind Eisenhower’s decisions as President.

Chapter 2 explores the intellectual pillars that led America to depart from isolationism and to assert world leadership during World War II. It begins by introducing the Truman Administration’s efforts to shepherd the broad efforts that emerged to change global norms after 1945. He also navigated through the substantial challenges that resisted them. To understand the factors that guided the nation’s rise to global leadership after World War II, the chapter adds the history of American efforts to redefine global statecraft during the interwar years. The period, when Eisenhower’s generation came of age, is remarkable for the concerted efforts that emerged to create a better world order. The world witnessed the rise of the ‘isms’ that sought to reorient global affairs, such as fascism, communism, and capitalism. This included a running intellectual debate within the United States about the nation’s role in the world. It led many to conclude that America needed to apply its leadership to transform the global norms of nation-state conduct.

After describing American intentions to create a better world order, Chapter 3 introduces Eisenhower’s involvement in the effort. It establishes his early advocacy for using American leadership to create an improved world order after World War II and

xviii then explores three of the pillars that informed his outlooks. First, his responsibilities immersed him within the network of activism to change global norms. Second, as a student of strategy, Eisenhower was in a position to add his own intellectual experiences to the challenges. He developed as an officer amidst a raging debate on the changing nature and character of war and strategy. These experiences fostered a belief in the need for a clearly defined purpose and that included comprehensive approaches to achieving them. Third, Eisenhower’s associations allowed for an appreciation of the intellectual pillars that informed the project to create a more peaceful world. The efforts were diverse and haphazardly supported, but did lead to many significant changes that shaped the postwar world. These factors would directly inform Eisenhower’s actions as president.

Chapter 4 traces Eisenhower’s actions after World War II to surmount the global and domestic challenges that contested the project for peace. His service and assignments after the war assisted in this endeavor. From his posting to be the Chief of Staff of the

Army, an interlude as the President of Columbia University, to his assignment to lead the Atlantic Alliance, Eisenhower remained committed to promoting new norms of international conduct. His positioning gave him unique access that allowed him to assess

Truman’s actions. It led him to search for ways to adapt America’s outlooks and the methods it used to apply world leadership. By the time he decided to run for President,

Eisenhower was a vocal advocate for a different US approach to foreign policy that remained consistent with the goal of creating a more peaceful world order.

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Chapter 5 explores one of the major obstacles that emerged, in part, due to

America’s project for peace. It examines how US efforts to create a better world order affected the issue of decolonization. The chapter emphasizes the ways asserting new global standards of statecraft directly challenged the influence of the former colonial powers. To illuminate this point, it presents a survey of the long British-Egyptian colonial relationship. This history clarifies the strategic factors that would inform Eisenhower’s policies toward the Middle East and during the Suez Crisis of 1956.

The remaining chapters relate how Eisenhower’s actions during his first term in office organized around the purpose of changing global norms, culminating with his policies and behavior in the context of the Suez crisis. Chapter 6 illuminates the strategic vision that Eisenhower implemented after his election, such as the domestic efforts he took to reorient the nation and the intellectual foundations that informed his grand strategy. He articulated a clear purpose for America in global affairs, as well as redesigning the nation’s policy making structures and processes. Eisenhower then approached US foreign policy within a novel conception of military and economic power, as well as adding the imperative for the nation to use and retain its spiritual, or moral, power. These conceptual pillars advanced a more comprehensive “grand strategy” to guide US statecraft. Chapter 7 explores the events that emerged during his first term in office, the ways Eisenhower adapted to them, and how his actions remained coherent with his grand strategic vision. The chapter includes an exploration of the challenges faced by the United States in the Middle East. It examines

Eisenhower’s foreign policy approaches toward Egypt and its efforts to manage Nasser’s

xx ambitions. As important, it reveals how America’s outlooks directly confronted the legacy of colonialism, such as the efforts by Britain to preserve their colonial gains.

The Suez Crisis of 1956 is the focus of Chapter 8. The issue engaged the interests of several nations, as well as American objectives both in the region and for the world. It forced Eisenhower to depart from his moderate policy line of neutrality that attempted to appease both its allies and Egypt. From the beginning to the end of the crisis, the

United States focused on upholding its enduring interest of advancing the new norms of global conduct that it championed after World War II.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ABSTRACT ...... iii

DEDICATION ...... iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... v

PREFACE ...... vi Reorientation ...... xiii Organization ...... xvii

CHAPTER

1. INTRODUCTION ...... 1 The Shadow of the Cold War...... 6 American Binary Thinking ...... 12 Creating Enduring Peace...... 19 Suez Crisis and Global Norms of Conduct ...... 25

2. AMERICA’S SEARCH FOR A BETTER WORLD ORDER ...... 32 America’s National Purpose ...... 38 America Rises to Create a New World Order ...... 50

3. JOINING THE MARCH FOR PEACE ...... 66 A Comprehensive Movement for Peace ...... 71 Changing Character of War and Strategy ...... 74 Rationales that Justified Changing Global Norms ...... 80

4. EISENHOWER’S STUDY FOR PEACE ...... 94 Education and the Project for Peace ...... 99 Advocate for Impartial Studies ...... 106 Korea, NATO and the Urgency to Adapt the Project for Peace ...... 115

5. DECOLONIZATION, EGYPT AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER...... 129 Britain, Colonialism and Military Power ...... 131 Truman and Decolonization ...... 147

6. ORIENTING ON THE GOAL OF PEACE ...... 160 Building Domestic Tools for Statecraft ...... 164 Orienting the Nation Toward Peace ...... 175 Redefining the Basis of American Power ...... 179

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7. GLOBAL WAGER FOR PEACE ...... 198 Sustaining the Initiative ...... 207 Eisenhower and Decolonization ...... 213 Decolonization, US Policy and Egypt ...... 219

8. THE SUEZ CRISIS ...... 237

9. CONCLUSION ...... 269 Suez ...... 278

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 283

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

A close look at the interwar years reveals a United States engaged in clarifying its purpose and relationship to world affairs, such as what were its enduring interests and how it should pursue them. Within this inquiry, significant efforts emerged to energize public opinion in order to break America out of its historic isolationism and penchant to avoid the problems of international relations. Some wanted the nation to assert itself to advance its economic interests. Others argued that such a narrow focus would only perpetuate the problems of global statecraft, such as the propensity for oppression and war. They mounted a sustained critique of the old-world order and its reliance on a “war system” to regulate its affairs.

These outlooks proliferated and led to calls to exercise US leadership in order to create a better world order. The most famous of these efforts were the arguments championed by President Woodrow Wilson to establish new global norms after World

War I. Through the advocacy of his “Fourteen Points,” he sought to establish new standards of international conduct that would reduce the sources of conflict and, when they did occur, allow ways to resolve them by non-military means. This discussion gained credibility as the nation witnessed a new wave of aggression in the 1930s. As the war intensified, the cries for US global leadership gained influence. They directly challenged counter efforts that sought to keep America isolated and out of the war. The attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor tipped the scales, shifting the United States from neutrality and toward an assertive foreign policy outlook. Among the many explicit goals

1 that justified the nation’s entry into World War II was a pledge to create a more peaceful world.

The horrors of two world wars and a great depression gave unprecedented impetus to efforts to reform the character of international relations. The problem had many causes. Narrow patriotisms informed a world based on nation-state competition. It led the world’s most advanced countries, the so-called great powers, to manufacture the tragedies by blindly pursuing national interests and relying on “balance of power” approaches to regulate geopolitics. These methods failed to tame an anarchical international system and, instead, generated unprecedented death, destruction, and poverty. The cold reality, that the unconstrained pursuit of economic and political power produced the world’s greatest disasters, indelibly marked a generation of

Americans.

Changing this dynamic became a driving impulse in America’s rise to global leadership. Those leaders, who were “present at the creation” of the postwar order understood that the problem of global warfare could not be attributed solely or even primarily to irrational actors. The early twentieth century disasters were the result of the absence of any systemic forces to restrain nations. These views added to and focused the orientation of American objectives in World War II. The United States entered the conflict late and hesitantly, but once committed, its goals went beyond simply ending the war or defeating its opponents. Successive US administrations made a concerted effort to use US leadership to create a better world order that would allow for enduring peace.

This judgment led them to propose and implement a diverse array of solutions that centered on reducing the efficacy of using force in international relations. This included the belief that adherence to new global institutions, structures, laws, and universal standards offered hope for a better world. The United States not only supported these efforts, but it also often championed them, thereby exhibiting a resolve to apply its leadership to transform the norms of nation-state conduct. For example, the creation of the United Nations represented a global effort to “end the scourge of war,” as the nations of the world pledged to not use “armed force…save in the common interest.”1

The United Nations complemented other efforts that emerged immediately following

World War II, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Fourth Geneva

Convention, and the Nuremburg Trials. Adhering to these global standards offered a way forward that in principle served the interests of all nations.

Additionally, the project sought ways to mitigate the factors that caused conflicts.

For example, it led to initiatives to create commercial interdependence, as the most effective way to constrain the “will-to-power” orientation of nation-states. This was seen in the development of the Bretton Woods system that came into force after the war. It produced new economic standards to govern monetary relations, such as creating a more stable system of exchange rates. It addressed the challenge of competitive devaluation of currencies, protectionism and economic nationalism. Global

1 “UN Charter,” United Nations, http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-full- text/index.html (accessed July 5, 2016).

3 leaders in the West thought that all of these factors contributed to war.2 The project included other efforts, such as collective security arrangements, trade and immigration agreements, and initiatives to promote freedom and democracy. Combined the program intended to cement a new global order that would make the world safe for

American democracy, liberty and capitalism.

The effort was never universally accepted. It competed for influence over US foreign policy, as well as for global support. Domestically, even supporters of the vision differed on the best approaches. This led to diverse, sometimes, haphazard projects or token support. Additionally, there was outright resistance to the whole scheme. For example, many argued that a transition to global leadership would shift the focus of American politics and tarnish the nation’s unique culture and freedoms. Others believed it was too idealistic, that it would concentrate undo power in Washington D.C., or that it would be too costly. They argued for alternatives, such as unilateralism and in some cases a return to isolationism. The new program also had selfish detractors, as it threatened entrenched interests and mindsets.

Internationally, opposition to America’s grand vision came from two major fronts.

Moscow’s resistance was the most obvious. It produced a concerted counter-effort to extend communism’s influence in order to prevent what it believed would be a western

2 US Secretary of State Cordell Hull became a champion for a liberal economic order, reflecting a belief that great-power economic rivalry was a causal factor of the two world wars. Michael A. Butler, A Cautionary Visionary: Cordell Hull and Trade Reform, 1933-1937 (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1998); See also Johnathan Stevenson, Preventing Conflict: The Role of the Bretton Woods Institutions (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Martin Daunton, “Britain and Globalisation since 1850: Creating the World of Bretton Woods, 1939-1958,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society (2008): 1-42; Benn Steil, The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White and the Making of a New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013).

4 and capitalist dominated world. The assertion of new global norms also added to the challenge of resolving the legacy of colonial power. This second obstacle to a better world order contained two aspects. Altering the standards of statecraft both accelerated the push for independence and threatened the influence, prestige, and power of many US allies. America’s vision for transforming the standards of statecraft faced stiff resistance from its friends. This last factor remains shrouded in the shadow of the Cold War.

Dwight D. Eisenhower was an engaged witness and supporter of the grand vision of creating global standards that would allow for a more enduring peace. The personal experience of war is sobering. It led Eisenhower to detest it and to commit himself to the cause that sought to prevent it. From the closing days of World War II and for the remainder of his life, he declared himself a soldier in the “labor for world peace.”3

During the early postwar period, he also had a vantage point from which to observe, study, and measure the progress of America’s project. Eisenhower remained just outside the immediate center of US policymaking architecture but nevertheless inside the corridors of power. This positioning gave him a front row seat that afforded him unique insights. It allowed him to develop a critical appraisal of the complex environment the nation faced and to assess the actions of the Truman Administration.

He gained an appreciation for the many competing demands and viewpoints that defined the competition within America’s foreign policy space, as well as the external

3 Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Inaugural Address, January 20, 1953,” 83rd Congress, US Senate Document No. 9 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1953).

5 obstacles that threatened the pursuit of enduring peace. Eisenhower combined this education with his well-established competencies in planning, leadership, organizational management, and strategic thinking. Additionally, he was not alone in the endeavor.

After World War II, he joined a network of like-minded individuals and groups that expanded his assessments. They also gave him the encouragement and requisite support to run for president. Eisenhower came to office with the resolve to reenergize

America’s efforts to define new global norms.4

The Shadow of the Cold War

Several factors obscure the rationales that informed the nation’s decision to assert its leadership into world affairs during and after World War II. In the course of my research, I found that the Eisenhower administration’s efforts to affirm new global norms contrast starkly with contemporary public discussions. Significant portions of the broad and diverse rationales that influenced US foreign policy after World War II are no longer emphasized or, perhaps, understood. They remain out of vogue, despite the significance of challenges that threaten the current world order.

The historiography of the Cold War contributes to the misinterpretation of the postwar period. The early scholarship, such as that by Thomas A. Bailey and Herbert Feis established an orthodox viewpoint that continues to inform contemporary narratives of the early postwar period. These historians filtered events through a traditional

4 Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 41-43.

6 understanding of global affairs, such as realism and the norms of statecraft that defined the old world order.5 In this framework of analysis, the Soviet Union became a ruthless aggressor and American actions, such as the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the creation of NATO, were defensive measures against threats emanating from

Moscow. Their viewpoint too narrowly portrayed the postwar world in bipolar terms.

This tide of scholarship created an indelible watermark that skewed understanding of global affairs in ways that retain influence today.

Beginning in the 1960s, a wave of revisionism emerged that tried to reorient understanding of the early postwar period. Using more evidence, such as published memoirs, diaries, and diplomatic correspondence, new views emerged that presented a more empirical basis of analysis. This scholarship shifted the blame of the Cold War away from Moscow and onto the United States. It claimed America blundered into the struggle.6 The approach challenged the “celebratory tone” of earlier scholars and their arguments that the United States was the hero of the early postwar period. It reflected a turn in scholarship that was much more critical of the US government due in large part

5 Their views placed emphasis on nation-centric calculations of strategy and foreign policy, such as its geopolitical aspects, balance of power calculations and threat perceptions. See Thomas A. Bailey, America Faces Russia: Russian-American Relations from Early Times to Our Day (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1950); and Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); Herbert Feis, Between War and Peace: the Potsdam conference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969).

6 See for example William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998 [1962]); D. F. Fleming, The Cold War and its origins, 1917-1960, 2 vols. (Garden City: Doubleday, 1961); David Horowitz, The Free World Colossus: a Critique of American Foreign Policy in the Cold War (New York: Hill and Wang, 1965); and Gabriel Kolko, The Politics of War: the World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945 (New York: Random House, 1968).

7 to the Vietnam War.7 It also sustained a line of inquiry overly focused on the superpower conflict.

This reevaluation continued to evolve and efforts emerged that provided more nuance to the period. For example, British scholars in the 1980s, with access to materials released by the Thirty-Year Rule, produced studies that explain the era as more than a superpower contest. They reveal that Britain worked to sustain its prewar global leadership and advanced its goals by seeking to influence American policy and lead allied efforts. Britain deliberately built the momentum needed to contain the Soviet

Union, such as by advocating for the North Atlantic Alliance. The Cold War was in part an expedient for promoting British interests.8 Later scholars would be more explicit. For example, in the 1990s John Kent and John Young explained that the British also sought to create a “third force” in world affairs. They only shifted their focus toward a special relationship with the United States in response to Soviet and communist aggression.9

Despite efforts to break out of a binary understanding of the era, significant portions of scholarship continue to reinforce the narrow framing. Even proponents for a post- revisionist interpretation remain wedded to Cold War contours. An example is John

Lewis Gaddis’s argument that challenges those who claim America was motived by

7 John Lewis Gaddis, “Presidential Address: The Tragedy of Cold War History,” Diplomatic History, vol. 17, no. 1 (1993): 1-16.

8 See Roy Douglas, From War to Cold War, 1941-1948 (London: Macmillan, 1981); Elisabeth Barker, The British Between the Superpowers, 1945-1950 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983).

9 John Kent and John W. Young, “The ‘Western Union’ concept and British defence policy, 1947- 1948,” in Richard Aldrich, ed., British intelligence, strategy and the Cold War (London: Routledge, 1992), 166-92.

8 selfish economic interests or a desire for world leadership. His counterpoints vindicate

US efforts and emphasize different factors that informed them, such as the domestic influences on foreign policy, the necessity to balance Soviet expansionist tendencies, and Stalin’s pathologies. His argument expands the factors of consideration, but remains focused on a superpower contest.10 Another example is Melvin Leffler’s exceptionally detailed history of the Truman Administration that highlights the US pursuit of a

“preponderance of power” against communism.11 These studies illuminate many pertinent aspects of the period. They all, however, remain wedded to a Cold War interpretation of events.

This criticism does not intend to minimize the importance of the superpower struggle, but to point out that it tended to drown out other events, issues, and ideas.

For example, for decades there was a dearth of historical scholarship on the importance of NATO to American postwar foreign policy. The US decision to join this entangling collective security arrangement played a secondary role to more unilateral efforts, such as the Truman Doctrine. The Atlantic Alliance’s contributions to the “normalization of relations with the Soviet Union and the establishment of a united Europe” were

10 John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972); John Lewis Gaddis, "The Emerging Post-Revisionist Thesis on the Origins of the Cold War," Diplomatic History, vol. 7, iss. 3 (Summer, 1983): 171-190; John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).

11 Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992).

9 marginalized, despite these being two of the major objectives of the 1949 treaty.12 Into the early 1990s, a clear emphasis on the superpower character of the world remained.

Even when criticizing it, inquiries often responded within the dominant story lines.

Historians seemed unable to overcome it and often neglected substantial factors that shaped international diplomacy, such as the United Nations, international peace movements and even development programs. Most significantly, the trend diluted efforts that sought to reorient understanding of the postwar world. The Cold War became an anchor that stabilizes understanding of even contemporary foreign policy events.

Several factors amplified this phenomenon. The duration of the conflict exacerbated this tendency, as it dominated news reporting and was often the focal point for political elections. From McCarthyism to Vietnam to the Reagan Revolution, the Cold War informed popular and cultural understanding of the world. Even after it ended, triumphant narratives emerged that intensified the challenge. For many, the fall of the

Berlin Wall in 1989 is much more than a symbol of victory. Its edifice physically divided a city, but metaphorically split the world into camps. Long after Berliners took to the streets to accelerate the destruction of the concrete and barbed wire structure; it endures as a figment of memory. It reinforces a narrative of American exceptionalism that perpetuates narrow considerations of US leadership in global affairs.13

12 Lawrence S. Kaplan, “Introduction,” in Lawrence S. Kaplan, ed., American Historians and the Atlantic Alliance (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1991), 1-10; It is also important to note that until recently it was difficult to gain access to NATO Archives.

13 See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History? (Washington, D.C.: National Affairs, Inc., 1989); John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997);

Despite these gaps, over the last two decades we can see a steady growth of scholarship that seeks to create more nuance in our understanding. An undercurrent of studies continues to pull the postwar world out of the shadow of the Cold War. For example, many scholars reframe US postwar foreign policy efforts by emphasizing aspects that are more enduring, such as America’s persistent objective of promoting democracy and advancing liberty.14 Others emphasize new protagonists, such as reasserting the agency of underdeveloped nations or underscoring the emergence of supranational factors into the equation of global affairs. This includes the United

Nations, International Law and Human Rights.15 New work on the North Atlantic

Alliance, or NATO, illuminates its role in mitigating the factors that led Europe into two

Additionally, US government documents perpetuate a narrow understanding, such as through the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series. Although there has been some progress recently, the volumes still organize documents primarily by topics, such as the Suez Crisis or the Arab-Israeli Dispute, that offer challenges to efforts to develop a comprehensive assessment of how events related to each other.

14 Tony Smith, America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Frank Ninkovich, United States and Imperialism (Malden, Ma.: Blackwell, 2001); Niall Ferguson, Colossus: the Price of America’s Empire (New York: Penguin Press 2004); Michael H. Hunt, The American Ascendancy: How the United States Gained and Wielded Global Dominance (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007); Walter L Hixson, The Myth of American Diplomacy: National Identity and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); Richard H. Immerman, Empire For Liberty: A History of American Imperialism From Benjamin Franklin to Paul Wolfowitz (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); David Ekbladh, The Great American Mission, Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).

15 See Eugene Wittkopf, Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990); Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); Moyn argues that the global Human Rights Movement sprang from the failures of ideology during the Cold War. Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010).

11 world wars.16 Akira Iriye exemplifies this trend. He challenges the orthodoxy by underlining that decolonization, international activism, and globalization are equally significant factors in understanding the post-World War II world.17 These fresh outlooks offer new distinctions to explanations of the period and create space for new perspectives.

American Binary Thinking

America’s shift toward more starkly partisan politics also dilutes understanding of

Eisenhower’s strategic approach. Specifically, Eisenhower’s vision for altering global norms by reducing the habitual recourse to the use of force remains a secondary, if not lost, aspect of his legacy. In part, Eisenhower’s moderate approach made him vulnerable to partisan maneuvering. He sought ways to preserve a broad consensus for the project of peace that emerged in 1945, seeking to bridge party divides. He campaigned for a

“Middle Way” between the extreme positions that traditionally defined America’s two party politics. It sought to find a position of balance that leaders and constituents from both political parties could endorse.

After assuming office, these efforts continued, as Eisenhower implemented thoughtful efforts to work well with others and to build consensus. He met routinely with congressional leaders on both sides of the aisle and consulted with them on

16 See Timothy A. Sayle, NATO's Crisis Years: The End of the Atlantic Mystique and the Making of "Pax Atlantica":1955-1968, PhD Dissertation (Philadelphia: Temple University, 2015), ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, Order No. 3671953.

17 Akira Iriye, “Historicizing the Cold War,” in Richard H. Immerman and Petra Goedde, eds., The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 15-31.

12 important issues. Through these actions, Eisenhower demonstrated an appreciation for the necessity of bipartisan cooperation to achieve his policy goals. He saw it as a prerequisite for effective policymaking within a democracy and accepted that it would entail compromises. More importantly, a collaborative mindset served to shore up support for a national commitment to lead the world toward peace.

Eisenhower’s brand of Republicanism did not last beyond his Presidency. Despite winning decisively in 1952 and 1956 and having a Republican Congress, Eisenhower’s middle way approach often clashed with his own Party. On domestic issues, many stalwarts remained wedded to orthodox Republican positions.18 The Democrats regained control of both houses in the 1954 mid-term elections, further fragmenting

Eisenhower’s hold and support on issues. In 1960, his brand of republicanism would be symbolically suppressed with the election of John F. Kennedy.

The rise of other factors, such as television news both added and detracted from

Eisenhower’s efforts. He understood and sought to use the new medium of communication as a tool of policy.19 For example, he deliberately used confusing

18 For example, they criticized his unwillingness to reverse what they saw as a long era of Democratic overreach ushered in with programs, such as the New Deal. Grant Madsen, “The International Origins of Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Political Economy,” Journal of Policy History, vol. 24, no. 4 (2012): 675- 708; See also Gary W. Reichard, The Reaffirmation of Republicanism: Eisenhower and the Eighty-Third Congress (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1975); Steven Wagner, Eisenhower Republicanism: Pursuing the Middle Way (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2006).

19 For a discussion of the rise of television media and its effect on US politics, See Craig Allen, Eisenhower and the Mass Media: Peace, Prosperity, and Prime-Time TV (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983); Kenneth Osgood explains how Eisenhower used various mediums of communication, as he waged a psychological Cold War against the Soviet Union. Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006).

13 phrases, intended to puzzle foreign adversaries. But political rivals used it to discredit his leadership and undermine his policy perspectives. They used this technique to question his credibility and to dilute perceptions of his competence.20 When Eisenhower left office, he remained extremely popular with the American public. But the moderate foundation he tried to build within the Republican Party and in national politics began to erode away.

The rupture led the nation away from its early postwar bipartisan foundation, with claims that “politics stops at the water’s edge,” and increasingly manifested a binary framing of issues. The subsequent generation of Americans that gained the reins of political power emerged within a more partisan climate. Recent scholarship on US domestic politics clarifies this shift. David Farber’s The Rise and Fall of Modern American

Conservatism illuminates the concerted efforts by conservatives to assert a “disciplined, well-ordered society” that began to take hold after the election of John F. Kennedy. The

Republican efforts to regain political power built national narratives that increasingly characterized political positions as a choice between conservative or liberal camps. It established a trend that led to a rise in partisanship, a resistance to compromise, and the increased polarization of the nation.21 The shift also left Eisenhower with few

20 See Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader (New York: Basic Books, 1982), subhead on “instrumental use of language; Ira Chernus, General Eisenhower: Ideology and Discourse (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2002), 1-5.

21 David Farber, The Rise and Fall of Modern American Conservatism: A Short History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). See also Lisa McGirr, Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Maurice Isserman and Michael Kazin, America Divided: The Civil War of the 1960s, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); Robert O. Self, All in the Family: the Realignment of American Democracy since the 1960s (New York: Hill and Wang, 2012); Rick Perlstein, Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American Consensus (New York: Hill and Wang, 2001).

14 champions. His moderate approach to politics that sought to build bridges across party lines moved out of vogue.

This political tide contributed to the early scholarly mischaracterizations of

Eisenhower’s performance. Even well after his Presidency, he remained a popular figure in America. The American public still “liked Ike.”22 But many intellectuals, journalists and politicians did not. They portrayed Eisenhower as politically inept, intellectually weak, and disengaged from policymaking. He was a “do-nothing” President that preferred golfing to leading the nation. In part, the criticisms reflected frustration with

Eisenhower’s unwillingness to depart from his Middle Way approach. Detractors pointed to his refusal to lead the nation on many issues, often using as examples his refusal to directly attack McCarthyism or aggressively promote Civil Rights.23

It is important to note, that these critiques, almost all of which have subsequently proven exaggerated if not invalid, point to particular issues. They cast aside his efforts to advance a comprehensive grand strategy over the “long haul” and that the nation would support. Additionally, they gloss over his actions to work with the moderates in both political parties, such as overlooking his intent to preserve what he saw as a needed consensus in foreign policy that required him to work within a spirit of compromise.

Eisenhower left office under this cloud of criticism and dismal ratings from scholars.

22 Mary McAuliffe, "Commentary: Eisenhower, the President," Journal of American History, vol. 68 (December 1981): 625-631.

23 William V. Shannon, “Eisenhower as President: A Critical Appraisal of the Record,” Commentary, vol. 26 (November, 1958): 390; Marquis Childs, Eisenhower, Captive Hero: A Critical Study of the General and the President (New York: Harcourt, 1958).

Despite the unprecedented era of peace and prosperity that America enjoyed, the orthodox perspective on his legacy gained hold.

A later wave of less polemical scholarship emerged, in the aftermath of Vietnam and the Nixon administration. It offered more balance to Eisenhower’s reputation.

Revelatory empirical investigations into the inner workings of the government revised the early assessments. They clarified Eisenhower’s firm comprehension of issues, organizational expertise, and hold on decision-making.24 Fred Greenstein argues that a closer study reveals that Eisenhower was, in fact, an “activist” President. The opening of his official files showed that he was “politically astute and informed, actively engaged in putting his personal stamp on public policy, and applied a carefully thought-out conception of leadership to the conduct of his presidency.”25 Robert Divine adds that

Eisenhower “played the dominant role in the foreign policy of his administration,” clearly rebutting the sophomoric and politicized attempts to cast his leadership as absenteeism.26 Richard Immerman added clarity to these points. He argues that

Eisenhower deserves credit for “being the first postwar president to produce a systematically articulated body of thought on war, peace, and security in the nuclear

24 Douglas Kinnard, President Eisenhower and Strategy Management (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1977); See also Vincent De Santis, "Eisenhower Revisionism," Review of Politics, vol. 38 (April 1976): 190-207; Gary Reichard, "Eisenhower as President: The Changing View," South Atlantic Quarterly, vol. 77 (Summer 1979): 265-81; Arthur M. Schlesinger. Jr., "The Ike Age Revisited," Reviews in American History, vol. 11 (March 1983): 1-11.

25 Fred I. Greenstein, “Eisenhower as an Activist President: A Look at New Evidence,” Political Science Quarterly, vol. 94, no. 4 (Winter, 1979-1980): 575-599, 577; See also Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader (New York: Basic Books, 1982).

26 Robert Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), ix.

16 age, and to try to formulate and implement U.S. strategy accordingly.” Eisenhower’s conception of national security remains unequaled by postwar presidents.27

America’s most successful military commander understood the dynamics of complex organizations. As president, he brought a new level of competence in planning, organization, and leadership to the White House that belies attempts to disparage them.28 Most importantly, under Eisenhower’s leadership the nation significantly reoriented its foreign policy approaches. These changes allowed him to lead in ways that placed the nation upon a course to endure the long cold war.29 The more comprehensive and lasting approach also oriented American foreign policy toward the purpose of creating a world order that would allow for more enduring peace.

Unfortunately, the damage was hard to undo. As new generations of Americans took the reins of authority, partisan debates no longer included many of the broad rationales that informed America’s rise to global leadership. The Cold War became overemphasized and the default descriptor of the postwar period. In part, this shift was warranted by events. The bipolar struggle and the possibility of mutual nuclear destruction was, as many argue, the dominant factors that influenced US statecraft.

They moderated national ambitions and advanced pragmatic approaches to foreign

27 Richard H. Immerman, “Bernath Lecture: Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal,” Diplomatic History, vol. 14, iss. 3 (July, 1990): 319-342.

28 See Paul Kengor, “Comparing Presidents Reagan and Eisenhower,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 28, no. 2 (Spring, 1998): 366-393; See also Robert A. Divine, Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America During World War II (New York: Atheneum, 1967); Cole C. Kingseed, Eisenhower and the Suez Crises of 1956 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995); Saki Dockrill, Eisenhower's New-Look National Security Policy, 1953-61 (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996).

29 Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, 3-7.

17 policy, such as leading both superpowers to accept the need for peaceful coexistence.

These characteristics certainly contributed to a remarkable “long peace,” helping to move the Cold War away from direct confrontation.30 Still, they were not the only elements at play and certainly not the only rationales that informed America’s rise to leadership after World War II or global stability.

The rhetorical aspects of the Cold War further weakened understanding of

Eisenhower’s legacy and the overall US effort to remake the postwar world. The initial confrontational language used to describe the superpower struggle intended to both galvanize a war-weary nation and shore up the free world’s resolve to meet the challenge of communism after 1945. It also reflected, in part, the traditional outlook toward international relations that frames events for domestic audiences within a zero- sum context. Several spectacular incidents during Truman’s first elected term amplified these voices. These include the Berlin Airlift and the shocks of the Soviets demonstrating their nuclear capability, the loss of China to communist forces, and the Korean War.

They confirmed the direst warnings and validated the claims that the world was divided between Manichean, bipolar divisions. The persistent conflict became a dominant narrative that shaped worldviews for subsequent generations and obscured many other aspects of the postwar world.31

30 John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 215-246; See also Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 2, Chapter 1; Bernard Brodie, ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order (New York: Harcourt, 1946).

31 Lynn Boyd Hinds and Theodore Otto Windt, Jr., The Cold War as Rhetoric: The Beginnings, 1945-1950 (New York: Praeger, 1991), 239-252; See also Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall, America's Cold War, The Politics of Insecurity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009).

Combined, these trends obscure understanding of the rationales that influenced

Eisenhower’s foreign policy outlooks. By the 1970s, discussions of foreign policy traced election cycles. It led discussions of US statecraft away from their complexity and toward politically expedient, often binary, choices. Most significantly, it reframed the nation’s understanding of foreign affairs away from its long-term progressive objectives toward strict evaluations of immediate results and the effect it would have on the next election. This difference of emphasis persists in many contemporary assessments of

Eisenhower’s approaches to foreign policy. In particular, his vision for how to obtain an enduring peace in world affairs is often downplayed, if not neglected altogether.

Creating Enduring Peace

Dwight D. Eisenhower’s election, and perhaps even more so his defeat of Robert Taft for the Republican nomination for president, was a referendum that upheld the nation’s resolve to transform the world order. The memories of Depression and World War, as well as the stalemated character of the Korean War, focused the nation, and the former

General became the trusted agent to lead the United States toward peace and prosperity. His decisive national election victories also represented a mandate to advance a more peaceful world order.32 For the eight years that he was president, the

United States enjoyed relative peace and a surge in prosperity. Much of the credit for these results rests with America’s 34th President and his administration, but the reasons

32 Eisenhower titled the second volume of his presidential memoir Mandate for Change (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1963).

19 for them, as well as the rationales that guided them remain a diluted aspect in our popular memory.

By the time Eisenhower took office, the broad effort to transform global norms was in disarray. Some felt that the turbulence of the early postwar word, from the civil wars in Greece, China, and India to the Iran, Berlin Crises and the Korean War, demonstrated that the effort to transform the global order had failed. Others, like Eisenhower, disagreed. They argued that the effort to redefine global norms remained a vital interest of the United States and that new approaches offered the chance to achieve it.

In fact, Eisenhower’s presidency consistently focused on making “peace” a normal condition of international relations. From his campaign slogans to his memoirs,

Eisenhower made “peace and prosperity” and “waging peace” a mantra of his

Presidential leadership. His election demonstrated that many Americans believed the former Five-Star General was the best person to preserve and lead this march.

Eisenhower also understood that transforming international relations was a long game that required persistence and pragmatism. He explained to audiences that the world was dwelling in “a twilight zone between peace and war” and believed that American leadership could tip the scales. He acknowledged the project would take decades, as

“we are not trying to buy peace or bring peace with the sword.” A comprehensive effort that combined strength with cooperation and America’s example offered a chance to gain victory without conflict.33

33 “Text of Gen. Eisenhower’s Foreign Policy Speech in San Francisco,” The New York Times, 9 October 1952, 24; See also “Transcript of General Eisenhower’s First Press Conference,” The New York Times, 6 June 1952, 10.

Several other factors bolster the argument that Eisenhower intended to advance the cause of peace as president. A reading of his speeches, letters, meeting notes, and diary entries reveals a persistent emphasis on trying to find approaches to foreign policy that would reduce the reflexive recourse to military force that plagued the early twentieth century. In this regard Eisenhower’s mindset was not unique. Many of his chief advisors had similar views. For example, George Kennan the author of America’s containment concept remained outside of official positions, but was a longtime associate of

Eisenhower. Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., who became Eisenhower’s ambassador to the

United Nations, was a vocal advocate for the internationalist wing of the Republican

Party. Even John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower’s secretary of state who was so often characterized and caricatured as eager to wage war,34 spent his adult life working to alter the factors that informed international relations.

These individuals, along with many others, shared the understanding of the catastrophic failures caused by the old world order. They lived through the horrors of both world wars and the great depression. Before entering the administration, several were activists with established records of trying to change the character of the world order. Some, much like Eisenhower, had the first-hand experience of conflict and a commitment to validate the sacrifices made by millions in the world war. Even though they often differed in their prescriptions, they shared a vision of using American leadership to escape the old-world system that often confronted nations with dilemmas

34 See particularly Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974).

21 that only war could solve. These factors formed the intellectual foundation of their worldviews. Eisenhower attentively listened to their suggestions. He did not always agree with them, but he sympathized with their purpose.

Eisenhower’s background also informed his outlook and actions. His election reversed the experiential mold of most Chief Executives. Ike’s immersion in domestic political affairs was limited, but he had expertise in planning, strategy and foreign relations. He also had faith in the intellectual pillars that guided the nation. For

Eisenhower, simple notions of power did not define the strength of the “American system,” such as its economic or military might, its patriotism, or its structures of government. He held that the source of the nation’s strength came from additional factors, such as its education systems, opportunities, civility, self-reliance, moral fiber, and adherence to the rule of law. These provided the essential intellectual and cultural pillars that allowed the nation’s free systems to function.

These experiences led Eisenhower to advance a novel approach to US foreign policy as president. It contained many dimensions. First, as mentioned he believed that advancing peaceful standards of statecraft was an enduring interest of the United

States. This outlook provided the purpose behind his efforts. Second, he implemented concerted efforts to enhance his influence over American foreign policy. Eisenhower was very critical of the politicized character of debates on most issues. From his campaigning slogan of a “Middle Way,” he sought to escape this dilemma, such as by generating a bipartisan consensus that empowered his leadership. This domestic

22 foundation allowed him to resolve problems in unpolitical ways, as well as building and sustaining domestic support for his foreign policy outlooks and approaches.

He complemented these actions by implementing a comprehensive approach to US foreign policy that empowered a US Grand strategy. Scholars note Eisenhower’s third pillar of substantially reorganizing the nation’s foreign policymaking processes. It was unprecedented, creating a remarkably structured and conceptually coherent method.

Most significantly, it enabled Eisenhower to advance a comprehensive US Grand

Strategy as his fourth pillar. It allowed him to navigate the challenges he perceived from both domestic and international opponents to the cause of peace. This included a concept of American power that encompassed both traditional and progressive aspects.

It redefined the basis of American power by expanding notions of how to use military and economic power. For example, it included the awareness of how military and economic power could contribute to instability as well as stability. His strategic concept added the imperative for the nation to use and retain its spiritual, or moral, power. It was a component that enabled American leadership in global affairs. Collectively, this triad of instruments of power formed a “Great Equation” that not only added necessary coherence to US efforts but also focused the nation toward a long-term vision of how to achieve enduring peace.35

35 DDE to Lucius Du Bignon Clay, February 9, 1952, DDEP, 13:961-965; See also DDE to Gabriel N. Stilian, August 23, 1951, DDEP, 12:487-490; DDE to George Arthur Sloan, March 1, 1952, DDEP, 13:1037- 1040; DDE to George Arthur Sloan, March 20, 1952, DDEP, 13:1097-1104; For an explanation of Eisenhower’s outlook, see Immerman, “Bernath Lecture: Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist,” 319- 342.

The Eisenhower years were distinctive for their absence of a great power war. The efforts he put in place to create new standards of statecraft were a direct and key contributing aspect. Eisenhower’s approach placed the nation firmly upon the Cold War path, an effort that avoided a direct or hot war. His leadership included efforts that went well beyond stabilizing the superpower contest. It reconceived America’s global leadership, making the creation of a “free world,” such as public support for personal freedom, human rights and quality of life, a critical step in the march toward advancing new global norms. These actions were consistent with the early postwar efforts to reorganize the basis of the world order, such as by using economic interdependence and collective security to mitigate the causes of war. These factors went beyond just structures and institutions, as they were key and essential ingredients to enduring change. In this line of effort, Eisenhower had an evolutionary view of the likelihood of progress. He did not believe the United States could impose its perspectives on the world. To be effective, they required voluntary acceptance of the value of self-restraint and the rule of law.

This new approach also led the administration to pursue US objectives in different ways. Eisenhower appreciated the contingent character of most events. He studied problems not just to determine root causes, but also to understand the contextual factors that would also inform solutions. He looked past ideal answers and delved into the complexity of issues, such as comparing opportunities, risks, costs, and benefits. This outlook led him to look for comprehensive solutions. It also allowed him to focus on different time horizons to produce results. For example, American efforts under

Eisenhower addressed issues based on their priority, such as between global or regional objectives, whether they concerned vital or important levels of interests, as well as if policy choices allowed for the possibility of success at a prudent cost or risk. An appreciation for these aspects transforms Eisenhower’s efforts to contain the expansion of communism from America’s focus to representing more immediate goals that coincided with other efforts and longer-term objectives.

This aspect of the broad effort to change global norms has increasingly become a foreign concept in the nation’s popular memory and generational experiences. Today’s partisanship amplifies the effects of America’s election cycles, negating the efficacy of long-term outlooks. The loss of a national appreciation of world war, as well as military service (more than two generations of Americans have grown to adulthood since the establishment of the All-Volunteer Force), adds to the challenge. Neither of these phenomenon was the case for Eisenhower’s cohort. The bipartisanship of the period directly derived from a broad familiarity with and abhorrence of war. Eisenhower was a member of the generation bathed in combat. It focused his efforts and he used

American leadership to prevent it. The promise of finding ways to create enduring peace guided his Presidency.

Suez Crisis and Global Norms of Conduct

The Suez Crisis of 1956 exemplified Eisenhower’s commitment to establishing new standards of statecraft, but several factors obscure this aspect. The first is the early treatments, mostly by journalists and participants, that situate the crisis within the

25 confines of 1956 and deny or underplay a correlation with America’s efforts to assert new global norms. Nasser’s nationalization of the canal and the subsequent invasion of

Egypt by Israel, Britain, and France drive its periodization. Many of the initial histories were also polemical. They sought to exonerate or condemn national involvement, fix the blame on various actors and personalities, and/or outright deny the fact that Britain,

France, and Israel colluded to stage the rationales for attacking Egypt.36

Of the early histories of the Suez Crisis, Robert Bowie’s Suez 1956 (1974) provides an unusually sophisticated and insightful portrayal of the administration’s thinking and behavior. Yet today it is rarely read and widely underappreciated. Bowie was a trained lawyer who directed the US State Department’s Policy Planning Staff and served as its representative to the National Security Council Planning Board from 1953-1957. His book, which is a penetrating study, not a memoir, underscores that Egypt’s actions, no matter how inimical to the interests of the United States and its allies, conformed to international law. Bowie’s monograph presents a unique perspective in the early scholarship. It emphasizes that the administration’s interpretation of international law formed the basis of America’s response. Yet his effort to improve understanding of the crisis has gone almost unnoticed by generations of scholars.37

36 The most notable memoirs include Anthony Eden, Full Circle: The Memoirs of Anthony Eden (Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1960); Sir Anthony Eden, The Suez Crisis of 1956 (Boston 1960); Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (Garden City: Doubleday, 1964); Hugh Thomas, Suez (New York: Harper & Row, 1966); Anthony Nutting, No End of a Lesson (New York: Potter, 1967); Christian Pineau, 1956 Suez (Paris: Laffont, 1976); Selwyn Lloyd, Suez 1956: a Personal Account (New York: Mayflower Books, 1978); Chester L. Cooper, The Lion's Last Roar: Suez, 1956 (New York: Harper & Row, 1978); Evelyn Shuckburgh, Descent to Suez: Diaries 1951-56 (New York: Norton, 1987); Additionally, many journalists and popular historians produced the first wave of literature on Suez. The prime example is Herman Finer, Dulles Over Suez: The Theory of His Diplomacy (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964). 37 Nasser understood and complied with the standards of international agreements, as he offered to pay back shareholders and declared his willingness to uphold international access to the

Much of the subsequent scholarship, particularly those written after the release of troves of official documents in the 1970s and 1980s, does improve on the initial wave by adding significant nuance to the story. These studies provide fine narratives, which illuminate the many competing factors that influenced national debates and decisions.

They expand appreciation of the crisis, such as by exploring how regional outlooks or domestic pressures informed US policy. Yet they also almost uniformly center their analysis on traditional nation-state perspectives and explain US actions all but exclusively within the context of Cold War attitudes and competing policy goals.38 In particular, they present a sea of details that drowns out US strategic calculations, deemphasizing Eisenhower’s efforts to build a new world order.

Several historiographic outliers foreshadow this dissertation’s contribution to understanding of the Suez Crisis. Burton Kaufman’s survey of US policy in the Middle

East highlights America’s goal of creating new global norms. He contends that both

Presidents Truman and Eisenhower worked toward building a Wilsonian world order characterized by “openness, interdependence, and commitment to democratic principles,” and that Eisenhower’s “strategy for achieving this world order was

waterway in compliance with the 1888 Constantinople Convention. Robert R. Bowie, Suez 1956: International Crisis and the Role of Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974).

38 Mohamed H. Heikal, Cutting the Lion's Tail, Suez, Through Egyptian Eyes (London: Andre- Deutsch Limited, 1986); Wm Roger Louis and Roger Owen, eds., Suez 1956: the crisis and its consequences (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Donald Neff, Warriors at Suez: Eisenhower Takes America into the Middle East (New York: Linden Press, 1981); Keith Kyle, Suez (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991); W. Scott Lucas, Divided we Stand. Britain, the US and the Suez Crisis (London: Hodder, 1991); Steven Z. Freiberger, Dawn Over Suez, The Rise of American Power in the Middle East, 1953-1957 (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1992); Fawaz A. Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East, Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994); See also Peter L. Hahn, The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991).

27 containment, and his tactics were collective security.” Roger Louis’ Ends of British

Imperialism, The Scramble for Empire, Suez and Decolonization portrays the Suez Crisis as a bookend of British colonialism, as it broke up the pretense that London could preserve its influence through force of arms or through coopting American power. Diane

Kunz’s The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis to an uncommon degree emphasizes the international aspects that informed US efforts. Her perceptive account reveals that changes to the international economic systems developed at Bretton Woods after WWII heavily influenced US Strategy. The new structures of global economics, dominated by the US, drove the denouement of the crisis. After the fabricated justification to attack

Egypt, the Eisenhower administration used the new economic tools to force Britain, and subsequently its accomplices, into compliance with the envisioned global order. Guy

Laron escapes a monolithic national filter and explores how political economy influenced the various national approaches that emerged to resolve the crisis. He places the crisis into an insightful analysis of domestic economic interests that variously competed to support or avoid integration into an emerging global market.39

Several works of scholarship that explore other events are also pivotal to this study.

Matthew Connelly’s history of Algeria’s struggle for independence from France makes the case that the Front de Liberation Nationale’s (FLN) successful independence efforts

39 Burton I. Kaufman, The Arab Middle East and the United States, Inter-Arab Rivarly and Superpower Diplomacy (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1996), 17, xv; Wm. Roger Louis, Ends of British Imperialism, The Scramble for Empire, Suez and Decolonization (London: IB Tauris, 2006); Diane B Kunz, The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991); See also Ralph Dietl, “Suez 1956: A European Intervention?,” Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 43, no. 2 (April, 2008): 259-278; Guy Laron, Origins of the Suez Crisis: Postwar Development Diplomacy and the Struggle over Third World Industrialization, 1945-1956 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013).

28 focused on an international human rights narrative and not military prowess. From the

1950s and into the early 1960s, the FLN used UN negotiations, press conferences, human-rights reports, and a public relations offensive to achieve their goals. This stratagem worked and led France’s Charles de Gaulle to conclude that, despite winning the war tactically, the costs of maintaining control of Algeria by force threatened

France’s economic and political influence throughout the world. By bringing to the foreground new factors, such as the power of new international institutions, global media, and world opinion, Connelly uncovers key aspects of the postwar world.40 Other studies in international and transnational history, such as those by Paul Chamberlin,

Ryan Irwin, Odd Arne Westad, and Victoria De Grazia likewise add valuably to our understanding.41 Collectively, these works challenge nation-centric treatments of Cold

War events that view national actions thru the narrow lens of realpolitik. They offer a fresh viewpoint that expands the global context of the postwar world. This includes the creation of structural changes that outlasted the bi-polar struggle.

This dissertation adds a substantive reframing of the Suez Crisis within the context of Eisenhower’s advocacy for new global norms. The crisis brought to the foreground

40 Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution, Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

41 Paul Chamberlin and Ryan Irwin build on Connelly’s insights. Paul Chamberlin, The Global Offensive: The United States, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Making of the Post-Cold War Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); Ryan Irwin, Gordian Knot: Apartheid and the Unmaking of the Liberal World Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); Westad decenters the Cold War from its East-West narrative toward a North-South perspective. Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War, Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); De Grazia explores America’s market empire and its effects on transforming European culture and society. Victoria De Grazia, Irresistible Empire: America's Advance Through Twentieth-Century Europe (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005).

29 longstanding Anglo-Egyptian tensions and forced the US administration to prioritize the contradictions inherent in its policies. For example, Eisenhower had to decide whether allied cohesion in the Cold War or a desire to marginalize Egypt’s Nasser outweighed efforts to create new norms of conduct in international affairs. He had to weigh the risks involved in applying both traditional and more progressive approaches to statecraft.

Eisenhower decided that upholding the new standards of statecraft were an American priority.

Throughout the crisis, the United States remained steadfast in its support of-some might argue its revived commitment for-the principles in the United Nations’ Charter.

From the time that President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt occupied the Suez Canal and until a United Nations Emergency Force supervised the withdrawal of the British,

French, and Israeli invasion forces, America did not waiver. Despite having to deal with a recalcitrant and opportunistic Egyptian President, America acknowledged that Egypt’s decision to nationalize the canal did not violate international law. Through two London

Conferences and then several rounds of meetings in the United Nations, the US

Administration tried repeatedly to work toward an internationally negotiated solution that conformed to the norms of conduct it championed. After the staged rationales that led to the British, French and Israeli aggressions, the United States placed economic and political pressure to stop the invasion and supported an end to hostilities supervised by the United Nations.

These efforts sustained America’s resolve to assert new standards of international conduct and identify new pathways toward a better world order. They were a visible

30 demonstration that the world’s superpower accepted that advancing a peaceful world order required adherence to limitations on state conduct. At Suez, the US elevated the importance of international law over the use of aggressive warfare and allied relations.

These decisions escaped the Cold War, asserting that it was an American enduring interest to establish and maintain new norms of global conduct.

CHAPTER 2

AMERICA’S SEARCH FOR A BETTER WORLD ORDER

After World War II, the Truman administration pursued efforts to establish American leadership in global affairs. The nation’s postwar rise to superpower status occurred within a fluid and contested environment. The downfall of Germany and Japan, as well as the exhaustion of France and Britain, created new vacuums of power. Several nations descended into civil war, most notably China and Greece, while in the evolving so-called

Third World both colonies and developing nations intensified their push for self- determination. The Soviet Union added the most direct challenge to US efforts, as it stood against a western dominated world system. It led a communist counter effort that declared that “capitalist society… [was] immoral, inefficient, and doomed to extinction.”1 These propaganda efforts aligned with aggressive military moves and posturing to create the perception that war was imminent and that communism threatened to tip the scales of global political systems. Combined, these factors pulled

America in many different directions.2

In the realm of foreign affairs, America’s inexperience exacerbated its challenges.

The nation’s historic isolationism and hemispheric outlook on security led many

1 Diane Kunz describes how communist countries organized a competing command economy based upon state control that "purportedly" followed socialist principles. Diane B. Kunz, Butter and Guns: America’s Cold War Economic Diplomacy (New York: Free Press, 1997), 4-5.

2 For a discussion of the fragmentation of states during the immediate postwar period see Mark Mazower, "Violence and the State in the Twentieth Century," The American Historical Review, vol. 107, no. 4 (October 2002); For a treatment of the impact of decolonization on the postwar world see Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

Americans, in and out of government, to believe that its strength made it invulnerable to the impulses of European power politics. It conceptually separated its new world from the old world. But the desire to assert its leadership in world affairs after World

War II required a shift in mindset, different types of expertise and organizations to support them. The Truman Administration found itself navigating through this transition and was often unable to balance the competing demands.

One of the major trials faced by Truman was the absence of a domestic consensus.

The nation’s unfamiliarity with world leadership exacerbated the disagreements over policy choices. Many Americans were supportive of efforts to produce peace, but not fully committed to providing the resources for it. This was seen in the conflict between the nation’s desires to assert its leadership into world affairs, while also rapidly demobilizing its military. Additionally, the executive branch found itself unable to organize coherent and effective foreign policy efforts. The National Security Act of 1947 sought to ameliorate this challenge. It restructured the US military establishment, revived the World War II Office of Strategic Services as the Central Intelligence Agency, and created a National Security Council to advise and coordinate government policy.3

America’s inexperience and lack of focus on international affairs allowed immediate crisis, such as the superpower rivalry, to capture the nation’s attention. The US

3 James Chace, “1945, Zero Year,” World Policy Journal, vol. 12, no. 4 (Winter 1995): 61-70; See also Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy in the United States (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1952), 30-52; “National Security Council,” in Richard Samuels, ed., Encyclopedia of United States National Security (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2005), 501-502; For a full treatment of the demilitarization and expansion of US foreign policy debate see Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron, Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State 1945-1954 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

33 approach became frequently reactive.4 For example, it led to sophomoric interpretations of George Kennan’s containment strategy that became reductionist and formulaic.5 This shortcoming may accurately characterize Truman as well as his policies.

Despite his personal intelligence, integrity, and strength in domestic politics, America’s

33rd president was woefully inexperienced in international affairs.6 The career politician found himself ill prepared for the turbulent postwar world, with a government apparatus that was under-organized and inexperienced in handling the complexities of world leadership.7

Under Truman, the United States focused its efforts on responding to Soviet initiatives. The Kremlin’s behavior in Europe appeared to confirm its “intentions as an aggressor” and eagerness to spread communism throughout the world.8 The Soviet posture motivated many of the early US responses. The advent of the atomic and then nuclear age amplified this already complex security challenge. It combined with political posturing to create what Melvyn Leffler describes as a “spiraling cycle of mistrust.” It led

4 Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2002. updated 9th ed. (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2004), 33-42.

5 America lost sight of its larger goal, such as the stage of Kennan’s strategy intended to allow for progress toward mutually acceptable results with Moscow. Under Truman, containment focused on military factors, balance of power considerations, and responding to emergencies. John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), Chapter 3, 71; See also John Lewis Gaddis, George F. Kennan: an American Life (New York: Penguin Press, 2011).

6 When Roosevelt’s death thrust him into the Oval Office, he had only travelled overseas once, as a junior soldier during World War I.

7 Robert H. Ferrell, Harry S. Truman: A Life (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1994); and Harry S. Truman with Louis W. Koenig, ed., The Truman Administration: Its Principles and Practice (New York: New York University Press, 1956).

8 “An Indictment of Russia-From the Record,” US News and World Report (May 2, 1947).

34 to a security dilemma, as policies to enhance security on one side led to insecurity and adaptations on the other. This cycle produced an arms race that perpetuated and exacerbated a bipolar narrative, often amplified by military camps in both countries. It caused many of the administration’s postwar policies to revolve around reducing the perceived Soviet threats to its immediate economic and security interests.9

Being underprepared is not to say the US was inept or ineffective. By 1952, Truman formulated a strategy to counter the threat of communism, fortify America’s global leadership, and secure a geopolitical “preponderance of power." For example, the

Administration integrated the industrial might of Western Europe, including West

Germany, and Japan into a US-led orbit. This foundation of security assured US hegemony and world leadership, while also cementing perceptions of a superpower struggle.10

Truman’s pursuit of power was a primary goal of US efforts, but not the only one.

America’s postwar policies also sought to define new standards for the postwar world.

Much of the extant scholarship insufficiently appreciates this dynamic. The vision for a better approach to world affairs influenced the generation of American leaders and academics that understood the true costs of conflict. Those that followed, often, subordinated this focus. This was seen in the early 1970s, when, and the venerable scholar Robert Ferrell writes, the “young men who remembered little or nothing about

9 Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 515-518; For more insights into the security dilemma, see Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30 (January 1978): 167-214.

10 Ibid.

World War II” interpreted the causes of the superpower contest differently.11 President

Truman was not within this group. He understood the costs of war and was a strong admirer of Woodrow Wilson’s efforts to change the norms of statecraft. Truman’s efforts as president went well beyond containing the Soviet Union and included the building of new norms of global statecraft.12

America’s rise to global leadership cannot be divorced from its promotion of progressive ideas and institutions. In 1919, President Wilson only had a vision for change. He had articulated principles to remake global politics, but he was unable to generate wide support for them. For example, he failed to convince America’s allies to abandon the old practices of statecraft that ensured their colonial gains.13 By 1945, this dynamic changed. When the war ended, the United States was in a position to “turn its principles into reality.”14 The death, destruction, and depression caused by a half- century of political and economic conflict irrevocably discredited the old world order.

The global wariness paired well with America’s emergence in 1945 as an unrivaled world power.15 It intended to assert its leadership along with the vision of championing a new

11 Ferrell, Harry S. Truman, 12.

12 Truman took his oath of office under the portrait of the former president and was a committed member of the crusade for a different and more principled approach to statecraft. Michael Neiberg, Potsdam: The End of World War II and the Remaking of Europe (New York: Basic Books, 2015), xv.

13 Chapter 5 focuses on this challenge.

14 Michael Neiberg emphasizes that the big three leaders at Potsdam, Truman, Churchill and Stalin, understood the shortcomings put in place during the Versailles Treaty and worked to avoid those mistakes. Neiberg, Potsdam, Introduction, 247-249.

15 It was the only great power that retained its industrial capacities, natural resources, and labor reserves. The Soviet Union with a comparable total population to the US lost almost twenty times as

36 global system, based in, “humane standards of international conduct.” The US emerged from World War II with exceptional power, confidence, and purpose.16

During a speech at Wake Forest College (later University) in North Carolina in 1951,

Truman highlighted the diversity that clarifies his objectives and his legacy. He began by describing the world as divided. There was a contest both domestically and internationally between those that believed in faith and hope and others that substituted suspicion and anxiety. He asserted that fear and doubts should not paralyze

America. History would not accept excuses or hesitation. It would judge the US based on its efforts to do what was right, not just avoid what was wrong. America, Truman proclaimed, had to shore up its resolve and remain focused on efforts that pursued peace. The past weaknesses of the “forces of principles” allowed for the rise of aggression and twice required America to send its “blood and treasure in defense of human freedom.” Through strength, the US could make a change. Truman forecast that as the United States gained strength, the Soviet Union would be more willing to negotiate settlements and to abide by them. He emphasized, “[A]ll we have done, our treaties with other nations, our defense program, our aid to other countries, has been the result of our determination to uphold the principles of the United Nations.”17

many people. Norman Polmar and Thomas B. Allen, World War II: The Encyclopedia of the War Years, 1941-1945 (New York: Dover Publications, 2012), 193.

16 Michael H. Hunt, The American Ascendancy: How the United States Gained and Wielded Global Dominance (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007).

17 Harry S. Truman, “Peace Comes High,” speech delivered at Wake Forest College, NC on October 15, 1951 in Vital Speeches of the Day, vol. xviii, no. 2 (November 1, 1951).

Truman‘s deeds paralleled his words. He continued many of the efforts put in place by Franklin Roosevelt to shape the postwar world. Within the first hour after taking the oath of office following FDR’s untimely death, Truman declared that the conference to create the United Nations in San Francisco would still occur. One of his first official acts signaled his intent to uphold America’s pursuit of a new world order. During his presidency, America joined with international partners to implement many historic initiatives to achieve it. Outcomes of these efforts included the United Nations (1945), the International Court of Justice (1945), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

(1948), the Fourth Geneva Convention (1949), as well as additions to the Bretton Woods agreement and the establishment of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947) to augment earlier moves for a more open global economic system that preserved

America’s faith in capitalism.

America’s National Purpose

The history of American efforts to redefine global statecraft provides essential context for understanding the nation’s rise to world leadership after 1945. During the first half of the twentieth century, as Dwight D. Eisenhower and his generation came of age, American society wrestled with the basic questions that defined the nation. It entered the era after a sustained period of substantial changes. Between its Civil War and the First World War, the United States experienced a major expansion of its commercial systems, massive immigration that diversified its citizenry, a dramatically increased labor force, advances in communications and transportation that connected

38 its disparate regions, and rapid urbanization and industrialization. These factors created new dynamics, such as the tripling of the nation’s population and turning the United

States from a country of small towns and farms into a nation of cities and factories. By the turn of the century, the turbulence also affected American national politics and brought to the forefront debates over the purposes of its society. These included arguments for more equality of opportunity, for better government efforts to protect the common good, and for the advancement of humanity.18

The transformations led America to adapt its foreign policy outlooks. By the twentieth century, the rapid increases in the nation’s economic reach generated new possibilities. It turned the United States into a world power. This rise also elevated two fundamental questions into the consciousness of the nation: Would America play a greater role in world affairs, and if so, what would that role would be? These inquiries divided the nation, reflecting significant domestic fragmentation in views toward the nation’s purpose and its approaches to international relations.19

18 For discussions on the transformation of American society, see Alan Trachtenberg, The Incorporation of America: Culture and Society in the Gilded Age (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982); Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1966); Herbert Gutman, Work, Culture, and Society in Industrializing America (New York: Random House, 1977); Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1977); and David M. Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980).

19 For a treatment of US foreign policy transformation, see Ernest R. May, Imperial Democracy: The Emergence of America as a Great Power (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961); Tony Smith, America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Frank Ninkovich, United States and Imperialism (Malden: Blackwell, 2001); Richard H. Immerman, Empire For Liberty: A History of American Imperialism From Benjamin Franklin to Paul Wolfowitz (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); Christopher McNight Nichols, Promise and Peril: America at the Dawn of the Global Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011); Frank Ninkovich, The Global Republic: America's Inadvertent Rise to World Power (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014).

These debates flourished within the emergence of a more robust civil society. The unprecedented changes within the nation fueled the proliferation of associations, committees, leagues, and journals that sought to use the new tools of media to reach citizens and shape American politics.20 Several centered their inquiries on the problems that plagued the international system. As a self-liberated former colony and a nation of immigrants, many who fled authoritarian systems, Americans were naturally critical of the old world system. They criticized the status quo for preserving aristocracies, for example, as well as the European scramble for empire in the late nineteenth century.21

Detractors explained that the system placed every nation in competition with each other, in a myopic quest to preserve or advance their national power. Some pointed out that the world had departed from the classical view of the Westphalian system, such as its intention to turn states into “the cornerstone of international law and order.”

Instead, balancing power became predatory, as national interests trumped calls for a just system. It allowed factors, such as ideological differences and zero-sum views of interests, to pull nations into war.22

Over time, these critiques of the nation-centric world order proliferated, evolving into a global phenomenon that pushed to change the international order. It led to

20 Andrew Arsan, Su Lin Lewis, and Anne-Isabelle Richard, “Editorial- the Roots of Civil Society and the Interwar Movement,” Journal of Global History, vol. 7, no. 2 (July 2012): 157-165; "Civil Society," in William A. Darity Jr., ed., International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 2d ed., vol. 1 (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2008), 552-554.

21 Frank A. Ninkovich, Global Dawn: The Cultural Foundation of American Internationalism, 1865- 1890 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 280-291.

22 Cathal J. Nolan and Carl H. Hodge, “’The Healthy Bones of a Single Pomeranian Grenadier’: The Atlantic Alliance and the Humanitarian Principle,” in Carl C. Hodge, ed., NATO for a New Century: Atlanticism and European Security (Westport: Praeger, 2002).

40 discussions that focused on alternatives, such as how to make alterations that avoided war and advanced civilization. Some solutions were limited in outlook. For example, The

Hague and London Conferences of 1908-1909 sought to establish international laws to protect established patterns of trade. They tried to constrain great power conduct by reasserting consultation and agreement as a norm of international behavior.23

Other, more radical, efforts sought to replace the foundation of the world’s system altogether. For example, several pre-existing ideologies rose to global prominence to contest the old world order, most notably Fascism and Communism. These diverse critiques of past dogma directly challenged status quo powers and their blind pursuit of narrow interests. They also rejected many of the prevailing claims made by the established powers, such as the narratives that their pursuits of power were natural, that the world system was impossible to change and that commerce was limited to a mercantile system that demanded economic nationalism. Opponents to these views countered that they simply served to perpetuate colonial efforts or to maintain imperial political and economic power. The early twentieth century devolved into a contest between those that sought to preserve the status quo and others that advocated for a variety of new possibilities.24

The United States joined these debates and increasingly worked to change the norms of international conduct so that they resembled American ways. In this debate,

23 Ibid.

24 N.A.M. Rodger, “The Hattendorf Prize Lecture,” Naval War College Review, vol. 66, no. 1 (Winter, 2013): 7-15; Mark Mazower, Governing the World: The History of an Idea (New York: Penguin Press, 2012); see also Hanson W. Baldwin, The Price of Power (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), 3-4.

41 the nation’s diversity and free systems created significant nuance in its outlooks. To harness the nation’s potential, several US based organizations emerged. Examples included the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (1910) and the Women’s

Peace Party (1915) that argued for new approaches that would make peace a more normal state of international relations. These efforts accelerated and helped to form the consciousness of the nation. By World War I, the United States was the outlier among world powers. It was “the great champion of world peace,” actively seeking to move the globe away from its flawed moorings in militarism, imperialism, and excessive nationalism.25

President Woodrow Wilson’s efforts after World War I represented the nation’s first significant attempt to push the world order out of its pattern of war and conflict.

Wilson’s “New Diplomacy” recognized that the static character of the old world order created “conditions that only war could solve.” Through his Fourteen Points and advocacy of the League of Nations, America’s President sought to orient US foreign policy toward freeing the globe from the failed world system. His actions emphasized the need for principles to govern world relations, such as open diplomacy, multilateralism, international cooperation, collective security, self-determination, and liberal trade. These ideas were not Wilson’s alone; they reflected a strong domestic and international resolve to inject new principles into global affairs. America’s early salvo was unsuccessful. It did not garner sufficient public and international support in 1919.

25 Merle Curti, Peace or War: The American Struggle, 1636-1936 (Boston: J.S. Canner & Company Publishers, 1959), 12.

The conferees at Versailles forced Wilson to compromise on many of his points, and the

Senate denied United States’ membership in the League of Nations.26

America’s rejection of affiliation in the League reflected, in part, the partisanship of the period. The historian John Milton Cooper asserts that there was enough public support for the League within the United States. It was President Wilson’s inflexibility and decision to try to force the issue by engaging the American public that prevented a political compromise. It allowed the adversarial character of US politics to decide the issue.27 Thomas Knock also faults Wilson, but it was less for his inflexibility than his alienation of the progressive left in the United States.28 Henry Cabot Lodge, Wilson’s chief Republican opponent after the death of Teddy Roosevelt in early 1919, became a vocal critic of the US president. He criticized Article 10 of the League Covenant that obligated member nations to aid other states facing external aggression, pointing out

26 Editorial, "Freer Trade vs. Control," Fortune, Vol. XXXV, No. 2 (February, 1947): 2-4; Stephen C. Schlesinger, Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations; A Story of Superpowers, Secret Agents, Wartime Allies and Enemies, and Their Quest for a Peaceful World (Boulder: Westview Press, 2003), 17- 31; Frank Ninkovich, Modernity and Power: A History of the Domino Theory in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 66; Paul Kennedy, The Parliament of Man: The Past, Present, and Future of the United Nations (New York: Random House, 2006), 12-20; John Foster Dulles, “The General Assembly,” in Hamilton Fish Armstrong, ed., The Foreign Affairs Reader (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), 417-418.

27 "… the League fight would almost certainly have resolved itself into some such compromise but for the actions of a single person." John Milton Cooper Jr., Breaking the Heart of the World: Woodrow Wilson and the Fight for the League of Nations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 2; Many prominent Republicans, such as Teddy Roosevelt and former President William H. Taft, were members of the League to Enforce Peace created in 1915. It had four propositions: that the United States should join a League of Nations that referred all disputes to a court, that all political disputes be adjudicated by a council of conciliation, that its members use force against any nation went to war without taking its case to the court or council, and that members meet routinely to discuss legislation. Ruhl J. Bartlett, The League to Enforce Peace (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944).

28 Thomas J. Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).

43 that it took the power to declare war out of the hands of Congress and might embroil the United States in the intrigues of other nations.29 Opposition to the League gained popularity and would lay the foundation for the brand of isolationism that emerged during the interwar years.30

Others fought the move to change US foreign policy because of a popular disillusionment with the federal government. The suspicion of power had deep roots in

America and became manifest in a natural opposition to the concentration of authority in federal programs. For example, after World War I many Americans believed that the

“war to end all wars” claims of advocates for US involvement turned out to be a false promise. They questioned why the nation was willing to enlist men for war but unwilling to conscript its wealth or its wealthy. Many saw the argument for US participation in the war as serving the interests of particular groups. For them, the “grand crusade” was a conspiracy that actually served business and banking interests. It also exacerbated the

29 Stephen Wertheim, “The League That Wasn't: American Designs for a Legalist-Sanctionist League of Nations and the Intellectual Origins of International Organization, 1914–1920,” Diplomatic History, vol. 35, no. 5 (September, 2011): 797-836.

30 Such as Senator Robert A. Taft, who argued “the states of the old world had been at war for over 2000 years over questions of trade and boundary lines.” He rejected the idea that US efforts could change this dynamic and sought to prevent the nation from simply entering into this competition. His resistance also reflected the belief that more engagement in world affairs would corrupt the nation’s pursuit of its principles, as it deemphasized domestic issues. It would needlessly amplify federal power and lead to wasteful spending on foreign affairs, neglecting important issues, such as labor relations and low-income housing. Senator Robert A. Taft quoted in Manfred Jonas, Isolationism in America, 1935-1941 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966), 234; see also James T. Patterson, Mr. Republican: a Biography of Robert A. Taft (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972), 75-81.

44 trend toward concentrations of power. These views led to cries that efforts to transform the world order actually masked the nation’s descent into imperialism.31

These interwar domestic concerns complicated efforts to expand America’s role in world affairs, but resistance did not mean unassailable opposition. Other efforts, such as those that sought to find ways to make the world more peaceful, remained popular.

Throughout the interwar years, activist and politicians worked to mitigate and even transform the nation’s reluctance to engage more fully in global affairs. America’s foreign policy debates reflected this phenomenon. They centered on an intellectual search to gain insight on how the nation could maintain its security, its values, its purpose, and find a balance between domestic and foreign affairs.

Augmenting this discussion was an unprecedented level of activism that came to frame America’s rise to world leadership in 1945. After World War I, significant public efforts emerged that sought to alter the systems that structured international relations and to increase America’s engagement in world affairs. They were never monolithic and often achieved very mixed results, but they were abundant. Some activities were more spectacular than effective, such as Edward Bok’s 1923 Peace Award that offered a

$100,000 prize for the best plan for world peace. Bok, a Philadelphia-based magazine

31 Kennedy, Over Here, 1-44; See also William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge of Isolation, 1937-1940 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952); Christian Herter, James W. Fulbright, and Walter Judd, “Regional Views on America’s Role in the Postwar World,” Council on Foreign Relations- Study Group Reports (May 11, 1943), CFR Records MC104, 1918-2004, Series 4: Meetings, Box 439, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library; Wayne S. Cole, America First: the Battle Against Intervention, 1940-1941 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1953); Manfred Jonas, “Isolationism,” in Richard Dean Burns, Alexander DeConde, and Fredrik Logevall eds., Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy, Vol. 2, 2nd Edition (New York: Scribner’s Sons, 2002), 337-350; For a discussion of US public opinion during the period, see J. D. Doenecke, Nothing Less Than War: A New History of America’s Entry Into World War I (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2011).

45 editor and Pulitzer Prize winning author, later explained that the public relations ploy intended to build excitement for an increased American role in foreign affairs. The award provided “an unbiased channel” for Americans to express their interest in pursuing peace and intended to help the nation escape its pattern of partisan politics. It also hoped to bypass the “newspaper filters” that prevented Americans from gaining a

“moral interests” in world affairs. The American Peace Award created a lot of public interest, as over 22,000 people submitted plans. It did not, however, change US national policies.32

Other interwar efforts were much better organized and productive. Throughout the

1920s and 1930s, “peace movements” grew and built significant public awareness and support for changing global norms. They gained political power, in part, through exceptional organization and the leveraging of new technologies. To market their ideas, they used movies, radio broadcasts, and public relations schemes. They presented narratives that focused on making peace the new norm in international conduct.

Examples include the 1931 “peace pays” advertising campaign that emerged in newspapers, magazines, and radio ads throughout the nation. The following year, the

Women’s International League sent a “peace caravan” across the country that stopped and held rallies in cities and towns along the way. These efforts gained momentum, and several groups attained substantial national and international followings. The greater

32 Edward Bok, “How the American Peace Award Came to Be,” in Esther Everett Lape, ed., Ways to Peace (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1924), vii-xvi; “Bok Offers $100,000 For Best Peace Plan,” Washington Post, July 2, 1923.

46 movement numbered close to twelve million members and spent around $1million annually.33

Their labors increasingly wove themselves into the interwar fabric of American politics. The result was a significant increase in the constituencies and political power of many peace organizations. Several global initiatives validate this point, most notably the

1921-22 Washington Naval Conference to reduce maritime armaments and the 1928

Kellogg-Briand Pact renouncing war.34 Additionally, the influential and concerted efforts led to an increase in US cooperation with the League of Nations and the World Court.

These actions garnered broad public support that cut across party and ideological lines.

Even the most “irreconcilable” opponents to an increased role for the US in world affairs, such as isolationists Senators William Borah of Idaho and Gerald Nye of North

Dakota, “did not call for complete, cultural, commercial, or political separation from the world.” They supported economic trade bills and commercial efforts that intended to avoid war. Preventing armed conflict became a common denominator within a broad range of foreign policy advocacy.35

33 Curti, Peace or War, 271-276, Chapters 9-10; Charles Chatfield with Robert Kleidman, The American Peace Movement: Ideals and Activism (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1992), Chapters 2-4; See also David Cortright, Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Charles DeBenedetti, Origins of the Modern American Peace Movement, 1915-1929 (Millwood: KTO Press. 1978); Charles DeBenedetti, The Peace Reform in American History (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980); and Lawrence S. Wittner, Rebels Against War: The American Peace Movement, 1941-1960 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969).

34 See Neil Earle, “Public opinion for peace: Tactics of peace activists at the Washington Conference on Naval Armament (1921-1922),” Journal of Church and State, vol. 40, no. 1 (Winter, 1998): 149-169; M. Limberg, “‘In Relation to the Pact’: Radical Pacifists and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, 1928–1939,” Peace & Change, vol. 39 (2014): 395–420.

35 Senator Borah was a vocal champion of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928. Christopher McKnight Nichols, “The Enduring Power of Isolationism,” Orbis, vol. 57, no. 3 (July, 2013): 390-407.

The efforts by American civilians to advance the cause of peace gained international attention and respect. In 1931, Jane Addams and Nicholas Murray Butler added to the nation’s already strong record of global recognition, jointly winning the Noble Peace

Prize. Addams, a social reformer renowned for founding Hull House, was a pacifist who believed that global interdependence could serve as a catalyst to create world peace. An interconnected world would damper the interests that exacerbated the worst effects of nationalism, leading to demands for different approaches. She believed it could lead people to turn toward “cooperation, respect” and a world community. Butler was also an advocate for peace, but he came from a different philosophical position. The longtime President of Columbia University and the Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace became an ardent proponent of Wilsonianism and the need for

America to assert its principles and democratic structures globally. The 1931 Nobel

Committee recognized the fact that both Americans worked for over a quarter of a century to improve the world order. It pointed out that they represented the best aspects of the United States, such as its efforts to use its power in the pursuit of peace.

Addams and Butler likewise reflected the rise of America’s peace movements to a position of national and international prominence.36

America’s new outlook on foreign affairs never coalesced into a single vision, remaining within a contested space that held many contradictions. The slogans that framed political positions tried to portray unity but more often obscured realities. For

36 Harriet Hyman Alonso, “Introduction to Special Issue Honoring Jane Addams,” Peace and Change, vol. 36, no. 1 (4 January 2011): 1; Halvdan Koht, “Award Ceremony Speech,” Nobelprize.org at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1931/press.html (accessed July 15 2015).

48 example, despite the claims that the nation had an isolationist tradition, throughout its history America sought global markets, negotiated treaties, engaged in international conventions, and waged wars. Its foreign policies often claimed neutrality, while also asserting a willingness to preserve its interests, such as its Freedom of the Seas policy and its Open Door policy in the Far East—and later beyond the Far East. America was at times expansionist, as it manifested its destiny across the continent and for a short time dabbled in efforts to establish a colonial empire. These discrepancies as well as the tendency to oversimplify positions remained an aspect of US advocacy and politics.37

Despite these contradictions, the nation did have a history of pursuing changes to global norms. It joined international partners to advance notions of humanity, human rights, disarmament, and the outlawing of war.38 Many of the intellectual foundations within this movement included a belief that the spreading of America’s democratic values represented a universally shared interest that could moderate global conflict.

These philosophical calls endured, but had many factors that limited them or that allowed others to dilute them. For example, without an immediate, pressing, and often existential threat, citizens remained unwilling to “have their children fight and die for

37 See Anders Stephanson, Manifest Destiny: American Expansion and the Empire of the Right (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995).

38 Warren F. Kuehl and Gary B. Ostrower “Internationalism” in Richard Dean Burns, Alexander DeConde, and Fredrik Logevall eds., Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy, Vol.2, 2nd Edition (New York: Scribner’s Sons, 2002), 241-258; and Richard J. Goldstone, “World Peace Through Justice Award Lecture,” Washington University Global Studies Law Review, vol. 8, no. 4 (2009): 619-625; See also Robert H. Ferrell, Peace in Their Time: the Origins of the Kellogg-Briand Pact (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952); and Patrick O. Cohrs, The Unfinished Peace After World War I: America, Britain and the Stabilisation of Europe, 1919-1932 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). For the contradictions in President Wilson’s foreign policy, see Emily S. Rosenberg, "World War I, Wilsonianism, and Challenges to U.S. Empire," Diplomatic History, vol. 38, no. 4 (July, 2014): 852-863; Kennedy, Over Here, 37-42.

49 those ends.” They wanted an “empire without tears,” often minus the taxes needed to pay for any sort of imperial role.39 America’s pre-World War II approaches to foreign policy were complex, reflecting the varying interests, perspectives, and personalities that composed its democratic polity.

America Rises to Create a New World Order

World War II became the catalyst that pushed peace efforts to the forefront of national debates. As Germany and Japan subjugated more people, the inability of

America to prevent, deter, or stop the spread of the war became glaringly evident. The bombing of Pearl Harbor by Japanese planes in 1941 abruptly ended attempts to stay out of the war. It also discredited many prominent perspectives, such as the claims that the United States could evade the global conflict through pacifism, isolationism, or neutrality. America’s entry into the war quickly shifted the national conversation away from avoiding the conflict toward defining the purpose and goals of the war. In line with calls during World War I to “end all wars,” President Roosevelt led the nation into World

War II to make “certain that this form of treachery shall never again endanger us.”40 His words signaled a move toward more assertive and progressive approaches in US foreign policy. "American policymakers took it for granted that civilization, if not taken in hand and redirected, contained within itself ironic possibilities for self-immolation,” the

39 Warren I. Cohen, “The American Dream: Empire without Tears,” Global Dialogue, vol. 5 (Winter, 2003): 1-11.

40 Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Address to Congress Requesting a Declaration of War with Japan," December 8, 1941, The American Presidency Project, at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16053 (accessed July 14, 2015).

50 historian Frank Ninkovich remarks. Many of the efforts that followed aligned with

Wilson’s precepts. They centered on changing the principles and structures of the world order.41

The conflict animated the resolve of the nation and provided opportunities for new levels of cooperation. During the conflict, the variety of peace outlooks coalesced even as they narrowed, as many activists quickly shifted their foreign policy positions. The transformation of the intellectual Reinhold Niebuhr provides an example. Arguably the most influential American theologian of the twentieth century, Niebuhr’s broad appeal is often lost in an American contemporary consciousness that focuses on partisan and secular absolutes. Originally a pacifist and a supporter of isolationism, Niebuhr became a vocal interventionists by WWII and worked to change the outlook of his constituencies. As the global war increasingly menaced US interests and values, he galvanized American Christians against Axis aggression, explaining that moralism had to draw a distinction between tyranny and democracy. His efforts sought to redefine the parameters of pacifism, claiming that not using military force when needed could be amoral. Niebuhr’s efforts helped ensure that America’s Christians did not allow civilization’s destruction through principled neglect.42

This shift in political positioning carried into US politics. A similar change is evident in the policies of President Roosevelt during the 1930s. Initially constrained by America’s

41 Ninkovich, Modernity and Power, Introduction, xiii.

42 Arthur Schlesinger Jr., “Forgetting Reinhold Niebuhr,” New York Times, September 18, 2005; See also Richard Wightman Fox, Reinhold Niebuhr: A Biography (New York: Pantheon, 1985); and Colm McKeogh, The Political Realism of Reinhold Niebuhr: a Pragmatic Approach to Just War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997).

51 isolationist leanings and a lack of national consensus, beginning halfway through his second term FDR nudged the nation gradually but inexorably toward intervention. The year after his landslide election in 1936, he proposed a “quarantine” to stop the epidemic of international lawlessness. This initial foray set the conditions for a more active campaign to shape the outcome of World War II, such as efforts to sustain Britain and Russia in their fights against aggression and the “unqualified” support of aid to anti-

Axis countries. Roosevelt found ways to prevent the defeat of America’s allies while staying officially out of the war. In the aftermath of Pearl Harbor, these moves became explicit and expansive.43

The influential Republican Arthur Vandenberg made a more radical conversion. The senator from Michigan was a vocal champion of isolationism during the 1930s. After co- sponsoring the [Gerald] Nye Committee investigations into World War I profiteering, he was a sponsor of the Neutrality Acts and became a leading voice in steering US foreign policy away from intervention. After America declared war in 1941, however, he recognized how misguided his approaches had been and converted to

“internationalism.” He used his status on the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee to create a climate of bipartisanship that moved his party toward support for US leadership in world affairs.44

43 Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 148-150, 530-545.

44 David C. Tompkins, Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg: The Evolution of a Modern Republican, 1884-1945 (Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1970); See also Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., with Joe Alex Morris, The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952).

Many organizations replicated this phenomenon of shifting loyalties and support.

During World War II, numerous peace organizations evolved and rebranded their perspectives. They joined the movement and leveraged their broad constituencies for the new political fight. Their well-established networks brought techniques of public engagement that significantly expanded awareness and support for changes to US foreign policy. A prominent example was the Federal Council of Churches (FCC).

Founded in 1908, the FCC represented twenty-five Protestant denominations. It worked nationally and internationally to build awareness of a wide variety of problems, such as industrial concerns, disarmament, local empowerment, race relations, education, and world peace. Originally aligned with efforts to keep the US out of the war, the FCC, by

1940, was working domestically and internationally to pursue new alternatives. The council jettisoned its isolationist stance and created a Commission to Study the Bases of a Just and Durable Peace (CJDP).45

As public awareness of the need for the nation to change its foreign policy increased, cooperation between the various peace groups progressively blurred their distinctions. For example, numerous activists were members of several different organizations and contributed to an assortment of efforts. John Foster Dulles,

Eisenhower’s future secretary of state, was a lifelong advocate for changing the basis of global statecraft through adherence to international law and norms. His efforts led him into diverse associations. He was a member of the Federal Council of Churches (FCC),

45 Albert N. Keim, John Foster Dulles and the Federal Council of Churches, 1937-1949 (Dissertation: The Ohio State University, 1971), Chapter II, ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, http://search.proquest.com/docview/302507326?accountid=4444 (accessed January 22, 2017).

53 the Foreign Policy Association, the International Chamber of Commerce, a founding member of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), a prolific contributor to numerous academic journals, the author of several books, a frequent public speaker, and a

Republican Party stalwart. His efforts, like many, increasingly straddled different perspectives, as cooperation gained a position of prominence in American affairs.46

The wartime consolidation also led to the rise in influence of many more moderate or bipartisan groups and think-tanks. For example, the CFR became a prominent force in building a consensus that favored an internationalist US foreign policy. It attracted a diverse base of intellectuals, politicians, and elites. The CFR routinely invited and worked with world leaders in business, academia, and government. It mirrored the efforts of peace movements, in its organization and the dissemination of its views. It held bipartisan meetings, published numerous papers, books, and most importantly, disseminated the journal Foreign Affairs to which many of its members as well as prominent representatives of the foreign policy establishment contributed. Moreover, it increased its political stature through an inclusive approach that emphasized reasoned debates that spanned the range of policy positions. While facilitating the free exchange

46 Dulles was a participant at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, held at the Palace of Versailles, and continued his involvement in US government efforts to design solutions to the problems of German war reparations. He helped to develop an American sponsored compromise solution known as the Dawes Plan in 1924 and its successor the Young Plan in 1929. Richard H. Immerman, John Foster Dulles; Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in US Foreign Policy (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1999), 10-13; Ronald W. Pruessen, John Foster Dulles: The Road to Power (New York: The Free Press, 1982), 103. The FCC was founded in 1908 and included thirty-two Protestant denominations and close to twenty-five million members. It worked nationally and internationally to increase awareness of a wide variety of problems, such as industrial concerns, disarmament, local empowerment, race relations, education, and world peace. “Dulles Praises World Charter,” New York Times (Jun 26, 1945); JFD Speech, “The United States and the World of Nations,” National Study Conference on the Churches and the International Situation, February 27, 1940, Box 290, John Foster Dulles Papers, Public Policy Papers, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library.

54 of information and opinions, the CFR avoided political polemics. This bipartisan approach bore fruit.47 By 1945, the CFR was the preeminent internationalist institution in America. Its members included much of the intelligentsia within the US foreign policy establishment, with many of them becoming prominent players in the Truman and

Eisenhower Administrations. Their views, along with the bipartisan consensus they fostered, dominated US foreign policy debates into the late 1960s.48

By the closing days of World War II, the influential character of private activism was a determining factor in shaping US foreign policy. Its shift toward a bipartisan basis represented a new and extraordinary dynamic in national politics. It allowed the nation to escape the norm of two-party politics and to work within a moderate consensus, what Arthur Schlesinger would label the vital center.49 The founding of the United

Nations captured this popular energy. “In unprecedented fashion, civic groups around the nation – in business, and labor, in academia, in social clubs, and among professionals – organized themselves to enlist in the fight,” Schlesinger’s son, Stephen, wrote four decades after this father. During the drafting of the UN Charter in 1945, many of these groups went to San Francisco to assert their political power. Along with

47 Robert D. Schulzinger, The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs: The History of the Council on Foreign Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984).

48 Immerman, John Foster Dulles; Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in US Foreign Policy, 11-12; Pruessen, John Foster Dulles: The Road to Power, 103; Peter Gross, Continuing the Inquiry: From 1921 to 1996 (Council on Foreign Relations Book, 1996), http://www.cfr.org/history-and-theory-of-international- relations/continuing-inquiry/p108 (accessed December 16, 2015).

49 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Vital Center: The Politics of Freedom (Cambridge: Riverside Press, 1962).

55 the forty-two “official consultant” organizations recognized by the US government, a significant unofficial presence flooded the city.50

These efforts were persistent, as even after the San Francisco Conference the various organizations continued to focus public pressure on politicians. A “rump crusade” emerged to ensure that the Senate ratified the UN Charter. For example, the

American Association for the United Nations held a conference in New York to build support for the Charter. Representatives from over seven hundred organizations attended. Other groups produced similar results, such as the Lions Club engaging its

4700 clubs, the League of Women Voters, the American Veterans Committee, and the

National Education Association, which had over 50,000 members. The extraordinary organization and resolve to change the world order reflected an engaged and determined American public.51

By 1945, bipartisanship held substantial influence over US statecraft. There were deliberate efforts to build and sustain a political consensus in foreign affairs, such as a political project to create and advance an “American way” identity that suppressed the normal state of partisanship that dominates the nation’s democracy. It was an inclusive outlook, as moderates in both parties worked toward building a common purpose.52 It created a climate in which American politics really did end at the water’s edge. Partisan disagreements became secondary in importance, and America’s political leaders placed

50 Schlesinger, Act of Creation, xviii, 122.

51 Ibid, 268.

52 Wendy L. Wall, Inventing the "American Way": The Politics of Consensus from the New Deal to the Civil Rights Movement (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

56 foreign affairs ahead of domestic posturing. For example, the Democratic Truman administration named the Republican intellectual John Foster Dulles to be a US representative to the San Francisco Conference to set up the United Nations. This trend of moderation and popular engagement to address the challenges of world peace continued into the first postwar decade.53

These efforts allowed the nation’s citizens to implement programs that sought to create enduring peace in the world. Gallup polls taken during the 1940s attest to this phenomenon. In early 1941, only a third of those polled claimed that they had given any thought to how to maintain world peace after the war. Four years later, a full 81% of

Americans believed that “the US should join a world organization with police power to maintain world peace.” This exceptional shift in awareness revealed a nation that sought to avoid the horror of war. It led to the ready acceptance of the need to influence politicians to empower the nation to change global norms. It also encapsulated a widely held belief that without a radical shift in global norms another war was likely.54

Two major pillars of US postwar statecraft emerged that reflected a determination to assert US leadership to alter the norms of statecraft.55 First, the unprecedented US

53 Godfrey Hodgson, America in Our Time: From WWII to Nixon what happened and why (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1976), 67-98; See also Nancy Beck Young, Why We Fight: Congress and the Politics of World War II (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2013); Kenneth Paul O’Brien and Lynn Hudson Parsons, eds., The Home-Front War: World War II and American Society (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1995).

54 “Gallup Poll March 5, 1941” and “Gallup Poll April 8, 1945” in George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll; Public Opinion 1935-1971 (New York: Random House, 1972), 267, 497.

55 Eric Frederick Goldman, The Crucial Decade: America, 1945-1955 (New York: Knopf, 1956).

57 public and political support for changing the standards of international relations pushed the nation toward world leadership. It clarified US actions beyond deciding if it would play a role in world affairs by focusing on what that role would be. Advocates for more

US leadership explained that avoiding the global conflict prevented the US from influencing world affairs. Hamilton Fish Armstrong, the prominent editor of Foreign

Affairs, wrote that America’s interwar foreign policy was “to have no foreign policy.” He explained that both pacifist and isolationist approaches were inherently flawed, describing them as “negative” in effect. They rested on the naïve belief that, through the principled rejection of violence or by separating itself from world affairs, America would be secure. Armstrong asserted that the task of preserving peace requires a proactive or “positive” effort. The US had to engage in the quest to preserve peace.

Using its leadership to guide global statecraft toward cooperation and collaboration became a foundational characteristic of US postwar world.56

Henry Luce, the influential founder of the Time-Life Magazine empire, captured the need for American leadership to solve the crisis of war. Writing almost a year before the fateful Japanese attack on Hawaii, he explained that when most people viewed the future they only saw “conflict, disruption, war.” A conservative, Luce pointed out that the nation was rich in comparison to the rest of the human family and that this placed upon it an obligation to “solve the problems of our epoch.” The United States needed to

56 Hamilton Fish Armstrong, When There is No Peace (New York: MacMillan, 1939), 1-7; Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Peace and Counterpeace: From Wilson to Hitler (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 560- 561. See also Wendell L. Willkie, “Our Sovereignty: Shall We Use It?,” in Hamilton Fish Armstrong, ed., The Foreign Affairs Reader (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), 365.

58 determine not whether it would send troops to combat, as these were matters of strategy, but why the nation would fight. Luce shifted the argument from what the nation was against toward “what are we fighting for.” It was up to America to clarify the purpose of the conflict. He linked the nation’s isolationism and its failure to assert its leadership after World War I to the disaster of World War II and proclaimed that the

20th Century was the American Century. By asserting its leadership, the United States could move the world away from perpetual war toward a better future. He argued that by combining factors, such as free enterprise, sharing its expertise and by being a Good

Samaritan, an American brand of leadership could transform the world. Luce’s vision of an “American Century” took hold during the war, as well as his counsel that world power must include “a passionate devotion to great American ideals” and to the progress of man.57

These solutions, even those proposed by conservatives like Luce, were also very progressive, forming the nation’s second pillar of foreign policy. The US did not fight

World War II to defend the international system. It sought to replace it. A consensus evolved among the political elite and within peace movements that entrenched political interests around the world sustained their stature, in part, by claiming that war was natural and that the global system of nation-states was static. Accordingly, these thinkers concluded that making the world safe for America’s social, economic, and political systems required a different mindset and a comprehensive approach to altering

57 Editorial, “The American Century,” Life Magazine (February 17, 1941); See a reprinted edition in Henry R. Luce, “The American Century,” Diplomatic History, vol. 23, iss. 2 (Spring, 1999): 159-171.

59 global norms.58 This is not to say that the United States’ effort coalesced to produce a unified project. The divergence of opinions and solutions remained, often leading to incoherent consequences. Nevertheless, the proposals that gained influence after World

War II had several factors in common. Most were consistent in attempting to export the

US socio-economic-political systems internationally.59

Throughout the interwar period and into World War II, many works emerged that explained the dynamics of why America’s system worked. John Foster Dulles’ 1939 monograph War, Peace, and Change provides a comprehensive example that was consistent with many of the nation’s postwar policies. Writing during the lead up to

America’s involvement in World War II, Dulles’s treatise pointed out the failures of the old world system. He explains that the pursuit of selfish national desires led to a struggle between “static and dynamic forces.” It created conflicts between those that sought to preserve their positions in the world and others that wanted to acquire a greater stake.

The primitive method to resolve these conflicts of desire “was force or the threat of force.” Governments address this challenge domestically by providing avenues that allow for peaceful change or adaptations, such as by using laws to preserve rights and courts to resolve conflicts. The basic problem of international relations was that the international system was too rigid. This forced the nations of the world, particularly

58 Leland M. Goodrich, The United Nations (New York: Tomas Y. Crowell Company, 1959), 1-18.

59 Curti, Peace or War, 12-14.

60 aspiring or emerging ones, into a constant state of conflict. A “war system” defined the character of the prewar order.60

Dulles also points to the emotional aspects of the old world order. Governments intensified the challenges inherent in the global nation-state system by creating narrow group identities and “patriotisms.” Leaders advanced their authority through the creation of heroic narratives that defined the uniqueness of their nations. The “nation- hero” descriptions of the world emphasized that other nations were “villains.” This framing placed citizens in constant peril, thereby requiring national power and leadership as prophylactics. He concludes that these intellectual fabrications allowed and justified rampant competition between nations. They found their ultimate expression in a willingness to commit the nation and its soldiers to a total war.

Industrialization added fuel to this fire, as the conscription of the entire population, when combined with unprecedented levels of resources, created heights of human suffering, death, and destruction that reached catastrophic proportions. Even victor nations took decades to recover from the generations lost and the collapse of economic capacity.61

To mitigate these grand narratives and their disastrous results, solutions were needed that advanced both ethical and political changes. Dulles was not idealistic. He believed that answers had to address both the realities of human nature, such as self-

60 John Foster Dulles, War, Peace and Change, 2d edition (New York: Harper Brothers Publishers, 1939), Chapter 1.

61 Ibid, 53-70, 167-170.

61 interest, and the fact that the world remained divided into several nation-states. This required a combination of short-term programs and long-term efforts to build stability and reduce the subservience of peoples to their nations. Time was needed to “attack those basic assumptions” that proved themselves unacceptable to humanity and to develop more reasoned approaches to international affairs. Dulles wrote War, Peace, and Change long before he encountered Eisenhower. But their points of view were fundamentally compatible. This meeting of minds continued after Eisenhower’s election as president and choice of Dulles as his secretary of state.62

Dulles’s insights joined with many others to propose solutions to the ills of the international order. Their answers provided ways to preserve America’s economic system, freedoms, and democratic institutions, through a progressive effort to replicate

America’s systems globally. Many believed that American methods and approaches to government and society held the answer to the problem of international relations. An example is Representative Walter Judd’s (R-MN) claim that the US system was a model for the world. In a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations, Judd, conventionally associated with the Joseph McCarthy brand of anti-communism, explained, “[W]e need to make a cohesive unit of the world and to devise a system and a set of values to make this possible.” He pointed to the diversity that existed within the United States and to the nation’s success in managing the interests of different people, regions, and states.

He shared a widely held view that the US system allowed for the peaceful pursuit of interests within a system bounded by laws. It also protected the freedoms and rights of

62 Ibid.

62 individuals from the abuses of power. The system was not perfect, but it had the ability to balance extremes and produce moderation.63 Judd’s comments represented a view shared by many informed Americans. They believed that the balance the nation achieved between its diversity of thought, interests, and perspectives was the source of its enduring power, resilience, and liberties. The nation seemed impervious to both the autocracies on the right or the left.64

Many of the nation’s initiatives that materialized after World War II worked within this broad and exceptionalist mandate. Spreading American systems of government, economics, and rule of law became the favored approach toward achieving a stable world order. For example, US monetary policies after World War II sought to change the global order by building a capitalist economic system based on interdependence. These moves belie attempts to describe them as simply a continuation of “open door” policies that only worked to shore up America’s own commercial interests or economic power.

As Francis Gavin argues persuasively, "Few major economies have ever been less dependent on global markets and resources for their well-being than the United States in 1945.” The nation intended to expand its system globally and implemented a very

63 Walter Judd quoted in Christian Herter, James Fulbright, and Walter Judd, “Regional Views on America’s Role in the Postwar World,” Council on Foreign Relations- Study Group Reports (May 11, 1943), 1-3, CFR Records MC104, 1918-2004, Series 4: Meetings, Box 439) John Foster Dulles Papers, Public Policy Papers, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library; See also Dr. Walter H. Judd, “Oral History Interview, April 13, 1970,” Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/judd.htm (accessed April 20, 2015).

64 Jessica C. E Gienow-Hecht, "Cultural Imperialism," in Richard Dean Burns, Alexander DeConde, and Fredrik Logevall, Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy, vol. 1, 2nd ed. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 2002), 397-408.

63 inclusive approach that worked to assimilate other nations.65 United States policies replicated this effort within a political framework. America embarked on a “mission” after World War II to promote democracy, as many believed that the US system of government contained a unique ability to produce political flexibility, stability, legitimacy, and international cooperation.66

It is important to note that America’s attitude and the spirit of bipartisan cooperation did not create a consensus let alone unanimity. Stark divisions remained in the nation’s foreign policy outlooks. For example, personal or group interests remained a critical component, seen in the fierce disagreements between proponents of worldwide free trade and advocates of protecting US industries or agriculture.67 The issue of foreign aid provides another example. Some believed it was a significant tool of statecraft in the postwar world, while others questioned its purposes, effectiveness, and costs. This diversity of thought and interests would continue to prevent a coherent approach to US postwar foreign policy.68

65 Francis J. Gavin, Gold, Dollars & Power: The Politics of International Monetary Relations, 1958- 1971 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 200, 245 n12.

66 Tony Smith, America's Mission, Introduction; See also Immerman, Empire For Liberty, 5; Ninkovich, United States and Imperialism, 247-252; Jagdish N Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of Peace (New York: David McKay Company, 1966), 388-390.

67 For a discussion of America’s free trade vs. protectionist debates, see Orin Kirshner, “Superpower Politics: The Triumph of Free Trade in Postwar America,” Critical Review, vol. 19, no. 4 (October, 2007): 523.

68 For a comprehensive assessment of the politics of foreign assistance, see Carol Lancaster, Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).

Understanding the factors that informed America’s rise to global leadership expands the framework of the postwar period beyond a contest between authoritarian and democratic systems. It reveals that America supported a global effort to alter the norms of statecraft in ways that were inclusive, appealed to common values, and intended to make peace more enduring. These changes were not revolutionary, as they did not replace the existing foundations of international relations, such as military and economic power or nation-state dominance. National power remained a key component of international relations. Instead, many of the changes that emerged sought to restrain the traditional factors that informed US and global statecraft, as well as adding new considerations to influence them.69 Truman guided America’s initial efforts to assert new norms into global affairs. His successor would develop his own approach to push even harder.

69 Harley A. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949), 434; For additional reading on Truman’s foreign policy goals, see Dean G. Acheson, Strengthening the Forces of Freedom: Selected Speeches and Statements of Secretary of State Acheson, February 1949-April 1950 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950).

CHAPTER 3

JOINING THE MARCH FOR PEACE

Eisenhower volunteered to be a soldier in the march for peace in the spring of 1945.

In the early morning hours of May 7, 1945, in Reims, France, a week after Adolf Hitler committed suicide, German General Alfred Jodl signed the Act of Military Surrender on behalf of the German High Command.1 Jodl then presented himself to the Supreme

Allied Commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Eisenhower had few words for the enemy leader; he simply instructed Jodl that he was accountable to the terms of the agreement and dismissed him. As his staff notified subordinate headquarters throughout the theater, Eisenhower gave a short impromptu speech for a newsreel recording. After the moment passed, he retired to his quarters with his closest staff and called for champagne to mark the occasion. The mood in the room for the next two hours, nevertheless, was not celebratory. There was little talk or gaiety. The weight of the war dead, the horrors of the concentration camps, and the strain of years of planning and fighting filled the room. Before retiring around 5 am, Eisenhower sent a simple cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff: “The mission of this Allied Force was fulfilled at 0241, local time, May 7, 1945.//signed// Eisenhower.” The Allied Forces in

Europe completed their primary military mission and ended the war with Germany, but

Eisenhower knew that the effort to win the peace lay ahead.2

1 Representatives for the American, Soviet, French, and British militaries endorsed the document, acknowledging the unconditional ending of World War II in Europe.

2 Carlo D ’Este, Eisenhower: A Soldier’s Life (New York, Henry Holt and Company, 2002), 700-704.

After the guns fell silent on V-E (Victory in Europe) Day, Eisenhower’s hope for an easier schedule was never realized. During the six months he spent as the First Governor of the American Zone of Occupied Germany, he became immersed in processing the flood of enemy prisoners’ demands to surrender to Western forces, as well as the task of preparing America’s troops to both occupy defeated areas and return to the United

States. The urgent task of rebuilding Europe also engaged his energies. The war destroyed significant portions of the continent’s infrastructure and displaced millions, who needed assistance. The requirements to feed, shelter, and treat these masses competed with other factors, such as a growing black market, denazification, and the ban on fraternization, such as with Nazi leaders. These challenges, as well as many others, all but consumed the Army’s, and the General’s, efforts.3

Despite these trials, Eisenhower revealed a resolve to pursue goals that went beyond strict military matters. His first-hand understanding of the tragedy and misery of world war evolved into a firm commitment to ensure the sacrifices of the fallen went beyond the defeat of Hitler. He wanted their efforts to lead to the prevention of another world war. When he surveyed the world situation, he saw many obstacles on the path to building the new global standards that would preserve peace. Among them was the challenge of changing the narratives that defined world politics. He noted that the

American people had a “tragic lack of understanding” of the world, such as a serious misinterpretation of the causes of war. He resolved to use his standing, popularity, and

3 Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect, 1890-1952, vol. 1 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 409-410, 420-425.

67 the public venues they provided to “tell the truth bluntly, fearlessly, and simply.”4 This early foray would lead him down the path of becoming a vocal proponent for peace and the need to change the norms of international conduct.

For the remainder of his life, Eisenhower used his public profile to educate audiences on the possibility of changing how nation’s approached statecraft. While making several rounds of official visits throughout Europe and the United States in the months after the German surrender, the war hero used the speaking opportunities to advance the cause of peace. He personally drafted his speeches, and through his carefully chosen words, he made it clear that he sought to build support for changes in the norms of international conduct. He repeatedly asked his audiences to recommit themselves to addressing the future and the enormous “problems of peace.” His points revolved around several consistent themes. He denounced the nation-centric mindsets that justified war as an immutable aspect of international relations. Eisenhower highlighted the common factors that bound people together beyond nationalities. He counseled his audiences that there was a need to avoid policies that only served the

“selfish aims” of “men of narrow vision,” pointing to mutual interests that escaped partisanships. These efforts sought to move his audiences toward identities that would help unify worldviews.5

4 DDE to Bradford Grethen Chynoweth, March 7, 1946, DDEP, 7:903-905; He also believed they did not fully appreciate that the war was a conflict to preserve human rights against totalitarian conspiracies. See DDE to Alumni and Friends, February 3, 1949, DDEP, 10:462-465.

5 See DDE, “Speech at Belfast, August 24, 1945,” “Recording for the Radio Forum, September 29, 1945,” “Remarks at Louvain University, October 19, 1945,” “Remarks to Congress, June 18, 1945,” “Homecoming Speech, Abilene, Kansas, June 22, 1945,” in DDE, “Pre-Presidential speeches,” https://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/all_about_ike/speeches.html (accessed May 30, 2015); See also

In London on June 12, 1945, Eisenhower reiterated these points in his famous

Guildhall speech. In front of the assembled English dignitaries, he accepted the city’s

Freedom of the City, a symbolic act dating from Roman times, making him a citizen of

London.6 The Allied Commander’s remarks were both humble and determined. He reminded his audience that he was but a representative of the “men and women that have served with me in this war.” He underscored that he accepted the honor not as an

American but as the symbol of the “great human forces” that labored in a righteous cause. Eisenhower then stressed that the war represented a struggle for the future and that America and Britain, Abilene and London, shared common values. The two communities and nations were related by beliefs, such as “equality before the law” and freedom of speech. He ended his remarks by stating that he hoped, after the defeat of

Japan, that “no petty differences in the world of trade, traditions or national pride should ever blind us to identities in priceless values.” Through his words, Eisenhower expressed a resolve to move people past narrow conceptions of identity or patriotism, providing a way to help end the cycle of warfare that plagued the, supposedly, civilized world.7

DDE, Selected Speeches of Dwight D. Eisenhower (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970); DDE, Eisenhower Speaks: Dwight D. Eisenhower in his messages and speeches (New York: Farrar and Straus, 1948).

6 From Our Own Correspondent, “General Eisenhower ‘Now a Londoner’,” The Times (London, England), Wednesday, June 13, 1945, 7-8.

7 DDE “Speech at London, England,” June 12, 1945 (Guildhall Address),” in DDE, “Pre-Presidential speeches,” https://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/all_about_ike/speeches.html (accessed May 30, 2015).

Eisenhower’s advocacy demonstrates that he was an engaged witness in the contested US effort to create enduring peace. From the 1930s and into World War II, he observed and analyzed the broad contours of the debates that both advocated for and derided this grand vision. Like many of his generation, Eisenhower understood at a personal level the costs of failure. For him, war was not glorious or romantic, but expensive and destructive. Its price was not just paid in treasure, but also in blood and humanity. He watched the world slaughter its youth for the second time in his lifetime and witnessed the descent into cruelty that war created, such as the concentration camps that existed around Europe. These experiences gave him the determination to use his service, his influence, and his leadership to make a difference. It was an ambitious endeavor that would face many hurdles and defeats. It was also seen by many as the only viable alternative.

Several factors would inform Eisenhower’s outlooks and amplify his influence. First, his positioning gave him access to an established network of activism that would transform him into a leading participant in the project to change global norms. They also became a foundation of support that encouraged him to run for president. Second,

Eisenhower would add his own experiences as a soldier and student of strategy to his assessment of the challenges. Third, Eisenhower’s associations provided him a comprehensive understanding of the broad intellectual pillars that informed the project to create a more peaceful world.

A Comprehensive Movement for Peace

Eisenhower’s ideas about how to wage peace and the arguments that he presented to audiences were not original. Instead, the advocacy reflected his personal support of a concerted and increasingly popular effort that was in the headlines for decades. During

World War II, the initiative took hold and gained influence in US foreign policy. The

General’s support placed him within a network of like-minded thinkers. Among them were activists, public officials, academics, and business leaders who worked for decades to build a better global order. Many had strong résumés of determined efforts to shape the postwar world order. For example, he became very familiar with many of the members of The Council on Foreign Relations, such as the editor of its Foreign Affairs magazine Hamilton Fish Armstrong.8 Eisenhower was aware of the Council’s “long experience…in studies of foreign policy.” Their analysis, of the challenges to creating a peaceful world order, added to his appreciation of global problems.9

The clearest example of Eisenhower’s expanding associations with people seeking a better world order was John Foster Dulles. His interactions with his future Secretary of

State before he became president were limited, but they did know each other and moved within a similar circle of proponents for changing global norms.10 Although

8 See Herbert Brownell with John P. Burke, Advising Ike: The Memoirs of Attorney General Herbert Brownell (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1993), 70-86; See also DDE to Dean Gooderham Acheson, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, et al., December 2, 1948, DDEP, 10:338-340.

9 DDE to Dean Gooderham Acheson, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, et al., December 2, 1948, DDEP, 10:338-340.

10 H.W. Brands Jr., Cold Warriors: Eisenhower's Generation and American Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 11.

71 associated later in his life with bellicose rhetoric and the reflexive use of brinkmanship in US foreign policy, Dulles’s reputation as a wise statesman, from the interwar years through the onset of the Cold War, placed him at the top of America’s foreign-policy pyramid. He had decades of experience attempting to change the character of international relations. From his initial participation in and frustration with the 1919

Paris Peace Conference, Dulles dedicated his life to promoting US interests by building a better world order. Throughout the interwar years, he worked diligently to influence US foreign policy efforts. For example, Dulles was a key interlocutor in the 1920s to restructure German reparations payments, required in the Treaty of Versailles. Dulles helped to develop the Dawes Plan to reduce Germany’s debt burden and its successor the Young Plan that implemented further reductions.11

By World War II, many considered Dulles as one of the leading intellectuals in

American foreign policy. He was a productive contributor to multiple policy journals and magazines as well as a sought-after-speaker for conferences that addressed the challenges of world affairs.12 He championed a commission for a “just and durable peace,” working with the Federal Counsel of Churches; an effort that allowed him to influence FDR’s postwar planning. After 1945, the Democratic president, Harry Truman included Dulles in many of the nation’s foreign policy efforts. Yet he was a pivotal advisor to the Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg and the twice-nominated

11 See Richard H. Immerman, John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in US Foreign Policy (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1999), 10-13.

12 Andrew Preston, Sword of the Spirit, Shield of the Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy (New York: Knopf, 2012), 396; John Robinson Beal, John Foster Dulles: A Biography (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), 100-102.

Republican candidate for president, Thomas Dewey. Dulles personified the bipartisan consensus on foreign policy.13

Several of Eisenhower’s new contacts sought to convince America’s war-hero to run for President, an effort that intensified his desire to understand the challenges to peace.

By the end of the war, many saw him as a viable contender, leading both parties to court him. Liberal Democrats, including Truman himself, sought to gain Eisenhower’s candidacy in 1948, but he refused.14 A core group of individuals, mostly Republican, engaged in a parallel effort that eventually persuaded him to run in 1952. Eisenhower referred to them as the “gang.” Through them, he added not only a growing web of political supporters to his network, but also new opportunities to dialogue on national policies and politics.15 These links would increasingly immerse him, through a steady stream of correspondence, conference participation and visits, within a determined bipartisan political movement to sustain and adapt America’s progressive outlook toward changing global norms.16

13 See JFD, “Memorandum: Conference With the President at the White House to Discuss the "Statement of Political Propositions Formulated by the Commission to Study the Bases of a Just and Durable Peace Which Proposed Future International Collaboration Based Upon ‘Six Pillars of Peace,’ 1943 March 26,” John Foster Dulles Papers, Box 283, Public Policy Papers, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library.

14 Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader (New York: Basic Books, 1982), 159.

15 See Blanche Wiesen Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower: A Divided Legacy (Garden City: Doubleday, 1981); See also Robert Mason, “Citizens for Eisenhower and the Republican Party, 1951- 1965,” The Historical Journal, vol. 56, no. 2 (2013): 513-536.

16 Michael Wala, "An 'Education in Foreign Affairs for the Future President': the Council on Foreign Relations and Dwight D. Eisenhower," in Shirley Anne Warshaw, ed., Reexamining the Eisenhower Presidency (London: Greenwood Press, 1993), 2-11; For a small sample of the exchange of ideas that occurred, see DDE to William Edward Robinson, October 31, 1951, DDEP, 12:670-673; DDE Diary Entry,

Changing Character of War and Strategy

Eisenhower would add his own experiences and views on war, strategy, and foreign policy to the broad effort of creating enduring peace. As a mid-grade officer after World

War I, he had a progression of assignments that were not particularly remarkable, but that gave him a firm conviction for the necessity of a sound strategy. The young officer had a reputation for exceptional organizational skills and planning. This acumen placed him in contact with several leaders that eventually moved him out of obscurity. One of these was General Fox Connor. Conner was one of the Army’s leading minds and, during

World War I, instrumental to the success of the American Expeditionary Forces, under

General John J. Pershing. He was not only a brilliant planner, Conner was also a student of history, a philosopher, and actively mentored many talented leaders, such as George

C. Marshall and George S. Patton.

Connor would later help to advance Eisenhower’s career, but, while they served together in the Panama Canal Zone, he pushed Eisenhower to study. During the four years they were together, Fox used the luxury of slow military promotions and long assignments to focus Eisenhower toward readings in military history, Shakespeare, and strategic theory. Connor followed this homework with discussion sessions that required

Eisenhower to explain the meaning and conclusions of the works. This included reading closely and analyzing Carl von Clausewitz’s On War several times. It gave Eisenhower an

March 13, 1951, DDEP, 12:123-124; DDE to Aksel Nielsen, October 31, 1951, DDEP, 12:676; DDE Diary Entry, November 3, 1949, DDEP, 10:808-809; DDE Diary Entry, January 10, 1952, DDEP, 13:870-871.

74 appreciation for the Prussian general’s treatise, particularly the stress that he placed on the psychological and political aspects of war.17 Eisenhower described the period as a

“graduate school in military affairs.” The critical thinking experience broadened

Eisenhower’s outlooks on foreign policy and strategy, enhancing his already significant organizational and leadership abilities.18

Eisenhower’s intellectual transformation coincided with efforts around the world to revolutionize military affairs. From the age of Napoleon, changes to warfare transformed the era’s techniques from a norm of limited engagements toward total wars that engaged the whole nation. The industrial age amplified this shift, significantly increasing war’s destructive effects. World War I accelerated this trend, as innovations in airpower, tanks and chemical weapons intensified the disaster of conflict. Despite significant intellectual efforts to constrain warfare, such as the adoption of new global standards of statecraft and disarmament agreements, the practices of international relations remained rooted in state-centric and total warfare logic. The stagnant character of trench warfare during World War I, along with its extraordinary casualties and the unprecedented destruction from which it took years to recover, finally broke the logjam. It led to a groundswell of efforts that questioned the old orthodoxy and

17 Robert A. Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War (New York, Oxford University Press, 1981), 5-7; See also Edward Cox, Grey Eminence: Fox Conner and the Art of Mentorship (Stillwater, OK: New Forums Press, 2011), 82-93; See Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and trans. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

18 Ambrose, Eisenhower, 73-78; DDE, At ease: stories I tell to friends (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1967), 187; See also Carlo D ’Este, Eisenhower: A Soldier’s Life (New York, Henry Holt and Company, 2002), 163-164, 167-170.

75 sought to reframe conceptions of national strategy. By the interwar years, these changes caused a prolific debate over the efficacy of modern war.19

Throughout the early twentieth century, theorists worked to help nations escape the entrenched mindsets that narrowly equated war with destroying an adversary’s capacity to fight. In England, writers such as Basil Liddell Hart sought to shift the military away from attrition strategies toward maneuver. He wrote several pieces in which he argued for an “indirect approach” to war, moving the aim of war away from destroying an enemy’s means toward subduing its will.20 Several other thinkers worked to redefine approaches to war and warfare. Julian Corbett reframed naval strategy and argued that maritime efforts should not simply seek to replicate land concepts, such as concentrating on large fleet battles. Instead, he asserted that they should serve as a part of a greater strategy that focused on achieving the nation’s interests.21 Giulio Douhet, an Italian general, argued that airpower would transform warfare, as it offered ways to bypass ground forces, rendering old notions of the value of ground positioning obsolete.

It allowed for the achievement of victory by directly attacking centers of production and enemy civilians.22

19 Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 70-77.

20 Ibid, 134-137.

21 Julian Stafford Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1975), originally published in 1911.

22 Giulio Douhet, Command of the Air (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), originally published in 1921.

In the United States, a similar debate ensued inside its military. Senior leaders sought to build upon Secretary of War Elihu Root’s reforms of the early-twentieth century and change the military’s approaches and mindset toward strategy.23 The greatest dissent from past dogma came from the US Navy and the Army’s Air Corps.

Navy Commander George J. Meyers told an Army War College class in 1923 that the nation needed to think of military power as part of a greater national strategy. This meant that the military had to work “hand in hand” with “diplomacy and statesmanship.”24 Brigadier General Billy Mitchell became a vocal advocate during the interwar years for innovative ways to use air power, but riled the traditionalist who attempted to marginalize him.25

Eisenhower and other junior officers, such as George S. Patton, were familiar with these theories and became vocal in the effort to enact changes within the Army. For example, while in Panama, Eisenhower published an article in the Infantry Journal on tank warfare.26 Eisenhower’s arguments were primarily tactical in nature, but they revealed a willingness to innovate that some, more senior, leaders derided. If not for his

23 Root instituted a general staff corps, realistic large-scale training, and a comprehensive system of professional education to include the US Army War College. The reforms departed from a past reliance on character and experience to develop officers, adopting professional capabilities that served the nation in two world wars. Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Education of a General 1880–1939 (New York, NY: Viking Press, 1963), 167–79.

24 George J. Meyers, Strategy (Washington: Byron S. Adams, 1928), xiv.

25 James J. Cooke, Billy Mitchell (Boulder: L. Rienner, 2002).

26 The article sought to shift war planning and doctrine toward the uses of new technologies and techniques. He argued against those that believed the tank was simply a byproduct of trench warfare, asserting that it offered value as a mobile platform and as part of a team of diverse capabilities. Captain Dwight D. Eisenhower, “A Tank Discussion,” Infantry Journal, vol. 27 (1920): 453-458, http://www.shsu.edu/~his_ncp/Ike1920.html (accessed January 15, 2016).

77 close connections to Fox Conner, who helped influence his assignments, his career may have never recovered.27 The historian Russell Weigley explains that this mindset was due to America’s limited experience in World War I, leading much of the Army and the nation to remain fixated on narrow conceptions of conflict that saw war in strict traditional military terms.28

Nevertheless, some Army leaders exhibited more vision. They implemented concerted efforts to teach the Army’s future senior leaders critical strategic skills for warfare, such as how to raise, train and sustain a large field force, as well as how to integrate all of the services into a joint force that focused on sound objectives.29 Many of these ideas meshed with Clausewitz’s theory of war. The Prussian theorist asserted that politics was at the center of conflicts, insisting on the need to take “war away from mindless violence" and toward a clear political purpose. Clausewitz wrote “war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.”30 It shifted the venture from a question of how to win battles toward a more complex appreciation that included how the military, along with other instruments of national power, could combine their efforts to achieve political goals. Clausewitz’s thoughts became foundational concepts embedded into

27 Jean Edward Smith, Eisenhower in War and Peace (New York: Random House, 2012), 53-56.

28 Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War, A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (New York: Macmillan Publishers, 1973), 192-222.

29 Michael R. Matheny, Carrying the War to the Enemy: American Operational Art to 1945 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2011).

30 Freedman, Strategy: A History, 70-95; Clausewitz, On War, 87.

Eisenhower’s and his peers’ understanding of the relationship between the military, war, and foreign policy.31 His cohort profited from this exposure when they became the senior generals, admirals, and staff officers during World War II. It would lead

Eisenhower to focus strategies toward an overarching political purpose.

For the remainder of the interwar period, Eisenhower’s education helped him build a strong reputation. He became known for his exceptional ability to clarify complex issues and apply comprehensive solutions. He became indispensable, leading to a succession of assignments working for the nation’s top military leaders, most notably

Douglas MacArthur and George C. Marshall. They provided him remarkable strategic experiences that laid the foundation for his rapid rise from Colonel to Five Star General, when the military expanded its ranks during World War II.32 As the Supreme Allied

Commander in Europe, Eisenhower demonstrated an unparalleled ability to comprehend, coordinate, delegate and supervise substantial efforts.33

Eisenhower often credited two factors for the successful allied efforts during World

War II and sought to replicate them in the nation’s approaches to foreign policy. First, he was a firm believer in the value of centralized planning and command, as it allowed for a cooperative common focus. At the onset of the war, Eisenhower led George C.

Marshall’s initiative to establish unity of command in both the European and Pacific

31 DDE Diary Entry, July 2, 1953, DDEP, 14:358-362; See also Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War, 10-11; See also Thomas Bruscino, “Naturally Clausewitzian: U.S. Army Theory and Education from Reconstruction to the Interwar Years,” Journal of Military History, vol. 77 (October, 2013): 1251-1275.

32 Carlo D’Este, Eisenhower: A Soldier’s Life (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2002), 203-307.

33 Smith, Eisenhower in War and Peace, 290-317.

79 theaters. Throughout World War II, America’s military services and allies bickered over factors such as who should control forces, the allocation of resources, and major campaign decisions. Eisenhower held that overcoming this divergence required giving authority to a single commander.34 Second, he witnessed and developed confidence in the synergies created when the allies integrated their assets. The comprehensive use of ground, air, and sea forces, along with intelligence and logistics, intensified their individual effects. He described this approach as a “new technique of war” and pointed to its ability to confound the Germans.35 He would retain these views as president and pursue comprehensive approaches that focused on clearly defined objectives. It would lead him toward novel ways to continue the march toward peace.

Rationales that Justified Changing Global Norms

Along with the new associations and strategic experiences, Eisenhower studied the rationales that informed the movement for peace. His exposure to the vast network of advocates for an improved world order gave him a full appreciation for the intellectual foundations of the project. The proliferation of efforts that emerged after 1945 contained very different views on the causes of conflict, leading to equally varied solutions. But when viewed holistically, the programs, agreements, and global institutions that emerged had one central focus. They centered on reducing the efficacy

34 Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, Waging Peace, How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 41-43.

35 DDE “Remarks to Congress,” June 18, 1945, in DDE, “Pre-Presidential speeches,” https://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/all_about_ike/speeches.html (accessed May 30, 2015); DDE to Joseph Ingham Greene, July 13, 1946, DDEP, 7:1196-1198.

80 of using force in international relations.36 This nuance is important. Together, they created synergies that sought to reduce the reliance on military force to achieve desired results in international relations. This explanation expands the changes to statecraft that emerged after WWII from simple rules against war into a more comprehensive effort to change global standards of statecraft. They intended to make peace the new normal, by altering the calculations that informed state interests and by constructing a pattern of cooperation that would build the trust needed to change international norms of conduct.

The most important aspect of this early postwar effort was its long-term view, and time became the greatest factor in the free world’s favor. Agreements such as treaties and declarations between governments had proven themselves insufficient to sustaining peace. Many of the nation’s early postwar actions accepted that changing the variety of national approaches and worldviews, as well as a global order based on nation-states and a climate of distrust, would take decades. Peace required a change in mindset, not just new rules or structures. Changing global norms became America’s long game. It led to a consensus on global affairs that sought to balance both immediate

36 The scholarship of historian Robert Divine provides an early attempt to characterize the significance of these efforts. His aptly entitled Second Chance chronicles the range of American attitudes during World War II that sought to correct its errors of 1919. Divine concludes that the variety of agreements and approaches that emerged after 1945 contained one essential emphasis. They centered on preventing the problem of armed aggression. Divine’s insight paves the way for a different and broader frame of reference to explain the significance of America’s postwar foreign policy. The goal of remaking the world order did not simply seek to arrest violent behavior. Wars were the symptom of a greater problem and required comprehensive solutions. Robert A. Divine, Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America During World War II (New York: Atheneum, 1967).

81 security needs with programs that intended to influence the beliefs and actions of future generations. This framework formed the contextual basis of many US efforts.37

The conservative journalist and former student of Woodrow Wilson, David

Lawrence, described the effort as the “war against war.” America’s immediate postwar challenge was to isolate the “internal despotism” that existed around the world, seen as the source of many global conflicts. This would allow time for other efforts to empower citizens in tyrannical nations, as only they could help to abolish war. This perspective recasts the US Cold War efforts beyond the immediate necessities of containing communist power. In many ways, the superpower struggle represented America’s short game. Building a preponderance of power and containing the menace of tyranny set the conditions that allowed for long-term efforts to mature into new standards of conduct to guide citizens and governments.38

The founding of the United Nations is an exemplar of this perspective. Despite its unprecedented public support, a constrained organization emerged in 1945. The diversity of governments, points of view, and interests represented by the fifty delegations present in San Francisco led to numerous concessions that limited the goals and the power of the world organization. The “hard realities of international and

37 See Carl Joachim Friedrich, Inevitable Peace (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948), 210- 239; Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991 (New York: Vintage Books, 1996), 72-78.

38 David Lawrence, “The War Against War,” US News and World Report (June 29, 1951); See also Grayson Kafauver, Education for War and Peace (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1942); James B. Reston, “The Critic Turns Actor,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 24, no. 1 (October, 1945), 50-61; Herbert Read, Education for Peace (New York: Scribner’s Sons, 1949); Jerome Davis, Peace, War and You (New York: Henry Schuman, 1952), 10, see Chapter 17 for a list of ideas for Waging Peace; Joseph M.F.G. Fernando, World Peace Through Education (New York: Carlton Press, 1968).

82 domestic politics” ensured that many of the old world structures remained, such as the

UN’s retention of a balance of power framework in its five permanent and veto-wielding

Security Council members.39 Its architects understood this fact. Roosevelt rejected efforts to form an organization of like-minded nations. Instead, he sought to create a new venue to address conflicts that did not exclude anyone.40 The inclusive approach intended to transform the global stage, albeit slowly and incrementally.41

The long-view toward change coincided with more immediate efforts to mitigate the causes of war. From the onset of America’s entry into World War II, addressing the economic factors and its related international competition became a US foreign policy pillar. Leading thinkers believed that economic breakdowns between the great powers were a chief cause of the Second World War. They also understood that economic nationalism amplified the normal and reoccurring sequence of economic downturns, as nations instituted protectionist measures that worsened the glut of credit and goods and cut off businesses from their sources of supply and markets. This practice exacerbated the Great Depression, both in intensity and duration. A concerted US effort materialized to create a more cooperative interdependent framework. It sought to

39 Stephen C. Schlesinger, Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations; A Story of Superpowers, Secret Agents, Wartime Allies and Enemies, and Their Quest for a Peaceful World (Boulder: Westview Press, 2003), xvi.

40 Woodrow Wilson, Woodrow Wilson’s Case for the League of Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1923), 64; Franklin Delano Roosevelt, “Speech before a Joint Session of Congress, March 2, 1944,” in Quincy Wright, ed., A Foreign Policy of the United States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), 75.

41 See Preston, Sword of the Spirit, Shield of the Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy, 407-409; See also Oliver Jütersonke, “Echoes of a Forgotten Past: Mid-Century Realism and the Legacy of International Law,” Ethics & International Affairs, vol. 26, no. 3 (2012): 373-386, 377.

83 moderate the effects of these economic cycles and competitive nation-centric practices.42

The US entered World War II intending to advance a liberal world trading system that reduced the rationales for conflict.43 Through the Atlantic Charter, Roosevelt made it clear to Britain that America would base its war support on several premises, such as

“the virtues of free trade versus Imperial preference.” America’s involvement intended to produce a new system of global commerce to assure the “freedom from fear and want for all men.”44 The 1944 Bretton Woods Conference was congruent with these views. The agreement, made by 730 delegates from 44 allied nations, aimed to create open markets through new economic standards. It promoted stable exchange rates, economic development, and increased international cooperation. It sought to eliminate discriminatory business practices and provide peaceful avenues to adjudicate trade disputes. The plan led to the creation of the World Bank and the International Monetary

Fund to solve the financial aspects of these problems. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) followed in 1947, substantially reducing tariffs and other trade

42 Edwin F. Gay, “The Great Depression,” in Hamilton Fish Armstrong, ed., The Foreign Affairs Reader (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), 133-146; Lionel Robbins, The Economic Causes of War (New York: MacMillan, 1940); See also Editorial, "Freer Trade vs. Control," Fortune, Vol. XXXV, No. 2 (February, 1947): 2-4.

43 James Chace, “1945, Zero Year,” World Policy Journal, vol. 12, no. 4 (Winter 1995): 61-70.

44 Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 280-285.

84 barriers on a reciprocal basis.45 It also opened a venue for assistance to less-developed nations, based on “criteria compatible with free-market capitalism.”46

Many other US postwar efforts further mitigated the rationales for war. The

Marshall Plan and foreign assistance programs played a crucial role in first ensuring the survival and then bolstering the stability of western socio-economic systems. They demonstrated America’s resolve to avoid future catastrophe, by sharing “the affluence that the United States had established amid the carnage of WWII [in original],” with others.47 Truman’s Point Four Program fit within this outlook.48 It offered development assistance to underdeveloped nations, encouraged “self-help” and was a “distinctive change” from imperial methods of achieving foreign policy goals. It also projected an

American form of modernization that sought to prevent communist expansion into the

45 See Jonathan Stevenson, Preventing Conflict: The Role of the Bretton Woods Institutions (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); See also Editorial, "Freer Trade vs. Control," Fortune, Vol. XXXV, No. 2 (February, 1947): 2-4; See also Alfred E. Eckes, Jr., and Thomas W. Zeiler, Globalization and the American Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

46 Walter L. Hixson, “Cold War Evolution and Interpretations,” in Richard Dean Burns, Alexander DeConde, and Fredrik Logevall, eds., Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy, vol. 1. 2nd ed. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 2002), 207-222.

47 Diane B. Kunz, Butter and Guns: America’s Cold War Economic Diplomacy (New York: Free Press, 1997), 3.

48 Point Four complimented Henry Luce’s grand vision of enlightened US leadership in the American Century. It sought to raise global standards of living through the sharing of American techniques, in fields as diverse as agriculture, industry, and health. Henry Luce, "the Reformation of the world's economies," Fortune, (February 1950): 59-63; This outlook was not unusual, Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), created during the 1944 Bretton Woods conference, sought to promote international “development.” Eric Helleiner, “The Development Mandate of International Institutions: Where Did it Come From?,” Studies in Comparative International Development, vol. 44, no.3 (Sep 2009): 189-211.

85 underdeveloped world. In practice, the concept was never sufficiently funded in ways that would have tested the theory.49

The creation of security alliances became a second pillar to mitigate the immediate causes of warfare and a foundational concept of US postwar foreign policy. Between

1947 and 1952, the US built collective security arrangements, such as NATO, with many nations and contractual agreements with Germany. These efforts went beyond containing the Soviet Union. They reinforced America’s commitment to the UN Charter’s vision of collective defense, served to alleviate the insecurity that defined the anarchic old world system, and established a foundation of peaceful coexistence.

The Peace Treaty with Japan exemplified the dynamic aspects inherent in this US postwar approach. In the late summer of 1950, President Truman asked John Foster

Dulles to negotiate a peace agreement with Japan. His mission sought to end America’s occupation, provide guarantees against a military resurgence, and transform the former enemy into an ally. Dulles had a full appreciation for the task. He recalled the failures at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, as US allies imposed draconian reparations on

Germany that led to “disastrous” consequences, such as their causal link to World War

II.50 Throughout the multinational negotiations, Dulles refused demands to impose reparations on Japan. He also understood the security dynamics at play and worked to

49 Stephen Macekura, “The Point Four Program and U.S. International Development Policy,” Political Science Quarterly, vol. 128, no. 1 (Spring, 2013): 127-160.

50 He was also a member of the US delegation at the San Francisco conference that created the UN Charter and had attended the postwar meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers mandated by the final wartime summit at Potsdam.

86 shore up support for the treaty with other key allies. Many of the nation’s that went to war with Japan in World War II were reluctant if not unwilling to extend it any trust.51

By the following year, Dulles successfully created new dynamics in international relations. He secured regional support for the treaty, such as by mitigating the security concerns of Australia and New Zealand through the creation of a security pact (ANZUS), signed on September 1, 1951, in San Francisco. It built the foundation for the greater effort to achieve peace with Japan. He stayed in the city and the following week chaired the conference to put the final touches on the Treaty with Japan. During these negotiations, Dulles outmaneuvered Soviet attempts to scuttle the effort and successfully gained the support of the other forty-eight nations present as well as both

Democrats and Republicans in the US Congress. The treaty officially ended the allied war with, and US occupation of, Japan. Later that same day, the US signed an additional

Security Treaty between the United States and Japan adding Asia’s industrial giant to the free world’s sphere. Dulles would bring these experiences to his duties as Secretary of State under Eisenhower.52

Dulles’s successes reflected an approach to statecraft initiated under Truman and institutionalized under Eisenhower. During the Truman era, the US secured the critical industrial cores of Europe and Asia not by force but through a willingness to account for

51 Richard Goold-Adams, John Foster Dulles: A Reappraisal (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1962), 45-52.

52 Ibid.; See also Department of State Publication, Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at San Francisco, September 8, 1951, with related documents (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952); Claude A. Buss, “US Policy on the Japan Treaty,” Far Eastern Survey, vol. 20, no. 12 (June 13, 1951): 113-119.

87 the stakeholders’ mutual interests. The approach effectively integrated Japan, Germany, and other nations into a cohesive foundation of both economic and military security.

The approach used the principle of collective security to contain communist expansion and to integrate many nations into the peaceful world order. It is not by coincidence that America’s enemies during WWII, Japan and Germany, transformed into strategic allies. By the end of the Cold War, America’s vision allowed these major belligerents to become the second and third largest economies in the world and partners in the new global order. 53

US efforts to build an enduring peace also sought to address what can be described as the intellectual factors that justified conflict. In 1922, the journalist and public intellectual Walter Lippmann captured the ways in which social perceptions informed societal behavior. He proclaimed that “...the pictures inside people’s heads do not automatically correspond with the world outside.” These discrepancies he described as

“public opinions.” Several factors contributed to this gap, such as censorship of information by authorities, social barriers and lack of personal interest. His book informed Eisenhower’s generation and led many to conclude that changing preconceptions, prejudices and moral codes offered a way to address causes of war.54

These ideas led to multiple efforts that sought to move world relations beyond nation-centric calculations of economic strength, military power, or narrowly defined

53 Melvin P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 516.

54 Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: The Free Press, 1922), 10–20, 59

88 interest. Advocates for a better world order understood that state-to-state conflict, in all of its forms, was historically the normative condition of the world. To change this dynamic, many postwar activists intended to work over time to build a globe “ordered by law” and to recast vital interests as the “freedom of the whole society from war rather than the freedom of the nation to wage war as an instrument of policy.” They sought to build trust, establish universal standards and to make peace the foundation of the postwar international order.55

After 1945, international law was elevated to a position of prominence, if not absolute authority. The catastrophe of World War reinvigorated International law as a vital component of international conduct. The shift was more in emphasis, as international law already provided the basis of global statecraft. The US Constitution gives Congress “the power to define and punish… offenses against the law of nations.”

This acknowledgement of international law was normative. President Wilson justified the US entry into World War I, in part, due to Germany’s disregard for International law.

Global agreements remain a factor that informs nation-state approaches to international relations.56

During the closing months of World War II, concerted efforts were made to reemphasize past global agreements and to add new ones aimed at regulating the violent impulses of nations. For example, the United Nations inserted a functioning

55 William Eldred Jackson, “Putting the Nuremberg Law to Work,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 25, no. 4 (July, 1947): 550-565.

56 Philip C. Jessup, "The Reality of International Law," Foreign Affairs, vol. 18, no 2 (Jan 1940): 245-253.

89 world organization into the equation of international relations. It created the foundation and legal basis for a new world order. The UN also established new rules of nation-state conduct that shifted conflict away from being a normal tool in global affairs toward a defensive instrument. It rejected the “realist” premise that the blind pursuit of power was the sole purpose of nations. Its Charter specifically denied the absolute sovereignty of nations and sought to make warfare unusual and aggressive wars illegal. The UN

Charter clearly states that “armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest.”

It denied the claim of “vital interests” as a justification for war, emphasizing the necessity to move away from the “scourge of war” and toward fundamental human and international rights. It intended to derail the singular focus on national interests that led to war and provide a forum for the peaceful adjudication of disputes.57

A groundswell of postwar activities furthered the effort to assert new norms into global affairs. Henry Stimson, the former US Secretary of War and Secretary of State, pronounced in 1947 that the Nuremberg Trials gave the world new hope as a “landmark in the history of international law.” The judicial proceedings elevated international law and global principles to be the new standard of statecraft. The trials placed law ahead of power and explicitly intended to avoid arbitrary punishment. It gave “to the Nazis what

57 Paul M. Kennedy, The Parliament of Man: The Past, Present and Future of the United Nations (New York: Random House, 2006), Introduction, xiii; A.H. Feller, United Nations and World Community (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1952), 5-6, 13, 138-141; See also Leland M. Goodrich and Edvard Hambro, Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents, 2d revised edition (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1949).

90 they had denied their own opponents – the protection of the law.”58 The International

Court of Justice (ICJ) created in 1945 offered another venue to constrain aggressive warfare. Although its jurisdiction was discretionary, it provided a forum for the peaceful and impartial resolution of disputes.59

The surge of human rights activity after World War II sought to reshape the intellectual underpinnings of the global commons. The 1948 American Declaration of the Rights & Duties of Man and the UN General Assembly’s adoption of the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) later that same year elevated human rights to become a global phenomenon. These declarations joined other associated efforts, such as the 1949 Geneva Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of

Genocide, to place new standards into the fabric of international relations. The historian

Elizabeth Borgwardt explains that, collectively, they affirmed that there were such a thing as “crimes against humanity” and infused universal norms into global debates.60

58 Henry Stimson, “The Nuremberg Trial: Landmark in Law,” in Hamilton Fish Armstrong, ed., The Foreign Affairs Reader (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), 451-463; See also William Eldred Jackson, “Putting the Nuremberg Law to Work,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 25, no. 4 (July, 1947): 550-565. 59 The International Court of Justice’s (ICJ), often referred to as the World Court, statute is an agreement appended to the UN Charter. It serves to further the UN mandate and facilitate the peaceful resolution of disputes. David Wirth, “International Court of Justice,” in Stanley I. Kutler, ed., Dictionary of American History, 3rd ed., vol. 4 (New York: Scribner’s Sons, 2003), 387-388; Throughout the late 1940s and into the 1950s, the Soviet Union and its allies refused to submit to the jurisdiction of the court in general. The US also added a clause "as determined by the US" that made its jurisdiction voluntary. See Georges Abi-Saab, “The International Court as a world court,” in Vaughan Lowe, ed., Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 3-16.

60 For discussions on the influence of Human Rights on global norms, see “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” United Nations, http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ (accessed August 12, 2015); David Fromkin, The Independence of Nations (New York: Praeger, 1981), 76-81; Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010); Akira Iriye, Petra Goedde, and William I. Hitchcock, eds., The Human Rights Revolution: An International History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); Other scholars point to US domestic efforts to leverage these universal values and principles to change America, such as the Civil Rights movement, see Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001); Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War

Combined, these efforts affected international relations in dynamic ways. They created a framework of international legitimacy and justice to alter nation-state conduct. Laws serve two critical functions in society. They are an almost universally accepted way to balance the ambitions and desires of parts of society in service of a common good. They also elevate the threshold for using violence, providing frameworks for mutual deterrence. This allows laws to moderate behavior, from individuals to nation-states.61 International laws and norms also have a co-opting or deterrence effect.

They serve to highlight infractions against common standards. The nations that agree to them become obliged to adhere to the new rules, or, at a minimum, are evaluated by them. For example, despite its limited authority, the International Court of Justice situated the actions of nations within the realm of “legal significance.” Whether members allowed the court to adjudicate international challenges or not, their actions became discussed within the new concept of international legitimacy and law. These moves created a different global commons or social reality after World War II. They also established public and popular expectations for nation-state conduct that, over time, placed pressure toward compliance and deterred non-compliance.62

Civil Rights, Race and the Image of American Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Elizabeth Borgwardt, “Bernath Lecture: Commerce and Complicity: Corporate Responsibility for Human Rights Abuses as a Legacy of Nuremberg,” Diplomatic History, vol. 34, Iss. 4 (2010): 627-640; and Elizabeth Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World: America's Vision for Human Rights (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005).

61 JFD Lecture “Toward World Order, March 5, 1942,” John Foster Dulles Papers, Public Policy Papers, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library.

62 Philip Allot, “The International Court and the voice of justice,” in Vaughan Lowe, ed., Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 17-39; Paul Gordon Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), 299-303.

During the early postwar period, Eisenhower studied and contributed to the efforts to change global norms, as well as the challenges that emerged to resist them. He watched as America’s first postwar president confronted the opening series of assaults on the grand project. As civil conflicts and cold war tensions moved to the foreground, the varied approaches to creating a more peaceful world order attracted uneven support or outright opposition. For example, many questioned the efficacy of international law to constrain state behavior, if not rejecting it altogether. Additionally, the cost of the effort became contentious, as Americans criticized its drain on national treasure and its impact on the national character. Eisenhower examined these trends, weighed alternative perspectives, and became interested in how the project could evolve.

CHAPTER 4

EISENHOWER’S STUDY FOR PEACE

In the fall of 1945, Eisenhower returned to Washington to serve as the Army’s Chief of Staff. The assignment exposed him to a network of new associations, as well as giving him a venue to assess the initial moves made by the United States under the Truman

Administration. In contrast to today’s norm of replacing substantial numbers of people when the White House changes its political party, many key Republicans, including

Eisenhower and his future secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, played substantive roles within the Truman Administration. These experiences gave them an insider’s appreciation for the challenges faced by America’s first postwar President. This included an education in the myriad efforts to transform the global order, as well as the obstacles that sought to or unintentionally prevented it. This continuity also provided the opportunity to acquire critical insights into the complexities that surrounded US foreign policy development. Eisenhower used the time to study the debates surrounding approaches to US foreign policy, as well as to develop his own assessment of the world situation and the challenges that threatened the project for peace.1

They led him to measure the efficacy of the various approaches, adapt his views, and formulate and even revise his advocacy. For example, Eisenhower was initially a strong supporter of the United Nations. But like many Americans, his outlook adjusted as he watched the Security Council struggle to be an effective organ for peace. This reality was

1 See DDE to Harry S. Truman, November 7, 1952, DDEP, 13:1414-1415.

94 due to many factors, such as Russia’s prolific use of its veto power.2 It led Eisenhower to accept the immediate limitations of the institution, as well as maintaining a belief in its value as a transformative agent in global affairs. William T.R. Fox, a distinguished professor at Columbia University and the first Director of Eisenhower’s Institute of War and Peace Studies, explained that the United Nations remained a “potent symbol of man’s aspirations of peace and security.”3

Additionally, Eisenhower understood that many of the obstacles to the project for peace came from American sources. He saw significant deficiencies in the nation’s ability to work toward common, and in his mind, vital interests. He had a general disdain for the factionalism that characterized US politics, believing that it derived from weak organization and weak thinking. This led him to become a vocal advocate for consolidating control over national security affairs. This included joining Truman in the push to “unify” America’s military forces through the merging of authorities and responsibilities. The 1947 National Security Act was in large part an attempt to combine the armed services into a cohesive National Military Establishment (NME), later called the Department of Defense. It intended to integrate the Army, Navy and the newly created Air Force, reduce redundancies, and build coherence in Defense policies and strategies. Eisenhower explained that the NME, headed by a Secretary of Defense, made

“possible the organization of a comprehensive civil defense.” Despite these efforts,

2 Caroline Anne Pruden, Conditional Partners: Eisenhower, the United Nations, and the Search for a Permanent Peace (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1998), 17, 16-27.

3 William T.R. Fox, “The United Nations in the Era of Total Diplomacy,” International Organization, vol. 5, no. 2 (May, 1951): 265-273.

95 opposition from within the military stymied many initiatives. The different services, particularly the Navy, offered firm resistance and would eventually succeed in sustaining a fragmented and parochial military apparatus that persists to this day. These experiences soured Eisenhower, and he remained frustrated by the narrow positioning he saw from many of his military contemporaries.4

His frustrations with parochialism extended to the shallowness he saw in national debates. In his routine of public appearances, Eisenhower consistently addressed the issue of oversimplified, often politicized, explanations of issues. He used his national stature to lament publicly that instead of promoting constructive dialogue, the nation often descended into the exchange of crude viewpoints that oversimplified the nation’s challenges. It contributed to a general intellectual malaise that allowed for the perpetuation of the “war system” in global affairs. He felt that “serious differences in conviction must be beaten out on the anvil of logic and justice.”5

Eisenhower also found that public inattention was causal to the challenge.

Americans allowed others to dilute the nation’s most significant issues. Eisenhower explained to audiences that dictators prevented public discussions of issues in their countries, but Americans gave away their rights by simply ignoring them. The United

4 David Jablonsky, War by Land, Sea and Air: Dwight Eisenhower and the Concept of Unified Command (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010); DDE to All Members of the Army, July 26, 1947, DDEP, 9:1867-1868; DDE “Speech to American Legion Convention,” New York City, August 29, 1947 in DDE, “Pre-Presidential speeches,” https://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/all_about_ike/speeches.html (accessed May 30, 2015); See also DDE to Douglas MacArthur, February 13, 1946, DDEP, 7:858-862; DDE to Douglas MacArthur, August 28, 1946, DDEP, 8:1258-1260; DDE to Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 2, 1946, DDEP, 7:818-819; DDE to Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 23, 1947, DDEP, 8:1458-1459.

5 DDE, “Hand of Aggressor is Stayed by Strength Alone,” speech delivered before the English Speaking Union, London, England, July 3, 1951, reprinted in Dwight D. Eisenhower, "The Challenge of Our Time," Vital Speeches of the Day, vol. 17, no. 20 (Aug. 1, 1951): 613-614.

States had to fear the “decay of our freedoms through our own neglect,” as a disengaged public surrendered its “own responsibilities to a central authority.” He tried to correct this by urging his listeners to demand more open discussions and inquires that would allow people to escape partisan politics and redirect the course of the nation.6

Eisenhower’s critiques included a belief that the nation needed a more comprehensive approach to the study of strategy and the development of national policy. For him and many of his contemporaries, the superpower rivalry was only one issue that vied for space within a complex span of concerns. For example, the problem of nuclear weapons was an equally pressing challenge and influence on American foreign policy. The use of atomic bombs on two of Japan’s cities at the closing of World

War II helped to end the brutal and costly war, but it opened a new chapter in international relations and strategy calculations. Similar to airpower, the weapons negated the military’s ability to protect its populations. No matter how many divisions of tanks a nation had, a nuclear-armed adversary could directly threaten its citizens. This shift transformed the character of postwar security, such as by altering traditional notions of military power and its use as a deterrent or bargaining tool in statecraft.7 This realization led to a proliferation of studies on how nuclear weapons transformed the

6 DDE, “Speech, Texas A&M,” College Station, Texas, November 9, 1950 in DDE, “Pre-Presidential speeches,” https://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/all_about_ike/speeches.html (accessed May 30, 2015).

7 Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).

97 calculations of strategy and security,8 as well as US government efforts to control their proliferation and use, such as through the Baruch Plan.9

Eisenhower became intimately familiar with these debates. He received an advance copy of Bernard Brodie, et al., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and the World

Order. The iconic anthology examined the implications of atomic weapons and offered several estimates of how they would affect warfare, US policy, the Cold War and international relations. The study emphasized that proliferation was likely and pointed toward the need for comprehensive strategies to counter them. This included political negotiations, disarmament efforts, and military defenses. The authors also concluded that the fear of mutual destruction might actually deter adversaries and restrain their rational use, leading to stability.10 Eisenhower agreed with many of the book’s premises.

He believed that the United States “must re-evaluate our situation in light of scientific advances” and develop policies that included them.11

8 Robert E. Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Security (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1957); Morton Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age (New York, Wiley, 1963); For the views of eight prominent nuclear theorist, see John Baylis and John Garnett, “Introduction,” in Makers of Nuclear Strategy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 1-18.

9 President Truman asked Bernard Baruch to be the US Representative to a committee created to advise the United Nations’ Atomic Energy Commission, formed in early 1946 under the auspices of the Security Council. Their proposal, commonly referred to as the Baruch Plan, called for an international organization to regulate atomic energy. Bernard M. Baruch, Baruch: My Own Story (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1957), 325.

10 Bernard Brodie, ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and the World Order (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1946); DDE, “Toast to Marshal Zhukov,” Frankfurt, Germany, June 10, 1945, in DDE, “Pre-Presidential speeches,” https://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/all_about_ike/speeches.html (accessed May 30, 2015).

11 DDE to Joseph Ingham Greene, July 13, 1946, DDEP, 7: 1196-1197; Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, Waging Peace, How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 48-52.

Education and the Project for Peace

As Chief of Staff of the Army, Eisenhower was in a position to go beyond his assessments and to insert many of these ideas into military affairs. During World War II, the military discovered that it needed to overhaul its education systems. The war demonstrated that senior officers needed a better basis of education and experiences that went well beyond tactical military affairs. Its officers lacked critical skills, such as regional expertise and an understanding of politics, economics, and national strategy.

Many civilian specialists received commissions during the war to meet these particular needs. Additionally, they needed a firm grounding in joint operations. No longer could

Army, Navy, and Air Force officers confine their expertise to their respective land, sea, and air domains. The highest levels of military service required a more holistic appreciation of national security and its effects on national and military strategy.12

Recognizing these failures, Eisenhower implemented programs to reorient the development and preparation of military leaders.13 This included support for the development of a National War College to replace the service centric Army-Navy Staff

College at Fort McNair, Washington D.C..14 Its curriculum included a diverse array of

12 George S Pappas, Prudens Futuri: U.S. Army War College, 1901 – 1967 (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Alumni Association of the U.S. Army War College, 1968), 139 – 150.

13 Eisenhower was a believer in education. Not only did he excel at both the US Army’s Command and Staff College and Army War College, but he also valued the benefits they gave him. Eisenhower believed that graduation from the War College should be a “prerequisite for selection for high command and staff positions.” DDE to Harry Wilbur Hill, January 28, 1946, DDEP, 7:800-803.

14 The new academic institution opened its doors in the summer of 1946, see DDE to John Francis Martin Whiteley, January 3, 1946, DDEP, 7:721-724.

99 subjects, such as “international commitments,” “central intelligence,” and “world organization for peace.” The nation’s future senior military officers also received a rigorous immersion in all of the elements that composed America’s national power, from diplomacy to economics, as well as a broad exposure to the dynamics of policy and strategy formulation. These efforts signal Eisenhower’s determination to broaden the military’s ability to understand and contribute to foreign policy.15

Eisenhower’s elevation of officer education coincided with a parallel effort to enhance the nation’s outlook on world affairs. For example, many advocates for changing global norms attempted to elevate the challenges of the Soviet Union beyond narrow military comparisons. George Kennan emerged at the center of the debate. The architect of containment gained national attention in early 1946 with his Long Telegram, but increasingly he came to believe that the nation departed from his vision. For example, it disregarded his arguments that confining the advance of communism could be done in limited, but comprehensive ways. The legacy of Munich shaped perspectives and perceptions for decades, leading opponents to call for more decisive, often martial, efforts. They coopted Kennan’s views on containment and combined them with hysterical narratives that portrayed Moscow’s moves as part of a grand plan for world domination and imminently catastrophic to US interests and the world.16 These actions

15 Pappas, Prudens Futuri, 139 – 150; DDE to Harry Wilbur Hill, January 28, 1946, DDEP, 7:800-803 (see the notes of the letter for a detailed review of the curriculum); DDE to Chester William Nimitz, June 12, 1946, DDEP, 7:1116-1117.

16 Two months after sending the telegram, Kennan confided to a friend that t it would be necessary to continue to restrain the “panic-mongers,” in order to maintain a long-term outlook. George Kennan quoted in John Lewis Gaddis, George F. Kennan: an American Life (New York: Penguin Press, 2011), 230-231.

100 led Kennan to present new arguments that intended to derail the myopic conceptions and approaches that he saw proliferating in Washington. Kennan countered that

Western militarism would exacerbate Soviet insecurities and perhaps trigger the very behavior the US sought to avert. Conversely, containment coupled with an

“unprovocative” demeanor offered a way to defeat the Soviet Union without fighting. It would allow the “internal contradictions” of the Soviet government to manifest themselves and accelerate domestic demands for change.17

The Army’s Chief of Staff became very familiar with and appreciated Kennan’s alternative views toward the Soviet Union. He was also often in the position of disputing the tendency toward exaggeration. For example, in the summer of 1946 Eisenhower found himself trying to avert another war scare. Several advisors persisted in presenting the inevitability of a war with the Soviet Union to Truman. Eisenhower countered by counselling the President toward restraint. He stressed that he did not believe that the

Soviets wanted a war. He also questioned whether they were strong enough to attempt an invasion of Western Europe, as they lacked the elaborate logistical support needed for the task.18

When Kennan decided to retire from the State Department in 1946, Eisenhower recruited him to be one of the National War College’s initial Deputies.19 While there,

17 This outlook understood that nations used the aggressive moves of others to build public support for government efforts. Gaddis, George F. Kennan, 32-37, 245.

18 DDE to Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 7, 1946, DDEP, 7:1105-1107, see notes 2 and 3.

19 Kennan complemented the three General Officers from each of the major services. Gaddis, George F. Kennan, 231.

101

Kennan continued to develop his ideas on how to respond to the Soviet Union. Although never completely aligned in thought, Kennan shared Eisenhower’s goal of shifting understanding of national strategy away from its military roots and toward a more comprehensive outlook. Kennan’s initial lecture, “Measures Short of War,” provides an example that also worked within Eisenhower’s intent of expanding the military’s strategic outlook.20 It examined the variety of means or tools available to the nation, as it approached international challenges. Kennan explained that there was a difference in how America had to operate globally. Public opinion, electoral politics, even morals and principles limited the options available to democratic states. Therefore, American approaches to strategy required a broader appreciation of the strategic environment. It demanded that the United States view its elements of national power holistically, requiring the nation to have a “grand strategy.” Kennan’s impact on the nation’s education would extend beyond the gates of Fort McNair, as he became a sought after lecturer throughout the nation.21

Eisenhower’s preparation of the Army for the future worked within a broader national attempt to modify the nation’s approaches to the postwar world. One particular scholarly effort would catch Eisenhower’s eye: Makers of Modern Strategy, first published in 1943. It sought to help the nation understand its emerging role as a

20 Joseph Nye would expand on this concept. Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).

21 He also spoke at the College of Naval Warfare, Air War College, US Naval Academy, at State Department seminars, various colleges and universities, and to civilian forms, such as businesses, banking and civic groups. Gile D. Harlow and George C. Maerz, eds., Measures Short of War: The George F. Kennan Lectures at the National War College, 1946-1947 (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1991).

102 world power, by advancing new approaches to strategic thinking. Its editor, the

Princeton University historian Edward Meade Earle, was instrumental in making strategy a new field of academic inquiry in the 1930s. Earle’s inclusive approach effectively integrated “just about every scholar working on strategy in the United States.” He sent

Eisenhower a copy of the book in 1947. In its introduction, Earle cautioned against the mindset that peaceful peoples do not need to study war, recalling the words of Pascal three centuries earlier: “Justice without force is impotent. Force without justice tyrannical. We must combine justice with force.” He challenged the nation to become engaged in understanding strategy and the “role which armed force plays in international society.” He also sought to develop a consensus toward the purpose of

America’s power.22

Makers of Modern Strategy became a foundational text in the study of national strategy. Written by a spectrum of distinguished scholars, the anthology’s twenty-one chapters explored strategic theorists, such as Clausewitz, Foch, and Marx, as well as the various dynamics of conflicts on land, sea, and air. It also explained the character of conflict and approaches to strategy in innovate ways. It delineated different levels of strategic thinking, distinguishing a range from military tactics to campaigns to a national purpose. This broad treatment shifted the scope of thinking about national strategy away from immediate crises and military responses to encompass global dynamics and

22 David Ekbladh, “Present at the Creation: Edward Mead Earle and the Depression-Era Origins of Security Studies,” International Security, vol. 36, no. 3 (Winter 20011/12): 107-141, 126; Edward Mead Earle, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944). The anthology was republished in 1971 and then revised in Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).

103 long-term developments. In particular, by exploring the connections between the economic, political, and moral foundations of war, it framed national foreign policy as an integrated effort to influence the world order. Its combined effect was to transform strategy from a military responsibility to an essential element of statecraft. Earle explained this intent explicitly and pointed toward the need for a more comprehensive outlook to foreign policy that he defined as “grand strategy.” He offered a broad conception that amalgamated all of the nation’s policies and instruments of power toward its enduring interests. He also clarified that even as a grand strategy approach maximized the likelihood of a victory for the US and its allies should efforts to preserve peace fail, its principal purpose was to make war “unnecessary.”23

In a reply to Earle, Eisenhower noted that the book’s arrival was timely. He thanked the scholar for his leadership in the nation’s study of grand strategy. At the time,

Eisenhower was in the midst of reorienting some of the War Department’s planners into a “super-blitz” group to study the “problems of the future.” He knew that collaboration with key academics would be essential and invited Earle to become one of their mentors. These efforts were not just platitudes. General Alfred Gruenther exchanged letters with Eisenhower and asked him to focus on Chapter 14 of the book. It explored

Soviet concepts of war. Authored by Earle, the chapter argued that Moscow’s initial outlooks were consistent with the French Revolution’s attempt to expand their worldview of liberty, equality, and fraternity through aggressive conquest. Earle wrote

23 Edward Mead Earle, “Introduction,” in Earle, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy, Introduction, viii; See also DDE to Frederick Edgworth Morgan, December 26, 1947, DDEP, 9:2165-2166.

104 that Lenin was a true believer in realpolitik and that for him peace was not the goal, but simply an instrument of policy. He added that Stalin’s intentions, as well as those of other Soviet leaders, were not as clear. Their actions did not absolutely conform to communist dogma. This allowed the possibility that the Soviet Union could become a stabilizing influence for peace.24

In early 1948, Eisenhower retired from the Army and planned to move to Columbia

University to take up his duties as its president that fall. He believed his transfer of responsibilities to Omar Bradley would be his final moments of military service. Before he left his office for the last time, he wrote a message “To the American soldier,” In it,

Eisenhower thanked them for freeing “the world from evil tyrannies,” adding that his

“fondest boast shall always be: ‘I was their fellow-soldier’.”25 During the transition, he composed his memoir of World War II. Crusade in Europe sold millions and gained critical acclaim. Edward Mead Earle proclaimed that it painted a vivid portrayal of the complicated character of modern war, exploring its political, economic, psychological, moral, and logistical aspects.26

In the last chapter of the book, Eisenhower wove into the account his perspective on the state of US – Russian relations. He proclaimed that the early “dream of rapid progress toward universal peace,” held by many people after World War II, was

24 DDE to Edward Mead Earle, February 12, 1947, DDEP, 8:1512-1513; Edward Mead Earle, “Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin: Soviet Concepts of War,” in Earle, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy, 322-364.

25 DDE to The American Soldier, February 7, 1948, DDEP, 9:2241.

26 Edward Mead Earle, “Review of Crusade in Europe,” The American Historical Review, vol. 54, no. 4 (July, 1949): 860-862.

105 shattered. The superpowers were in a contest to expand their influence in the world. In this struggle, the Soviet ideology held advantages as it could expand “wherever popular discontent” existed. Democracy could only flourish if it was able to satisfy “the mental, moral, and physical wants of the masses.” Eisenhower firmly believed that people preferred individual rights, free expression and self-dependence. The free world’s systems could persevere, if they retained their “moral integrity… [and] clarity of comprehension.” Time was on their side.27

Advocate for Impartial Studies

While president of Columbia, Eisenhower processed these views on Grand Strategy and combined them with his belief in education. By the time he moved to New York, it was clear that the early hopes for rapid changes to global norms would not easily materialize. Many obstacles stood in the way. First among them was a concerted Soviet effort to expand its ideology and influence. Not only did it seek to exploit the vacuums of power that emerged after World War II, Moscow also intended to use the new global systems in ways that served these purposes.28 For example, the United Nations was unable to live up to expectations, or at least the aspirations of its founders, because of deliberate attempts to undermine it. Eisenhower explained this frustration in his diary,

27 Dwight. D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1948), 472-478.

28 For example, during the initial drafting of the organization’s Charter, Russia sought to limit the powers of discussion within the Assembly. It wanted an organization that it could manage with the other great powers. JFD introduction of Dr. H.V. Evatt in “Dr. Evatt on the United Nations Problems,” CFR Records, MC 104, 1918-2004, Box 441, Series 4: Meetings, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library.

106 pointing to the “obstructionism” of the Soviets in their repeated use of their Security

Council veto and their pandering in the UN General Assembly.29 For many Americans, these actions contributed to a shift in outlook toward the world body.30

The trends that derailed the project did not all originate from Moscow. American foreign policy exacerbated the challenge. Advocates for creating peaceful norms judged that US responses contributed to an escalatory cycle that made a serious clash with the

Soviet Union more likely. For example, The Council on Foreign Relations pointed to the fallacies that they saw guiding government policies, such as that a strong army and navy would prevent war. They felt this narrow view and approach placed the nation within a cycle of competition that might actually produce a confrontation.31 The international relations scholar John Herz would explain this phenomenon as a security dilemma. He emphasized that when states only pursue their own security it actually leads to “rising insecurity for others as each interprets its own measures as defensive and the measures of others as potentially threatening"32

29 Additionally, the global organization suffered from its diversity, as its members had different beliefs, socio-political systems, and bases of power. DDE Diary Entry, September 16, 1947, in Robert H. Ferrell, ed., The Eisenhower Diaries (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1981), 143-144.

30 DDE, “Address to the American Newspaper Publishers Association, April 26, 1946,” in Allan Taylor, ed., What Eisenhower Thinks (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1952), 94.

31 Council of Foreign Relations’ study on “National Power and Foreign Policy,” published in Hanson W. Baldwin, The Price of Power (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1947).

32 John H. Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," World Politics, vol. 2, no. 2 (January, 1950): 157-180; Herz would expand on this idea and argue that realist liberalism offered a way to bridge the ideals of realism and idealism. John H. Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism. A Study in Theories and Realities (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951).

107

Eisenhower was an engaged witness in these debates. Just two months after he retired and assumed Columbia’s presidency in 1948, he found himself called back into the government to help solve the nation’s challenges. President Truman, along with

America’s first Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, convinced Eisenhower to become the acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in Washington. Eisenhower returned to duty, theoretically on a part-time basis, to help develop a sound national strategy and a balanced military budget.33 These experiences bolstered his resolve, leading him to promote deliberate efforts to assess and adapt the project to create new global norms.

One of these approaches was to find ways to get past the hurdle of narrow partisanship. Eisenhower became an advocate for organizing and executing apolitical studies of the major issues of the day. He was familiar with the practice, as during

Truman’s Administration several studies emerged that tried to create a better point of balance in American foreign policy. For example, while chairing the Commission for a

Just and Durable Peace, John Foster Dulles led an effort to look at the superpower struggle differently. The study concurred with the view that the Soviets were inclined toward an expansionist outlook. But it emphasized that serious internal challenges offered an opportunity to the free world. Dulles argued that the early communist gains, a product derived from their exploiting mass discontent, would be tempered by an inability to construct new and better systems. The flaws behind the Iron Curtain would be hard to hide for long, as comparison of social-political-economic systems would

33 He retained his position at Columbia and struggled to reconcile the competing demands. DDE to Henry Harley Arnold, March 14, 1949, DDEP, 10:544-545; See also DDE to James Vincent Forrestal, December 21, 1948, DDEP, 10:379-386.

108 eventually illuminate its deficiencies. “As the repressive features of the Soviet program become more clearly revealed, resistance will grow.” He concluded that the Soviet denial of personal liberties would never overcome man’s natural preference for them.34

This insight led Dulles to argue for a varied approach to defeating the Soviet menace. By reducing tensions, the US could highlight the problems with the totalitarian model. It would also allow national rivalries to emerge that amplified internal resistance to being “Soviet lackeys.” He also called for comprehensive solutions that went beyond the current administration’s tendency to rely too heavily on economic and military coercion. He asserted that the free world had “the spiritual, intellectual and economic conditions which all men want.” The US needed to engage these aspects and implement an enduring strategy that could overcome the Soviet menace through America’s merits, not just its might.35 Dulles’ arguments did not deny a role for the traditional economic and military levers or power, but did seek creative ways to amplify the pressure on the

Soviet Union.

Discovering better methods to orient the nation’s approaches to world leadership and foreign affairs became a central focus of Eisenhower. In addition to pulling double duty at Columbia and in Washington, D.C., the Council on Foreign Relations drafted him

34 John Foster Dulles, “Thoughts on Soviet Foreign Policy and What To Do About It,” in John D. Rockefeller Jr. to John Foster Dulles, May-June, 1946, Folder 223; 227, Box 26, Series Q, FA326, Rockefeller Family, Area of Interest: Peace Plans, Rockefeller Archive Center; Dulles’ pamphlet was also published in Life Magazine in two articles in the June 3 and June 10, 1946 editions.

35 Ibid.

109 to chair a study group to determine Europe’s needs for American aid and arms.36 Their first report, “The Economics of Freedom,” presented a comprehensive assessment of the Marshall Plan, along with Europe’s four main economies and their recovery challenges.37 Eisenhower appreciated the utility of the open, honest and unbiased effort.

He decided to replicate this approach at Columbia by launching initiatives that advanced what he called “clear thinking.” Eisenhower believed that the virtues of the

American system derived from healthy and open debate, not from paternalistic approaches that sought to drown out competing views.38 He rejected the need for the

“noble lie” and asserted that the best way to combat the “various ‘isms’...” was to subject them to “public scrutiny and exposure.”39 Several study groups formed to promote “scholarly, dispassionate, impartial” debate, such as the Program for the

Conservation of Human Resources and the Citizenship Education Program. Two of these

36 Eisenhower assembled a diverse array of national experts, such as John Foster Dulles’ brother Allen Dulles, Edward Mead Earle, and Hamilton Fish Armstrong. The Aid to Europe Group held its first meeting, in January 1949, and over the next several months developed concrete proposals to shore up European recovery.

37 Its final section argued for the need to help create a more open global trading system, as the best way to eliminate Europe’s deficits and balance of payments challenges. DDE to Aid to Europe Group, December 2, 1948, DDEP, 10:338-340; DDE to Arthur Seymour Nevins, February 1, 1949, DDEP, 10:459- 460; Howard S. Ellis, The Economics of Freedom (New York: Harper, 1950).

38 “I deem it not only unobjectionable but very wise to allow opposing systems to be presented…even though they are completely misguided and fanatical.” This position led Eisenhower to defend the diverse perspectives taught at Columbia University, such as socialism and communism. DDE to Louis Graham Smith, May 25, 1948, DDEP, 10:84-87.

39 DDE to John Stephens Wood, March 23, 1950, DDEP, 11:1028-1030.

110 forums directly addressed the challenges of peace in world affairs: The American

Assembly and the Institute of War and Peace Studies (IWPS).40

Eisenhower would call the American Assembly his “most important step” as president of Columbia University. It focused on studying those domestic factors that framed the cause of peace, such as the meaning and value of freedom. “If all that

Americans want is security, they can go to prison. They’ll have enough to eat, a bed and a roof over their heads. But if an American wants to preserve his dignity and his equality as a human being, he must not bow his neck to any dictatorial government.” Eisenhower believed that open discussions of freedom, war, and peace were critical to building

American public engagement. It was an attempt to ensure that Americans, and by extension global populations, understood the need for the nation’s increased role in world affairs.41

The IWPS implemented a similar approach to discussions of global affairs. Its purpose was to research the problem of war and peace in the postwar world, such as nuclear proliferation and the Cold War. 42 Eisenhower assembled experts from

40 Travis Beal Jacobs, Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Founding of the American Assembly (New York: American Assembly), 4-5; See also DDE to Deans, Directors, and Departmental Executives, October 12, 1950, DDEP, 11:1379-1382; A full transcript of his installation speech that was published in the New York Times, October 13, 1948; DDE to Leonard Franklin McCollum, May 31, 1950, DDEP, 11:1144-1148; DDE to William Benton, December 8, 1948, DDEP, 10:352-354.

41 DDE quoted in Jacobs, Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Founding of the American Assembly, 37, 17-22; See also DDE “Remarks at Dorado, Puerto Rico, at Meeting of the American Assembly,” Mar 4 1960, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=12149 (accessed January 12, 2016); and “Eisenhower Plans ‘American Assembly’,” The Washington Post, 19 October 1950, 7; DDE to William Averell Harriman, November 30, 1949, DDEP, 10:843-845; DDE to Clifford Roberts, November 6, 1950, DDEP, 11:1411-1412.

42 Originally envisioned to be an endowed chair position, the University instead created a more expansive institute. It is still active but now as the endowed Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies.

111 academia, business, and other professions that held different perspectives. He hoped open discussions would produce a comprehensive appreciation of issues and develop the broad consensus needed to damper the problem of political positioning. Eisenhower believed that America’s efforts to transform global norms could only take place within a framework of domestic and international cooperation.43

Eisenhower’s actions at Columbia coincided with a significant national effort to reframe America’s outlooks on global affairs. During Truman’s full term in office (1949-

1953), world conditions threatened a return to war. Eisenhower joined with a chorus of critics to try to counter the voices of militarism that seemed to exacerbate the issue.

After the Soviet Union exploded its own atomic weapon in the summer of 1949, the fear narratives intensified. Advocates for a preemptive military response argued that 1954 would be a “year of maximum danger” that demanded US action before it. At that time,

Moscow would gain parity in nuclear weapons, increase it global belligerence and become an existential threat to the nation.44

Eisenhower was not contemptuous of these views, but felt they ignored other possibilities. The reality that the use of nuclear weapons could decimate both sides did not only lead to apocalyptic prognoses; throughout history, military parity actually

43 DDE to Edward John Bermingham, May 22, 1950, DDEP, 11:1117-119; For a listing of the five goals of the Institute, see footnote 3, DDE to George Frost Kennan, November 3, 1950, DDEP, 11:1403- 1405; See also Annette Baker Fox, The Institute of War and Peace Studies: The First Thirty-Five Years (New York: Columbia University, 2001).

44 NSC-68 pointed to 1954 as a year of "maximum danger." David S. McDonough, “Nuclear Superiority or mutually assured deterrence,” International Journal, vol. 60, no. 3 (Summer, 1005): 811- 823; Marc Trachtenberg, “A ‘Wasting Asset’: American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance, 1949- 1954,” International Security, vol. 13, no. 3 (Winter, 1988-1989): 5-49.

112 stabilized many situations. There was also the possibility of testing the “inevitability” of a confrontation or a chance to moderate Soviet behavior.45 Proponents for aggressive actions also discounted critics that challenged whether a nuclear first strike could actually achieve rapid victory.46 Finally, Eisenhower believed Truman’s nuclear policy was too ambiguous and could produce miscalculation. He felt that a more creative approach could leverage America’s nuclear superiority and create a deterrent to great power war.47

Eisenhower saw many of the efforts to promote military solutions as self-serving and contradictory to promoting new global norms. His insider positioning revealed to him that “special interest groups” made it difficult for the nation to adopt coherent policies and budgets. World War II and the postwar world created corporate “war babies” that aligned with a particular service and legislators to lobby for their “league’s” objectives.48

His military experience and credentials allowed him to be publically skeptical, such as rejecting the idea that the United States had to use aggressive military action to achieve security. In fact, this was the mindset that the broad efforts to change the world order, such as the UN charter, the Declaration of Human Rights, the Geneva conventions, and the Nuremberg trials, actively worked to correct and explicitly rejected. The prolific

45 Marc Trachtenberg, “Preventive War and US Foreign Policy,” Security Studies, vol. 16, no. 1 (January-March, 2007): 1-31, 4-8.

46 Such as the Harmon Committee Report in 1949 that refuted the Strategic Air Command’s exaggerated claims that it could bring victory in a nuclear war. Steven L. Reardon, Council of War: A History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942-1991 (Washington D.C.: NDU Press, 2012), 82-87; See also DDE to Louis Arthur Johnson, May 3, 1949, DDEP, 10:567-570.

47 DDE, Mandate For Change, 1953-1956 (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1963), 133.

48 Ibid.

113 efforts to change global norms of conduct intended to dilute the legacy attitudes that justified jingoism.49

It led Eisenhower to add his voice as the informal Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff to try to redefine the superpower contest beyond its military or economic dimensions. He supported a campaign to reframe the bipolar contest as a battle over

“moral legitimacy.” Many believed that the American system was a great asset in the fight against totalitarian governments. Its democratic systems gave people choices, protected their rights, and contrasted favorably with the Soviet model’s reliance on centralized control and oppressive measures.50

Several initiatives emerged to correct the misinformation that Soviet governments and communist agitators used to sway public opinion. They encompassed efforts to inform and influence the beliefs and actions of both friends and enemies. By the 1960s, many Americans had come to view these activities pejoratively, as disingenuous and manipulative. Eisenhower was no innocent. He recognized the extent to which international and domestic public opinion affected the decisions of politicians, government officials, and individual nations. He also recognized that sometimes, because of Soviet propaganda or domestic war mongering, populations within and beyond the United States were greatly misinformed. While addressing this challenge,

49 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: , 1982), 96-97; See also DDE to Errett Power Scrivner, June 30, 1953, DDEP, 14:341-343.

50 DDE to Robert Wood Johnson, July 10, 1959, DDEP, 11:1216-1217; DDE to Harry S. Truman, December 16, 1950, DDEP, 11:1488-1493; See also Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Unity of Purpose Urged for Security of Atlantic Area,” Department of State Publication 4129 (Washington: Department of State, Office of Public Affairs, February 1, 1951), 18.

114

Eisenhower elevated social aspects, such as individual freedoms, as the new measure of the cold war struggle.51

Reframing the superpower contest in less militaristic tones included actions to balance the excessive rhetoric that was becoming prevalent in the nation. Eisenhower believed the United States needed to remain strong, but should not overreact to the point that it bankrupted itself or pervaded America’s way of life. He stressed that the nation could not buy influence with military or economic power. It could not force its ways on others, as that path would create a “very broad gap between what we should like to have as peace in this world, and what is attained.” He emphasized that America’s pursuit of honesty, justice, and decency in dealing with others was the source of the nation’s strength. The nation had to guard this moral power and not let it be corrupted.52

Korea, NATO and the Urgency to Adapt the Project of Peace

The outbreak of the Korean War accelerated the urgency of the effort to improve

America’s approach to foreign policy. For most of the early postwar era, the United

States worked unsuccessfully through the US-Soviet Joint Commission to resolve the division of Korea. By 1947, it passed the problem to the United Nations, but resistance

51 Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2006), 8, 361; See also Walter L. Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997).

52 DDE to “Nassau County Bar Association, June 10, 1950,” in DDE, “Pre-Presidential speeches,” https://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/all_about_ike/speeches.html (accessed May 30, 2015).

115 from both the North and the South prevented any reconciliation.53 By 1949, as both superpowers withdrew their forces, the peninsula remained starkly divided. Dean

Acheson, the US Secretary of State, tried to mitigate the tensions, proposing a UN

Commission of impartial observers to report on the possibility of a military conflict.

Acheson also defined Korea as outside of America’s defensive perimeter, leading many to question whether the United States intended to defend it. The North Korean invasion in late June of 1950 trumped the efforts to resolve the impasse peacefully.54

After the attack, Eisenhower immediately went to Washington D.C. and consulted with President Truman. He was supportive of Truman’s moves to defend South Korea through the collective security aspects of the UN Charter, but disagreed with his decision to use force without a congressional declaration of war.55 "Under the constitution, our government could not, of course, except in an unforeseen emergency, employ military forces against another nation unless so authorized by Congress.”56 As the Korean War developed, Ike agreed with many that the situation would be a real test of the “viability” of the United Nations, particularly its prohibition on aggressive war.57

53 The Truman Administration became frustrated by the inability and unwillingness of the South Korean government to make any progress, as it remained divided by factionalism and skirmishes. Additionally, the conflicts in Berlin, Greece, Turkey, Iran, and Indochina overshadowed Korea, detracting from America’s willingness to get too involved.

54 William Whitney Stueck, Jr., The Road to Confrontation: American Policy Toward China and Korea, 1947-1950 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), 7-9, 47-49, 159-170, 253.

55 Truman became the first president to commit US forces into a foreign war without seeking congressional approval. Instead, he characterized the intervention as a “police effort.” Robert Kennedy, The Road To War: Congress' Historical Abdication Of Responsibility (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010), 90.

56 DDE, Waging Peace: 1956-1961 (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1965), 37.

57 DDE, Mandate for Change, 82-83.

116

He also counselled that once committed to the use of force, the nation could not dither.

It had to demonstrate its resolve to preserve the territorial integrity of South Korea quickly and stand against the violation of international law.58 Eisenhower also believed that the conflict derived in part from Truman and Acheson’s ambiguous statements as to whether the United States was willing to defend South Korea. It allowed a

“miscalculation…as to the determination of the free world to protect itself.”59 This last point would lead Eisenhower toward efforts to demonstrate the nation’s resolve to pursue its interests as President.

As the Korean War heated up, Eisenhower became determined to reorient US foreign policy approaches. In July 1950, he testified before Congress, stressing the need to spread the word about America’s “good intentions, latent strength, [and] respect for others.” The aggressive actions by communist forces were an opportunity. They contrasted with America’s more progressive outlook on global affairs and its efforts to pursue peace as a new norm of international conduct. Ike continued this line of effort, becoming the spokesperson for a fundraising effort that supported increased information efforts, such as Radio Free Europe, to diffuse the misinformation many saw emanating from the Kremlin.60

58 DDE Diary Entry, June 30, 1950, DDEP, 11:1189-1191.

59 DDE to Kenneth William Dobson Strong, June 29, 1950, DDEP, 11:1184-1186.

60 In response to Soviet expansion into Eastern Europe and their blockade of Berlin, George Kennan, along with several other government officials and private citizens, formed the National Committee for a Free Europe. To raise money for their projects, they established the Crusade for Freedom and General Lucius Clay, the orchestrator of the Berlin Airlift, became its chairperson. Initial members of the committee included Joseph Grew, Charles Spofford, DeWitt Poole, Allen Dulles, Frank Wisner, and Henry Luce. CD Jackson, who later became Ike’s special advisor for psychological warfare, served as the Committee’s President from 1951-1952. Martin J. Medhurst, “Eisenhower and the Crusade for Freedom:

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After a long publicity campaign and weeks of preparation, on Labor Day in 1950

Eisenhower delivered his Crusade for Freedom speech. Carried live by all of the major television stations, as well as radio-broadcasting networks, it emphasized that universal ideals were a central component of the postwar world and that they needed to be sustained. Ike explained that millions of people behind the Iron Curtain only heard

“devilish libel” against America and found it hard to conceive that its efforts could have peaceful motives or intents. Efforts such as Voice of America offered ways to counter this communist propaganda. He stressed that “in the battle for truth” everyone should play a part and asked his audiences to contribute to the struggle. The speech was a resounding success, raising millions of dollars for the cause. The New York Times reported that Eisenhower opened up a war on “the Big Lie.”61

His efforts to reframe perceptions of the postwar world both at home and abroad took on added momentum in the fall of 1950. President Truman asked Eisenhower to become the first Supreme Allied Commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO). The Korean War brought the possibility of another world war to the fore, even as it intensified concerns that the deployment of UN forces under US command left

Europe vulnerable to a Soviet invasion. Therefore, sending the wartime leader to command NATO was a clear signal of US resolve.

The Rhetorical Origins of a Cold War Campaign,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 27, no. 4 (Fall, 1997): 646-661.

61 DDE Diary Entry, July 6, 1950, DDEP, 11:1211-1213; DDE “Speech Crusade for Freedom,” Denver, Colorado, September 4, 1950, in DDE, “Pre-Presidential speeches,” https://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/all_about_ike/speeches.html (accessed May 30, 2015); See also DDE to Lucius Du Bignon Clay, March 16, 1951, DDEP, 12:135-136.

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Eisenhower accepted the post. He wanted to play his part in helping the free world through the “world crisis.”62 The military alliance offered a way to regulate global affairs, by shoring up the concept of collective security. Eisenhower was a strong supporter of pooling the resources of the free world community of nations to deter and, if needed, to defeat aggression. In a letter to his boyhood friend, Edward E. "Swede"

Hazlett, Eisenhower explained that “[o]ur efforts in the United Nations have been defeated by the vetoes of hostile groups,” but that the Atlantic Pact offered a pathway for “free countries” to “band together to protect themselves.” He intended to ensure the defensive union got “off to a good, practical and speedy start.” Eisenhower would assume the position the following April, while retaining his Presidency of Columbia.63

His new duties caused him to miss the dedication ceremony of the American

Assembly, but he had a letter read to the attending delegates. It explained, to the more than eighty representatives from business, labor, agriculture, government, and other professions, that the country needed the Assembly.64 Its success depended on the

62 DDE Diary entry, October 28, 1950, DDEP, 11:1388-1391.

63 DDE to Edward Everett Hazlett, Jr., November 1, 1950, DDEP, 11:1396-1398. In a letter to Winston Churchill a few years later, Ike would remark “we failed to halt Hirohito, Mussolini and Hitler by not acting in unity and in time. That marked the beginning of many years of stark tragedy and desperate peril.” It was a hard lesson that Eisenhower did not want to repeat. DDE to Winston Spencer Churchill, April 4, 1954, DDEP, 15:1002-1006.

64 Participants included: Harry Bullis, Chairman of General Mills; John Cowles, President Minneapolis Star and Tribune; Oveta Hobby, Executive Vice President Houston Post; Leonard McCollum, President Continental Oil Company; Grayson Kirk, Vice President Columbia University; Philip Young, Dean Columbia University Graduate School; John Baker, National Farmer’s Union; Richard Bissell, Deputy Administrator European Cooperation Administration; Hugh Moore, Chairman Dixie Cup Company; Francis Wilcox, Treasurer California Fruit Growers Exchange; Thomas Watson, President International Business Machines; Lewis Douglas, Former US Ambassador to Britain and Chairman Southern Arizona Bank and Trust Company. “80 Notables to Meet in Forum Tonight,” New York Times, May 21, 1951; See also “Leaders at Arden Clash on U.S. Tasks,” New York Times, May 22, 1951.

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“objectivity and impartiality of the proceedings, the integrity and thoroughness of professional research, and upon the character and qualifications of the participants.”

The first official meeting addressed the topic of US relations with Europe. Unilateralist

Senator Robert Taft (R-Ohio) presented a criticism of America’s efforts, arguing the nation’s resources would be better spent in Asia and in a decisive way to end the war in

Korea. Senator Paul H. Douglas (D-Illinois) countered with an explanation of the importance of NATO in preventing Europe from falling under Soviet control. The

Assembly then divided into three round tables for deliberations over the next few days.

In an effort to bypass political partisanship and build transparency into national debates, it sent transcripts of the speeches, as well as study and discussion aids, to schools and community groups across the nation.65

Many Americans understood and supported an impartial forum to discuss national issues. In the New York Times report of the American Assembly’s first meeting, Anne

O’Hare McCormick explained that the forum intended to escape partisan debates and give the country a “pause to think.” The Pulitzer Prize winning journalist clarified that the nation faced many dilemmas and needed these types of “free, informal [and] unpartisan” exchange of views. She concluded that the remarkable aspect of the event was not that everyone agreed, but that they were each willing to work toward a common position. After seeing her article, Eisenhower sent McCormick a personal note, mentioning that he was “delighted that you found the effort to be worthwhile- you have

65 Jacobs, Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Founding of the American Assembly, 54-58; See also American Assembly, United States- Western Europe Relationships as Viewed within the Present World- wide International Environment (New York: American Assembly, 1951), 1, 179.

120 certainly accurately described its purposes and hopes.” Eisenhower would maintain interest in and support for these initiatives into his Presidency.66

Eisenhower’s assignment to NATO gave him a new venue to assess and advance the march toward peace. The collective security organization complemented earlier US actions to revive and integrate Western Europe into America’s project for peace. For example, the 1947 European Recovery Program, or more commonly, the Marshall Plan, aimed at reducing trade barriers, modernizing industry, and advancing commercial cooperation. Combined it sought to advance the economic interdependence of its members even as it promoted greater integration among them. European partners resisted the effort and haggled to ensure control over much of its implementation.67

Beyond these aspects, the plan contributed to the broad effort for peace. It altered the ways in which a nation defined its national economic interests, mitigating a perceived primary cause of conflicts. The plan was also a psychological tool of the Cold War. It revitalized Europe’s commerce, creating political stability, and contrasted well with communist efforts that focused on labor strikes, protests and sabotage.68

The creation of the North Atlantic Alliance in 1949 served parallel purposes. By the late 1940s, the United Nations proved itself incapable of changing the old practices of

66 Anne O’Hare McCormick, “A Pause to Think Out American Policy,” New York Times, May 28, 1951; DDE to Anne O’Hare McCormick, June 4, 1951, DDEP, 12:321-322.

67 For example, they diverged over the support the program offered to Germany. Timothy Healey, “Will Clayton, Negotiating the Marshall Plan, and European Economic Integration,” Diplomatic History, vol. 35, no. 2 (April, 2011): 229-256.

68 Greg Behrman, The Most Noble Adventure: The Marshall Plan and How America Helped Rebuild Europe (New York: Free Press, 2007), 464, 89, 120, 138-139.

121 statecraft. It was beset by factional bickering and lacked any enforcement authority. For many, NATO was not just a Cold War expedient. It was a second attempt to assert the concept of collective security into the fabric of the postwar world. It added to the larger and contested US effort to change global norms. The wording of its founding treaty defined not just what NATO was against but also what it was for. The preamble reaffirmed the faith of its members in the “purposes and principles of the Charter of the

United Nations” and its efforts to advance new norms of international conduct. Its members pledged to settle disputes by peaceful means and to cooperate in efforts to eliminate the economic factors that caused international conflicts.69 The inclusion of these clauses provides evidence that proponents for NATO intended it to go beyond its military aspects. They envisioned the North Atlantic Alliance serving as a new precedent; an example that could help reorient nations toward the efficacy of a better world order.70 Its first Supreme Allied Commander grasped these transformative ambitions and actively worked to shift conceptions of the alliance beyond its geostrategic underpinnings.

The program to advance the cause of peace also depended on convincing the nations and peoples of the free world that it served mutually beneficial goals. By the early 1950s, it was clear that the opposition to asserting new standards of statecraft

69 “The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C. April 4, 1949,” NATO, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-ECAE8DB0-F591EC88/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm (accessed 13 March, 2016).

70 Owen J. Roberts, "Atlantic Union Now," Foreign Policy Bulletin, vol. 30 (April 7, 1951): 3 – 4; See also Clarence K. Streit, Union Now: A Proposal for a Federal Union of the Democracies of the North Atlantic (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1939); Lawrence S. Kaplan, The United States and NATO: the Formative Years (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1984), 187-204.

122 went beyond the usual suspects, such as the challenges of the superpower rivalry or domestic opposition. Changing the world order also faced the entrenched mindsets and approaches to foreign policy that resided within the world of free nations. These obstacles made it clear to the United States that it could not force its will upon the world. Instead, it had to find avenues that served the “enlightened (sic) self-interests” of its partners. The cost and difficulties inherent in coalition efforts had to be balanced by the ways the cooperative effort served each member-nation’s economic, social and security objectives.71

This point led Eisenhower to emphasize the ways that NATO’s collective security architecture advanced global stability and the cause of peace. During an initial tour of

European capitals before he assumed his new command, he described NATO as a tool

“to build defenses behind which its children may prosper and live in peace.” It presented a way to ensure that its members did not squander the sacrifices made during World War II. He called upon America’s allies to work for the “children of all nations,” stressing the need to move beyond national prejudices and past grievances.

“Our task is to preserve the peace, not to incite war.”72 In a speech at Bayeux, France,

Eisenhower told his audience that with the soldiers that landed on Normandy’s beaches

“rode the hopes of all who loved freedom.” They paid the price to regain freedom, after

71 DDE to Ralph Austin Bard, January 7, 1952, DDEP, 12:847-849.

72 DDE, At Ease: Stories I tell to Friends (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1967), 367-369; DDE “Radio Statement Upon Arrival in Paris,” January 7, 1951 in DDE, “Pre-Presidential speeches,” https://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/all_about_ike/speeches.html (accessed May 30, 2015).

123 it was lost. NATO represented the West’s efforts to “defend freedom-before it is lost.”73

His words emphasized that its members’ collaboration in military efforts fit into a greater framework of peace and security. When combined with political and economic cooperation, it offered a way to counter aggression, as well as directly reframing the interests of its member’s in ways that made it an example to the world.74

Membership in NATO also expanded America’s global investment in the new world order. Senator Robert A. Taft and his allies criticized this effort and sought to sustain US unilateralism or a “free hand” policy.75 Eisenhower made moves to reverse this backsliding. Reporting on his exploratory trip to NATO, he explained to Congress and in a nation-wide radio address that “our hope remains the achievement of peace,” but the task included and required America’s military strength. The North Atlantic Alliance would help “erect a wall of security for the free world behind which free institutions can live.” The effort would be needed “until Communistic imperialism dies of its own inherent evils.” He repeatedly made this point, emphasizing that the purpose of effort went beyond its military contours. NATO’s collective security effort fit within the

73 DDE, “Speech, D-Day Commemoration Ceremonies,” Bayeux, France, June 6, 1951 in DDE, “Pre-Presidential speeches,” https://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/all_about_ike/speeches.html (accessed May 30, 2015); See also DDE “Speech at El Alamein Reunion, Empress Hall,” London, England, October 19, 1951 in Ibid.

74 Thomas M. Sisk, “Forging the Weapon: Eisenhower as NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, 1950 – 1952," in Gunter Bischof and Stephen E. Ambrose, eds., Eisenhower: A Centenary Assessment (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995), 64 – 83; The Executive Secretary, “A Report to the National Security Council, NSC-68,” April 12, 1950, President’s Secretary’s File, Truman Papers, Truman Library, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/10-1.pdf (accessed May 31, 2016).

75 Michael T. Hayes, “The Republican Road Not Taken: The Foreign-Policy Vision of Robert A. Taft,” The Independent Review, vol. 8, no. 4 (Spring, 2004): 509-525.

124 broader strategic framework of containment. It advanced the concept of a “free world,” based on cooperation and integration, to counter the menace of communism.76 It aligned with Walter Lippmann’s proclamation that there existed a “community of interests” within global affairs that went beyond nationalisms.77 Eisenhower’s move to

NATO provided a new venue and a way to change America’s and the world’s outlook on international issues.

Along with his official duties in Europe, Ike set the conditions for an election run.

This included sending letters to prominent leaders that laid out his policy positions. He knew they would pass them around. He also “continued to arm himself for battle,” such as by asking experts to send him background papers on issues. His efforts included meeting with a steady flow of visitors. Senators, Congressmen, Governors and other elected officials from both political parties, as well as friends and intellectuals, came to gauge his views or to inform them. The topics discussed included a study of domestic challenges, such as mortgage financing, farm subsidies and public housing. Several of these meetings, as well as much of his diary entries and correspondence revolved around the ideas and plans to adapt America’s approaches to foreign policy.78

76 DDE “Report to the Nation from the Pentagon,” February 2, 1951, in DDE, “Pre-Presidential speeches,” https://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/all_about_ike/speeches.html (accessed May 30, 2015); See also Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Unity of Purpose Urged for Security of Atlantic Area,”18; and Jean Edward Smith, Eisenhower in War and Peace (New York: Random House, 2012), 499; see also John Milloy, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1948-1957: Community or Alliance? (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006).

77 Walter Lippmann, quoted in Lord Robertson, “NATO and the Transatlantic Community: The ‘Continuous Creation,’” Journal of Transatlantic Studies, vol. 1, iss. 1 (2003): 1-7.

78 William Pickett, Eisenhower Decides to Run: Presidential Politics and Cold War Strategy (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2000).

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Eisenhower’s meeting with Paul Hoffman in June of 1951 exemplifies these influences. Hoffman directed the Economic Cooperation Administration that oversaw

Marshall Plan assistance to Europe. He was also a vocal advocate for efforts to advance new standard in world affairs.79 Their meeting gave Eisenhower the opportunity to become more familiar with Hoffman’s just published book, Peace Can Be Won. Hoffman shared Eisenhower’s critique of the prevailing views of how to deal with the Soviet challenge. The nation had more choices than between a deal with Stalin or a preventive war. Hoffman argued that the United States was in a “long and protracted” contest that required the adopting of comprehensive understandings, policies, and strategies. This included the creation of a “formidable” military force that could thwart overt Soviet aggression, but Hoffman saw its purpose beyond strict military advantage. It could establish the conditions that allowed the nation to execute a “vigorous” economic, political, and psychological offensive to expose the hollowness of the Soviet model. This broad based approach offered a solution short of war that could take the initiative from

Moscow and allow America’s “assembly line” to outperform “the Communist party line.”80 Eisenhower appreciated Hoffman’s strategic point of view and would later make him the chair of the Eisenhower Campaign Committee.81

79 DDE, Mandate For Change, 16; For background on Eisenhower’s relationship with Hoffman, see DDE to Henry Ford II, September 26, 1950, DDEP, 11:1342-1343; DDE to L. Clifford Kenworthy, October 10, 1950, DDEP, 11:1369-1371; DDE to Paul Gray Hoffman, April 17, 1951, DDEP, 12:219-220; DDE Diary Entry, June 4, 1951, DDEP, 12:321.

80 Paul G. Hoffman, Peace Can Be Won (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 1951), 23, 46, 70-72, 79.

81 After his election, Eisenhower offered Hoffman, at the time the president of the Ford Foundation, a cabinet post, but Hoffman removed himself from consideration. He would return to the

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Eisenhower’s duties in Europe also contributed to his views on foreign policy, particularly the military’s role. He understood that the alliance’s martial capabilities were never intended to match the Soviet Union’s in direct comparisons. Only the US monopoly, increasingly its parity, in nuclear weapons changed the military aspects of the security equation.82 General Alfred Gruenther later explained that they helped augment war plans beyond “Tank-for-Tank and Division-for-Division” approaches.83 It provided NATO with a critical strategic umbrella that evened the military scales. As a deterrent, it made war unlikely. It also offered a clear line of reasoning to assuage fears of war and to shore up the belief in collective security. These lessons would influence

Eisenhower’s approaches as President, as he leveraged America’s nuclear supremacy to influence several world events.

America’s progressive efforts through NATO remained contested by domestic interests that persisted within its member states. Guardians of the old world order and their outlooks remained strong and entrenched on both sides of the Atlantic. In Europe, critics of the alliance pointed to its infringement on their nation’s sovereignty and riled at the ways US efforts co-opted European outlooks. This divergence included a move in

corporate world until 1966, when he became the first administrator of the United Nations’ Development Program. DDE, Mandate For Change, 86.

82 DDE to Alphonse Pierre Juin, May 19, 1952, DDEP, 13:1224-1226, note 1.

83 When he became the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO General Gruenther kept up this line of argument. He highlighted in a briefing to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to discuss the rationales for adding the might of West Germany to the alliance that it would allow a forward positioned shield of forces. It would force any Soviet attack to concentrate its forces, making them more vulnerable to the allied advantages in air, artillery and nuclear power. General Alfred M. Gruenther, Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, March 26, 1955 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1955), 1-7.

127 the Western capitals to resist American influence over their internal affairs.84 European elites understood that closer integration gave leverage to both American and indigenous efforts to reframe national interests into a more cooperative framework, later described by some as making America’s imperium “irresistible.”85 Many Americans also remained opposed to the military effort and its entangling character. Their views ranged from opposition to the heavy cost born by the United States to the fact that it restrained more unilateralist outlooks. These opinions sustained a tension at the heart of the alliance, leading to calls in Europe for American soldiers to go home, as well as US efforts to comply.86 But to others, NATO offered the hope of reinvigorating the project to advance a new world order. Many believed that it could form the foundation or core of an Atlantic Community that could provide an example for the world.87

84 See Jenny Raflik, “The Fourth Republic and NATO, 1946-1958: Alliance Partnership or Idiosyncratic Nationalism?,” Journal of Transatlantic Studies, vol. 9, iss. 3 (2011): 207-219; Milloy, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 67-96.

85 Victoria De Grazia, Irresistible Empire, America's Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005).

86 Kaplan, The United States and NATO, 176-186.

87 Donald H. McLachlan, Atlantic Alliance: NATO’s Role in the Free World (New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1952); Arthur C. Turner, Bulwark of the West: Implications and Problems of NATO (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1953).

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CHAPTER 4

DECOLONIZATION, EGYPT AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER

Eisenhower’s study and his efforts to advance the chances for peace included an appreciation for the challenges presented by decolonization. He understood that the postwar era was not a blank canvas for the United States to paint upon. The Soviet

Union’s opposition to the new global norms championed by the United States, as well as

America’s domestic critique, are well covered in scholarship. What is less well known is that America’s vision exacerbated the indigenous calls for independence and explicitly challenged the efforts of some of its major partners, particularly Britain and France.

Upholding more peaceful standards of international conduct intentionally delegitimized many of the prewar practices that built and sustained colonialism. It directly threatened the last vestiges of imperial power held by some of America’s allies. US efforts to assert new norms of statecraft had to find ways to overcome this impediment.1

The logic that justified the use, or the threat of the use, of force was the foundational practice that built the empires of Europe. The old standards of statecraft derived from the belief that the world was anarchic. It placed nation-states at the center of a system of almost unconstrained competition. Prior to 1945, states regularly used force to conduct their global affairs. From the fifteenth to twentieth centuries, Europe’s mostly, but not exclusively, maritime powers progressively expanded their colonial footprints through the projection of military as opposed to economic power.

1 The term decolonization came into vogue in the 1930s. It captured a broad effort to deny the right to empire and colonies, based on the use of force. Raymond F. Betts, Decolonization: Making of the Contemporary World Series (New York: Routledge, 1998), 1-4.

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This did not mean that every foreign policy effort led to conflict or bloodshed.

Having both the capability and the will to use military force defines the factors that allow for deterrence and coercion in statecraft.2 The normative practice of having and using force often avoided war. At times, intimidation or the signaling of a resolve to use force could produce the desired result. By the nineteenth century, it led to the prolific practice and success of gunboat diplomacy and its derivatives. It opened up foreign markets, facilitated commercial concessions, and led to substantial influence over the

America’s, South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.3

America’s project to create a more enduring peace sought to move the globe away from these old world practices, leading to a collision with established colonial interests.

The UN Charter explicitly repudiated the right to use force aggressively. Other efforts pursued ways to elevate humane standards in warfare, such as through the Nuremberg

Trials and the Geneva Conventions. These precedents and agreements denied to the imperial powers some of the tools that allowed for their colonial influence, such as the right to be a “bully” in international relations. They sought to ensure that might alone did not determine what was right. As important, they called into question the legality of the gains made by the old techniques of statecraft. World War II not only rolled back the

2 Thomas Schelling’s seminal work expanded on this concept, such as arguing that “compellence” was a more assertive form of deterrence. He explained that they all fell within the “diplomacy of violence,” transforming the purpose of military power from a focus on victory into a bargaining power tool. Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).

3 See James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy 1919–1991 (London: Macmillan/IISS, 1994); See also Robert Mandel, “The Effectiveness of Gunboat Diplomacy,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 30, no. 1 (March, 1986): 59-76; For a discussion of the geostrategic factors of colonialism in Africa see Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, with A. Denny, Africa and the Victorians: The Climax of Imperialism in the Dark Continent (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961).

130 imperial ambitions of Japan, Germany, and Italy; it also laid bare the question of what to do with the empires that remained.4

Britain, Colonialism and Military Power

The history of British colonial efforts toward Egypt, as well as throughout the greater

Middle East, reveals the link between military power and London’s imperial system. It provides the critical context that would frame Eisenhower’s policies as president toward the Middle East and his interpretation of the Suez Crisis.

During the nineteenth century, Europe’s colonial expansion enveloped the Ottoman

World. The Sultan in Istanbul ruled for centuries over a highly decentralized empire, as semi-autonomous provincial rulers collected taxes from local leaders and gave, often, token deference to Istanbul.5 But the region’s proximity to Europe placed it within the wake of a wave of changes that swept across its northern neighbors, such as the industrial revolution and the expansion of commercial efforts that reached a global scale. These transformations amplified the competition between European states. By the nineteenth century, European powers increasingly moved their continental competition and pursuit of interests outwards.

In some cases, European expansion challenged the Ottoman Empire directly. For example, in 1798, Napoleon conducted an expedition to secure Egypt. The province’s

4 Crane Brinton, The United States and Britain (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948), 258.

5 Ottoman rule consisted of decentralized structures of government, as local tribal sheikhs or Mamluks actually ruled. The Empire collected 95% of its taxes through a system of independent tax farmers plagued by graft. David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1989), 34-36.

131 geostrategic position at the eastern end of the Mediterranean offered an intermediate site from which France could threaten Britain’s interests in India. It also presented a valuable land route that could shorten commercial sea voyages to Asia. Although unsuccessful, the French action made securing Egypt a pillar of London’s foreign policy objectives in the Middle East.6 It also opened up the Ottoman world to a sustained period of European expansion, throughout the nineteenth century.7

The competition for influence was multi-dimensional and dynamic. European nations played a balance of power game on the continent that spilled over into the

Ottoman world. This allowed for both cooperation and competition, as they sought to expand their interests from Istanbul to Cairo. Additionally, the character of the Ottoman system made it difficult for both the Empire and European states to maintain or expand their economic and political influence. Provincial rulers, as well as indigenous and tribal leaders, constantly challenged external authority.

Egypt typified this dynamic and was often at the center of these rivalries. The French excursion into Egypt created new conditions. It destroyed the Mamluk caste system that

6 Geoffrey Symcox, “The Geopolitics of the Egyptian Expedition, 1797-1798,” in Irene A. Bierman, ed., Napoleon in Egypt (London: Ithaca Press, 2003), 13-15; See also Afaf Lufti al-Sayyid Marsot, “Social and Political Changes after the French Occupation,” in ibid., 100; Stuart Harten, “Rediscovering Ancient Egypt: Bonaparte’s Expedition and the Colonial Ideology of the French Revolution,” in ibid., 34-36.

7 Europe’s intervention in the Greek War of Independence provides another example. Between 1821 and 1832, Greece tried to assert its independence, initially suffering many defeats. In 1827, the conditions changed and the Greeks gained the support of Russia, Britain, and France, shifting the balance of power in their favor. Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1991), 258-278; See also Richard Clogg, ed., The Struggle for Greek Independence: Essays to Mark the 150th Anniversary of the Greek War of Independence (Hamden: Archon Books, 1973); C.M. Woodhouse, The Greek War of Independence: It’s Historical Setting (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1952).

132 dominated the socio-political structures of power in Egypt for centuries.8 A civil war ensued and Muhammad Ali, an Albanian commander sent to reassert Istanbul’s rule, broke with the Sultan and quickly rose to power. Through a carefully orchestrated campaign, in which he gained the support of various Egyptian guilds, tribal sheiks, and large swaths of the religious Ulama, Ali successfully opposed his British-, French- and

Ottoman-supported rivals. After consolidating power, he declared himself the Khedive or viceroy of Egypt. 9

For most of the period, a competition for control between Ottoman, European, provincial, and indigenous structures of power typified the geopolitics of Egypt and much of the Middle East. These challenges to Ottoman authority led the Sultan to search for new ways to shore up his influence and the viability of the empire. For example, beginning in 1839 the empire implemented a series of Tanzimat reforms that reorganized many aspects of the Ottoman system. It created a Civil Service School in

1859 and an Ottoman Constitution in 1876. These efforts intended to give Istanbul the tools needed to consolidate control over its far-flung possessions, but provincial rulers

8 The Mamluks were a caste of slave soldiers sent by the Sultan in the 9th Century that established their own rule over Egypt. Comprised mostly of Turks, Circassians, and Georgians, they spoke Turkish and became a militarized oligarchy that ruled Egypt for thirteen centuries in a feudal system. The system subordinated native Egyptians peasants, or fellahin, to Ottoman rulers; Fellahin literally means peasant or farmer in Arabic. In Egypt, it is commonly associated with the group of indigenous Egyptians who were not from the land-owning class of Mamluks. P.J. Vatikiotis, The History of Modern Egypt: From Muhammad Ali to Mubarak, 4th edition (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 19-29.

9 It confirmed Ali’s rule over the Egyptian governate and hereditary rule for his heirs that lasted until 1953. Khaled Fahmy, All the Pasha's Men: Mehmed Ali, his army and the making of modern Egypt (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1997), 281-282 and xi, 276, 304, 310; see also Henry Dodwell, The Founder of Modern Egypt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1931); Arthur Goldschmidt Jr., Modern Egypt: The Formation of a Nation-State, 2d edition (Boulder: Westview Press, 2004), 15-29.

133 continued to resist these efforts.10 They pursued opportunities to gain autonomy, duplicating the symbols and structures that empowered nationalism in Europe.11

This led Istanbul to try other methods, such as negotiating agreements with

European governments that would help it to reassert control over its possessions.

Through a variety of capitulations, concessions, and treaties, the Ottoman Sultan gave

European nations preferential access to markets within the Empire for their military and financial support.12 This move overwhelmed the efforts of indigenous populations. The various levels of governments in the Middle East struggled to reform and compete with their more organized, industrialized, and militarized European neighbors.

The growth in power that Britain enjoyed during the nineteenth century allowed it to assert greater influence over the Ottoman Empire. The 1838 Anglo-Ottoman Treaty exemplifies this point. By nominally supporting the sovereign claims of the Sultan over his provinces, Britain received almost full access to its markets.13 The 1840 Treaty of

London that followed made British control in Egypt more explicit.14 It forced Ali to

10 E. Attila Aytekin, “Before the Young Turk Revolution (1904-1908): Popular Protest and State Formation in the Late Ottoman Empire,” Journal of Policy History, vol. 25, no. 3 (July, 2013): 308-333.

11 For an example of the deliberate efforts at state formation, see Timothy Mitchell, Colonising Egypt (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

12 See Michael Provence, "Ottoman Modernity, Colonialism, and Insurgency in the Interwar Arab East," International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 43 (2011): 205-225.

13 Robert T. Harrison, Gladstone's Imperialism in Egypt: Techniques of Domination (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1995), 36-56; see also Edhem Eldem, “Ottoman financial integration with Europe: foreign loans, the Ottoman Bank and the Ottoman public debt,” European Review, vol. 13, no. 3 (2005): 431-445.

14 Ali also sought to expand his basis of power throughout the region. This move was mostly successful until 1840, when it threatened the viability of the Ottoman system. It led London to send its naval forces to intervene. British ships interdicted the supply lines of Ali’s forces in Syria, as well as blocking the Nile delta. English military might, as well as the shelling of Beirut, led Ali to acquiesce to the

134 dismantle Egypt’s military apparatus and placed strict limits on the size of Egypt’s military, allowing for only 18,000 men, not many more than comprise one Army division.

It also led the Egyptian ruler to reduce several other reform efforts, such as the closing of schools and the ending of public works projects.15 By the middle of the century,

Britain surpassed its French and Russian rivals, attaining a greater share of influence over many provinces within the Ottoman Empire.

Britain also advanced its positions in indirect ways. London implemented a semi- open system of trade that avoided unnecessary and destabilizing contests with both its

Ottoman and European rivals. For example, in 1881 the great powers of Europe collaborated to design an agreement to collect the debts owed by the Ottoman Empire to European companies. They created the European-controlled Ottoman Public Debt

Administration that served all of their interests and balanced their ambitions. It expanded Europe’s influence over Istanbul’s provinces, by giving them unprecedented foreign control over the empire’s revenues.16 As the nineteenth century progressed, these efforts preserved the veneer of an Ottoman world, but transformed the Empire into the “sick man of Europe.” Istanbul increasingly presided over a system held together by European financing and military power.

1840 Treaty of London. The action reasserted Istanbul’s nominal control over Egypt, but gave Ali a new dynasty over Egypt that lasted until 1953. Fahmy, All the Pasha's Men, 281-282, xi, 276, 304, 310.

15 William L. Cleveland and Martin Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East, 5th edition (Boulder: Westview Press, 2013), 68-69.

16 Eldhem, “Ottoman financial integration with Europe,” 431-445.

135

Several factors added to Egypt’s value in this geopolitical gambit. The building of extensive railroad networks and the expansion of agricultural production, particularly cotton, amplified its commercial significance. But it was the opening of the Suez Canal in

1869 that fundamentally changed the province’s importance. A French-Egyptian venture created the canal and the Suez Canal Company, Compagnie universelle du canal maritime de Suez. The Egyptian government gave the company a 99-year lease, at which time the canal would revert to Egyptian control. The deal also paid Egypt 15% of the company’s net proceeds and gave Cairo a 44% stake in the company.17 It added a strategic waterway that considerably reduced the travel time and cost of global trade between Europe and Asia.18

The British initially opposed the canal’s construction. As the world’s greatest sea power, Britain understood the implications of a shorter route to India and Asia and tried to suppress its construction. For example, they implemented a public campaign that criticized the Company’s use of slave labor and sent armed Bedouins to incite a revolt against its construction. They also delayed the effort by getting the Sultan in Istanbul to withhold approval of the project. Despite this resistance, the former French Consul to

Cairo and canal developer, Ferdinand de Lesseps, successfully completed the project after a decade of work.19

17 Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, A History of Egypt: From the Arab Conquest to the Present, 2d edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 83-85.

18 The 101-mile long canal shortened the route between Europe and Asia by approximately 7,000 kilometers.

19 S. C. Burchell, Building the Suez Canal (New York: American Heritage Publishing, 1966), 118- 122, 138.

136

After its efforts to prevent its construction failed, London shifted its approach toward trying to control the Suez Canal. The British gained the most from the venture.

Its impressive merchant fleet became the dominant user of the new waterway. Two- thirds of the ships passing through the canal, during its first year in operation, were

British. In subsequent years, this rate increased. In 1875, London bought Egypt’s shares from the indebted Khedive, a move that gave it effective control over the Suez Canal

Company. Egypt’s debt crisis continued and in 1880, Cairo sold its stake in the proceeds of the canal to the Credit Foncier of France in order to pay off additional debts. This act ended all sources of income for Egypt from canal traffic for decades.20

Along with the changes it brought internationally, the expansion of trade from the canal altered the socio-political dynamics in Egypt. During the nineteenth century, Ali and his descendants implemented many programs that sought to transform Egypt into a modern, European-style, state that could become autonomous. For example, they reorganized its military, education, and governance systems. Egypt also witnessed significant advances in industry, agriculture, trade, communications, and transportation.21 These reforms accelerated the development of an Egyptian middle class, made up of fellahin, or native Egyptians. They in turn increasingly questioned the consolidation of economic and political power in the hands of Egypt’s foreign ruler, the

20 Egyptians criticized the fact that the country received no funds from the canal. It was partially remedied in 1936, when a royalty fee was agreed upon. Additionally, Egyptians were named to the board of directors of the Suez Canal Company, increasing its representation in employees from 2.5% to 33%. In 1949, Egypt received a 7% share in the canal’s gross profits. A.G. Mezerik, "The Suez Canal 1956 Crisis- 1967 War," International Review Service, vol. xiv, no. 103 (1969): 1-2.

21 See Pascale Ghazaleh, “Trading in Power: Merchants and the State in 19th-Century Egypt,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 45, no. 1 (February, 2013):71-91.

137

Khedive, leading to a steady drumbeat of demands for more political and economic opportunities, as well as for Egyptian autonomy from outside powers. Their criticisms often focused on the Khedive’s inability to shake off foreign influence or to manage the nation’s affairs, seen in Egypt’s repeated descent into indebtedness.22

In 1882, Colonel Ahmad Urabi, the first fellahin to rise to political and military prominence, made a push to end the domination of Egypt by all foreigners. This included the Ali dynasty and the Turko-Circassian aristocracy that ruled Egypt. Under a slogan of “Egypt for the Egyptians,” Urabi revolted against the Anglo-French domination of the Khedive, calling for free elections and independence. Britain’s leaders understood

Urabi’s threat to the delicate balance that gave them influence in Cairo. The status quo kept Egypt inside an Ottoman system guided by Europe that was very advantageous to

London. Britain responded by attacking Egypt, bombarding Alexandria with naval gunfire and landing troops that moved into and secured the Canal Zone. This overt move removed the façade that the British were only serving the role of advisors within an Ottoman system. London’s Consul-Generals established a permanent residence in

Cairo, to preserve Britain’s economic and geostrategic advantages. It began an occupation of Egypt that lasted for seventy-two years.23

22 Goldschmidt Jr., Modern Egypt: The Formation of a Nation-State, 15-29; See also Vatikiotis, The History of Modern Egypt, 49-51; Fahmy, All the Pasha's Men, 49-248.

23 Harrison, Gladstone's Imperialism in Egypt, 32-60, 83-120; see also A.G. Hopkins, “The Victorians and Africa: A Reconsideration of the Occupation of Egypt, 1882,” Journal of African History, vol. 27 (1986): 363-391; Roger Owen, “The Brismes Annual Lecture 2004: Biography and Empire: Lord Cromer (1841-1917) then and now,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 32, no. 1 (May, 2005): 3-12.

138

London’s assertion of overt military control caused consternation among its

European rivals. They were particularly incensed over the physical control of the Suez

Canal and the geostrategic advantages it gave to Britain. Since its opening in 1869, Egypt and the Suez Canal Company extended free passage to all ships during conflicts. For example, during the Franco-German war in 1870, ships from both sides had access to the canal. Britain’s occupation of Egypt threatened to alter this dynamic. Europe’s other great powers wanted a more formal assurance and pushed to formally neutralize the canal. On October 29, 1888, the Constantinople Convention officially turned the canal into an international waterway. The treaty, signed by the United Kingdom, Germany,

Austro-Hungary, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, the Russian Empire, and the

Ottoman Empire, guaranteed access for all to the Suez Canal, during war as well as peace.24

By the early twentieth century, support for colonial practices began to unravel.

There was a global outcry against the old world order, as it denied opportunities to many groups. This resistance included domestic challenges, such as those that led to the rise of labor movements. Additionally, in Europe, debates emerged that questioned the legitimacy of the practice of using force to sustain empires. It led to the rise of popular opposition that divided European nations.25

24 The 1856 Convention signed by Egypt and the Suez Canal Company declared that the waterway “shall be open forever as neutral passage to every merchant vessel.” The clause did not include the movement of warships during conflicts. Robert R. Bowie, Suez 1956, International Crisis and the Role of Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), 3-4.

25 For a discussion of the divided interests within the British government, between advocating for the colonies or the British economy, See David Sunderland, Managing British Colonial and Post-Colonial Development: The Crown Agents, 1914-1974 (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2007).

139

Proponents for colonies justified their actions, pointing toward empires’ geopolitical necessity in an anarchic world and that colonies served as a civilizing mission. They asserted that the practice of imperialism gave advantages to colonial peoples by helping them create the institutions needed to make them viable once they achieved independence at some indefinite future time. The “heroic founding fathers" benefited indigenous societies through a three C’s mission- civilization, commerce, and

Christianity- to mask a greater span of actual motivations. They claimed that the benefits that would emerge from programs, such as education, industrialization, agriculture, modernization, and governance, would produce mutually positive outcomes.26 In practice, Britain was one of the few European powers that implemented a determined liberal development doctrine within its possessions, albeit often subordinated to efforts to advance the British economy and project its power.27

After World War I, despite the fall of several empires and renewed calls to liberate every colony, allied governments refused to end colonization. Instead, the victorious

European powers sustained the old practices and reasserted their global influence, carving up the territories of the vanquished. In the Middle East, this process led to the breaking up of the former Ottoman Provinces into mandates under the influence of the

26 Julia Clancy-Smith, "Twentieth Century Historians and Historiography of the Middle East: Women, Gender, and Empire," in Israel Gershoni, Amy Singer, Y. Hakan Erdem, eds., Middle East Historiographies: Narrating the Twentieth Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006), 71-72.

27 European states, such as France, are generally criticized for implementing a simple façade of efforts to civilize their colonial possession. Others argue that French efforts did expand their culture into the regions they dominated, providing the essential foundation for modern states. See Mathew Burrows, “‘Mission Civilisatrice’: French Cultural Policy in the Middle East, 1860-1914,” The Historical Journal, vol. 29, no. 1 (1986): 109-135.

140

British and French.28 T.E. Lawrence, the famous British soldier who assisted the Arab resistance against the Ottomans throughout World War I, understood the ramifications.

In the introduction of his 1922 classic account of the revolt, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, he lamented the fact that after the war “the old men came out again and took our victory to re-make in the likeness of the former world they knew.” The established powers and interests denied the aspirations of the Arabs and, instead, preserved the basis and practices of the old-world order.29 After 1919, the remaining European empires actually expanded. By the next global conflict, 15 world powers would control almost 120 political units; two-thirds of the world lived within a system of subordination.30

In an ironic twist, London’s early twentieth century push to enact reforms in Egypt both advanced state institutions and the indigenous demands for liberation. It led to a significant expansion of infrastructure, agriculture and industry, as well as education.31

The phenomenon also contributed to significant pressure for social changes. For example, fellahin within the government bureaucracies pointed out that they were denied opportunities, as their education focused on menial tasks and excluded

28 Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, 104-120.

29 T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom: a Triumph (Garden City: Doubleday, Doran & Company, 1935), Introduction.

30 Lord Hailey, “Future of Colonies,” Council on Foreign Relations- Study Group Reports, January 6, 1943, MC104, 1918-2004, Series 4: Meetings, Box 439, CFR Records, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library.

31 Roger Owen, “The rapid growth of Egypt’s agricultural output, 1890–1914, as an early example of the green revolutions of modern South Asia: some implications for the writing of global history,” Journal of Global History, vol. 1 (2006): 81-99; Relli Shechter, “Selling Luxury: The Rise of the Egyptian Cigarette and the Transformation of the Egyptian Tobacco Market, 1850 – 1914,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 35 (2003): 51-75; Alan Richard, Egypt’s Agricultural Development 1800–1980: Technical and Social Change (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982).

141 commerce, banking, trading or shipping. They criticized the fact that Egyptians workers often saw the best jobs given to foreigners.32

Adding to these efforts, deliberate attempts to expand political awareness among

Egypt’s native population emerged. Indigenous leaders produced a wave of writings that sought to build an Egyptian national consciousness or patriotism, modeled on those used by European states.33 They also engaged in a variety of campaigns to create the symbols and narratives needed to unify its population, such as by emphasizing Egypt’s

Islamic, Arabic, or Pharaonic identities.34 These efforts increasingly coalesced around opposition to Egypt’s political structures dominated by former Ottomans and

Europeans. The Wafd Party rose to become the leading voice of Egyptian opposition. It dominated Egyptian political elections throughout the interwar period by building a broad nationalist alliance upon a narrative of resistance to external control, emphasizing the nation’s history of foreign dominance, whether by the Ottomans, French, or

British.35

32 W. J. Berridge, “Object Lessons in Violence: The rationalities and irrationalities of urban struggle during the Egyptian Revolution of 1919,” Journal of Colonialism & Colonial History, vol. 12, no. 3 (Winter, 2011).

33 For example, the influential intellectual Tifa'a Badawi Rafi'al-Tahtawi articulated “the idea of the Egyptian nation,” explaining that the country’s backwardness derived from the Ottoman system. Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought: in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 68-69.

34 Hourani, Arabic Thought: in the Liberal Age, 341-344; See also Fauzi M. Najjar, "The debate on Islam and secularism in Egypt," Arab Studies Quarterly, vol. 18, no. 2 (Spring 1996): 1-21.

35 Roger Owen, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East, 3rd ed. (London: Routledge, 2004), 132-133.

142

After World War I, Woodrow Wilson’s promotion of “self-determination” added an additional rallying cry against efforts by London to preserve Egypt as a Protectorate.36 In

1919, this opposition turned into overt dissent, after Britain’s High Commissioner in

Cairo refused to allow an Egyptian delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. Massive non-violent demonstrations ensued that disrupted life in Egypt.37 The British responded by arresting and exiling the Wafd leader, Saad Zaghlul. Egypt then descended into chaos.

“A wave of demonstrations and strikes swept the country," accompanied by attacks on

British military personnel, foreign interests and the destruction of railroad and telegraph lines. The violence continued and Britain, unwilling to brutally suppress it with military force, agreed to negotiations.38

After two years, the talks remained stalemated. The British High Commissioner,

Edmund Allenby, deported Zaghlul again. He also pushed London to grant Egypt its independence unilaterally. In February 1922, the British government declared Egypt to be a sovereign state. It was mostly a symbolic step. The pronouncement abolished

Egypt’s formal condition as a British protectorate, but included four reservations that preserved much of the status quo. First, Britain retained control over the security of

British communications in Egypt, such as the Suez Canal Zone and the use of its

36 Woodrow Wilson, “Address to Congress Analyzing German and Austrian Peace Utterances,” February 11, 1918, http://www.gwpda.org/1918/wilpeace.html (accessed May 19, 2016); See Erez Manela, “The Wilsonian moment and the rise of Anticolonial Nationalism: The Case of Egypt,” Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol. 12, no. 4 (2001): 99-122; Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

37 Stephen Zunes, Social Movements: A geographical perspective (Malden, Mass: Blackwell, 1999), 42.

38 Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, 417-420.

143 international waterway. Second, it preserved London’s right to defend Egypt against foreign aggression. This kept Egypt as a protectorate under international law. Third, it pledged to protect foreign interests and minorities in Egypt. Fourth, it asserted that

Britain remained committed to resolving the status of the Sudan. The act allowed Britain to proclaim Egypt’s independence publically, while maintaining significant control over the state.39

For most of the interwar years, Britain sustained its efforts to maintain control and influence over its former empire. In some areas of the Middle East, Britain explicitly used its military to control the population.40 The crown also implemented new initiatives that sought peaceful ways to maintain the vestiges of its empire. In 1926, it declared that Britain and its dominions were “equal in status,” leading to the creation of a “commonwealth” that retained allegiance to the crown. In the 1930s, it added a

“sterling area” that included Egypt. It guaranteed access to London’s financial resources, establishing the largest closed currency bloc in the world.41

39 Cleveland and Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East, 182; See also W. J. Berridge, “Object Lessons in Violence: The rationalities and irrationalities of urban struggle during the Egyptian Revolution of 1919,” Journal of Colonialism & Colonial History, vol. 12, no. 3 (Winter, 2011), http://search.proquest.com/docview/1018692272?pq-origsite=summon (accessed October 12, 2016).

40 Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the British used various techniques to “police” resistance against their empire. In the Middle East, this included using military occupation, punitive military expeditions, bribery and punitive air power to coerce Arab tribesmen to submit. Air Chief Marshal Lord Portal, “Air Force Cooperation in Policing the Empire,” Journal of the Royal United Service Institution (London: W. Mitchell and Son, 1937), 343-358.

41 The British "Commonwealth" idea emerged at the Imperial Conference of 1926. It stressed the "autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal to each other" but all with allegiance to the crown. In regards to the shift in policy toward financial zones, the French also adopted the practice. For example, they created a French African Banking Zone. Betts, Decolonization: Making of the Contemporary World Series, 30-31.

144

Despite these British moves to shore up its influence, Egyptians continued their efforts to advance indigenous socio-political reforms. To cite but one illustration, Egypt passed a Constitution that adopted a parliamentary representative system. It expanded popular participation through elections. London did not oppose many of these moves, but Britain’s presence in Egypt ensured a reflexive Egyptian resistance that prevented arriving at a complete accord. As the interwar years progressed, London found it almost impossible to work with the Wafd Party. This led it to pursue policies to marginalize the

Wafd’s power and work more directly through the Egyptian king, Farouk, the tenth and last crowned ruler in the line of Ali. By the early 1930s, Egyptians increasingly associated the monarchy with the established interests that governed the nation, as well as with its foreign domination.42

London’s approach to shoring up its power through Egypt’s hereditary ruler changed in 1935. Mussolini’s expansionist policies in the Mediterranean combined with massive popular protests in Cairo to create concern that Egypt might make a move to join the

Axis camp. Britain negotiated a public compromise, leading to the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian

Treaty between the Kings of Britain and Egypt. It legitimized the presence of 10,000

British forces to protect the Suez Canal Zone and provided for a permanent military alliance. The Treaty also pledged to end the British occupation, declaring the arrangement would only last for 20 years -- until 1956. To the average Egyptian, the treaty represented another delay in granting the promise of full independence. Many

42 After forcing Faud II to abdicate in 1952, his infant son was named to replace him, but the boy was never crowned.

145 derided the terms and continued to agitate for a more immediate and complete withdrawal.43

World War II tabled many of these demands. In part, this was due to Britain’s Prime

Minister, Winston Churchill, who pointed to the threat of fascist expansion and declared that the war was a more pressing issue. He refused to consider any further changes in

Egypt’s status until after the conflict. Egyptian reformist conceded to this argument. This acquiescence allowed Britain to expand its military presence in Egypt exponentially during the war. Even with this delay, Egyptian proponents for independence did not remain idle. They used the period to assert their sovereignty in different ways. In early

1943, the government in Cairo reached out to its neighbors, calling for the creation of an association of Arab states. Two years later, Egypt joined with Iraq, Transjordan,

Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Syria to form the Arab League. The charter established its headquarters in Cairo, created the basis for cooperation between Arab nations and reinforced the right to “independence and sovereignty.” It also elevated Egypt to a leadership role in the region based on an Arab identity and opposition to imperial influence.44

The end of the war unleashed an indigenous push for reforms and independence in

Egypt. Although still significantly fragmented over visions of the future, the various factions within the country coalesced under one main issue: their opposition to foreign

43 Laila Morsy, “The Military Clause of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, 1936,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 16, no. 1 (March, 1984): 67-97.

44 Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski, Redefining the Egyptian nation, 1930-1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 192-211, 218.

146 influence and British control. The rising and, increasingly, powerful fellahin opposition in

Egypt adopted the technique of seeing all foreigners as an “other,” reversing the concept that Europeans used to justify their subjugation.45 It led to nationalist narratives that declared Egypt’s social, political, and economic deficits were primarily caused by foreign exploitation. It was a very narrow portrayal of the nation’s problems. The political move worked, galvanizing support for liberation, even as significant differences remained over social and economic questions. It also created the false expectation that removing London’s advisors and soldiers would quickly lead to substantial progress.46

Truman and Decolonization

After 1945, the issues surrounding decolonization complicated America’s efforts to assert new global norms. The end of World War II led to “cataclysmic transformations,” as “more than one-half of the peoples of the world saw their political, social, and economic conditions transformed within a period of two decades,” to quote the long-

45 In his monograph, Orientalism, initially published in 1978, Edward Said illuminated the biases and patronizing nature of the European powers in their dealings with their colonized nations. He claimed that they developed a superior attitude toward eastern societies, viewing them as “others.” By creating a subordinate “other,” European powers justified their actions to assert social control. A quarter century later, Said added an ‘Afterward’ to the 1994 edition that emphasized that the technique held significant nuance. It was a tool also used to build nationalisms. Many emerging nations would witness the replication of the technique by indigenous leaders and groups after World War II, as they worked to gain power and influence inside their states. Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1994).

46 Egypt was caught within a national debate that sought to reconcile its many competing identities, such as its ties to ancient Egypt, Islam, and the Ottoman Empire, as well as between modernity and traditional culture. See Hourani, Arabic Thought: in the Liberal Age, 68-69, 341-344; Abdeslam M. Maghraoui, Liberalism without Democracy: Nationhood and Citizenship in Egypt, 1922-1936 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 144; Najjar, "The debate on Islam and secularism in Egypt,"1-21.

147 time US foreign service officer and scholar David Newsome.47 Those nations pushing for independence did not always know how to judge America’s liberal project. Their responses varied from seeing it as idealistic to neo-colonial. Many saw it through an opportunistic lens. Within the world’s far-flung colonies, America’s vocal support for

“self-determination” and the assertion of new standards of statecraft became a tool for liberation movements.48 This included actively pursuing their sovereignty through the

UN General Assembly.49 This outlook also led many new nations to define the world as within a north-south struggle, overriding concerns with the superpower (east-west) contest altogether. It led to a broad push by underdeveloped nations to form regional alliances, such as the Arab League, and a global non-aligned movement.50

These efforts included demands for instant liberation. For many nations, independence became the first step, rather than the last, in the process of decolonization. They sought to accelerate the move toward sovereignty and suppressed arguments for more organized, evolutionary transitions, such as those calling for the

47 David D. Newsom, The Imperial Mantle: The United States, Decolonization, and the Third World (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 1-10.

48 President Wilson called for self-government after World War I, but emphasized it within the principles of democratic principles. Wilson believed that a “civic commitment to common goals” could form the basis of international cooperation. Colonies throughout the world rebranded the idea, simplifying them into calls for immediate liberation. Trygve Throntveit, “The Fable of the Fourteen Points: Woodrow Wilson and National Self-Determination,” Diplomatic History, vol. 35, no. 3 (June, 2011): 445- 481.

49 The UN had 80 members by 1956, an almost 60% increase from the 51 that founded it in 1945. See “Growth in United Nations membership 1945-present,” United Nations, http://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/growth-united-nations-membership-1945- present/index.html (accessed March 19, 2016); See also Newsom, The Imperial Mantle, 176-190.

50 See Kirstin S. Tassin, “‘Lift Up Your Head, My Brother:’ Nationalism and the Genesis of the Non- Aligned Movement,” Journal of Third World Studies, vol. 23, no. 1 (Spring, 2006): 147-168.

148 prerequisite of functioning governments that held popular legitimacy or the need for better social, cultural, educational and economic foundations.51 Decolonization became one of the most significant challenges facing the postwar world.52

During the early postwar period, the US tried to navigate the imbroglios surrounding the issue of decolonization. President Truman initially tried to lead the way forward by demonstrating America’s resolve to uphold the new norms of conduct by liberating its own possessions. For example, he made a public spectacle of the nation’s commitment to following through on the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934 that pledged to liberate the

Philippines. He fast-tracked the process after World War II, signing the Treaty of Manila granting the Philippines full independence on July 4, 1946. It was a move timed to coincide with America’s Independence Day commemoration. Parades throughout

Manila celebrated the event, with participants from both nations marching and taking part in the festivities. Critics in Britain claimed it signaled the end of America’s presence in the Far East and portended a withdrawal to Hawaii.53

The Truman administration also witnessed and learned from the challenges caused by the rapid move toward decolonization. After World War II, the push by indigenous

51 For a discussion of the challenges brought by the rapid transition to independence, see Ann Hironaka, Neverending Wars: The International Community, Weak States, and the Perpetuation of Civil Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005).

52 P.J. Cain, “The Economics and Ethics of British Imperialism,” The Historical Journal, Vol. 55, 01 (March 2012): 249-261.

53 Philip C. Jessup, “Philippine Independence,” The American Journal of International Law, vol. 29, no. 1 (January, 1935): 83-87; Treaty of General Relations and Protocol with the Republic of the Philippines: Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the Treaty of General Relations and Protocol Between the United States of America and the Republic of the Philippines, Signed at Manila on July 4, 1946 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946).

149 populations for their immediate liberation created significant power vacuums and instability. India’s transition to independence exemplified this phenomenon.

Throughout the war, Indian liberation movements continued to agitate against the

British and accelerated their efforts at the wars end. The British quickly found themselves unable to control the protests that followed, which, often, turned violent and divided the nation. By 1945, religious nationalism replaced Mahatma Gandhi’s efforts during the 1930s to influence London through nonviolent civil disobedience.54 It led to a sustained period of communal violence that divided the country along religious lines, mostly between Muslims and non-Muslims.

Unable to control the violence, London pledged, in early 1947, to grant India its independence quickly. Britain sent Lord Louis Mountbatten, who commanded its forces in India during World War II, “to wind up the 182-year-old British Indian Empire in fifteen months.” By the summer, the country seemed ready to disintegrate. The British tried to mitigate the tensions and to resolve the political divisions. For example, they mediated an agreement to partition the country that created the sovereign state of

Pakistan.55 The violent clashes also led Britain to decide to liberate India a year early, at midnight on 14-15 August 1947.56 The rapid transition to independence led to a

54 Gandhi was arrested in 1942 and spent the remainder of the war in prison. Upon his release, he tried and failed to preserve Indian unity, as well as cooperation between sectarian groups. See H.J.N. Horsburgh, Non-Violence and Aggression: a Study of Gandhi’s Moral Equivalent of War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968).

55 The Agreement created the Dominion of Pakistan, splitting later into Pakistan and Bangledesh, and the Union of India that would become the Republic of India.

56 Brigadier Desmond Young, “Hindsight on India,” The Spectator Archive, http://archive.spectator.co.uk/article/12th-december-1947/7/hindsight-on-india (accessed June 3, 2016).

150 sustained period of brutal conflict in India that caused famines and vast human suffering. It displaced an estimated twelve million Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs, leading to the largest mass migration in human history. It also produced almost a million deaths, as well as creating economic challenges that remained for decades.57 It is not unreasonable to refer to the event as a genocide.58

India’s independence came much too late for many of its nationalists, but in many other corners of the world it demonstrated the significant challenges that surrounded independence. For some, India’s political fragmentation and descent into violence validated the claim in the UN Charter that many colonial territories lacked the capability to “stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world.”59 Others refuted this outlook as paternalistic and pointed to the difficulties of creating new states within a climate of low living standards, low productivity, a lack of qualified technical personnel and no systems of representative leadership. Additionally, the existence of fragmented and traditional socio-political structures within many of the emergent states made them politically weak. Finally, international factors exacerbated the issue. For

57 Jonathan D. Greenberg, “Divided Lands, Phantom Limbs: Partition in the Indian Subcontinent, Palestine, China, and Korea,” Journal of International Affairs, vol. 57, no. 2 (Spring, 2004): 7-27.

58 Paul R. Brass, “The partition of India and retributive genocide in the Punjab, 1946-1947: means, methods, and purposes,” Journal of Genocide Research, vol. 5, no. 1 (2003): 71-101.

59 A phrase captured in Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant and replicated in the UN Charter. Annette Baker Fox, “The United Nations and Colonial Development,” International Organization, vol. 4, no. 2 (May, 1950): 199-218.

151 example, the Cold War competition led communists to exaggerate and decry the link between western capitalism and indigenous poverty.60

The issue of decolonization also divided America from several of its allies, most notably Great Britain. Despite a strong basis of similarities, most prominently alignment in their efforts to contain Soviet aggression, as well as a common language, political culture, and customs, the two diverged starkly over the issue of how to manage the transition of colonies. Agreeing to the UN Charter’s explicit prohibition on aggressive war directly threatened Britain’s established interests, its global prestige, and its economic advantages.61 It was understood that too rapidly applying the new global norms would complicate British efforts to recover quickly from the ruin caused by World

War II.62 This led London toward policies to retard if not stifle the moves toward decolonization in many of its possessions. It also created opposition to these policies, from both domestic and international critics. They derided these steps as simply

60 Scholars analyze the challenges of decolonization and international relations through many factors, such as domestic politics and economics, international pressures and dependency theories. See Darwin, The End of British Empire; Ole R. Holsti, "Theories of international relations," and Thomas J McCormick, "World Systems," and Louis A. Perez Jr, "Dependency" in Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, second edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 51-91, 149-161, 162-175; For a novel discussion of how decolonization did not conform to western notions of nation-building, see Ruth Ginio and Lynn Schler, "Decolonization Reconsidered: Rebirths, Continuities and Erasures," Hagar, vol. 9, no. 2 (Summer, 2010): 3-13,193-196.

61 Both Article 1 and Article 51 of the UN Charter emphasized the principle of self-determination. Interpretations of the articles remain disputed, but, throughout the Cold War, a plethora of UN resolutions continued the trend to support national liberation movements, despite their power of enforcement being arbitrary. In 1970, the international community formally recognized the principle of self-determination as a legal right. See “Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,” October 24, 1970, United Nations Documents: Gathering a body of global agreements at http://www.un- documents.net/a25r2625.htm (accessed December 3, 2013).

62 Brinton, The United States and Britain, Introduction; See also Herbert Nicholas, Britain and the U.S.A. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1963).

152 preserving the vestiges of empire and argued that they placed Britain on a collision course with indigenous efforts to affirm self-determination. Managing its challenges with decolonization became a focus of London’s postwar efforts, often rivaling if not surpassing its concerns with Moscow’s ambitions.63

The new norms of statecraft combined with other factors to undermine Britain’s colonial control. The postwar agreements challenged the political legitimacy of Britain’s colonial holdings and put its efforts under a spotlight of global opinion. Additionally, the war diluted the London’s ability to forcefully resist the demands for liberation. The conflict destroyed its industries and martial capabilities. When the Axis forces occupied its territories, protectorates and mandates, they also dissipated the illusion of British invulnerability. In combination, these factors made it difficult for postwar Britain to project and sustain military forces abroad. Instead, vacuums of power emerged in its far-flung possessions that the British were often unable to manage or control.64

Predictably, decolonization caused several of America’s allies to waver in their willingness to promote a new world order. Along with public pronouncements of wanting to advance the cause of peace, they sought to ensure their independence of action in world affairs. For example, Britain pursued policies to create a “third power” in

Europe after World War II. This was seen in the Anglo-French alliance created with the

Dunkirk Treaty of 1947. Prime Minister Ernest Bevin believed that “with their

63 Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman, American Umpire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), 272.

64 John Darwin, The End of the British Empire: The Historical Debate (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991).

153 populations of 47 million and 40 million respectively and with their vast colonial possessions they could, if they acted together, be as powerful as either the Soviet Union or the United States.”65 The two powers expanded this approach a year later, signing the 1948 Treaty of Brussels that included Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the

Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The London Declaration of 1949 complemented this policy outlook, creating a Commonwealth out of many of Britain’s former territories. London’s efforts signaled an attempt to retain its leadership and autonomy in world affairs.66 It also risked diluting the effort to advance new global norms.

Several factors added to America’s assessments of the decolonization challenge. This included envisioning the transitions from colonies to modern states as a linear process that replicated the western experience. During the early postwar period, the United

States adhered to a development doctrine or modernization theory that saw the economic and political growth of the industrialized West as “normative.” These views led US policymakers to take steps to replicate them in the underdeveloped world.67

Additionally, America’s approaches reflected the fact that there was little domestic

65 Ernest Bevin quoted in Carl Watts, “Britain and the Formation of NATO,” Historian, vol. 62 (Summer, 1999): 6-11.

66 The founding members joined for many pragmatic reasons as well, such as the acknowledgement of geostrategic realities, or as a way to keep America engaged to prevent the resurgence of Germany. For a discussion of allied rationales, see Timothy P. Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Organization (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1981).

67 Nick Cullather credits the American experiences with the New Deal, “particularly the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and the Manhattan Project,” as reinforcing the belief that science and development planning could change whole societies. Nick Cullather, "Modernization Theory"; in Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, second edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Nick Cullather, "Development Doctrine and Modernization Theory," in Richard Dean Burns, Alexander DeConde, and Fredrik Logevall, eds., Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy. 2nd ed. vol. 1 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 2002), 477-491.

154 political will or popular support to pay for the costs of more ambitious programs, such as replicating the Marshall Plan formula in other parts of the world.68 The US evaluations also ignored other fundamental factors, such as the unequal relationships between the north and south, as well as the differences in geography, geopolitical positioning and social-cultural dynamics.69

These trials and outlooks led Truman to advocate that decolonization needed to be organized, systematic, and gradual. To the US president, taking an evolutionary approach seemed both humane and prudent, given examples such as India. America saw the issue as a “Pandora’s Box that might lead to state-fragmentation, genocide, or the proliferation of states too small or too primitive to merit self-government.” Many policymakers echoed these views. They argued that the international agreements made to transform global norms were just the beginning of a long process of adaptation. This led to calls to conceive of self-determination as a measured process that oriented on

“democratic self-rule.” This middle ground positioning sought to both counter communist efforts and place the principle of national sovereignty within a broader project to advance a liberal democratic order.70

68 See Warren I. Cohen, “The American Dream: Empire without Tears,” Global Dialogue, vol. 5 (Winter, 2003): 1-11.

69 Martin Shipway presents a study that rejects both “imperialist apologies” and “romantic nationalist” narratives of decolonization. Martin Shipway, Decolonization and Its Impact: A Comparative Approach to the End of the Colonial Empires (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, 2008).

70 Simpson, “Bernath Lecture: The United States and the Curious History of Self-Determination,” 685.

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This long-term perspective placed the United States in the awkward position where it felt compelled to vote against the 1952 UN General Assembly resolution that claimed self-determination was a human right. America also refused to support demands that

“the colonial powers report on the progress of non–self-governing territories toward self-government.”71 Additionally, this policy outlook contained a view to the nation’s strategic priorities. It placed assisting the economic recovery from the war of America’s strategic allies above indigenous demands. It was a way to avoid shouldering all of the burdens of the postwar world.72

This last point derived, in part, from a US reluctance to become overly involved in many global issues. The United States, particularly its Congress, was not prepared to underwrite the cost that a more ambitious decolonization project demanded. Instead,

US policies tried to prevent over-extending the nation’s commitments. It allowed its allies and other organizations, such as the United Nations and the World Bank, to assist postcolonial areas in managing their transitions.73

Moscow’s program to advance the Soviet model of modernization into the underdeveloped world added pressure to America’s policy. In the early postwar period,

Soviet industrial growth and its scientific framework made its model very appealing to

71 Brad Simpson, “Bernath Lecture: The United States and the Curious History of Self- Determination,” Diplomatic History, vol. 36, iss. 4 (July, 2012): 675-694, 676, 680.

72 Eisenhower supported this view as the Army Chief of Staff, see DDE to Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 22, 1947, DDEP, 9:2155-2158; See also Simon C. Smith, Ending Empire in the Middle East: Britain, the United States and Post- War Decolonization, 1945-1973 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012).

73 See David Webster, “Development advisors in a time of cold war and decolonization: the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration, 1950-1959,” Journal of Global History, vol. 6, no. 2 (July, 2011): 249-272.

156 the many nations emerging from imperial control.74 Moscow also actively tried to gain influence over these areas through propaganda efforts that sought to discredit the capitalist system, drawing on such Leninist dogma as the claim that capitalism was a system that needed and created colonies.75 Stalin also tried to diminish the links between the underdeveloped world and the west by offering to provide direct support for their development needs.76

These Soviet steps partially moved the United States away from policies that tried to outsource most of the challenges associated with decolonization. The Truman Doctrine, announced to Congress on March 12, 1947, pledged American political, military, and economic support to counter communist threats. Truman also made development assistance a tool of US foreign policy.77 The fourth point in his 1949 inaugural address, declared America’s intention to make “the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas.”78 Proponents, such as Walt Whitman Rostow argued that it was in the United

74 Lolly Merrell, “The Soviet Union Promotes Rapid Technological Development in the Communist Ideology," in Neil Schlager and Josh Lauer, eds., Science and Its Times, vol. 6: 1900 to 1949 (Detroit: Gale, 2000), 527-529.

75 See V.I. Lenin, Imperialism: The highest stage of capitalism (New York: International Publishers, 1939).

76 For a discussion of the Soviet effort to expand the communist model into the underdeveloped world, see A. Brewer, Marxist theories of imperialism: a Critical Survey (London, Routledge, 1990).

77 Cobbs Hoffman, American Umpire, 287-295.

78 Thomas G. Paterson, “Foreign Aid Under Wraps: The Point Four Program,” The Wisconsin Magazine of History, vol. 56, no. 2 (Winter, 1972-1973): 119-126; Harry S. Truman, “Inaugural Address, January 20, 1949,” https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/50yr_archive/inagural20jan1949.htm (accessed May 4, 2016).

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States’ interest to help modernize all areas of the world, as it offered a pathway to both counter Soviet expansion and to help prevent the instability that might escalate into significant conflicts.79 While the development assistance that followed was important, its scope was minimal and did not fundamentally alter America’s policy of supporting gradual transitions to independence.

Britain’s approach to decolonization also shifted after 1949 in response to the aggressive Soviet moves that threatened its grand plan. London saw the assertive steps made by Moscow the previous year, such as the coup in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin

Blockade, as indicators that the Kremlin had great ambitions and would exploit whatever opportunities it identified. London made moves to secure Europe and its interests, such as engaging in an effort to include the United States in collective security initiatives around the world. This shift in attitude contributed to the creation of NATO.80

The founding members joined for many pragmatic reasons as well, such as the acknowledgement of geostrategic realities, or as a way to keep America engaged to prevent the resurgence of Germany. NATO also served to extend the UN Charter’s efforts to use collective security as a foundational framework to prevent the aggression of others. In addition to advocating for NATO, Britain pursued a “special relationship” with the United States. Placing emphasis on policy alignment with Washington, was a way for London to both preserve its global great power role and to influence American

79 Cullather, "Development Doctrine and Modernization Theory,” 477-491; W.W. Rostow, The Process of Economic Growth (New York: W.W. Norton, 1952); W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960).

80 Cullather, "Development Doctrine and Modernization Theory.”

158 choices. Britain’s shift in policy obscured a desire to delay the push for decolonization in its far flung possessions.81

81 John Baylis, The Diplomacy of Pragmatism: Britain and the Formation of NATO, 1942-1949 (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1993), 116-130.

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CHAPTER 6

ORIENTING ON THE GOAL OF PEACE

By 1952, Eisenhower’s study of the challenges faced by the project to create enduring peace began to coalesce into a comprehensive agenda. As he prepared to run for president with a “whirlwind campaign,”1 he articulated his views on both the problems and the solutions to creating new global norms. Among the many issues he identified was Truman’s management of the nation’s security. Eisenhower believed that under Truman the nation suffered from haphazard attempts to influence the course of global events. The administration’s unsystematic, frequently reactive decision-making processes permitted narrow approaches to foreign policy, from conception to implementation.2 These deficiencies came to the fore after the outbreak of war in

Korea. The conflict trumped Truman’s initial efforts to find a balanced approach to national security and led to his approval of NSC-68, a national strategy document that in

Eisenhower’s judgment crudely defined the Soviet threat, emphasized a significant militarization of US foreign policy, and led to a mammoth increase in the defense budget.3

Eisenhower was a supporter of a strong defense, but he believed that the shift in strategy went too far. In particular, the national security approach exponentially

1 DDE, Mandate For Change, 1953-1956 (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1963), 54.

2 For example, Truman often only saw a consensus position to approve or reject. This allowed his key leaders to pursue their own agendas, resulting in many uncoordinated efforts, as well as bureaucratic infighting.

3 Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron, Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State 1945-1954 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 1-12.

160 redefined the meaning of containment.4 NSC-68 sought to prevent all threats emanating from the Kremlin and did not distinguish between vital and peripheral interests nor hierarchically organize means and capabilities.5 Ike explained that Truman had embraced a program for “the annual expenditure of unconscionable sums on a program of indefinite duration, extending far into the future.”6 Domestically, critics quickly emphasized that it would lead to a perpetual cycle of conflict and spending that could bankrupt the nation.7 As important, the strategy threatened to derail the nation’s efforts to advance new approaches in international relations. Eisenhower believed that without better approaches, these unbounded outlooks could produce an “internal deterioration” that might lead the United States to refocus domestically and abandon the effort to advance a better world order.8

4 Kennan’s initial concept focused national security efforts toward clear priorities, such as establishing control of critical centers of power. It also worked within a limited definition of US interests. NSC-68 built its recommendation upon an expanded concept of national security.

5 John Lewis Gaddis and Paul Nitze, “NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat Reconsidered,” International Security, vol. 4, no. 4 (Spring, 1990): 164-170; Melvyn P. Leffler, “National Security,” The Journal of American History, vol. 77, no. 1 (June, 1990): 143-152.

6 DDE, Diary Entry, January 22, 1952, DDEP, 13:896-902.

7 The federal government projected deficits of $10 billion for FY1952 and $12 billion for FY1953. Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, Waging Peace, How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 11-40; They also had plans to exacerbate this trend, such as a proposal for another $20 billion for a “massive federal shelter program.” Robert Cutler, No Time For Rest (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965), 353; See also Frank Ninkovich, Modernity and Power: A History of the Domino Theory in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 136-138; Arnold A. Offner, Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945-1953 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002).

8 DDE, Diary Entry, January 22, 1952, DDEP, 13:896-902; DDE to William Wallace Chapin, February 4, 1952, DDEP, 13:945-946; DDE to William Edward Robertson, February 12, 1952, DDEP, 13:984-990.

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The 1952 presidential election became a decision point to determine if America would continue its progressive vision of changing global norms. While assigned to NATO,

Eisenhower’s network of supporters set the conditions for him to run for president.

They understood that the program to create a more enduring peace risked an early failure. For many, the ideal of a better world order seemed to be a mirage, as the aggressive opposition presented by the Soviet Union and significant global turbulence, such as the violence surrounding decolonization, threatened its viability.9 Eisenhower’s supporters believed the project could continue, as it still had significant popular support in the United States.10 Eisenhower’s candidacy placed him at the center of this debate.11

The Republican primaries decided the direction of US foreign policy. The Democratic

Party’s backroom politicking resulted in Adlai Stevenson’s nomination. Their candidate retained the vision of building “universal world peace.”12 The Republican nomination,

9 The nation and the world suffered from the belief that changing global norms would be immediate. Some pundits and politicians declared that the ideal of a peaceful world order had failed, as it proved itself unable to supplant or suppress the traditional, often violent, pursuit of power in international politics. During the run up to the presidential election, John Foster Dulles addressed this fallacy by emphasizing that the transition to a peaceful world order would only follow an evolutionary course. John Foster Dulles, War or Peace (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1950), 262-266.

10 For example, by early 1951 American opinion divided on whether the UN was increasing or decreasing in importance, but 71% believed that the United States should not give up its membership. George H. Gallup, “January 5, 1951, United Nations” and “December 14, 1951, United Nations,” The Gallup Poll; Public Opinion 1935-1971 (New York: Random House, 1972), 957-958, 1028.

11 It was widely understood that Truman’s successor would either reinforce the move toward advancing peaceful norms or, at least for the foreseeable future, abandon them. Edith S. Sampson, “Show the East How the Freedom Revolution Works,” Vital Speeches of the Day, vol. 17, no. 9 (February 15, 1951): 272-275; Reinhold Niebuhr, “The Illusion of World Government,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 17, no. 3 (April, 1949): 379-388.

12 Democratic Party Platforms: "Democratic Party Platform of 1952," July 21, 1952, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29600 (accessed 25 February, 2016); Edward F. Cooke, “Drafting the 1952 Platforms,” The Western Political Quarterly, vol. 9, no. 3 (September, 1956): 699-712; See also Elaine C. Kamarck, Primary Politics: How Presidential Candidates Have Shaped

162 however, became a referendum on whether the nation should continue its progressive postwar moves. Senator Robert A. Taft’s wing of the Party sought a significant rollback of New Deal programs and advanced an "America first" approach to foreign policy.13

This framework was manifest in his strong criticism of NATO and his devotion to US unilateralism.14 Eisenhower accepted that his candidacy represented the effort to preserve the venture to change global norms.15 He feared that the nation might otherwise move toward a “new wave of isolationism,”16 returning to an inward focus that would dilute, if not surrender, its ability to influence world events.17 In a close contest, Eisenhower’s team successfully out-maneuvered Taft’s for the Republican nomination.18

The disputed nomination threatened to divide the party, leading Eisenhower to make immediate conciliatory moves. He ran for office on a “Middle Way” platform that

the Modern Nominating System (Washington D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 2009); Adlai E. Stevenson, "Korea in Perspective," Foreign Affairs (April 1952).

13 He called for a fortress America and tried to preserve the vestiges of economic nationalism. James T. Patterson, Mr. Republican: a Biography of Robert A. Taft (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972), 492-496.

14 Timothy Healey, “Will Clayton, Negotiating the Marshall Plan, and European Economic Integration,” Diplomatic History, vol. 35, no. 2 (April, 2011).

15 DDE to Charles McElroy White, April 1, 1952, DDEP, 13:1151-1153.

16 DDE, Mandate For Change, 8.

17 DDE to John Foster Dulles, June 20, 1952, DDEP, 13:1254-1256.

18 See John Andrew, “The Struggle for the Republican Party in 1960,” The Historian, vol. 59, no. 3 (Spring 1997): 613-631; Robert Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 12-17; Robert T. Elson, "Taft or Eisenhower: The Choice Narrows," Life (August 13,1951): 86-101; DDE Diary Entry, October 29, 1951, DDEP, 12:666-667; DDE to Charles McElroy White, November 9, 1951, DDEP, 12:699.

163 deliberately intended to be inclusive and coopt the opposition of others.19 This included integrating the dissenters within his own party. He needed the support of the Taft wing to win the general election and to lead the nation. Despite its breaking with precedent and against the wishes of his advisors, at the GOP convention in San Francisco

Eisenhower called Taft and asked if he could come see him. He then walked through the crowd of cheering supporters to the Senator’s hotel room to mend fences. These peacemaking efforts worked, and the Republican Party entered the general election united. It was a move that contributed to Eisenhower’s resounded victory.20

Building Domestic Tools for Statecraft

Eisenhower took many deliberate steps to empower his leadership over US affairs.

He was comfortable with his leadership style. A lifetime of practice and successes leading military organizations, culminating as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, gave him confidence in his capabilities. This background also shaped his outlooks and oriented the techniques he applied to presidential leadership. Eisenhower’s presidency is marked by the systematic approaches he took to manage the diverse responsibilities of the executive branch.

19 Steven Wagner, Eisenhower Republicanism: Pursuing the Middle Way (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2006); DDE, “Campaign Speech in Wheeling, West Virginia, September 24, 1952,” in DDE, “Pre-Presidential speeches,” https://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/all_about_ike/speeches.html (accessed May 30, 2015); DDE Campaign Speech in Boise Idaho October 20, 1952 in Ibid; New York Times, August 21, 1952, page 12; DDE Diary Entry, December 11, 1953 in Robert H. Ferrell, ed., The Eisenhower Diaries (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1981), 264; See also the Republican Platform of 1952, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25837 (accessed 9 March, 2015).

20 Colin Dueck, Hard Line: The Republican Party and U.S. Foreign Policy, Since World War II (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 80-84; See also Vincent P. DeSantis, “The Presidential Election of 1952,” The Review of Politics, Vol. 15, No. 2 (April, 1953): 131-150.

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In many ways, his election reversed the experiential mold that defines most Chief

Executives. Ike had a lifetime of experience focusing on the root causes of complex issues and designing comprehensive solutions to address them. He possessed a commendable grasp of statecraft, strategy, and organizational leadership. This included decades of exposure to the most significant global issues of the day and a personal relationship with many of the nation’s and the world’s leaders.21 Eisenhower “had a genius for avoiding confrontation” and sought creative ways to advance his agenda.22

Armed with this background, he began the task of reorienting the nation toward the pursuit of peace.

Immediately after his election, Eisenhower assembled his team. He appointed his cabinet and senior leaders within days of his election and in record time.23 His selections placed a premium on choosing capable people of character that would work as a team.24 Additionally, he did not want yes-men, but leaders that held and were willing to express diverse opinions, as well as who could help make and implement informed

21 Andrew J. Goodpaster, “Foreward,” in Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, v-viii; See also H.W. Brands, “Eisenhower and the Problem of Loose Ends,” in Gunter Bischof and Stephen E. Ambrose, eds., Eisenhower: A Centenary Assessment (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995), 126-135.

22 Wm. Roger Louis, “Dulles, Suez and the British,” in Richard H. Immerman, ed., John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 135.

23 H.W. Brands Jr., Cold Warriors: Eisenhower's Generation and American Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), ix-x; Geoffrey Perret, Eisenhower (New York: Random House, 1999), 420-424; DDE, Mandate For Change, 83-92.

24 Many of his appointees were not politically ambitious and came from outside Washington. Herbert Brownell with John P. Burke, Advising Ike: The Memoirs of Attorney General Herbert Brownell (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1993), 291.

165 decisions.25 Eisenhower also picked men baptized in the horrors of war and who believed in America’s sustained engagement in international affairs.26 Not all of these men would be strategic level leaders or decision makers, but they did represent a cohort of advocacy that Eisenhower supported.

Ike’s selections also demonstrated his intent to elevate the reputation of the United

Nations so that it would serve as a visible symbol for a new world order. Eisenhower chose Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., the longtime and influential senator from Massachusetts, as the U.S Ambassador to the United Nations; a position he would elevate to cabinet- level rank.27 Eisenhower joined with many others to reject the early claims that the organization had no utility. They accepted that the United Nations had limits. It was a forum that reflected the lingering beliefs in the old standards of statecraft. This led the

25 Robert J. Donovan, Eisenhower: The Inside Story (New York: New York Herald Tribune, 1956), 11; Brands, Cold Warriors, ix-x; DDE, Mandate For Change, 86; Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War, 19- 20.

26 Many of his choices were known advocates for building a new world order, such as Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. See John Foster Dulles, War, Peace and Change, 2d edition (New York: Harper Brothers Publishers, 1939), 1-8; Eisenhower named his brother, Allen Dulles, Director of the CIA. See Allen W. Dulles and Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Can We Be Nuetral? (New York: Harper & Bros., 1936); Allen W. Dulles and Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Can America Stay Nuetral? (New York: Harper & Bros., 1939); Eisenhower brought in C.D. Jackson to be his speechwriter and personal advisor on psychological warfare. This move elevated diplomatic warfare to a position of prominence. Anthony Leviero, “Eisenhower Picks a ‘Cold War’ Chief,” New York Times, February 17, 1953; See also Shawn J Parry-Giles, “The Eisenhower Administration's conceptualization of the USIA: The development of overt and covert propaganda strategies,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 24, no. 2 (Spring, 1994): 263-275; Harold Stassen a known opponent of isolationism and the president of the University of Pennsylvania, was named as the Director of the US Foreign Operations Administration. Along with Foster Dulles, he served as a US delegate at the San Francisco Conference that drafted the UN Charter. Under Eisenhower, Stassen focused on new efforts at arms control and disarmament. Harold Stassen and Marshall Houts, Eisenhower: Turning the World Toward Peace (St. Paul: Merrill/Magnus Publishing, 1990).

27 Eisenhower used Lodge’s public stature to demonstrate the new prestige he intended for the United Nations. Henry Cabot Lodge, "Modernize the G.O.P.," Atlantic Monthly (March 23, 1950): 23-28; Henry Cabot Lodge, "Eisenhower and the GOP," Harper's (May 1952): 34-39; See also Henry Cabot Lodge, The Storm Has Many Eves: A Personal Narrative (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1973), 75-127.

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US administration to focus on the ways the United Nations could contribute to changing global norms,28 such as after “a long period of trial and error… .”29 This included seeing the organization as a setting to socialize the new dynamics intended for international relations.30 It was also a valuable venue for global discussion. Eisenhower understood and accepted these factors. He remained a vocal supporter of the United Nations, but was often reluctant to rely on the institution to solve global issues.31

After establishing his team early, Eisenhower created opportunities to prepare them. In fulfillment of his campaign promise, in late November he departed to assess

28 Ernest A. Gross, “The Problems of Leadership- The United States in the United Nations, Feb 5, 1953,” CFR Records, Meeting Minutes, Box 444, 1952-54, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library; James F Byrnes, “observations on United States foreign-policy,” December 2, 1953, CFR Records, Meeting Minutes, Box 444, 1952-54, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library; “Memorandum by the President to the Secretary of State, September 8, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs, vol. II, part. I, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d89 (accessed March 16, 2017).

29 DDE, “Final Report of the Chief of Staff to the Secretary of the Army, February 7, 1948,” Rudolf L. Treuenfels, ed., Eisenhower Speaks: Dwight D. Eisenhower in his messages and speeches (New York: Farrar, Straus, 1948), 294; John Foster Dulles, "What Shall We Do With the U.N.," Christian Century, vol. 64 (September 3, 1947): 1041; See also DDE, “Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 6, 1955,” Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwiqht D. Eisenhower, 1955 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, 1959), 10; see also DDE, “Radio and Television Address to the American People on the State of the Union, April 5, 1954,” Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwiqht D. Eisenhower, 1954 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, I960), 379.

30 The United Nations had several committees with responsibility to study the problems of peace and to advance global solutions. The United States nominated prominent politicians or intellectuals, to serve on them as US Representatives to the General Assembly. By the time Eisenhower took office, Eleanor Roosevelt, the widow of FDR, was its best-known delegate. She chaired the UN’s Human Rights Commission that produced the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, often referring to it as the “international Magna Carta for all mankind.” See Rowland Brucken, A Most Uncertain Crusade: the United States, the United Nations, and Human Rights, 1941-1953 (Dekalb: NIU Press, 2014); Beginning in 1950, US Congressional leaders served routinely at the US delegation to the United Nations. Chadwick F. Alger, "United Nations Participation as a Learning Experience," Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 27 (Fall, 1963): 411- 426; Robert E. Riggs, "One Small Step for Functionalism: UN Participation and Congressional Attitude Change," International Organization, vol. 31 (Summer, 1977): 515-537.

31 Caroline Pruden, Conditional Partners: Eisenhower, the United Nations, and the Search for a Permanent Peace (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1998), Introduction.

167 the war in Korea. While on this secret trip, several of his key leaders accompanied or met up with him.32 During the return voyage at sea, Ike “set the broad outlines” of his leadership approach and clarified his vision for US foreign policy.33 For example, he stressed the need for a more disciplined approaches to policymaking. He also made it clear that their role was to focus on implementing national decisions, not their department’s desires. This complex yet integrated approach established clear standards and expectations. It also foreshadowed the changes that followed in the executive branch’s organization, processes and vision for US foreign policy.34

Eisenhower also worked diligently to gain and retain a broad mandate of American support for the pursuit of a better world order. He knew that he was a popular national figure,35 but that his power in Washington D.C. was limited by the separation of government powers and by the natural diversity of interests that exists within a free

32 Such as Omar Bradley (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), Charles Wilson (Secretary of Defense), Herbert Brownell Jr. (US Attorney General), and Arthur W. Radford (the Commander of US Forces in the Philippines and Formosa and successor to Bradley as CJCS); Eisenhower then went to Guam and boarded the USS Helena. During the return voyage, they stopped at Wake Island and several cabinet level designees joined them. John Foster Dulles, George M. Humphrey (Secretary of the Treasury), Joseph M. Dodge (Budget Director), and Douglas McKay (Secretary of the Interior), joined the future President, as well as Lucius D. Clay. Clay was not a cabinet level appointment, but, instead, a longtime friend of Eisenhower’s. He would later became the Chairman of the Crusade for Freedom.

33 Jean Edward Smith, Eisenhower in War and Peace (New York: Random House, 2012), 557-560; See also Michael Korda, Ike: An American Hero (New York: Harper Collins, 2007), 657-661; and DDE, Mandate For Change, 93-103; “Eisenhower Interview by Philip Crowl,” 28 July 1964, Gettysburg, PA, in JFD Oral History Collection, Public Policy Papers, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library.

34 Eisenhower continued this effort, meeting with his forming cabinet twice more before his inauguration. Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader (New York: Basic Books, 1982), 105-108.

35 His manners resonated with the American people. They were drawn to “his sense of proportion… [and] innate practicality.” Eisenhower was likeable and trusted. Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War, 11.

168 state.36 Given this situation, Eisenhower shunned “noisy, strong-armed tactics.”37

Instead, he adopted a cooperative outlook that sought to avoid unnecessary confrontations.38 This positioning sometimes required that he support programs that he did not fully believe in or to counter-propose a more moderate option. He also expected reciprocity.39 It helped him escape unnecessary partisan bickering and the crisis of the day.40 One way that he worked to place himself above petty political bickering was by focusing on the nation’s common and enduring interests of creating a more peaceful world.41

36 In the 83rd US Congress, the Republican Party held only an eleven-seat lead in the House of Representatives and only one in the Senate. Zahid Ali Khan and Munawar Sabir, “President vs Congress in US Foreign Policy: Cooperation or Confrontation,” Journal of Political Studies, vol. 20, no. 1 (Summer, 2013): 143-158; DDE to Albert A. Volk, June 21, 1949, DDEP, 10:650-651; See also DDE to the Editor, Harvard Crimson, October 27, 1952, DDEP, 13:1401-1403.

37 The contested environment was seen in efforts to remove the taxes levied to pay for the Korean War, to defund mutual-security programs, and to restore protectionist tariffs on foreign goods. DDE, Mandate for Change, 192-199.

38 Ernest R. May, “Epilogue,” in Dennis E. Showalter, Forging the Shield: Eisenhower and National Security for the 21st Century (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 2005), 219-221; See also Richard A. Melanson, “The Foundations of Eisenhower’s Foreign Policy,” in Richard A. Melanson and David Mayers, eds., Reevaluating Eisenhower: American Foreign Policy in the 1950s (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1987), 31-32, 55; Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency, 70-73.

39 Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency, 50-51; It was a temperate outlook borrowed from Lincoln. America’s third party President led the nation through its darkest hour not by trying to control every outcome, but by accepting that change would be violent or gradual. DDE to Bradford Grethen Chynoweth, July 20, 1954, DDEP, 15:1202-1204; See also Doris Kearns Goodwin, Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005).

40 DDE to Senator Lodge, May 20, 1952, quoted in Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., The Storm Has Many Eyes: A Personal Narrative (New York: Norton, 1973), 104-105.

41 Dwight D. Eisenhower, "The Middle Way: All Our Freedoms Are a Single Bundle," reprinted in Vital Speeches of the Day 15, no. 23 (1949), 708-11; His campaign slogan for his second term in office, Peace and Prosperity, would also emphasize this focus.

169

Along with sharing a vision of hope that resonated with many Americans,

Eisenhower developed effective policymaking instruments. His background created a strong faith in the power of planning and organization.42 Eisenhower believed that policies and strategies “must think of the whole thing and try to solve it as a unit, an integrated problem, not one of just little bits of pieces….” 43 It led him toward structured efforts to transition ideas into action. The National Security Council (NSC), composed of senior security advisors and cabinet officials, became the center for considering national policy. Its staff acted as the principal arm for making and coordinating the inputs and outputs of national policy. The system allowed the nation to expand the factors that informed policy development.44 The President also ensured that decisions made by the

NSC translated into actions by building an Operations Coordination Board (OCB) that focused on “the integrated implementation of national security policies” across

42 On January 24, 1953, to fulfill his campaign promise to “overhaul…the federal establishment,” he issued his first Executive Order. It created the President’s Advisory Committee on Government Organization (PACGO) to study ways to reorganize the Executive branch to facilitate efficient administration. The committee’s recommendations, along with inputs from other cabinet members and Congress, led to several significant changes in America’s management of foreign affairs. DDE, Mandate For Change, 133; Douglas Kinnard, President Eisenhower and Strategy Management (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1977), 89-93; See also Herman Finer, “The Hoover Commission Reports,” Political Science Quarterly, vol. 64, no. 3 (Sep, 1949): 405-419, 579-595; Louis P. Galambos, ed., The New American State: Bureaucracies and Policies since World War II (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987).

43 DDE, “The President’s News Conference,” May 23, 1956, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10498 (accessed 14 April, 2016).

44 The preparation of policy documents often took several months and allowed the NSC to master the details and the context of an issue. The NSC staff received inputs from all of the major government agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Agency, as well as the Departments of State, Defense, and Treasury. After several iterations, they would present consolidated reports to the NSC for policy decisions, which included disagreements. Eisenhower would approve these reports as statements of policy only after NSC discussion and debate.

170 departments and agencies.45 Several special assistants, such as for Foreign Economic

Policy, Atomic Energy, and Disarmament, complemented these efforts.46 Combined this reorganization amplified the complexity involved in foreign policy considerations and solutions. NSC papers and meetings included consideration of multiple points of view, as well as weighing a broad range of opportunities and risk.47

The deliberate approach to policy making expanded Eisenhower’s influence over foreign policy in several ways. It established a hierarchy of policy goals that placed US programs into a framework of national priorities and that reduced parochialism. The administration’s Basic National Security Policy documents, such as NSC 162/2 or the

New Look, captured America’s overarching national policy goals. Reproduced annually, they synthesized broad data and perspectives, intending to provide a common understanding and predominant focus for all national efforts.48 Other policy documents,

45 The NSC then received progress reports on the policies’ implementation from the Operations Coordination Board. See Editorial Note, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs, vol. II, Part 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d86 (accessed September 26, 2016).

46 Bradley H. Patterson, Jr., “Teams and Staff: Dwight Eisenhower’s innovations in the structure and operations of the modern White House,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 24, no. 2 (Spring, 1994): 277; See also Alfred Dick Sander, Eisenhower’s Executive Office (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1999); David Rothkopf, Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), 65-66; For the purposes of the OCB see Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Executive Order 10483 - Establishing the Operations Coordinating Board," September 2, 1953, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=60573 (accessed 14 April, 2016).

47 The President appointed Robert Cutler as the newly created White House special assistant for National Security Affairs to oversee this effort. Cutler, No Time For Rest, 240, 306, 314, 353, 366; For insights into Eisenhower’s thoughts on decision making see DDE to Milton Stover Eisenhower, October 9, 1953, DDEP, 14:576-579; See also John P. Burke, Honest Broker?: The National Security Advisor and Presidential Decision Making (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2009).

48 NSC 162/2, “Basic National Security Policy, October 30, 1953” in FRUS, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d101 (accessed March 13, 2016); NSC 5440, “Basic National Security Policy, December 13, 1954” in FRUS, 1952–

171 such as on Economic Development, the Middle East, or for the mission of the US

Information Agency (USIA), advanced US goals in limited ways and were conceptually subordinate. Departments used them to develop strategies to accomplish more immediate or narrow goals.

Eisenhower was comfortable with this stratification. It followed a “vertical continuum” of policy-strategy-tactics, expressed by theorist such as Clausewitz, and mirrored techniques used by the military and American corporations.49 It also allowed him to evaluate the merits of a policy based on many factors, such as the opportunities they presented, the risks involved and how closely they aligned to his core commitments.50 By ensuring an appreciation of how different issues related to a national agenda, Eisenhower sought to reduce the inclination to pursue personal viewpoints or departmental interests.

Eisenhower believed his more deliberate system gave him decisional latitude. He never expected it to achieve perfect results. Policies were conditional guides based on

1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952- 54v02p1/d138 (accessed March 13, 2016); NSC 5501, “Basic National Security Policy, January 7, 1955” in FRUS, 1955–1957, National Security Policy, Volume XIX, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v19/d6 (accessed March 13, 2016); NSC 5602/1, “Basic National Security Policy, March 15, 1956,” in FRUS, 1955-1957, National Security Policy, Volume XIX, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v19/d57 (accessed March 13, 2016); See also Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, 169-177.

49 See David Jablonsky, “Why is Strategy Difficult?” in J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., ed., U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, vol. I: Theory of War and Strategy, 5th Edition (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2012), 3-12; See also DDE Letter to Fred I. Kent, April 17, 1952, DDEP, 13:1182- 1184; DDE Letter to Richard Milhous Nixon, October 1, 1952, DDEP, 13:1366-1372; Alan Axelrod, Eisenhower on Leadership: Ike's Enduring Lessons in Total Victory Management (San Francisco: Jossey- Bass, 2006); Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1977).

50 John P. Burke, “Political Context and Presidential Influence: A Case Study,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol.15 (1985): 301–319.

172 assessments, not omniscience, created within an inherently fluid environment.51

Therefore, they existed within a process that was prepared and intended to adapt to new information or circumstances. This perspective also tolerated a bifurcation of policies and allowed competing goals to coexist, such as accepting the need to find a balance between immediate interests, while also trying to shape long-term trends. The process pursued ambitious possibilities, when the conditions allowed. When they did not, practical objectives emerged.52 Eisenhower’s approach also avoided managing the nation’s foreign affairs by crisis. He often remarked that “plans are worthless, but planning is everything,” reflecting the view that the act of planning made organizations aware of the “character of the problem.” It created a shared understanding that allowed for more rapid adaptation.53

Eisenhower’s processes preserved his authority. Having served in World War II with many strong personalities, most notably Patton, Montgomery, and Churchill,

Eisenhower grasped the necessity of creating and clarifying a common purpose to develop a team approach. He brought this complex understanding of his leadership role to the White House. Assuming that competing views and interests were the norm,

51 Like Winston Churchill, Eisenhower did not see a policy or a strategy as “a blueprint for victory.” It provided a framework to identify goals and to focus efforts. Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 140-141.

52 See DDE Letter to Fred I. Kent, April 17, 1952, DDEP, 13:1182-1184; DDE Letter to Richard Milhous Nixon, October 1, 1952, DDEP, 13:1366-1372; See also Steven Metz, Eisenhower as Strategist: The Coherent Use of Military Power in War and Peace (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1993).

53 DDE, “Remarks at the National Defense Executive Reserve Conference,” November 14, 1957, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10951 (accessed April 22, 2016); For a discussion on the iterative and calculated character of warfare see Mark W. Clark, Calculated Risk (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950).

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Eisenhower ensured that his inner circle shared conflicting information and viewpoints.

He produced a climate of open discussion and that facilitated reaching a consensus.

After hearing all perspectives, “the President would come to a line of action, he wanted everybody to hear it, everybody to participate in it, and then he wanted everybody to be guided by it.”54

By placing himself at the center of policy efforts, Eisenhower explicitly reserved decisions for himself. National Security Council participants did not vote on policy decisions. They presented their perspectives and advice. Afterwards, Eisenhower would withdraw to the Oval Office to consider choices and to decide.55 Ike delegated responsibility for issues that were below the level of national policy and that did not warrant presidential attention or require his explicit judgment. In these cases, he gave his subordinates wide latitude to implement his guidance.56 For example, he retained sole control over the use of nuclear weapons, despite telling the Department of Defense to plan for their use.57 He kept a similar hold on other foreign policy efforts when he felt

54 General Andrew Goodpaster, February 27, 1988, in “Project Solarium: A Collective Oral History,” 1988, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs Records, Box 93, folder 10, Princeton University Archives, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library; See also Richard M. Nixon, Six Crises (New York: Doubleday, 1962), 161; Donovan, Eisenhower: The Inside Story, 64.

55 Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War, 20-22.

56 Diane B. Kunz, Butter and Guns: America’s Cold War Economic Diplomacy (New York: Free Press, 1997), 27.

57 Secretary Dulles would also push the NATO military alliance to create viable alternative means of defense. Robert A. Wampler, “Eisenhower, NATO, and Nuclear Weapons: The Strategy and Political Economy of Alliance Security,” in Gunter Bischof and Stephen E. Ambrose, eds., Eisenhower: A Centenary Assessment (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995), 162-190.

174 they were particularly sensitive.58 Eisenhower’s system of organization and policymaking helped him lead American foreign policy in new directions even as it generated loyalty and support within his administration for those directions.

The approach was not a panacea for the complexity of foreign affairs, but it did offer ways to better orient government efforts. Despite significant emphasis on understanding strategic issues and possible responses, the approach, like any, remained grounded by biases, such as personal experiences and worldviews. It also allowed key leaders and departments the independence of action for both initiative and error.

History will continue to judge the efficacy of the system. The issues he decided to address and the ones he allowed to develop remain a part of his legacy. Eisenhower believed that his approach allowed him to guide the nation toward its major and enduring interests.59

Orienting the Nation Toward Peace

Along with actions to shore up domestic support for the administration’s efforts and to redesign America’s policymaking apparatus, Eisenhower implemented a novel grand strategy outlook to guide the nation’s foreign affairs. He assessed that Truman’s errors went beyond the low priority he placed on balancing the budget or his inability to

58 Eisenhower often reviewed, corrected and approved statements or records of major policy decisions, as well as personally editing important documents. W.W. Rostow, Open Skies: Eisenhower’s Proposal, July 21, 1955 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), 84-85; see also Cole C. Kingseed, Eisenhower and the Suez Crises of 1956 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995), 153; Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War, 20-22.

59 DDE, Crusade in Europe (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1948), 475-478.

175 establish a coherent methodology to organize US foreign policy.60 Eisenhower concluded that a chief cause of America’s perpetual state of crisis was the lack of a sound strategic concept.61 In his diary, he explained that the previous administration did not recognize “that the purpose of America is to defend a way of life rather than merely to defend property, territory, homes, or lives.”62 This outlook led Ike to join with others in rejecting the belief that the complexity of global affairs denied the chance for a better world order.63 Under his leadership, the US sought ways to organize global efforts to advance the cause of peace. The challenge was immense.64

Every president comes to office with goals he, one day she, wishes to achieve.

Eisenhower saw war and the global order that relied on it as the existential challenge faced by the nation. It threatened not only America’s short-term interests, but also the great experiment of America, such as the view that notions of liberty could inform the

60 Cutler, No Time For Rest, 353.

61 It was a well-understood problem in Washington. Dean Acheson, Truman’s Secretary of State, would explain this pull toward immediate issues as the “thundering present.” If not managed, it permitted day-to-day crises to orient US efforts. Amy B. Zegart, “Why the Best Is Not Yet to Come in Policy Planning,” in Daniel W. Drezner, ed., Avoiding Trivia: The Role of Strategic Planning in American Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2009), 115-117; Sarah-Jane Corke, “Bridging the Gap: Containment, Covert Action and the Search for the Missing Link in American Cold War Policy, 1948-1953,” Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 20, no. 4 (December, 1997): 45-65; Raymond Millen, “Cultivating Strategic Thinking: The Eisenhower Model,” Parameters, vol. 42, no. 2 (Summer, 2012): 56-70.

62 DDE Diary Entry, January 22, 1952 in Ferrell, ed., The Eisenhower Diaries, 209-213; Eisenhower’s outlooks echoed those of Woodrow Wilson. The purpose of the United States was “not to provide free homes, but to assert human rights.” Wilson believed that it was America’s “thoughts” and “ideals” that made it great, not the fact that it was “rich.” Woodrow Wilson quoted in E.M. Bowles Alsop, ed., The Greatness of Woodrow Wilson, 1856-1956 (New York: Rinehart & Company, 1956), Introduction.

63 Reinhold Niebuhr, “A Protest Against a Dilemma’s Two Horns,” World Politics, vol. 2, no. 3 (April, 1950): 338-344; See also William T. R. Fox, “The United Nations in the Era of Total Diplomacy,” International Organization, vol. 5, no. 2 (May, 1951): 265-273.

64 George F. Kennan, “Some Thoughts on Stalin’s Foreign Policy,” Slavic Review, vol. 36, no. 4 (December, 1977): 590-591.

176 rule of law and guide the ways of men. Eisenhower entered the White House intent on reorienting American foreign policy toward this goal. His outlook was not an ideology.

The complexity of world affairs required programs that addressed both the immediate challenges, such as the Korean and Cold Wars, and the enduring structures that perpetuated the war system in international relations. His strategic framework appreciated the limits of American influence, elevated US foreign policy above crisis management and advanced new global norms that served the nation’s long-term interests.

He began by orienting his Grand Strategy in pursuit of the nation’s purpose. On

January 20, 1953, Dwight David Eisenhower stood on the East Portico of the US Capital for the first time as president of the United States. After giving a short prayer, he began his address by explaining the context of the moment. He recalled that the first half of the century was a period of bloody wars that changed the international landscape, as thrones and empires disappeared. He assessed that the test was not over, as the world was at “the midway point of a century of continuing challenge.” He sought to galvanize domestic and international support for the project for peace, declaring that the world was wrestling with the question of whether it was “nearing the light” or if “another night [was] closing in upon us?” He proclaimed that those “who are free must proclaim anew our faith” in the nation’s virtues, such as democracy and a free way of life. This common bond could overcome the challenge.65

65 Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Inaugural Address, January 20, 1953,” 83rd Congress, US Senate Document No. 9 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1953).

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America’s 34th President then declared that there were nine enduring principles that guided the nation in its just cause to advance “world peace.” Among them, was the assertion that Americans abhorred war, but that in order to promote peace they would need to be strong and resolute. He pledged that the United States would support its

“proven friends of freedom” and would not attempt to “impose” its beliefs on either friends or enemies. Despite the differences that existed in the world, the nation’s future was interdependent with others, such as its economic health and security. He also proclaimed the United Nations as a “living symbol” that the United States could transform into a force for honorable peace. Eisenhower’s inauguration speech revealed the broad vision that would guide US foreign policy for the next eight years.66

Eisenhower chose his words carefully. In his diary, he confided that he hoped his first speech as President would “appeal to the speculative questions of free men.”67 His speeches were not flashy. They were “devoid of gestures,” “serious in manner,” and reflected a thoughtful demeanor.68 They followed the practice of the period and focused

66 Eisenhower laid out nine principles. First, freedom-loving people abhorred warfare, but prudently deterred the forces of aggression, while promoting the conditions of peace. Second, America would never enter into a “wicked bargain” of appeasement; that traded honor for security. Third, the world needed a strong America to defend freedom. Fourth, America could not impose its beliefs on others and would honor the “identity” and “special heritage” of others. Fifth, America would work with its “proven friends of freedom” to share the burdens defending freedom. Sixth, economic health was an “indispensable basis of military strength and peace.” Seventh, regional groupings offered a path to creating collective security. Eighth, that freedom was indivisible and applied equally to “all continents and peoples.” Ninth, because the United Nations was the living symbol “of all peoples hope for peace,” America would “strive to make it… an effective force.” Ibid.

67 DDE Diary Entries, January 16, 1953 and February 2, 1953 in Ferrell, ed., The Eisenhower Diaries, 225-227.

68 Cutler, No Time For Rest, 286-287; See also Ira Chernus, General Eisenhower: Ideology and Discourse (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2002), 294; and Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency, 108-110.

178 on presenting an argument.69 The effort did not intend to produce sound bites. What his words lacked in theatrics they sought to make up for in substance. They presented the results of detailed analysis, communicated in logical arguments that sought to inform and to educate, as well as to clarify and build consensus. He wanted to engage

Americans and the world in the vision that peace was achievable.

Redefining the Basis of American Power

Within months of taking office, Eisenhower successfully and comprehensively reoriented US foreign policy. In May of 1953 he called for a Top-Secret study to explore three viable policy options for winning the Cold War. They shared the purpose of

“establishing a stable peace and regular diplomatic relations in the long run,” with the

Soviet Union. The effort, known as Project Solarium, mirrored the techniques employed by the American Assembly and the Institute of War and Peace Studies.70 Teams assessed each choice based on criteria that encompassed the nations enduring interests, such as costs, manpower needs, the impact on world relations, and relations with the UN and

US allies.71 After weeks of work, on 16 July, the teams presented their findings to the

69 Elana Levine, “Teaching the Politics of Television Culture in a “Post-Television” Era, Cinema Journal, vol. 50, no. 4 (Summer, 2011): 177-182, 187; See also John Fiske, Media Matters: Everyday Culture and Political Change (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994); and David Leonhardt, “Eisenhower, an Unlikely Pioneer of TV Ads,” The New York Times, October 30, 2015.

70 George Kennan chaired Task Force A, Admiral Leslie C. Stevens chaired Task Force B, and Vice Admiral R. L. Connolly chaired Task Force C.

71 William B. Pickett, “Introduction: The Solarium Exercise of June 1953,” in William B. Pickett, ed., George F. Kennan and the Origins of Eisenhower’s New Look: An Oral History of Project Solarium (Princeton: Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, 2004), 1-13; See also Michael J. Gallagher, “Intelligence and National Security Strategy: Reexamining Project Solarium,” Intelligence and

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President and the National Security Council.72 Eisenhower directed that the best features of each recommendation should form the basis of a new Basic National

Security Policy that would reorient American statecraft.73

The ultimate statement of national security policy, known as the New Look, reframed America’s global challenges, national interests, and its uses of national power.

Approved in October of 1953, the document reflected the more rigorous analysis produced by Eisenhower’s policymaking system.74 For example, its insights denied that the Soviet Union was an ideological monolith. Instead, the inquiry revealed the significant fragmentation that persisted behind the iron curtain, most notably the popular unrest in its European satellites. These challenges preoccupied Soviet efforts and required Moscow to spend one-sixth of its GDP on its military; a ratio needed to continue its subjugation of Eastern Europe. The US policy assessed that these expenditures detracted from its economic reform efforts and would be hard to sustain.

National Security, vol. 30, iss. 4 (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.885203 (accessed February 18, 2016).

72 At the conclusion of the briefings, Eisenhower “he ruled out any policy that could not win the support of America’s allies, that cost too much, and that accepted a greater risk of general war because of the belief that the United States could survive one.”

73 For a comprehensive exploration of the Solarium Exercise, see Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, 123-138.

74 It departed from the narrow analysis of Soviet intentions used to justify NSC-68. Instead, US experts on Soviet affairs presented the different factions that existed in Moscow as well as support for diverse policy approaches.

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It also concluded that by stabilizing the cold war, the United States could exploit these dynamics over time.75

The New Look also reoriented US foreign policy in novel ways that complemented the nation’s pursuit of establishing new global norms. To begin, Eisenhower advanced a new strategic concept, asserting that national security was the product of a “great equation…” of “spiritual force, multiplied by economic force, multiplied by military force.” This formula captured an “inescapable truth” that if one of the factors fell to zero, US security would as well.76 These views were in line with the “three imperatives for peace” that he outlined during the presidential campaign: the necessity of maintaining US moral, economic and military national strength, the need for collective security and an active effort to “bridge the gap” between the free world and “the peoples under communist rule.”77 The new approach emphasized a dynamic way to think about national power, as well as tying its pursuit and use to America’s purpose.

Finally, it built upon the capabilities created by Eisenhower’s new procedures, organization and leadership approach. Together they became essential tools that

75 “NSC 162/2, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d101 (accessed March 15, 2016); See also John Foster Dulles, "Memorandum on limitation of armament," June 29, 1955, box 4, subject series, John foster Dulles papers, Eisenhower library.

76 DDE to Lucius Du Bignon Clay, February 9, 1952, DDEP, 13:961-965; See also DDE to Gabriel N. Stilian, August 23, 1951, DDEP, 12:487-490; DDE to George Arthur Sloan, March 1, 1952, DDEP, 13:1037- 1040; DDE to George Arthur Sloan, March 20, 1952, DDEP, 13:1097-1104; For an explanation of Eisenhower’s outlook, see Richard H. Immerman, “Bernath Lecture: Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal,” Diplomatic History, vol. 14, iss. 3 (July, 1990): 319-342.

77 DDE: "Address at the Cow Palace on Accepting the Nomination of the Republican National Convention," August 23, 1956, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10583 (accessed May 20, 2017).

181 allowed for the assertion of a “grand strategy” concept to guide America’s efforts,78 laying the conceptual foundation of US strategy for the remainder of the Cold War.79

The most significant shift was that the New Look creatively reimagined notions of national power. Power has many definitions, in international relations. The word derives from the French pouvoir (to be able) and implies a capacity to affect the environment.80

Eisenhower understood that there was a bifurcation in the concept of how to use power in foreign affairs. In the old world order, power was often narrowly defined as a tool to impose one’s will on another. This outlook placed emphasis on military power and the economic capacity to produce it. But power could also be a positive phenomenon, such as a referent factor that inspires cooperation or used in ways that advances mutual interests (often called “soft power” in contemporary parlance).81 Eisenhower did not choose between these two approaches. Instead, he pursued both, while also expanding the conceptions of military and economic power along with adding the equaling important factor of spiritual power. Collectively they offered a dynamic scheme to advance the nation’s security in ways that were consistent with the cause of peace.

78 Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, 43-45.

79 Raymond Millen, “Eisenhower and US Grand Strategy,” Parameters, vol. 44, no. 2 (Summer 2014): 35-47.

80 See R. Craig Nation, “National Power,” in J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Vol. I: Theory of War and Strategy (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, 2012), 147-158.

81 See Thomas H. Etzold and Robert L. Messer, "Power Politics" in Richard Dean Burns, Alexander DeConde, and Fredrik Logevall, Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy, eds., 2nd ed., vol. 3 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 2002), 169-177; See also Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 18-24.

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Eisenhower understood that, despite the strong rhetoric that US efforts would produce a peaceful world, military force remained the basis of the postwar world order.

Fear and distrust continued to guide international efforts, as institutions, such as the

United Nations, lacked enforcement mechanisms and could only add some order to an anarchic world.82 Therefore, military capabilities remained a pertinent factor in global affairs and provided levels of security that were a precondition for more liberal global efforts.83 Even countries that did not intend to use their military aggressively felt they needed to be strong and willing to use force to discourage and deter others.84

To balance this outlook, Eisenhower designed US foreign policy in ways that refused to see military power as the means of first resort.85 The goal was to prevent conflicts, not to incite them. Despite the campaign rhetoric of “liberating” Eastern Europe from

Soviet control, the administration adopted a much more tempered and dynamic

82 The United Nations could not compel new approaches to statecraft. The turbulent, often violent, early postwar period illuminated this fact. It revealed the willingness of some to use force opportunistically and in ways that threatened to derail the idea that new standards of conduct offered a pathway to relations that were more peaceful.

83 DDE to Andrew Wells Robertson, October 11, 1950, DDEP, 11:1572-1573; See also Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); See also DDE, “Hand of Aggressor is Stayed by Strength Alone,” speech delivered before the English Speaking Union, London, England, July 3, 1951, reprinted in Dwight D. Eisenhower, "The Challenge of Our Time," Vital Speeches of the Day, vol. 17, no. 20 (Aug. 1, 1951): 613- 614.

84 The concepts of deterrence and coercion require both the capacity and the will to use military force. They emphasize that it is impossible to convince an opponent to change its policies and goals solely with military capabilities. It had to believe that you are willing to use those capabilities. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 36-39.

85 DDE, Mandate For Change, 1953-1956 (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1963), 446; See Beatrice Heuser, Nuclear Mentalities?: Strategies and Belief in Britain, France, and the FRG (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998).

183 vision.86 Within months of taking office, Eisenhower made it clear to supporters that he rejected the highly militaristic views that justified NSC-68, as well as calls for “rolling back” the Soviet Union.87 He described many of these arguments as “imaginary” and asserted that no amount of military spending could produce absolute security in the nuclear age.88

He also acknowledged that the aggressive actions of communist elements, such as their well-established subversion efforts, gave them some advantages. They could choose when, where, and how they might offer challenges. If not managed correctly, the United States and the free world risked becoming exhausted by communist conflagrations, as they could not hope to defend every interest, everywhere and at all times. US adversaries hoped to provoke overreactions, seeking ways to consume the free world’s resolve to spend blood and treasure. It led Eisenhower to reframe the superpower rivalry in ways that escaped the emphasis on strict military comparisons or geographical limited responses.89

86 Chris Tudda, “‘Reenacting the Story of Tantalus’: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Failed Rhetoric of Liberation,” Journal of Cold War Studies, vol. 7, no. 4 (Fall, 2005): 3-35.

87 This included the view that there would be a “year of maximum danger” in 1954, when the Soviets would risk general war after achieving nuclear parity. Ike believed this last idea, promulgated forcefully from the Pentagon, was self-serving. DDE To Carl Andres Spaatz, May 19, 1953, DDEP, 14:237- 238; DDE to Errett Power Scrivner, June 30, 1953, DDEP, 14:341-343.

88 DDE: "The President's News Conference," August 11, 1954, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9977 (accessed March 18, 2016).

89 DDE, “State of the Union Address,” February 2, 1953 quoted in New York Times, February 3, 1953.

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The New Look also sought to “meet the Soviet threat” to ensure its expansive efforts did not alter decisively the balance of global power.90 Eisenhower assumed the presidency during a period of significant fear in America. Domestically, McCarthyism and the red scare added popular pressure for the United States to be more aggressive to combat communism. The “hot war” languishing in Korea and the possibility of nuclear confrontation with the Soviets amplified these tensions.91 The steady hand of

Eisenhower was able to offer a counterbalance. He also understood that losing other nations to communism could have tipped the scales, leading him to support the use of covert operations. This included psychological operations to discredit communist ideology, as well as actions aimed at regime change in areas peripheral to Soviet interests and that were thus unlikely to instigate retaliation and perhaps war.92 These efforts reflected the belief that the non-aligned world was vulnerable to communist

90 NSC 162/2, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d101 (accessed March 27, 2017).

91 Doug Dowd, “Cry ‘Havoc!’ and let slip the dogs of war: McCarthyism, Korea, and other nightmares,” Monthly Review, vol. 48, no. 11 (April, 1997): 32-42; See also Ellen Schrecker, Many Are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).

92 The Eisenhower administration conducted several covert operations against reputed communist foes. Examples are Iran (1953—political action), Guatemala (1954—paramilitary and psychological warfare), Vietnam (1954–1956 paramilitary efforts), Eastern Europe (1953–1956 psychological warfare), Indonesia (1958 paramilitary), Laos (1958 political action; 1959–on paramilitary), Tibet (1959–on paramilitary), Cuba (1960–on paramilitary and economic warfare), and Congo (1960–on). John Prados, “Covert Operations,” in Richard Dean Burns, Alexander DeConde, and Fredrik Logevall, eds., Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy, vol. 1. 2nd ed. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 2002), 392; See also Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982).

185 expansion. Covert efforts also offered a way to maintain the hope within communist satellites that a better future was possible.93

More central to his strategy than covert actions, however, was Eisenhower’s assessment that nuclear weapons were a dynamic tool to prevent communist aggression. “The existence of the atomic bomb in our hands is a deterrent, in fact, to aggression in the world.”94 He found ways to leverage the nation’s short-term nuclear monopoly to prevent the miscalculations that might lead adversaries toward aggressive efforts. The administration repeatedly and publicly expressed its willingness to escalate the stakes of a minor conflict by threatening the more vital interests of its adversaries. It emphasized that America would keep all of its options open in responding to aggression, including the threat of a “massive retaliation” with nuclear weapons.95

Eisenhower overcame significant resistance to implement this approach, from critics, intellectuals, and even in his second term from Secretary Dulles. Ike believed that muddling the distinction between little conflicts and conventional wars would only lead to a series of “brush-fire wars” that risked both escalation to a superpower conflict and perpetual conflicts.96 He sought to enhance America’s strategic position in world affairs,

93 See “Interview with Robert Bowie, Episode 7: After Stalin,” The National Security Archive: Cold War, George Washington University, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/interviews/episode- 7/bowie21.html (accessed March 24, 2017).

94 DDE to Bernard Mannes Baruch, June 14, 1946, DDEP, 7:1125-1127.

95 See DDE to Kenneth William Dobson Strong, June 29, 1950, DDEP, 11:1184-1186; See also DDE to Charles Erwin Wilson, January 5, 1955, DDEP, 16:1488-1491; DDE to John Foster Dulles, April 15, 1952, DDEP, 13:1178-1181; DDE to John Foster Dulles, June 20, 1952, DDEP, 13:1254-1256.

96 Editorial, “Who Fights Brush-Fire Wars?,” Life (January 13, 1961).

186 by creating “certainty in an adversary’s mind” that the United States would counter any provocation with overwhelming force.97

The nation’s economic strength formed a central component in Eisenhower’s calculations of power and strategy. It was the basis of the nation’s military might and gave it influence in global affairs. The first step was to mitigate efforts that overly focused on military preparedness to the detriment of the nation’s economy.98

Eisenhower wanted a strong military, but only to the extent that it was sufficient for the purposes ascribed for it, did not bankrupt the nation, and provided the strategic flexibility necessary to respond to unforeseen challenges. This led him to contest the calls for unbounded expenditures based on narrow conceptions of security and a reliance on military force, such as a comparison of the number of tanks or troops on both sides of the iron curtain. Eisenhower would point out that with this technique every military service could find something that justified increasing its own strength.99

97 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 147-152; See also Richard H. Immerman, John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in US Foreign Policy (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1999); and Campbell Craig, Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).

98 DDE, Crusade in Europe, 476.

99 DDE, Diary entry, January 22, 1952, DDEP, 13:896-902; Eisenhower disdained the repeated calls by military professionals for more spending, becoming a vocal skeptic of many of their arguments. He pointed to the futility of seeing national security through a “numbers racket,” such as those that evaluated the nation’s safety by comparing military weapon systems. His views were congruent with America’s NATO allies. For instance, it was well understood that labor in developed societies was expensive. Trying to match the Soviet Armies man for man could quickly bankrupt the alliance. See Jan Willem Honig, Defense Policy in the North Atlantic Alliance: The Case of Netherlands (New York: Praeger, 1993).

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He also believed that excessive expenditures threatened to turn the nation away from the cause of peace. This risk contained two main aspects. Its exorbitant cost could undercut public support for an engaged American foreign policy and lead the nation back toward more pragmatic policies, such as isolationism. Along with ensuring the nation’s financial capability to endure a long cold war, he wanted to prevent the creation of a garrison state. He understood that America’s postwar shift to a leadership role in world affairs created the conditions that could lead to the government having

“unnecessary domination” and excessive control. This led him to resist efforts to increase government control of the economy. He believed the nation was not at war, but was in a space between war and peace that required a sustained approach that preserved its freedoms.100

This led Eisenhower to champion new frameworks that considered national power and security holistically. He asserted that the nation’s security derived from the capabilities of all of the military services, the full capacities of the nation, such as its industry, economy, national spirit, and the power possessed by its allies. This conception directly refuted efforts to justify unnecessary spending in narrow frameworks of analysis.101 Instead, Ike denied that the superpower struggle demanded a perpetual

100 DDE to William Edward Robinson, February 12, 1952, DDEP, 13:984-992; Grant Madsen, “The International Origins of Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Political Economy,” The Journal of Political History, vol. 24, no. 2 (2012): 675-708; Aaron L. Friedberg, In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America’s Anti-Statism and its Cold War Grand Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

101 DDE to Charles Erwin Wilson, January 5, 1955, DDEP, 16:1488-1491; Donovan, Eisenhower: The Inside Story, 324-331; See also DDE, “The Washington Mess,” Vital Speeches of the Day (30 September 1952); and DDE to William Edward Robinson, February 12, 1952, DDEP, 13:984-992.

188 state of crisis,102 allowing him to pursue military capacity in ways that the nation could endure for the “long pull.”103

Although Eisenhower insisted that he would never jeopardize national security by skimping on defense appropriations, the New Look elevated ensuring America’s economic health to be equal to meeting the Soviet threat.104 It included deliberate efforts to arrest the trend of wasteful government spending and to eliminate redundancies, adhering to spending programs that conformed to national policy priorities. This approach included programs that built military capacity at a steady rate.

By the end of his first term, Eisenhower successfully implemented both spending reductions and tax cuts, fulfilling his campaign promise to eliminate the federal deficit within four years.105

The strategy included the pursuit of a more open trading system that sought to reduce a key cause of war and that was vital to America’s economic interests.106 As

102 Dueck, Hard Line, 85-89.

103 Arthur W. Radford, “National Security Planning Problems,” September 20, 1954 in Council on Foreign Relations Records, Box 446, Public Policy Papers, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library.

104 NSC 162/2, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d101 (accessed March 27, 2017); DDE, “Memorandum of Discussion at the 131st Meeting of the National Security Council, February 11, 1953,” FRUS, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1, Document 46, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d46 (accessed March 13, 2016); See also Saki Dockrill, Eisenhower's New-Look National Security Policy, 1953-61 (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996), 29.

105 Donovan, Eisenhower: The Inside Story, 352-361.

106 After the war, proponents for a more open trading system explained that the US economy could not improve without a general global economic recovery that allowed it to sell its surplus of products abroad. In 1945, the nation had two choices: it could provide foreign aid to the countries in question or it could liberalize its trading policies to allow foreign countries to sell more of their own products in the United States. DDE, Mandate for Change, 41, 208.

189 president, Eisenhower elevated this macroeconomic viewpoint to the forefront of public awareness. He explained to audiences that the nation’s general welfare, security, and economic health were tied to the world’s. “Only a more closely integrated economic and political system can provide…the economic strength needed to maintain both necessary military readiness and respectable living standards.” He sought to undermine protectionist arguments by changing the perception that the nation’s economic health forced it into a strict competition with others.107

America’s economic power became a tool of statecraft and, similar to military power, Eisenhower sought to use it in dynamic ways. By 1950, this outlook had gradually eroded, as the optimism that economic interdependence would lead to peace declined. The US Congress increasingly refused to underwrite these efforts. For example, it declined to join the International Trade Organization, leading Truman to abandon the effort.108 Eisenhower believed that trade and aid remained a valuable tool in America’s policy arsenal.109 Without them, “discontent can be fanned into revolution,

107 DDE: "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union," February 2, 1953, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9829 (accessed March 13, 2016).

108 Throughout the early twentieth century, US trade policies oscillated between protectionism and strategies to lower tariffs to encourage more trade. After 1929, the nation passed legislation to encourage international trade by reducing the trade barriers that exacerbated the Great Depression. Other efforts, such as the 1934 Reciprocal Tariff Act, gave the President increased power to negotiate trade agreements. After World War II, efforts to encourage better trade standards intensified, as illustrated by the enactment of the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the creation of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Martin Daunton, Amrita Narlikar and Robert M. Stern, eds., “The International Trade Organization,” The Oxford Handbook on The World Trade Organization (November, 2012), http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199586103.001.0001/oxfordhb- 9780199586103-e-5 (accessed March 10, 2016).

109 Robert Mark Spaulding provides an insightful analysis of the economic dimensions of the Cold War. Robert Mark Spaulding, “Trade, Aid, and Economic Warfare,” in Richard H. Immerman and Petra Goedde, eds., The Oxford Handbook of The Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 394-414.

190 and revolution into social chaos. The sequel is dictatorial rule.”110 Addressing this challenge, Eisenhower was hesitant to use grants and, instead, emphasized trade over aid. He reinvigorated America’s economic tools by asking Congress to extend authorities over foreign economic policy, such as the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act and the

Trade Agreements Extension Act.111 The administration also “re-conceived export controls as a political tool rather than an economic endeavor.”112 For the remainder of his first term in office, Eisenhower expanded on these efforts.113 The shift toward enabling the US economic instrument of power included supporting allied calls for the relaxation of the rules on East-West Trade.114 During his second term, Eisenhower became more insistent on using trade as a lever in foreign policy, but these efforts faced

110 DDE, Mandate for Change, 208; See also DDE, Crusade in Europe, 476.

111 See Randall Commission, Report to the President and Congress (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954), 1-5; Richard N. Gardner, “Review of the Report to the President and the Congress (Randall Report),” The Yale Law Journal, vol. 63, no. 5 (March, 1954): 751-756; Based on the recommendation of the Randall report Eisenhower emphasized trade and private investment, while supporting the continuation of some aid efforts, such as technical assistance programs. Burton I. Kaufman, Trade and Aid: Eisenhower's Foreign Policy 1953-1961 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 6-10, 17-26.

112 The administration also “re-conceived export controls as a political tool rather than an economic endeavor.” Spaulding, “Trade, Aid, and Economic Warfare,” in Immerman and Goedde, eds., The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War, 406; See also DDE, "Special Message to the Congress on Foreign Economic Policy," March 30, 1954, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10195 (accessed June 3, 2016).

113 Kaufman, Trade and Aid, 207-209; For a thorough discussion of Eisenhower’s Economic Diplomacy, see Diane B. Kunz, Butter and Guns: America’s Cold War Economic Diplomacy (New York: Free Press, 1997); Jessica E. Martin, Corporate Cold Warriors: American Business Leaders and Foreign Relations in the Eisenhower Era (Ph.D. diss., University of Colorado, 2006); See also Bruce A. Khula, Multinationals and the “Middle Way”: The Eisenhower Administration, Multinational Enterprises, and U.S. Foreign Policy (Ph.D. diss., The Ohio State University, 1999).

114 While placing embargoes on military goods, the United States encouraged the increase of trading links with Eastern Europe, as a way to reduce their dependency on Moscow. DDE to Winston Spencer Churchill, March 18, 1954, DDEP, 15:958-960.

191 constant resistance, as cutting deficits, reducing government excess, and encouraging domestic economic growth diluted efforts to influence the development of non-aligned nations.115

Eisenhower added spiritual power or psychological power as an essential third pillar to his efforts to reorient American foreign policy. It included those internal factors that influenced behavior, such as beliefs, ideas, and norms. From America’s 1776 assertion that individual rights were natural and that government legitimacy derived from the

“consent of the governed,” the opinions of citizens became a significant factor in global affairs.116 America’s revolution did not just liberate its colonies from British rule. It elevated public opinion as a fundamental factor in war, international relations, and the conduct of conflicts. Napoleon used it to transform European warfare in the nineteenth century, raising the intensity of war by engaging the identity and interests of individual

Frenchmen. A public’s determination to fight and persevere became a critical and equivalent factor to traditional considerations of war, such as the military means, in calculations of strategy.117 Carl von Clausewitz, after seeing firsthand the power of

115 Ian Jackson, The Economic Cold War: America, Britain and East-West Trade, 1948–1963 (Basingstoke, England: St. Martin's Press, 2001), 112; In 1956, the Senate voted to shave $1 billion off of the administration's requested $4.67 billion Mutual Security Program (MSP) budget, whereas the House of Representatives wanted to cut it by $1.1 billion. Kaufman, Trade and Aid, 63–73.

116 Declaration of Independence, http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/declaration_transcript.html (accessed March 19, 2016).

117 The revolutionaries "fought for themselves and for their newly won liberties. They were inspired by new political ideals, and fought for their own cause." Beatrice Heuser, The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 114; See also David Avrom Bell, The First Total War: Napoleon's Europe and the Birth of Warfare as We Know It (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2007).

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France’s armies, acknowledged this phenomenon, explaining that an opponent’s resistance was the product of their means and their will.118

Eisenhower was very familiar with this concept and believed that appealing to the will of citizens could advance the cause of peace.119 During World War II, he met C.D

Jackson, the Vice-President of Time-Life Inc., who was the Deputy Chief of the

Psychological Warfare Branch.120 Through radio broadcasts, newspaper articles, posters and films, Jackson’s office sought to connect civilians with their soldiers overseas and to inform the popular opinion of audiences abroad. The success of the allied program led

Eisenhower to become a proponent for the power of psychological warfare.121 In the early 1950s these efforts gained broad support, with C.D. Jackson serving as the

President of the National Committee for a Free Europe in 1951-1952. It was an organization created by Allen Dulles and its board members included General Dwight D.

Eisenhower, Lucius D. Clay, Cecil B. DeMille, and Henry Luce. The organization oversaw several programs, such as Radio Free Europe. After his election, Eisenhower joined with

118 Clausewitz argued that to achieve victory you had to “match your efforts against his power of resistance, which can be expressed as the product of two inseparable factors…the total means at his disposal and the strength of his will.” Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 77; See also J. Boone Bartholomees, “Theory of Victory,” Parameters, vol. 38, no. 2 (Summer, 2008): 25-36.

119 It was a pillar of US efforts during World War II. For example, the military created daily summaries of America’s “press and other news publications” to send forward to Eisenhower’s headquarters in Europe. This effort kept him informed about US public opinion and helped him build narratives and provide information that maintained support for the war. DDE to George Catlett Marshall, May 17, 1945, DDEP, 6:60.

120 Anthony Leviero, “Eisenhower Picks a ‘Cold War’ Chief,” The New York Times, February 17, 1953.

121 For Eisenhower’s psychological efforts as the Supreme Commander of NATO, See DDE Diary Entry, October 28, 1950, DDEP, 11:1388-1392. After the war, both Ike and Jackson maintained contact and a shared belief in the power of information to influence world events.

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Jackson to promulgate the view that a concerted allied information effort could "win

World War III without having to fight it.”122

Programs to employ public opinion gained a place of prominence in America’s national policy approaches. Within days of taking office, Eisenhower appointed C.D.

Jackson as advisor to the president on psychological warfare. He became an influential member of the Committee on International Information Activities (known popularly as the Jackson Committee after its chairperson, William Jackson).123 Its findings led to the consolidation of the nation’s information activities under the United States Information

Agency.124 The committee also reported on ways to “progress toward a peaceful world order.” It argued that isolating the United States was a preliminary goal of Soviet policy.

To prevent this, America needed policies that moved beyond just assuring its military security. It recommended efforts to amplify awareness of the virtues of free institutions and collective security. This included cultural exchange programs.125

122 C.D. Jackson to Eisenhower, December 17, 1952, quoted in Brands, Cold Warriors, 17-120.

123 The Committee was composed of: William H. Jackson (chairman), Robert Cutler, Gordon Gray, Barklie McKee Henry, John C. Hughes, CD. Jackson, Roger M. Kyes, and Sigurd Larmon. “Editorial Note,” FRUS, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs, vol. II, part 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d77 (accessed September 26, 2016).

124 The United States Information Agency (USIA) unified the nation’s information efforts under a single authority guided by the Secretary of State. Eisenhower also consolidated the nation’s military and economic assistance programs under a Foreign Operations Administration. DDE, "Special Message to the Congress on the Organization of the Executive Branch for the Conduct of Foreign Affairs," June 1, 1953, and DDE, "Memorandum on the Organization of the Executive Branch for the Conduct of Foreign Affairs," June 1, 1953, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9861 and http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9865 (accessed January 8, 2016).

125 “Report to the President by the President’s Committee on International Information Activities,” FRUS, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs, vol. II, part 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p2/d370 (accessed September 26, 2016).

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Eisenhower accepted these recommendations and elevated the goals of creating a peaceful world order to a position of prominence. Engaging the “spiritual strength” of

American and international opinion offered a way to influence global affairs.126 They amplified the efforts begun in 1950, with the Crusade for Europe, to redefine the Cold

War through a new “strategic discourse.”127 The efforts employed propaganda and psychological warfare to reframe the superpower competition away from military confrontation, moving moral standards and notions of justice, legality and liberty to the center of many global issues. It submitted “evidence to peoples of other nations… that the objectives and policies of the United States” were in harmony with “their legitimate aspirations for freedom, progress and peace.”128 The approach intended to undermine the control of communist governments in nonviolent ways, such as denying that war was inevitable and keeping the door of peace open to the Soviet Union. It also elevated mutual standards of conduct to a place of prominence in international affairs,129 by calling into question the justice of the actions of their regimes and their legitimacy. It

126 DDE to George Arthur Sloan, March 1, 1952, DDEP, 13:1037-1040; “The theory of defense against aggressive threat must comprehend more than simple self-preservation; the security of spiritual and cultural values, including national and individual freedom, human rights and the history of our nation and our civilization, are included.” DDE to Gabriel N. Stilian, August 23, 1951, DDEP, 12:488-490; See also DDE to George Arthur Sloan, January, 29, 1952, DDEP, 13:928-932; DDE to Allan Blair Kline, December 5, 1950, DDEP, 11:1457-1458.

127 Martin J. Medhurst, “Eisenhower and the Crusade for Freedom: The Rhetorical Origins of a Cold War Campaign,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 27, no. 4 (Fall, 1997): 646-661.

128 DDE, "Directive Approved by the President for the Guidance of the United States Information Agency," October 28, 1953, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9747 (accessed January 9, 2016).

129 DDE to James Selden Lay, Jr., January 24, 1953, DDEP, 14:10-12.

195 sought “to win the Cold War by working to liberalize the world.”130 The approach went beyond the superpower contest, having universal application and coherence within the broader effort to assert new global norms.

The nation’s spiritual power also informed its global leadership. Eisenhower asserted that the United States could not lead in world affairs solely because it possessed significant military and economic power. “The genius, strength and promise of America” came from the nation’s dedication to human “dignity, equality and freedom.” It was the

“basis of the respect and leadership which have been accorded our nation by the peoples of the world….” The promotion of globally recognized principles, as well as the example provided by its free institutions and its conduct in world affairs, became a pillar of American power, global leadership and influence.131 This line of argument was not absolute, as the nation also engaged in the pursuit of its own interests and took aggressive steps to counter communist expansion, such as using covert operations.132 In part, this approach was pragmatic. It derived from the belief that new standards in global affairs would only take hold when an educated and enlightened global citizenry

130 Ned O'Gorman, “The One Word the Kremlin Fears": C. D. Jackson, “Cold War ‘Liberation,’ and American Political-Economic Adventurism,” Rhetoric and Public Affairs, vol. 12, no. 3 (October, 2009): 389-428; See also Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman, American Umpire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), 17-20.

131 NSC 5602/1, “Basic National Security Policy, March 15, 1956,” in FRUS, 1955-1957, National Security Policy, Volume XIX, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v19/d66 (accessed February 27, 2016).

132 The administration justified covert actions as a necessary response to “the vicious covert activities of the USSR and Communist China and the governments, parties and groups dominated by them, (hereinafter collectively referred to as “International Communism”) to discredit and defeat the aims and activities of the United States and other powers of the free world. “NSC 5412/2, National Security Council Directive, undated,” in FRUS, 1950-1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950-1955, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950-55Intel/d250 (accessed March 24, 2017).

196 emerged who ensured their governments worked toward “collective purposes.”133 By championing new norms of conduct, albeit not unconditionally, the United States sought to advance the “essential ingredient” of mutual faith and confidence between peoples. It gave credibility to the idea of a better world order.134

133 DDE to Lucius Du Bignon Clay, February 9, 1952, DDEP, 13:961-965; See also, DDE quoted in Chernus, General Eisenhower: Ideology and Discourse, 59-60, 299.

134 DDE, “World Peace,” Vital Speeches of the Day, vol. 16, no. 13 (April 15, 1950): 386-391; See also DDE to Walter Bedell Smith, March 18, 1947, DDEP, 8:1609-1611.

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CHAPTER 7

GLOBAL WAGER FOR PEACE

During his first term in office, global events created obstacles and opportunities for

Eisenhower to apply his grand strategy. The death of Joseph Stalin on March 5, 1953, just over a month after the US president took office, seemed to open a door to explore new global dynamics. Shortly after, Georgy Malenkov emerged as the Kremlin’s new leader. In front of the Supreme Soviet, he made the first move with an overture toward peace, claiming that all international disputes could “be decided by peaceful means.”1

This “peace offensive” set off a flurry of conjecture around the world. Before the British

Parliament, Winston Churchill proposed exploring Malenkov’s sincerity, asking the

British Parliament to consider “is there a new look?”2

Many of Eisenhower’s advisors were more hesitant. They believed Malenkov was insincere or saw his statements as an attempt to use Stalin’s death to undermine western unity and deter German rearmament. They counselled extreme caution and openly questioned the need to change US policy. The comprehensive assessments and discussions that followed in the NSC pointed the nation toward very measured choices.3

1 Georgy Malenkov quoted in Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President, vol. 2 (New York: Simon &Schuster, 1984), 91.

2 Winston Churchill in a speech to the British Parliament, November 3, 1953 quoted in Lazar Volin, “The Malenkov-Khrushchev New Economic Policy,” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 62, no.3 (June, 1954): 187-209.

3 DDE, Mandate For Change, 1953-1956 (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1963), 143-145; See also Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, Waging Peace, How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 109-122.

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Eisenhower rejected such pessimism and decided to “make a serious bid for peace.”

He joined with many in believing that assessments of Russia were often one-sided or portrayed the state as a monolith; completely united in thought and deed. These narrow caricatures ignored more nuanced aspects of the postwar relationship, such as disregarding the Kremlin’s willingness to collaborate when interests aligned,4 as well as several conciliatory gestures.5 Eisenhower accepted that Soviet leaders sought to expand their influence, but also believed that they wanted to avoid a direct war.6 He also felt that the toxic rhetoric emanating from both sides of the Iron Curtain poisoned the chances for more moderate choices. This assessment led Eisenhower to explore the possibility of whether the death of Stalin created new prospects.7 He personally supervised the drafting of a speech that signaled the chance for a new era in global relations.8

On April 16, 1953, Eisenhower delivered his “The Chance for Peace” speech before the American Society of Newspaper Editors. It began by stressing that one question

4 This included trade cooperation, many peace agreements and, in 1948, the return of thirty lend-lease ships. The Soviets also conceded to peace treaties with Italy, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Finland. Thomas A. Bailey, America Faces Russia: Russian-American Relations from Early Times to Our Day (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1950), 347-355; See also William Henry Chamberlin, “Russians Against Stalin,” The Russian Review, vol. 11, no. 1 (January, 1952): 16-23.

5 See “Memorandum by Carlton Savage of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director of the Staff (Nitze), April 1, 1953,” FRUS, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v08/d574 (accessed March 20, 2017).

6 See Richard H. Immerman, “Trust in the Lord but Keep Your Powder Dry: American Policy Aims at Geneva,” in Gunter Bischof and Saki Dockrill, eds., Cold War Respite: The Geneva Summit of 1955 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000), 35-36.

7 DDE, Mandate for Change, 143-145; See also Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, 109-122.

8 Jean Edward Smith, Eisenhower in War and Peace (New York: Random House, 2012), 571-575.

199 weighed heavily on the minds of the free world: whether there was a “chance for a just peace for all peoples.” He reminded his audiences that after World War II the hope for new norms of conduct diminished, as a “shadow of fear” crossed the globe. He highlighted that the Soviet Union’s attempts to build security, through the accumulation of power and the control of satellites led to similar reactions from the United States that placed both nations inside a security dilemma. Eisenhower concluded that these moves were too costly, did not bring security and, instead, led to “humanity hanging from a cross of iron.” He then asserted that peace was attainable and that new precepts could work. He pledged the United States to the support of “lasting peace,” built upon a foundation of “just relations and honest understanding” if others reciprocated.9

Two days after the president’s speech, Secretary Dulles presented a firmer line. He warned the public that the desire for peace made them susceptible to “Soviet guile.”

The free world needed to stay strong and ensure the talks of peace went beyond a

Soviet publicity ploy.10 This argument acknowledged that the Soviets were making conciliatory gestures, but worried that they might only serve to create internal

9 He asked for deeds, not words that would demonstrate Moscow’s true resolve, such as concluding an armistice in Korea, disarmament agreements, and the release of prisoners held since the Second World War. DDE, "The Chance for Peace," Delivered Before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 16, 1953, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9819 (accessed April 8, 2015).

10 John Foster Dulles, “A World-Wide Peace Offensive, April 18, 1953,” Vital Speeches of the Day, vol. XIX, no. 14 (May 1, 1953): 421-424; The administration continued this line of argument, pointing to the consistency in Moscow’s approach with Lenin’s concept of weakening the west “beyond its strength.” The Soviet leader saw this wearying of the west as the first step along a path that would allow for eventual victory. John Foster Dulles, "Policy for Security and Peace," Foreign Affairs (April, 1954), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/71092/john-foster-dulles/policy-for-security-and-peace (accessed 21 Jan 2015).

200 dissensions within the free world.11 Dulles went on to assert that the goal was not to preserve the status quo, as America did not accept the “captivity” of millions behind the

Iron Curtain. Instead, the free world’s task was to stand firm.12

The dual productions were intentional and oriented on deescalating superpower tensions. Eisenhower’s speech carried more authority and presented the possibility for a new relationship with the Soviet Union. The cautionary message later delivered by

Dulles ensured that the talk of peace did not prematurely reduce western resolve to meet the threats emanating from the iron curtain. Both efforts, emphasized the need to move beyond words and for Moscow to demonstrate its intentions through concrete steps. Additionally, the overtures sought to reduce the influence of scare-mongers on both sides of the superpower contest who called for aggressive militarism to regulate global affairs. For example, by presenting a prudent and alternative vision for the world, the US Administration “strategically attacked” the logical basis for Soviet aggression. It undercut its justifications for brutally suppressing dissent in Eastern Europe and the legitimacy of aggressive expansion. The move allowed the chance for more peaceful relations and norms of international behavior to emerge.13

11 “Special Estimate, April 30, 1953,” FRUS, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v08/d590 (accessed March 20, 2017).

12 Dulles, “A World-Wide Peace Offensive,” Vital Speeches of the Day.

13 Shawn Parry-Giles, "The Eisenhower Administration's Conceptualization of the USIA: The Development of Overt and Covert Propaganda Strategies," Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 24, no. 2 (Spring, 1994): 263.

201

Ending the Korean War added a critical litmus test for Eisenhower’s attempts to reorient global dynamics. By 1953, the conflict had reached a seemingly intractable and unpopular stalemate.14 For almost two years, the military effort stagnated around the

38th parallel, but fighting continued without any substantial effect. Peace talks dragged on for months, straining the resolve of the US and its allies. It also challenged the belief that collective security could effectively counter aggression.15 Eisenhower considered many possible options to escape this standoff, such as intensifying the conflict, as well as expanding negotiations. He decided to combine them, as simply addressing the tactical challenges on the Korean peninsula would be insufficient. He entered into discussions, while adding a credible threat of escalation that included the possibility of employing nuclear weapons.16 After months of discussions, in July, both sides agreed to an armistice.17

14 By 1953, a large majority, 62% wanted to end the war and 69%, would approve of an armistice that ended the fighting. C.D Jackson, “Memorandum on Recent Polls, June 2, 1953,” C.D Jackson Records, Box 4, Korea (3), Eisenhower Presidential Library.

15 Many other factors also complicated matters. For example, South Korea’s President, Syngman Rhee, wanted a more comprehensive agreement that kept the United States engaged in supporting an independent South Korea and made deliberate moves to scuttle the peace talks. William Stueck, The Korean War, an International History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 320-338; See also “Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, August 27, 1954,” FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, vol. XV, Part 2, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v15p2/d751 (accessed March 15, 2016).

16 For example, just weeks after taking office, in February, he declared that he was removing the restrictions on the US Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Straits. This move opened up the possibility that Nationalist Chinese forces in Taiwan might attack the communist mainland. It intended to put pressure on Red China to help end the conflict. Eisenhower also communicated to communist leaders through diplomatic channels that, without satisfactory progress, the United States intended to move more decisively to resolve the war.

17 DDE, Mandate for Change, 178-191; See also DDE to Winston Spencer Churchill, February 2, 1953, DDEP, 14:18-19; Wilfred A. Bacchus, “The Relationship Between Combat and Peace Negotiations: Fighting While Talking in Korea, 1951-1953,” Orbis, vol. 17 (Summer, 1973): 545-574; Eisenhower used the signing of the Korean War armistice as a platform to emphasize the senselessness of perpetual warfare. He called on nations to resolve their differences at the “conference table,” rather than in “brutal and

202

Scholars continue to disagree on the factors that led to the truce. Many contest whether Eisenhower was practicing “brinkmanship” or was actually willing to use nuclear weapons. The bargaining character of international relations could lead us to assess that both possibilities existed and were not mutually exclusive. The efforts were consistent with a strategy to avoid war, by reasserting the means and the will that enabled American deterrence and coercion.18 Rosemary Foot departs from this line of argument and questions if the threat to use nuclear weapons had any impact on negotiations.19 Campbell Craig adds a perspective that is more consistent with the comprehensive character of Eisenhower’s strategies. He asserts that Eisenhower’s actions also created dilemmas for both the United States and the Soviet Union that pushed and pulled them toward peace. They deliberately placed the nation and adversaries in the predicament of having the choice between peace or global nuclear war. The US president’s move rejected the advice of experts that argued for limited concepts of superpower bargaining, adopting an approach that was “so dangerous that his advisors would find it impossible to push Eisenhower toward war and away from

futile battle.” DDE, “Radio and Television Address to the American People Announcing the Signing of the Korean Armistice,” July 26, 1953, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9653 (accessed April 8, 2015).

18 Michael Gordon Jackson, “Beyond Brinkmanship: Eisenhower, Nuclear War Fighting, and Korea, 1953-1968,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 35, no. 1 (March, 2005): 52-75; See also Timothy J. Botti, The Long Wait: the Forging of the Anglo-American Nuclear Alliance, 1945-1958 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987); Peter J. Roman, Eisenhower and the Missile Gap (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995); Andreas Wenger, Living with Peril: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Nuclear Weapons (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997).

19 Rosemary Foot, A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990).

203 compromise.” It may also have given leverage to moderate elements within Moscow over more militant factions.20

Along with unambiguous signaling of American positions, the administration sought ways to shore up global security. The New Look declared that for the United States to meet its defensive needs it needed allies, leading to an expansion of mutual defense agreements. But after the Korean conflict, US collective security efforts moved away from the venue of the United Nations.21 Instead, regional agreements proliferated around the world. This included a significant expansion of NATO, the Southeast Asia

Treaty Organization (SEATO) created in 1954 and the Central Treaty Organization, or

Baghdad Pact, in 1955.22 Military alliances became one of the primary methods to stop the spread of communism. They offered security at a bearable cost and for the “long haul.” They also promoted economic integration, aligned national interests, augmented perceptions of security, and enhanced support for American leadership.23

Eisenhower balanced his tough stance with consistent overtures for peace. In

December of 1953, he traveled to the United Nations in New York to deliver what would later be called his “Atoms for Peace” speech. He described the General Assembly

20 Craig contrasts this approach with his successor, President John F. Kennedy, whose advisors created several new initiatives that gave the President strategic options, such as Special Forces and the ability to implement an all-out nuclear attack. Campbell Craig, Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 69.

21 Stueck, The Korean War, an International History, 368-369.

22 Ibid, 349-353, 356-366.

23 Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, 164-165, 189; See also David Rothkopf, Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2006), 65-66.

204 delegates that gathered from nations all over the world as representing a new “hope” for “lasting peace for all nations.” He told them he decided to avoid reciting hopeful and

“pious platitudes.” Instead, he warned that the proliferation of nuclear weapons was likely, as well as the probability of civilization’s destruction if ever used. Eisenhower declared that America, along with its allies, stood ready to find a different way. He proposed that the UN establish an International Atomic Energy Agency that would help regulate nuclear weapons, such as through repurposing fissionable material for research and energy production. He claimed it offered a way to solve the atomic dilemma.24

In practice, any agreement was unlikely to solve the challenge of atomic weapons, but the effort did endorse America’s global leadership in guiding the world toward more peaceful norms. Scholars continue to disagree on whether Eisenhower’s approach was a genuine attempt to achieve peace or simply a public relations campaign. We should not try to fit his efforts into this binary. Instead, his actions reflected a comprehensive approach to a dynamic problem. From his “The Chance for Peace” to his “Atoms for

Peace” speeches, Eisenhower applied a pattern of signaling that addressed different audiences and sought to achieve effects in diverse, often indirect, ways. For example, he made it clear to both domestic and international listeners that the United States shared their hopes for a better world, but that the nation was prepared to go to war if necessary. This effort sought to shore up the resolve to resist totalitarian governments.

24 DDE, "Address Before the General Assembly of the United Nations on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, New York City," December 8, 1953, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9774 (accessed March 15, 2016); See also DDE, Mandate for Change, 252-255.

205

Additionally, while he did not hope to sway Moscow’s hardliners, Ike did seek to undercut the narratives they used to justify their efforts. By holding out the olive branch of peace, the US administration sought to discredit the descriptions that emphasized the menace of the western world. The outreach reframed the superpower contest and added influence to those, on both sides of the iron curtain, who desired better relations.25

Eisenhower’s actions also garnered global support for America’s vision of creating new standards in international statecraft. The narratives framed the stakes in global affairs as between dictatorship and freedom, directly confronting “the repressive, closed, totalitarian and expansionist Soviet regime.”26 They highlighted that peace required not just the absence of war, but a change in global behavior by both sides.

Additionally, the overtures advanced America as the champion of this better world order. The comprehensive steps, put in place during his first year in office, reveal

Eisenhower’s attempts to stabilize the superpower contest and to assert US global leadership, in order to uphold the efficacy of adopting mutually beneficial standards for international affairs.27

25 Martin J. Medhurst, "Atoms for Peace and Nuclear Hegemony: The Rhetorical Structure of a Cold War Campaign," Armed Forces and Society, vol. 23, no. 4 (Summer, 1997): 571-593.

26 David Tal, “Eisenhower’s Disarmament Dilemma: From Chance for Peace to Open Skies Proposal,” Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol. 12, no. 2 (June, 2001): 175-196, 190.

27 Ira Chernus makes a similar argument in the context of the Atoms for Peace speech and the Cold War. The premise is equally consistent with efforts to build standards of statecraft that would lead to more enduring peace. Ira Chernus, Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), 120.

206

Sustaining the Initiative

Despite sharing public and private offers of the desire for world peace, both superpowers remained focused on defining the global order. In studying this challenge,

US cabinet members recommended approaches that ranged from cautious optimism to complete suspicion of Moscow.28 Others, like Dulles, saw the issue differently. His rationales did not focus on Moscow’s intentions, but on how their actions affected free world cohesion and the global march toward peaceful norms of statecraft. This led him to counsel that any move toward détente would relieve pressure on Russia’s overextended positions in Europe, encourage allied “wishful thinking” and policies of neutralism. He understood that these types of actions would dilute America’s ability to lead the free world and to advance normative changes in global affairs.29

For the first two years of his Administration, Eisenhower supported a cautious outlook. He avoided efforts that might reduce free world resolve or encourage further

Soviet belligerency by appearing too ready to compromise.30 In taking this position,

Eisenhower deflected calls from allies and advisors to hold any type of peace summit with the Soviet Union. He believed that, without some promise of results, a premature

28 US Department of State, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. ii (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1987), 137-139; See also Ronald W. Pruessen, “Beyond the Cold War—Again: 1955 and the 1990s,” Political Science Quarterly, vol. 108, no. 1 (Spring, 1993): 59-84.

29 Immerman, “Trust in the Lord but Keep Your Powder Dry,” in Bischof and Dockrill, eds., Cold War Respite, 35-54; See also Peter G. Boyle, ed., The Churchill-Eisenhower Correspondence, 1953-1955 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 48-55.

30 DDE to Winston Spencer Churchill, February 18, 1955, DDEP, 16:1574-1579.

207 conference could be worse than none at all. In public, he maintained that America remained ready to “disarm, to live by law, to abjure force,” as long as it could be

“confident that others” would go along.31

The United States continued actions that sought to encourage the Kremlin to moderate its policies. Washington was sensitive to the internal debates that persisted since the death of Stalin and tried to influence them in ways that stabilized the superpower competition and reduce the threat of war. The approach did not hope to control Soviet goals, but it did believe that America’s actions could sway the ways

Moscow pursued them.32 In this effort, Eisenhower pursued interim agreements to build a more stable “modus vivendi” in the superpower competition.33 The approach sought to find points of mutual interests and included softening the tone of US messaging.

Eisenhower explained that the United States displayed “a spirit of firmness without truculence, conciliation without appeasement, confidence without arrogance.”34

31 DDE to Hallock Brown Hoffman, February 7, 1955, DDEP, 16:1555-1556.

32 "Memorandum For Psychological Strategy Board: Plan for Psychological Exploitation of Stalin's Death, March 13, 1953," and Robert Amory, Jr., “The Current World Situation, 31 May 1955,” in CIA Records, FOIA Electronic Reading Room, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD; William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003), 325-360; See also Geroid T. Robinson, “The Significance of Recent Events in Russia,” March 3, 1955 and John N. Hazard, “A Look at the New Look in Russia,” November 17, 1954, in Council on Foreign Relations Records, Box 445, Public Policy Papers, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library.

33 Immerman, “Trust in the Lord but Keep Your Powder Dry,” in Bischof and Dockrill, eds., Cold War Respite, 35-54.

34 DDE, Mandate For Change, 147-149; America also pursued indirect ways to change global dynamics, such as by trying to accelerate the dependency between Moscow and Beijing, as a way to drive a wedge into the Sino-Soviet alliance. David Mayers, Cracking the Monolith: U.S. Policy against the Sino- Soviet Alliance, 1949–1955 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986); John Lewis Gaddis, “Dividing Adversaries: The United States and International Communism, 1945–1958,” in The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), chap. 6; Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, Mao: The Unknown Story (New York: Knopf, 2005).

208

Additionally, America maintained a steady drumbeat of information efforts that emphasized the value of a free society that contrasted with the totalitarian character of

Soviet regimes. This included highlighting the East German Government’s decision to consolidate control over the country’s economy, a move that further diluted its middle class and threatened to decrease standards of living. It led to protests and riots that were violently suppressed by Soviet forces in 1953.35

At the mid-point of his first term, Eisenhower decided to try to push the superpower relationship further toward the cause of peace. In part, the choice was a reaction to the positive moves made by Khrushchev, such as his efforts to create an accommodation with the West beginning in 1955 and his de-Stalinization program.36 It led to a mid- summer great power conference, in Geneva, Switzerland.37 To prepare for this move,

Eisenhower directed a study to explore world public opinion and Soviet vulnerabilities.

The panel, led by Nelson Rockefeller, concluded that the Communist bloc was psychologically weak and susceptible to an overture of peace. They recommended a

35 United States Information Agency, Soviet Reporting on the East German Uprisings of 1953: A Case Study of Soviet Propaganda (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1954); S. Kondrashev, “Berlin on June 17, 1953,” International Affairs, vol. 49, no. 4 (August, 2003): 199-206; Arnulf Baring, Uprising in East Germany: June 17, 1953 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972); Alison Smale, “60 years Later, Germany Recalls Its Anti-Soviet Revolt,” The New York Times, June 17, 2013.

36 Soviet officials openly attacked Stalin's ideology and the "cult of personality" he created that harmed the party and the country. On February 25 and in a closed session of the Twentieth Communist Party Congress, Soviet Party chief Nikita Khrushchev denounced Stalin as a despot whose policies created a regime based on terror. Western governments learned of the speech in the middle of March. DDE, Waging Peace, 1956-1961 (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1965), 67.

37 Smith, Eisenhower in War and Peace, 664.

209 dramatic move that could open the door to “graduated disarmament.”38 The president found “much of value” in the Quantico report and would use it to guide his efforts during the Geneva Summit. He intended the meeting to be much more than a propaganda effort. He planned to take a dramatic step that would deescalate superpower tensions, shore up moderates on both sides of the iron curtain and to continue the march toward new standards of statecraft. 39

In July of 1955, Eisenhower went to the “Big Four” meeting to discuss the possibility for peaceful changes in global relations.40 Less than an hour before he departed, he spoke to the nation and declared that his trip was “unprecedented.” Other presidents had traveled to conferences during war or to end a war, but he would be the first to go forth to “prevent wars” for all mankind.41 The initial meetings of the five-day summit were very collegial, but produced little progress on many of the discussion points, such as disarmament or European security.42 Despite these setbacks, the fact that a meeting

38 Nelson A. Rockefeller, “Memorandum For the President, June 13, 1955” and “Nelson A. Rockefeller to John Foster Dulles, June 13, 1955” in Quantico I: Vulnerabilities Panel, June 5-10, 1955, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers, Washington D.C. Series, Box 64, Folder 529, Rockefeller Archives Center.

39 DDE to Charles Douglas Jackson, June 14, 1955, DDEP, 16:745-1746; See also DDE to Charles Douglas Jackson, June 29, 1955, DDEP, 16:1758-1759; W.W. Rostow, Open Skies: Eisenhower’s Proposal of July 21, 1955 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), 34, 44-45, 155-158; See also Robert J. Donovan, Eisenhower: The Inside Story (New York: New York Herald Tribune, 1956), 343-351.

40 The Big Four were President Eisenhower of the United States, Premier Nikolai A. Bulganin of the Soviet Union, Prime Minister Anthony Eden of Britain and Prime Minister Edgar Faure of France, as well as their foreign ministers: John Foster Dulles, Vyacheslav Molotov, Harold Macmillan, and Antoine Pinay, respectively.

41 DDE, “Radio and Television Address to the American People Prior to Departure for the Big Four Conference at Geneva, July 15, 1955, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10301 (accessed June 3, 2016).

42 The Russians also made it clear they were unwilling to consider the reunification of Germany. For a discussion of the Eden plan that sought Germany reunification as a prelude to its inclusion in NATO,

210 occurred did serve to send a clear signal to the world that both sides were willing to work to avoid war.

Eisenhower wanted more than this token gesture. During these early meetings, he made it clear that he was willing to enter into “sound and reliable” agreements, calling for concrete steps that could relax tensions, as “fear and distrust flourished.” He then stole the show.43 While delivering his prepared statement, Eisenhower abruptly stopped and spoke directly to his Russian counterparts, Bulganin and Khrushchev.44 The US president pointed to the fact that the possession of nuclear weapons created anxiety, due to the possibility of surprise attacks. He proclaimed that America was ready “to proceed in the study and testing of a reliable system of inspections and reporting.”

Eisenhower offered to create the transparency that would reduce the danger and ultimately relax superpower tensions.45

Later referred to as the “Open Skies” plan, it was, in fact, a carefully orchestrated proposal that placed the United States on the moral high ground in the cause of peace.

Eisenhower understood that the offer had intelligence advantages.46 Nevertheless, he

see Saki Dockrill, “The Eden Plan and European Security,” in Bischof and Dockrill, eds., Cold War Respite, 161-189.

43 Smith, Eisenhower in War and Peace, 666-667.

44 The United States remained uncertain of who within the Kremlin pulled the strings of power. At Geneva, it became clear that Khrushchev had emerged on top. Thomas McCormick, America's Half- Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War and After (Baltimore, 1989; 2d ed., 1995), 118–122.

45 He called for reciprocal steps, such as the disclosure of military establishments, inspection teams and the allowance of aerial photography. Donovan, Eisenhower: The Inside Story, 344.

46 It allowed the United States to conduct high altitude aerial reconnaissance that could warn of a surprise attack.

211 also believed that the agreement might allow for an improvement in the United States-

Soviet relationship. Greater transparency and shared expectations offered a pathway to stabilize the superpower contest.47 Additionally, it offered a way for both sides to control exorbitant military spending, through controls and disarmament agreements.

Finally, he intended the proposal to be dramatic and to provide a way for the United

States to maintain the initiative in the battle to influence global opinion. It asserted US leadership to reduce superpower tensions and to push the world toward new standards of statecraft.48

The Soviets were unsure how to react to Eisenhower at Geneva. Bulganin responded with a speech about “peaceful coexistence,” but Khrushchev, who was more influential, rejected it immediately.49 Moscow continued to negotiate over the issue for months. In a letter to Bulganin on March 1, 1956, Eisenhower proposed to combine the atoms for peace and open skies proposals, adding that America would consider halting the further production of atomic weapons. Over time, it became apparent that the Soviets were not prepared to make such a substantive leap, as hardliners within Moscow refused to support it.50

47 Rostow, Open Skies, 57-62; Dan Lindley, Promoting Peace with Information: Transparency as a Tool of Security Regimes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).

48 John Prados, “Open Skies and Closed Minds: American Disarmament Policy at the Geneva Summit,” in Bischof and Dockrill, eds., Cold War Respite, 215-233.

49 Initially, the United States was not sure whether Moscow was willing to discuss the proposal. The Soviets showed some interest, asking in August if the agreement would include a willingness to allow the stationing of inspection teams in each country at critical points, such as airfields, rail terminals and ports.

50 Donovan, Eisenhower: The Inside Story, 343-351.

212

Eisenhower and Decolonization

Cooling down the superpower rivalry moved several other issues to the foreground.

Neither Moscow nor Washington saw the reduction in overt hostility as establishing an acceptable status quo in world affairs. It led both to redirect their efforts, such as by implementing peace offensives to win over the underdeveloped and non-aligned worlds. These moves included illuminating the virtues of their competing socio-politico- economic models.51

In this contest, the proliferation of new states, due to decolonization and independence movements, added challenges to America’s and the Soviet Union’s efforts.52 The new nations refused to be idle observers and sought to assert their sovereignty. After World War II, a groundswell of efforts emerged that sought to hold the world to the new standards of statecraft; agreements that both superpowers ascribed to. Those that continued to be occupied or overly influenced by outside powers used the promise of a better world order to call for more rapid changes in their affairs, such as accelerating demands for independence. This demand for autonomy included creating their own regional alliances and organizations, such as the Arab League. It also transformed the UN General Assembly in ways that did not always mesh with America’s or the Soviet’s desire to assert their leadership over world affairs. The organization

51 Ibid, 9.

52 By the time Eisenhower took office, UN membership had grown from 51 to 60 members. Another 20 nations joined by the end of his first term. This growth trend would continue leading to 159 members by the end of the Cold War, eventually reaching the 193 members it has today. See “Growth in United Nations membership 1945-present,” United Nations, http://www.un.org/en/sections/member- states/growth-united-nations-membership-1945-present/index.html (accessed February 12, 2016).

213 became a venue to push for the interests of the underdeveloped world.53 Additionally, many of the new nations tried to add new choices in the contest for the world order, defining international dynamics as within a north-south struggle. In 1955, these efforts took on a global scale as twenty-nine nations met in Indonesia to try to pave the way for a Non-Aligned Movement.54

The Eisenhower administration adapted slowly to this new north-south dynamic. In part, these factors competed for attention in US foreign policy. The Cold War (east-west dynamic), alliance relations and their management, and domestic politics remained the dominant considerations.55 At times, these other concerns also overwhelmed and enveloped the efforts of the global south, such as leading US administrations to explain the challenges of the underdeveloped world within a Cold War framework. They touted the trials of economic growth, social-political structures and decolonization as giving advantages to communism, as their centrally planned economic model promised a

53 Richard N. Gardner, In Pursuit of World Order: U.S. Foreign Policy and International Organization (New York: Praeger, 1964), 19-21.

54 The Bandung Conference never created a homogenous option, but it did represent a concerted effort to work together to prevent any form of re-subjugation by the latest global powers. Office of the Historian, United States Department of State, “Bandung Conference (Asian-African Conference), 1955,” Milestones: 1953-1960 at https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/bandung-conf (accessed October 17, 2016).

55 Jason Parker, “Cold War II: The Eisenhower Administration, the Bandung Conference, and the Reperiodization of the Postwar Era,” Diplomatic History, vol. 30, no. 5 (November, 2006): 867-892; See also DDE, Mandate For Change, 480-482; Cary Fraser, “An American Dilemma: Race and Realpolitik in the American Response to the Bandung Conference, 1955,” in Brenda Gayle Plummer, ed., Window on Freedom: Race, Civil Rights, and Foreign Affairs 1945-1988 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 115.

214 short-cut to modernization. This bi-polar framing required an American response to prevent the third world from aligning themselves with the Soviet Union.56

The US administration applied policies to respond to these pressures. This included rhetorically supporting decolonization and pushing its allies to accelerate the process to empower national governance. America also developed programs that highlighted the value of a free politico-economic system. This included cultural and educational exchanges, a book translation and distribution program, as well as support to civic group development around the world.57 Additionally, Eisenhower understood that many nations were more concerned with providing basic needs to their people than they were with geopolitics. This led him toward policies to win over nations by expanding US trade and aid efforts with them.58 The administration’s actions included increasing US psychological operations, such as Voice of America that contained both cultural and

56 N. Bukharin, “Imperialism and Communism,” in Hamilton Fish Armstrong, ed., The Foreign Affairs Reader (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), 189-205; See also Robert Amory, Jr., “The Current World Situation, 31 May 1955,” CIA Records, FOIA Electronic Reading Room, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.

57 These efforts contrasted with the Soviet systems of oppression, concentration of power, and coercion. NSC 5501, “Basic National Security Policy, January 7, 1955” in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, National Security Policy, Volume XIX, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v19/d6 (accessed May 5, 2015); See also Kenneth Alan Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 2006), 1-10; Martin J. Medhurst, ed., Eisenhower’s War of Words: Rhetoric and Leadership (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1994); H. W. Brands Jr., Cold Warriors: Eisenhower’s Generation and American Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988).

58 Henry Kissinger explained in 1956 “For several years, we have been groping for a concept to deal with the transformation of the Cold War from an effort to build defensive barriers into a contest for the allegiance of humanity.” Henry Kissinger, “Reflections on American Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 35 (October, 1956): 37.

215 information transmissions.59 Through all of these actions, the President sought to “set up…what you might call a series of centrifugal forces” that would allow the United

States to gain the initiative in the Cold War. This positioning sought to stabilize global affairs, allowing the time and space needed to build support for a free world order- a critical prerequisite for establishing new norms of state behavior.60

The issues surrounding decolonization increasingly gained a place of prominence in

American foreign policy. Eisenhower sustained the approach to decolonization instituted by Truman, holding firm to policies that promoted the gradual transition to sovereignty. In part, this positioning reflected the conviction that rushing the process of independence created vacuums of power, violence, and instability, such as those seen in

India’s liberation and its quick descent into violence.61 This policy view also reflected an appreciation of the challenges faced by most nations. The strength of the “American system” did not derive simply from its independence, economic and military might, patriotism, or structures of government. Eisenhower held that the source of the nation’s strength came from additional factors, such as its education systems, its civil society, self-reliance, bill of rights, and adherence to the rule of law. These provided the

59 This tool was not benign, but did offer a way to counter communist subversion. Osgood, Total Cold War, 1-6; Walter L. Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997).

60 DDE, Mandate For Change, 10-11, 130-132.

61 An isolated episode did not inform this outlook. The United States remained preoccupied with addressing the results of similar challenges, such as the conflict between Chinese Communists and Nationalists, the stalemate in Korea and, after 1954, the repercussions of the French defeat at Dienbienphu. These issues revealed the problems surrounding the too rapid march to independence. Parker, “Cold War II: The Eisenhower Administration, the Bandung Conference, and the Reperiodization of the Postwar Era,” 872-873.

216 essential intellectual and cultural pillars that allowed the nation’s free systems to function. This perspective led him to perceive many of the discussions surrounding decolonization as superficial. They tended to revolve around who held the reins of power.62 This outlook led Eisenhower to uphold the goal of advancing an independent existence and in ways that built functioning socio-political systems that did not allow communist expansion.63

Eisenhower’s views did not deny the abuses of power or selfish interests that created empires. He, like his predecessor, believed that the system of imperialism was a product of another age. Its subordination of notions of human rights to power and the use of aggressive warfare to support a nation’s political economy were examples of the problems that caused the catastrophes of the old world order. It led Eisenhower to try to convince America’s allies to support the new norms of conduct.

In 1954, he met with Winston Churchill in Washington DC to try to persuade Britain to declare a definitive program to transition its colonies to self-rule. Eisenhower believed that it would both counter Soviet claims of western imperialism and help assuage the concerns of colonized populations. In a series of letters afterwards, he tried to convince Britain’s war-hero that the world could not stop the spirit of nationalism that was sweeping across the globe. If not handled properly, communism would exploit

62 DDE Diary Entry, December 27, 1935 in Robert H. Ferrell, ed., The Eisenhower Diaries (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1981), 7-12; See also DDE, Mandate For Change, 247; DDE, At ease: stories I tell to friends (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1967), 140.

63 Giles Scott-Smith, "Attempting to Secure an "Orderly Evolution": American Foundations, the Hague Academy of International Law and the Third World." Journal of American Studies, vol. 41, no. 3 (December, 2007): 509-532.

217 the issue to their advantage. He asked Churchill to give a speech that laid out a sequence of steps and a clear timeline for independence.64 Eisenhower mentioned, “You could say that twenty-five years from now, every last one of the colonies…should have been offered a right to self-government and determination.” All of these measures would ensure that the aims of the free world coincided with indigenous ambitions. He added that it would “electrify the world.” Churchill declined. He dismissed the idea and responded that it would not be his “swan song.”65

United States’ support for gradual but definitive decolonization would continue to rest uneasily with its allies. Despite an almost worldwide condemnation, many of

America’s closest partners maintained both progressive claims of support for decolonization, while also, and at times brutally, resisting the efforts.66 These tensions in positioning created fissures both within national policies and between the United States and its allies.67 Despite these disagreements, the United States tried to walk a line that appeased neither its allies nor the indigenous populations seeking independence.

64 Such as educational opportunities, trade agreements and standards, and the development of systems of governance.

65 Boyle, The Churchill-Eisenhower Correspondence, 162-168.

66 See Martin Thomas, Fight or Flight: Britain, France, and Their Roads from Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

67 For example, it was a barrier to cooperation as the French fought to retain their Indochinese possessions. In Vietnam, they did not receive the direct American military support they asked for, after refusing to accept Eisenhower’s condition that they pledge to give freedom to their colonies in the area. See “Introduction,” DDEP, 14: xx-xxii.

218

Decolonization, US Policy and Egypt

The postwar challenges in Egypt illuminate the pressures that existed between

United States advocacy for a new world order, its allies, and decolonization. After World

War II, America’s initial efforts in the Middle East were very modest. Other than asserting an Open Door economic policy, particularly in regards to oil agreements,

Truman approached the region as a sphere of British responsibility.68 London accepted this role, as it aligned with its efforts to preserve its systems of military defense and oceanic power.69 This included a preferential alliance with Iraq, a Middle East Command headquartered in Egypt that maintained its Suez Canal bases, and the command of

Jordan’s Arab Legion, by British General John Bagot Glubb. While both England and the

United States aligned over the need to counter communist efforts in the region, Britain’s desire to preserve its colonial influence became a barrier to US efforts to assert new standards of statecraft.

The legacy of colonialism was not just limited to military arrangements. After World

War II, nations throughout the Middle East made a push to demand better economic agreements with the West. In 1950, King Abdullaziz asserted Saudi Arabia’s sovereignty and threatened to nationalize the Arabian-American Oil Company’s (ARAMCO) oil

68 For example, between 1945 and 1946 the United States gave little more than moral support to Iran and Turkey in their resistance to Soviet pressure.

69 By 1946, the French evacuated their mandates and only Britain retained significant aspects of its imperial influence in the Middle East. J.C. Hurewitz, Middle East Dilemmas: The Background of United States Policy (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953), 1-6, 250-262; America also maintained its presence in the Middle East after World War II. It had major airbases in Saudi Arabia and in Libya, Morocco, and Turkey. Rashid Khalidi, Sowing Crisis: The Cold War and American Dominance in the Middle East (Boston: Beacon Press, 2009), 8-9.

219 facilities in the country. He demanded and received a 50% share in the profits.70 Many nations in the region and around the world saw this move as the new standard. Britain, however, continued to resist this trend.71 Its rigidity complicated US policy approaches toward the Middle East, often leading America to try to avoid taking sides. There were some exceptions, such as the dispute over the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951 that enveloped both cold war and decolonization dimensions. It led the Eisenhower administration to support a coup to overthrow Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953.72

Egypt often took center stage in this decolonization drama. Since the end of World

War II, London and Cairo remained at an impasse over if and when Britain would withdraw its roughly forty thousand troops from the Suez Canal Zone bases.73 In 1951,

Egypt tried to force the issue by abrogating the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, but Britain

70 Robert A. Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 73.

71 Many businesses shifted their approaches, making deals with the nations of the region as equal partners. Into the 1950s, a healthy debate raged in London that addressed if and how the nation could retain its imperial influence. Guy Laron, Origins of the Suez Crisis: Postwar Development Diplomacy and the Struggle over Third World Industrialization, 1945-1956 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013), 13-17, 187-188.

72 In 1951, Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. President Truman was unable to convince the two sides to accept a compromise. When Eisenhower took office, Iran was in political turmoil and Mossadegh made it clear he was unwilling to work with the British. In 1952, he took several steps to consolidated power in Iran, moves that empowered communist elements in the nation, leading Eisenhower to support a CIA effort with Britain to instigate a coup. DDE, Mandate For Change, 159-166; See also James A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: the Tragedy of American- Iranian Relations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 67-86; Simon C. Smith, Ending Empire in the Middle East: Britain, the United States and post-war decolonization, 1945-1973 (New York: Routledge, 2012), 27-33; Michael J. Cohen and Martin Kolinsky, eds., Demise of the British Empire in the Middle East: Britain's Responses to Nationalist Movements, 1943-55 (London: Frank Cass, 1988).

73 Two major issues prevented progress toward a negotiated solution. Egypt wanted support for its claim of historical sovereignty over the Sudan and Britain desired to retain its foothold in the Suez Canal Zone.

220 refused to accept it and tried to tie its departure to the creation of a Middle Eastern

Command. The British proposal envisioned a collective security force that would headquarter in the Suez Canal Zone and consist of forces, from Britain, the United

States, France, Turkey and Egypt.74 The US refused London’s request to endorse the

British position.75

The years of unsuccessful negotiations led Egyptians to formulate and often execute alternative approaches. This included protests, boycotts, and attacks on British interests and military personnel. On January 25, 1952, the issue boiled over and turned bloody.

The British commander tried to disarm the police in the city of Ismailia on the Suez

Canal’s west bank and the Egyptians resisted. Over forty people were killed and seventy wounded. It provoked a riot in Cairo the next day that left an additional seventy people dead.76 Tensions continued for months, amplifying the calls in Egypt for liberty, political change, and for the British to leave. In the early morning hours of July 23, a group calling themselves the Free Officers executed a nearly bloodless coup. The roughly two hundred mid-grade Army Officers, supported by a few thousand troops, seized key

74 DDE, Mandate For Change, 151.

75 Truman also rejected Churchill’s efforts to get America to send a “symbolic brigade” to patrol the canal to get Cairo to accept London’s offer. Smith, Ending Empire in the Middle East, 17-20; See also William Roger Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945 – 1951: Arab Nationalism, the United States, and Postwar Imperialism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 715-721.

76 Ibid; See also M.A. Fitzsimons, Empire by Treaty: Britain and the Middle East in the Twentieth Century (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1964), 98-102.

221 military facilities, airports, broadcasting stations and, most importantly, senior military officers loyal to King.77 The move amplified the demands for Egyptian independence.78

Eisenhower inherited these dilemmas and tried to find new approaches. Despite his intention to maintain a global focus in US foreign policy, he explained, “no region of the world received as much of my close attention and that of my colleagues as did the

Middle East."79 Just days before assuming office, he noted that the United Kingdom was trying to link its interests too closely with the United States. He hinted that the nation might have to “proceed independently.”80 As president, he retained this line of thinking and searched for ways to shift US policies, such as by adopting a policy of neutrality toward the Middle East.81

To demonstrate America’s commitment to treating all nation’s as equals,

Eisenhower sent John Foster Dulles in May of 1953 on a “listening tour” of the region.

During the trip, the US Secretary of State found an almost universal condemnation of

77 Farouk. P.J. Vatikiotis, The History of Modern Egypt (New York: Praeger, 1969), 378-379; Joel Gordon, Nasser's Blessed Movement: Egypt's Free Officers and the July Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 14-15; See also Anwar el Sadat, Revolt on the Nile (New York: John Day Company, 1957), 143-144.

78 In February of 1953, Egypt and Britain made an agreement on the future of Sudan. It removed one of the major obstacles to the Suez dispute. See Charles B. Selak, Jr., “The Suez Canal Base Agreement of 1954,” The American Journal of International Law, vol. 49, no. 4 (October, 1955): 494.

79 DDE, Waging Peace, 20.

80 DDE, “Diary Entry, January 6, 1953,” in Ferrell, ed., The Eisenhower Diaries, 222-224; The day before Truman left office, the National Security Council issued a new Middle East Policy, NSC-141, that echoed Eisenhower’s assessment. NSC 141, “Report to the National Security Council by the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director for Mutual Security, January 19, 1953,” in FRUS, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs, vol. II, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d42 (accessed October 21, 2016).

81 DDE, Waging Peace, 22.

222

America’s alignment with British and French policies. For example, Egypt’s Minister of

Foreign Affairs, Mahmoud Fawzi, told Dulles that his country had several concerns, such as addressing its social and economic problems. He pointed to a newly enacted agricultural reform law as an example and mentioned Egypt’s interest in the Aswan

Dam, a project that would harness the Nile River for electricity and could increase the country’s arable land by up to 50%. He then turned to the Anglo-Egyptian disagreements, citing the continued presence of British troops and London’s insistence on maintaining control of the Suez Canal, as persistent obstacles.82 Reporting on his trip to the NSC, Dulles explained that the “United States suffered from being linked with

British and French imperialism.” Eisenhower understood and seemed to agree with these views, but decided that the United States would not be “too rough on the British.”

He decided to pursue concrete ways to prevent instability without taking sides in every dispute.83

In July of 1953 the NSC issued a new Middle East policy that implemented this guidance. NSC 155/1 explained that the British and French refusals to accelerate independence and, in the British case, to remove their military forces, were causing

82 “Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in the Embassy in Cairo, May 11, 1953,” FRUS, 1952- 1954: The Near and Middle East, vol. IX, part 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952- 54v09p1/d3 (accessed January 5, 2017); Other leaders that Dulles met took a similar line. See “Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in the Embassy in Syria, May 15, 1953,” (misprinted as 1951) FRUS, 1952-1954: The Near and Middle East, vol. IX, part 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v09p1/d22 (accessed October 19, 2016); “Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in the Embassy in Iraq, May 18, 1953,” FRUS, 1952-1954: The Near and Middle East, vol. IX, part 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952- 54v09p1/d32 (accessed October 19, 2016).

83 “Memorandum of Discussion at the 147th Meeting of the National Security Council, June 1, 1953,” FRUS, 1952-1954: The Near and Middle East, vol. IX, part 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v09p1/d137 (accessed October 20, 2016).

223 trends “inimical to Western interest.” The problem surpassed the “threat of direct

Soviet military attack.” But the administration also wanted to avoid a vacuum of power.

For this reason, the policy called for Washington to work with London to leverage its established positions, but only if Britain’s posture remained “consistent with US principles and policy objectives.” The new US approach also made it clear to all of the stakeholders in the region that the United States did not plan to defend the colonial interests of its allies.84 Approved several months later, the New Look statement of national security would reemphasize this outlook. It explained that “colonial challenges” weakened the efforts to create a “free world.” The United States needed to find ways to build support for its global leadership, by sustaining the hope that it offered a better way of life.85

To shore up this effort, the administration sought to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict by treating all of the parties equally. Eisenhower believed that “the prior administration had been excessively partial to Israel.” It exacerbated resentment in the Arab world toward the West and gave the Soviet Union an opportunity it could exploit.86

84 NSC 155/1, “United States Objectives and Policies With Respect to the Near East, July 14, 1953,” in FRUS, 1955-1957, National Security Policy, vol. XIX, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v19/d66 (accessed October 15, 2016); The Project Solarium study issued in late July added the need for US “impartiality and objectiveness.” “Memorandum to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay),” July 22, 1953,” FRUS, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs, vol. II, part 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d80 (accessed October 20, 2016).

85 NSC 162/2, “Basic National Security Policy, October 30, 1953” in FRUS, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d100 (accessed March 13, 2016).

86 Salim Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 25-29.

224

Eisenhower sent Eric Johnson to lead a series of missions, in 1955 and 1956, as his personal representative to try to find a negotiated settlement.87 Eisenhower also pledged to continue to uphold US commitments to the 1950 Tripartite Declaration that sought to deescalate the conflict by giving assurances to all sides that Britain, France, and the United States would guarantee the territorial integrity agreed to in the 1949

Arab-Israeli Armistice Agreements.88

A fundamental goal of this shift in US policy approach was to build a better relationship with a turbulent Egypt. For the two years after the revolution, the Free

Officers struggled to stabilize Egyptian domestic politics. Their efforts, such as agrarian reforms, abolishing the monarchy and the restructuring of political parties, met resistance from the Wafd Party and the Muslim Brotherhood. Additionally, communist forces instigated riots that often turned violent. In March 1954, the Free Officers’ decided to consolidate control over Egypt with military force. They seized power and established Gamal Abdel Nasser as the first native Egyptian leader since the time of the pharaohs.89

87 DDE, Waging Peace, 23.

88 Keith Kyle, Suez (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 36, 98, 103-105; See also DDE, Waging Peace, 22, 77.

89 The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) banned all political parties in January of 1953. In February of 1954, Nasser was named as the both the RCC chairman and Prime Minister. In March of 1954, the RCC began efforts to forcefully end domestic infighting and consolidate their hold on power. It led to months of arrests and dismissals of opposition supporters. In January 1956, a new Constitution was adopted that established a single party system and in June 1956, Nasser was officially elected President in a public referendum. Eberhard Kienle, A Grand Delusion: Democracy and Economic Reform in Egypt (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2001), 182, 185-186; See also Said K. Aburish, Nasser, the Last Arab (New York City: St. Martin's Press, 2004), 52-56.

225

The United States closely watched these events. Some believed that Nasser’s initial moves appeared to conform to American goals for the region, such as his pledge to create a democratic state.90 Throughout most of Eisenhower’s first term, the United

States assessed that internal challenges diluted this worthy goal.91 Nasser also made several moves that asserted Egypt’s pan-Arab leadership in the region. The Eisenhower administration understood these efforts, but believed that by building a new relationship with Egypt the United States could mitigate them. This included the offer of trade and aid agreements, as well as actions to gain Egyptian support to help reduce

Arab-Israeli tensions and to join the Baghdad Pact.92 Nasser accepted many of these

American overtures, but actively opposed the pact, seeing it as a threat to his leadership

90 The officers claimed to have six goals for the revolution: battling imperialism, abolishing feudalism, breaking up monopolies and the domination of foreign capital, application of social justice, strengthening the military, and the founding of a "sound" democratic system. Joel Gordon, Nasser's Blessed Movement, 6, 125-143, 156, 196.

91 America assessed that Nasser governed a politically weak state, as Egypt remained fragmented into various ideological camps, such as liberal democrats, Islamic fundamentalist, Marxist, and transitional authoritarians. These challenges prevented many progressive reforms. Kirk J. Beattie, Egypt During the Nasser Years (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 2, 9-11; See also Alan Richards and John Waterbury, A Political Economy of the Middle East (Boulder: Westview Press, 2008), 394, 173, 222; The regime also demonstrated a bias toward economic programs that favored those close to the government. Kienle, A Grand Delusion, 182, 185-186.

92 Henry William Brands, Jr., “What Eisenhower and Dulles Saw in Nasser: Personalities and Interests in U.S.-Egyptian Relations,” Middle East Policy Council, vol. IV, no. 2 (Summer, 1986), http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/what-eisenhower-and-dulles-saw-nasser?print (accessed October 20, 2016); see also Diane B Kuntz, The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina press, 1991), 3; With United States and British pledges of support, Turkey and Iraq formed the Baghdad Pact in February of 1955. A few months later, Iran, Pakistan and Britain joined. The official announcement of the organization emphasized that the alliance would serve United Nations’ principles, as well as providing security in the region from aggression. “Official Communique: Turco-Iraqi Talks, 12 January 1955, Royal Institute of International Affairs,” in Noble Frankland, ed., Documents on International Affairs 1955 (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), 286.

226 of the Arab world. Instead, he became one of its most vocal critics. He also created a counter military alliance, including Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and eventually Yemen.93

The US efforts to win over Nasser, included trying to advance a compromise between Egypt and Britain over the Suez Canal Zone. Eisenhower wanted to resolve the issue without bloodshed and in ways that ensured allied access to the canal in time of war. To accomplish these goals, the US Administration believed Britain had to moderate its negotiating positions. Washington made it clear to London that it was not going to support its colonial claims.94 To try to move things along, Eisenhower got personally involved. He stressed in a letter to Britain’s Deputy Prime Minister Anthony Eden his conviction that a satisfactory solution was possible, but that it would only materialize when London demonstrated “an attitude of absolute equality with all other nations.”

Eisenhower added that he was disturbed by the attempt to create the appearance that the United States and Britain coordinated their efforts, as it created unwarranted concern that the allies sought to “dominate the Councils of the free world.”95 After months of negotiations, on October 19, 1954, London and Cairo signed a final

93 DDE, Waging Peace, 26 and note 5; Additionally, Nasser put in place programs to undermine western influence in the region, such as by encouraging protests and anti-western news reporting. Elie Podeh, “The drift towards neutrality: Egyptian foreign policy during the early Nasserist era, 1952-55,” Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 32, no. 1 (Jan 1996): 174, 159-178.

94 DDE to Winston Spencer Churchill, February 24, 1953, DDEP, 14:68-70; See also DDE, Mandate For Change, 156-157; “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo- Egyptian Sudan Affairs (Burdett), May 4, 1953,” FRUS, 1952-1954, The Near and Middle East, vol. IX, part 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v09p1/d132 (accessed October 24, 2016); Smith, Ending Empire in the Middle East, 25; see also Hurewitz, Middle East Dilemmas, 1-6, 250-262.

95 DDE to Robert Anthony Eden, March 16, 1953, DDEP, 14:100-102; See also DDE to Winston Spencer Churchill, March 19, 1953, DDEP, 14:111-113; and DDE to Muhammad Naguib, May 24, 1953, DDEP, 14:244-246; DDE, Diary Entry, December 10, 1953, DDEP, 15:738-747.

227 agreement on the status of British forces in the Canal Zone.96 It included provisions that all British troops withdraw from their bases by June of 1956, allowed for a British reentry in case of war, and affirmed that the canal remained an international waterway as defined by the 1888 Convention of Constantinople.97

This progress emboldened Nasser. For most of 1955, he made it clear that Egypt sought to expand its influence in the region. This included encouraging other Arab nations to join it in adopting a neutralist outlook toward external forces.98 He also openly exploited the superpower contest to get equipment that would improve Egypt’s military, citing the fact that Egypt remained in a state of conflict with Israel.99 The

United States acknowledged the border tensions in the Gaza strip, but sought to avoid an arms race in the region and refused to sell Egypt modern military equipment. Nasser responded by concluding an arms sale agreement with Czechoslovakia in September of

96 DDE to Winston Spencer Churchill, July 12, 1954, DDEP, 15:1177-1181.

97 Selak, Jr., “The Suez Canal Base Agreement of 1954,”487-505; Kyle, Suez, 50-52.

98 See Rami Ginat, “The Egyptian Left and the Roots of Neutralism in the Pre-Nasserite Era,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 30, no. 1 (2003): 5-24; Ljiljana Manic, Nada Torlak, and Natasa Simeunovic Bajic, "Tito, Yugoslavia, and the ‘Third Way’: Understanding Physical and Symbolic Borders," Eurolimes, vol.11 (Spring, 2011): 55-62, 217-218; Richard West, Tito and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1994); See also Nick Cullather, “Hunger and Containment: How India Became “Important” in US Cold War Strategy, India Review, vol. 6, no. 2 (2007): 59-90.

99 For example, in late February of 1955, Israel conducted a raid into the Gaza strip that left 39 Egyptian soldiers dead. This escalation of tensions placed pressure on Nasser to demonstrate his ability to improve Egypt’s military. Jon B. Alterman, "American aid to Egypt in the 1950s: From hope to hostility," The Middle East Journal, vol. 52, no. 1 (Winter, 1998): 51-69, 60-61.

228

1955. The move gained international headlines, often misrepresenting the deal as signaling Egypt’s alignment with the Soviet bloc.100

The bargain placed the United States in the middle of a multi-sided dilemma. The administration chose not to overreact to the barrage of critics that proclaimed the free world was losing to communism in the Middle East. Eisenhower understood that the issue was more complicated. He assessed that Nasser’s actions and vitriol reflected the domestic pressure he faced from opposition groups that demanded a response to Israeli raids. The United States also judged that it could contain the Egyptian move,101 as well as preventing communist encroachment.102 Eisenhower reached out to Soviet Premier

Nikolai Bulganin, sending two letters on the same day. The first emphasized the shared progress made with the discussions over the Geneva proposal. The second questioned the arms sales to Egypt and the hope Ike had that both superpowers sought to

100 National Security Agency, The Suez Crisis: A Brief Communications Intelligence History (1988) at https://www.nsa.gov/news-features/declassified-documents/cryptologic- histories/assets/files/Suez_Crisis.pdf (accessed October 27, 2016).

101 Secretary Dulles sent a letter to the US Ambassador to Egypt, Henry A. Byroade that he wanted read to Nasser. It expressed an American commitment to having a productive association with Egypt. Dulles also expressed concern over the Soviet arms deal. “Telegram From Secretary of State to the Department of State, September 27, 1955,” in FRUS, 1955-1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, vol. XIV, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v14/d315 (accessed October 27, 2016); Ambassador Byroade cabled that Nasser assured him that the arms deal did not signal Egypt’s move toward a Soviet sphere of influence. “Telegram From Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State,” in FRUS, 1955-1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, vol. XIV, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v14/d321 (accessed October 27, 2016).

102 The administration assessed that communist forces were implemented a new Cold War offensive into the Middle East through the use of covert actions (creating “revolutions from within”), trade and aid. It also believed that the pervasive anticolonial sentiment would also counter balance communist efforts to control the region. “National Intelligence Estimate, November 1, 1955,” in FRUS 1955-1957, National Security Policy, vol. XIX, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955- 57v19/d39 (accessed March 24, 2017).

229 deescalate tensions. His correspondence hoped to encourage the Kremlin to help prevent an arms race in the Middle East that might lead to instability.103

The US administration also tried to salvage the relationship with Egypt. It offered to support World Bank funding of the Aswan High Dam Project, as well as to provide an initial $54.6 million grant to get the project started.104 America also agreed to the sale of

280,000 tons of surplus wheat to relieve Egypt’s grain crisis.105 These actions were a US attempt to create incentives that would induce Nasser to moderate his policies, such as by convincing him to help settle the Arab-Israeli conflict. To shore up these initiatives,

Eisenhower sent Robert B. Anderson in early 1956 as his special envoy to try to facilitate a peace agreement between Egypt and Israel. Despite these efforts, neither Cairo nor

Tel Aviv was willing to move forward on a peace agreement.106

103 DDE to Nikolai Aleksandrovich Bulganin, October 11, 1955, DDEP, 16:1865-1867 (two letters); Eisenhower was in correspondence with Bulganin over the Geneva Open Skies proposals and over disarmament discussions in the United Nations. He remained hopeful that the two nations could create a “fresh atmosphere” of cooperation. The administration believed that Bulganin’s ascent to leadership earlier in the year represented the rise in influence of moderate factions inside the Kremlin. Eisenhower would maintain this line of effort into 1956. See DDE to Nikolai Aleksandrovich Bulganin, March 1, 1956, DDEP, 16:2039-2041.

104 The 4-5 year project was estimated to cost $1.37 billion and would provide significant hydroelectric power to Egypt. “Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt, December 16, 1955,” FRUS, 1955-1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Vol. XIV, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v14/d461 (accessed March 27, 2017).

105 See DDE Diary Entry, March 8, 1956 and DDE Diary Entry, March 13, 1956 in FRUS, 1955-1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1- July 26, 1956, vol. XV, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v15/d177 and https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v15/d187 (accessed October 27, 2016).

106 David A. Nichols, Eisenhower 1956: The President’s Year of Crisis, Suez and the Brink of War (New York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 2011), 54; See also “Memorandum of a Conversation, Secretary Dulles’ Residence, Washington, December 30, 1955,” in FRUS, 1955-1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, vol. XIV, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v14/d472 (accessed October 27, 2016).

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The United States saw British actions as a contributing factor to the obstacles it faced in the Middle East.107 By the end of 1955, London’s persistent efforts to preserve its colonial influence came to a head. The United States failed to dissuade Britain from trying to expand its influence by adding Jordan to the Baghdad Pact. The effort departed from the Pact’s original purpose of preventing Soviet encroachment through an area defense by the region’s northern tier states. Additionally, it was a move by London to exercise a policy of “power-by-proxy” in which Britain would retain its positioning in the region. It was an attempt to transfer the financial burden of its influence to the US, through its commitment of military aid to Pact members, and to leverage the Pact to create a zone of British influence.108 America also pointed out it that expanding the Pact, by including Jordan, was very unpopular in the Arab World. It would amplify Egyptian opposition and scuttle US efforts to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict.109 The British decided to try anyways. It led to riots in Amman that threatened to topple Jordan’s government.

King Hussein responded by dismissing Britain’s Lieutenant-General Glubb, who

107 NSC 5428 explained that the regional backlash against the British and French was “inimical” to western interest. “NSC 5428, United States Objectives and Policies With Respect to the Near East, July 23, 1954,” in FRUS, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, vol. IX, part 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v09p1/d219 (accessed March 23, 2017).

108 Kevin Ruane, “SEATO, MEDO, and the Baghdad Pact: Anthony Eden, British Foreign Policy and the Collective Defense of Southeast Asia and the Middle East, 1952-1955,” Diplomacy and Statecraft, vol. 16, no. 1 (August 6, 2005).

109 Kevin Ruane, “Anglo-American relations, the Cold War and Middle East Defence, 1953-1955,” Journal of Transatlantic Studies, vol. 4, no. 1 (2006): 1-25; See also Daniel C. Williamson, “Understandable Failure: The Eisenhower Administration’s Strategic Goals in Iraq, 1953-1958,” Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol. 17, iss. 3 (September 21, 2006): 597-615.

231 remained the Commander of Jordan’s Arab Legion. The development amplified US concerns that British goals were incongruent with US policies in the region.110

By 1956, the United States decided to adapt its New Look strategy. It believed that it was making progress in addressing the multi-faceted dynamic of global issues, but that its policy goals in other areas, such as the Middle East, languished. For example, it assessed that the strength of the NATO alliance and the efforts by both superpowers made it unlikely that the Soviet Union would apply “overt military aggression…within the next several years.”111 The administration as well as its allies remained cautious, but also optimistic toward the possibilities of peaceful coexistence. This trend led

Eisenhower to shift some of America’s focus toward actions that addressed the “acute” problems that persisted in the less developed world. This required a more robust United

States response, such as efforts to accelerate economic growth, promote stability and empower self-help. The change in US policy approach included taking actions to build the cohesion of the free world, by remedying the “weaknesses” that held back allied progress.112

110 Robert R. Bowie, Suez 1956, International Crisis and the Role of Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), 19; DDE Diary Entry, January 10, 1956, DDEP, 16:1947-1951.

111 Walter L. Hixson, “Cold War Evolution and Interpretations,” in Richard Dean Burns, Alexander DeConde, and Fredrik Logevall, eds., Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy, vol. 1. 2nd ed. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 2002), 213.

112 NSC 5602/1, “Basic National Security Policy, March 15, 1956,” in FRUS, 1955-1957, National Security Policy, vol. XIX, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v19/d66 (accessed March 18, 2016).

232

This shift in American policy recognized that its neutralist approach in the Middle

East failed to harness either British or Egyptian ambitions.113 For example, despite following through on its agreement to withdraw all of its troops from the Suez Canal

Zone by June of 1956, British concerns over the loss of their global positions diminished support for continued decolonization efforts.114 Egypt’s actions also frustrated the US administration. Nasser consistently refused to deliver on his pledges. For example, while making overtures of cooperation Nasser continued a steady stream of anti-western and anti-American reporting in the Egyptian Press, as well as in radio broadcasting. He also supported armed confrontations against western targets in the region. It led the US administration to change course and to acknowledge that Nasser was being duplicitous.115 These dual challenges, along with others, led the Eisenhower administration to conclude that both Britain and Egypt threatened American efforts to expand its influence in the region.116

113 Peter Hahn’s study explains the strains that developed in Israeli-American and Arab-American relations during the period. An equal challenge for the Eisenhower administration was the strains caused by London’s efforts to retain their colonial influence. Peter L. Hahn, Caught in the Middle East: U.S. Policy toward the Arab–Israeli Conflict, 1945–1961 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004).

114 Along with the dismissal of Lieutenant General Glubb, the British witnessed their influence decline in other areas, such as Cyprus that threatened its major base in the Mediterranean. DDE, Waging Peace, 28.

115 "CIA Staff Memorandum 84-55, December 1, 1955," CIA Records, FOIA Electronic Reading Room, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD; The booklet Nasser published in 1954, Philosophy of the Revolution, that was initially seen as exaggeratedly ambitious, became viewed in 1956 as a road map for Egyptian national strategy. Its emphasis on pan-Arabism threatened US goals of injecting new standards of statecraft. Gamal Abdel Nasser, The philosophy of the revolution (Buffalo: Smith, Keynes & Marshall, 1959); See also Said K. Aburish, Nasser: The Last Arab (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2004); See also DDE to Gamal Abdel Nasser, February 27, 1956, DDEP, 16:2028-2030; DDE Diary Entry, March 28, 1956, DDEP, 16:2096-2098.

116 Alterman, "American aid to Egypt in the 1950s," 51-69; See also DDE to Gamal Abdel Nasser, February 27, 1956, DDEP, 16:2028-2030; DDE Diary Entry, March 28, 1956, DDEP, 16:2096-2098.

233

In March 1956, the US administration took steps to ostracize Nasser. It joined with

Britain, in Operation Omega, to apply political and economic pressure to persuade

Egypt’s leader to adopt a more cooperative outlook. The plan included the withholding of aid to Egypt and efforts to shore up Iraq and Saudi Arabia as potential alternative leaders in the Arab world.117 The allies hoped that by isolating the Egyptian leader and marginalizing his influence in the Middle East, he would accept the need to moderate his positions.118

In May, Nasser added impetus to America’s conclusion that it was becoming a disrupting force in the region. Egypt joined with many other non-aligned nations and formally recognized the People’s Republic of China. The move contrasted starkly with the American position. It caused a backlash in the US Congress and a further loss of support for attempts to build a relationship with Egypt. Eisenhower was also concerned that Nasser’s actions might derail American support for the overall project for peace.

For example, if the United Nations voted to admit Communist China, it might lead to domestic pressure for the United States to leave the organization. This would be a potentially fatal blow to Eisenhower’s efforts to shore up American global leadership and to assert new global norms of behavior.119

America’s opposition to Nasser became public. On July 19, 1956, Secretary Dulles informed the Egyptian Ambassador that the United States would not support the Aswan

117 Alterman, "American aid to Egypt in the 1950s,” 63-67.

118 Ray Takeyh, The Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine: The US, Britain, and Nasser’s Egypt, 1953- 1957 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 105-123.

119 DDE, Mandate For Change, 214-215; Kyle, Suez, 124-125, see note 48 on page 584.

234

Dam Project. He then issued a press release that cited Egypt’s inability to pay back such a substantial loan. The public withdrawal of US support for World Bank financing of the project was calculated to undermine Nasser’s leadership.120 The US administration’s move reflected the belief that it could manage Nasser. It assumed that America had a strong bargaining position and that, through direct and indirect negotiating, it would be able to bring Egypt around to a more pragmatic acceptance of its need for western support.121

Nasser remained defiant after this rupture with the United States. On July 26, 1956, he gave a speech in Alexandria. During the three-hour tirade, the Egyptian leader told a series of stories explaining the history of British occupation and the exploitation of Egypt since 1882. He linked this pattern of mistreatment to the failure of the Aswan Dam proposal, asserting outsiders tried to use the venture to gain control over Egypt. He then told his audience “de Lesseps imposed conditions on the Khedive. I am not the Khedive, and I am not willing to accept conditions.” Nasser repeated the name de Lesseps numerous times, as he continued his speech. What no one knew until later was that ‘de

Lesseps’ was the code word to launch an Egyptian operation to seize the offices of the

Suez Maritime Canal Company throughout the Canal Zone. While Egyptian forces

120 “Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, July 19, 1956, 9:40-9:52 a.m.” and “Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, July 19, 1956, 4:10-5:07 p.m.,” in FRUS, 1955-1957, Arab- Israeli Dispute, January 1-July 26, 1956, vol. XV, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955- 57v15/d473 and https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v15/d478 (accessed October 27, 2016); See also Nichols, Eisenhower, 1956, 120-126; Alterman, "American aid to Egypt in the 1950s,” 62-69.

121 Malcolm H. Kerr, “‘Coming to Terms with Nasser': Attempts and Failures,” International Affairs, vol. 43, no. 1 (January, 1967): pp. 65-84.

235 captured these buildings, Nasser concluded his speech with the historic announcement that Egypt had just nationalized the Suez Canal Company. He added an assurance to the stockholders of the company that Egypt would pay the price of their shares, according to the day’s closing stock prices.122 This transparent, forceful, but bloodless nationalization of the Canal in late July started the sequence of events known today as the Suez Crisis.123

122 They published the Nationalization Law in the Egyptian Gazette the next day. Mohamed H. Heikal, Cutting the Lion's Tail, Suez, Through Egyptian Eyes (London: Andre-Deutsch Limited, 1986), 123- 127; “Editorial Note,” FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, vol. XVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d1 (accessed October 28, 2016); “1956: Egypt seizes Suez Canal”, BBC News, On This Day 26 July, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/26/newsid_2701000/2701603.stm (accessed May 3, 2013).

123 Laura James explains that the Egyptian regime planned to nationalize the canal well before the Aswan Dam or recognition of China issues. This argument is consistent with Nasser’s vision articulated in The Philosophy of the Revolution. The final withdrawal of British troops on June 13, 1956 was a prerequisite for any effort to take control of the Suez Canal Zone. Laura M. James, Nasser at War: Arab Images of the Enemy (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 21-36.

236

CHAPTER 8

THE SUEZ CRISIS

In July of 1956, the Suez Canal became a strategic factor in the effort to change global norms of statecraft. It simultaneously engaged several competing interests. The canal’s water was a vital route of commerce, allowing for the rapid movement of goods and oil. It also passed through the heart of Egypt, a nation that held significant influence in the Middle East. Nasser’s actions captured the attention of the world, as he stood in defiance of imperial powers and seemed to champion the efforts at non-alignment and decolonization. For Britain and France, the canal became a symbol of their past glory and future prosperity.

American interest in the Suez issue were also varied. The US administration understood that its response held significant risk, as it could threaten the unity of NATO, empower a recalcitrant Nasser, provide an opening for Soviet expansion into the Middle

East, or risk escalation of the conflict in the region and around the world. The crisis also occurred in the final months of an American election year, amplifying domestic efforts to influence Eisenhower’s policy choices or to deride them. In October, the Hungarian uprising against Soviet control would add an additional factor to the equation. Within this complex milieu, Eisenhower knew that the decade-old United States’ campaign to change global norms was at stake. He understood that the 193-kilometer waterway that flowed from Port Said to Port Tewfik might frame world events for years.1

1 See David A. Nichols, Eisenhower 1956: The President’s Year of Crisis, Suez and the Brink of War (New York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 2011).

237

Predictably in light of the diversity of interests and stakes, Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal led to very different responses. Britain and France vehemently protested the unilateral measure. In London, after Nasser’s announcement Prime

Minister Anthony Eden summoned the US chargé d’affaires to a late night meeting with the French Ambassador and several members of his government. The report that the US embassy sent to the State Department emphasized two points: that the legal assessment of the action remained debated and that the British seemed to conclude that a consortium needed to take over the canal, “establishing itself if need be by military force.”2 Eden followed up with a personal letter to President Eisenhower that stressed the strategic value of the canal to the free world and Egypt’s “complete lack of technical qualifications” to manage its traffic. He added that both countries must be ready to use force if needed and that the British military was preparing for this contingency. Eden also sought to gain support for an emergency meeting between

Britain, France and the United States to discuss the situation.3

The next day the United States manifested its preference for pursuing a different tact. After Eisenhower held a morning meeting on July 27, 1956, at the White House,

2 “Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State, July 27, 1956,” FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, vol. XVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d2 (accessed October 28, 2016); The British also alerted their commanders in the Mediterranean, a move that Eisenhower concluded signaled their contemplation of military action. DDE, Waging Peace, 1956-1961 (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1965), 35.

3 “Message From Prime Minister Eden to President Eisenhower, July 27, 1956,” FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, vol. XVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955- 57v16/d5 (accessed October 31, 2016); The Suez Canal Company also issued a communique that stated it did not recognize the action by force of the Egyptian government. Focsaneanu Lazar, “L'accord ayant pour objet l'indemnisation de la Compagnie de Suez nationalisée par l'Egypte,” Annuaire français de droit international, vol. 5 (1959): 161-204.

238 the administration decided to ensure American reactions contributed to the development of peaceful norms. A major point of discussion throughout the conference was whether Nasser’s actions were in violation of international agreements.4 The next day, the administration took a definitive stand and declared that Egypt’s nationalization of the canal was within its rights. Egypt had publicly stated its intent to adhere to the

1888 convention that designated the canal an international waterway. The Nasser regime also pledged to compensate the shareholders of the Suez Canal Company.

Therefore, unless the Egyptian operation of the canal proved “incompetent or unjust,” there was no legal basis for disputing their actions.5

Despite the frenzied character of events, domestic pressures and international posturing, the US administration’s position on the Suez Crisis aligned with its established policy goals in the region. Eisenhower affirmed his commitment to adhering to the 1950

Tripartite Declaration; the accord made with Britain and France that pledged to counter

4 “Memorandum of a Conference with the President, July 27, 1956,” FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, vol. XVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955- 57v16/d3 (accessed October 28, 2016).

5 The Suez Canal Company that administered canal traffic was established and registered under Egyptian Law. The concession agreement for the Canal Company was separate and distinct from the Suez Canal Convention of 1888, commonly known as the Convention of Constantinople. The Convention guaranteed the use of canal, effectively making it an international waterway. As long as Egypt ran the canal operations effectively, their nationalization of the Canal Company was legal. “Memorandum of a Conversation with the President, July 28, 1956,” FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, Supplementary Note, vol. XVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d16 (accessed October 28, 2016); See also “Memorandum by the Assistant Legal Advisor for United Nations Affairs, July 27, 1956,” FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, vol. XVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d8 (accessed October 28, 2016); “Memorandum by Warren E. Hewitt of the Office of the Assistant Legal Advisor for United Nations Affairs, July 27, 1956,” FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, vol. XVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d9 (accessed October 28, 2016).

239 military aggression and uphold the Arab-Israeli armistice agreements.6 Additionally, the

American outlook was consistent with its regional policy objectives. During Eisenhower’s first term, US efforts in the Middle East shifted from trying to organize the area for defense against Communist aggression7 toward focusing on restoring western influence in the region, such by resolving the Arab-Israeli dispute.8

Most importantly, US behavior during the Suez Crisis was driven by the conviction that the use of force was anathema to establishing norms of behavior that settled disputes peacefully. This was a central purpose of the New Look strategy. It emphasized the need to uphold the “the principle of collective security,” to advance the “promise of an eventual effective world security system.” This stance accepted that America’s grand strategy effort to alter global standards of statecraft required remaining loyal to the pledge to attempt to resolve international disputes peacefully, even when it wasn’t opportune.9 Throughout the crisis, the Eisenhower administration adhered to these

6 DDE, Waging Peace, 22.

7 “NSC 5428, United States Objectives and Policies With Respect to the Near East, July 23, 1954,” in FRUS, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, vol. IX, part 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v09p1/d219 (accessed March 23, 2017).

8 By 1956, the United States saw opportunities for accommodations with the Soviets in the region, such as a common desire to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute. Paper Prepared by Elbert G. Mathews of the Policy Planning Staff, April 19, 1956,” in FRUS 1955-1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1-July 26, 1956, vol. XV, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v15/d291 (accessed March 24, 2017); The United States also acknowledged the Moscow was trying to increase its influence in the region, such as building a stronger relationship with Egypt. See “Editorial Note,” FRUS 1955-1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1-July 26, 1956, vol. XV, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955- 57v15/d397 (accessed March 24, 2017).

9 NSC 162/2, “Basic National Security Policy, October 30, 1953,” in FRUS, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d100 (accessed March 13, 2016).

240 global agreements and the hope that the principles of the United Nations, such as its stance against aggressive war, would begin to define global affairs.10

On July 31, Eisenhower made it clear to both Britain and France that he would not support precipitative military action. In a letter to Eden, the US president expressed surprise upon hearing that Britain had made a “firm and irrevocable” decision to use military force. He emphasized his “conviction” that peaceful means had to be the first attempt or the US population might turn against its Western Allies. He cautioned that military success might initially be easy, but that “the eventual price might become far too heavy.” He asked Eden to consider the larger picture and stated that he was sending

Secretary Dulles to London.11 Eisenhower sent a similar message to French Prime

Minister Guy Mollet, highlighting that although “events may ultimately make forceful action necessary, I feel that the present situation demands that we act moderately, but firmly, to bring about a dependable administration of the Canal.” He asked France to avoid “precipitate action” and called for a meeting of interested states to discuss the way forward.12

The American administration was also sensitive to the other issues at play. First, it understood that Nasser’s actions to secure the canal fit within his larger plan. Outlined

10 See “Interview with Robert Bowie, Episode 7: After Stalin,” The National Security Archive: Cold War, George Washington University, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/interviews/episode- 7/bowie21.html (accessed March 24, 2017).

11 “Letter from the President to Prime Minister Eden, July 31, 1956” FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, vol. XVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d35 (accessed January 2, 2017).

12 “Message from the President to Prime Minister Mollet, July 31, 1956” FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, vol. XVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955- 57v16/d39 (accessed January 2, 2017).

241 in the 1952 treatise, The Philosophy of the Revolution, the Egyptian leader explained the goals of uniting the Arab, African, and Muslim worlds.13 Nasser may also have assumed that if he could get world opinion on his side he might be able to transform regional dynamics. Throughout the early months of the crisis, he “courted international sympathy.”14 The United States also assessed that Egypt’s outlook, particularly its desire to remain independent and to be a regional leader, made it unlikely that Nasser would become a “stooge” of the Kremlin.15

The US administration acknowledged Nasser’s objectives but assessed them to be overly ambitious. Egypt’s dream denied several global realities. Eisenhower did not accept that Egypt could use its control of the canal to decisive effect, such as to strangle

13 Secretary Dulles pointed out that Egypt sought to secure critical lines of communication as part of a broader effort to gain influence in global affairs. “Memorandum of Discussion at the 292d Meeting of the National Security Council, August 9, 1956,” FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, vol. XVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d72 (accessed January 2, 2017); See also Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt's liberation: the philosophy of the revolution (Cairo: Printed at the General Organisation for Government Printing Offices, 1958); “Memorandum of a Conversation with the President, July 28, 1956,” FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, vol. XVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d16 (accessed January 2, 2017).

14 James, Nasser at War, 171-172.

15 “Memorandum of a Conversation with the President, July 28, 1956,” FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, vol. XVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955- 57v16/d16 (accessed January 2, 2017); A National Intelligence Estimate issued a few days later reached the same conclusion. It also assessed that it was “unlikely” that Nasser had colluded with the Soviet Union and that Egypt could easily manage the canal traffic. “Special National Intelligence Estimate: Nasser and the Middle East Situation, July 31, 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, vol. XVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d40 (accessed October 31, 2016); The French came to the same conclusion. “Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State, July 27, 1956,” FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, vol. XVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d4 (accessed December 19, 2016); Moscow reinforced this view in the middle of August in conversations between Secretary Dulles and Soviet Foreign Minister Dmitri Shepilov. It signaled that it planned to support Egypt’s position, but was willing to work with the United States to create a negotiated solution. “Message From the Secretary of State to the President, August 16, 1956,” FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, vol. XVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d86 (accessed January 2, 2017).

242

European commerce or dictate terms to the world. The interdependent character of global trade and Nasser’s need of canal revenues would force him to adopt a more pragmatic approach. Additionally, Western Europe, the Arab world, and much of the international community relied on the free flow of goods and oil from the Middle East.

Any attempts by Nasser to monopolize them would lead the global markets toward alternative solutions and create vigorous opposition to him.16 America also judged that the region’s fragmentation would prevent Egypt’s regional ambitions. Many Arab states reinforced this judgment, informing the US administration that they would vocally support Nasser’s rights over the Suez Canal issue, but that they were against his leadership of the Arab world. Combined, these factors led Eisenhower to conclude that

Nasser’s goals could be managed.17

Second, the US administration estimated that the Soviet Union would not be able to do much more than try to exploit the issue publically. The President expressed that “the

Soviet Union was not going to get into a major war over a question of this kind.”18 To

16 “Interview with Robert Bowie, Episode 7: After Stalin,” The National Security Archive: Cold War, George Washington University.

17 “Memorandum From the Acting Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Boggs) to the National Security Council, August 22, 1956,” FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, vol. XVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d118 (accessed January 2, 2017); and “Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State, August 28, 1956,” FRUS, 1955- 1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, vol. XVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d141 (accessed January 2, 2017).

18 Ibid.; A National Intelligence Estimate issued a few days later reached the same conclusion. It also assessed that it was “unlikely” that Nasser had colluded with the Soviet Union and that Egypt could easily manage the canal traffic. “Special National Intelligence Estimate: Nasser and the Middle East Situation, July 31, 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, vol. XVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d40 (accessed October 31, 2016); The French came to the same conclusion. “Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State, July 27, 1956,” FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, vol. XVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d4 (accessed December 19, 2016);

243 ensure this, Eisenhower opened up an informal line of communication with Moscow that sought to build confidence in a negotiated solution.19 The Soviets would openly support this course, but actually used the crisis to try to “undermine” the west’s position in the Middle East.20 The president recalled that the Kremlin tried to “pose as the champion of the underdog, giving support to the newly emerging nations against onetime colonial powers.”21

Third, the Eisenhower administration anticipated that Israel would try to exploit the issue. Tel Aviv would attempt to use the crisis to advance several of its own goals, such as ensuring the passage of Israeli ships through the canal and tying any settlement to the Arab-Israeli question.22 The United States was also sensitive to Israel’s security concerns. The British troop departure, completed in June, created anxieties that Egypt would no longer be constrained in its conflict with Israel.23

Moscow reinforced this view in the middle of August in conversations between Secretary Dulles and Soviet Foreign Minister Shepilov. It signaled that it planned to support Egypt’s position, but was willing to work with the United States to create a negotiated solution. “Message From the Secretary of State to the President, August 16, 1956,” FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, vol. XVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d86 (accessed January 2, 2017).

19 See “Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union, August 6, 1956” and “Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State, August 7, 1956,” FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, vol. XVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d66 and https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d69 (accessed December 19, 2016).

20 “Message From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Eden, September 2, 1956,” FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, vol. XVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d163 (accessed January 4, 2017).

21 DDE, Waging Peace, 41.

22 “Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant (Russell) to the Secretary of State, August 4, 1956,”FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, vol. XVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d60 (accessed January 2, 2017).

23 DDE, Waging Peace, 24, 28.

244

Finally, the United States was convinced that the greatest challenge to resolving the crisis peacefully would come from its allies, Britain and France. This attitude reflected a divergence of perspectives among the western allies. For the Eisenhower administration, sustaining America’s global leadership and preserving the march toward a better global order were paramount. America framed Egypt’s actions within this larger grand strategic puzzle, viewing the Suez Crisis as a contest over whether the new standards of statecraft would be upheld.

London and Paris had different interests and saw the episode from a more

"nationalist" and even "colonial" perspective. This outlook placed their concerns well beyond their claims of trying to ensure international traffic through the canal, as, from the beginning, both nations made clear their preference for using force. Eisenhower saw through this maneuvering and understood that America’s allies saw the Suez episode as threatening the “loss of their international position.” Britain and France believed that

Nasser’s action might lead other countries to follow suit, challenging their interests all over the world. Pursuing ways to embarrass or replace Nasser drove their efforts, as they sought to retard the global push for decolonization.24 Additionally, both Britain and

France retained the goal of trying to create a “third force” in global affairs. They realized

24 “Memorandum of a Conversation with the President, July 28, 1956,” and “Memorandum of a Conversation With the President, July 31, 1956,” FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, vol. XVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d15 and https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d34 (accessed October 31, 2016); See also DDE, Waging Peace, 35-37; Steven Z. Freiberger, Dawn Over Suez: The Rise of American Power in the Middle East, 1953-1957 (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1992), 39-41; Burton I. Kaufman, The Arab Middle East and the United States, Inter-Arab Rivalry and Superpower Diplomacy (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1996), 17.

245 that the Cold War created a bi-polar world order and that it would relegate them to being a junior partner of the United States.25

Eisenhower worked to dissuade Britain and France from this course. It was only a quick intervention in early August by Secretary Dulles at a meeting in London that convinced Britain and France to support a negotiated approach—at least temporarily.

The administration used the time to try to convince its allies that the unjustified use of military force would turn the entire Middle East and perhaps many other parts of the world against them. Dulles stressed that the “immediate use of force would alienate world opinion.” Despite their concurrence, America’s allies continued military preparations that would allow them to retake the canal aggressively.26 Their perspective led to concerns within the US administration that Britain and France hoped to use any failures in the negotiations as a casus belli to invade.27

25 Ralph Dietl, “Suez 1956: A European Intervention?,” Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 43, no. 2 (April, 2008): 259-278.

26 In addition to moving military forces into the Mediterranean, Britain and France took other steps that detracted from a spirit of negotiations. For example, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden made a public attack of Nasser just before the first London Conference to negotiate a solution. See Dulles’ assessment in “Memorandum of Discussion at the 295th Meeting of the National Security Council, August 30, 1956,” FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, vol. XVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d149 (accessed January 2, 2017); See also “Warships On The Move”, The Times (London, England), Wednesday, Aug 01, 1956.

27 With this understanding, the United States avoided being too closely aligned with the British and French. It also rejected early moves by its allies to create a tripartite effort to issue Egypt an ultimatum, instead advocating for a broad base of interested nations to negotiate an international agreement. “Message From the Secretary of State to the President, August 2, 1956,” FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, vol. XVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955- 57v16/d48 (accessed January 2, 2017);.

246

The Eisenhower administration continued to argue against this point of view and asserted that any military undertaking carried more risks than potential gains.28 In a letter to Anthony Eden, Eisenhower urged caution and pointed out that the unjustified use of force might lead to the possibility of expanding the conflict into other areas that would increase the threat to the economies of Western Europe. He also mentioned that it would push the non-aligned world away from the west and toward the Soviet Union.

America tried to advance a different strategy, arguing that its allies should decouple the issue of international access to the canal from the desire to discredit Nasser. Eisenhower concluded that trying to pursue both at the same time risked mutual failure.29

The American administration’s position faced domestic opposition. For example, it clashed with its military’s studies of the problem. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff’s initially argued that the United States should support a military solution to the crisis. The chiefs asserted that it was imperative to place “the Suez Canal under a friendly and responsible authority at the earliest practicable date.”30 A few weeks later, another report pointed

28 “Memorandum of a Conference with the President, July 31, 1956,” FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, vol. XVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955- 57v16/d34 (accessed January 6, 2017).

29 “Message From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Eden, September 2, 1956,” FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, vol. XVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d163 (accessed January 2, 2017); See also “Special National Intelligence Estimate, September 5, 1956” FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26- December 31, 1956, vol. XVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d175 (accessed January 2, 2017).

30 “Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of Defense (Robertson) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay), August 2, 1956,” FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, vol. XVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d50 (accessed March 24, 2017); see also “Editorial Note, FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, vol. XVI, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d11 (accessed November 15, 2016).

247 to the serious consequences to NATO if the Suez Canal was controlled by a hostile power. It listed several ways military power could either act unilaterally or in support of

Britain and France to control the Canal Zone.31

Eisenhower opposed the JCS’s outlook and kept the United States focused on its larger goals. He wanted to ensure that the United States was not “just protecting someone’s private property.”32 Secretary of State Dulles was personally sympathetic to the British and French concerns, but he underscored that America’s allies did not have a comprehensive appreciation for the challenges inherent in their position. “The whole

Arab world would be pitted against them, and obviously it would be easier to start such a war than to finish it. In order to achieve their objectives, they might even have to try to re-establish colonial rule over the whole area of the Middle East.”33

Eisenhower’s arguments and efforts maintained coherence with America’s New

Look grand strategy. He oriented the American response beyond a focus on the immediate actions of Nasser and in ways that were in line with the nation’s enduring interests. For example, US actions during the crisis explicitly refuted the narrow justifications for conflict put forth by its allies. These approaches defined the pervasive rationales of the old world order and that led to the catastrophes of the early twentieth

31 “Memorandum From the Acting Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Boggs) to the National Security Council, August 22, 1956,” FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, vol. XVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d118 (accessed March 24, 2017).

32 “Memorandum of Telephone Conversations Between the President and the Secretary of State, Washington, July 30, 1956,” FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, vol. XVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d27 (accessed December 19, 2016).

33 “Memorandum of Discussion at the 295th Meeting of the National Security Council, August 30, 1956,” FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, vol. XVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d149 (accessed January 2, 2017).

248 century. Instead, the United States framed the challenge as a choice between whether a broader basis of principles would guide global affairs or not. This line of thinking led it to advocate for a collective approach that was in line with the UN Charter. The Eisenhower administration sought to engage the international community in resolving the crisis, as it offered a way to build a global consensus that would reduce the chances of escalation.34

In the middle of August, the first in a series of conferences began in London to find a peaceful solution. Eisenhower rejected British efforts to invite only the most powerful countries, instead including the signatures of the Constantinople Convention and those nations that used the canal the most. Twenty-two nations attended the first London

Conference to develop a proposal for a peaceful settlement, but Egypt refused to participate.35 A delegation, led by Australian Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies, travelled to Cairo and delivered the initial offer to Nasser in early September. It included eighteen proposals that ensured international use of the canal, recognized Egypt’s sovereignty, and guaranteed it a fair financial return on the canal’s use. It also sought to establish international control through a Suez Canal Board to manage the canal. The last point was unacceptable to Nasser, as it denied Egypt’s sovereignty. It led him to reject the agreement.36

34 “Memorandum of a Conversation Between Secretary of State Dulles and Secretary-General Hammarskjöld, New York, August 10, 1956,” FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, vol. XVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d76 (accessed December 19, 2016).

35 Australia, Ceylon, Denmark, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, West Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Soviet Union, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States attended.

36 Elizabeth D. Sherwood, Allies in Crisis, Meeting Global Challenges to Western Security (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 73.

249

While the canal users were working at peaceful and negotiated solutions, Britain and

France took steps to threaten Egypt. Press reports in London explained that the government was preparing for the worst, such as issuing a Royal Proclamation calling up reserve forces. This included arming of aircraft carriers for combat and the deployment of bombers to Malta. After the Menzies delegation arrived in Cairo to discuss the proposal with Nasser, news emerged that Britain granted France rights to station forces in Cyprus. Both nations also directed their embassies in Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and

Lebanon to evacuate their citizens.37 The moves intended to coerce Nasser by signaling preparations for military force if the negotiations failed. The gap between the American resolve to negotiate in good faith and the positions of Britain and France led Eisenhower to write a personal note to Eden that sought to remove all doubt about the “convictions of the American government.”38

In September, a second London conference formed to address an American proposal for a “Suez Canal Users Association” (SCUA). It was a plan designed by Dulles that focused on the rights given to the global commons to use of the canal, based on the

1888 Constantinople Convention. It invited the major users of the waterway to join a coordinating body that could serve several functions, such as collecting canal dues and working with Egypt to resolve any issues surrounding the usage of the canal.39 Secretary of State Dulles also saw it as a tool to delay military action by America’s allies. The US

37 After America protested this move, the order to evacuate civilians was rescinded.

38 DDE, Waging Peace, 42-43, 48-49.

39 Fawaz A. Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East, Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 63-64.

250 administration believed that the British and the French were likely to resort to force and sought a way to maintain options that might deter them from this course.40

Eisenhower reached out again to Eden to try to convince him that a comprehensive approach had more merit. Ike expressed the belief that, by using the full range of diplomatic, economic and moral power available to the world community, Nasser could be gradually isolated. It would allow “a victory which would not only be bloodless, but would be more far-reaching in its ultimate consequences than could be anything brought about by force of arms.” He cautioned the British Prime Minister that the unwarranted use of aggressive force threatened the principles of the United Nations.41

Dulles also made public statements that sought to discredit a military option, such as that the US had no intention for ships to "shoot their way through the canal."42

Nasser exploited this positioning. He asserted publicly that Egypt’s acceptance of its international obligations was sufficient and denounced attempts that tried to intimidate it or govern the canal. In a speech in mid-September, Nasser argued, “Britain and France said Egypt grabbed the Suez Canal as if it were part of France or Britain. The British

Foreign Secretary forgot that only two years ago he signed an agreement stating the

Suez Canal is an integral part of Egypt.” He ended his comments by proclaiming Egypt’s

40 “Memorandum by the Secretary of State, September 2, 1956,” and “Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and Secretary of State, September 8, 1956,” FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, vol. XVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955- 57v16/d161 and https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d191 (accessed January 4, 2017).

41 DDE to Robert Anthony Eden, September 8, 1956, DDEP, 17:2274-2277.

42 Mohamed H. Heikal, Cutting the Lion's Tail, Suez, Through Egyptian Eyes (London: Andre- Deutsch Limited, 1986), 160.

251 sovereignty and deriding those that threatened the use of military force. He also pledged a willingness to negotiate international standards of use, but refused any right of a global body to control canal operations.43

In early October, Britain, and France took the issue to the United Nations. The

Eisenhower administration informed its allies that the United States planned to make an

“honest effort” to find common ground with Egypt and that it would oppose the use of the international body simply as a pretext for military action. From private conversations, Dulles reported that both the Soviet Union and Egypt indicated a willingness to negotiate a solution.44 During UN discussions, Britain, France, and Egypt reached an agreement based on “six principles.”45 The British and French representatives then added a rider requiring Egypt to provide detailed reports on how it would implement the proposals, which Egypt rejected citing that it would infringe on its national sovereignty.46 Despite the failure, the United States and most of the

43 “President Nasser: Denouncement of the Proposal for a Canal User’s Association, 1956,” Modern History Sourcebook, http://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod/1956Nasser-suez1.html (accessed January 4, 2017).

44 Dulles reported that during a UN meeting with Lloyd and Pineau he made it clear that the United States was “determined to make this an honest effort to reach a settlement” and they agreed to do the same. “Message From the Secretary of State to the President, October 5, 1956,” FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, vol. XVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955- 57v16/d302 (accessed December 19, 2016).

45 The Six Principles: (1) There should be free and open transit through the Canal without discrimination, overt or covert…; (2) The sovereignty of Egypt should be respected; (3) The operation of the Canal should be insulated from the politics of any country; (4) The manner of fixing tolls and charges should be decided by agreement between Egypt and the users; (5) A fair proportion of the dues should be allotted to development; (6) In case of disputes, unresolved affairs between the Suez Canal Company and the Egyptian Government should be settled by arbitration with suitable terms of reference and suitable provisions for the payment of sums found to be due.” DDE, Waging Peace, 54.

46 Cole C. Kingseed, Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis of 1956 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995), 71-78.

252 international community continued working toward a peaceful solution, but the subsequent meeting planned in Geneva never took place.

Concurrent with the crisis over Suez, on 23 October students in Hungary began a demonstration that quickly transformed into a revolutionary demand for the end of

Soviet rule. Eisenhower was by then all too aware that “The Presidency seldom affords the luxury of dealing with one problem at a time.”47 Over several days, bloody fighting between Soviet and Hungarian militias ensued. By the end of October, the Hungarian

Army was refusing to kill their compatriots and eighty percent of the military forces had defected. Additionally, the Soviets withdrew their army elements from the nation. Allen

Dulles described the event as “a miracle.”48 America’s support of internal dissent against the totalitarian systems in Eastern Europe, such as with Voice of America, appeared to be bearing fruit. But the subsequent escalation of the Suez Crisis would drown out

Hungary’s efforts to gain greater autonomy, as the Kremlin reversed course and crushed the revolution.49

The US reaction to the Hungarian uprising and the Soviet attempts to influence the

Suez Crisis exposed several realities. Both powers found themselves unable to control the actions of their allies. They also “found themselves powerless to act in their rival's

47 DDE, Waging Peace, 58.

48 Allen Dulles quoted in DDE, Waging Peace, 82.

49 In early November, Hungary declared its intention to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact. The Soviets decided to invade on November 4, 1956 and crushed the revolution. Eisenhower lamented that the Soviets used their seventy-ninth Security Council Veto. It “torpedoed” an American resolution calling on the Russian Government to withdraw its forces from Hungary. DDE, Waging Peace, 83, 86.

253 sphere of influence,” without risking a general war.50 The standoff would lead Moscow and Washington to assert their hegemony and leadership within their own camps, but in very different ways. While the Soviets resorted to brutal military confrontation, the

United States would apply the economic and psychological tools called for in

Eisenhower’s New Look strategy. For much of the world, the stark contrast in approaches clarified the stakes in the superpower contest.

The crisis in Hungary did not sway London or Paris to alter their approach to the

Suez Crisis. While meeting at the United Nations to negotiate with Egypt and without informing the United States, Britain and France were also secretly colluding with Israel.51

Along with the prepositioning of military forces, later revelations clarified that a clandestine meeting took place in Sevres, France from October 22-25, 1956. The key officials included French Prime Minister Guy Mollet, British Foreign Minister Selwyn

Lloyd and Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion. At the gathering, France, Britain and

Israel agreed to fabricate a rationale for military aggression.52 On 29 October, Israel began the hostility by invading the Sinai Peninsula. Initially Eisenhower was not aware of

50 Brian McCauley, “Hungary and Suez, 1956: The Limits of Soviet and American Power,” Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 16, no. 4 (October, 1981): 777-800.

51 U-2 flights on 15 October revealed Israel was mobilizing. They also determined that Israel had 60 French Mystère fighter bombers, far more than the twelve France reported to the United States. DDE, Waging Peace, 56; See also “Memorandum of a Conference With the President, October 29, 1956,” FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, vol. XVI, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d411 (accessed March 26, 2017).

52 S. Ilan Troen, “The Protocol of Sevres: British/French/Israeli Collusion Against Egypt, 1956,” Israel Studies, vol. 1, no. 2 (Sep 30, 1996): 122-139; see also Keith Kyle, Suez (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 314-332; Robert R. Bowie, Suez 1956, International Crisis and the Role of Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), 53-60; Mordechai Bar-On, “Three Days in Sevres, October 1956,” History Workshop Journal, iss. 62 (Autumn, 2006): 172-186.

254 the collusion and informed the British that he believed the tripartite declaration applied to the Israeli aggression; a move that demanded Britain, France, and the United States oppose the Israeli hostility.53

The United States took the issue to the United Nations. Its Ambassador, Henry Cabot

Lodge, Jr., opened a 29 October UN Security Council meeting by calling for collective action to restrain Israel.54 Over the same period, London and Paris feigned surprise at

Israel’s aggression and issued a 12-hour ultimatum to end the hostilities, ostensibly to both Israel and Egypt. The Anglo-French demand gave Israel and Egypt twelve hours to stop fighting, as well as requiring that both sides evacuate their forces from the Suez

Canal. It required that they accept temporary occupation by British and French forces of

“key positions on the Canal” to “guarantee freedom of passage.”55 The wording was obviously favorable to Israel and designed to be unpalatable to Egypt, as it had repeatedly asserted its sovereignty over the canal area and would have to evacuate its forces from their garrison positions. President Nasser quickly rejected it.56

Ambassador Lodge tried to preempt the ultimatum and accelerated the UN Security

Council deliberations the next day. During the discussions, Russia’s representative insinuated that Britain and France sought to settle their differences with Egypt by force.

53 Wm Roger Louis and Roger Owen, eds., Suez 1956: The Crisis and its Consequences (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 127-129.

54 Kyle, Suez, 360-361.

55 Edward Johnson, “’The Umpire on Whom the Sun Never Sets': Dag Hammarskjold's Political Role and the British at Suez,” Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol. 8, iss. 1 (March, 1997): 260.

56 Kyle, Suez, 353-359.

255

The British remarked that it was impossible to find a solution that both stopped the fighting and “safeguarded free passage.” Lodge introduced an American resolution calling for Israel’s complete withdrawal from Egypt and the suspension of all military, economic, and financial assistance to them until they complied.57 In a remarkable change of roles, the Soviet Union joined with United States and denounced Israel’s attack. Britain and France remained obstinate and vetoed the effort, deadlocking the issue.58

Despite the British and French ultimatum being on the surface aimed at both Cairo and Tel Aviv, the real intent of the demand was clear the next day. On October 31,

British and French troops initiated Operation Musketeer, beginning with the bombing of

Egyptian airfields.59 Secretary Dulles mentioned the “tragic” aspects of the global situation, as the push by Hungary to end “Soviet colonialism” was taking place at the same time that Britain and France worked to sustain their imperial gains by attacking

Egypt.60

Many were caught off guard by the situation, but Egypt remained defiant. After

British and French bombs began falling, “Nasser ordered the Suez Canal blocked. A rusty

American surplus ship, the Akka, preloaded with cement was sunk, along with other vessels throughout the entire length of the canal." The over fifty ships effectively

57 Kyle, Suez, 363-364.

58 Johnson, “’The umpire on whom the Sun never sets': Dag Hammarskjold's political role and the British at Suez,” 260.

59 Kyle, Suez, 353-359.

60 Dulles quoted in DDE, Waging Peace, 83.

256 blocked international transit. The Canal would not reopen to shipping until April of

1957.61 Egypt also responded by preparing to resist the British and French. Its Army withdrew from the Sinai and preparations for a “popular war” were put in place to combat another occupation of Egypt.62

These events unfolded during the closing days of America’s presidential election.

Eisenhower refused to bend to domestic criticisms of his policy to resolve the Suez

Crisis. He absorbed the condemnation from his political opponents and their claims that he had abandoned America’s friends, threatened the solidarity of NATO and failed to act to liberate Hungary. Instead, America’s war hero postponed his election campaign indefinitely and explained his actions to American and global audiences. Ike clarified

“the United States was not consulted in any way” by Britain and France before they decided to attack Egypt. More importantly, their actions revealed their intent to violate the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of aggressive warfare. Eisenhower accepted that to be effective the new global standards of conduct could not just be platitudes.

“The peace we seek and need means much more than mere absence of war. It means the acceptance of law, and the fostering of justice, in all the world.”63

Eisenhower understood that the actions by America’s allies directly challenged US efforts to advance new standards of statecraft in global affairs. He was incensed and told Dulles: “Foster, you tell ‘em, God-damn it, that we’re going to apply sanctions,

61 Freiberger, Dawn Over Suez, 191.

62 James, Nasser at War, 37-50.

63 DDE quoted in Nichols, Eisenhower 1956, 214-215; DDE, Waging Peace, 81.

257 we’re going to the United Nations, we’re going to do everything that there is so we can stop this thing.”64 Secretary Dulles explained to NSC members that the United States had to decide whether “the future lies with a policy of reasserting by force colonial control over the less developed nations, or whether we will oppose such a course of action by every appropriate means.” Eisenhower shared this view and the understanding that the aggressive actions by its allies threatened the new world order, the viability of the United Nations and America’s global leadership.65

A collective effort to resolve the crisis ensued. On November 1, Ambassador Lodge implemented the ‘Unity for Peace’ procedure, engaging the United Nations General

Assembly as a solution to the war over the Suez Canal. During the subsequent discussions, Secretary Dulles framed the issues at stake for the world. He highlighted that the United States found itself in the unenviable position of having to oppose its friends, two being its closest allies. The rift caused the US administration to reevaluate its policy goals and to conclude that the “disagreement involves principles which far transcend the immediate issue… .” He explained the Suez Crisis followed a long history of provocations and hostilities by Egypt, but that these “cannot justify the resort to armed force” undertaken by Britain, France and Israel. Their aggressive acts threatened the very existence of the UN Charter, as it engaged the issue of whether the “principle of renunciation of force” was going to remain viable. The principles of the UN Charter

64 DDE quoted in Nichols, Eisenhower 1956, 203.

65 “Memorandum of Discussion at the 302d Meeting of the National Security Council, November 1, 1956,” FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, vol. XVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d455 (accessed December 19, 2016).

258 were a “barrier against the recurrence of a world war… .” Dulles added that there were times when using force was needed and just, but that the aggression was inconsistent with the purposes of the Charter. Finally, Dulles called on the UN members to stand together to demonstrate for “all posterity, that there is here the beginning of a world order.”66

Dulles words reveal an American determination to advance new global norms and to directly oppose the aggressive militarism that sustained colonialism. Britain and France miscalculated, assuming they could force the issue by acting on the eve of the US national elections. They believed domestic political pressure to support America’s friends would constrain or delay Eisenhower’s response. Instead, the aggressive actions forced the US administration to prioritize US goals. Eisenhower accepted the potential rifts in relations with Britain and France. He decided the development of peaceful norms were a more important interest of the United States and used American power to assert a better world order.67

The US Secretary of State then presented a draft resolution to the world body. It called for an immediate cease-fire, the withdrawal of forces behind the armistice lines and for the reopening of the Suez Canal. It asserted that the United States took the side

66 “Statement in the United Nations General Assembly by Secretary of State Dulles, November 1, 1956” United States Policy in the Middle East, September 1956-June 1957; documents/Department of State, 151-157, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pur1.32754081233763;view=1up;seq=167 (accessed March 26, 2017).

67 Wm. Roger Louis, “Dulles, Suez and the British,” in Richard H. Immerman, ed., John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 133-158.

259 of “peaceful processes” against its “oldest and most trusted and reliable allies.”68 In the early hours the next day, the emergency session concluded and adopted Resolution 997

(ES-I) with 64 votes for, 5 against and with 6 abstentions.69

The final statement given by the UN Representative from Uruguay summarized the majority view. He stressed that the creation of the United Nations reflected the postwar consensus that force should not be employed to settle international differences. This meant that no nation could declare itself the policeman of the world. Instead, the principles established in the UN Charter needed to be respected, as they represented

“the fruit of the immense sacrifice of the flower of mankind lost in the last world war.”

Only by accepting these constraints, would better global standards of conduct become

“the new law of the world.”70 Egypt quickly accepted the resolution.

The next day, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) added a Canadian proposal for a

United Nations Emergency Force to supervise the cessation of hostilities and to clear the canal.71 Canada’s Secretary of State for external affairs, Lester B. Pearson, explained that it was necessary to set up a "United Nations force large enough to keep these borders at peace while a political settlement is being worked out. My own government would be

68 Kyle, Suez, 402-403.

69 “Middle East UNEF I, Background,” United Nations Web Site, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unef1backgr2.html (accessed January 15, 2017).

70 Mr. Rodriguez Fabregat in “562nd Plenary Meeting, First Emergency Special Session, Thursday, 1 November 1956,” United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Document A/PV.562 https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NL5/600/51/pdf/NL560051.pdf?OpenElement (accessed January 15, 2017), 43-45.

71 Greg Donaghy, “The politics of accommodation: Canada, the Middle East, and the Suez Crisis, 1950-1956,” International Journal, vol. 71, no. 2 (Jun 2016): 313-327.

260 glad to recommend Canadian participation in such a force." Pearson’s proposal to mitigate the crisis represented the type of collective efforts envisioned in the UN

Charter. It organized the overwhelming international condemnation of the Israeli,

French and British aggression into a collective response to mitigate the fiasco. The

UNGA quickly passed the measure. The Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjold, chaired a committee to supervise these UN efforts. The force was later hailed as a “weapon for peace” that represented a novel approach to settling disputes.72 For his efforts, Pearson, who later served as Canada’s prime minister, won the Nobel Peace Prize.73

While the world community was immersed in negotiations in New York, Britain and

France pressed their attack. Despite the international backlash and efforts to prevent further aggression, on the night of November 5, French and British troops finally landed in Port Said, Egypt.74 Their delay was attributed to many issues, such as the weather, but it was also due to Eden’s desire to assure plausible deniability. Not wanting to give orders for movement, until the ultimatum ran out, the air bombardment was not synchronized with the ground assault. For example, once notified the armada of ships at

72 The committee consisted of representatives from Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, Columbia, India, Norway and Pakistan. See Gabriella Rosner, The United Nations Emergency Force (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963); Rosner would co-author an article thirty years later that explained that after Suez the world community failed to use this approach effectively, a factor that contributed to the decline of the prestige of the UN. Leland M. Goodrich and Gabriella E. Rosner, “The United Nations Emergency Force,” International Organization, vol. 11, no. 3 (Summer, 1957): 413-430.

73 Lester B. Pearson quoted in Michael Hanlon, “Pearson solves crisis, builds model for peace; He won Nobel Prize after his Suez solution 40 years ago,” Toronto Star, November 4, 1996, A2.

74 Anthony Eden sent a letter to Eisenhower explaining his decision, to attack despite the UN decision to send in a force. “Message From Prime Minister Eden to President Eisenhower, November 5, 1956,” FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, vol. XVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d499 (accessed January 4, 2017).

261

Malta took several days to arrive in Egypt. The delayed commands, along with a lack of synchronization with the French due to efforts to maintain secrecy, forced groups of ships to accelerate their invasion plans. It caused the aggression to founder, as not all of the forces were able to be committed quickly or together. The attack stalled and the

Eisenhower administration supported global efforts to ensure its failure.75

The United States joined with the international community to use both economic and moral leverage to resolve the crisis. For example, America refused to use its financial resources or to allow the IMF to provide emergency loans to offset the run on the British sterling. This created economic pressure that threatened to bankrupt Britain.

Saudi Arabia implemented an oil embargo against France and Britain, and NATO members announced they would refuse to sell oil to the belligerents.76 Domestic opposition in Britain was also fierce. The Labour Party and the Trade Union Congress organized nation-wide protests under the slogan “Law, not War!” They also held an anti- war rally in Trafalgar Square in London. The Labour leader, Aneurin Bevan, asked the crowd of thirty-thousand protesters if Britain “was prepared to accept for ourselves the

75 See National Security Agency, “The Suez Crisis: A Brief Comint History (U),” Special Series Crisis Collection, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C, 1988); Edwin Herbert, Damage and Casualties in Port Said; Report by Sir Edwin Herbert on his investigation into the effects of the Military Action in October and November, 1956 (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1956); See also Kyle, Suez, 371-374.

76 Diane B. Kunz, “The Importance of Having Money: The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis”, in Louis and Owen, eds., Suez 1956; see also Diane B Kunz, The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991).

262 logic we are applying to Egypt?” He mentioned what would happen if this absence of principle was turned against Britain one day.77

The US also made moves to prevent escalation of the crisis. The President issued orders to put “the Sixth Fleet and the Atlantic and Pacific fleets on battle-ready alert, deploying additional ships, submarines, and tactical air resources, and placing heavy troop carrier wings on a twelve-hour alert.” These moves publicly demonstrated

America’s resolve and sought to deter any military actions by Moscow.78 On 5

November, the Soviets denounced the British and French action and threatened to intervene. The United States believed that this was mostly a bluff, but informed its superpower rival that it would respond to any attack on Britain or France. The US threat included the use of nuclear retaliation; a move that was consistent with the New Look and its threat to respond to aggression in dynamic ways. Eisenhower also rejected a

Russian offer to work closely with the United States to resolve the issue. He understood these overtures sought to amplify Moscow’s prestige. Instead, America held that it would only support the United Nations’ solution.79 For the remainder of the crisis, the

77 See Aneurin Bevan, “Anti-Suez Speech, Trafalgar Square rally, November 1956,” NewStatesman, http://www.newstatesman.com/uk-politics/2010/02/aneurin-bevan-1956-speech (accessed January 15, 2017).

78 See “Memorandum of Discussion at the 302d Meeting of the National Security Council, November 1, 1956,” FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, vol. XVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d455 (accessed December 19, 2016).

79 Oleg M. Smolansky, The Soviet Union and the Arab East Under Krushchev (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1974), 45-46; Eisenhower also directed that preparations be made in case the Soviet’s gambled and attacked Britain and France, declaring “we would be at war.” This included alerting NATO forces. See “Memorandum of a Conference With the President, November 6, 1956,” FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, vol. XVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955- 57v16/d518 (accessed January 15, 2017).

263

Soviets continued their attempts to exploit the situation. The CIA believed they wanted to keep “the pot boiling” and to disrupt a settlement, as well as to distract the world’s attention from their brutal attacks into Hungary that forcibly prevented its departure from the Warsaw Pact.80

The collective effect of these efforts led England on November 7, and, subsequently,

France and Israel to agree to a cease-fire and to the withdrawal of their forces.

Eisenhower wrote “at two o’clock in the morning, Cairo time, fighting ended in the

Middle East.” A few hours later, he stood before elated crowds of supporters, having been elected to a second term as president.81 Over the next several weeks, the situation remained tenuous as negotiations continued over the terms of the British and French withdrawal. Both London and Paris attempted to legitimize their actions, such as by claiming that they had forced the issue that allowed for a UN force and that the action would pressure Nasser to accept previous proposals surrounding the Suez Canal operation.82 These moves included demands to be included in the UN force,83 as well as

80 “Memorandum of Discussion at the 303d Meeting of the National Security Council, November 8, 1956,” FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, vol. XVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d554 (accessed January 15, 2017); See also “Message From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Bulganin, November 11, 1956,” FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, vol. XVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955- 57v16/d569 (accessed January 15, 2017).

81 DDE, Waging Peace, 93.

82 “Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State, November 14, 1956,” FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, vol. XVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d575 (accessed January 15, 2017).

83 “Message From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Eden, November 6, 1956,” FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, vol. XVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d527 (accessed January 15, 2017).

264 refusing to leave Egypt until the entire force was in place and ready to assume its duties.84 The US administration did not budge and upheld the UN resolution that required the belligerent forces to withdraw before entertaining any other issues. In early December, Britain and France finally agreed to remove their forces by December

18.85

Getting Israel out of Egypt was a different story. Ben-Gurion refused to pull out of all the areas its military seized by force. As late as February of the following year, the situation remained at an impasse. The United States sponsored a UNGA resolution to have UNEF troops move into the positions occupied by Israel.86 Israel tried to block the effort and mounted a public relations offensive that created US Congressional opposition to Eisenhower’s policy.87 The American administration refused to back

84 “Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State, November 7, 1956,” and “Message From Prime Minister Mollet to President Eisenhower, November 6, 1956,” FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, vol. XVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955- 57v16/d531 and https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d532 (accessed January 15, 2017).

85 See “Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State, December 2, 1956,” FRUS, 1955-1957, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, vol. XVI, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d629 (accessed January 15, 2017); British and French forces started their withdrawal on November 21 and completed their withdrawal on December 22, 1956.

86 The resolution passed on February 2, stating that after a full withdrawal of Israel from the Gulf of Aqaba and Gaza areas, a United Nations Emergency Force would replace it.

87 Robert A. Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 64- 66; See also Philip A. Walker, Jr., “Lyndon B Johnson's senate foreign policy activism: The Suez Canal crisis, a reappraisal,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 26, no. 4 (Fall 1996): 996-1008.

265 down.88 Eisenhower decided to take his case directly to the American people.89 In a national television address on February 20, 1957, he explained that allowing Israel to use its occupation of parts of Egypt as a bargaining chip for other issues would violate the principles and purposes of the United Nations. It would turn “back the clock of international order…” and reward aggressive behavior. The organization’s Charter explicitly sought to prevent this type of activity. The new norms of statecraft that

American sought to create required that Israel withdraw its forces from the territories it occupied.90 The United States also sent a warning to Ben-Gurion that it would impose trade sanctions against Israel and cut off private assistance. On February 27, Israel accepted the US position and pledged to withdraw.91

America’s decision to uphold the new international principles of statecraft empowered a recalcitrant Nasser. Throughout the crisis, Egypt maintained its international right to nationalize the canal. It accepted many of the standards suggested to manage canal traffic, along the lines of the six-principles agreed to at the United

Nations, but it never conceded to international oversight of its operation. Nor did

Nasser ever back away from his decision to replace the Suez Canal Company with an

88 Donald Neff, Warriors at Suez (New York: Linden Press/Simon and Schuster, 1981), 433.

89 On February 11, Secretary Dulles presented Israel a statement of United States policy that was later made public. America would not impose solutions on Egypt as a condition of Israel’s withdrawal but it did offer to work toward a negotiated solution.

90 DDE, "Radio and Television Address to the American People on the Situation in the Middle East," February 20, 1957, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10980 (accessed January 15, 2017).

91 Neff, Warriors at Suez, 433-435.

266

Egyptian Suez Canal Authority. In July 1958, the two sides reached a settlement that resolved the legal issues, such as the disposition of canal company assets and the payments to shareholders.92 After two years, the issue of international use of the waterway was resolved through negotiations.

Suez was not the end for Britain. Eden miscalculated on several levels. First, he did not anticipate that Eisenhower would so forcefully restrain America’s allies, reflecting a misunderstanding of the president’s resolve to assert new global norms. Second, the failure at Suez injured Britain’s global reputation and proved fatal to Eden’s career, but it did not significantly alter Britain’s world role. “The retreat from the Middle East that had begun in 1948 did not become a rout, and acceleration of decolonization in Africa after 1959 was the result of a complex combination of factors.” Mostly, the Suez Crisis illuminated the “realities of Britain's position in world affairs.”93 Also, the United States and Britain quickly repaired the damages in their ‘special’ relationship. London quickly moved past its failed gamble, as Eden was replaced by Harold McMillan.94

For many, Egypt appeared to be the winner of the Suez affair. Nasser emerged with new confidence and amplified his focus on expanding Egyptian influence throughout the

Middle East. He remained very popular in the region for years and was able to achieve a

92 Kunz, The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis, 186.

93 G.C. Peden, “Suez and Britain’s Decline as a World Power,” The Historical Journal, vol. 55, no. 4 (December, 2012): 1073-1096.

94 Jean-Yves Bernard, “Disregarding the Atlantic “Special Relationship”: The Eden Cabinet in the Lead-up to the Invasion of the Suez Canal Zone,” Canadian Journal of History, vol. 44, no. 1 (Spring/Summer, 2009): 39-61.

267 strategic alliance with Syria, forming the short-lived United Arab Republic.95 However, the effects of his actions on the region were mostly negative. “The Nasserist dream inspired a wave of pan-Arab nationalism that helped install lookalike leaderships, with similar flags, propaganda and secret police, across much of the Arab world.”96 The popular movements successfully subdued calls for better governance, economic opportunities and social freedoms. They sustained the historical pattern of disempowerment and the marginalization of large sectors of the populations that persist to this day. By the 1960s, Nasser’s approaches in Egypt would also prove themselves insufficient. His nationalization of the Egyptian economy and industry stifled growth and exacerbated the concentration of power dynamics in Cairo. Nasser never created a “durable base of power and legitimacy outside the shear impact of his charisma” to replace Egypt’s pattern of “class, privilege and status.”97 The story of

Nasser’s triumph at Suez did not change the fundamental challenges facing the nation.

His heroic narrative remains out of step with the reality that it was Eisenhower’s actions and those of the international community that prevented his defeat and that resolved the Suez Crisis.

95 This was seen in the creation of the United Arab Republic that temporarily created a political union with Damascus. It lasted from February 1, 1958 to September 28, 1961.

96 “Special Report: An Affair to Remember- The Suez Crisis; 8The Suez Crisis,” The Economist, vol. 380 (July 29, 2006): 23.

97 Fouad Ajami, “On Nasser and His Legacy,” Journal of Peace Research, vol. 11, no. 1 (1974): 41- 49.

268

CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION

The Suez Crisis framed Eisenhower’s first term. America’s actions throughout the crisis remained consistent with the New Look vision of creating new norms of statecraft.

In the spring of 1957, Secretary Dulles gave a speech before the associated press in New

York. He reminded his audience that the principle of collective protection that exists in every individual nation should guide international affairs. Through the use of police forces, laws and a disciplined society, states protect their citizens domestically. He pointed out that, unfortunately, this rudimentary principle did not exist in international affairs. But that by following new principles, such as those included in the UN Charter, the world could ensure that the “door be firmly closed to change by violent aggression.”1 His ideas illuminated the vision behind Eisenhower’s New Look national security strategy.

They also informed America’s actions during the Suez Crisis. Throughout the conflict the US administration prioritized asserting a new world order. Its actions subordinated the competing goals of appeasing its allies and avoiding entanglements in decolonization dramas. Eisenhower’s approach also escaped the superpower contest and went well beyond simply trying to gain favor in the developing world. They exemplified his resolve to advance new standards of statecraft that would serve the nation’s and the world’s enduring interests.

1 John Foster Dulles “Address by United States Secretary of State, before the Associated Press in New York, April 22, 1957,” https://sites.temple.edu/immerman/john-foster-dulles-dynamic-peace-1957/ (accessed June 14, 2017).

269

During his first term, Eisenhower built upon the significant project for peace that emerged after 1941. World War II animated American and global efforts to alter the failed practices of statecraft that defined the old world order. An unprecedented level of

US public activism emerged that created pressures that pushed the nation toward not only international engagement but international leadership. It allowed a consensus to emerge, among the nation’s political elite, intellectuals, and peace activists on the root causes of global challenges. They believed that entrenched political interests around the world sustained their stature, in part, by claiming that war was natural and that the global system of nation-states was static. The early twentieth century generations that suffered the catastrophes that derived from these mindsets adopted comprehensive efforts to make the world safe for America’s social, economic, and political systems. The

United States did not fight the Second World War to defend the international system. It sought to replace it. After 1945, America embarked on a mission to use its world leadership to change the standards of conduct in international relations.

These solutions were both pragmatic and progressive. The nation emerged from

World War II as a global power, with its industry intact, a strong labor reserve, and substantial military force. Despite these significant levers of power, its influence was limited. The world was not a blank canvas to paint upon. Instead, the old factors that defined global statecraft remained relevant, such as a diffusion of interests, nation centric power dynamics and geostrategic factors. Additionally, the world remained considerably divided by its differences, such as in culture, ideology and socio-political systems. America’s strong position in global affairs and desire to create new norms of

270 statecraft remained within a contested space and the nation had to maneuver within these realities.

Despite these challenges, the United States supported a broad effort, through programs, agreements, and global institutions, to reduce the efficacy of using force in international relations. Spreading American systems of government, economics, and rule of law internationally became the favored approach toward achieving a stable world order. This included the advancement of a liberal world trading system and collective security agreements to mitigate economic nationalism and insecurity, both of which historically caused conflict. These efforts also addressed the intellectual pillars that justified aggressive war, seeking to discredit them and replace them with a world organized by laws and the belief in human rights. Combined, these efforts directly addressed the calculations that informed state interests and worked to construct a pattern of cooperation to make peace a normal aspect of global affairs.

Eisenhower volunteered to be a soldier in this march for peace in the spring of 1945.

During the early postwar period, he studied and assessed the obstacles on its path. This process included evaluating how the Truman administration navigated global and domestic affairs to achieve these goals. From positions proximate to but not at the core of the centers of American power, he witnessed how the US project confronted a turbulent postwar world. The downfall of Germany and Japan, as well as the exhaustion of France and Britain, created new vacuums of power. Several nations descended into civil war and a surge of indigenous efforts emerged to assert their sovereignty, leading

271 to a global push for decolonization. He also watched as the Soviet Union exploited these conditions and offered a counter to America’s vision of the new world order.

Domestically, overcoming the scope of these global challenges tested American resolve. The nation’s early postwar forays did successfully assert US leadership to build a preponderance of military and economic power to counter the Soviet Union. In Western

European the NATO alliance and the economic support provided by the Marshall Plan were notable exemplars. Despite these accomplishments, Eisenhower understood that

America’s early moves revealed the nation’s and Truman’s inexperience in foreign affairs. The first postwar president allowed the nation to become overly focused on counterbalancing the Soviet Union. This outlook oriented on responding to domestic critiques and not on a systematically conceived grand strategy. More importantly, the initial efforts under Truman departed from many of the tenets that composed the grand project for peace. His shortsighted outlook diluted many of the conceptual aspects included in the effort to create new standards of statecraft. Additionally, his ad hoc, reactive approach, along with the shocks of the fall of China and the Korean War, challenged the nation’s resolve to sustain the effort. American support for creating a more peaceful world order weakened as the cost of the project, such as the excessive demands placed by the Truman administration on the US budget manifested themselves.

By the early 1950s, the plan to apply American leadership to create an improved world order risked an early failure. But advocates for advancing peaceful norms refused to concede, arguing that a more comprehensive approach would better serve the

272 nation’s enduring interests. Eisenhower emerged as a principal figure in the effort to adapt the grand project. For this, his positioning as the Army’s Chief of Staff, the

President of Columbia University and the first Supreme Allied Commander of NATO gave him unique insights. It immersed him within the network of activism to change global norms, as well as giving him a lens through which to view their study of ways to adapt the project. To this, Ike added his own qualities, such as significant expertise in military affairs and organizational leadership, to the effort to sustain the march toward peace.

Eisenhower’s most important contribution as president was to assert a novel

American Grand Strategy to guide its foreign affairs. Eisenhower’s strategic concept had many dimensions. This included both structural and conceptual aspects. His significant reorganization of US policymaking mechanisms allowed for comprehensive assessments of America’s situation in global affairs. It engaged a diverse range of stakeholders, allowing different views to emerge, to be shared and to be understood. This technique created a common understanding of the challenges faced by the administration, allowed Eisenhower to clarify US policy goals, and empowered the nation to respond to crisis in ways that cohered with the nation’s enduring objectives. Under Eisenhower, the operation of the executive branch allowed American foreign policy to regain the initiative and in a way that the nation could afford for the “long-haul.”

Conceptually, the new approach significantly altered America’s posture during the

Cold War. Eisenhower’s vision went well beyond simply relying on nuclear weapons for deterrence, using covert operations to combat communism, or enhancing collective security efforts. They inserted a calculated stratagem into US efforts. This included

273 efforts to build and use American influence to help direct global affairs. For example, instead of only reacting to communist challenges around the globe, Eisenhower sought to find points of accommodation that deescalated tensions even as they empowered US global leadership. His investing in America’s military deterrence, by threatening the use of nuclear weapons, allowed him to stabilize the superpower competition.

Eisenhower’s strategic concept set the conditions to elevate comparisons of socio- politico-economic systems to become the measure of the superpower rivalry. The US

President advanced the project to reframe the Cold War as a battle between totalitarianism and freedom. He deliberately involved popular opinion, not just within the United States, but around the world. The effort engaged the desire for a more peaceful world order, based on standards of living, social freedoms, representative government, economic interdependence and collective security. It was a program that promoted and projected an American way, as a universal system that could be enjoyed by all people. It elevated ideals over the traditional factors that caused war, such as nationalism, ethnicity and religious identity. The strategic line shored up domestic, allied and global support for America’s leadership. It not only cooled down the Cold War, it also reoriented US foreign policy toward its enduring objectives. Eisenhower’s grand strategy advanced the goal of escaping the “war system” that governed international affairs during the early twentieth century. In its place, he helped build the confidence in global affairs that allowed for new norms of statecraft to emerge.

In designing and implementing the New Look, as well as its annual revisions, the administration added a novel conception of power to address America’s challenges.

274

Ike’s strategic framework expanded notions of the ways military and economic power could be used, as well as adding the imperative for the nation to apply and retain its spiritual, or moral, power. This outlook refused to rely on a single aspect of American power. Instead, it asserted the need to be strong in all of them. As important,

Eisenhower sought to combine their use with global partners to greatest effect. His experiences in World War II demonstrated the utility of applying simultaneously the full range of US and allied assets toward a common goal. The complexity of global affairs required an equally refined response. For example, he shifted US calculations beyond narrow comparisons, such as the number of tanks on each side of the Iron Curtain. Ike believed a better measure was to consider the product of American power, as well as those of its allies. Collective efforts offered a way to create synergies that would amplify their individual effects.

Eisenhower also expanded the tools of power available to the nation and in pragmatic ways. To accomplish the broad goals identified in statements of American foreign policy, Eisenhower increased efforts in intelligence, scientific research, and development; technical training; aid and trade; and psychological and covert operations.

The last effort clarifies the practical character of Eisenhower’s approaches. His assessments of issues focused on possibilities not just ideals. In the battle against communism, he remained willing to prevent the expansion that threatened to tip the scales of the Cold War.

Additionally, he applied more sophisticated conceptions of American foreign policy.

This included an understanding of the bargaining character of international affairs. For

275 example, in trying to determine the intentions of other actors, misinterpretation and miscalculation could lead to conflicts.2 The Eisenhower administration was proactive and ensured that the global community understood US positions. In analyzing challenges, Eisenhower also remained sensitive to the interests of both America’s allies and its enemies. He refused zero-sum assessments and, instead, weighed issues within an understanding of what others could palate. This approach avoided actions or statements that would create security dilemmas, as well as evading policy choices that would threaten vital interests or that would not endure due to domestic opposition.

The US grand strategy also reimagined the basis of US leadership. America’s vision included asserting its leadership and hegemony in global affairs, but in pragmatic ways.

The nation needed to remain strong, economically and militarily, to counterbalance peer competitors, such as the Soviet Union. A strong United States also offered a pathway to guide global affairs and to establish new standards of international conduct.

Eisenhower had a clear sense of what the US could control and what it could not. This outlook led him toward very measured efforts. For example, his approach to US global leadership understood that it required voluntary acceptance by other nations; it only worked if the United States advanced mutually beneficial standards.

Eisenhower understood that if the United States only used its power to advance narrow interests, it could not hope to lead international affairs toward new standards of statecraft. Nations remained suspicious of each other. Only time, experience, and a

2 This was seen in the ambiguity allowed by the Truman administration that brought into question America’s resolve to defend South Korea. It contributed to the decision by communist forces to start the Korean War.

276 cooperative outlook would build the trust needed for the system to function. Therefore, to sustain support for the march of peace, America’s actions needed to go beyond the focus of accruing power or professing support for peace. It had to pursue and apply power in ways that integrated the interests of other nations. This outlook legitimized US power and global leadership. International support for US hegemony depended on ensuring that every nation could share in the benefits of a more peaceful world order.

Perpetuating new standards of international conduct became the foundation of

America’s influence in global affairs. It transformed the acquisition of power from being the goal of US foreign policy to become a tool to promote new global norms.

Eisenhower did not seek to impose these principles on others, but to uphold them as mutually beneficial. His outlook included a belief that forcing changes upon the world was counterproductive. Global norms would not change through the use of force; nations and their leaders had to willingly accept them. Eisenhower sought ways to influence global developments and accepted the evolutionary character of this approach. The administration explained this outlook explicitly in its 1956 Basic National

Security Policy. The nation’s “genius” and strength was not based on its power, but on its commitment to human “dignity, equality, and freedom.” These values, supported by institutions and the rule of law, allowed for individual and national prosperity. America’s structured environment worked domestically, not because it was perfect, but because it offered ways to mitigate extremes. It provided nonviolent ways to counterbalance the normal trend toward concentrations of power. In a similar way, adherence to global principles could advance a “peaceful and orderly world environment.” They represented

277 a pathway that ensured the US enduring interest of preserving the nation’s free way of life.3

Suez

America’s project for peace remained contested and in ways that went well beyond the superpower dispute. Stabilizing the Cold War amplified America’s focus on solving other global problems. The new rules and agreements that emerged after 1945 to govern global statecraft created many secondary effects. They directly challenged the legitimacy of the imperial gains of America’s closest allies. Additionally, they emboldened indigenous demands for self-determination and intensified the issues surrounding decolonization. Around the world, emerging nations exploited these new global norms to advance their push for independence. New states also used the new norms of statecraft to serve their national interests.

In the Middle East, Egypt obfuscated the self-constraints agreed to in the United

Nations Charter to assert its leadership throughout the Middle East. The global pledge to prevent aggression collectively became a tool for its president, Gamal Nasser, to expand Egyptian influence in the region. His moves included insurgent attacks and propaganda that directly challenged Britain and its colonial positions. America tried to hold a line of neutrality and to work toward evolutionary changes in the dynamic until

1956. Then, the Eisenhower administration decided to take a more active role to

3 NSC 5602/1, “Basic National Security Policy, March 15, 1956,” in FRUS, 1955-1957, National Security Policy, vol. XIX, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v19/d66 (accessed February 17, 2016).

278 marginalize Egypt. But Nasser forced America’s hand. His actions tested Eisenhower’s resolve to adhere to his grand strategy goals.

America’s response to the Suez Crisis fits within many story lines. Initially, interpretations focused on the temperaments of the key actors, highlighting most notably the personality conflict that existed between Britain’s Anthony Eden and

Nasser, as well as pointing to Eisenhower’s misreading of the threat posed by Egypt’s president to regional stability. This point of view included blaming US Secretary Dulles for being ambiguous and misrepresenting America’s positions to its allies Britain and

France. These early characterizations chiefly sought to fix blame for the fiasco. Later, more archivally-driven studies emerged that emphasized the Cold War dynamics at play.

They explained that US actions were in line with the Eisenhower administration’s goal of winning over the non-aligned world and stopping their turn toward communism. Others clarified the conflict as revealing a US desire to supplant Britain in the Middle East or that it demonstrated the effects of domestic influences on American foreign policy.

These explanations only reveal parts of the picture, and in fundamental respects not the most important ones. When we compare US actions to Eisenhower’s grand strategy, a different picture emerges. American efforts during the Suez Crisis remain consistent with the New Look. Within this arc of analysis, US actions are in harmony with

Eisenhower’s efforts to pursue new global norms. From the implementation of his comprehensive policymaking framework and development of the Basic National

Security Policy or the New Look, as formulated in 1953, Ike focused American foreign policy on the nation’s purpose and enduring interest. His actions encompassed several

279 steps that would achieve this overarching goal. For example, Eisenhower sought to stabilize the Cold War, but not just to create peace in global affairs. His predominant objective was to create the conditions that would allow the new norms of statecraft to take hold that would make enduring peace possible. This outlook reframes our understanding of the Cold War. Creating a détente with Moscow along with shoring up the cohesion of the free world were prerequisites for putting the world upon a path that would establish a more peaceful order.

The Suez affair required the US Administration to abandon its preference of trying to balance several competing policy goals in the Middle East. During his first three years in office, Eisenhower tried to build a collective security framework in the region that would shore up the free world’s leadership and counter communist efforts to expand their influence. To do this, America’s policies adhered to a line of neutrality, such as trying to be an impartial broker to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute. This posture included refusing to take sides over the issue of decolonization. This outlook was seen in US approaches toward Anglo-Egyptian relations. As London negotiated with Cairo over the basing of its troops in the Suez Canal Zone, the US administration remained neutral and encouraged a peaceful settlement of the dispute. The American method appeased neither Egypt nor Britain. Eisenhower understood that both parties pursued goals that went beyond the basing disagreement. Nasser sought to assert Egyptian sovereignty and regional leadership. This mandated expelling British troops from their bases in the

Suez Canal Zone. Britain sought to delay these moves, working to preserve its colonial influence, as well as its positions in the Middle East and East of Suez.

280

The Suez Crisis became a catalyst that forced Eisenhower’s hand. The issues involved in the crisis went well beyond assuring access to an international waterway. It brought to the foreground incompatible choices, such as the American desire to support its

NATO allies, to marginalize a recalcitrant Egypt, or to advance new standards of international conduct in global affairs. From the beginning, Eisenhower decided to uphold the new norms required by international law. This decision accepted the risk that it presented in the Cold War contest and the advantages that it would give to

Nasser. The US administration believed that these issues could be managed.

Upholding Egypt’s right to nationalize the canal was also consistent with the New

Look’s emphasis on building the cohesion of the free world. America’s decisions during the crisis reveal a US resolve to assert its leadership to produce a mutually beneficial new world order. The US administration understood that sustaining the march toward new global norms required remedying the “weaknesses” of its allies to persist in their colonial ambitions. Despite countering the narrow interests of Britain, France and Israel during the Suez Crisis, the American administration was able to quickly restore positive relations. In part, this reflected allied acceptance that US actions advanced common and peaceful standards of statecraft.

The US decision to oppose the aggressive statecraft of its allies led it toward a more active role in the Middle East. The administration quickly followed its actions at Suez with a new policy to fill the vacuum of power in the region. The Eisenhower Doctrine, issued in January 1957, pledged American military and economic assistance to any

Middle Eastern country threatened by communist aggression. The effort sought to

281 counter both soviet encroachment and Nasser’s efforts to establish regional leadership that threatened pro-western regimes. By the end of his second term, the Eisenhower administration realized that opposing the popular Nasser was counterproductive to US goals in the region and shifted toward a strategy to accommodate the Egyptian leader.4

Most importantly, Eisenhower’s actions at Suez preserved the concept that global affairs could be guided by new norms of conduct, hoping to give them room to grow. It established new standards within the free world that became the model for international affairs for the remainder of the Cold War. It offered a pathway for international security and prosperity that every nation could enjoy. This logic formed the basis of US foreign policy, as America accepted its leadership role, the expenditures and the constraints required to preserve a better global order. For the generations of

Americans that grew up in the catastrophes of the early 20th century and that witnessed the loss of two generations to the brutality of the old world order, the burden was worth it.

4 “As officials in Washington realized that their resistance to Arab nationalism had failed to guarantee Western interests in the region, the Eisenhower Doctrine faded as the administration adopted a policy of accommodating nationalism by such means as nurturing a rapprochement with Nasser.” Peter L. Hahn, “Securing the Middle East: The Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 36, no. 1 (March, 2006):38-47, 46; See also Salim Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004)

282

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