Reforming NATO's Partnerships

Home , Mediterranean Dialogue, Pierre Razoux

SWP Research Paper Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

Markus Kaim Reforming NATO’s Partnerships

RP 1 January 2017 Berlin

SWP Research Papers are peer reviewed by senior researchers and the execu- tive board of the Institute. They reflect the views of the author(s).

SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

Ludwigkirchplatz 34 10719 Berlin Germany Phone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-200 www.swp-berlin.org [email protected]

ISSN 1863-1053

Translation by Tom Genrich

(Updated English version of SWP-Studie 12/2016)

Table of Contents

5 Issues and Conclusions

7 NATO’s Partnership Formats: How an International Security Institution Adapts

9 The Four “Waves” of NATO Partnership Formats 9 1. Security for Europe: The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace 10 2. Confidence-building and intra-regional cooperation: The Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative 13 3. Contributions to NATO operations: Partners across the Globe 15 4. 2014, the crisis year: Partnerships as a defence against external threats 18 The NATO partnership formats: A mixed track record

20 A Special Case: NATO-EU Relations

22 Conclusions

23 Abbreviations

Dr Markus Kaim is a Senior Fellow in SWP’s International Security Division

Issues and Conclusions

Reforming NATO’s Partnerships

Since 1994, NATO has created partnerships as an institutional framework for its relations with countries that cannot or do not want to become Alliance members. In the past 20 years, the circle of countries involved has become ever larger, the associated agenda ever more heterogeneous, and the goals pursued by NATO ever more diverse. The institutional proliferation of partnerships contrasts increasingly with what is potentially expected of them. The existing formats are now overdue for an effectiveness check so that they can be prioritised politically. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) groups together twelve post-Soviet states, among others. NATO has supported them in reforming their respective security sectors in line with western standards and bringing them closer to the Alliance. The forum also includes Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden, non-allied states that need no assistance with their domestic transformation. What matters to them is the security cooperation with NATO. The countries of the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) – Egypt, Algeria, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Mauretania and Tunisia – were meant to receive NATO support primarily for cooperating with each other on security policy. In turn, this was intended to contribute to regional security. For a number of political reasons, however, the Dialogue has been only a limited success. The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), which aspired to intra-regional cooperation between Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, has likewise limped along. Saudi Arabia and Oman have been invited to join this forum, but have so far stood apart. Finally, there is Partners across the Globe (PATG), consisting of countries that, for various reasons, are strategically important to NATO or have extensively contributed to its operations: Afghanistan, Australia, Iraq, Japan, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan and South Korea. Alongside this, there are consultations with India and China that to date have been informal. Special committees that handle relations with Georgia, Russia and the Ukraine – all of which are already members of the EAPC – complete the partnership picture. Finally, NATO’s summit in 2014 created further partnership formats in the Partnership Interoperability Initiative (PII) and the Defence and related Security Capacity

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5 Issues and Conclusions

Building Initiative (DCB), whose functions overlap to some extent with already existing formats. Most recently, two developments have attracted sustained attention to the NATO partnerships. First, NATO’s transformative potential and its experience in reforming national security sectors seem to be transferable to other regions. Such was the hope expressed during the wave of transformations in North Africa and the Middle East in 2011, as well as for Ukraine and Georgia. Current efforts to support Tunisia in reforming its security policy underline this approach. Second, for political and financial reasons, NATO will only be able or willing to carry out fewer crisis- management operations in the coming years than to date. However, crises and conflicts necessitating a NATO intervention can still be expected to occur on the Euro-Atlantic periphery. It is likely to be the rule, rather than the exception, that such operations will be jointly planned and carried out with partners from outside the Alliance. Only a few years ago, this would have applied exclusively to international crisis management; given the crisis in the Euro-Atlantic security order, however, it could now also be the case in collective defence. Against this backdrop, NATO will need to reorganise its partnership policy. This should be based on a shared idea of how to order political priorities and institutional forms of cooperation, even though political considerations may differ greatly from case to case. The study is intended to contribute to this reorganisation process by analysing two key questions: a) What priorities should NATO members set in designing the partnership formats, given the most recent developments in the security environment? Should the focus be on transforming partner countries, or on their security cooperation with each other, or on “strengthening” them according to the Alliance’s terms? Should the level of cooperation be measured in terms of the operative usefulness to NATO or the Alliance’s potential influence in a specific region? b) What institutional formats can be derived from these priorities? A whole spectrum of reorganisation models can be imagined. NATO members could keep the existing structure unchanged because they assume that it is logical to use different formats for different security policy interests. Or else they might discard the current formats to make room for a complete restructuring.

SWP Berlin Reforming NATO’s Partnerships January 2017

NATO’s Partnership Formats: How an International Security Institution Adapts

A large number of academic studies addressing NATO’s it has had for the Euro-Atlantic area. There are further development since the end of the East-West conflict elements of international change, however, that have have analysed its institutional form from a conceptual challenged or continue to challenge NATO’s ability to perspective. Their main point of discussion tends to be adapt as an institution: the Balkan wars of the 1990s the reasons behind NATO’s continued existence and (meaning ethnic-national conflicts carried out by mili- behind its largely unchanged, core institutional char- tary means on European soil); the repercussions of acteristics. After all, the Alliance’s key task of guaran- Islamist-inspired transnational terrorism; the fragile teeing collective defence greatly lost in importance states on Europe’s periphery; and the wave of trans- after 1990/1991, becoming a merely residual function formations among Europe’s neighbours during the so- – at least until the Russia-Ukraine conflict erupted in called Arab Spring of 2011. The assumption that these 2014. This school of research chiefly focuses on NATO’s new security challenges will be long-lasting is of pri- institutional continuity in the face of the changes that mary importance in determing NATO’s reaction. NATO have occurred in the international system.1 members have been prepared to adapt its institutional This study takes the opposite approach. It examines format only when they were convinced of the pro- NATO’s capacity for adapting its institutions to the found nature of the change and its significant impact changed international security parameters. It uses a on their own security policies. concrete example: the partnership formats that have Second, current research shows that transforma- become increasingly differentiated both regionally tions of international security institutions also express and functionally since the 1990s.2 Research into the the internal division of power between member states. way international security organisations change, or There is no need to go as far as some observers, who rather adapt, shows that a series of factors determines interpret NATO’s partnership policy as a direct deriva- whether new security formats are decided and what tive of the United States’ changed global strategy.4 specific shape they take.3 Given the US’s long-standing political hegemony with- First, the stages in NATO’s development – each of in NATO, however, it is appropriate that the partner- which reflects an additional functionality of the insti- ship formats should reflect Washington’s interests tution – should be interpreted primarily as a reaction more strongly than those of smaller NATO members, to the various changes or new phenomena in inter- or that these formats were not created against the will national politics. The end of the East-West conflict of the US government. At this juncture, it remains to takes pride of place in this, with all the consequences be seen what impact the domestic transition that the US has undergone under President Obama will have 1 Cf., for instance, Andrea Locatelli and Michele Testoni, “Intra- on the durability and effectiveness of the partnership Allied Competition and Alliance Durability: The Case for Promot- formats. This transformation goes hand-in-hand with ing a Division of Labour among NATO Allies”, European Security 18, no. 3 (2009): 345–62; Anthony Forster and William Wallace, an increased reluctance to shape the global political “What Is NATO For?”, Survival 43, no. 4 (2001): 107–22; Robert B. order. McCalla, “NATO’s Persistence after the Cold War”, International Third, the key to the permanence of international Organization 50, no. 3 (1996): 445–75. security institutions lies in their ability to adapt their 2 Cf. Anand Menon and Jennifer Welsh, “Understanding NATO’s institutions. Other international organisations have Sustainability: The Limits of Institutionalist Theory”, in: Global Governance 17, no. 1 (2011): 81–94; Celeste A. Wallander, “Insti- manifestly adapted their institutional form to changed tutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War”, Inter- parameters. In the case of the EU, the genesis of the national Organization, 54, no. 4 (2000): 705–35. Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and more 3 The following volumes offer as instructive an overview as ever: Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane and Celeste A. Wallander, eds., Imperfect Unions. Security Institutions Over Time and Space, Oxford 4 For instance, Trine Flockhart, “Changing Partnerships in a 1999; Helga Haftendorn and Otto Keck, eds., Kooperation jenseits Changing World”, in Cooperative Security: NATO’s Partnership Policy von Hegemonie und Bedrohung. Sicherheitsinstitutionen in den inter- in a Changing World, ed. Trine Flockhart, DIIS Report 2014:01 nationalen Beziehungen (Baden-Baden, 1997). (Kopenhagen, 2014), 17–34 (29ff.).

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7 NATO’s Partnership Formats: How an International Security Institution Adapts

specifically of the Common Security and Defence of very specific NATO procedural rules whereas the Policy (CSDP) should be read as a process during which participation of Moroccan officers in a NATO Defence an organisation that was not explicitly founded to College course needed far less coordination and co- externalise security gradually built up institutional operation. capacities for precisely that function. Inversely, insti- Sixth, the argument of “functional continuity” pro- tutions can disintegrate because they no longer have vides clues as to why the NATO partnership formats any functional added value – such as the Western have developed. From this perspective, the Alliance European Union (WEU). In other cases, they continue should be evaluated as a multi-functional or “hybrid” to exist formally but are hollowed out functionally security institution that fulfils a wide range of func- by the loss of their members’ political support. tions with different levels of intensity, rather than Fourth, NATO members had the option of making a one-dimensional system of collective defence (and use of other, already existing institutions – such as nothing else). A number of studies have suggested the EU or OSCE – in shaping the security policy of the that, already during the East-West conflict, NATO’s neighbouring regions. In principle, one could even role was not confined to deterring an attack by the imagine creating entirely new institutions for this Warsaw Pact. Instead, ideas of security cooperation in purpose. To some extent, that did happen. Research the Euro-Atlantic area already played a part. The goal has posited two interconnected explanations of why of cooperative security – one of the aims of the part- new foundations are relatively rare or rather why the nership formats – is in this perspective a permanent “rival” institutions were not necessarily to the detri- issue of Euro-Atlantic security policy. ment of NATO. First, the creation of new institutions This short overview spells out that research has generates significantly higher costs than the mainte- been primarily interested in what drives an institution nance or adaptation of existing ones. Second, an to adapt to a changed international security environ- organisation does not allow itself to become superflu- ment. Little attention has been paid to the question ous. Rather, it explores new topics and creates new of how effective the new elements are, and what their institutional forms because of the variety of interests relationship is to each other. An international security of its member states and especially of those actors who institution can only be successful if it manages to solve are active in the organisation. the specific security problem for which it was created, Fifth, the process of change concerns not only the or at least transforms it to such an extent that it no form of the institution per se, but also (and especially) longer poses an acute threat to the participating states. NATO’s rules of conduct and procedures, which need Failing that, there is a risk of “institutional incrusta- to be adapted or developed from scratch. Regular con- tion”, meaning that the institution’s specific formats sultations suffice to integrate some partners into the of cooperation, while available, are no longer used. Alliance. However, other partner states contributing This is the more significant because the effective- troop contingents to NATO operations demand to be ness of NATO’s partnerships rests on two assumptions. continuously involved in the corresponding planning First, all those involved must agree on what the secu- sessions. In general, international security institutions rity problem to be tackled actually is. Second, solving like NATO have the ability to adapt to new internation- the problem must lie within NATO’s power. In other al parameters, especially through “their regulatory words, the solution must not overlap with the conduct system finding appropriate responses to newly arising of other international actors or even entirely depend security problems and by having at their disposal pro- on it. This study will show that the second assumption cedures for regular reciprocal consultations and for in particular could (and can) not always be taken for adapting their rules.”5 Here, there is reason to assume granted in NATO partnership formats, which severely a connection between the function that the partner- restricts their effectiveness in many areas. ship format is expected to perform and the complexity of the body of rules. For example, integrating Aus- tralia into the ISAF mission required a great number

5 Helga Haftendorn, “Sicherheitsinstitutionen in den inter- nationalen Beziehungen. Eine Einführung”, in Kooperation jenseits von Hegemonie und Bedrohung, ed. Haftendorn and Keck (see note 3): 11–33 (29).

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The Four “Waves” of NATO Partnership Formats

Even a cursory glance at NATO’s partnerships makes forms of cooperation between the Alliance and its it clear that they are not a group of institutions which partner countries in the Euro-Atlantic area. have been set up to pursue a package of coherent and NATO views this partnership format as an instru- clearly formulated political goals. Each is founded on ment of cooperative security. In the Council, it dis- the shared assumption that NATO outreach to non- cusses with the participating countries topics that members and international organisations is good for are of general security interest, such as crisis manage- maintaining security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic ment, peace-keeping missions, disarmament and arms area. However, that is too low a common denominator control, counterterrorism, WMD proliferation, etc. to ensure a coherent approach to security policy in the The EAPC also serves the more specific goal of making respective regions. a lasting contribution to reforming security policy in The term “partnership format” instead refers to the region’s countries. This included (and includes) an overarching category of heterogeneous institutions placing individual states’ armed forces under the over- dedicated to coordination and cooperation, which sight of democratically legitimate parliaments and gov- have different raisons d’être and differ in their sphere ernments and the justice system; if necessary, reduc- of participation, degree of institutionalisation and ing the size of those forces without causing political political targets. Since each format was first created, upheavals; and, last but not least, ensuring a separa- its extent or functions have changed, in some cases tion of responsibilities for internal versus external significantly; so have NATO’s political ambitions asso- security. ciated with them.6 The way in which the formats have There was no coherent plan for the establishment evolved since 1994 thus reflects the Alliance’s changing of the EAPC, which developed rather by chance. The priorities over that period of time. NATO’s partnership NACC had been conceived as a relatively small format formats echo crucial security events and major devel- for the then 16 NATO and seven Warsaw Pact mem- opments in international relations. However, they also bers. Later, the dissolution of the Soviet Union “im- reveal adjustments in NATO’s self-perception: as an posed” on NATO much broader and more extensive international security organisation that changes be- cooperation than originally planned. There can be no cause the world around it is in upheaval. question here of a strategically thought-out partnership policy from the start. Not least, this can be seen in the fact that Russia and Ukraine are members of the 1. Security for Europe: EAPC, while also enjoying independent bilateral part- The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and nerships with the Alliance. Those formats are far more Partnership for Peace important politically: the NATO Russia Council, which has existed since 2002, and the NATO Ukraine Com- NATO’s oldest partnership programme still in exist- mission, created in 1997. ence is the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). It The programme Partnership for Peace (PfP) fulfils a developed in 1997 out of the North Atlantic Cooperation similar function to the EAPC although NATO does not Council (NACC), founded in 1991. As a multilateral explicitly run it as a separate partnership format, but forum for political dialogue and security cooperation as a subdivision of the EAPC. The format, created in that comprises 50 states (28 NATO members and 22 1994, offers states a framework for individually tailored partner countries), the EAPC is the framework for all cooperation programmes with NATO. Such programmes can focus on quite different areas: reforming the defence sector, defence planning, civilian-military rela- 6 On this point, cf. Sten Rynning, “Why Connect? On the Con- tions, education and training, joint manoeuvres, ceptual Foundations of NATO Partnerships”, in Managing Change. disaster relief, and more. NATO’s Partnerships and Deterrence in a Globalised World, ed. Riccardo Alcaro and Sonia Lucarelli (Norfolk, Bologna and Rome, 2011): Thr PfP programme is primarily bilateral, i.e. aimed II-5–II-8. at the cooperation of individual countries with NATO.

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9 The Four “Waves” of NATO Partnership Formats

Its intended outcome, however, is to safeguard secu- tion of Crimea, the reverse is true as well. While rity in the entire Euro-Atlantic area. To this end, the Europe appears divided again and is no longer at Alliance strives to familiarise the 22 PfP partners with peace with itself, the impact of the two partnership its procedures, make the defence planning of the in- tools also remains limited. dividual states more transparent, and improve secu- This fundamentally affects the Alliance’s self-image. rity cooperation in general. Alongside these functions, Long before the annexation of Crimea and the destabi- the programme’s main purpose is to provide European lisation of eastern Ukraine, the transformative impulse states pursuing a policy of neutrality or non-align- that had guided NATO in shaping Euro-Atlantic secu- ment – such as Switzerland, Ireland, Austria, Finland rity since 1990 began to flag in the face of Moscow’s and Sweden – an opportunity for extended coopera- changed politics. In NATO’s capitals, it was the war in tion with NATO.7 Since the NATO foreign ministers’ Georgia (2008) that finally gave geopolitical considera- meeting in Berlin in April 2011, all programmes and tions the upper hand over the goal of further trans- action plans of the PfP format have also been available forming the post-Soviet space. For as long as it remains to other NATO partner countries. They are listed in the impossible to return to the principles of the Paris so-called Partnership Cooperation Menu, which consists of Charter, neither the EAPC nor PfP will be able to have almost 1,600 activities. an impact as partnership frameworks. The EAPC and PfP have never explicitly been iden- tified as institutions that prepare countries for full NATO membership. Their functional proximity to 2. Confidence-building and intra-regional NATO’s policy of expansion in Central Eastern Europe cooperation: The Mediterranean Dialogue was nevertheless obvious. The goal of the partnership and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative frameworks for the Euro-Atlantic area was to bring about different levels of rapprochement between NATO In addition to the two partnership frameworks that and the states in Central Eastern Europe as well as the target the states of Central Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. This was intended to transform post-Soviet region, NATO launched the Mediterranean their security and defence policies and thus guarantee Dialogue (MD) in 1994. The states participating in the stability and security beyond the NATO membership forum are Egypt, Algeria (since 2000), Israel, Jordan circle.8 Implicitly, NATO’s policy was not only self- (since 1995), Morocco, Mauretania and Tunisia. The interested, but also had a value dimension, insofar as aim of the framework is to boost security and stability its medium and long-term goal was to transform these in the Mediterranean region and dismantle wariness states in line with western political conceptions. of NATO. It makes possible consultations and coopera- NATO’s 2010 strategic concept once again placed tion between NATO and individual MD partners as both the EAPC and the PfP in a context of cooperative well as in the NATO+7 format, i.e. jointly with all par- security: “The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and ticipating states. Partnership for Peace are central to our vision of The political inspiration for the MD format were Europe whole, free and in peace.”9 However, seeing the so-called Oslo Accords of 1993, i.e. the autonomy that the Euro-Atlantic security order entered into a agreements between Israel and the Palestinians, which state of crisis after the Russian Federation’s annexa- were augmented by a multilateral strand of the Madrid

Middle East Peace process. The latter concentrated on 7 On this point, cf. Andrew Cottey, “The European Neutrals and topics of regional cross-border relevance such as en- NATO: Ambiguous Partnership”, Contemporary Security Policy 34, vironmental issues, economic development and secu- no. 3 (2013): 446–72; and Magnus Petersson, “NATO and the EU rity. Not least, the negotiations were intended to serve ‘Neutrals’ – Instrumental or Value-oriented Utility?”, in NATO: as a confidence-building measure to contribute to The Power of Partnerships, ed. Håkan Edström, Janne Haaland Matlary and Magnus Petersson (New York, 2011): 112–30. normalising relations between the states of the Middle 8 Flockhart appropriately calls it the “integrationalist rationale” East. This intra-regional security cooperation in the of this wave of expansions. Cf. Flockhart, “Changing Partner- Mediterranean countries was supported by NATO. ships in a Changing World” (see note 4), 27f. In its early days, however, the MD received little 9 Active Engagement, Modern Defence. Strategic Concept for the Defence attention. It barely rose above the status of a “diplo- and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, matic talking shop”. Only the attacks of 11 September adopted by heads of state and government in Lisbon, Paragraph 35, http://www.nato.diplo.de/contentblob/2970688/Daten/ 2001 raised the interest of NATO members in the 971427/strat_Konzept_Lisboa_DLD.pdf (accessed 25 May 2016). Alliance’s southern flank. At the 2002 NATO Summit

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10 2. Confidence-building and intra-regional cooperation: The Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative in Prague, the Alliance finally integrated the MD into lenges in the Arab Persian Gulf can also have indirect the set of already existing partnership frameworks.10 consequences for the security of NATO states and that Since then, security and stability in the Mediterranean they should be jointly solved, i.e. together with the ICI region have been considered decisive for the security partner nations. Reflections focused above all on grow- of the NATO area, whether in the context of transna- ing concerns about a proliferation of weapons of mass tional terrorism, WMD proliferation, energy security destruction and on fighting transnational terrorism.14 or managing migration.11 From the perspective of its As in the MD, ICI partners also have the opportunity contributions to NATO operations, the MD is of minor of choosing between bilateral and multilateral coopera- importance – Jordan was the only partner nation to tion. So far, however, the ICI has been insufficiently participate in the ISAF mission, for example, and then multilateralised, and has thus not developed into a only with a relatively small contingent. true regional security forum. This is primarily due Two factors have been limiting the effectiveness of to the non-involvement of Saudi Arabia and Oman, the MD. First, the forum consists of a very heterogene- which are responsible for over half of the total defence ous group of North African and Middle Eastern states, expenditure of all the region’s states. Other countries with little to link them in terms of security policy. To in the Arab Persian Gulf are in fact looking to cooper- name just three examples: Tunisia is interested in re- ate with NATO, but their understanding of security forming the defence sector; Jordan wishes to cooper- interests is primarily national. Individual ICI partners ate with NATO in the context of Islamic State’s ad- have even made it plain that they are less interested vances; and Israel is preoccupied with exchanging in good relations with NATO per se than in relations with NATO on missile defence. Against this backdrop, with selected Alliance members, principally the United NATO has repeatedly considered dividing the MD into States, Great Britain and France.15 two regional subgroups: one for the Maghreb (Algeria, This reflects the nature of the regional order, which Morocco, Mauretania and Tunisia) and one for the has been shaped as much by the Saudi-Iranian power Mashriq (Egypt, Israel, Jordan).12 In 2008, the NATO struggle as by the general willingness to resort to the states who are also members of the EU created the use of military force. It also shows that the region Euro-Mediterranean partnership (EUROMED), an in- gives primacy to bilateral security policies over organ- strument which theoretically complements the MD ising collective defence or collective security. This is but actually competes with it, and which has been shown not least in the great number of individual undermining any serious and exclusive international security agreements that the region’s states have con- security focus on the MD.13 cluded with external actors.16 At the 2004 NATO Summit, the Istanbul Cooperation NATO is currently considering building an institu- Initiative (ICI) was added to the mix. It pools NATO’s tionalised partnership with the Gulf Cooperation relations with Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. This format was (and is) likewise based 14 Cf. the declaration of the Istanbul Summit: “Istanbul Co- on the assumption that international security chal- operation Initiative”, NATO Policy Document, http://www.nato. int/docu/comm/2004/06-istanbul/docu-cooperation.htm (accessed 10 Cf. Mohammed Moustafa Orfy, NATO and the Middle East. The 19 May 2016); on the areas of practical cooperation, see NATO’s Geopolitical Context post-9/11, Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern “ICI Fact Sheet” of April 2014 at http://www.nato.int/nato_static/ Politics, 30 (London, 2011), 109ff.; and Sten Rynning, “NATO and assets/pdf/pdf_2014_04/20140331_140401-factsheet-ICI_en.pdf the Broader Middle East, 1949–2007: The History and Lessons of (accessed 19 May 2016). See also the speech by the NATO Deputy Controversial Encounters”, The Journal of Strategic Studies 30, no. 6 Secretary-General Alexander Vershbow in Doha on 2 May 2015, (2007): 905–27 (919ff.). “Preventing WMD Proliferation: NATO’s Engagement with its 11 On the increased importance of the Mediterranean region Global Partners”, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_ for NATO, cf. Costanza Musu, “NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue: 117732.htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed 19 May 2016). More than Just an Empty Shell?”, Mediterranean Politics 11, no. 3 15 Cf. Bilal Y. Saab, “Friends with Benefits. What the UAE Really (2006): 419–24 (419f.); and Philip H. Gordon, NATO’s Growing Role Wants from NATO”, Foreign Affairs Snapshot, 14 August 2014, https:// in the Greater Middle East, ECSSR – Emirates Lecture Series, 63 (Abu www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2014-08-14/friends- Dhabi, 2006), 3ff. benefits (accessed 19 May 2016). 12 Cf. Pierre Razoux, How to Revitalize the Dialogue between NATO 16 On this issue, cf. Erik Reichborn-Kjennerud, NATO in the ‘New’ and the Maghreb Countries, NATO Defense College Research Paper, MENA Region. Competing Priorities amidst Diverging Interests and Finan- 64 (Rome, 2010), 2f. cial Austerity, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs – Secu- 13 On the dangers of an institutional “overload” in the Mediter- rity in Practice, 1/2013 (Oslo, 2013), 20; Jean-Loup Samaan, NATO ranean region, cf. Massimo Ambrosetti, “NATO’s Mediterranean in the Gulf: Partnership without a Cause?, NATO Defense College Dialogue”, The International Spectator 36, no. 14 (2001): 83–89 (87f.). Research Paper, 83 (Rome, 2012), 5f.

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11 The Four “Waves” of NATO Partnership Formats

Council (GCC); any actual agreement, however, is still The Alliance was hence unable to contribute to any in the distant future. Brussels sees the GCC as a poten- lasting transformation of these countries’ security or tial partner in the task of guaranteeing regional secu- defence policies, in sharp contrast to its achievements rity on the Alliance’s southern flank.17 NATO’s growing in Central Eastern Europe (if under different condi- interest in more extensive cooperation is also based tions). The only exception merely confirms the rule: on the GCC’s declared intention of becoming an in- since summer 2015, NATO has made cautious efforts dependent collective-defence organisation with inte- to accompany Tunisia in transforming its security grated military capabilities. The NATO visit by GCC policy.19 In January 2016, urged on by Spain, France Secretary General Abdul Latif Al Zayani in March 2016 and Italy, NATO’s Military Committee consulted on an served the goal of improving mutual relations. appropriate package of measures for Tunis. To date, The transformative drive, which has been charac- however, the Tunisian government seems unwilling terising the EAPC, is largely missing for the Mediter- to make open use of Alliance support, preferring bi- ranean region and the Arab Persian Gulf, i.e. both in lateral cooperation with individual NATO members. the MD and in the ICI. In both forums, NATO’s col- The Alliance’s partnership activities played no part laboration with the partner countries is intended to in the efforts to (militarily) contain the Syrian civil familiarise them with Alliance procedures. However, war, fight Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, or build up the partnerships focus more on cooperation with the effective Iraqi security forces – apart from the largely countries than on their potential transformation, let unsuccessful NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I, 2004– alone embedding them in the Euro-Atlantic order. 2011).20 In April 2016, NATO followed up on the NTM-I Thus, a shared value base or possible NATO member- to a limited extent by financing the training of 350 ship for individual partner nations effectively have Iraqi officers in Jordan.21 Both of NATO’s other Medi- no role to play, even though policy advisors do bring terranean missions are preventative in nature and up these prospects every now and again.18 As a result, more an expression of political solidarity than of expectations that NATO might contribute to the de- military stabilisation. mocratisation of North African and Middle Eastern Operation Active Fence aims to protect Turkey from states by supporting reform of the defence sector attacks launched from within the neighbouring coun- remain unfulfilled. try of Syria, torn by civil war. The goal of the maritime The aftermath of the so-called Arab Spring – the Operation Active Endeavour, which ran from 2001 until wave of protests and revolutions against authoritarian 2016, was to contribute to the discovery and deterrence regimes and political and social conditions that swept of terrorist activities in the Mediterranean region.22 through various Middle Eastern and North African However, the two missions have hardly been a state- states (including Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria) from ment of NATO’s ability to stabilise North Africa or the December 2010 onwards – strikingly illustrated the Middle East, or of its legitimacy there as an inter- limitations of this approach. Following the uprisings, national security institution. established power structures were ultimately restored. It is hard to discern whether and to what extent the joint fight against Islamic State might be a catalyst for 17 Cf., on this point, Christopher S. Chivvis, “NATO’s Southern improving cooperation between NATO and its Middle Exposure. The Real Threats to Europe – and the Alliance”, Foreign Eastern partner countries within the MD or ICI frame- Affairs Snapshot, 17 April 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/2016-04-17/nato-s-southern-exposure (accessed 19 May works. In a speech to those states in December 2014, the 2016); and, on ideas for how Middle Eastern and North African then-NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen states could shoulder some of NATO’s operative burden: Sally Khalifa Isaac, NATO and Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Security: 19 Two high-ranking visits in the past year served this goal: Prospects for Burden Sharing, NATO Defense College Forum Paper, Thrasyvoulos Terry Stamatopoulos, NATO Assistant Secretary 16 (Rome, 2011). General for Political Affairs and Security Policy, travelled to 18 These deliberations mostly concerned Israel. Cf., most recent- Tunis in June 2015; in September, the Tunisian Foreign Minister ly, Shlomo Ben Ami, “Israel and NATO – Between Membership Taieb Baccouche in turn visited NATO Headquarters in Brussels. and Partnership”. A Working Paper in Preparation for the Herz- 20 On the track record of the NTM-I, cf. Florence Gaub, Against liya Conference 2010, http://www.herzliya conference.org/ all Odds: Relations between NATO and the MENA Region (Carlisle, PA: _Uploads/3045israelNATO.pdf (accessed 19 May 2016); and Josef United States Army War College – Strategic Studies Institute, Joffe, “Israel and NATO: A Good Idea Whose Time Will Never August 2012), 13ff. Come”, BESA Center Perspectives Papers, 77 (Ramat Gan, 2009), 21 Cf. European Diplomacy & Defense, no. 878 (2016): 2. http://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/israel-and-nato-a-good- 22 Cf. Dieter Stockfisch, “NATO-Operation ‘Active Endeavour’ im idea-whose-time-will-never-come/ (accessed 25 May 2016). Mittelmeer”, Europäische Sicherheit & Technik 63, no. 4 (2014): 52ff.

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12 3. Contributions to NATO operations: Partners across the Globe did emphasise the shared threat perception and the ness for future deployments any experiences already Alliance’s efforts towards capacity-building and mili- made in the area of what is known as interoperability. tary cooperation. The fact that the MD countries have Future missions could be in highly unstable conflict been integrated into the regular consultations with zones, but also to fight piracy, defend against cyber- the NATO chief of staff since January 2016 points in threats, etc. This “operational” rationale behind part- the same direction.23 However, for as long as NATO nerships is primarily based on NATO’s self-interests as an institution does not play any part in fighting IS, in maintaining, extending and improving its military these efforts will yield only limited results. capabilities. It became the case from the 1990s onwards, when NATO’s operations were increasingly geographically remote from the Alliance area and 3. Contributions to NATO operations: took place within new security contexts. NATO is not Partners across the Globe nearly in a position to act as a provider of global security either through its membership structure or its The third “wave” of NATO partnerships began in a operations.26 At the same time, however, its assertions relatively small way as long ago as the 1990s, with of political order have long exceeded the Euro-Atlantic the Alliance’s operations in the Balkans, in which space. From this perspective, the global partnerships Argentina24 and China participated. These formats, are an almost inescapable consequence of the globali- however, were selective, short-lived and little shaped sation of security challenges and the geographical ex- by political considerations. It was not until NATO took tension of NATO’s operational area that results from it. over control of the International Security Assistance Force The very nature of the Alliance, however, has been (ISAF) in Afghanistan in August 2003 that considera- changed by the expectations placed on partners and tions about the operative integration of partners the fact that their contributions have become a firm became politically decisive. The ISAF operation – the part of NATO planning. The integration of partner Alliance’s longest and most extensive to date – signifi- countries into NATO operations consolidates a devel- cantly changed the status of partner countries and the opment that has been noticeable for some time. NATO expectations placed on them. Time and again, NATO operations outside the Alliance area are still subject representatives emphasised that ISAF was not just a to unanimous approval in the North Atlantic Council mission by its 28 member states, but one in which by all 28 members. However, for a variety of political over 50 countries had participated in some form or reasons, ever fewer NATO members take part in imple- other. These statements were driven as much by an menting the decisions. Instead, the Alliance is trans- attempt to provide greater legitimacy for NATO’s own forming into a sort of “operative platform”, whose actions as by the endeavour to gain additional military missions are also open to partner countries depending capabilities. The Alliance cultivated a new perspective on the kind of operation, region and military require- on partnerships with this far-reaching integration of ment. The 2011 mission in Libya, Operation Unified Pro- non-members into the ISAF mission. Since, the Alliance tector, exemplified this development. It saw the partici- no longer evaluates partnership formats solely on the pation of the partner nations of Jordan, Qatar, the basis of what it can do for its partners, but also in the United Arab Emirates and Sweden alongside 14 NATO light of what partners can do for it: in other words, members.27 In light of the limited defence budgets of what real military contributions they can make to NATO countries and the evident reservations in many ongoing operations.25 NATO capitals about participating in further crisis- NATO’s goal is to establish lasting connections with management operations, this looks like a development non-members that have substantial military capabili- that will be hard to reverse in coming years. To that ties and are willing to deploy them within NATO operations. At the same time, it wants to preserve and har- 26 On this older debate, cf. Tobias Bunde and Timo Noetzel, “Unavoidable Tensions: The Liberal Path to Global NATO”, Con- 23 Cf. European Diplomacy & Defense, no. 855 (2015): 5. temporary Security Policy 31, no. 2 (2010): 295–318; and Thomas 24 Cf., on this point, Federico Merke, “Political and Military S. Mowle and David H. Sacko, “Global NATO: Bandwagoning in Utility of NATO for Argentina”, in NATO: The Power of Partnerships, a Unipolar World”, Contemporary Security Policy 28, no. 3 (2007): ed. Edström, Matlary and Petersson (see note 7): 181–208 (185f.). 597–618. 25 On this paradigm shift, cf. Rebecca R. Moore, “Lisbon and the 27 Cf. Fredrik Doeser, “Sweden’s Participation in Operation Evolution of NATO’s New Partnership Policy”, in Perceptions 17, Unified Protector: Obligations and Interests”, International Peace- no. 1 (2012): 55–74. keeping 21, no. 5 (2014): 642–57.

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13 The Four “Waves” of NATO Partnership Formats

extent, this dimension of the partnership policy also struct a form of cooperation that is not only guided by has repercussions for NATO itself. Since the integra- shared security interests, but also based on a consensus tion into NATO operations of partner countries – or on political principles such as democracy, the rule rather of their military capacities – is becoming the of law and human-rights protection. It is self-evident rule, it is now easier for NATO members not to take that this aspiration comes up against the limits of the part in certain missions at all. In the long term, this actual partnership formats and restricts their effec- trend threatens to create an “Alliance à la carte”.28 tiveness.29 In the Partners across the Globe (PATG) framework, Since 2011, in accordance with the decisions of the NATO categorises a handful of countries so as to Lisbon Summit and the foreign ministers’ meeting in underline their special status. They are Afghanistan, Berlin, the PATG nations have had access to the same Australia, Iraq, Japan, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakis- partnership instruments as partners from other for- tan and South Korea. However, two of these countries mats.30 Forms of cooperation range from joint exer- – Afghanistan and Iraq – fall outside of the outlined cises and operations to collaborating on training operative logic since their own fragile security situa- issues and information exchange between the intelli- tion raises substantial doubts about their ability to gence services. Yearly Individual Tailored Cooperation contribute to future NATO operations at all, and if Packages of Activities complement these projects. so, to which areas. Rather, their inclusion expresses The PATG countries take part on an equal footing NATO’s continued determination to assign them a in the military planning sessions for individual opera- prominent – though not explicitly formulated – status tions. The responsibility for this lies with liaison offi- in its security policy, a status that is the equivalent cers at the appropriate committees in Brussels and at of the “strategic partnership” in other foreign-policy Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). Part- contexts. ner countries also participate in NATO members’ In terms of their function, the PATG are nothing political meetings, as can be seen from the sessions new. They are a cross-sectional category, or rather of heads of state and government as part of the NATO an additional format for those countries that do not summits of the past few years.31 Building on this, in- belong to the formalised partnership frameworks dividual PATG nations have added a political facet to already mentioned. As pointed out above, in the past the operative dimension by taking up regular political few years countries from other partnership frame- consultations with NATO. Most have an ambassador in works have also taken part in NATO operations and in Brussels to represent them. Currently, out of the PATG certain cases provided substantial contingents: espe- countries, Australia, Mongolia and New Zealand are cially the neutral European states in the EAPC, Jordan especially active in NATO missions. They are partici- (MD), and Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (ICI).

NATO cooperates with the PATG countries on an 29 Cf. the Riga Summit Declaration. Issued by the Heads of State and individual basis. The partner nations independently Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council decide on the particular areas in which they want to in Riga on 29 November 2006, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/ increase their cooperation with the Alliance. In 1998, official_texts_37920.htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed 25 May NATO had already loosely grouped these states together 2016), Para. 12: “we task the Council in Permanent Session to further develop this policy, in particular to: […] increase the as Contact Countries. Since then, they have had a operational relevance of relations with non-NATO countries, standing invitation to participate in the Alliance’s ac- including interested Contact Countries; and in particular to tivities – not only its operations, but also its exercises strengthen NATO’s ability to work with those current and and conferences. The framework for the outlined potential contributors to NATO operations and mission, who operative dimension was created at the NATO Summit share our interests and values”, http://www.nato.int/docu/ pr/2006/p06-150e.htm# partnerships (accessed 19 May 2016). in Riga in 2006. In so doing, the meeting underlined 30 Cf. the Lisbon Summit Declaration. Issued by the Heads of State and a facet of the global partnerships that is often over- Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in looked because of the predominance of security issues: Lisbon on 20 November 2010, Para. 24–28, http://www.nato.int/cps/ their value dimension. The Alliance’s aim is to con- en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm#partners (accessed 19 May 2016). 31 Cf., as an example, the declaration of the 2014 Summit: Wales 28 Cf. Jakub M. Godzimirski, Nina Græger and Kristin M. Hauge- Summit Declaration on Afghanistan. Issued by Heads of State and Govern- vik, Towards a NATO à la Carte? Assessing the Alliance’s Adaptation to ment of Allies and their International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) New Tasks and Changing Relationships, NUPI-Report (Oslo: Norwe- Troop Contributing Partners, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/ gian Institute of International Affairs [NUPI], 2010). news_112517.htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed 19 May 2016).

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14 4. 2014, the crisis year: Partnerships as a defence against external threats pating in the maritime mission Operation Ocean Shield the region’s conflicts, or even as an informal promise (Australia/New Zealand) – whose goal is to fight piracy of assistance to one of the parties involved. around the Horn of Africa – and in the ISAF follow-up mission Operation Resolute Support (Australia/Mongolia), which provides education, consultancy and training 4. 2014, the crisis year: Partnerships as a for Afghan security forces. defence against external threats Finally, NATO entertains relations with individual states outside of the formalised partnership formats. The first three “waves” of partnerships were founded The political consultations with China,32 India,33 Singa- on the assumption that due to the changed security pore, Indonesia, Malaysia and Colombia are elevated environment NATO would hardly ever be called upon to a higher status than the “normal” relations NATO to provide its traditional core function of collective has with its surroundings by the prominence that the defence, given the de-facto absence of external threats. Alliance confers on them. The dominant diplomatic Politically, cooperative security became the Alliance’s mantra here is that it is always sensible to consult guideline and goal from the early 1990s onwards, in with one another on security matters.34 On closer in- light of the profound transformation of the Euro- spection, however, one cannot avoid the impression Atlantic security order. Militarily, the task of defend- that NATO is more interested in extended relations ing the Alliance and its member nations gradually than the other side. receded into the background as well. A series of in- This mismatch concerns above all the Alliance’s dicators elucidates this: the low number or even total activities in South and Southeast Asia, where the absence of relevant Allied military exercises; the lack rationales for forming partnerships in other contexts of military structures for defending Central Europe do not apply. NATO neither strives to contribute to the (such as headquarters or pre-deployment of arma- internal transformation of the countries in question, ments); and, not least, the decreasing defence budgets nor does it have the means to do so. Given the existing in the majority of NATO states. These budget cuts conflicts in the region, there is indeed a need to boost expressed the commonly held assumption that the intra-regional security cooperation. For external ac- changed security situation made such investments tors, this is generally a difficult topic, but it is particu- superfluous. The declining interest in NATO’s global larly so for NATO, which is not perceived as an “Asian military crisis management once the ISAF mission actor”. And finally, the countries mentioned have to was completed only intensified this trend.35 date been unwilling to deploy contingents on NATO- Since then, a fourth wave of NATO’s partnership led operations, thus putting them under its command. policy has been in evidence. Its circumstances are This type of cooperation has been limited by questions quite different from the previous three. The Alliance of national sovereignty as much as a lack of experience now pursues the intention of strengthening neigh- of interoperability. Conversely, NATO deliberately bouring non-members. Its immediate aim is to im- keeps its “Asian profile” low to avoid its partnership prove and expand these states’ military capabilities. activities being misunderstood as a taking of sides in Indirectly, NATO hopes to deter external threats to its members’ territorial integrity and political sovereignty. In short, its partnership policy is now also being

32 Cf. Mads Kjeldsen and Friis Arne Petersen, “China and NATO: harnessed as a function of collective defence. Room for Partnership?”, in Cooperative Security, ed. Flockhart (see This “return” to collective defence was triggered by note 4): 87–98; Tania M. Chacho, “Potential Partners in the Pacific? two factors. First, Russia’s revisionist defence policy Mutual Interests and the Sino-NATO Relationship”, The Journal of under President Putin, which has, to date, been most Contemporary China 23, no. 87 (2014): 387–407. strongly expressed in the annexation of Crimea and 33 Cf. Robert Helbig, NATO – India: Prospects of a Partnership, NATO Defense College Research Paper, 73 (Rome, 2012); and David Moscow’s ongoing policy of destabilising eastern Scott, “NATO and India: The Politics of Strategic Convergence”, Ukraine. This is no direct concern of NATO’s since International Politics 49, no. 1 (2012): 98–116. 34 Cf., e.g., Michael Rühle, “Die NATO auf dem Drahtseil”, Frank- 35 Cf., on this point, the annual compilation of NATO members’ furter Allgemeine Zeitung, 29 September 2015: “NATO must […] not arms spending, “Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO let the impression arise that its partners have fulfilled their duty Defence”, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49198.htm as soon as the joint Afghanistan deployment ends. In the era of (accessed 19 May 2016); and the relevant SIPRI data sets for the globalisation, good relations with other states are an investment years 1949 to 2014 at http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/ that will continue to pay off.” milex/milex_database (accessed 19 May 2016).

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Ukraine is not a member state and will not become work.38 To meet these objectives, the defence ministers one in the foreseeable future either.36 However, meeting in Wales created an Interoperability Platform, Moscow’s approach has intensified pre-existing fears, which encompasses 24 partner countries from various, especially among NATO’s Central East European mem- already existing partnership formats.39 The intention bers, that they might become the object of Russian is to improve and advance dialogue and practical attempts to rearrange the post-Soviet and post-com- cooperation. munist space both politically and territorially. In fact, Within the PII, the Enhanced Opportunities Program it is questionable whether and to what extent Moscow (EOP) offers five of the partner countries additional even continues to feel bound by the principles of the opportunities for cooperation at their request. They Paris Charter, i.e. the acquis in security policy that are Australia, Finland, Georgia, Jordan and Sweden – forms the normative core of what is usually under- countries whose armed forces are considered to be stood by the Euro-Atlantic security order.37 particularly interoperable with NATO’s. The options The second factor linking collective-defence issues for this prominent form of cooperation have not yet with NATO’s partnership policy are the military ad- been spelled out in detail. However, individual state- vances achieved by Islamic State in Iraq and Syria ments from NATO circles as well as the first concrete since 2014, and even more so, the organisation’s politi- measures allow conclusions to be drawn as to what cal and territorial claims beyond those two countries. the intensified cooperation might consist of. For While IS currently threatens neither the territorial example, NATO has assured the EOP countries that integrity nor the political sovereignty of NATO mem- they will be able to participate in select manoeuvres. bers, the instability in the region exacerbated by its Furthermore, Brussels has designated them in prin- advances does have an impact on the Alliance. To date, ciple as troop-contributing nations for Alliance opera- this has shown itself in two ways. The skirmishes tions. This also gives them the opportunity of filling between Syrian and Turkish forces in 2012 led to NATO military staff positions with their own officers NATO operation Active Fence, whose aim is to protect and engaging in extended political dialogue.40 Turkey from attacks launched from within the neigh- For Finland and Sweden, NATO complemented the bouring country torn apart by civil war. Second, Rus- EOP by concluding bilateral Host Nation Support Agree- sian military aircraft repeatedly entered Turkish air- ments in September 2014. These allow and regulate space. The situation escalated in November 2015 when the presence of NATO contingents on the two states’ Turkey shot down a Russian Su-24 bomber aircraft. territory, for example in the context of joint exercises. Against this backdrop of enduring instability on The EOP gained a more definite shape on the fringes NATO’s eastern and southeastern flank, the NATO of the NATO foreign ministers’ meeting in December Summit in Wales in 2014 added new forms of coopera- 2015, when NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg tion to the already introduced partnership formats. discussed mutual exchange of information with the In part, these are at odds with the traditional frame- Swedish Foreign Minister Margot Wallström and her works; in part they replicate their functions: Finnish counterpart Timo Soini. The main areas were hybrid warfare, the coordination of national training a) The goal of the Partnership Interoperability Initiative

(PII) is to maintain and further enhance the ability 38 Cf. Wales Summit Declaration. Issued by the Heads of State and Gov- of external partners to carry out joint military opera- ernment participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in tions with NATO armed forces. On the one hand, this Wales, Para. 88, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_ format perpetuates the aspiration of the Connected 112964.htm (accessed 19 May 2016). On the CFI, cf. John R. Deni, Forces Initiative (CFI), decided in 2012; on the other “Shifting Locus of Governance? The Case of NATO’s Connected Forces Initiative”, European Security 25, no. 2 (2016): 181–96. hand, it integrates the activities that were already 39 They are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Australia, Bahrain, Bosnia and planned within the Partners across the Globe frame- Herzegovina, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Kazakh- stan, Morocco, Macedonia, Moldovia, Mongolia, Montenegro, 36 Cf. Markus Kaim, Partnership Plus: On the Future of the NATO- New Zealand, Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, Serbia, South Korea, Ukraine Relationship, SWP Comments 28/2014 (Berlin: Stiftung Ukraine and the United Arab Emirates. Wissenschaft und Politik, June 2014). 40 On this point, cf. the article by the American Ambassador to 37 On this point, cf. Markus Kaim, Hanns W. Maull and Kirsten NATO, Douglas Lute, “The Wales Summit: Strengthening NATO Westphal, The Pan-European Order at the Crossroads: Three Principles Partnerships”, 20 November 2014, https://nato.usmission.gov/ for a New Beginning, SWP Comments 18/2015 (Berlin: Stiftung november-20-2014-the-wales-summit-strengthening-nato- Wissenschaft und Politik, March 2015). partnerships/ (accessed 25 May 2016).

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16 4. 2014, the crisis year: Partnerships as a defence against external threats and exercises, the creation of joint situational awareness In the run-up to the 2014 Summit, the designation – especially in the Baltic area – and possible contribu- of individual states as special partners in cooperating tions by the two nations to the NATO Response Force with NATO – as sketched out above – was not without (NRF).41 controversy. This concerned Finland, Georgia and The NRF is the Alliance’s rapid deployment force, Sweden in particular. On the one hand, the decision consisting of land, air, sea and special forces. Its troop took into account the need for differentiating partners contingents are registered on a yearly basis by the more strongly since – according to proponents – they NATO states, and are then delegated for the corre- differed so greatly in their respective degree of close- sponding timeframe. Other units take over their func- ness to the Alliance. Equal treatment for unequal part- tions by rotation. Since the NRF is not an additional ner countries in the same category, proponents argued, unit, but relies on existing forces, any Finnish and would have signalled to states such as Finland and Swedish contributions will be relatively straightfor- Sweden that their specific expectations would not ward to integrate. The Ukraine crisis and NATO’s be taken into consideration. A rejection of this sort, reaction thereto demonstrated that the NRF – and it was claimed, could have resulted in Helsinki and thus also the contributions of possible partner coun- Stockholm turning away from NATO, blocking the tries – is significant for collective defence purposes. possibility of improving defence cooperation in To be able to react more quickly to such crises, heads Northern Europe. of state and government decided at the Wales Summit Critics, on the other hand, objected that Russia in September 2014 to establish a Very High Readiness might interpret the rapprochement of the two Nordic Joint Task Force (VJTF) as part of the NRF.42 countries with NATO as a precursor to full member- The EOP has also come into focus for Georgia. The ship. That in turn would reduce Moscow’s willingness Substantial NATO-Georgia Package (SNGP), adopted in to cooperate, at a time when its cooperation was espe- Wales, comprises a broad range of measures and ini- cially critical in light of the great number of political tiatives in 13 areas. Its objectives are to enhance crises in the world.46 This argument is even stronger Georgia’s defence capabilities and boost the interoper- for Georgia, which has an unsolved territorial conflict ability of its troops with NATO armed forces.43 In this with Russia. Ever since the Bucharest Summit of 2008 context, the NATO-Georgian Joint Training and Evaluation held out the prospect of full membership to Georgia, Centre (JTEC), opened by Secretary General Stoltenberg member states’ differences of opinion have continued on 27 August 2015, is a sort of beacon project.44 unabated on how seriously the Alliance should pursue The EOP membership circle could be expanded in this. The Bucharest compromise reflected the faultline future, should additional qualified countries show an between the NATO states that supported full member- interest. This underlines the programme’s principles: ship for Georgia (and Ukraine) – primarily the USA – while NATO identifies its specific expectations to the and those, such as France and Germany, which saw participants and thus defines the cornerstones of the the Russian-Georgian tensions as a reason to desist.47 partnership, it is above all the partner nations them- selves that are expected to specify the political areas in Anna Wieslander, “NATO Turns Its Gaze to the Baltic Region. which they want to cooperate more closely with NATO Sweden Should Make Wise Use of NATO’s Benevolent Attitude to Establish Closer Relations”, euractiv.com, 18 December 2014, with regard to interoperability.45 http://www.euractiv.com/sections/security/nato-turns-its-gaze- baltic-region-310962 (accessed 19 May 2016). 41 Cf. European Diplomacy & Defense, no. 847 (2015): 4. This agenda 46 On this new orientation in Swedish and Finnish security was discussed in more detail during a visit to the two countries policy, cf. Jannicke Fiskvik, Nordische Sicherheit: Eine Annäherung an by General Petr Pavel, chairman of NATO’s Military Committee, die NATO?, CSS Analysen zur Sicherheitspolitik no. 189 (Zurich, in April 2016. 2016); Tobias Etzold and Christian Opitz, Between Military Non- 42 Cf. Rainer Glatz and Martin Zapfe, NATO Defence Planning Alignment and Integration. Finland and Sweden in Search of a New between Wales and Warsaw: Politico-military Challenges of a Credible Security Strategy, SWP Comments 25/2015 (Berlin: Stiftung Wis- Assurance against Russia, SWP Comments 5/2016 (Berlin: Stiftung senschaft und Politik, April 2015); Ann-Sofie Dahl, NORDEFCO and Wissenschaft und Politik, January 2016), 2ff. NATO: “Smart Defence” in the North?, NATO Defense College Research 43 For details, cf. “Substantial NATO-Georgia Package (SNGP)”, Paper, 101 (Rome, 2014). NATO Fact Sheet, http://nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/ 47 Cf. the Bucharest Summit Declaration. Issued by the Heads of State pdf_2015_12/20151209_151209-factsheet-nato-georgia- and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic package.pdf (accessed 19 May 2016). Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/ 44 See also European Diplomacy & Defense, no. 820 (2015): 3f. natolive/official_texts_8443.htm (accessed 25 May 2016). On 45 On the Swedish expectations of the EOP, cf., for example, Georgia’s ambitions, see Tornike Zurabashvili, “Let Georgia

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b) The Defence and related Security Capacity Building 1990s and 2000s, the political class and public opinion Initiative (DCB) is likewise based on existing NATO in the West still had a basically positive attitude to activities in capacity-building – the measures which multilateral military interventions, this has now been aim to support, advise and assist other countries’ superseded by intervention fatigue. There is particular armed forces.48 The DCB is seen as a lasting commit- scepticism about the goals that such missions might ment by the partner countries and as a NATO instru- attain. The deployments are often successful in the ment for projecting stability among its neighbours short term, at least according to military criteria or and beyond, without having to transfer larger combat under the terms of the UN Security Council mandate. units of its own. NATO is unmistakeably performing It is an entirely different question, however, whether a shift of focus from “security provider” to “security the intended changes in the political order can be consultant”, even though the latter function does not realised in the medium or long term. De facto, this completely replace the former.49 resulted (and results) in NATO operations that seem The first partner countries in this context are never-ending, or interventions that must essentially Georgia, Jordan and Moldova. The programme is also be described as political failures soon after their con- open to additional states and regional organisations. clusion. The impression of pointlessness is one of the Functionally, it is the equivalent of the EU’s efforts to factors that have led to fundamental concerns in guarantee regional security by supporting key states many NATO states about military engagements using and regional organisations through its Enable and their own troops. Enhance Initiative. The NATO approach corresponds to Second, the multiple, simultaneous crises in the what is often known in Germany’s security policy as European integration process play an important part. the enhancement strategy (Ertüchtigungsstrategie). In the They have shifted the priorities of Euro-Atlantic politics past, the security policies and military engagements of as well. The long-term consequences that these crises many Euro-Atlantic states were aimed at fundamentally might have for the integration process and individual redesigning the system of government after a conflict, member states (of the EU and NATO) cannot yet be for instance in the Balkans or Afghanistan. The future foreseen. However, they have received more attention will be primarily about a policy of subsidiarity, which in the past years than international crisis manage- enables individual governments or regional organisa- ment. This does not necessarily mean that it is impos- tions to manage security challenges autonomously, sible to imagine a situation in which NATO members and to safeguard peace and international security in overcome the domestic political restrictions that accordance with the UN Charter.50 result from such a prioritisation. However, it would Removed from their respective context, the driving require substantial political capital. forces behind these initiatives are identical. First, the The changed financial parameters also directly phase of liberal interventionism is over. While in the influence the Alliance’s actions. In many NATO states, defence budgets will not increase for many years, or https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/georgia/2016-04-12/let- only to a limited extent. Many partners will therefore georgia-join-nato (accessed 19 May 2016); Tedo Japaridze, Georgia have to reduce their capabilities for participating in and NATO: Perpetual Threshold, European Leadership Network, international interventions, or lose them entirely. In 11 May 2016. terms of cooperation among NATO members, the con- 48 Cf. Wales Summit Declaration (see note 38), Para. 89. 49 This is equally true for NATO and the EU. See the comprehen- clusion is to strengthen military integration; in terms sive treatment by Daniel Göler, “Zwischen security provider und of NATO’s cooperation with a great many partner security consultant. Veränderungen im Leitbild der strategischen countries, it is capacity-building. Kultur der Europäischen Union”, Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicher- heitspolitik 7, no. 3 (2014): 323–42. 50 Cf., on this point, Majid Satar, “Kosten der Ertüchtigung. Deutschland zahlt 100 Millionen Euro an Krisenstaaten”, Frank- The NATO partnership formats: furter Allgemeine Zeitung, 20 May 2016; Markus Kaim, “Subsidiäre A mixed track record Ertüchtigung. Auslandseinsätze zu verweigern wäre gefährlich”, Internationale Politik 70, no. 4 (2015): 94–97; and Marc von Boem- As was pointed out at the beginning, NATO’s partner- cken, “Verantwortung durch Ertüchtigung? Ausbildungshilfe ship formats are a result of changed security para- und Waffenlieferungen als Mittel deutscher Außenpolitik”, in meters, but also an expression of the Alliance’s adapt- Friedensgutachten 2015, ed. Janet Kursawe, Margret Johannsen, Claudia Baumgart-Ochse, Marc von Boemcken and Ines-Jacque- ability. Over the past 25 years, it has reacted to the line Werkner (Münster, 2015): 87–99. changes in its surroundings. However, this adaptation

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18 The NATO partnership formats: A mixed track record over time has brought about an accumulation of partly unconnected, partly overlapping formats. The fact that some countries are members of several partnership frameworks or enjoy special-status bilateral relationships in addition to partnership illus- trates these findings. NATO has largely followed the guiding principle of “new challenge – new format”: it has added new formats of cooperation, but has not adapted them in the sense of regularly checking the existing partnerships for effectiveness and suitability. Just as changes in international security parameters provided the impetus for creating the partnership formats, they could just as well lead to reforms within the formats or to their termination. Given that this has not happened, the Alliance’s adaptability needs to be evaluated more critically than is usually the case in the academic literature. Different but parallel objections could be raised for the first two partnership formats. The EAPC has quite simply outlived its usefulness. In the foreseeable future, no states of the post-Soviet area will need to be brought closer to NATO and supported in reforming their security sector. The few states to which the considerations of the EAPC still apply in part (Georgia, Ukraine) or in full (Sweden, Finland), have long since been offered different forms of cooperation by the Alliance. And, for a variety of reasons, neither the MD nor the ICI have attained the aims they have pursued, namely confidence-building and enhanced intra-regional security cooperation. Here, too, NATO shows its tendency to expand its relations with individual countries of a given partnership format (Tunisia, Jordan, Qatar) by bilateralising them. There may be plausible reasons in each individual case. However, it undermines the regional multilateral approach of the original partnership frameworks. Already, regional security considerations and the partner countries’ relatedness to each other no longer underpin the two most recent partnership formats. Ultimately, the political and material efforts NATO expends on the partnership framework are not always in proportion to its gains. Since the partnerships have not met all their targets and expectations, the Alliance is faced with the question of whether it is now time to get rid of antiquated practices. However, it remains doubtful whether the Alliance can successfully take this step. After all, it has been unable to date to im- pose a hierarchy on its partnerships. An exception is its relationship with the European Union.

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A Special Case: NATO-EU Relations

Alongside its bilateral partnerships – i.e. those with NATO’s joint military capabilities, including the re- individual countries – NATO also maintains a series quired command structures. The initial assumption of special, partly institutionalised relations with the was that the EU would increasingly carry out military OSCE, the United Nations, the African Union, and the interventions in line with its growing international EU. While these are not, strictly speaking, considered security profile, for which it would require NATO sup- part of the Alliance’s partnership formats, they are port, without involving NATO as a whole.52 Numerous nonetheless a functional component of them. As institutional arrangements have since perpetuated forms of cooperation, they too contribute to NATO and consolidated this cooperation. reaching its aims quicker or better or at all. The two organisations’ agreement on cooperation Relations between NATO and the EU are the oldest, was first put into practice in 2003, when the NATO-led most substantial and at the same time the most com- operation for Macedonia, Allied Harmony, merged into plicated. On the one hand, both sides speak of a “stra- the EU-led operation Concordia. NATO and the EU ex- tegic partnership”. On the other hand, Alliance and tended their cooperation beyond Europe with the co- EU representatives complain time and again that the operation in Afghanistan between ISAF and EUPOL potential for cooperation remains unused and point Afghanistan, responsible for police training, and with out that, given the far-reaching congruence of their their parallel fight against piracy around the Horn of membership, this is unsatisfactory. Africa. The two organisations institutionalised their rela- However, not much remains of the confidence in tions in 2001 when they established joint meetings at cooperation seen in the 1990s. This can mainly be the ambassadorial and ministerial level. The earlier attributed to the completely different ambition levels collaboration between the Alliance and the Western within the two organisations. Just over ten years ago, European Union (EU) provided the basis. In the 1990s, the EU launched an ambitious international security at the behest of European NATO members, the WEU programme called European Headline Goal, whose imple- had been extended into a pillar of Europe inside the mentation would have turned it into a power to be Alliance and at the same time into a security and taken seriously in international crisis management. defence component of the EU. It was intended to take However, its momentum has now flagged. The EU on the so-called Petersberg tasks: a specific spectrum states do not seem to have the will to enhance co- of priorities that ranges from humanitarian and operation in this policy area, nor are the existing insti- rescue tasks to crisis management, including peace- tutions truly used.53 Within NATO, the reverse is true. making. Fifteen years ago, in light of the strategic changes in The first concrete cooperation came in 1996 when the Euro-Atlantic surroundings, it still looked both NATO declared itself willing to put its military capa- likely and politically desirable for the Alliance to as- bilities at the disposal of the WEU (and later of the EU) sume a subordinate role to the Europeans. Since then, for crisis-management operations carried out autonomously by Europe. This created the core of what later 52 Cf. “EU-NATO: The Framework for Permanent Relations and developed into the EU’s Common Security and Defence Berlin Plus”, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ 03-11-11%20Berlin%20Plus%20press%20note%20BL.pdf (accessed Policy (CSDP). After the 2002 NATO-EU declaration 19 May 2016), and Matthias Dembinski, “Die Beziehungen zwischen on CSDP, the EU was assured access to the Alliance’s NATO und EU von ‘Berlin’ zu ‘Berlin plus’. Konzepte und Konflikt- 51 planning capacities for its own military operations. linien”, in Die Beziehungen zwischen NATO und EU. Partnerschaft, Kon- The Berlin-Plus agreement of March 2003 went one kurrenz, Rivalität?, ed. Johannes Varwick (Opladen, 2005), 61–80. step further by giving the EU complete access to 53 On this sobering evaluation, see most recently Anja Opitz, “Baujahr 1998 – rostig und ambitioniert. Die GSVP heute”, Poli- tische Studien 66 (2015), Themenheft no. 2: 41–48; and Michael 51 EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP, 16 December 2002, http://www. Gahler, “Agonie trotz zunehmender Bedrohungen. Bilanz des nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_19544.htm (accessed EU-Verteidigungsgipfels 2015”, Europäische Sicherheit & Technik 64, 19 May 2016). no. 8 (2015): 10–13.

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20 2BA Special Case: NATO-EU Relations however, Russia’s revisionist foreign policy under Presi- for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica dent Putin and the advances of IS in Syria and Iraq have Mogherini, having discussed the issue in December conferred new significance on the Alliance.54 What 2015. Among other topics, they debated how better to makes the imbalance between the two organisations coordinate NATO and EU activities aimed at strength- so concerning is that the cited changes in Europe’s ening the security sector of partner countries, espe- strategic environment in fact make a coordinated and cially in the Middle East and North Africa.57 complementary policy more, not less, necessary.55 In the past year, the NATO-EU partnership has once There is one further reason for the Alliance’s inter- again attracted greater attention because two further est in the EU: it has more experience of partnerships areas of cooperation have been added to this joint as instruments of foreign and security policy. This effort to enhance third states’ defensive capacities: concerns the operational dimension in particular and the handling of so-called hybrid threats and issues of only to a lesser degree formal interinstitutional rela- maritime cooperation. NATO already cooperates with tions. National contingents from a great many third the EU’s Frontex mission, which has, since February states have taken part in CSDP missions, thus 2016, provided reconnaissance, surveillance and ob- strengthening their legitimacy and effectiveness.56 servation of boat and ship movements in the Aegean Some of them – especially those neighbouring the Sea between Greece and Turkey. Its objective is to con- Euro-Atlantic area –also collaborate with NATO in its tain the uncontrolled movement of refugees towards partnership frameworks. A few other states have ex- Europe.58 There are signs that the international waters perience of cooperating with the EU’s CSDP missions off the coast of Libya may become the setting for a that could be interesting for NATO politically and/or comparable cooperative mission. The ships, aircraft militarily. Such is the case, for example, of Angola, and helicopter of the EU operation EUNAVFOR Med South Africa, Malaysia or the Philippines. In future, are already monitoring the sea. Their reconnaissance certain non-European states – for instance, Japan – results contribute to the larger picture being drawn could conceivably decide to assume greater respon- up of the activities of people-smugglers who attempt sibility in international crisis management or to ob- to bring in migrants, mainly to Italy. The mission’s tain experience in this field while shunning coopera- ships are authorised to stop and search boats in inter- tion with NATO for a variety of political reasons. In national waters on suspicion of being used by smug- this scenario, they are more likely to seek to cooperate glers. Such boats can be confiscated and diverted. It with the EU, not least because of its civilian-military is also possible to take those suspected of people- approach to crisis management. What is needed is a smuggling on board a warship and hand them over more detailed exchange between the two organisa- to an EU member state.59 tions about their respective partnership agendas and Additionally, following an Italian initiative, NATO experiences. There are some signs that the appropriate has changed the mandate of its Operation Active Endeav- steps are already being taken, with NATO Secretary our, which ran from 2001 to 2016. For 15 years, its General Stoltenberg and the EU’s High Representative objective was to contribute to discovering and deterring terrorist activities in the Mediterranean through surveillance of civilian sea traffic. The follow-up Opera- 54 Cf. Markus Kaim, “Die NATO ist zurück. Die NATO ist die tion Sea Guardian is providing support to maritime Gewinnerin der Ukraine-Krise, nicht die europäische Außen- politik”, Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, 28 July 2015 (online), situational awareness and to counter-terrorism at sea, http://www.ipg-journal.de/rubriken/aussen-und-sicherheitspolitik/ and contributing to maritime security capacity-build- artikel/die-nato-ist-zurueck-1008/ (accessed 19 May 2016). ing. By doing so it has taken on a complementary role 55 Within the extensive body of literature on the EU-NATO rela- to EUNAVFOR Med in maritime surveillance. tionship, cf. Nina Graeger and John Todd, Still a “Strategic” EU- NATO Partnership? Bridging Governance Challenges through Practical Cooperation, PISM Policy Paper, 21 (Warsaw, 2015); and Henna Hopia, Breaking Down the Walls. Improving EU-NATO Relations 57 Cf. European Diplomacy & Defense, no. 847 (2015): 4. See also (Brussels, 2013). Jeffrey A. Larsen, Time to Face Reality: Priorities for NATO’s 2016 War- 56 For a list of third-state contributions, cf. Thierry Tardy, CSDP: saw Summit, NATO Defense College Research Paper, 126 (Rome, Getting Third States on Board, EUISS Issue Brief, 6/2014 (Paris, 2014), 2016), 14. 3. On their participation in the EU’s decision-making processes, 58 Cf. European Diplomacy & Defense, no. 873 (2016): 6f. see also Valentin Misteli, “EU Associates: Third-State Involvement 59 Cf. European External Action Service, “EUNAVFOR MED opera- in EU Foreign Policy Decision-Making”, European Foreign Affairs tion SOPHIA”, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and- Review 18, no. 2 (2013): 255–72. operations/eunavfor-med/index_en.htm (accessed 25 May 2016).

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Conclusions

Even though reforming the NATO partnership frame- fully shaping international relations are on the works will probably not play the leading role at NATO defensive. If one assumes that the Alliance’s portfolio deliberations in 2017, it will nonetheless be urgent to of responsibilities will at the very least remain un- set the course in this policy area. The issue is signifi- changed, or even grow, in the coming years, then part- cant primarily because the partnerships have become nerships must be maintained and developed further relevant for almost all NATO functions and are hence so as to safeguard NATO’s functionality. a cross-sectional topic. However, institutional prolif- Second, the governments of NATO members should eration and path-dependent growth are also hallmarks keep their expectations realistic as far as any upgrad- of the partnership policy. ing of the partnership policy or formats is concerned. If NATO were to reorganise the entire tableau of Partnerships may well selectively expand NATO’s pos- partnership formats from scratch today, it would be sibilities for political and military action. However, it logical to group them more clearly into different “bas- would be unrealistic to assume that they can provide kets”, which would give equal footing to functional lasting assistance in reducing the Alliance’s own com- necessities and the issue of shared political princi- mitments or even making them entirely obsolete. ples.60 To call for institutional or political coherence After all, partner nations remain autonomous – i.e. may seem logical. However, it is probably unrealistic they are free not to act in accordance with NATO’s in a policy area that has grown for 25 years in accord- wishes. Moreover, governments can be replaced in ance with varying goals and priorities and that was office and new priorities fixed. Not least, it is likely ultimately shaped for maximum flexibility. A wealth that structural shifts will still occur within the inter- of political considerations makes it unlikely that national system in future and have an impact on NATO will “close” individual partnership frameworks. NATO’s partnerships. The Alliance is more likely to take into account the Third, NATO should make its goals within the indi- potential impact on the governments of the partner vidual partnership frameworks clearer. At the same nations concerned – which would feel rejected – and time, these goals should be subdivided into detailed engage in an incremental “muddling-through” in action programmes lasting one to two years, so that creating new partnership formats and further devel- the success or failure of a given approach is easier to oping existing ones. identify. The approach that has already begun with There is nevertheless a series of principles for a mod- the Individual Partnership Action Plans should be ex- erate reorganisation of this policy area in the next year: panded as it is the only way of guaranteeing political First, NATO should proceed on the assumption momentum. Too often individual partnership activ- that in the coming years partnerships with individual ities give the impression that such momentum is countries, groups of countries or organisations will lacking and that a bureaucratic perspective predomi- increase in significance. This assumption derives from nates instead. member states’ increasing unwillingness to provide Fourth, it is crucial that the Alliance more clearly NATO with the necessary resources, but most of all prioritises the partnership formats politically. In light from the domestic political change in many NATO osf the changed security parameters, it is at best ques- states. Anti-integrationist and anti-globalist forces that tionable whether NATO will deliberately externalise turn their backs on international cooperation in secu- security in the foreseeable future by forming bonds rity policy are currently very much in the ascendant. with third states or promoting intra-regional coopera- Conversely, proponents of NATO actively and force- tion – the factors that drove the first two waves of partnerships. However, more significance is likely to be given to the concern to enhance the Alliance’s 60 For a proposal on how to reorganise the partnerships insti- capabilities indirectly, through improved cooperation tutionally, cf. Karl-Heinz Kamp and Heidi Reisinger, NATO’s Part- nerships after 2014: Go West!, NATO Defense College Research Paper, and enhanced capacity-building in other countries, 92 (Rome, 2013), 6. so that NATO can take on tasks in international crisis

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22 Conclusions management as well as guarantee collective defence. Abbreviations This approach should also be reflected in its partnership policy. AU African Union This goes hand in hand with the fifth principle, CFI Connected Forces Initiative CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy the necessity to prioritise partners – some are more DCB Defence and related Security Capacity Building important to NATO than others. That may change Initiative again when the challenges change. However, the Al- EAPC Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council liance should clearly emphasise its current priorities, EOP Enhanced Opportunities Program not to demote other partner countries, but to under- ESDP European Security and Defence Policy line its esteem for its closest partners in cooperation EU European Union EUNAVFOR Med European Union Naval Force – Mediterranean and to motivate those to continue working together. EUROMED Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Sixth, an institutional prioritisation would also GCC Gulf Cooperation Council be logical. Out of the first two partnership waves, the CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy formats that pursue a multilateral approach – in the CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy sense of focusing on the partner nations’ intercon- ICI Istanbul Cooperation Initiative IS Islamic State nectedness in security matters – have shown them- ISAF International Security Assistance Force selves to be unwieldy and not very effective. By con- JTEC NATO-Georgian Joint Training and Evaluation trast, formats which loosely group together partner Centre countries according to their respective function for MAP Membership Action Plan NATO, such as the two most recent frameworks, seem MD Mediterranean Dialogue to be more useful for NATO, even though they are less MENA Middle East and North Africa NACC North Atlantic Cooperation Council ambitious. In essence, these formats bring together a NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation series of bilateralisms within an overarching frame- NORDEFCO Nordic Defence Cooperation work. NATO’s tendency to “bilateralise” partnership NRF NATO Response Force formats has been perceptible since the foreign minis- NTM-I NATO Training Mission-Iraq ters’ meeting in Berlin in April 2011. It suggests the OSCE Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe right priorities and should be further consolidated. PATG Partners Across the Globe PfP Partnership for Peace PII Partnership Interoperability Initiative SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe SNGP Substantial NATO-Georgia Package UAE United Arab Emirates UN United Nations VJTF Very High Readiness Joint Task Force WEU Western European Union WMD Weapons of mass destruction

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