Mediterranean Security After EU and Nato Enlargement

ZTBW Bundeswehr Transformation Center - Berlin

A joint research project between Military Centre for Strategic Studies (Rome) and Bundeswehr Transformation Center (Berlin)

ZTBw team Ralph Thiele, Wolf Kinzel, Frank Kolstelnik, Gerd Föhrenbach

CeMiSS team Carlo Finizio, Olga Mattera, Paolo Quercia

Rubbettino

1 Foreword p. 7 2 Executive Summary 9

3 Part One: Introduction 3.1 Creating the “Common Security Area Europe” 17 3.2 Living the EU-NATO Strategic Partnership 19

4 Part Two: Perceptions of the enlargements 4.1 Effects of EU and NATO Enlargements on the Mediterra- nean: Italian and German Points of View 25 4.1.1 Italian interests 25 4.1.2 German interests 34 4.2 Core Findings of selected national perceptions 42 4.2.1 The new EU member states 42 4.2.1.1 Cyprus 42 4.2.1.2 Malta 43 4.2.1.3 Slovenia 44 4.2.2 The Would-be EU-Members 46 4.2.2.1 Turkey 46 4.2.2.2 Bulgaria 50 4.3 Core findings on regional points of view 51 4.3.1 The Mediterranean Dialogue Countries and NATO 51 4.3.1.1 The Eastern Mediterranean Countries: Egypt, Jordan and Israel 51 4.3.1.2 The Western Mediterranean Countries: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya 55

5 © Rubbettino 4.3.2 The Mediterranean Dialogue Countries and the European Union p. 64 4.4 The Mediterranean - Adriatic Dimension: Croatia, Serbia Montenegro, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina 68

5 Part Three: Initiatives to enhance the security situation in the Mediterranean. An Analysis of effectiveness and development options 5.1 Upgrading the Mediterranean Dialogue 75 5.1.1 Programmes 2003 77 5.1.2 Options for Future Development 78 5.2 The EU and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 80 5.2.1 Security Interests of the EU 81 5.2.2 An emerging New Policy 82 5.2.3 ESDP and the Mediterranean 84 5.2.4 An EU Strategy Against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 85 5.2.5 Options for Future Developments 86

6 Conclusions 6.1 EU-NATO Security Co-operation in the Mediterranean - 87 A Strategic Partnership 88 6.2 Conflict prevention and crisis management within sub-regional security regimes through different comprehensive approaches 91 6.3 Encouraging and Supporting developments towards good governance, human rights and democracy 92 6.4 Policy options to induce development within the Mediterranean Dialogue Partner countries 94

6 © Rubbettino 1. Foreword

Europe’s security landscape has changed profoundly since 1989. While the region’s two pre-eminent political organisations, NATO and the EU, have achieved remarkable success in promoting stability and democracy in the Eastern and South-Eastern part of the continent, the security situation which Europe is facing today in the Southern Mediterranean is in many respects worse than a decade ago. It is now the time to broaden Europe’s strategic perspective. The Southern Mediterranean is still politically unstable and economically weak. The hope of a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the wake of the 1993 Oslo Accords has all but vanished. Nevertheless, militant Islam is spreading. Terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technology are changing the strategic environment of the whole region. Yet there are also encouraging signs. Libya recently decided to stop its nuclear programme and open it to international inspec- tions. Iraq is no longer ruled by a ruthless dictator and will certainly develop into a more democratic state, despite the efforts by some groups to incite chaos. Most importantly, as the 2002 Arab Human Development Report of the U.N. Development Programme illustrates, the call for democratic reforms in the Arab world, though still feeble, is getting louder. This study shows that there is a need for a new approach to the region, despite of the various European programmes, partnerships and dialogues which have been evolving in the Mediterranean and proven to be useful up to a point. Put simply, NATO and EU members should push harder for political and economic reforms in the Mediterranean. Key objectives of this new approach should be to reinforce good governance, i.e. the commitments to democratic reforms, human rights and the rule of law, and enhance regional and co-operation sub- regional Co-operation as a major prerequisite for stability and prosperity. The two main instruments for advancing these key objectives would be firm conditionality and a strategic partnership between NATO and the EU. To be sure, conditionality has been a tool of the EU’s co-operation with part-

7 © Rubbettino ner countries for a long time. However, with regard to the Mediterranean it has been employed reluctantly in order not to jeopardise modest progress. A new understanding of conditionality would lead to a more vigorous application of that principle. The recognition that NATO lacks economic incentives and that the EU is not yet perceived a serious security policy actor should prompt both organisations to fuse their initiatives into one common strategy for the region. A strategic partnership between NATO and the EU towards the Mediterranean would create the maximum synergy of resources by making all tools at their disposal available for the implementation of the strategy. This study presents the findings of a research project conducted jointly by the Centro Militare di Studi Strategici (CeMiSS) and the Bundeswehr Transformation Center (ZTransfBw). CeMiSS and ZTransfBw held several workshops in Rome and Berlin during the 2003 Italian presidency of the Eu- ropean Union. We would like to thank our staff for carrying out the research for this project. Particular thanks go to Olga Mattera and Paolo Quercia at CeMiSS and Wolf Kinzel, Frank Kostelnik and Gerd Föhrenbach at ZTransf- Bw.

Brigadier General Carlo Finizio Colonel Ralph Thiele Director, CeMiSS Commander, ZTransfBw Rome Berlin / Waldbröl

8 © Rubbettino 2. Executive Summary

This study examines the possibilities of an intensification of the co-operation between NATO and the EU on the one side and the Mediterranean Arab countries and Israel on the other. At the same time it constitutes a practical instrument that could stimulate both the co-operation within NATO and the ESDP process of the EU. This study could not only help to explain the Ital- ian and German interests and positions vis á vis the Mediterranean countries but it could also lead to the development of joint initiatives that would profit from the respective Italian and German experiences and contacts since the foundation of NATO and the EU. As the conference of the Cairo Library with Non Governmental Organi- sations in March 2004 – opened by the Egyptian President Mubarak – showed, the Arab states are beginning to feel the need for modernisation and sustained development. Disquieting developments in the socio-economic and demographic fields have been going on for decades. The problems have accu- mulated and are now forming fertile soil for the growth of militant Islamist fundamentalism. NATO and the EU have reached a watershed in history by opening up for new member states from the Baltic to the Mediterranean. At the same time NATO and the EU have agreed to enhance their co-operation concerning the developing of the ESDP-dimension and of common security policy initiatives. Therefore they have created a “Common Security Area Europe” where stability, peace and development are guaranteed for the time being. This new enlarged Security Area will enable NATO and EU to enter in a new phase of dialogue and co-operation with the Mediterranean countries. The terrorist attacks on 11 March 2004 in Madrid once more demonstrated that the security of the European countries is closely linked and in- terrelated to the security and stability of the Mediterranean countries and that Islamist fundamentalist terrorism is a common enemy to all our societies.

9 © Rubbettino In order to enhance co-operation and promote mutual trust and understanding, NATO in 1994 and EU in 1995 began to develop partnership and co-operation programmes (NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and EU’s Barcelona Process) with the countries in the Mediterranean region. Lately both organisations have intensified their efforts by establishing the 2003 Work-programme and the so-called “Option Paper” of February 2003. Since 2001, new developments have taken place. This fact should be seen as an encouragement of the intensification of the Mediterranean dialogue with our partner countries: 1) the security concern related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the war on terrorism, the spread of Islamist fundamentalism and illegal immigration and the trafficking of drugs and small arms in combination with the concerns about guaranteed energy supply and free access to the Mediterranean markets; 2) the need to remedy the shortcomings of the existing dialogue that are constituted by the following factors: - the self funding basis for the Mediterranean partner countries - the lack of possibilities for the Mediterranean countries to influence the work programme - the still existing mistrust of the Mediterranean countries. They fear that the dialogue might be a postcolonial attempt of the west at gaining influence in Arab countries - the limited dimensions of the respective dialogue programmes. NA- TO’s dialogue lacks the social – and economic dimension and the EU’s agenda lacks the security dimension 3) the growing understanding in the Mediterranean countries that democratic reform and good governance are essential prerequisites for sustained development and stability 4) the development of a Mediterranean dimension of NATO and the EU with the new member states in the region in Eastern Europe and the Balkans (where security is now guaranteed) and with new partnerships that have been established with the Russian Federation and the Ukraine As regards to their interest in a Mediterranean dialogue, Italy and Germany have many perceptions in common: both countries prefer a multilateral – not a national – approach to the Mediterranean dialogues and they are trying to engage international or supra-national institutions. Both countries see the solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a prerequisite for substantial progress in the Mediterranean dialogue process. Both countries also prefer a multidimensional approach to Mediterranean security; this means that socio-economic factors

10 © Rubbettino would play an important role at the same time as great attention would be paid to the security dimension (e.g. arms control and confidence building measures). However, they are reluctant to see an exclusively military dimension. Since it is a Mediterranean country Italy has greater economic and trading interests in the area than Germany. The same regards the security of the energy supply. Good relations to the main suppliers of Italy’s energy like Libya, Algeria and Egypt is of vital importance. Illegal immigration via the Mediterranean is also a major problem to Italy, which is dealt through a special unilateral dialogue with selected Mediterranean countries. Although Germany has smaller economic interests in the region, it has a special relationship – as a consequence of its national history – to the state of Israel and is emotionally committed to the survival and security of the Jewish State. However, Germany is not neglecting its good relations to the Arab states for the sake of the abovementioned reasons. After having analysed the perceptions and wishes of the Mediterranean dialogue countries, the shortcomings of the existing dialogues and the new opportunities and security concerns CeMiSS and ZTransfBw (and their experts and researchers) will make the following four propositions.

1) Forming a strategic Partnership between NATO and the EU for joint initiatives concerning the Mediterranean

2) Dialogue

A strategic partnership between NATO and the EU would capitalise on the strength of both organisations and avoid their respective weaknesses. This would constitute one more concrete step to the Berlin plus agreement. The aim of this new strategic partnership is to: - formulate a common security concept for the region - co-ordinate initiatives in order to attain a maximum of collaboration - form a joint working group with a secretariat as well as a common council (PSC - NAC) for the formulation and implementation of the joint policy. The already existing programmes and initiatives have to be reviewed and assessed in the light of the common goals (“Meda-Acquis”). The organisation that is best suited to take on a specific part of the strategy will be tasked to do so by the EU-NATO Co-ordination Council. Policy areas that are in the realm of both organisations will be handled jointly and co-ordinated by EU-NATO working groups.This would create a “Win-Win” situation for all participants in the Mediterranean dialogue.

11 © Rubbettino Benefits for the EU - the frictions within the EU regarding its relationship to NATO could be reduced - it would become more capable in the field of preventive action and crisis management - the EU would become a true partner of the transatlantic partnership - this would strengthen European influence in regions with predominant US influence - this would co-opt the U.S. into a more multilateral and more comprehensive approach

Benefits for NATO - co-operation would expand the scope of NATO’s policy dimensions - co-operation would increase the influence of NATO where the traditional influence of the U.S. is low (i.e. North Africa except Morocco)

Benefits for the MP/ MD-countries - transparency in EU and NATO matters relating to the Mediterranean - no overlap between EU and NATO initiatives - country-specific co-operation programmes including political, economic, social and military aspects in support of good governance

3) Conflict prevention and crisis management in sub-regional security regimes through a comprehensive approach

In order to be able to cope with the complex security problems of the region, a comprehensive approach that encompasses economic, social, political and security related issues will be necessary. However, the geographical aspects of the co-operation and integration have to be diversified since the Mediterranean countries are too different between themselves to deal with them with a single set of measures. A single “great Mediterranean approach” has to be put aside since the ultimate aim of a single geo-economical MP/MD-region is almost impossible to reach. For this reason the Mediterranean-dialogue countries should be subdivided into three sub-regional groups of countries with similar geopolitical interests and socio-economical structures. The sub-regions are the following: - The eastern Mediterranean/ Adriatic Sea – countries: Slovenia, Croatia, Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro. - The Southwestern Mediterranean-countries: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya

12 © Rubbettino - The Southeastern Mediterranean countries: Egypt, The Palestinian Pro- visional Authority, Jordan, Syria and Israel. These sub-regions should be addressed with specifically tailored sets of political, economical and security related instruments. Although there already are some sub-regional organisations, neither integration in the economic field nor progress in the field of arms-control and confidence building measures is satisfactory. Consequently, a joint NATO/ EU policy should be tailored to encourage and support sub-regional economic – and infrastructure integration and to establish sub-regional security regimes. These security regimes could encompass: - road maps that would help to solve regional conflicts - The establishment of arms control regimes for conventional arms as well as for weapons of mass destruction - confidence building measures like advance notice of military exercises and information about the state of readiness of the military forces - conflict management and conflict prevention through joint crisis management centres - NATO/ EU commitment to regional peace keeping-and observer forces In the long run these initiatives could lead to the establishment of a Mediterranean security community that would support Euro-Atlantic security effectively.

4) Encouraging and Supporting developments towards good governance, human rights and democracy

Bad governance and the violation of human rights can easily lead to civil disturbances, anarchic conditions and even to the collapse of states. These factors promote terrorism, organised crime and illegal immigration and cause interstate conflicts. As stipulated in the European Security Strategy “A Secure Europe in a better World” from December 2003 the EU will “... promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and co-operative relations.” The MP/MD-countries themselves stress the importance of economic and structural changes and of good governance for the stabilisation of the region. Of course, the initiatives for this must come from within the Mediter- ranean countries. All the more it is necessary for NATO and EU to encourage any sign of change and to strengthen and support these changes efficiently and unbureaucratically with the appropriate means. Many analysts believe that

13 © Rubbettino there are indigenous forms of democracy, which combine democratic principles with traditional forms of legitimacy, like religion, tribe, neighbourhood or syndicates. Nevertheless, NATO and EU should expect the Mediterranean dialogue countries to end their anti-Western rhetoric and to give up their double standard in the fight against the internal Islamist opposition. As long as these groups are tolerated – and even supported – when they fight Western influence and values only by the local governments but when they threaten the governments themselves they are dealt with politically or by law enforcement. In 2001/2 the “African Union” started several encouraging initiatives that seem to lead in the direction of good governance, pluralism and free elections. Several African countries have joined the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) which is an instrument for the implementation of good standards of democracy and good governance. At the moment only one Mediterranean dialogue country – Algeria – is part of the voluntary APRM-process. A joint NA- TO/ EU initiative ought to encourage the MP/MD-countries to join this promising initiative.

5) Policy options to induce development within the Mediterranean Dialogue Partner countries

Although the Mediterranean dialogue partners are becoming aware of the fact that they need democratic reforms, NATO and the EU should improve their ability to induce and influence change in the direction of good governance in the dialogue countries. Both the National Security Strategy of the United States (September 2002) and the European Security Strategy (Decem- ber 2003) propose the conditionality of development assistance and targeted trade measures in order to induce good governance and freedom. Since the imposition of Western patterns of government and society mod- els would be highly counterproductive this study proposes the implementation of subtle forms of incentives and pressure, based on cross-issue linkage. For this purpose NATO and the EU should elaborate the following issues: - a common yardstick to specify the expectations that regard reforms and the development of civil societies - subtle forms of using “conditionality tools” on the basis of gradualism and cross-issue linkage - the possibility to co-operate with Western and Mediterranean NGO’s in order to strengthen the starting points for the development of civil societies.

14 © Rubbettino This kind of conditionality should be effectively introduced into all aspects of the NATO/ EU relations to the region. Consequently the development aid would not only help to improve the standard of living in the region, but it would also safeguard certain standards that would guarantee the constant progress of human rights and good governance in the Mediterranean dialogue countries.

15 © Rubbettino © Rubbettino 3. Part One: Introduction

3.1 Creating the “Common Security Area Europe”

The barbaric attacks in Madrid on 11 March 2004 by a Moroccan terrorist network have once more demonstrated that European security is closely connected to the security of the states in the Mediterranean region. Terrorism is the worst common enemy of our western civilisation as well as of the legit- imate governments and the populations of all the countries around the Mediterranean basin. Together with the Middle East the Mediterranean is one of the unstable regions of the world today. Many conflicts in this area catch the attention of the world. It could easily become fertile soil for even greater threats like weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists and large-scale illegal immigration. At the same time the Mediterranean – once the cradle of West- ern civilisation – is a strategically important region, with roughly 25% of the energy supply of the EU coming from the countries around the Southern Mediterranean. The region is also important as a trading partner for the Southern NATO and EU countries.

After the end of the East-West conflict NATO started its Mediterranean dialogue (February 1995) with an invitation to Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Mo- rocco and Tunisia to take part in bilateral dialogues with NATO. The dialogue would also allow for multilateral action on a case by case basis. NATO wanted to make use of the positive effects of the Middle East peace process that seemed promising at the time. Later on Jordan and Algeria joined the dialogue. In 1995 the EU began its Barcelona process, which has an even more multi-dimensional approach. It focuses on economic issues and includes twelve dialogue countries.

17 © Rubbettino Although both dialogue mechanisms gathered momentum after 11 Sep- tember 2001 they still have their shortcomings. The main aim is to develop both forms of dialogue into one single, multidimensional approach that will lead to mutually beneficial co-operation with the Mediterranean countries. This kind of collaboration would combine the strength of both organisational and compensate for their weaknesses. At the moment, the Mediterranean dialogue countries are beginning to feel the need for substantial change inside their states and societies in order to be able to achieve sustained economic growth, better education and greater social justice. Now that a historic step has been taken and both NATO and the EU have been joined by many former Warsaw Pact member countries it is time to intensify the dialogue with the Mediterranean states in order to develop a true, beneficial partnership for all participants. In the long run this might lead to the extension of areas of equal security from the EU-and European-NATO countries to the Mediterranean partner countries. In this manner one single “Common Security Area Europe” with equal security for all participants would be formed. Since 2001 four new developments have taken place that have spurred on the work on the intensification of the Mediterranean dialogue with our partner countries: 1) The security concern related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the war against terrorism, the spread of Islamist fundamentalism and illegal immigration and the trafficking of drugs and small arms in combination with the concerns about guaranteed energy supply and free access to the Mediterranean market 2) The need to remedy the shortcomings of the existing dialogue which are: - The self funding basis that constitutes a problem for the Mediter- ranean partner countries - The lacking possibilities for the Mediterranean countries to influence the work program - The still existing mistrust of the Mediterranean countries that the dialogue is a postcolonial Western attempt to gain influence over Ara- bic countries - The limited dimensions the respective dialogue programs as NATO’s dialogue lacking the social-and economic dimension and EU’s agenda lacking the security dimension 3) The fact that the Mediterranean countries are beginning to realise that democratic reform as well as good governance are essential prerequisites for sustained development and stability

18 © Rubbettino 4) The development of a Mediterranean dimension of NATO and the EU with the new member states in the region in Eastern Europe and the Balkans (where security is now guaranteed) and with new partnerships that have been established with the Russian Federation and the Ukraine.

3.2 Living the EU-NATO Strategic Partnership

With the 16 December 2002 EU-NATO joint declaration on ESDP (the so-called Berlin Plus Agreement) both organisations established a strategic partnership on the basis of shared values and the indivisibility of their security in order to be able to meet the challenges to the Euro-Atlantic security of the 21st century. In this sense, both organisations stressed the importance of effective mutual consultations, dialogue and co-operation. The main goal of this strategic partnership is to engage in common initiatives that reinforce both sides but still respect the different nature of the two organisations. At the same time the strategic landscape of European security has changed considerably. Seven new member states will be joining NATO on 2 April. The EU enlargement with 12 new member states will be taking place on 1 May. Consequently, the fluent and ambiguous situation in Eastern and Southeastern Europe will be stabilised by the incorporation a whole region with a long history into the Euro-Atlantic community of common values and common security. For a long time this region was artificially separated from the centre of Europe. Now that most security problems in Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans have been solved and strategic partnerships to the Russia and the Ukraine have been established, the dialogue and co-operation with the Mediterranean states becomes increasingly important. It is now generally recognised that the security of the Euro-Atlantic region is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean and that the Mediterranean dimension is one of the security components of the European security architecture. Although the states around the Mediterranean are geographically united by the sea the various states on the southern and eastern shores differ considerably as regards their economic and demographic development, their resources, their political systems and their political orientation. The attacks of the 11 September 2001, the fundamentalist terrorist threat, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, illegal immigration into the EU, the ongoing war against terrorism and the commitment of the Bush-administration to democratic change in the sphere of Islam has made the

19 © Rubbettino Mediterranean region the focal point of attention and of the kind of preventive co-operation that aims at inducing economic and political development. Naturally NATO and the EU enhanced their efforts to intensify their Mediterranean dialogues. The EU’s so-called “Option-Paper“, the declaration of the Thessaloniki EU-summit and the first meeting of the Political and Security Committee (PSC), in which high ranking representatives of the Mediterranean partner states participated, provided additional momentum to dialogue and co-operation process. The Mediterranean states that participate in NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue have been invited to the NATO summit in Istanbul in June 2004 where the Alliance is planning to inaugurate the Is- tanbul Initiative that is intended to enhance the status of the Mediterranean dialogue. Nevertheless, the NATO Work Programme of the Mediterranean Dia- logue (MDWP) of 2003 and the EU’s “Option Paper” that was elaborated within the framework of the Barcelona Process are two separate efforts that lack the benefits of collaboration. Close co-operation between the two organisations could combine – through joint initiatives – NATO’s impressive security dimension with the more comprehensive approach of the EU-Mediter- ranean dialogue. In this manner the weaknesses of the respective organisations would be compensated for and their specific strengths taken advantage of. Equally, the different NATO and EU member states have different interests and take different views on many things, not the least in the case of their relations to the states of the southern and eastern Mediterranean. Especially the southern NATO states like Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Greece and Turkey have developed close links to the Islamic states in the Mediterranean. Howev- er, the northern NATO or/and EU member states have shown quite limited interest in the abovementioned area. When they have shown interest it has mainly regarded the energy supply and illegal immigration. For historic reasons the Federal Republic of Germany has developed a special relationship to the state of Israel. Nevertheless both NATO and the EU as a whole take a strong interest in stability, peaceful change and development in the Mediterranean. The Italian “Centro Militare di Studi Strategici” (CeMiSS) of the Centre for High Defence Studies of the Italian Armed Forces and the “Bundeswehr transformation center” (ZTBw) of the German Armed Forces have developed the present study. The project is intended to promote co-operation between the different NA- TO countries and support the developing European Security and Defence Poli- cy. At the same time it is an opportunity to take advantage of the many different points of view and to develop joint policy options in the Mediterranean region.

20 © Rubbettino The terrorist attacks of 11 September and the subsequent terrorist activities in Europe and other parts of the world have focused the attention on the threatening security scene that has developed in the Mediterranean, both for the EU states and for the countries in the region. The lack of economic development, the explosive birth rates and the urbanisation have created very young societies and high rates of unemployment. In combination with social injustice these factors are leading to a very unstable socio-economic situation, which is exploited by fundamentalist Islamic groups. At the same time, the pan-Arab and socialist ideology of the former revolutionary regimes has lost (mainly because of the repeated defeats in the wars against Israel) its legitimacy and attraction. The Seven Days War in 1967 caused a renaissance of fundamentalist Is- lamic which have affected parts of the educated middle classes and the lower strata of the Islamic societies. This movement dreamt of a renaissance of Is- lamic power and influence. The Shiite revolution in Iran in 1979 meant that, for the first time, a fundamentalist Islamic movement was able to form a government and transform the society into an Islamic country. Almost all other Islamic states are facing dangerous Islamist opposition movements, ranging form the “Muslim Brotherhood” in Egypt to the terrorist GIA in Algeria that has caused ten thousands of casualties in a bloody civil war. Unresolved disputes (like the dispute over the West-Sahara region between Morocco and Algeria) and rivalries among the Mediterranean Arab states add to the instability of the region. Since September 2000 the peace process between Israel and the Palestin- ian Provisional Authority has come to a halt and violence has flared up with little hope for a satisfying solution in the near future. Therefore, the continuing dramatic situation between the Israeli and the Palestian peoples remains the main reason for the estrangement of the Arabic-Islamic world vis-a-vis the western countries of NATO and the EU. The emergence of the Al-Quaida terrorist network has revealed a new dimension of the terrorist threat. This new form of terrorism does not only seek to overthrow moderate Islamic governments but also strives to spread its ideology to areas outside the traditional Islamic world. The strategy of this new kind of terrorism is to achieve a maximum of psy- chological shock and terror by maximising the number of innocent, civilian casualties. For the Al-Quaida terrorists weapons of mass destruction would not be weapons of last resort, but of prime choice. NATO’s weapons of mass destruction initiative of April 1999, the EU’s Thessaloniki Declaration of a strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction of June 2003 and the National Security Strategy of the Unit-

21 © Rubbettino ed States of September 2002 demonstrate the deep concern of the western world, that such weapons might be made available to terrorists by rogue states or through international criminal activities. Another major threat to European security – as listed in the EU-document “European Security Strategy” of December 2003 – is constituted by the networks of organised crime that deal in drug trafficking, smuggling of small arms and illegal immigration. Failing states that might collapse through bad governance, corruption, civil war or secession, are also closely connected to the abovementioned threats. The emerging new threats are but one side of the coin. At the same time as east-and southeast European security is strengthened, the EU is enlarging its Mediterranean dimension with the entry of Cyprus and Malta into the Union. The “winds of change” are blowing around the globe. In part this can be explained with concepts like “globalisation” and “new information tech- nologies.”The reinforced presence of the United States in the “greater Mid- dle East” pushes some former enemies of the west towards internal reform and a better conduct concerning international law. After the end of the east-west conflict both the EU and NATO have initiated a fruitful dialogue with the non-EU and non-NATO states of the Mediterranean through the Barcelona Process and the Mediterranean Dia- logue. Now it is time to take advantage of all chances and opportunities to transform this dialogue into a kind of co-operation that will be even more beneficial for all the participants.

The Methodical Approach

The goal of this joint research project is to work out more effective ways of organising co-operation in the field of mutual security with the non-EU and non-NATO states of the Mediterranean, to devise new forms and procedures of joint NATO and EU initiatives and to do research on intelligent ways of supporting changes in the direction of extended democracy, human rights and good governance that have already been started by the Mediterranean non EU/NATO states on their own. To achieve this goal, the research project was subdivided into the following chapters: - Italy’s perceptions and interests concerning the Mediterranean situation - Germany’s perceptions and interests concerning the Mediterranean situation

22 © Rubbettino - The perceptions and interests of the non-NATO/EU Mediterranean states concerning the enlargement of NATO and EU and the western countries in general subdivided into the following regional groups: - The Maghreb-states - The Eastern Mediterranean states - The Adriatic states - A stock-taking of NATO’s Mediterranean dialogue - A stock-taking of EU’s Mediterranean dialogue - The specific security problems after 11 September 2001 - Options for improving NATO and EU co-operation - Options for improving regional security - Options for supporting political, economic and social change in the region - Means for supporting political, economic and social change in the region.

Each of these chapters deals with an important aspect of the overall aim. Seen in concert, they enable the reader to adopt a comprehensive approach to this complex problem. For the analysis of the regional perceptions Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya were selected among the Maghreb states while Egypt, Jordan and Israel were selected among the eastern Mediterranean states. The Adriatic dimension will be analysed through an analysis of the points of view of Bosnia Herze- govina, Serbia-Montenegro, Croatia and Albania. Furthermore, useful research has been done on the points of view of the new EU or NATO member states and on the potential EU member Turkey. Although not directly linked to the research interest of this study, these perceptions give a useful background and framework for the overall analysis. These perceptions can be found in the appendix. Chapter 4 evaluates the more general perceptions and interests of the Mediterranean dialogue countries.Chapter 5 deals specifically with the Mediterranean dialogue of NATO and EU. It analyses the perceptions, the means of participation and the interests of the different partner countries. Chapter 5 also analyses the upgrading of the Mediterranean dialogue that is the result of NATO’s Work Program 2003 and of the EU’s “Option-Paper”. European security interests concerning the Mediterranean dialogue countries after 11 September 2001 will also be analysed. The final topic of Chapter 5 is constituted by an evaluation of both the chances of survival and the obstacles that a reinforced Mediterranean dialogue

23 © Rubbettino will encounter in a time that is characterised by the onset of growing threats and at the same time by new opportunities. After having evaluated the present setting of co-operation of NATO and the EU with the Mediterranean dialogue countries CeMiSS and ZTBw propose four final conclusions that might improve the existing dialogue and make use of the opportunities in this historically important epoch. These are: 1) A strategic EU-NATO partnership concerning the Mediterranean dialogue 2) Sub-regional security systems for conflict prevention and crisis management 3) Methods of encouraging and supporting developments towards good governance, human rights and democracy 4) Policy options to induce development in the Mediterranean dialogue partner countries

24 © Rubbettino 4. Part Two: Perceptions of the enlargements

4.1 Effects of the EU and NATO Enlargement on the Mediterranean: Italian and German Points of View

4.1.1 Italian interests

Italy has always had a special relationship to the Mediterranean Sea due to its peculiar geographical position – 80% of its landmass borders the Mediterranean Sea. As a consequence of its geographical position Italy has often voiced the interests of the Mediterranean region inside the European institutions. In this manner it has tried to remind Europe of the importance of the Mediterranean region for Europe’s well being. During the historic era between the end of the Second World War and the end of the Cold War, Italian foreign policy was inspired by three different visions that can be considered the pillars of our country’s international policy during the last fifty years: the establishment, maintenance and strengthening of a solid Atlantic link, the construction of an integrated European community and the process of pursuing an open door policy towards the two main areas of tension and potential crisis, namely the Mediterranean basin and the Soviet bloc. The three pillars of Atlantic integration, European co-operation and the open door policy towards East and South were considered prerequisites for the modernisation and economic growth of the country. During the cold war – due to the limited contacts to the East – the Mediterranean region became the third Italian foreign policy arena after the Transatlantic and European ones. Whereas the first pillar of the Italian foreign policy (the NATO Alliance) was needed to provide strict security for our country, the second pillar (EU integration) was considered to be the best framework for the creation of the social and economic conditions that would be necessary for the modernisation

25 © Rubbettino of the country. The third pillar was constituted by the Mediterranean that was perceived of by several Italian governments as the ideal arena for a limited national foreign policy. As a matter of fact, the lack of organised military and economic regional structures in the Mediterranean area gave Italy bigger margin for attempts at autonomous initiatives. This could be done through the establishment of separate relations to states like Libya, Egypt and Algeria but also to an organisation like the PLO. Italy’s main interests were to secure its energy supply with the help of friendly relations to energy exporting countries and to open these markets to large Italian state industries like FIAT, ENI and Olivetti.

Italy and the Mediterranean in the Nineties After the end of the Cold War one of the main aspirations of the Italian foreign policy has been the hope that Italy would be able to take full advantage of its geographical position in order to spread the influence of multilateral institutions like the EU and NATO to the North African countries. The creation of the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue in 1994 was one of the first achievements of this policy. Even if the EU and NATO enlargement to the East has attained important and strategic results, Italy has remained one of the most convinced sup- porters of the diversion of political interest and resources to the South. De- spite Italy’s strong political commitment the effects of its lobbying have been modest and for the most part, Italy’s Mediterranean policy has remained in- consistent and has not been able to mobilise sufficient political energies and resources to sustain a high-profile policy in the area. One of the reasons for this is related to the great changes that have affected all the three pillars from 1990 onwards: - The first pillar of the Italian foreign policy has been radically transformed by factors like the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the East bloc, the inclusion of the former Warsaw Pact countries in NATO and the EU and the reshaping of the strategic direction of NATO. At the same time threat perceptions concerning hard security have shifted dramatically from conventional and nuclear warfare to the asymmetric threat of terrorist attacks. In its turn this has given way for the growing concern of non- military challenges like illegal trafficking of drugs, arms and human beings and the connections of organised crime to international terrorism. All this has shifted the concept of security from traditional territorial self- defence to crisis prevention abroad.

26 © Rubbettino - The second pillar of the Italian foreign policy – the deepening and widen- ing of the European Union – also underwent profound changes through the drafting of a European constitution and the enlargement of 2004 with ten new member states. Even with the accession of Slovenia, Malta and southern Cyprus the Mediterranean dimension of the EU will shift to the East by strengthening the Nordic and Baltic geopolitical element, whereas the accession of further states with a Mediterranean orientation seems to be not clear and straight enough to allow to predict if they will join the Union by the end of the decade. The most recent division among the European countries regards their position on the issue of the US policy towards Iraq. This will make it more difficult to formulate a common perception of and strategy against the Mediterranean countries in the foreseeable future. - With regards to the third pillar the Italian capacity for an autonomous political Mediterranean initiative has been substantially reduced both by the new global security issues that NATO is confronting and by the increasingly active role of the United States in the Mediterranean. The new enlarged dimension of the EU and the protracted process of developing a common European Security and Defence Policy had the same effect. The great changes that have affected the EU and NATO (the first two pillars of Italian foreign policy) both with regards to their extension and nature and the new developments in the Mediterranean region have resulted into a reduction of the political margins that for a long time allowed Italy to develop its own Mediterranean initiatives. Both the political exclusion of Italy from US attempts at settling the Is- raeli-Palestinian question and the failure of the Conference on Security and co-operation in the Mediterranean launched by Italy and Spain at the beginning of the nineties are clear signs of the obstacles that Italian foreign policy in the Mediterranean is facing now that the political and economical conditions of the last fifty years have been modified completely. The margin of political initiatives that Italy has pursued in the past in the Mediterranean region has been clearly shaped by the fact that the southern dimension of NATO has been of a secondary importance compared to the East- ern one, leaving therefore political space for an original and partially autonomous Italian Mediterranean foreign policy. Italy’s national role in the Mediterranean remains marginal. Basically it is restricted to the following areas: the maintenance of a politically sustainable energy supply policy towards Algeria, Libya and Egypt, the introduction of good governance, the regulation

27 © Rubbettino of the immigration fluxes and last but not least, the ambition to contribute to the solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through economic initiatives (by striving for the adoption of a European “Marshall Plan” for Palestine and the creation of a European Investment Bank for the Reconstruction and Develop- ment of the Mediterranean Region).

Policy Approaches and Interests It has already been mentioned that the key Italian interest in the Mediter- ranean is to extend the degree of involvement of multilateral institutions like the EU and NATO in the main political and security issues that are affecting the security and stability of the Mediterranean region. The main reasons for this include the following factors: - The “moral” superiority of the multilateral approach over the national one. It has a far greater legitimacy and does not remind of neo-colonial- ism. - With this approach many more resources can be mobilised compared to what a national approach could do. Only a multinational effort makes it possible to mobilise enough resources to address the main regional problems. However, the greatest weakness of a multilateral approach is the difficul- ty to achieve permanent political consensus among all the states that can guarantee the necessary efficiency. In terms of security, the main Italian concerns are for the risk of an esca- lation of terrorist activities in the Mediterranean. Even if terrorism has been present in abundance in the Mediterranean region during the last decades, the present phase of global terrorism and the rise of rampant violent Islamic Mil- itancy is extremely dangerous not only because it represents a challenge to the West and to the non-Islamic world but also because it is aimed at destabilising the Islamic moderate governments. The risk of the multiplication of Al- gerian style crises is one of the worst scenarios that can be imagined for a country like Italy that will be one of the first to be affected by the eventual collapse of state institutions on the Northern African coast. Another serious problem for Italy is related to the phenomenon of the trafficking of human beings across the Mediterranean Sea. Especially during the last few years the Mediterranean has become a suitable conduit for the smuggling of refugees and immigrants to Western Europe. Nevertheless, in recent years substantial progress has been made in this field through the bilateral relations between Italy and Tunisia that are now considered a model for co-operation on migration issues in the area. After having taken successful

28 © Rubbettino measures against illegal immigration, Italy and Tunisia are now working on “second generation” agreements that will include the cultural and professional formation of legal migrants. With regards to the Arab-Israeli conflict the Italian point of view is that the only way out of the crisis is to pursue a parallel path that could put an end to violence in the area through mutual concessions on security issues and the reciprocal acceptance of the right of both Israel and Palestine to exist as states. This process would be sustained by an economic reconstruction plan for Palestine. A reasonable and effective policy could be to increase the efforts that are made at isolating the conflict from the rest of the region and to put in- to force a strategy aimed at reducing the consequences of the conflicts in the other Mediterranean states. Since the stability, security and prosperity of the Mediterranean region remains the first priority of the Italian Mediterranean policy, Italy is particularly keen to nourish the dialogue with the governments of Southern Mediter- ranean not only in terms of Security – hard or soft – but also in terms of opportunities and cultural exchange. From an Italian standpoint these two factors have the same priority as the security related measures. Economic development in the Mediterranean states is a prerequisite for peaceful change and stability. For this reason Italy is a strong supporter of horizontal integration among the North African economies. This kind of economic integration could be achieved by a grouping of countries into smaller units like the Agadir Group (Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan). This approach has been stressed by the special relevance that Italy attaches to the 5 + 5 Dialogue (Italy, France, Spain, Portugal, Malta, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya and Mauritania) that started in 1990 in Rome and that Italy contributed to resume in 2001 after it had been suspended from 1992 to 1999 due to UN sanctions against Libya. Unlike most countries in the EU Italy attaches high importance to the economic factor as an opportunity for its own economy as well as an instrument for the creation of conditions for stability. As a whole, the importance of the Mediterranean markets for the total of EU commercial trade is minimal: in 2001 it amounted to only just 189,578 millions of Euro which represents only about 3.0% of the exports and about 3.4% of the imports of the EU. Nevertheless, for some EU countries the importance of the Mediter- ranean in commercial terms is higher – in the case of Greece, significantly higher – than the EU average. Among the EU countries Greece is the biggest exporter to the MEDA area with a preponderance of the Mediterranean markets on its economy of 15.2%. In proportion to their total national exports

29 © Rubbettino Italian, French and Spanish exports to MEDA countries are higher than the EU average, being respectively 5.8%, 5.1% and 4.6%. On the import side, it is Italy who is the first European commercial partner for Mediterranean countries. Italy imports almost 7% of its total import from the (non-European) Mediterranean countries with a relevant weight on energy products (almost 70%), which provides them with relevant revenue in Euros: 17.5 Million Euros yearly. The country that is getting the biggest share of this amount (28%) is Libya, followed by Algeria (24.3%) Turkey (16.8%) Tunisia (8.7%) Syria (6.9%) and Egypt (6.4%).

The sub-regional dimension The Mediterranean basin does not constitute a coherent and integrated “regional system”. The reasons for this lies in the profound cultural, linguistic, legal and social differences that in their turn are the products of different and complex historic experiences. Every assessment of the political and security situation in the Mediterranean requires a different and more complex approach than the one usually employed in the study of other regional international systems. Consequently the Mediterranean basin should be seen as a cluster of different sub – regional systems that are composed by states bound together by historical, cultural, geographical and linguistic ties. Thus the analysis of the regional economic integration is an important aspect not only because it is possible to measure the variables more accurately, but also because economic co-operation is one – and the one that has gained most ground – of the three pillars that were introduced when the Barcelona Process was initiated in 1995 (the first pillar refers to political and security co-operation and the third to social and cultural co-operation). Although the idea of achieving economic integration among Mediterranean countries is an old project of the Barcelona process, the failure to achieve a comprehensive, coherent, integrated Arab development and the consequent reliance on limited domestic markets or integration with foreign markets have adversely affected Arab economic and social development. Probably the impossibility of attaining horizontal integration is the result of both a lack of political will among the political elites and the lack of complementarity between the national economies of the region. If we consider the economic structures of the five North African Maghreb countries it is clear that they have little to sell to each other, as can be seen by the insignificant share that intra-regional trade represents in any single country’s external trade (table below).

30 © Rubbettino Intra Regional Mediterranean Trade. Source: FEMISE 2002 Annual Report

Intra regional trade in the Southern Mediterranean can be considered marginal since exports are 7 times lower than exports to Europe and more than 12 times lower for imports; the largest share of south – south trade is composed of petroleum products. This fact can be explained by the: - Weak complementarity of the economies which means that these countries have little to offer and are of very little importance to the economies of the neighbouring countries - The protectionist attitude of most of the MEDA countries that results in high trade tariffs - The lack of a horizontal transport infrastructure which in its turn results in very high transport costs A comparison of average custom duties evidentiates the protectionist attitude of most MEDA countries whose duties are not only much higher than those of the EU, USA and Japan but also higher than those of the former com- munist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The Barcelona process initiated a pattern of dialogue and integration with the Mediterranean countries that is mainly based on economic and social integration. The most significant aim of this integration process is the creation of a free trade area in the Mediterranean based on economic and political principles of liberal democratic origins. The strategy of creating a single Mediterranean geo-economic region is encountering enormous problems and until now it has yielded no positive results. It seems that the soft issue of a single MEDA geo-economical region cannot be considered a short to medium turn goal, not even inside the framework

31 © Rubbettino Average of custom Duties applied to manufactured goods, minerals and metals. Source The impact of EU enlargement on the Mediterranean Partners, Femise Report 2003 of the Barcelona process (the creation of a North – South/EU – MEDA free trade area by 2010). Viewed from the Italian perspective, one should put aside the “greater Mediterranean” approach and encourage, develop and promote the geopolitical differentiation of the Mediterranean in three sub-regional areas. It will then become a realistic policy to approach each of them with a different mixture of political and economic instruments, in order to reshape the bilateral relations to this end and to search for different partnerships with third countries in all of these areas. By encouraging the division of the Mediterranean in- to different regional political and economic sub-entities Italy feels that it is contributing towards the isolation of potential sources of tension. At the same time this is a way of allowing for the extension of co-operation between the EU and those (Arab) Mediterranean countries that are prepared to make the strategic choice of a EU integration model. The selected sub-regions are: - The southeastern Mediterranean countries: Egypt, the Palestinian Provi- sional Authority, Jordan, Syria, and Israel. (See Chapter 4.3.1.1.) - The southwestern Mediterranean countries: Marocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya (See Chapter 4.3.1.2.) - The eastern Mediterranean and Adriatic Sea countries: Croatia, Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro (view Chapter 4.4.)

32 © Rubbettino Recent developments The birth of the Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for Dialogue between Cultures, the evolution of the Euro-Mediterranean Investment Facil- ity and Partnership and the inclusion, with consultative functions, of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly in the Barcelona Process, are some of the more significant results achieved on the occasion of the 6th Eu- ro-Mediterranean Conference that was held in Naples on 2 and 3 Decem- ber 2003. The Naples Conference, whose participants included the Foreign Minis- ters of the enlarged EU and the Foreign Ministers of Third Mediterranean Countries in the Barcelona Process (Israel, PNA, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Jor- dan, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey) contributed to a relaunching of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership that was launched in Barcelona in 1995 with the 1st Euro-Mediterranean Conference. The new “Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly” will be a consultative forum made up of 240 Deputies: 120 from Mediterranean partner countries and 120 from the EU (75 appointed by national parliaments and 45 by the European Parliament). The first session will be held in Greece during the first semester of 2004. The sessions will be structured internally into three

33 © Rubbettino parliamentary committees that will have it as their task to develop the three Euro-Mediterranean areas of competence: political co-operation and security, economic and financial co-operation and social, human and cultural co-operation. The Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for Dialogue between Cultures was also founded in Naples. The Foundation is intended to act as a catalyser for all those initiatives that aim at increasing the dialogue and work for “reciprocal understanding” between the peoples that live along the shores of the Mediterranean. Rome was proposed as a candidate for the Foundation’s headquarters, and is presently in competition with Alexandria, La Valletta and Nicosia for the position. As regards the Euro-Mediterranean Investment Facility and Partner- ship (FEMIP) the foreign secretaries have approved the decision with which the ECOFIN Council in November reinforced its structure. In this manner the range of operative instruments and financial endowments was enriched. Economic co-operation between the EU and MEDA countries under the auspices of the Barcelona process is one of the mainstays of the Italian approach to the Mediterranean region. For this reason Italy is actively working for closer collaboration in the field of counter terrorism between NATO and the MEDA countries. In this regard Italy is in favour of including some ME- DA countries in the PFP programme. Italy proposes military co-operation with those countries that are wishing to join a strategic partnership for Secu- rity and Stability in the Mediterranean. In this context Italy is in favour of including Libya in the strategic alliance against terrorism. The first step of this policy could be to include Libya in the Barcelona process.

4.1.2 German interests

Since the end of the cold war and the reunification of Germany, the Ger- man government has seen itself faced with the responsibility of pushing forward the European project. During the era of chancellor Helmut Kohl, the main interests of the German foreign policy concerning the integration process were focused on the foundation of a Monetary Union and the stabilisation of eastern and southeast Europe. For the further development of the Union various geographical, cultural and historic aspects have led to different opinions and interests among the member states. The Mediterranean policy is only one of several policy fields where these differences have become apparent.

34 © Rubbettino The Mediterranean Dialogue of the EU was established at the Council’s meeting in Barcelona in November 1995. With the “Barcelona declaration”1 a co-operative framework was established that encompassed social, cultural, economic and security issues. In a way it was seen as a counterweight to the integration process of the Union towards the East. In the beginning German interests focused on the stabilising effects of that kind of co-operation, but the federal government was unwilling to spend too much effort on the process. The German focus was still concentrated on the enlargement project in Eastern Europe and the stability-and security-building initiatives in the Balkans. On the one hand there were historical reasons for this (especially as regards the German policy towards Poland and the Czech Republic), on the other hand there were also economic reasons. Being faced with the establishment of a new EU border in the East, Ger- many was very interested in securing the financial and economic prosperity of the new member states, so that there would be no uncontrolled migration that could affect the German labour market negatively. Security issues were also seen as primarily concentrated to the southeast corner of Europe that was proving itself to be very unstable and was falling into a wide range of civil wars and ethnic conflicts. Therefore, the German interests and points of view as regards the Mediter- ranean Dialogue were only very vague and left the main approach to southern EU member states like Italy, Spain and Greece. In 2002 the Euro Med Dialogue countries adopted the “Valencia Action Plan”2 that stresses the security aspects of the Barcelona process. This decision went along with an overall new threat assessment, in the wake of the terrorist-attacks of 11 September 2001. This era of new security thinking enforced the already existing integration process of the European foreign and security policy (CFSP). Considering the new challenges the EU had to face, Germany became more aware of the broad range of policy-fields that were directly or indirectly linked to the field of security.

National interests German foreign interest cannot be analysed by looking at German foreign policy alone. Germany considers itself part of a European family, where national foreign policy concepts accumulate into a common European point of view, especially regarding the foreign policy towards regions that are not in one’s direct or traditional sphere of strategic security interest (Africa, Asia, Middle East). German security interests in the Mediterranean can only be analysed by linking it to a bi-or multilateral focus.

1 http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/bd.htm 2 http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/conf/val/action.pdf

35 © Rubbettino Germany is truly interested in gaining a more active role in formulating the international security policy agenda. The top-down approach of the Solana Paper is consequently seen as a first step towards the establishment of a European grand strategy. At the same time German politicians are afraid of getting drawn into a crisis that they are not capable of dealing with. For this reason the German government appreciates the ongoing process – without specifying clear objectives at present.

Main Focus The German policy towards the Mediterranean area is primarily focused on the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli conflict. This has two main reasons. The first is Germany’s historic and moral responsibility to guarantee the existence of the sovereign state of Israel. Since the first diplomatic contacts between the Federal Republic of Germany (under chancellor Konrad Adenauer) and Israel, and especially since the reunification in 1990, the diplomatic efforts of Germany have been led by a sense of affirmation and strengthening of this special relationship that is based on the devastating loss of lives that was the result of the genocide of the European Jews during the Nazi Regime. Secondly, the German government recognises the Arab-Israeli conflict as the main source of violence and destabilisation in the region and that this influences the whole Southern and Eastern Mediterranean region and could again, after 1972, threaten the energy resources that Europe is dependent on. Without finding a solution for the Middle East peace process there cannot be a long-term stabilisation effect in the Middle East. A positive influence on the whole Mediter- ranean area is therefore closely linked to the resolution of this conflict.

Security Considering this focus on the Eastern Mediterranean it does not come as a surprise that the German government has always attempted to combine national perceptions concerning the peace process with European foreign policy initiatives in the area. But this dual approach has proven to be of poor progress, mainly due to the fact that the EU countries do not share a common view of how to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. During the council’s presidency in 1999, the German foreign minister Joschka Fischer represented the Union’s criticism against Israel’s settlement policy, which forced him to be more radical in his statements than the official national German position on that issue. The balance between a strong commitment for Israel’s security and German acceptance of the Palestinian right of self-determination is not always easy to achieve, even when it is argued that the latter serves Israel’s own security.

36 © Rubbettino During periods of violent conflict, especially since the beginning of the second Intifada in 2000, also known as the Al-Aqsa Intifada, this balancing approach often results in a more passive policy towards the region. Since a one-sided approach could give both parties in the conflict the impression of being neglected, German attempts have always aimed at putting forward a comprehensive initiative. In order to be recognised, such an initiative has to be supported by the EU, the United States or Russia. The important role of the so-called Middle East quartet (EU, US, Russia and the UN) must not be forgotten. This leads to a multilateral policy that renders national efforts in the fields of foreign and security policy towards the Mediterranean region almost impossible and undesirable. Security in the Mediterranean is closely connected to the issue of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the uncontrolled spreading of small arms. Most of this is connected to the Middle East that is the main source of new conventional threats. The strict German export con- trols are the only national measures that can be taken in order to prevent negative influence on the armament market in the area. Stricter control of the proliferation of WMD can first and foremost be guaranteed by the implementation of the kind of multilateral systems that will be analysed later.

Terrorism The terrorist attacks on the Tunisian island of Djerba (11 April 2002) and the diplomatic struggle for the liberation of the German hostages in Al- geria and Mali (2002/2003) confirmed that the new threat assessment that was developed after 9/11 was right. Both cases show the risks for Europe and Germany. These risks can trace their ultimate sources to the Mediter- ranean. Religious fundamentalists are using the vast spaces of the desert for the training and recruiting of their terrorist groups. These spaces are prac- tically beyond the control of the regular police and military forces. Failed states add to this problem. On the one hand they are of no help to the West- ern world in its fight against terrorism. What is even worse is that the lack of social, political and economic reforms in the Southern Mediterranean could drive even more people towards radical groups. Those sympathisers of the radicals that are already living in the EU represent a great peril to Ger- many and Europe. It is consequently in Germany’s interest to support the stabilisation of the Mediterranean area. Otherwise several southern states in the Arab-Mediterranean region might be facing serious internal problems that could result in civil war (Algeria, etc.) and open the door for military conflicts. By helping the North African and Middle East states in their fight

37 © Rubbettino against terrorist groups that are operating on or from their territory, the Ger- man policy could help stabilise and secure the region as a whole and at the same time help prevent a spill over effect that would find its outlet in the Eu- ropean continent. The German government is prepared to do anything in its might in order not to become involved in military conflicts in the area. At present a German military commitment in the Mediterranean is far from realistic.

Migration Security is also related to the migration of people from North Africa and the Middle East to Europe. The importance of this aspect can be discerned by its inclusion in the “Solana-Strategy Paper”3, which is a first draft of a future European strategic concept. The relevance of this issue does not only depend on the fact that terrorist groups might cross the German borders, but also on the destabilising effect of the uncontrolled migration of ten thousands of people who seek a better future in the EU and Germany. With the “Schengen Treaty”4 in place no EU member country is left alone with the responsibility for its migration problems. Member states have to act together with the rest of the EU if they want to secure their borders from illegal immigrants effectively. Considering the fact that most of the current immigration has economic grounds, the problem of migration must be addressed not only by looking at its consequences, but also by dealing with its roots. Therefore, the Barcelona Process serves as a development project for the region. Territorial conflicts, economic and social injustice and the growing importance of reli- giously motivated terrorism create an urgent incentive for people in the region to leave their home in order to look for a more secure future in Europe. The security of Southern Europe is closely connected to the social, economic and security problems of the southern (Arab-) Mediterranean states. The new threat assessment has given the German policy a new awareness. Open internal borders in Europe, uncontrolled migration through its outer borders and unstable security conditions outside Europe are all factors that are closely connected to Germany’s own security. Therefore it has the same interests in dealing with the migration flows as the rest of Europe.

3 “A secure Europe in a better world”, presented by Javier Solana at the European Coun- cil in Thessaloniki on 20th of June 2003. 4 http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/willkommen/einreisebestimmungen/schen- gen_html

38 © Rubbettino Economy Concerning the economic interests in the region it can clearly be said that Germany could profit from a more active role in the Mediterranean. If the establishment of a free-trade-zone that includes the states of North Africa and the Middle East is to take place by the year 2010 (a main objective of the Barcelona Process) a huge amount of investments is needed in order to prepare the area even for small-scale economic integration with Europe. Gaining access to the regional markets and securing the free access to energy resources are major factors for the EU. As long as there is no political progress towards a deepening of the Mediterranean Dialogue there will not be any big business rush towards the region either. Nor will there be any foreign investments. Sta- bilisation is the key aspect for investment in this area but it can only be attained through prosperity and social –, economic-and prudent political reforms. Regarding the security interests, the dilemma for the German policy shows itself in the difficult balance between maintaining economic ties with the Arab states and a special relationship with Israel at the same time.

Focus Considering the four different approaches towards the Mediterranean Dialogue interests – security, terrorism, migration and economy – the main focus of the German policy is concentrated on solving the Arab-Israeli conflict and stabilising the whole Mediterranean region. Only good progress in resolv- ing this conflict will help push forward the Barcelona Process as a whole instead of restricting it to economic relations. Major economic and security interests will be influenced by it. Therefore German diplomatic and political ad- vances that refer to the European foreign policy are of great concern. Nation- al German initiatives (trade aspects apart) that propose a further intensification of the Euro Med Dialogue have almost no chance of success. This is mainly due to Germany’s fear of having to face the disapproval of either side of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the several European structures dealing with the economic or security aspects of the Mediterranean Dialogue.

Activities on the multilateral level Germany is participating in the United Nations Conference on the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons. In July 2001 a programme was signed by this conference that focuses on preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit small arms trade in all its aspects. The participating states agreed on the necessity to undertake measures on a national, regional and global level. One major aspect concerning the implementation of the programme encourages the

39 © Rubbettino states to establish and strengthen co-operation and partnerships at all levels among international and intergovernmental organisations5. Interestingly enough the EU countries coordinated themselves very well and constituted the only group of states to submit an overall plan of action6. Once again it seems obvious that the options are very limited for national interests within the framework of multilateral bodies that deal with specific security related issues. In its 2003 national report on the implementation of the UN Programme of Action, Germany did not mention the role of the Mediterranean Dialogue or the Barcelona Process with one word. Instead the German policy that supported the Action Programme was mainly directed towards southeastern Eu- rope. No southern member state of the Mediterranean Dialogue is mentioned in the report. Germany is part of four major proliferation control regimes (The Masse- na Arrangement, The Nuclear Supplier Group, The Australia group and The Missile Technology Control Regime). As a participant, Germany always ex- presses great concern about the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons in conflict areas like the Middle East and East Africa. If one takes a look at the annual plenary meeting reports it becomes clear that most of these control regimes focus their work on gaining new co-operation possibilities with former Soviet states like the Ukraine and Belarus. Iraq and the Arab world are seen as a region of serious conflicts, but a Mediterranean policy is not on the agenda.

The Enlargement of the EU – Effects on the German Mediterranean Policy The enlargement process will not be finished with the entry of ten new member states in 2004. Several other states in eastern and southeastern Eu- rope are hoping to become candidates in the next enlargement process. This will keep the attention and major German interests directed towards the east and southeast of the European continent. And yet, a new awareness can be discerned in the German policy: an awareness of the way in which the Mediterranean directly influences European and German security. Germany welcomes the efforts to strengthen the dialogue and co-operation with the southern Mediterranean states, especially in the field of security matters. At the same time, the German policy is not interested in raising false expectations inside those countries. In contrast to the economic integration, the establishment of ESDP is not yet finalised. The EU is taking its first small

5 UN Document (A/CONF.192/15), Programme of Action to prevent, combat and erad- icate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects. 6 Official Journal of the European Community (2001/C351/01), Third annual report according to operative provision 8 of the EU Code of Conduct on arms export.

40 © Rubbettino steps on its way to become an international security actor. However, the problems of capabilities, standardisation and interoperability have not yet been solved. In Germany an all too fast security related approach to the Euro Med Dialogue is seen as a potential risk for the establishment of a common ESDP. It is feared that the inclusion of too many partners will water down the Euro- pean self-definition in the field of its security policy. Therefore, German interests aim at a further intensification of the Barcelona Process as a whole and at a more comprehensive approach to the Mediterranean area, whilst avoiding misperceptions and over-hurried steps. Transparency is a key objective for achieving both.

Outlook Various factors are responsible for the German perceptions and interests in the Mediterranean region. The German policy concerning the Euro Med Dialogue does not define itself from an isolated national point of view. Instead it is given substance by a mixture of national and multinational initiatives. They all have their main objective in common: namely that of stabilising the region by finding a solution to the Middle East conflict that has been identified as the major obstacle to the intensification of the dialogue. Consequent- ly, German interests in the Mediterranean are closely connected to the development of the peace process. It is very difficult for the German policy to play a major role in this process; a good economic relationship with the Arab states, acceptance of the Palestinian right to self-determination, and the special relationship with Israel do not always fit together when it comes to proposing security related issues and initiatives for the Middle East. This line of action easily leads to misinter- pretations and might be mistaken for partiality. Nevertheless it might be an advantage that Germany is seen in a positive light by all the conflict parties and has no special economic interests in the region. For this reason Germany would be suited to take over the role of mediator, if this is desired. As a result, the German Mediterranean policy is closely connected to Eu- ropean initiatives. Within the Euro Med Dialogue specific changes towards a more comprehensive approach to the region are regarded with sympathetic caution. Nevertheless, the integration of the southern Mediterranean states in- to ESDP is stalled at any price. The main focus lies on information exchange and on the confidence-building effects of the dialogue. A more active role for Germany could be provided by the inclusion of security relates issues in the dialogue on a multinational level.

41 © Rubbettino 4.2 Core findings on selected national perceptions

4.2.1 The new EU member states

4.2.1.1 Cyprus With the entrance of Cyprus and Malta the European Union is strengthening its Mediterranean dimension but it is also getting nearer to the potential trouble spots in the region. The island of Cyprus itself constitutes one of those spots. Since 1974 the island has been divided into the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and the Greek Republic of Cyprus in the south. Since then about 35000 Turkish troops with 300 tanks are deployed in the North of the island. There exists a UN peace plan from November 2002 that would lead to the reunification of the island. This plan envisions the creation of a bi-state federation, territorial adjustments between the two entities, and a phased right of return for displaced Cypriots and a notable reduction of Turkish troops on the island. Since 1974 the Republic of Cyprus bases her security on a close co-operation with Greece which is based on the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 and the Joint Defence Doctrine of 1993 which provides for automatic military assistance by Greece in case of a (Turkish) attack. It has been hoped that the entry into the EU could help solve the problems in so far as it will add incentives to the north to join the more prosper- ous southern part and thus to enjoy the same access to markets and the same EU subsidies, and so forth. The Republic of Cyprus is a staunch supporter of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). It sees the ESDP as a suitable tool for the strengthening of Europe’s credibility in the Mediterranean Region. As the Republic of Cyprus is aware of the strong military preponderance of Turkey in general and the Turkish forces on the island in particular it is trying to solve its security problems with the EU Membership and its trust in the United Nations. Excessively close relations to NATO are seen as detrimental but Cyprus is also aware of the fact that certain NATO capabilities are indispensable for independent EU operations; the decision to use the ESDP should be free from NATO influence.

The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus The TRNC’s security analysis is predominantly focused on the Cyprus issue and what it perceives as a “massive military build-up” by the Republic of

42 © Rubbettino Cyprus within the framework of the “Joint Military Doctrine” of the Repub- lic of Cyprus and Greece. The entrance of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU before a settlement has been reached and before the entrance of Turkey into the Union, is actually seen by the TRNC government as a major hindrance to the solution of the Cyprus question and a generally destabilising act for the region. It will “disturb the external balance” between Turkey and Greece in Cyprus and the internal balance between the two peoples on the island. The TRNC believes that the entrance of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU without the entry of the TRNC or Turkey into the European Union will lead to a permanent division of the island. The TRNC is determined to counter any threat to her sovereignty or any crises will be answered in consultation with Turkey.

4.2.1.2 Malta Malta consistently plays a very active role in the international organisations such as the UN, OSCE and within the Barcelona process and as a member of the Mediterranean Forum. It is also a vigorous proponent of a “Con- ference on Security and co-operation in the Mediterranean”. The Maltese foreign policy has the goal of achieving as many bilateral agreements as possible that will facilitate good neighbourly relations – integration into the European Union is the preferred means of achieving this. Malta plays a consistent and very active role within international organisations such as the UN, OSCE and within the Barcelona process as well as a member of the Mediterranean Forum and as a vigorous proponent of a “Con- ference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean”. Malta supports the mechanism of “enhanced” or “deepened co-operation” within the Barcelona process and suggests that the whole process should be made more flexible especially concerning the sub-regionalisation. (i.e. the creation of sub- regional free trade zones as a first step). Maltese high court judges have seen no contradiction between neutrality and participation in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) of the EU, since both are voluntary and not binding. Consequently Malta wants to play the role of an “active neutral” agent. The role Malta envisions for the CFSP and ESDP in the region is one of cooperative security and confidence building; a goal that fits into the pattern of traditional Maltese efforts. As Malta sees itself as a bridge to the Mediterranean countries and as a mediator it also considers itself a real asset for the EU’s Mediterranean dialogue. Malta promotes so-called “enhanced co-operation” inside the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean dia-

43 © Rubbettino logue at the same time as it is pursuing a policy of “qualified pacifism”, a combination of neutrality and a strong reluctance to resort to the use of military force. In the military field Malta is cooperating closely with Italy. The Maltese contribution to the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) was trained in Italy and will, in case of an operation, be deployed as part of an Italian unit and with access to the Italian chain of supply. The professional Army of Mal- ta aims at achieving complete inter-operability with the Italian Army and emphasises its CIMIC duties that constitute its contribution to the EU-operations. A further strengthening of the political union is seen with scepticism. Es- pecially the aim of some members to include a mutual defence clause (ART. V) in the EU treaties that would change the EU into a military alliance is very difficult to accept for neutral Malta and it would entail constitutional amend- ments. The relationship of Malta to NATO seems rather strained. The Govern- ment of Prime Minister Adami has not entered the Partnership for Peace programme again since the Labour government left the programme in 1996 in order to concentrate its attention on the EU activities. Good relations to Libya and Tunisia are of great importance for Malta, primarily for economic reasons. The creation of a free trade area between Mal- ta and Tunisia and, in the long run, with Libya will create a sub-region that, it is hoped by Malta, will spread its beneficial effects to the whole region. Mal- ta enters the EU with the clear goal of being an advocate for Mediterranean concerns inside the union. Nevertheless, Malta’s “Trans-Mediterranean security relations” are advantageous for the EU’s long-term goal of a further integration of the European, North African and Eastern shores of the Mediter- ranean. Malta sees the creation of a triangle of prosperity and security between itself, Tunisia and Libya as a long-term goal.

4.2.1.3 Slovenia From the very beginning of its independence, Slovenia’s national interests have been strategically oriented towards the entrance into NATO and the EU. This has been so not only because Slovenia sees itself as politically, economically and culturally deeply rooted in the European context, but also because Slovenia wanted to solve the pressing security problems in the Balkans. A national consensus that includes all parties has been reached on these issues. In the referendum of 23 March 2003 90% of the population voted in favour of

44 © Rubbettino EU membership and 66% voted in favour of NATO membership. Neverthe- less it seems that most of the benefits for Slovenia will be gained by entering the NATO military alliance. According to Slovenia’s point of view NATO membership would greatly increase its chances of access to the leadership in the allied capitals and it would also give Slovenia an important role in the most authoritative forum where the future of the transatlantic relations will be take shape. The integration into the EU is seen as a process that in the long run will result in economic gains for Slovenia; the costs connected to the upgrading of the Slovenian country system to EU levels are partly compensated by the access to structural funds. Otherwise, the NATO integration process is generally considered too expensive compared to the country’s security risks. Recent polls indicate that the population is feeling more secure as regard to conventional military threats, whereas it has become more aware of non- military threats. This is especially the case with ecological and socio-economic threats but it also regards crime and political instability. From a geopolitical point of view, Slovenia does not see itself as a country of the Balkans or South-Eastern Europe but mainly as “the most southern part of central Europe” and as an important juncture between Mediterranean and Southeast Europe; Slovenia is also a link between two NATO members: Italy and Hungary. Even if Slovenia prefers not being included in the geopolitical region of southeastern Europe, the country’s ambition is to become the gate to Southeastern Europe and to act as a herald and interpreter of the transatlantic policy in the region. Slovenia unreservedly supports the activities of the EU in the framework of its Common Foreign and Security Policy at the same time as it is lobbying for increased focus on the Balkans and the Mediterranean region in the Com- mon European Security and Defence Policy. The political and economic knowledge of Slovenia in this region could be an asset for the EU. Slovenia does not want the European CESDP-process to construct a new military union in Europe that would try to compete with NATO or even re- place it. For this reason Slovenia warmly welcomed the Laeken Agreement in which the CESDP’s partial operational status was declared. The main trends of Slovenian foreign policy in the nineties have been concentrated on a strengthening of the links to the Central European states and mostly with its neighbours Austria, Hungary and Italy. Although it constitutes a natural hinterland for the Republic of Slovenia, the Mediterranean dimension was given too little weight for a while due to the need to concentrate the political and economic resources elsewhere. But now it is foreseeable that in

45 © Rubbettino the future more resources and efforts will be dedicated to the creation of a national Mediterranean policy. Special attention will be paid to crisis areas and illegal migration in this region. These are two other elements of increasing importance for the Slovenian national security. As early as the end of 1994 Slovenia expressed its interest in increased participation in the European Mediterranean policy. Now, as the integration into the EU is drawing to a close, Slovenia has officially stressed the importance of rediscovering its maritime dimension. The problem is that the Mediterranean focus of Slovenia’s foreign policy should not be completely ab- sorbed by the bilateral relations to Croatia. The two countries have a number of unresolved disputes between themselves, especially as regards the still un- defined maritime border between them and Slovenia’s access to the international waters through a passage right (or a corridor) across the Croatian territorial waters.

4.2.2 The Would-be EU Members

4.2.1.2 Turkey During the Cold War Turkey was part of the Western alliance. For a long time it has contributed to European and regional security and consequently to the strengthening of freedom and democracy. Turkish importance for NATO during the cold war was relevant due to its geopolitical position: it shares its longest border with the former Soviet Union and it was consequently responsible for the defence of one third of the Alliance’s land frontiers against the Warsaw Pact. The disappearance of a great conventional enemy after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union gave place for the rise of a number of non-traditional, asymmetric security threats and risks. These threats and risks include terrorism, regional instabilities, separatist micro-and ethnic nationalism, fundamentalism, organised crime, drug-and human trafficking, mass migration and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their de- livery means. The terrorist attacks of September 11 against the US and the recent attacks in Istanbul have clearly showed that terrorism can no more be considered a domestic issue that should be take care of by the different national states. As Turkey lies at the centre of a triangle that can be drawn between the conflict-ridden Balkans, Middle East and Caucasus and at the same time at crossing points of several borders its strategic relevance remains high. The Turkish point of view stresses the importance of safeguarding the country’s territorial integrity, of combating asymmetric threats like terrorism,

46 © Rubbettino sabotage, organised crime, the disruption of the flow of vital resources and the uncontrolled movements of large numbers of people as a consequence of armed conflicts. Turkey considers stability and security as two pillars for crisis prevention. For this reason Turkey promotes regional economic co-operation in order to address economic challenges at an early stage. In this context Turkey has pio- neered the creation of the Black Sea Economic Co-operation Zone. In recent years Turkey has contributed considerably to specific regional initiatives such as the southeast European co-operation Process (SEECP) that is composed by Turkey, Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania, FYROM/Macedonia, Greece, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia (as an observer). Another Turkish initiative in the Balkans is the Multinational Peace Force of Southeast Europe (MPFSEE) that originates from a Turkish proposal in 1997. This force consists of Turkey, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Macedo- nia, and Romania. USA, Slovenia and Croatia participate in the MPFSEE as observers. Since September 1989 its headquarters have been situated in Plov- div/Bulgaria. The location of the MPFSEE headquarters will rotate among member countries and will be situated in Istanbul in 2007-2011. Under this force operates an on-call brigade (SEEBRIG) composed of forces assigned by the participant countries. This brigade has been declared operational as of 1 May 2001. The main objective of the MPFSEE is to contribute to the security of the Euro-Atlantic area and to foster good neighbourly relations, co-operation and interoperability among the southeastern European countries. Through its role as an important confidence-building measure the MPFSEE also contributes to the maintenance of peace and stability in the region. In the Balkans Turkey has participated in all operations led by NATO since 1995: IFOR, SFOR, KFOR, Essential Harvest, Amber Fox and Allied Harmony. Turkey continued to contribute to the peace and stability in Mace- donia when operation Allied Harmony was taken over by the EU under the name of “Operation Concordia”. Ten personnel represent Turkey in this operation that is the EU’s first military crisis management operation. Approximately 1300 Turkish troops have been serving in Bosnia-Herze- govina, Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania. 101 Turkish police officers took part in the International Police Task Force (IPTF) in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the UN Mission in Kosovo. From 1 January 2003 Turkey has also contributed with 12 personnel to the EU’s first civilian crisis management operation, the EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The NATO enlargement process will result in a strengthening of Turkey’s geopolitical position, particularly so due to the effects that the entry of Roma-

47 © Rubbettino nia and Bulgaria will have on the strategic scenario of south-eastern Europe and the Black Sea region. For this reason Turkey supports the present enlargement process and is confident that NATO’s enlargement process will strengthen the Alliance and enhance security in the Euro-Atlantic region. Turkey has dedicated considerable resources to the reinvigoration of the Turkish PfP Training Centre (BIOEM) and to opening it to all Mediterranean Dialogue countries. The Turkish General Staff established the centre in Ankara on 29 June 1998. Its main task is to organise courses and seminars that aim at providing the military and civilian personnel with strategic and tactical training and education. From its establishment till the end of December 2003, the Centre hosted 3796 participants from 17 NATO countries (1299), 24 partner countries (2455) and 4 Mediterranean Dialogue (42) countries. Turkey’s approach to the EU enlargement process is particularly interesting due to the fact that Turkey is a NATO member but not – or not yet – a EU member. Turkey has shown political support of the idea of EU enlargement, not the least because Turkey itself could benefit from the process. For these reasons the Turkish approach to the development of a European Security and Defence Policy is to be understood as a way of strengthening the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the frames of the NATO Alliance rather than facilitating the creation of autonomous EU defence capabilities. Basing its efforts on the vested rights and status that it enjoyed in the Western European Union, Turkey has contributed to the development of the ESDP through its efforts to render the ESDP more inclusive to non-EU member countries. These efforts produced the so-called Ankara Document (December 2001) that was negotiated by Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. This document defines the modalities of participation of non-EU Eu- ropean allies in the ESDP and it has become the basis of the NATO-EU strategic partnership. The EU heads of state and government finally agreed to accept the Ankara Document during the Brussels European Summit of 24-25 October 2002. Since 1994 Turkey has provided NATO’s Mediterranean dialogue initiative with staunch support. Turkey shares the Alliance’s view that the dialogue with the Mediterranean partner countries should be intensified. Turkey enjoys good and friendly relations with all the dialogue countries (Algeria, Egypt, Is- rael, Jordan, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia) and has signed with them various bilateral technical co-operation agreements in the military field. Turkey wants to focus the Mediterranean dialogue on those issues that have a direct effect on security matters and on those fields where joint action

48 © Rubbettino is necessary such as international terrorism and organised crime. To prevent these hard security risks from becoming a threat to national security Turkey focuses her attention on soft security matters in the first place. A constant goal of the Turkish foreign policy is the strengthening of the economic cohesion of the MD/MP-countries through the elimination of trade barriers and the improvement of the conditions for foreign investment. Nevertheless the Turkish attitude towards the Euro-Mediterranean Part- nership has been characterised by a degree of indifference all since its foundation in 1995. This is mainly due to the fact that Turkey feels that the dialogue has developed into an exclusive Euro-Arab dialogue that has been taken hostage by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Thus the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue is not on the immediate agenda of Turkish foreign policy and some- times Turkey behaves as an affiliate but reluctant partner. In combination with the difficulties in the management of MEDA – EU funds these problems have contributed to cause Turkish disappointment and doubts about the future possibilities of the Euromed process. In the nearest future Turkey can be expected to follow EU initiatives within this framework but not to play a very active role. The Turkish view of the Mediterranean is more similar to that of the US than to the EU’s definition of the region. Just like the United States Turkey gives priority to Eastern Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf and the Caucasus in defining its priorities in the security environment of the Mediterranean. More- over, the Americans give utmost importance to Turkey while the Europeans are still uncertain about Turkey’s place in the EU. It seems that Turkey is more sympathetic to US led initiatives regarding Mediterranean security issues, although it supports the EMP in the economic sphere and is willing to contribute to this process. Ankara in general doesn’t see the EMP as a promising initiative in the political and security fields since Turkey was not given a clear prospective of full EU membership in Helsinki where it was placed between the second catego- ry countries for a future EU enlargement. In geopolitical terms Ankara perceives the Mediterranean as composed of the Middle East, Greece and Cyprus, the Balkans plus Europe. In terms of Turkish strategic thinking the concept ‘Mediterranean’ means ‘Eastern Mediterranean’. This is primarily so because the ‘Eastern Mediterranean’ dis- plays a variety of problems that are seen as important threats directed against Turkish territorial integrity and vital national interests. The problems with Greece and Syria, the Cyprus issue, the spill over of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the region, Iraq and Iran and the instability in the Caucasus constitute the

49 © Rubbettino main preoccupations pf the Turkish foreign policy. The relatively stable western Mediterranean, from which Turkey does not anticipate any serious direct threats, is not considered a priority area.

4.2.2.2 Bulgaria Bulgaria no longer feels threatened by state actors rather than by international terrorism and organised crime. Therefore it actively supports the Unit- ed States in the fight against terrorism and on the policy over Iraq. Since the end of the east-west conflict Bulgaria has become a major transit country for organised criminal groups that smuggle drugs, weapons and human beings. Nevertheless, the area around Bulgaria contains many “frozen” conflicts, weak states and potential points of tension the Balkans and Moldova. Concerning the Balkans Bulgaria sees herself as a very useful new NATO member with excellent relations with Southeastern Europe who has earned the trust of all conflicting parties. Together with its Southeastern neighbours Bulgaria has initiated the South Eastern Defence Ministerial Process (SEDM) that introduces security and defence issues on the level of regional co-operation. Bulgaria also participates in the “SEEBRIG” multinational peace force of southeastern Europe that is composed of military units from Albania, Bul- garia, Greece, Italy, Macedonia, Romania and Turkey. Bulgaria welcomes the decision of the EU-Council at its meeting in Thes- saloniki to offer the Balkan states a future perspective of integration into the EU ad the only solution to the region’s latent conflicts. Concerning its own position in the international organisations Bulgaria regards membership of political and military security structures like NATO, EU, WTO or IMF as the only way to deal with the security threats Bulgaria is facing. NATO is seen as the primary guarantor for Bulgaria’s survival and territorial defence, while the EU is seen as a prerequisite for development and prosperity. Thus NATO and EU membership remained the highest priorities of the Bulgarian foreign policy until the nation’s entry in April and May 2004. The relations to the United States are considered of utmost importance; Bul- garia has been a staunch supporter of President Bush’s Iraq Policy and has now deployed 470 troops under Polish command. The improvement of Bul- garia’s image through her membership in NATO and the EU has already led to better creditworthiness and has also attracted foreign investors. Should there be a conflict of interests between NATO obligations and the European Security and Defence Policy, it is likely that the trans atlantic interest may prevail in Bulgarian politics. But it is clear that it is the goal of Bulgar-

50 © Rubbettino ia to pursue a foreign policy that will enable it to avoid choosing between the two. The European Union’s CFSP and ESD are only supported as long as they are not damaging the transatlantic relationship. Nevertheless Bulgaria sees the ESDP in a positive light and believes that it will certainly get rid of its “paper tiger status”. Most of the new asymmetric threats cannot be met by military force alone, so Bulgaria sees an important role for the EU as an agens movens for sustained development and prosperity. Bulgaria would like to see a clearer definition of the “spheres of interest” of NATO and the EU respectively. For a long time NATO’s and the EU’s Mediterranean dialogue has been only of general interest to the Bulgarian security policy. The Balkans have ab- sorbed most of its energies. It is only with the entry into NATO and the EU that Bulgaria has started to become familiar with issues like the non-proliferation policy and asymmetric threats.

4.3 Core findings on regional points of view

4.3.1 The Mediterranean Dialogue Countries and NATO

4.3.1.1 The Eastern Mediterranean Countries: Egypt, Jordan and Israel

General Perceptions of Europe Egyptian and Jordanian political analysts have frequently expressed the expectation that once the enlargement process is concluded the Union will be able to dedicate more attention and resources to its non-candidate neighbours in the same way as it has assisted the Central and Eastern European countries during the last ten years. They hope that the Barcelona Process (the economic basket in particular) will be revived and accelerated. It is doubtful whether it is realistic to believe that this could really take place. A second hope of the Arab dialogue countries is that, once enlarged, the European Union will become a heavy weight actor on the global stage, since it is one of the largest, if not the largest, regional bloc in the world. According to the Arab point of view this increasing international importance could be used in a number of ways that, directly or indirectly, would benefit the southern Mediterranean countries too. In this context Israel often has different point of view: it has always considered Europe as clearly pro-Palestinian and pro-Arab, especially so during the last decades. The scandal about the Euro- pean financial flows to Palestinian terrorism is only one among Israel’s con-

51 © Rubbettino cerns. Consequently, Israel has never shown any interest in seeing the Euro- pean Union become a major political actor in the Middle East. A third expectation of the (non-member) Mediterranean states is that the new Mediterranean EU members (Malta and southern Cyprus in the first round and perhaps Turkey in a later round) could be of great use in focalising the attention on other Mediterranean issues on the EU agenda. As a consequence the NATO and EU enlargements are seen with contra- dictory feelings. One of the most pressing concerns that the EU enlargement has caused is an inevitable feeling of exclusion and of being refused to join the EU. Some Southern Mediterranean countries would also like to join the EU since they feel that this would be an easy solution to the majority of their socio-economic problems. The mere fact of not being accepted as an eligible country for EU membership causes a certain amount of frustration. As the ESDP has accelerated considerably – at least in terms of declarations – it is perceived with some kind of suspicion by the Arab dialogue countries: on the one hand it is desired as a counterweight to US politics, but on the other hand it is feared that it might be a European post-colonial instrument of influence or, even worse, an instrument of intervention. During the regular meetings of the Senior Officials of the Barcelona Process a large-scale information campaign has been held in order to explain the ESDP to the neighbours of the European Union. The campaign has been designed in order to reassure the Southern Mediterranean countries of the advantages of a regular Euro-Mediterranean defence and security dialogue within the framework of the Barcelona Process. Nevertheless, the political and security dialogue is still the most stagnant area of the partnership. And it will continue to be considered as such until the EU becomes more clearly involved in the solution of urgent conflicts, mainly in the Middle East crisis that, up until now, has obstructed the approval of the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability. After the war in Iraq it will require more than cosmetic efforts on the part of the EU to rebuild its trust in the Southern Mediterranean countries, not only as regard to their governments but also as regard to the peoples of those countries. There is a structural imbalance in the level of integration of the two dialogue partenership, since the countries of the Eastern and Southern Mediter- ranean participate to the processes individually, in order to negotiate or sign association agreements or to discuss security matters with NATO. This is a case of what is called “bi-multilateralism”: on the one hand they are united, on the other they keep their individualistic attitude. This was their way of proceeding

52 © Rubbettino even before Barcelona. In spite of its multilateral dimension the Barcelona process has not managed to produce a new, more balanced formula. One has to be careful not to transpose the CSCE Helsinki process in- to the Mediterranean. When the process was established in 1975 there were two alliance blocs; consequently the structural conditions were quite different from the present ones in the Mediterranean countries. The main source of instability stems from a number of unresolved conflicts that need to be solved and that are all occurring one side of the Mediterranean and they have never been south vs. north conflicts. Moreover, many southern countries strongly believe that they do not really need confidence-building measures across the Mediterranean. What they need, according to themselves, are processes of conflict solution and crisis management. In the opinion of the Mashrecki countries, the defining issue is Europe’s ability and willingness to play an active and efficient role in the solution of these conflicts. Although a stronger and a more cohesive link to NATO and the EU is often seen as highly desirable, Israel, Egypt and Jordan do not demand membership in the EU or NATO; nor do they expect financial aid packages or ap- propriations that can be compared to those of the PHARE and TACIS programmes. The Mashrek countries have a full understanding of the “special” treat- ment that is offered the candidate countries of Eastern Europe that are now about to enter the EU and they do not consider it detrimental to the South. From a conceptual point of view they do not believe that the enlargement will have any negative consequences for the Euro-Mediterranean relations. In the same manner, they do not expect the EU to give them lists of criteria similar to the Copenhagen criteria or other conditions for partnership although they have occasionally encountered something like this attitude during their inter- actions with the EU. Another point of complaint of the Mediterranean dialogue countries is that most crucial decisions regarding the Mediterranean are normally made outside the Barcelona framework; as they see it, the Europeans settle this kind of issues within the framework of ELI and NATO. A third complaint regards the slow decision-making processes and lengthy procedures of several EU bodies and their programming and implementation capacity.

Israel’s Special Position Even if Israel participates in the Barcelona process as a Southern Mediter- ranean country, it differs notably from its neighbours in terms of its socio-eco-

53 © Rubbettino nomic features that are more similar to those of the EU countries. After the 1 May enlargement of the EU, all non –Arab Mediterranean countries except Israel will be members of the EU so that the pressure to transform the Mediterranean partnership programme into an exclusively Euro-Arab partnership will grow. In that event, the EU and Israel will have to revise their type of relationship to each other. There are three possible scenarios for that kind of new relationship: 1) To enhance the attractiveness of the Barcelona process for Israel. At the present state of affairs the gains for Israel from the EU’s Barcelona process are rather marginal – in economic as well as in political terms. Consequently it is important to increase the benefits for Israel in the long run. However, one has to bear in mind that the basis of the EU-Israel relations should remain bilateral in accordance with the bilateral association agreement of 1995. 2) Economic integration only. The Mediterranean dialogue has failed to provide any benefits for Israel and to stabilise the Arab economies. The Euro-Mediterranean dialogue has focused too much on form and procedure and too little on content. The enlargement of the EU will increase Israel’s trade dependence on the EU; this has been the case with every enlargement in the past. Con- sequently Israel would benefit greatly if it applied for entry into the Eu- ropean Economic Area. In that case Israel would become part of the EU’s single market for EFTA countries. These are countries like Nor- way and Iceland that do not want to become full members of the EU. This alternative implies full economic integration without political integration into the EU and it might suit both parties. Although no political integration is required, the political consequences would be enormous. A stronger connection to Europe would mean that the Israelis would no longer be able to accuse the Europeans of being biassed against Israel. Israeli lawmakers would probably take a more positive view of the idea of participating in the EU’s decision-making process. They might even adjust to the Acquis communautaire in the domain of trade in goods, services and capital. In fact, no major efforts would be needed in most cases. 3) The third scenario is full membership in the EU In spite of the failures of the past some members of the Israeli Peace Camp and of the secular left still believe that the idea of a New Middle East and the development of a Mediterranean identity could still make a comeback. According to them Israel should leave the door open to this

54 © Rubbettino option. Nevertheless, full access to the EU constitutes an identity problem for a large part of the population.

4.3.1.2 The Western Mediterranean Countries: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya

This chapter deals exclusively with Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. These countries are all involved in NATO’s Mediterranean Initiatives, the EU Mediterranean Partnership and the Barcelona Process. Libya’s perceptions and posture will be mentioned in general terms. All since the UN sanctions were suspended in April 1999, Libya has been participating as an “observer” at the EU Mediterranean conferences.

Basic Attitudes: Relationship to the “West” Morocco and Tunisia have always oriented themselves towards the “West” and are consequently seen as unproblematic partners by the West. In- dependent Algeria and revolutionary Libya used to be closer to the Soviet Union and as a result they were seen as problematic although neither country allowed the Soviet Union to establish military bases on their territory. After the end of the East-West conflict, Algeria and Libya have become more open to the “West” so that this opinion has gradually begun to change.

Morocco Friendship between Morocco and the USA has long traditions. The still valid Treaty of Friendship between Morocco and the USA dates from 1776. The king decided to leave it unchanged when Morocco won is independence in 1956. Morocco has also been trying hard to pursue the political objective of integrating Morocco’s economy into the world economy since the mid- 1990s. Fortunately the population has not questioned Morocco’s “Western” leanings. Despite political criticism of the US foreign policy in the Near East and the unilateralism of the US administration, the “Western” leanings of the Moroccans have remained unaltered.

Tunisia During the East-West conflict Tunisia tended to seek co-operation with Europe. Tunisia even went so far as to co-operate closely with the French and American Mediterranean armed forces. These forces have supported the Tunisian military and security forces during internal political conflicts and when there has been tension with Libya (e.g. 1980 and 1984). All since the

55 © Rubbettino 1970s Tunisia has had a capitalist orientation and it has sought to integrate the Tunisian economy into the world market. The economic ties to the European states and the EC/EU have been carefully expanded since 1976. There are no widespread culturally based anti-Western movements in Tunisia. There are two main reasons for this: Tunisia’s economic dependence on the West and its general openness to Europe. Nevertheless, politicians, representatives of civil society and large sections of the population are very sensitive to any US activities in North Africa and the Near-and Middle East that may be construed as attempts at “re-colonisation” or “domination”.

Algeria Since Algeria gained its independence in 1962 it has striven to steer clear of both the Eastern and Western blocs and keep an independent course. Nevertheless the enforced continuance of historic ties with Europe has weakened antagonism and focused it on certain issues. From the 1980s onwards, a strong Islamist opposition has grown up around this question of identity and the accompanying issues of state and social structure. Parts of this opposition went underground in 1991/92 in order to use armed resist- ance and terrorism against the (“Western”) state and social structures that they rejected. Algerian society contains a certain potential for the disruption of the leadership’s pro-“West” foreign and economic policies. Even among those who favour favouring the government’s pro-“West” orientation there is substantial unease about the fast pace of the process since it might desta- bilise internal politics.

Libya When Mohammed Gheddafi took over the reins of power in 1969 he tried to free Libya from western influence. The population supported the Libyan leadership’s revolutionary “anti-strategy” enthusiastically. From the 1970s onwards the national leadership and the majority of the population considered the USA as the Arabs’ “Number One Enemy”. To them the US not only played the role of Libya’s “No.1 enemy” but it was “a bastion of reaction” and “the head of a crusading campaign of destruction” that was directed against all Arab nations per se. At the moment Libya is in the middle of liberating itself from an ideolog- ical strain of politics and economics. It has renounced on the production and possession of weapons of mass destruction and has established friendlier relations to Western countries like the UK and Italy.

56 © Rubbettino General Perceptions of NATO and NATO’s enlargement In the Maghreb states there is general agreement among the members of the government, the politicians and the political representatives of civil society that NATO lost its right to exist when the East-West conflict ended. After all, that conflict had been the original motivation for its creation. NATO is seen as a political and military power “on their doorstep”. Nevertheless, after the end of the Cold War all the Maghreb States, with the exception of Libya, have been involved in discussions with NATO. Their willingness to carry on the dialogue with NATO originates in pragmatic and realistic considerations that are free from illusions about the global balance of power. Although the further development of NATO as a military organisation after 1990/91 has been viewed with suspicion, it does offer non-members a forum for the exchange of information and gives them the opportunity to profit from the programmes that NATO offers. Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya do not see the NATO enlargement as a “problematic development”. Nor do they consider it of particular security relevance to the states in the region. The enlargement is regarded as beyond their influence and as an “internal matter for NATO”. Nevertheless they realise that the new Eastern European member states will increase the influence of the United States in the Alliance. Both the NATO discussion about the ‘new risks’ in the Southern Mediterranean that began in the 1990s and NATO’s new strategic concept that was launched in November 1991 have made the North Africans feel that they are being threatened. This fear has not subsided yet. This fear and mistrust were intensified in the mid-1990s when North Africa was openly referred to as a “threat to the security of NATO”. The creation of the NATO Response Force that is planned to be on partial service in 2004 and on complete service in 2006 has been closely followed by the Maghreb states. The insecurity that is associated with NATO’s “out of area” missions has not led to a reduction of their mistrust of NATO’s intentions. The perception that America’s foreign policy since 11 September 2001 has been offensive and “aggressive” has only served to strengthen this mistrust. It is feared that NATO will become more interventionist in the Mediter- ranean region. This scepticism as to the plans of the US administration and of NATO as an institution dominated by the USA was intensified by the war in Iraq in 2003. To the media and to the politicians and scientists in the Maghreb states NATO is the threat from the north. One Moroccan political scientist, Mustafa Sehimi, describes NATO as the “machine de guerre“of the West. Al- though this seems to be exaggerated, there is a certain fear that NATO is being reconstructed as a “substitute” of the United Nations. Nevertheless, Alge-

57 © Rubbettino ria, Morocco and Tunisia maintain their determination to communicate and co-operate with NATO. Political realism is important to them. These are the main concerns about the future role of NATO: - The unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict in which the Arab states see NATO as pro-Israeli biased - There is a fear that the “new NATO” that has emerged since the NATO summit in Prague might conduct world-wide missions and interfere in the internal affairs of Arab countries; this fear has a great effect on the public opinion of the Mediterranean dialogue countries - The more aggressive foreign policy pursued by the US administration after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 - The dominant position of the USA within NATO.

The Attitude of the Maghreb States towards the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue NATO started its Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) in the early 1990s. At that time, the so-called “Ad-Hoc Group on the Mediterranean”, which had been monitoring Soviet-related issues in the area since the 1970s, began to focus on the new security challenges that were emerging in the Mediterranean region. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and growing concerns about the transfer of missile technology from the former Soviet sphere of influence to North African and Middle Eastern states resulted in the need for a more active role in the region. At the Brussels summit meeting in January 1994 NA- TO Heads of States and Governments welcomed the progress of the Israeli- Palestinian question, which opened the way for a Mediterranean Dialogue initiative. The first contacts between the representatives of the participating states were established in February 1995 when invitations to participate in a dialogue with NATO were sent to Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. This invitation was extended to Jordan in November 1995 and Alge- ria in February 2000. Information exchange between the seven dialogue countries and NATO takes place in bilateral meetings (19+1) or multilateral conferences (19+7). The main objective of the dialogue is to raise the level of attention on the Mediterranean within the alliance and to encourage the introduction of mod- ern concepts of good governance and co-operative patterns of international behaviour in the area. Only Libya, the fifth member of the Arab Maghreb, does not participate in the dialogue. NATO’s announced intention to either intensify (1997) or un-

58 © Rubbettino dertake an “upgrading“of the Dialogue (e.g. at the NATO Summit in Prague in 2002), have been welcomed. However, the expectations that were raised by such announcements have been mixed with some scepticism. A positive Maghreb response to NATO’s announcements and proposals concerning the intensification of the dialogue between NATO and the Mediter- ranean states does not automatically mean a more active involvement in the individual programmes of NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative and doesn’t imply a more positive (less mistrustful) attitude towards NATO as an organisation.

Algeria To Algeria co-operation with NATO is only one pillar among others in its security architecture. Algeria wants to be embedded in a system of collective security that will increase stability in the region. One building block would be NATO’s Mediterranean dialogue and its contribution to Algeria’s efforts to modernise and professionalise her armed forces. Algeria shows a high willingness to support the international war on terrorism; it has signed a security treaty with NATO that outlines the kind of co-operation that will be needed in that war. Officially, Algeria has often stated that “privileged bi-lateral relations” between NATO and the individual Dialogue partners in North Africa are very positive. An essential prerequisite for the intensification of such co-operation is the incorporation of the Dialogue partners into the conceptualisation of the programmes. For this reason Algeria has reacted positively to the exchange programme that has allowed its parliamentarians to visit their NATO colleagues. This exchange is part of the programme of the North Atlantic Assembly. Algerian officials have referred to NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue as complementary to the Barcelona Process, which has not dealt with military issues so far. Algeria does not expect the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU to make rapid progress. Because of the unsolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict the EU Security Charter cannot be considered a part of the Barcelona Process at the moment. However, it has been stressed that Algeria accepts NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue because it precludes a direct “tête-à-tête” with the USA.

Morocco Officially Moroccans believe that good relations with NATO are important. Participation in NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue, military co-operation, and parliamentary exchange within the framework of the North Atlantic As- sembly are elements of a development that is seen in a positive light. Howev-

59 © Rubbettino er, NATO’s negotiators encounter more difficulties when they raise issues that regard migration terrorism, and security. Morocco does not want to discuss illegal migration merely in terms of its security implications. It would prefer to look for the causes of illegal migration (and illegal drug trafficking and terrorism) so that common solutions can then be investigated. Morocco finds it almost impossible to find the funds that would be necessary for its participation in NATO’s partnership programmes.

Tunisia Tunisia has good relations to the individual NATO member states. Its efforts to promote good relations between itself and the southern Mediterranean through the Mediterranean Dialogue have had a positive response. But there exists a feeling that Tunisia, along with other participants, has not received offers of co-operation commensurate with her needs. This is the case with the Barcelona Process. NATO’s dialogue is perceived as being guided “from above”. There has been talk of “dictation”. The fact that the states that participate in the Dialogue are only expected to “react” to pre-prepared offers is seen as very negative. Tunisian officials wish to be incorporated into the preparation of concepts and programmes that relate to the Mediterranean dialogue.

Criticism and suggestions made by the Maghreb Dialogue Partners All three countries formulate identical criticisms of NATO’s Mediter- ranean dialogue. Their only major differences were constituted by the inten- sity of the language that was used when they criticise the Mediterranean Dia- logue. The main aims of their verbal attacks were the lack of consultation in the creation of programmes and in the construction of the Dialogue’s general framework. In brief, the following aspects of NATO’s Mediterranean Dia- logue were criticised: - Firstly, the lack of consultation in the development of the concept and programmes. Algeria criticised the “imposition of the concept”, and Tunisia complained because the programmes are being “dictated” to them. - The programmes had not been devised in order to address the needs and problems of the participating states in an adequate way. - The failure of NATO to keep the Dialogue partners adequately informed (lack of transparency) about developments that regard the Mediterranean (e.g. discussions about strategy and the organisational re-structuring of NATO). - The lack of transparency about the intentions and aims of NATO in the Mediterranean. In connection with this it became clear that the feeling of

60 © Rubbettino not being informed about NATO’s real aims significantly increased fears and mistrust. These fears revolved around one main possibility, that of “interference in internal affairs” (or even military intervention), and consequently, the “disregard of national sovereignty”. The self-funding-principle for the participation in the dialogue programmes. Accordingly, all three participants agree on the following points: - They would like to participate in the elaboration of concepts and programmes. In other words, they do not want a programme that is prepared in advance. They would all rather take part in its elaboration. Participa- tion is seen as an essential element of a “genuine partnership” that can be characterised as a relationship between “equals”. This aspect is regarded as extremely important. - The Dialogue should be continued on a ministerial level. Algeria, in particular, would like to see the creation of a consultative structure at the highest level in which civil and military representatives participate. - They would like to see a solution of the problems of financing the participation in the programmes (abolition of the self-funding-principle). - All participants respect the fact that international law and the UN will be strengthened.

Factors that Obstruct the Intensification of NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue Specific measures have been employed to encourage the Dialogue all since the NATO summit in Madrid in 1997. In the Rand Report7 on NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue that was published in 2000 the authors confirmed that there was a “continuing ambivalence” among the Arab Dialogue partners in relation to the Dialogue initiative. In this context “ambivalence” means that there is “considerable interest in building a more constructive relationship with NATO and in exploring opportunities offered within the framework of the Initiative” but that “attitudes remain mixed”. These “mixed attitudes” refer to the mixture of caution and mistrust that the Arabs in the Dialogue countries feel towards NATO as an organisation and towards its aims.

Two main factors that obstruct the intensification of NATO’s Mediterranean dialogue were identified: 1. “Political factors”, i.e. factors that are closely connected to the respective political cultures (comprising among other things: political experience,

7 Lesser, Ian et.al.: The Future of NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative, Santa Monica (CA) 2000, p. 25.

61 © Rubbettino self-identification, regional and international positioning, the political system) and to the internal political situation; 2. “Structural factors” i.e. factors that have to do with the capacity, the training and the competence of the personnel that is sent to the programmes that are offered as part of NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue. Political factors Both the leadership and the people of the Maghreb states are very sensitive to any kind of interference in their national sovereignty. Given this background the following “states of mind” and “attitudes” also obstruct the intensification of dialogue: - Mistrust of the NATO’s intentions in the Mediterranean region; especially as regards the new strategic concept and the dominant role of the Unit- ed States that are thought to have been conducting an aggressive foreign policy all since 9/11. - The strong nation state mentality that is characterised by a reluctance to cede sovereign rights to supranational institutions even when it is the matter of transnational co-operation. This kind of mentality impedes the forming of co-operative structures on a Maghrebian regional level. Lack of experience of multi-lateral co-operation on a regional level also has a negative impact on the use of the multi-lateral programmes offered by NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative. The most popular form of co-operation still is bi- laterality. This situation will probably not change in the foreseeable future. - The feeling that the Mediterranean dialogue is an asymmetric North- South relationship and that the stronger partner “dictates” the partnership program and that these programs do not really address the needs of the dialogue countries. - Public opinion sees NATO as pro-Israeli biased. This is a fact that political leaders have to take into account. - The perception that the Initiative has not achieved sufficient progress because it did not receive full support from all NATO member states (in comparison to the Partnership for Peace programme). - The Maghreb states share the impression that the intensification of their co-operation with NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue programme will not provide them with sufficient advantages. Algeria has gone on the offensive. The government has defined two areas of co-operation: the fight against terrorism and the modernisation of the armed forces. It can be as- sumed that Algeria’s involvement in the Mediterranean Dialogue will be intensified if co-operation in the two abovementioned fields is intensified. - Divergent security perceptions between NATO and its Mediterranean di-

62 © Rubbettino alogue countries; When discussing security related issues like the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technology, NATO emphasises the destabilising effects on the region, but hardly ever mentions Israeli WMDs. To the Arab states WMDs are mainly a question of strategic competition with Israel.

Structural Factors These are the most important “structural factors” that have prevented the Maghreb countries from taking full advantage of NATO’s Mediterranean Ini- tiative: - The personnel: there are not enough adequately trained personnel with a sufficient knowledge of English to be eligible for the programmes of NA- TO’s Mediterranean Dialogue. As a result only limited use can be made of programmes on offer. - The self-funding principle: for the use of the programmes and the limited financial resources that NATO can make available to cover costs. All three states emphasise the weak state of their own finances and claim that the funding problem is a concrete obstacle to the participation in some of the programmes. The fact that neither cost-free schemes nor scientific co- operation programmes that receive extra financial support have been fully expploited proves that cost plays a role but is not the main factor. - The authoritarian mentality and control mechanisms of the Maghreb governments are softening gradually but hesitantly. The application of new patterns of behaviour in state institutions and organisations is lagging behind even in those cases when the legal basis has already been put in place. The security organisations are the least transparent institutions and the most tightly controlled. Contacts abroad and on the international stage have always been strictly controlled. This will probably not change fun- damentally in the near future. The express wish of the Algerian government that NATO should help modernise and professionalise its army does not mean that this mistrust has faded away but it is simply the matter of technical and organisational assistance. - This mistrust of foreign states also dominates the relations between the Maghreb states themselves and between them and states in the Near East. However, during the last few years some progress has been made in the field of bi-lateral relations. The mistrust has not completely disappeared. This kind of mistrust diminishes the willingness of the Maghreb states to participate in multi-lateral activities. Consequently they still prefer bi-lateral relations.

63 © Rubbettino Structural Improvements of the Maghreb-NATO Mediterranean Dialogue In spite of these limiting factors Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia are in principle willing to link themselves to NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue. The current “boundary of co-operation” is determined by the characterisation of NA- TO’s Mediterranean Dialogue as a “concertation framework”. It is simply a matter of political pragmatism and realism to be in contact with a powerful military organisation “at one’s own front door” – especially given the current global political situation. Co-operation “on matters of common concern” (as described by Algerian President Bouteflika in December 2002) has not been refused but it must meet needs and take national interests into consideration. NATO will have to reduce mistrust and clarify its aims and intentions in the Maghreb and the Mediterranean area. These intentions might be expressed through the following measures: Measures that could be taken to improve the flow of information and to increase transparency in all matters relating to the Mediterranean. A more precise definition of NATO’s strategic concept for the Mediter- ranean as well as the pre-conditions for preventative military measures; The linkage of NATO out-of-area-missions to a mandate of the Security Council of the United Nations; The inclusion of the Maghreb Dialogue partners in the preparation of programmes – as it has already happened in the Work Program 2003 to a certain extend – so that these will suit the needs of the individual participants better. Nevertheless the NATO member states ought to accept the fact that, within the foreseeable future, the dialogue will be used bi-laterally by the Maghreb states. The Maghreb states will continue to use intensive bi-lateral relations to individual NATO member states as the central axis of their co-operation abroad. In this context all Maghreb states have emphasised that they would like Germany to show more interest in co-operation in all areas.

4.3.2 The Mediterranean Dialogue countries and the European Union

Perceptions of the EU Enlargement of 2004 In Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia the EU enlargement of May 2004 mostly provokes “fears” about the medium term negative effects on their own national economies, even if they realise that a geographically enlarged EU theo- retically implies greater opportunities for export. However, none of the Maghreb states denies the possibility that enlargement might develop positive long-term effects.

64 © Rubbettino The Maghreb states see the enlargement of the EU as a competitive challenge for - Political attention - Governmental development aid and money - Foreign private investment - Competition about the agricultural markets and about textile products Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia expect medium-term economic and social consequences. The extent of these consequences cannot be predicted. Alge- ria and Morocco stress the consequences for the “economic and social security” – and consequently also for the political stability if the economic and financial co-operation of the EU with the Maghreb states were to diminish as a result of the expansion to the east. They highlight the favourable conditions that poverty and under-development would create for terrorism and (illegal) migration. The significance of regional co-operation is quite clear to the Maghreb states. The EU enlargement has heightened their awareness of the importance of regional co-operation. And yet they do not believe that the Arab Maghreb Union will develop into a stable and effective regional organisation in the short-term. For this reason the co-operation on “soft security issues” within the framework of the EU Mediterranean partnership and with individual partners is driven forward by the Maghreb states. Consequently, the bilateral relations to individual EU member states are given a great deal of importance. The Mediterranean countries also prefer bilateral relations in the field of military co- operation.

The Attitude to the EU Mediterranean Partnership Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia stress the importance of the economic, social and developmental dimension of the EU’s Mediterranean dialogue. Alge- ria signed an Association Treaty in December 2001. The Algerian government has also described the Barcelona Process as a series of “irreversible” and “strategic” choices that are seen as prerequisites for the necessary liberalisation of the Algerian economy. In a similar manner Morocco considers the economic dimension a “priority”. Algeria particularly values the EU Mediter- ranean Process because it is not dominated by the USA. All three states pretend to have a comprehensive notion of security (economic and social security included). Consequently they consider co-operation as a means of getting help to obtain economic and financial stability. They expect their EU partners to support them in their struggle against the causes of terrorism and the environment that encourages it. It has been emphasised

65 © Rubbettino more than once that the military aspects of security should not have priority over other areas of co-operation and the EU Mediterranean Dialogue. For a long time the Maghreb states have regarded the strategic discussions and organisational development inside NATO as more relevant to the Mediterranean’s security than EU discussions about the CSDP/ESDP. The development of a common European foreign and security policy was welcomed by the Maghreb states since they are quite interested in co-operating on „soft security issues“as long as the measures are designed to fit the needs of the countries that are involved. They would like to see “combined approaches” that contain security and developmental measures and aid. Al- though progress within the EU concerning the CFSP/ESDP may open up for new opportunities for co-operation on security with the Maghreb partner countries, their active involvement will depend on the recognisable (national) advantages they can gain from such co-operation. The Maghreb partners believe that a more animated discussion of EU related security issues might be provoked in the Maghreb states if the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Pol- icy (ESDP) continue to make dynamic progress. Nevertheless, they do not expect the CFSP/ESDP to make rapid progress. The EU’s positive assessment of the CFSP does not mean that the mistrust of the aims of the CFSP/ESDP and the European Intervention Forces in the southern Mediterranean has disappeared. An intervention force concept is perceived as diametrically op- posed to the common aims of stability and security in the Mediterranean.

Suggestions Made by the Maghreb States The Maghreb states see the EU’s approach to “soft security” issues as too limited. They would like the security measures to be supplemented by developmental policies. In addition, the EU should provide the means and offer the measures that the Maghreb states would need in order to be able to carry out effective policing tasks and security duties (technical equipment, training etc.). They would like both sides to clarify these aspects together in an intensive bilateral dialogue. The implementation of a “variable geometry” of the EU Mediterranean Partnership would be welcomed and there is also a desire for greater flexibility in this area of co-operation. However, a duplication of the EU and NATO initiatives is feared. They wish the EU to organise a permanent ESDP consultation mechanism for the Mediterranean partner states. In this way contacts and the exchange of information would be improved. Since it is a long-term process the Barcelona Process should support the integration of the Maghreb states. All

66 © Rubbettino the member states of the Arab Maghreb Union, including Libya, should participate in the Barcelona Process. In order to make this possible Tunisia has proposed using and promoting the 5+5 Talks; a proposition that Libya regards favourably.

Recommendations: The recommendations can be discerned from the ideas, criticisms, and wishes that the Maghreb states have expressed publicly. The following conclusions can be drawn from the joint research project that has been conducted by the CeMiSS and the ZTBw concerning EU’s Mediterranean dialogue: - An optimisation of the existing co-operation in the field of soft security would be in the EU’s interest. In order to be able to pursue this aim it would be necessary to take the suggestions and needs of the individual states into account and to adopt a more “partner-like” and trusting attitude. In its turn, this kind of trust might prepare the way for future military co-operation within the framework of the EU Mediterranean Partnership. In this process, development should be given equal priority to security. - The optimisation of the co-operation in the field of “soft security” should take full advantage of the Maghreb states’ willingness to strengthen the bilateral dialogue. As a consequence of the intensification of the co-operation on security issues more attention should be paid to the implementation of (surveillance) technology and to the kind of professional training that would be necessary in order to improve border security. Finan- cial contributions that would sponsor the return of illegal migrants to their countries of origin should also be taken into consideration. - Efforts should be made to include Libya in the security co-operation projects in the fight against terrorism and illegal migration. The incidents close to the Italian island of Lampedusa in June 2003 made this even more urgent. Since Libya is not an active participant in the Barcelona Process it should be offered bilateral support by the EU members (e.g. border security). This kind of support should first be co-ordinated by the EU states. - Germany should participate actively in the construction of an institution- alised European Security and Defence dialogue with the Maghreb states. All of the Maghreb states (including Libya) have said that they would like this to happen. - If the Barcelona process should develop a security policy dimension then co-operation would only be attractive to the Mediterranean dialogue countries if: - They would gain significant advantages - There would be a more intensive exchange of information

67 © Rubbettino - They could have a significant influence on the co-operation agenda - There were increased flexibility to meet the needs of the individual states

4.4 The Mediterranean – Adriatic Dimension: Croatia, Serbia-Montenegro, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina

Earlier in this report it was mentioned that the Mediterranean could be divided into three parts or sub-regions. For the purposes of this research project particular attention should be paid to the Mediterranean Adriatic Dimen- sion. The six countries that border on the Adriatic Sea (Italy, Slovenia, Croa- tia, Serbia Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania) make part of the same geopolitical context. These countries form a sub region of the Mediter- ranean that is of special interest due to its importance as a crossing point of strategic interests, different foreign policy orientations and potential crises scenarios for the artificially stabilised Balkans. After having divided the Mediterranean region into 3 main geopolitical sub-regions the study will now focus on the area of the Eastern Mediterranean that can be described as a three-sea-system (the Adriatic – the Aegean –the Black Sea). Italy borders this region through the Adriatic Sea and the countries that constitute its hinterland are the Stability Pact countries. According to Calafati8 “there are at least three spheres at which the relationships between the different natural and social elements of the Adriatic Sea Region are so strongly interconnected as to justify their enclosure within the boundaries of a single system. Firstly, there is the ‘ecological indivisibility’ of the Adriatic Sea. Secondly, there is the emerging interrelation of the territory: private and above all public investment is forming an integrated artificial landscape. Thirdly, there is the growing density of the economic relationships (transaction of commodities and capital flows) among the local systems of the area”. In this context the states that border on the eastern shore of the Adriatic Sea form an area of growing political interest for Italy and the EU, especially in the context of a future stabilisation of these countries and their progressive acession in the EU and NATO. The Adriatic dimension will be the only Mediterranean dimension that can – and probably will – be successfully incorporated into NATO and the EU in the nearest future.

8 Antoni G. Calafati, Perspective on the Adriatic Sea Region: A Preliminary Analysis, Pa- per at the International Adriatic Confernce, University of Trieste, July 1999.

68 © Rubbettino In the three-sea-system the Adriatic dimension is the most relevant for the Mediterranean dimension amongthe three seas. The Aegean Sea can be reduced to a bilateral – and problematic – relation between two NATO countries (Greece and Turkey). As far as the Black Sea, it can be said that both Romania and Bulgaria are lacking of a specific Mediterranean dimension and strong political and economic factors connect them closely to their western neighbours, so to the Adriatic Sea. Bulgaria and romania can be consdired part of the Adri- atic hinterland. The political and economic activities that took place in Roma- nia ad Bulgaria during the past ten years reveal how efficient this “attraction” effect (from the Adriatic to the Black Sea) has been. The development of political and economical bridges towards the Adriatic and the Danube took place under the auspices of the European Commission and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. Since both Romania and Bulgaria will become NATO members in April 2004 and plan to gain entrance into the EU in 2007 their political orientation is clearly directed towards western integration as main goal and only subordinately to maintain regional linkage to the western Balkan states. To maintain Eu integration compatible with regional co-operation the Stability Pact worked on the creation of a Free Trade area in South Eastern Europe. This was completed, after more than 3 years of negotiations, in the Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Trade of South Eastern Europe that took place in Rome in November 2003. This free trade area has laid down the ba-

69 © Rubbettino sis for an even greater harmonisation of the countries of the region and it will work in the way of strengthening the attraction of the Adriatic Sea for the Caspian countries. The Stability Pact sees it as its main strategy to create security and economic and political stability in the SEE area. The Pact also tries to promote the integration of all SEE states into the EU and NATO. The main trend of the countries of the region goes towards the progressive incorporation into both Euro-Atlantic institutions. This means that by the end of the decade, or somewhat later, the number of the Mediterranean EU countries will have doubled from four to eight (due to the Adriatic enlargement) or ten. The same aspects should be taken into consideration as regards the NATO enlargement. It is still unclear whether the enlargement process will increase or reduce the Mediterranean Dimension of the Adriatic countries. During the last ten years the forces of attraction of the EU and NATO have strengthened the con- tinental or middle-European vision of the countries of former Yugoslavia. In this manner their Adriatic and consequently, Mediterranean dimension has been reinforced.

Slovenia should be considered as an alpine middle-European country. Re- cently Slovenia took its first diplomatic steps towards its integration into the Barcelona process and it is now trying to increase its geopolitical value as a transit country from the southern Mediterranean to Austria, Hungary and the Czech Republic through the Adriatic port of Koper/Capodistria.

Croatia Croatia signed the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) in Oc- tober 2001 and is now gradually fulfilling the core obligations of membership and begins to harmonise its legal and economic framework with that of the EU. Croatia is intensifying its co-operation with its neighbours and it is also co-operating with the EU on a number of issues. Even though the Croatian government is striving to join EU in 2007 analysts are unsure whether the country will manage to solve all its pending impediments in such a short term. For this reason most analysts believe that Croatia will enter the EU somewhere in between 2007 and 2010. Croatia has been a NATO partner country since May 2000, when it signed the PfP framework agreement. In May 2002 it joined NATO’s Mem- bership Action Plan. During his last visit to Zagreb, former Secretary Gener- al Lord Robertson highlighted the main challenges that Croatia will have to face in order to be able to advance further towards complete integration in-

70 © Rubbettino to NATO. These challenges included the need for a further restructuring of Croatia’s armed forces and the necessity for Croatia to ensure the full protection of its minorities and to facilitate the return of refugees. It will also have to co-operate fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. After its independence Croatia did not construct a Mediterranean foreign policy but directed its efforts towards the construction of a Central European identity that would link Croatia to the landlocked Middle-Europe (Austria and Hungary) and consequently, to the Middle European dimension. The lack of established and relevant Croatian contacts with the Arab countries of the Southern Mediterranean might the consequence of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in which Bosnian Croats fought against their former allies the Bosnian Muslims. This war alienated Croatia from the world’s Islam- ic countries that supported the Muslim-Croatian side against the Bosnian Serbs. Croatia’s inexperienced and superficial Mediterranean policy can be seen by the unilateral way in which Croatia recently proclaimed an Exclusive Eco- nomic Zone in the Adriatic. Croatia has insisted on it in the face of the opposition of all the neighbouring states and the European Commission. This move has been interpreted generally as a clear sign of the lack of Croatian interest in the construction of a serious Mediterranean policy that will require a co-operative and constructive attitude and good relations to its Adriatic neighbours.

Bosnia Herzegovina Bosnia Herzegovina is a de facto state-protectorate that is governed by the United Nation. It is divided into two distinct political sub-entities with three “nationalities”. Bosnia Herzegovina’s thin corridor to the Adriatic Sea is almost devoid of concrete geopolitical relevance in time of peace. Bosnia Herze- govina’s only real chance of playing an active role in the Mediterranean is to solve the old dispute with Croatia about the internationalisation of the Croa- tian harbour of Ploce according to the Dayton Agreements. At the moment there does not seem to be a concrete possibility of a solution of this conflict. The agreement on the internationalisation of the harbour of Ploce has never been ratified by the Croatian parliament and it seems unlikely that it will be so in the nearest future. Although the country is officially pursuing the objective of Euro-Atlantic integration the difficulties that both processes are encountering are relevant. These difficulties can only be explained against a background of serious internal problems. Bosnia Herzegovina started its Stabilisation and Association

71 © Rubbettino Process in 1999. It is consequently a potential candidate for EU membership but the way to full EU membership will be long. The main function of the EU presence in the country is to sustain the country economically and politically. Since 1991 Bosnia Herzegovina has received funds of 2,5 Billion Euros from the European Union in order to establish peace and security. Nevertheless, NATO and the United Nations try to guarantee peace and security by providing law enforcement and technical assistance. As far as the SFOR mission is concerned, NATO will assess the options for its future size and structure. The “Mediterranean” connections of Bosnia Herzegovina are constituted by the cultural and religious relations that the Islamic part of the country have to other Islamic states around the Mediterranean. During the war and soon after, some Mediterranean Arab countries like Egypt, Jordan and Mo- rocco participated in the UN and NATO missions by sending peacekeeper troops to Bosnia Herzegovina. The only Arab country that is still keeping a reduced contingent of soldiers in Bosnia Herzegovina is Morocco that is deploy- ing around 350 soldiers in the area.

Albania Albania signed the Partnership for Peace Framework Document in Feb- ruary 1994. However, the pace of reform in Albania has been too slow to allow further progress towards NATO membership. Key reforms will first have to be implemented in several key non-military areas such as the fight against corruption, organised crime and a reform of the judiciary branch of the administration. Compared to Albania’s backwardness at the beginning of the nineties it is undeniable that Albania has made steady progress during the stabilisation and association process of the last few years. This is proved by the ongoing negotiations about the conclusion of a Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the EU and Albania. But there are still serious issues that have to be faced such as the fight against corruption and organised crime, the strengthening of the judicial system and the improvement of the public administration. Now Albania is too busy pursuing internal stability and the kind of minimal economic growth that could sustain its political and social system to be able to develop an autonomous Adriatic and Mediterranean foreign policy.

Serbia and Montenegro Serbia’s relations to the EU were only marginal before the fall of Milose- vic in October 2000. So were the funds that it received from the EU assistance programmes. This was all due to Serbia’s involvement in the wars in Croatia

72 © Rubbettino and Bosnia Herzegovina. The country also endured EU sanctions that were lifted in November 2000. Prior to that date Serbia Montenegro (Yugoslavia) received less than 100 million Euros per annum from EU funded assistance programmes. When the transition from the Milosevic regime was initiated Serbia and Montenegro received 2 billion Euros from the assistance programmes. As far as NATO is concerned, the country is negotiating its accession to the PfP. At the moment the main obstacle is political rather than technical. The indictment of General Mladic is considered of great importance to NA- TO. It seems as if NATO membership and co-operation with the ICTY tribunal in The Hague are conditional issues. During the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 4 December 2003 NATO recognised the progress that Serbia and Montenegro have made through their efforts to join Partner- ship for Peace. There has also been substantive progress in the field of defence reform. The coming Istanbul summit is considered a realistic target by which Serbia Montenegro and Bosnia Herzegovina might be able to fulfil the out- standing conditions. Their eligibility for membership in the PfP will be re- assessed before the next NATO Summit. In the case of Serbia Montenegro, this is an important accomplishment if one considers the fact that NATO air- craft were bombing Belgrade less than five years ago. Nor should one forget how distressing the present situation in Kosovo is to the Serbs and that this situation was created by the intervention of NATO. Among the countries around the Adriatic, Serbia and Montenegro might become one of the most active actors on the Adriatic Mediterranean scene. It seems that only Belgrade maintains a potential for a “possible restoration” of some of the geopolitical ties that united Yugoslavia with countries like Egypt and other Mediterranean states during the Cold War, a time when they were united in the non-aligned movement. Further evidence of this is provided by the fact that, contrary to some other countries in the western Balkans, Yu- goslavia welcomed the EU invitation to participate in the meeting of the Eu- ro Med foreign ministers in November 2001 and in the following Euro Mediterranean forums. This apparent stronger commitment of Serbia and Montenegro to the Mediterranean geopolitical area and to its political and security aspects is partially reduced by the internal developments of the Union and the progressive autonomy that Montenegro is achieving in the field of common institutions. It is still unclear what the final shape of the Union will look like and whether the Union itself will survive the next years. What can be said is that it is clear that the developments up until now have led to the creation of two distinct

73 © Rubbettino political identities and economies that are linked together by a loose union: The Adriatic state of Montenegro and the more “Balkanic”, “Pannonian” and “Danubian” Serbia.

Summary Apart from Slovenia that is already part of the Euro-Atlantic community, the attitude of the four Western Balkans Adriatic States (Croatia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Serbia Montenegro and Albania) towards the EU and NATO and the enlargements differs from country to country. All states in the region share a positive attitude towards the EU as well as towards the NATO-integration process. Bosnia Herzegovina and Serbia Montenegro are facing great difficulties with the process of EuroAlantic integration and it is still impossible to set dates for the enlargements. There is a serious risk that this area – including Kosovo that is in a very difficult situation – might remain a “black hole” in the map of future enlargements. Albania, Croatia and Macedonia are in a different situation. Even if there are serious problems that they will have to face their accession paths seems to have reached a stable point from where to continue the integration process. It is important to note that although the Adriatic countries (they are still in the middle of their integration process into the Euro-Atlantic institutions) are following national-individual patterns of integration there is some encouraging attempts at regional integration processes. One of the most interesting initiatives in that field is probably the Adriatic Charter that was launched by Croatia, Albania and Macedonia after seven of the 10 Vilnius Group countries had received invitations to join NATO. This US sponsored initiative was based on the successful co-operation of the Baltic countries. The initiative is called the Adriatic Group or A-3, and the three states and the U. S. Secretary of State Colin Powell signed a Joint Charter in May 2003. In the Charter the United States reaffirmed its enduring interest in the independence, territorial integrity, and security of Albania, Croatia and Macedonia and a profound ded- ication to their full integration into the community of democratic Euro-At- lantic states. The signatory countries unanimously affirmed their commitment to a transatlantic community of free and democratic nations.

74 © Rubbettino 5. Part Three: Initiatives to enhance the security situation in the Mediterranean - An Analysis of effectiveness and development options

5.1 Upgrading the Mediterranean Dialogue

Several factors support the establishment of a more comprehensive security framework, despite certain limits to NATO’s MD. The phenomenon of terrorism and its spill over effects (small arms trafficking, illegal migration and the uncontrolled movement of fundamentalists) affect both NATO countries and the southern Mediterranean states. Co-operative measures against this threat could help stabilise governments and states in the Southern Mediter- ranean. This kind of measures would also increase security for Europe as a whole. Consequently, both sides have an interest in tackling these issues. At the NATO summit in Prague in November 2002 the heads of state approved the document “Upgrading the Mediterranean Dialogue Including an Inventory of Possible Areas of Co-operation”1 (hereafter: the Prague Docu- ment) in order to go ahead with the political and practical dimensions of the dialogue. As a result, more security-related topics have been included in the annual MD Work Programme and the MD Military Programme. The strengthening of the dialogue was regarded to be among the highest priorities of the Alliance. After September 11, 2001, NATO has agreed on a series of measures to enhance consultations on terrorism between NATO and the MD countries. The dialogue was upgraded in order to contribute to security and stability in the region. In its turn this could be achieved by better mutual understanding and by dispelling any misconceptions about NATO, especially after the alliance had decided to support the war against terrorism2.

1 See Prague Summit of NATO’s Heads of State and Government, Upgrading the Mediterranean Dialogue Including an Inventory of Possible Areas of Co-operation, November 2002, in: Internet http://www.NATO.int/med-dial/upgrading.htm. 2 However, not all NATO members seemed to be convinced of the necessity to intensify consultations with the MD countries. Especially Belgium and France were sceptical about a

75 © Rubbettino The Prague Document and the annual programmes (see below) show signs of strengthening the dialogue. The various forms of consultation have been widened. The southern MD countries have been allowed to participate more actively in the preparatory phase of the MD programmes, a point often raised by critics of the dialogue. The dialogue’s critics used to raise this point often. The MD countries are encouraged to participate more actively in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programmes already open to them. The Prague Document also encourages NATO and the MD countries to promote additional nationally sponsored activities “in the spirit of the MD”. The practical dimension of the dialogue has been expanded and it is now offering a “tailored approach to co-operation” and “continuous consultation on expert-level”3. A greater number of training opportunities have also been proposed. Both the already existing and the new areas of co-operation have been expanded. The programme includes activities that range from civil emergency planning seminars to activities in the field of desertification to the management of water and other resources. Political and defence efforts against the proliferation of WMD, democratic defence reform and consultations on terrorism and border security have also been included. New areas of co-operation include the preparation for the implementation of the Single Fuel Con- cept and an introduction to the concept of a Multinational Joint Logistic Co- ordination Centre. Moreover, the Prague Document suggests a new format for meetings with interested MD countries. In addition to the existing 19+1 and 19+7 consultations, the Alliance is planning to organise meetings in the format 19+n on a case-by-case basis. The latter kind of meetings will include at least two MD partners. This kind of sub-regional dialogue is intended to focus on security matters of common concern, e.g. border security and terrorism4. The Prague Document also proposes visits by senior NATO officials to the seven MD countries as a means of expanding the dialogue. It has already been noted that deeper integration of the MD countries within NATO. The main reasons were doubts about the ability and the resources of the MD partners to take part in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) or Partnership for Peace. Both countries refused to support an invitation to the MD countries to contribute more substantially to the EAPC programmes. Especially the French position can be explained by the general aim of the French policy to strengthen the EU’s Mediterranean initiative rather than NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue. It is argued that this would open new opportunities for a European Mediterranean policy and Middle East initiatives without having to rely on the United States. 3 Upgrading the Mediterranean Dialogue, paragraph III.1. 4 Upgrading the Mediterranean Dialogue, paragraph II.7.

76 © Rubbettino such visits could provide an opportunity to meet with a wider audience including representatives from society in general. The document states that the first visit ever by NATO’s Secretary General to the MD partners should be organised “as early as possible”5.

5.1.1 2003 Programmes

The annual Mediterranean Dialogue Work Programme (MDWP) which includes a MD Military Programme (MDMP)6 is designed to build up confidence through practical co-operation. Contrary to the past, when NATO staff used to prepare the MDWP, MD countries are now participating in the preparation process. The Alliance encourages MD partners to express their interests. Nevertheless, most activities still depend on the input of NATO members rather than that of the MD countries. The MDWP lists activities such as seminars, workshops and expert visits in nine areas that range from the information policy to civil emergency planning to small arms and protective security. The purpose of these activities is to share the experiences that have been made during NATO operations and programmes. These activities are also meant to provide the MD countries with assessment, training and technical advice. This serves the interests of both sides. Considerable progress has been made in other fields too. Special meetings between high-level participants from the diplomatic and governmental sectors, the media and academia will be organised on an annual basis. The MDWP 2003 proposes that future special meetings should take place not only in NATO countries, as has been the case in the past, but also in MD countries if the regional security situation allows for it. This might give the MD countries a more active and influential role and act as a confidence-building measure among the public. However, it is not likely that a special meeting with the participation of high-level NATO personnel will be held in a southern Mediterranean country as long as there is uncertainty about the future of Iraq and the further development of the Arab-Israeli conflict7. The Military Programme primarily offers educational and training activities. The Alliance calls it a “menu à la carte” from which partner countries

5 Upgrading the Mediterranean Dialogue, paragraph II.9. 6 See NATO‘s Mediterranean Dialogue website (http://www.nato.int/med-dial/home.htm) for more information on the annual programmes. 7 The annual Civil Emergency Planning Seminar, which was planned to take place in Jor- dan in 2000, also had to be postponed for security reasons.

77 © Rubbettino can choose activities that meet their interests. The number of activities has constantly increased since NATO decided to open selected military activities to MD countries in 1997. The MDMP lists six areas that include activities that are organised by NATO’s International Military Staff and the NATO Stan- dardisation Agency, and courses at the NATO Defence College in Rome and the NATO School in Oberammergau (Germany). Furthermore, since 2001 the MDMP has included not only NATO activities but also activities conducted by individual member states and MD partners. Egypt and Jordan are cur- rently the most active participants in the MDMP activities, especially in the field of NATO military exercises. Jordan’s proposal to open the Senior Course of the NATO Defence College to MD countries has been approved by MDMP 2003 and implemented. In the future, Jordan plans to establish a counter-terrorism centre in Amman, which could also contribute to both the Work and Military Programme8. In brief, the 2003 programmes constitute a step in the right direction. By and large the Prague document’s commitment to upgrade the MD has been honoured. However, more has still to be done in order to build up confidence in the Alliance.

5.1.2 Options for Future Developments

It is essential to enhance relations with the Mediterranean in order to provide the region with stability and prosperity. As former NATO Secretary Gen- eral Lord Robertson pointed out, there is “considerable scope for us to focus our efforts more effectively”9. Measures that could be taken in the direction of enhanced security co-operation within the framework of NATO’s Mediter- ranean Dialogue could include the following points: - Greater attention to the needs of every single MD country This option requires a twofold approach: The Alliance should involve the MD countries in the preparation phase of both the Work and the Military Programme on a larger scale. At the same time, the MD partners should try to adopt a more open attitude towards the Alliance. Defence reform and crisis management are just two of the areas in which NATO has con-

8 It should be noted that both countries play a vital role for the stability of the Middle East; this fact emphasises the importance of enhancing military co-operation. 9 George Robertson, Keynote Speech, Royal United Services Institute Conference on “NATO and Mediterranean Security: Practical Steps towards Partnership”, London, 30 June 2003, Internet http://www.nato.int.docu/speech/2003/s030630a.htm.

78 © Rubbettino siderable experience. Both sides would benefit if NATO shares these experiences with interested Mediterranean partners. - More nationally sponsored co-operation activities Through the Mediterranean Dialogue programme NATO provides its members with a kind of “umbrella” for security co-operation with Arab Mediterranean countries. However, both the Alliance’s separate member states and the Mediterranean countries should be encouraged to undertake more co-operation activities “in the spirit of MD”. It should be re- membered that co-operation “in the spirit of PfP” contributed significantly to the success of that programme. - Participation in the Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism At the 2002 Prague Summit, the member states of the Euro-Atlantic Part- nership Council (EAPC) adopted the Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism10. Since the MD countries have not been involved in the Part- nership Action Plan it would be reasonable to identify fields under this plan in which the MD partners could participate11. - Sustained efforts to negotiate a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict As this study emphasises in various chapters, the on-going Arab-Israeli conflict is the single most important obstacle to improved relations in the Mediterranean. The Alliance should contribute as much as possible to the peaceful resolution of the conflict since that would open the way for much more substantial relationships with the southern Mediterranean states. In particular, the U.S. as NATO’s leading power should make a renewed effort to negotiate a solution of the conflict. - A NATO-EU Strategic Partnership Closer co-operation with the EU’s more comprehensive approach towards the Mediterranean area could prove to be fruitful. A new strategic partnership between NATO and the EU would combine the security-related capabilities of NATO with the economic, social and cultural expert- ise of the EU. It is in particular the last recommendation that would provide the western approach to the Mediterranean with added value – and it would make sense strategically. The security challenges of the region are complex and in-

10 See: Prague Summit, Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism, 22 November 2002, http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b021122e.htm. 11 However, it is still difficult for the Alliance to establish relationships with the security services of the MD countries due to the their suspicion with regard to NATO’s role. To establish such co-operation between the security services could represent a commitment to a substantially enhanced security co-operation between NATO and the Mediterranean.

79 © Rubbettino tertwined and require a holistic approach. The quest for exclusivity and institutional autonomy will not bring about the fulfilment of the duties that NA- TO and the EU have towards their constituencies. Instead, NATO and the EU should co-operate and form a strategic partnership. This would be a major step ahead in what former NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson called “the great historic project of linking NATO and EU”12.

5.2 The EU and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) set wide-ranging goals for itself when it was founded in Barcelona in 1995. The 12 Mediterranean Part- ners, situated in the southern and eastern Mediterranean, are Morocco, Alge- ria, Tunisia (Maghreb), Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Lebanon, Syria (Mashrek), Turkey, Cyprus and Malta. Libya, which current- ly has observer status at certain meetings, has expressed its interest in joining the EMP13. The key objectives of the Barcelona Declaration is to establish partnerships in three areas: - The political and security partnership aims at ensuring peace and stability on the basis of principles such as human rights and democracy in the Eu- ro-Mediterranean region. - The economic and financial partnership endeavours to create an area of shared prosperity through the establishment of a free-trade area between the EU and its partners and among the Mediterranean Partners themselves. These efforts are accompanied by substantial EU financial support of the economic transition and reform processes, including the social consequences. - The social, cultural and human partnership is intended to promote understanding between cultures and a rapprochement of the peoples in the Euro- Mediterranean region and to develop free and flourishing civil societies14. In the economic field, some progress has been made since Barcelona. As- sociation Agreements have been concluded with all partner countries except Syria. However, with regard to both the cultural and human partnership and

12 George Robertson, Welcoming Speech at the New Year Reception of the Press, Brüs- sel, 10.01.2003. See: Internet http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s030110a.htm. 13 See: “Prodi Welcomes Libyan Readiness to Join Barcelona Process”, Brussels, 28 Feb- ruary 2004, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/lybia/news/ip04_279.htm. 14 See the website of the EMP: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/index.htm.

80 © Rubbettino the political and security partnership, co-operation has not materialised to the originally envisaged degree. For the political and security partnership, on which this chapter focuses, one can distinguish between the following, admit- tedly simplified, misconceptions and structural restraints: - The EMP is characterised by a certain degree of asymmetry. Whereas the EU can claim to represent Europe, the Mediterranean does not exist as a coherent partner. This holds true in the economic as well as the political field. - The EMP’s multilateral approach tends to ignore the different conflicts between and security concerns of the Mediterranean partner countries. - Basic concepts such as “security” have neither been defined nor agreed upon. Partners on both sides of the Mediterranean take divergent views of the overall aim of the partnership. - Hopes for the solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict have not been fulfilled, which had a negative effect on the EMP. - Among Mediterranean partner countries the suspicion persists that the EMP might be a tool for “post-colonialist” interference. Some partner countries see European involvement in the politics of the southern Mediterranean as rather problematic since it touches the crucial issue of national sovereignty. Still, the EMP’s unique value originates in its normative dimension. This dimension is based on the values of democracy and to the adherence to human rights. It is this base that should be strengthened, despite the fight against international terrorism. Even if the achievements in that field fall short of the modest expectations at the start of the process, some improvements (e.g. regarding the development of civil society in the partner countries) had in fact become tangible towards the end of the 1990s – only to disappear again almost completely in the wake of September 11, 2001.

5.2.1 Security Interests of the EU

The European Security Strategy, which was drafted by the High Represen- tative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, and adopted by the EU’s heads of state and government in December 2003, identifies five key threats to European stability and security, all of which also concern the states of the Mediterranean region. These key threats include the following: - Terrorism - Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) - Regional conflicts

81 © Rubbettino - State failure - Organised crime15. The European Security Strategy also identifies related interests, including: - The fostering of good governance While inter-state stability is a prime objective, intra-state instability due to bad governance and the abuse of human rights in the different nation states is equally unacceptable. - Prevention of illegal migration Illegal migration and trafficking must be prevented on land rather that at sea - Safeguarding of energy resources As the world’s largest importer of oil and gas, Europe is heavily dependent on energy imports, most of which come from the Gulf region, Russia and North Africa. On the whole these interests call for a new approach towards the region. For this reason the strategy proposes that one of the crucial strategic objectives of the EU should be to promote “a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and co-operative relations”16.

5.2.2 An emerging New Policy

The shape of the new approach to the region is slowly becoming visible (although there has been a kind of setback, see below). In March 2003, the European Commission published a report entitled “Wider Europe – Neigh- bourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours”. The policy paper proposes to develop “a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood – a ‘ring of friends’”17. The Neighbourhood Policy is planning to construct a framework for the development of a new and mutually beneficial relationship with countries that do not aspire to EU membership in the medium-term. The EU’s neighbours should be offered “the prospect of a stake in the Union’s Internal Market and further integration and

15 See A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 De- cember 2003, p. 3ff. 16 Ibid. p. 8. 17 See Commission of the European Communities, Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Brussels, 11 March 2003 (COM (2003) 104 final), p. 4.

82 © Rubbettino liberalisation to promote the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital”18. These are the so-called four freedoms. For the co-operation with the Union’s eastern and southern neighbours the report suggests an approach based on firm conditionality that moves away from what could be called the “send-money-and-hope-for-the-best” approach of the past. The basis of the new policy is spelled out in all but uncertain terms: “In return for concrete progress demonstrating shared values and effective implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms, the EU’s neighbourhood should benefit from the prospect of closer economic integration with the EU”19. More specifically, the report proposes that the Union’s approach should be based on incentives such as the extension of the internal market, preferen- tial trade relations and market openings, and prospects of legal migration and movement of persons. Other proposals include: - Greater efforts to promote human rights, cultural co-operation and mutual understanding The Commission states that shared values, mutual understanding and good governance are essential prerequisites for more profound political relations. The EU should contribute to the development of civil societies in order to promote basic human rights and freedom. Furthermore, the Union should make a greater effort to create a positive image of itself in the neighbouring countries. - Greater EU political involvement in conflict prevention and crisis management The Commission stresses that democratic institutions and the respect for human rights “will open the way for a closer and more open dialogue”20 on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The report also encourages the EU to take on a more active role in order to help settle the conflict over Pales- tine and Western Sahara. At the same time, the Commission stresses the importance of regional and sub-regional co-operation. These were key aspects of the three partnerships concluded in Barcelona. Particularly with regard to the political area and to the security area, the so-called partnership-building measures such as confidence and security-building measures have, for the reasons already noted, not developed as envisaged. Partnership-building activities have included:

18 See European Commission, Wider Europe - Neighbourhood, p. 4. 19 See European Commission, Wider Europe - Neighbourhood, p. 10. 20 See European Commission, Wider Europe - Neighbourhood, p. 12.

83 © Rubbettino - Information and training seminars for diplomats - The establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean network of foreign policy in- stitutes - A political and security dialogue between senior officials from 27 EMP states that are to meet quarterly - Projects for the promotion of democracy and human rights. Because of the lack of progress, the Commission “strongly”21 encourages further regional and sub-regional co-operation among the southern Mediter- ranean states. Unfortunately, the unambiguous message of conditionality from the Commission seems to have been watered down. The presidency conclusions of the Sixth Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs that was held in Naples in December 2003, includes toned-down language that does not put sufficient stress on the linkage between tangible political and economic reforms on the one hand and gradual integration into Europe’s internal market on the other22.

5.2.3 ESDP and the Mediterranean

Under the Spanish, Greek and Italian Presidencies (2002 and 2003) efforts were made to strengthen the Mediterranean dimension of the ESDP in order to enhance transparency and promote mutual understanding in the ES- DP. As a result the Foreign Ministers welcomed the weight that was put on dialogue and co-operation inside the framework of the ESDP at the 2003 Naples Euro-Mediterranean Conference. The key objectives are the following: To make the partners familiar with the aims and instruments of ESDP To pave the way for future participation in ESDP activities on a regional, sub-regional or country basis23. Several mechanisms have been proposed to this end24. The dialogue will be conducted on a regular basis with the EU’s Political and Security Commit-

21 See: European Commission, Wider Europe - Neighbourhood, p. 8. 22 See: Sixth Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Presidency Conclusions, Naples, 2-3 December 2003: Internet http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_rela- tions/euromed/conf/naples/index.htm, paragraphs 7 and 34. 23 See: Sixth Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Presidency Conclusions, paragraph 31. 24 See: Council of the European Union, Option Paper on Dialogue and Co-operation on ESDP between the EU and Mediterranean Partners, Brussels, 19 February 2003, p. 5 (6276/1/03 rev 1).

84 © Rubbettino tee and on expert level. Moreover, each Mediterranean partner may, if it so wishes, establish contacts with the Secretariat General of the Council and the Commission in order to facilitate the exchange of information. One of the EU’s main messages is to point out that the notion of “defence” that underlies the ESDP goes far beyond the establishment of a rapid reaction force. The ESDP is an all-encompassing approach whose emphasis lies on crisis prevention and the civilian aspects of crisis management. It remains to be seen how responsive the Mediterranean countries’ position towards ESDP will be. As the Council’s option paper points out, it “is worth noting that the success of this endeavour will not only depend on the Union’s offer but also on the readiness and capacity of the Mediterranean Partners to engage in it”25.

5.2.4 An EU Strategy Against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

In June 2003 the EU Council approved a document entitled “Basic Prin- ciples for an EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass De- struction” and endorsed an action plan for its implementation. The Basic Principles stress the threats to Europe that the proliferation of such weapons represent. The Principles also analyse how these weapons are delivered and acquired by terrorist groups. Special focus is put on the Mediterranean region: “Proliferation of WMD is a global threat, which needs a global approach. However, as security in Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean, we should pay particular attention to the issue of proliferation in the Mediterranean area”26. More specifically, the action plan calls for giving particular attention to the WMD proliferation in the Mediterranean, which is to lead to a WMD threat assessment for the region. It also proposes to include the issue of adherence to non-proliferation and arms control treaties in the Union’s dialogue and to study the implication of an initiative for a WMD free zone in the Mid- dle East27.

25 Council of the European Union, Option Paper, p. 4. 26 Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruc- tion, Luxemburg, 16 June 2003: Internet http://ue.eu.int/pressdata/EN/reports/76328.pdf, paragraph 11 (reiterated in the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruc- tion, Thessaloniki European Council, 12 December 2003, paragraph 24). 27 See: Basic Principles, Action Plan for the Implementation of the Basic Principles against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, paragraph 10.

The three partnerships that were entered upon in Barcelona have developed unevenly during the past few years. Due to its generous economic programmes, the EU’s economic relations to the Mediterranean partner countries have made some progress. However, political and security relations are lagging behind. In order to foster political change in the region and address the key issues of its security agenda, the Union should make use of its economic power more often. The political and security partnership of the EMP could be enhanced by the following measures: - Firm conditionality The funding of the MEDA programme as the principal financial mechanism for the implementation of the EMP amounts to 5,35 billion for the period 2000-2006. In view of this huge sum, the EU should put more stress on the linkage between concrete political and economic reforms in the Mediterranean partner countries on the one hand and the continua- tion of these countries’ participation in the programme and integration into the EU’s internal market on the other. - Enhanced regional and sub-regional co-operation Successful regional and sub-regional co-operation are major mechanisms for improving security. The EU should attribute higher priority to the development of new initiatives and to the promotion of already existing initiatives and increase their funding. - A Strategic Partnership with NATO A major obstacle to a stronger EU role in the security arena is constituted by the fact that the Union is not perceived of as a strong political actor; a view that is by no means confined to the Mediterranean. As a security actor, the Union has a mixed record. It would therefore be sensible to work together with Europe’s foremost security organisation, NATO. This chapter and the previous one dealt with the EU and NATO. Both chapters point out the existence of various programmes and strategies within the structures of these organisations. To maximise the impact of these programmes, it is necessary to merge them into a “Meda-Acquis” and develop a common strategic concept. Indeed, the EU and NATO pursue the same strategic goals in the region. Consequently both organisations should become close partners in their approach to the Mediterranean. A strategic partnership with a comprehensive, efficient set of tools would serve as a catalyst at the same time as it would be an excellent opportunity to bring a new kind of peaceful dynamism to the region.

The main purpose of this research paper has been to analyse and proffer political options that could improve NATO’ s and EU’s Mediterranean dialogue. In this manner the development of the Dialogue has been evaluated and taken stock of. Subsequently, the main interests of the actors involved and the main threats to peace and stability in the region have been identified. The analysis revealed that the predominant interest of Italy and Germany is to use multilateral organisations in order to encourage the Mediterranean dialogue. It also pointed out the achievements and shortcomings of the existing dialogue with the Mediterranean partner countries. The analysis also identified the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the spread of terrorism based on religious fundamentalism, illegal immigration, failing states as well as the disruption of energy supplies as the main threats to Europe. The analysis of the perceptions of the Mediterranean dialogue countries also revealed that there still are open or latent suspicions that NATO or the EU might use the dialogue mechanism in order to establish a post-colonial influence over the respective countries. The perceived lack of neutrality in the Israeli – Palestinian conflict was also identified as the main source of estrangement of the Arab countries from NATO and the EU and subsequently as a main obstacle to the intensification of the Mediterranean dialogues. Furthermore, the study highlighted the diversity of interests and political orientation of the Mediterranean partner countries and their internal development problems. It also pointed out the growing understanding within the Mediter- ranean states that only good and responsible governance, the protection of human rights and sufficient investment in the education of the growing population can guarantee sustained economic development and well being in the future. The study takes all these facts and current trends of development within the region into account and comes to conclusions that support the intensification of the Mediterranean dialogue and encourages good governance, peace, security and sustained development throughout the Mediterranean basin.

87 © Rubbettino Policy Options for the “Common Security Area Europe” It is widely agreed that the current dialogue between different organisations and actors needs to be transformed into a comprehensive “Common security area Europe”. At a later stage a truly beneficial co-operation between the current processes, including the whole of the Mediterranean region, needs to be achieved. The joint research project that has been carried out by CeMiSS and ZTransfBw provides the following options that should be further pursued: 1. EU-NATO Security Co-operation in the Mediterranean in order to define a new Strategic Partnership 2. Conflict prevention and crisis management in sub-regional security regimes through a comprehensive approach 3. Encouraging and Supporting developments towards good governance, human rights and democracy 4. Policy options in order to induce development in the Mediterranean Di- alogue Partner countries These options will be dealt with in the abovementioned order.

6.1 EU-NATO Security Co-operation in the Mediterranean – A Strategic Partnership

Today, there is a convergence of many interests on both sides of the Mediterranean. Terrorism, for example, is directed both towards the southern neighbours from Morocco to the Emirates and towards Europe. Illegal migration is another example of this kind of problems. There is a convergence between EU and NATO interests in the region. Just like the EU, NATO’s goals include the promotion of democracy and human rights, the promotion of interstate and intra-state stability, the fight against international terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs. In the light of these facts it is time to capitalise on the close co-operation between NATO and the EU. If they joined forces the respective strength of both organisations could be used for the benefit of all partners. Moreover, the current situation should be changed since it often forces the MPCs to choose between the two dialogues due to resource limitations. Instead, the MPCs should become partners of a European concept that includes clear aims, conditions and programmes. The EU and NATO should enter into a true strategic partnership on the basis of the “Berlin Plus” agreement of December 2002. A common Mediter-

88 © Rubbettino ranean concept that reaps the benefits of a combined approach to security, stability and prosperity could be the first manifestation of the usefulness and added value of this strategic partnership. - This co-operation should include the following: - The formulation of a common strategic security concept for the region; - The foundation of a joint EU-NATO working group, secretariat and council (PSC-NAC) for the formulation and implementation of their common policy; - Full co-ordination of EU and NATO initiatives. Maximum collaboration could only be created in this way. To guarantee the best possible use of the EU’s and NATO’s resources and avoid duplication as well as to ensure coherence, the multitude of initiatives and already existing programmes have to be summed up in a collective “Me- da-Acquis”. The “Meda-Acquis” and the concept that underlies the EU’s Eu- ropean Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) would be among the building blocks of a comprehensive strategy for the region.

Institutional Co-operation The co-ordination of a EU-NATO strategy would take place in a joint Co- operation Council that would meet on the levels of foreign and defence ministers, ambassadors (PSC-NAC) and CHODs. The Co-operation Council would decide on the overall strategy, which would then form the basis of all kinds of further action that the two organisations would undertake in the region. Representatives of both organisations should be made part of the decision-formulation process of the other organisation. These representatives must not be biased against the respective decision making rules and the decision-making autonomy of the two organisations. The objective would be to gain maximum coherence and co-ordination between all measures and programs undertaken within the framework of the strategy. Similar working methods have already been introduced into the ESDP in order to co-ordinate the civil and military aspects of the decision-making processes. The work of the Co-operation Council would be supported by a joint secretariat and joint working groups.

Pragmatic Burden Sharing The EU-NATO Co-ordination Council would agree to take on specific parts of the strategy and then would task the organisation that was most fit to take care of the matter. Policy areas that are in the realm of both organisations will be handled jointly and co-ordinated by EU-NATO working groups.

89 © Rubbettino Implementation of EU-NATO Policies Even if the overall strategy reflects the interests and goals of all players involved, including the U.S., it still makes sense to allow certain states that are interested in moving forward on specific aspects and programmes to do so within the scope of the strategy. The concept of “enhanced” or “deepened co- operation” offers the opportunity, for those interested, of enhancing their security co-operation.

The EU-NATO Strategic Partnership – Creating a “Win-Win” Situation

Benefits for the EU The EU would become more active in the Mediterranean region. Friction both within the EU and with regard to its relationship with NATO could be reduced. It would also become more capable in the fields of crisis management and preventive action. The collaboration effect of a combined effort by both organisations could further enhance the EU’s foreign policy impact. Moreover, the EU would become a true partner in the transatlantic partnership; a partner that is willing to follow up on its strategic declarations with concrete steps and in concert with its friends. In many regions the U.S. has an influence that is unequalled by Europe. The combined effort could strengthen European influence on the shaping of these regions. Finally, a combined EU-NATO strategy offers the EU the possibility to co-opt the US into a multilateral approach towards issues and regions of common interest.

Benefits for NATO In the long run the problems in the Mediterranean can only be solved by profound structural changes in the political and economic structures. The EU is obviously the organisation that is best suited to deal with these problems. NATO’s strategic mission aims at guaranteeing the Alliance’s security. Thus an approach that could make use of all available synergies would by definition be the most desirable one. Full co-operation and co-ordination with the EU (and its multitude of political, diplomatic and economic tools) will enhance NA- TO’s efforts vis-à-vis the Mediterranean and enable it to become even more effective. With regard to the U.S. and its unwavering interests in the region this approach could hold immense benefits. Whereas U.S. influence is very strong in the eastern Mediterranean it lacks such intensive contacts with most of the

90 © Rubbettino North African states. In order to reach a durable stabilisation of the region as a whole it would be essential to form a coalition that was as broad as possible. This collaboration effect would maximise the impact of the western policy in the region and reinvigorate transatlantic co-operation.

Benefits for the MPCs - Transparency in EU and NATO matters relating to the Mediterranean. - No overlap between EU and NATO initiatives. - Country-specific co-operation programmes including political, economic, social and military aspects in support of good governance. It is obvious that all parties involved in the EU’s and NATO’s dialogue fo- ra would benefit from a strategic partnership between the two organisations. would be necessary The collaboration that would result from this kind of co- operation would create a “win-win” situation.

6.2 Conflict prevention and crisis management within sub-regional security regimes through different comprehensive approaches

To cope with the complex security problems of the region a comprehensive approach would be necessary. This approach would encompass economic, social, political and security related issues. The geographical aspects of co- operation and integration have to be diversified since the Mediterranean countries are too different to be dealt with with a single set of measures. The “greater Mediterranean” approach has to be discarded since the goal of a single geo-economical MP/MD-region is almost impossible to reach. The Mediterranean-dialogue countries of NATO and the EU should be subdivided into three sub-regional groups with countries of similar geopolitical interests and socio-economic structures. These sub-regions should then be addressed with specifically tailored sets of political, economic and security related instruments. These sub-regions are: - The Eastern Mediterranean – Adriatic Sea – countries: Slovenia, Croatia, Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Serbia Montenegro. - The south-western Mediterranean countries: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya - The south-eastern Mediterranean countries: Egypt, The Palestinian Pro- visional Authority, Jordan, Syria and Israel. The existing sub-regional organisations, like the UMA (Union du Maghreb Arab that includes Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania) and

91 © Rubbettino the “CEN-SAD” (18 Sahara and sub-Saharian countries, including Libya, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia) have only brought about marginal economic integration. Although the economic factor is given high priority in the Mediter- ranean dialogue the horizontal integration among the North-African countries is still very limited as regards trade and transportation infrastructure. Further- more, during the last ten years progress in the UMA countries has been stalled by the conflict between Morocco and Algeria about the Western Sahara region. A free trade area could presumably first be organised among the states of the Agadir-group (Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan). This would enhance the socio-economic conditions considerably. It would also lead to the modernisation and growth of the respective national economies and raise the standard of living for the growing populations. A joint NATO/ EU policy should therefore be tailored in order to encourage and support regional integration efforts. This would constitute an addition to the Barcelona Process’ long-term goal of establishing a Mediterranean free trade zone by 2010. It seems unlikely that the above mentioned regional organisations will make any progress in the area of security related issues. The long-term aim of NATO and EU in the Mediterranean region is to form a common Mediter- ranean security understanding through seminars, consultations and the education of the military personnel of the MP/MD-countries. This aim should be supplemented by regional approaches that are independent of the existing regional organisations. These initiatives might consist in: - Road maps that would facilitate the solution of regional conflicts - The establishment of arms control regimes for conventional arms as well as for weapons of mass destruction - Confidence building measures like advance notice of military exercises and information about the state of readiness of military forces - Conflict management and conflict prevention through joint crisis management centres - NATO/ EU commitment to regional peace keeping-and observer forces The right combination of these activities – in proportion to the regional needs and situations – could lead to the creation of a real Mediterranean security community that would support Euro-Atlantic security effectively.

6.3 Encouraging and Supporting developments towards good governance, human rights and democracy

Interstate stability in the MEDA region will be the single most important factor for peace and security within the “Common security area Europe”. In

92 © Rubbettino its turn this stability depends on the internal situation in the region’s national states. Bad governance and the violation of human rights can easily lead to civil disturbances, anarchic conditions and even to the collapse of states. These factors promote terrorism, organised crime and illegal immigration and cause interstate conflicts. As stipulated in the European Security Strategy “A Secure Europe in a better World” from December 2003 the EU will “... promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and co-operative relations.” The MP/MD-countries themselves stress the importance of economic and structural changes and of good governance for the stabilisation of the region. Of course, the initiatives for this must come from within the Mediter- ranean countries. All the more it is necessary for NATO and EU to encourage any sign of change and to strengthen and support these changes efficiently and un-bureaucratically with the appropriate means. Many analysts believe that there are indigenous forms of democracy, which combine democratic principles with traditional forms of legitimacy, like religion, tribe, neighbourhood or syndicates. Nevertheless, NATO and EU should expect the Mediterranean dialogue countries to end their anti-western rhetoric and to give up their double standards as regards the fight against the internal Islamist opposition. As long as these groups only fight western influence and values they are tolerated – and even supported – by the local governments but when they threaten the governments themselves they are dealt with politically or by law enforcement. The governments of the Mediterranean dialogue countries have to shift gradually their base of legitimacy and stability from the use of nationalism and anti-western feelings to democratic forms of good governance. Fundamentalist Islamist movements are common enemies to both the western countries and the Mediterranean countries. They are only concentrating their forces on fighting western influences as long as they know that they are not strong enough to turn against their own governments. Their attacks on what they call western influences are of a predominantly tactical nature. From the late 1980s onwards there have been signs of structural change and reform in the region although there they did not lead to a durable political liberalisation. Recently there have been important impulses from the African Union (AU) and its initiative “New Partnership for Africa’s Development” (NEPAD) of July 2001. In the founding document of NEPAD the African states stress that good governance is an essential prerequisite for economic growth and development. They acknowledge the importance of political pluralism and

93 © Rubbettino free and fair elections. In the long run it is the aim of the NEPAD-initiative to bring Africa onto a course of stability and sustained development. As an instrument for the implementation of standards of democracy and good governance 16 African States have agreed to join the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). This year three new institutions have been established: The Pan- African Parliament, the Human Rights Tribunal and the African-Standby- Force so that NEPAD is also developing a kind of security dimension. The beginning of the review process of the APRM-regime will start this year. At the moment only one Mediterranean dialogue country – Algeria – is part of the voluntary APRM-process. A joint NATO/ EU initiative should encourage the MP/MD-countries to join this promising initiative.

6.4 Policy options to induce development within the Mediterranean Dialogue Partner countries

Although the Mediterranean dialogue partners have realised that they are in need of further democratic reforms, NATO and the EU should improve their ability to induce and influence change in the direction of good governance in the dialogue countries. This will enable them to participate in a true Euro-Atlantic /Mediterranean partnership. A modest “reward conditionality” is already evident in the distribution of the EU’s development aid. In September 2002 the “National Security Strategy of the United States” of September stipulated the goal to provide resources to aid countries “... that have met the challenges of national reform”. It goes on saying: “We propose a 50 percent increase in the core development assistance given by the United States ... for projects in countries whose governments rule justly, invest in their people, and encourage economic freedom”. The same holds true for the European Security Strategy “A Secure Eu- rope in a better World” from December 2003 which states that trade and development policies can be powerful tools for promoting reform: “As the world’s largest provider of official assistance and its largest trading entity, the European Union and its Member States are well placed to pursue these goals. Contributing to better governance through assistance programs, conditionality and targeted trade measures remains an important feature in our policy that we should further reinforce”. As an imposition of western patterns of government and societies would be highly counterproductive this study proposes subtle forms of incentives and pressure, based on cross-issue linkage.

94 © Rubbettino For this purpose NATO and EU should elaborate on: - A common yardstick to specify their expectations that regard reforms and the development of civil societies - Subtle forms of “conditionality tools” on the basis of gradualism and cross-issue linkage - Options to co-operate with Western and Mediterranean NGO’s in order to strengthen the starting points for the development of civil societies This specific kind of conditionality should be effectively introduced into all aspects of the NATO/ EU relations to the region. Consequently the development aid would not only help to improve the standard of living in the region, but it would also safeguard certain standards that would guarantee the constant progress of human rights and good governance in the Mediterranean dialogue countries. This fourfold approach could help to create and strengthen a coalition of moderate, stable and developing states around the Mediterranean. These states would not only be dialogue partners but also true allies and friends inside the “Common Security Area Europe” which in its turn would encompass its Mediterranean partners gradually.

95 © Rubbettino Finito di stampare nel mese di maggio 2005 da Rubbettino Industrie Grafiche ed Editoriali per conto di Rubbettino Editore Srl 88049 Soveria Mannelli (Catanzaro)

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99 © Rubbettino 64 L’impatto della presenza militare in Emilia Romagna “il caso Budrio”, il caso del “triangolo aeronautico”: Forlì, Cervia, Rimini, (1994) NOMISMA S.p.A. (*) 65 Sistema di sicurezza dei Paesi del Golfo. Riflessi per l’Occidente (1995) S. Sil- vestri, R. Aliboni, L. Guazzone (*) 66 Sistema di controllo dell’esportazione degli armamenti e della tecnologia avan- zata. Ammaestramenti delle crisi del Golfo (1995) A. Politi, A. de Guttry, S. Gallucci, M. Bilbesi, M. Lastella (*) 67 Emergenza marittima e Forze Armate – Piani di emergenza e coinvolgimento della Marina Militare in caso di gravi incidenti navali con versamenti di petro- lio (1995) U. Bilardo, G. Mureddu (*) 68 Il ruolo del pilastro europeo della NATO nella definizione di un sistema di sicurezza integrato: rapporti istituzionali e industriali (1995) L. Caligaris, W. Wessels, G. Treverton, J. Chipman, Laporta, G. Dottori, D. Ruiz-Palmer (*) 69 L’organizzazione e l’architettura C3I per il vertice decisionale nazionale (1995) M. Nones, R. Romano, S. Silvestri, A. de Guttry (*) 70 La disintegrazione dell’impero sovietico. Problemi di sicurezza nazionale e col- lettiva in Asia Centrale (1995) V. Fiorani Piacentini, B. Nicolini, G. Pasini, G. Pastori, R. Redaelli (*) 71 Evoluzione del rischio da Sud in connessione con il prevedibile progresso tecnologico e misure di difesa (1995) C.M. Santoro (*) 72 Presente e futuro della professione militare in Europa. L’Ufficiale italiano (1995) G. Caforio, M. Nuciari (*) 73 Possibili effetti della legge sull’obiezione di coscienza sull’assolvimento dei compiti istituzionali delle FF.AA. (1996) U. Pescatori, G. Muzzarelli 74 Lo Status delle Forze Armate italiane impegnate in operazione “fuori area” condotte sotto l’egida di organizzazioni internazionali (1996) N. Ronzitti 75 Il potere aereo post-CFE (1996) A. Politi 76 La gestione disciplinare e normativa del personale volontario (1996) G. Gaspe- rini, M. Negri (*) 77 Il soldato della complessità: tra specializzazione e flessibilità (1996) M. Negri, G.B. Colucci 78 Il futuro della CFE. Il passaggio alla seconda fase di riduzione dopo la conclu- sione della prima (1996) M. Cremasco 79 La componente sicurezza/rischio negli scacchieri geopolitici Sud ed Est. Le opzioni del Modello di Difesa italiano (1996) A. Colombo 80 La geopolitica del Mediterraneo: problemi e prospettive dell’Italia negli scenari futuri (1996) C. Giglio, P. Soave 81 La conoscenza come risorsa produttiva: le Forze Armate di fronte alla società postmoderna (1996) F. Battistelli, T. Ammendola, M. Negri 82 Geoeconomia dei principali stati occidentali. Riflessi sull’Italia (1996) R. De Santis, G. Vulpes 83 Le operazioni militari all’estero gestite al di fuori del sistema delle organizza-

100 © Rubbettino zioni internazionali o nel suo ambito: problemi giuridici o organizzativi per le Forze Armate italiane (1996) A. de Guttry 84 La difficile scommessa. L’allargamento della NATO ad Est (1997) M. Cremasco 85 L’embargo e le altre misure economiche come mezzo di gestione e soluzione delle crisi (1998) G. Pastori 86 La questione sindacale nell’evoluzione delle politiche strategiche della sicurezza in Italia - Osservazioni storico metodologiche (1998) A. Ciampani 87 Cooperazione dell’Italia con l’Austria, La Repubblica Ceka, la Slovenia, la Croazia e l’Ungheria (1998) S. Mazzaroli 88 Elementi di diritto umanitario dei conflitti armati (Diritto italiano di bandiera) (1998) A. Marcheggiano (*) 89 Italia e nucleare francese: attualità e prospettiva (1998) C. Paoletti (*) 90 Analisi delle spese per l’investimento dell’Esercito. Esame delle note aggiunti- ve: previsioni e scostamenti. Valutazioni sulle principali cause degli scostamenti (1998) M.T. Fiocca 91 Applicazioni spaziali civili di possibile interesse della Difesa (1998) M. Nones, A. Traballesi 92 Lo Stratega mediatico (1998) P. Visani 93 Le prospettive di integrazione tra Unione Europea e Unione Europea Occi- dentale (1999) E. Letta 94 Prospettive di applicazione del D.D.L. di iniziativa governativa riguardante l’i- stituzione del servizio civile nazionale e della nuova legge sull’obiezione di coscienza (1999) C. Politi 95 Aspetti politici ed economici della European Security and Defence Identity nel quadro di una integrazione degli eserciti europei (1999) A. Ferranti 96 Le zone di pesca nel Mediterraneo e la tutela degli interessi italiani, (1999) N. Ronzitti 97 Il processo di approvvigionamento degli idrocarburi in situazione di crisi internazionale (1999) N. Pedde e V. Porfiri 98 Albania – (Manuali-Paese) (1999) a cura del Centro per l’Europa Centro- Orientale e Balcanica (*) 99 Bosnia-Erzegovina – (Manuali-Paese) (1999) a cura del Centro per l’Europa Centro-Orientale e Balcanica (*) 100 Proliferazione missilistica: stato ed evoluzione della minaccia e prospettive per un sistema di difesa antimissile (1999) A. Nativi 101 Il controllo degli armamenti nella ex-Jugoslavia con particolare riferimento alla Bosnia-Erzegovina (1999) M. Cremasco 102 Peace Dividend. Aspetti teorici ed applicazioni al caso italiano (1999) G. Streppi 103 Evoluzione dei rapporti transatlantici nel settore della produzione industriale della difesa, a fronte della costituzione dell’Europa degli armamenti (2000) A. Traballesi 104 La geoeconomia delle imprese italiane: riflessi sulla gravitazione degli interessi geostrategici nazionali (2000) A. Cattaneo

101 © Rubbettino 105 Strategic sealift: sviluppo e caratteristiche nazionali di un importante strumen- to di proiezione e di forza nel mediterraneo allargato (2000) G. Mureddu 106 Repubblica di Jugoslavia (Manuali-Paese) (2001) a cura del Centro per l’Euro- pa Centro-Orientale e Balcanica 107 Fyrom: La Repubblica di Macedonia (Manuali-Paese) (2001) a cura del Cen- tro per l’Europa Centro-Orientale e Balcanica 108 La corte penale internazionale, i crimini di guerra e le truppe italiane all’estero in missione di pace (2001) N. Ronzitti 109 Gli effetti delle sanzioni economiche: il caso della Serbia (2001) M. Zucconi 110 Il coordinamento interministeriale per la politica industriale della difesa: valutazione comparata tra la soluzione italiana e quella dei principali paesi europei (2002) M. Nones 111 La difesa europea in ambito alleanza: una sfida per l’industria degli armamenti (2002) A. Traballesi 112 I diritti delle donne: le presenti strutture normative nel diritto internazionale ed i loro effetti nei casi di conflitti etnici (2002) P. Brusadin 113 Il legame nazione-esercito: l’abolizione della leva basterà a rendere le forze armate meno impopolari tra i giovani? (2002) T. M. Blasi 114 La logistica degli anni 2000: ricorso a risorse esterne (outsourcing), contratti di servizi, logistica integrata, contratti chiavi in mano. Evoluzione o rivoluzione? (2003) F. Franceschini, M. Galletto, M. Borgarello 115 Cambiamenti organizzativi dell’industria statale della difesa: confronto con le altre realtà europee, con particolare riferimento agli stabilimenti di manuten- zione navale (2003) R. Stanglini 116 La bonifica umanitaria nel quadro della cooperazione civile e militare (2003) F. Termentini 117 La questione di Cipro (2003) G. Sardellone 118 The international role of the European Union (2003) R. Balfour, E. Greco (edizione in lingua inglese) 119 Storia del Servizio Militare in Italia – Il terzo dopoguerra (1921-2001), Vol. VI (2003) V. Ilari, P.P. Battistelli 120 Cooperazione tra Forze Armate e Organizzazioni Non Governative nelle operazioni militari di risposta alle crisi (2003) M. Panizzi 121 Gli interventi in aree di crisi a favore della tutela del patrimonio culturale, in applicazione ai dettati della convenzione dell’Aja: esperienze e prospettive (2003) F. Parrulli 122 Ethnic conflict in the former Soviet Union (2004) V.V. Naumkin, L.S. Pe- repyolkin 123 Diritto Internazionale Umanitario Violazioni e crimini nelle nuove tipologie di conflitto (2004) C.M. Polidori 124 I ritorni industriali negli approvvigionamenti internazionali: la negoziazione, il concordamento ed il controllo dell’esecuzione (2004) R. Rufo 125 Il ruolo della Telemedicina nel nuovo modello di Difesa (2004) M. Anaclerio

102 © Rubbettino 126 La certificazione dei prodotti aeronautici alla luce del D.P.R. 25 ottobre 1999 N° 556 (2004) B. Morelli, V. De Blasi 127 Sviluppo tecnologico ed evoluzione della dottrina d’impiego del potere aero- spaziale (2004) A. Traballesi, N. Cardinali 128 La funzione dell’Intelligence nel contesto del processo decisionale (2004) A. Politi 129 Le minacce “globali” alla sicurezza e all’ordine internazionale (2005) P. Soave 130 Norme sull’esercizio della giurisdizione delle Forze Armate inviate all’estero. Tutela giuridica del personale (2005) D. Libertini

Collana Ce.Mi.S.S. – Serie Blu – Atti di convegni

• South-Eastern Europe, bridge or border between civilizations (Atti del convegno tenutosi a Sofia nei giorni 17 e 18 ottobre 1997) • The Future of NATO’s Mediterranean Iniziative (1997) (Atti della conferenza CeMiSS – RAND Corporation – Roma, 10 e 11 novembre 1997) (edizione di- sponibile anche in lingua araba) • NATO enlargement: situation and perspectives (Atti del convegno tenutosi a Budapest dal 11 al 15 luglio 1998) • I reparti multinazionali come strumento della sicurezza regionale (Atti del 1° seminario italo/polacco – Roma, 24 marzo 1999) • Centralità dell’Italia nello sviluppo delle relazioni Nord-Sud nel bacino del Mediterraneo. Quale ruolo per la Sicilia? - Atti del Seminario di studio fra stu- denti dell’Ateneo palermitano ed Istituti di Formazione della Difesa (Palermo, 23-25 novembre 1999)

Altre pubblicazioni

• Diritto Internazionale per Ufficiali della Marina Militare (1996) N. Ronzitti (Ristampa della ricerca n. 40 sul supplemento della “Rivista Marittima” del luglio 1996)(*) • Un’intelligence per il XXI secolo (1999) G. Dottori • Il Neo-Terrorismo: suoi connotati e conseguenti strategie di prevenzione e con- tenimento (2001) V. Pisano

Collana Ce.Mi.S.S. – edizioni Franco Angeli

1520.269 Giovani e Forze Armate (1996) F. Battistelli 365.59 L’industria della Difesa. L’Italia nel quadro internazionale (1996) F. Oni- da, G. Viesti

103 © Rubbettino 1136.11 Scenari di sicurezza per l’Europa e l’Italia (1996) M. Cremasco 1136.13 Società civile e processo di pace in Medio Oriente (1996) D.V. Segre 1136.14 Interesse nazionale e interesse globale (1996) P. Portinaro (*) 1136.15 La crisi del bipolarismo (1996) S. Romano (*) 1136.16 Il pensiero militare nel mondo musulmano (1996) V.F. Piacentini 1136.17 Rischio da Sud (1996) C.M. Santoro (*) 1136.18 Evoluzione della Guerra (1996) C. Pelanda 1136.19 L’invasione scalza (1996) G. Sacco 1136.21 Pax Pacifica (1996) M. Dassù (*) 365.66 Il Sistema Italia (1996) CeMiSS; (Atti del convegno “Gli interessi nazionali italiani nel nuovo scenario internazionale” Roma, 25-26 giugno 1996) 365.66 Integrazione e sicurezza nel Mediterraneo – le opzioni dell’Occidente (1997) P.C. Padoan 1136.23 Russia e sistema di sicurezza Occidentale (1997) M. Cremasco 1550.6 Difesa della Patria e interesse nazionale nella scuola (1997) R. Cartocci, A. M. L. Parisi 1136.24 La logica del disordine (1997) E. Zanoni 1136.25 Alla ricerca dell’interesse nazionale (1997) A. L. Pirocchi, M. Brunelli 1136.26 La politica di sicurezza tedesca verso il duemila (1997) G. Dottori, S. Ma- rino 1136.27 Medio Oriente e Forze di Pace (1997) G. Tappero Merlo 1136.28 Armi e Disarmo (1997) F. Calogero, P. Miggiano, G. Tenaglia 1136.29 Le missioni delle Forze Armate italiane fuori area (1997) A. de Guttry 1136.30 La guerra civile in Rwanda (1997) Umwantisi 1136.31 La “questione illirica” (1997) L. Bozzo, C. Simon Belli 1550.9 Difesa, Politica e Società (1997) P. Bellucci 1136.32 Partenariato nel Mediterraneo (1997) R. Aliboni 1136.34 Combattere con le informazioni (1997) F. Pierantoni 1136.35 Il conflitto Etnico (1997) R. Arbitrio 1136.36 Geopolitica della salute (1997) B. Arrabito 1136.37 Interessi nazionali e identità italiana (1997) F. Corsico 1550.10 Missione in Bosnia (1999) T. Ammendola 1136.42 Le armi inabilitanti non letali (1999) J. Alhadeff 1136.43 L’Italia e l’Islam non Arabo (1999) G. Pastori, R. Redaelli (*) 1136.44 Geopolitica della Turchia (1999) R. Aliboni 1136.45 Antropologia e Peacekeeping (1999) A. Antoniotto (*) 1136.49 Regionalismi economici e sicurezza (1999) L. Troiani (*) 1136.50 Asia Centrale: verso un sistema cooperativo di sicurezza (1999) V.F. Pia- centini 1136.51 Macedonia: la nazione che non c’è (1999) L. Bozzo, C. Simon Belli (*) 1136.52 Scenari strategici per il futuro (1999) M. Coccia 1136.53 The Kosovo Quagmire. Conflict scenarios and method for resolution (1999) L. Bozzo, C. Simon Belli (*)

104 © Rubbettino 1136.1.1 Transizioni democratiche (2000) L. Bonanate 1136.1.2 La Difesa Civile e il progetto Caschi Bianchi (2000) F. Tullio 1136.1.3 La difficile sfida (2001) M. Cremasco (*) 1136.1.4 L’Egitto tra Maghreb e Machrek (2001) C. Simon Belli 1136.1.5 Le organizzazioni criminali internazionali (2001) M. Giaconi 1136.1.6 La questione Kurda (2001) S. Mazzocchi, R. Ragionieri, C. Simon Belli 1136.1.7 L’Europa centro-orientale e la NATO dopo il 1999 (2001) F. Argentieri 1136.1.8 Europa – Stati Uniti: un Atlantico più largo? (2001) M. de Leonardis 1136.1.9 The Effects of Economic Sanctions: the Case of Serbia (2001) M. Zucconi

Collana Ce.Mi.S.S. – edizioni A & P

1.09 Security Threat perception in South – Eastern Europe (2001) CeSPI and EWI 1.10 La guerra incruenta (2001) F. Pierantoni 1.11 La politica di sicurezza e difesa dell’Unione Europea (2001) F. Attinà, F. Lon- go, C. Monteleone, S. Panebianco, P. Rosa 1.12 The flexible officer (2001) G. Caforio 1.13 Il documento di Washington: problemi politici e giuridici (2001) N. Ronzitti 1.14 UMA: Les difficultés d’une reconstruction régionale (1989-1999) (2001) K. Chater 1.15 Peacekeeping: Polizia internazionale e nuovi ruoli militari tra conflitti etnici, terrorismo, criminalità organizzata (2001) R. Bettini 1.16 Il XXI Secolo: Ipotesi e tendenze dei modelli di difesa negli scenari mondiali (2001) C. M. Santoro 1.17 Sociological aspects concerning the relations within contingents of multinational units: The case of the Italian-Slovenian Hungarian Brigade (2001) G. Ga- sperini, B. Arnej ˇciˇc e A.Ujj 1.18 Il ruolo della forza europea di reazione rapida: un quadro strategico degli anni duemila (2001) M. Cremasco 1.19 Il ruolo delle istituzioni finanziarie internazionali nei processi di peace building (2002) M. Fiocca 1.20 La sicurezza in Europa dopo il Kosovo (2001) R. Menotti e R. Balfour 1.21 Il processo di integrazione del procurement militare in Europa (2001) L. Bertini 2.22 Towards a European security and defence policy (2002) Ce.Mi.S.S. – C.D.S. 2.23 Il ruolo internazionale dell’Unione Europea (2002) R. Balfour – E. Greco 2.24 Rapporto dal futuro. 2004: lo Stato dell’Europa e l’Europa come Stato (2002) L. Bonanate 2.25 Changing U.S. defense policy and the war on terrorism: implications for Italy and for U.S.-Italian relation (2002) Ce.Mi.S.S. – RAND 2.26 Il diritto dei trattati nelle attività di interesse delle FF.AA. (2003) N. Ronzitti 2.27 Le dinamiche palestinesi nella politica giordana, prospettive per la stabilità di un pivotal state (2003) R. Storaci

105 © Rubbettino 2.28 Le cooperazioni rafforzate per la ristrutturazione dell’industria europea degli armamenti (2003) G. Bonvicini – G. Gasperini

Collana Ce.Mi.S.S. - edizioni Rubbettino

04/1 The Errf and the Nrf – The European Rapid Reaction Force and the NATO- Reaction Force: Compatibilities and Choises (2004) – Ce.Mi.S.S. – C.D.S. 04/2 Transforming Italy’s Military for a New Era: Options and Challenges – (2004) – Ce.Mi.S.S. – RAND 04/3 Globalization, Armed Conflicts and Security (2004) – A. Gobbicchi 04/4 Verso un concetto di Politica Estera Europea. Le sfide esterne e di sicurezza per la UE (2004) – R. Balfour e R. Menotti 04/5 Comunicazione e politica internazionale. Mutamenti strutturali e nuove strategie (2004) – E. Diodato 04/6 La Nato dopo l’11 settembre. Stati Uniti ed Europa nell’epoca del terrorismo globale (2004) – G. Dottori e M. Amorosi 04/7 La dimensione finanziaria del terrorismo e del contro-terrorismo transnazio- nale (2004) – M. Fiocca e S. Cosci 04/8 Islamist and Middle Eastern Terrorism: a Threat to Europe (2004) – M. do Céu Pinto 04/9 Tra due culture. Le problematiche della famiglia del militare (2004) – M. A. Toscano 04/10 Russia’s Western Orientation after 11th September (2004) – D. Sagramoso 04/11 Opinione pubblica, sicurezza e difesa europea (2004) – M.L. Maniscalco 04/12 Guidare il cambiamento: la leadership nelle Forze Armate Italiane (2004) – T. Ammendola 05/1 Le forze di pace dell’Unione Europea (2005) – N. Ronzitti 05/2 Gli atteggiamenti dei giovani italiani verso il mondo militare (2005) – R. Stras- soldo 05/3 Flussi migratori illegali e ruolo dei paesi di origine e di transito – A. Corneli

Paper Ce.Mi.S.S.

• L’evoluzione della politica di controllo delle esportazioni di materiali d’arma- mento e di alta tecnologia dual use alla luce della nuova intesa “The Wassenar Arrangement” (1998) A. Politi, S. Ruggeri • L’Ucraina nuovo architrave della sicurezza europea (1999) F. Argentieri • L’impatto dell’evoluzione sul futuro campo di battaglia (1999) ISTRID • Disordine, Sicurezza, Stabilità. Il sistema internazionale ed il ruolo per l’Italia (1999) P. Soave • Research-Papers on Balcans and Caucasus. A Russian Point of View (1999) N. Arbatova – V. Naumkin

106 © Rubbettino • Resources and economic cooperation in the Caspian and Black sea region and security in south-eastern Europe (1999) N. Behar • Western European Union: operational capabilities and future perspectives from the national point of view (1999) S. Giusti (*) • Conflict management in Europe on the return of the century (1999) I. Gyarmati • Risks for Russia’s security in the next decade: repercussion on the country’s domestic, foreign and defence policies (2000) I.B. Lada • Central-Eastern Europe and the process of approaching western institutions (2000) B. Klich, B. Bednarczyk, A. Nowosad, M. Chorosnicki - .Institute for Strategic Studies “Studies and Analyses” – Krakòw (*) • Institutions and civil society: crucial aspects of a peace process (2000) A. Co- razza Bildt • Projects of exploitation of the Caspian Sea Central Asia energy resources: impact on relations between the states involved and the stability in the region (2000) V. Naumkin • The CIS Security cooperation: problems and prospects (2000) – A.G. Arbatov, A.A. Pikayev; S. K. Oznobischev; V.E. Yarynich - ISS Mosca; • Is the establishment of a national security policy for a Bosnia – Herzegovina possible? (2000) S. Turkovic (*) • The regional co-operation initiatives in the black sea area and their influence on security in the Romania-Moldova-Ukraine region (2000) A. Pop • The regional and circum-regional co-operation initiatives in South-East Euro- pe and their influence on security (2000) Center for National Security Studies – Sofia • Possible developments in the Balkans in the medium term (2000) E. Kojokine • Catalogo ragionato delle pubblicazioni CeMiSS (1987-1999) (2000) V. Ghiotto • Il controllo della qualità degli approvigionamenti della Amministrazione della Difesa, con particolare riferimento ai servizi. (2000) Politecnico di Torino • Il futuro delle forze armate nell’era dell’information technology (2000) A. Fer- ranti • L’evoluzione della minaccia e l’alea di rischio delle nazioni moderne (2000) V. Porfiri – N. Pedde • The post – Yeltsin Russia: the main trends in domestic and foreign policy evolution (2001) N. Arbatova • European transport corridors and security in south eastern Europe (2001) In- stitute for Social and Political Studies – Sofia • Società e Forze Armate in Albania (2001) R. Devole • La politica estera e di sicurezza italiana nell’Europa Sud – Orientale e l’iniziativa quadrilaterale (2001) R. Umana • Tendenze dello sviluppo della dottrina militare della Russia (2001) M. Gareev • Maghreb Alaqsa. L’estremo Occidente (2001) M. Giaconi • Le politiche della ricerca militare e duale nei principali paesi industrializzati (2001) M. Nones, G. Perani, S. Rolfo

107 © Rubbettino • La cultura del peacekeeping (2002) T. Bergantini • Ottimizzazione della contrattualistica di Forza Armata (2003) R. Pardolesi • Possibili forme di coinvolgimento degli Stati facenti parte del dialogo mediterraneo della NATO in PSOs (2004) L. P. Zema, M. E. Gattamorta

(*) pubblicazione esaurita