IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2019 232 Strategic Sectors | Security & Politics Panorama States and from Mediterranean Dialogue countries conducted in 2018. in conducted countries Dialogue Mediterranean from and States School Kennedy TO’s partnershipswillbeputtothetest,asthey by regionalactors.Finally, itisaplacewhereNA- biguous andcontested,bothbyitsmembers place where NATO’s current and future role is am- the relevanceandunityofalliance.Itisalsoa internal challengescometogether,testingboth cern. Itisaplacewherelotoftheseexternaland southern flank,isofcrucialimportanceandcon- Within thiscontext,theMediterranean,orNATO’s cratic valuesbysomeofitsmembers. defence strengthandadriftfromitscoredemo- during Americanleadership,inadequateEuropean nally, NATO isthreatenedbytheuncertaintyofen- changing natureofwarfareinthedigitalage.Inter- assertive Russia,competitionwithChinaandthe erational fightagainstterrorism,containingamore unprecedented setofchallenges,includingagen- United StatesCongress,theorganizationfacesan Jens Stoltenbergnotedinhisspeechfrontofthe beyond itsborders.AsNATO SecretaryGeneral threats ofthefuturefrombothwithinNATO and the alliance,anditsreadinesstoconfront for reflectiononthestrengthsandweaknessesof tion (NATO). Atimeforcelebration,butalsoa document oftheNorthAtlanticTreaty Organiza- signing oftheWashington Treaty, thefounding 4 April2019markedthe70thanniversaryof The German Marshall Fundof the UnitedStates, Brussels Senior ProgramOfficer, MediterraneanProgramme Brandsma Charlotte NATO and the Mediterranean Politics & Strategic Sectors |Security 3 2 1 The analysis and recommendations are based on open source research as well as interviews with officials and experts from NATO Member NATO Member from experts and officials with interviews as well as research source open on based are recommendations and analysis The B 2019. April in finalized was article This u r ns , R. Nicholas and and Nicholas R. . February 2019. www.belfercenter.org/publication/nato-seventy-alliance-crisis. February L ute , Doug. “NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis.” Belfer Center for Science Crisis.” and in International Harvard Affairs, Alliance An Seventy: at “NATO , Doug. 2

regional andinternationalorganizations. cooperation withtheEuropeanUnionandother Mediterranean Dialoguepartnership,aswellon sources into its partnerships and focus on the in the future, NATO must put more energy and re- stakeholders. Itwillarguethat,toremainrelevant and howthatstrategyisperceivedbyregional the evolvingstrategyofNATO towardstheregion curity environmentposestothealliance,discuss and futurechallengesthattheMediterraneanse- This article will take a closer look at the current play acentralroleinaneffectivestrategySouth. Beyond the ongoing NATO-led combat operation The fightagainstterrorismremainsacoreconcern. looming onthehorizon. ers frombeyonditsborders;andstillothersare others new;somearefromwithintheregion,oth- verse, interlinkedchallenges.Somearefamiliar, Under theseconditions,NATO facesasetofdi- be difficultforthealliancetokeepatarm’slength. tributed toasituation of durablechaos,whichwill mate changeareamongthefactorsthathavecon- economic, socialandpoliticalinequality, andcli- the MiddleEast,NorthAfricaandSaheldueto lapse ofLibya,theriskfurtherstate-breakingsin in AfghanistanandIraq,thewarSyria,col- amount ofchallengesforNATO. Ongoingconflicts The Mediterranean space holds an enormous Matters Mediterranean the Why . 1 3

L publications/future-natos-mediterranean-dialogue can not only happen in the East, but also in the can notonlyhappenintheEast,butalso ranean suggestthatconfrontationwiththeWest vant andrenewednavalpresenceintheMediter- in Libya,EgyptandAlgeria,itspresencetheLe- sia’s militaryinterventioninSyria,itsengagement ternal powersintheregion,notablyRussia.Rus- vironment isthedestabilizingpresenceofotherex- A crucialfeatureoftheMediterraneansecurityen- its and by members regional actors ambiguous and contested, both by NATO’s current and future role is Mediterranean, isaplaceThe where sue ofmajorconcern. ons to its proxies in Syria and Lebanon are an is- where Iran’scapabilitiesandthespreadofweap- which isaffectedbythesituationinLevant, less thanadecadeago.TheexceptionisTurkey, in theMediterraneanstillposesarisk,butmuch missiles andweaponsofmassdestruction(WMD) terranean. Thetraditionalthreatposedbyballistic members insupportingNATO actionintheMedi- ingly driventheinterestofallianceEuropean perceived asamajorchallengeandhasincreas- Member States.Migrationalsocontinuestobe works acrosstheMediterraneanregionandNATO tation inthe nature andcapabilitiesofterroristnet- elsewhere. Thisprocesswillproduceasteadymu- fighters willreturnhomeortraveltobattlegrounds Iraq have been progressively eliminated, these Horn ofAfrica.AsISISstrongholdsinSyriaand arms with jihadist groupsin the Saheland travelled toIraq,SyriaandLibya,orhavetakenup Russia, North Africa and the Middle East have phenomenon. ThousandsofrecruitsfromEurope, increasingly challengedbytheforeignfighters’ how toreconsiderthis mission, thealliancewillbe in Afghanistanandthedebateonwhether 5 4 12 December 2018. www.gmfus.org/publications/balancing-trumpism-transatlantic-divergence-middle-east12 December été See See For a more extensive analysis of the evolving securityenvironment, Mediterranean see: The German Marshall Fund of the United States United the of Fund Marshall German The Dialogue.” NATO’s Mediterranean of Future “The , Bruno. K aus ch The German Marshall Fund of the United States , Kristina.“Balancing Trumpism: United the of Fund Transatlantic Divergence Marshall in the Middle East.” German The 4 . gion. ing toundermineeachother’sactionsinthere- politics –IranandPalestineareactivelytry- the twofundamentalpillarsofMiddleEasterngeo- ance itself.EuropeandtheUnitedStatesclashon ranean security challenge the cohesion of the alli- lematic forNATO is that issuesrelatedto Mediter- What makestheMediterraneanespeciallyprob- the Maghreb. influence onShiacommunitieswithincountriesin Qatar andSaudiArabia;inthecaseofIran,its of force in Syria, Iraq and Libya; the rivalry between ing Mediterraneanstability, includingthedirectuse and Iranplayanincreasinglyrelevantroleinaffect- more ofapriorityforthealliance.TheGulfstates ence intheMediterraneanandAfricawillbecome country’s growingdiplomaticandeconomicpres- challenge ofglobalcompetitionwithChina,this creasingly focusesitsattentiononthelooming peting stakesintheMediterranean.AsNATO in- South. AndRussiaisnottheonlyactorwithcom- operations andcapacitybuilding.ForNATO today, an tions that go beyond traditional crisis management Tackling thesechallengeswillrequirestrategy andac- South Strategy Its with NATOWhy Struggles within. And for now it does not have an answer. within. Andfornowitdoesnothaveananswer. should dowhenitscorevaluesareattackedfrom key has posed the question of what the organization ance cohesion.ThedemocraticbackslidinginTur NATO alliestothem,arefundamental forthealli- rule oflaw. Thesevalues,andtheadherenceof core values of democracy, individual liberty and the more existentialthreatisTurkey’s driftfromNATO’s serious rupturebetweenthetwoNATO allies.A sian S-400 missile defence system, have caused a Syria, coupledwithTurkey’s purchaseofthe Rus- tection UnitsinthefightagainstIslamicState Turkey crisisovertheSyrianKurdishPeople’s Pro- the sametimeposesachallengeinitself.TheUS- security threats on NATO’s southern flank, but at 5 Turkey iscrucialformanagingmanyofthe L esse r , Ian, , Ian, B r an d s m a . , Charlotte, , Charlotte, . June 2018. . June B asa www.gmfus.org/ g ni , Laura and and , Laura - .

IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2019 233 Strategic Sectors | Security & Politics Panorama IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2019 234 Strategic Sectors | Security & Politics Panorama Mediterranean. InFebruary2017, anewStrategicDi- Sophia inaddressingmigration issuesinthecentral ness and counter-terrorism,andhelpEU’sOperation building, providesupporttomaritimesituationalaware- ian, inordertocarryoutmaritimesecuritycapacity NATO launchedanew maritimeoperation,SeaGuard- and reconnaissancecapabilities.AftertheSummit, also aimedtoimprovejointintelligence,surveillance deploying theNATO ResponseForce,ifneeded.It the Mediterraneanregion,includingpossibilityof strengthening training,exercisesandoperationsin Summit. Thisframeworkprovidedafirststeptoward of aframeworkfortheSouthat2016Warsaw reforms for NATO structures. This led to the adoption ment intheregionanddeterminingappropriate pose ofbetterunderstandingthesecurityenviron- cess ofthesouthernflankwaslaunchedwithpur- Wales Summitin2014,whenaninternalreviewpro- should looklikefirstemergedontheagendaof one. ThequestionofhowaNATO strategySouth does notmeanthatithasmadeeffortstodevelop The factthatNATO struggleswithitsstrategySouth partners expect. the southern flank – and what its Mediterranean sidering how theorganization sees itsown role on States. Underthesecircumstances,itisworthcon- ceptions ofspecificallies,abovealltheUnited other cases, views of NATO are closely tied to per- about theaftermathofinterventioninLibya.In Cold War perceptions,othersremainconcerned Some partnersretainimagesofNATO basedon and asensitivitytoquestionsofnationalsovereignty. eral uncertaintyabouttheallianceaimsinSouth, challenged byregionalstakeholders.Thereisagen- national andmultilateralbasis.NATO’s roleisalso engagement undertaken by its member states on a region againstabackdropofpoliticalandmilitary the comparativeadvantageofNATO actioninthe lenged byindividualalliancemembers,whoquestion fact thatNATO’s roleintheMediterraneanischal- Tackling thisdilemmaisfurthercomplicatedbythe arguably morelikely, setofthreatsintheSouth. Russian aggressionintheEast,versus a diffuse,but manding problemofdefenceagainstaneventual and attentionbetweentherelativelysimplebutde- existential questionishowtodivideitsresources 6 Full text of the 2018 Brussels Summit Declaration can be found here: www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156624.htm here: found be can Declaration Summit 2018 the of Brussels text Full partnership has evolved significantly over more than partnership has evolved significantly over more than (since 2000) under the Mediterranean Dialogue. This dan, Egypt,Tunisia, Morocco,Mauritania,andAlgeria dialogue andpracticalcooperationwithIsrael,Jor- cial. Since1994,NATO hasbeenengaged inpolitical organization on shared security concerns will be cru- Mediterranean partners’ interestinworking withthe tries in the region and other organizations. NATO’s tiveness andlegitimacyofitscooperationwithcoun- will dependtoaconsiderabledegreeontheeffec- which suggeststhatitssuccessfulimplementation put emphasisoncapacitybuildingandpartnerships, NATO’s evolvingsouthernstrategyhasincreasingly Partners with and Better Work More NATOWhy Must political processinLibya. tions withJordanand Tunisia, andsupport for the continued commitmenttotheirlongstandingrela- bat trainingandcapacitybuildingmissioninIraq, NATO leadersannouncedthelaunchofanon-com- partners buildresilienceagainstsecuritythreats. forts intheregion;and(3)tohelpNATO’s regional to contributeinternationalcrisismanagementef- fence againstthreatsemanatingfromtheSouth;(2) tives: (1)tostrengthenNATO’s deterrenceandde- package for the South, outlining three core objec- declared theHubfullyoperationalandadopteda At theBrusselsSummitin2018,allianceleaders for now not it does have answer an values are attacked from within. And organization should do when its core the posed has question of what the democraticThe backsliding in Turkey and tobetterunderstandhowaddressthem. awareness oftheMediterraneanandadjacentareas Hub’s missionistocontributeNATO’s situational Allied JointForcesCommandinNaples.TheNSD-S rection South(NSD-S)Hubwascreated,basedatthe 6 . L Kennedy School Kennedy publications/future-natos-mediterranean-dialogue their listofstrategicprioritiesis,essentially, shared. in capacitybuildingandsecuritysectorreform, NATO-EU initiatives.Bothinstitutionshaveaninterest The Mediterraneanshouldalsobecentraltonewjoint too focus little currently suffers: too little money and which the Mediterranean Dialogue interrelatedtwo limitations from allianceThe must urgently address their securityneeds. ential strategicactor,andasapracticalcontributorto terest indeeperengagementwithNATO asaninflu- its southernstrategy, asregionalpartnershaveanin- the tools of the Mediterranean Dialogue at the core of suggests that there is an opportunity for NATO to put lored totheneedsofindividualcountries.Research eration, whichhasintensifiedandbecomemoretai- two decades,especiallyinthefieldofpracticalcoop- 8 7 between theseandNATO activities. projects toavoidduplicationandpromotealignment approach tosurveyingtherangeofthesenational programmes. NATO flag,whilemostofthemimplementtheirown national contributions,sometimesplacedundera grammes. Thealliance must rely on member states’ percent ofNATO’s budgetgoestopartnerpro- little moneyandtoofocus.Overall,lessthanone like otherNATO partnerships–currentlysuffers:too limitations fromwhichtheMediterraneanDialogue– the alliancemusturgentlyaddresstwointerrelated été B For a more extensive analysis of the evolving securityenvironment, Mediterranean see: u r The German Marshall Fund of the United States United the of Fund Marshall German The Dialogue.” NATO’s Mediterranean of Future “The , Bruno. ns , R. Nicholas and and Nicholas , R. . February 2019. www.belfercenter.org/publication/nato-seventy-alliance-crisis. February 8 There is a need for a more systematic Thereisaneedformoresystematic 7 L But to consolidate this interest, Buttoconsolidatethisinterest, ute , Doug. “NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis.” Belfer Center for Science Crisis.” and in International Harvard Affairs, Alliance An Seventy: at “NATO , Doug. . and otherregionalorganizations. terranean Dialoguecountries,theEuropeanUnion more resourcesintoitspartnershipswiththeMedi- alliance wouldthereforebewelladvisedtoinvest only besustainedbynurturingitspartnerships.The foreseeable future.Butthisstrategicadvantagecan advantage intheMediterranean,todayandfor potential competitors,NATO stillenjoysastrategic rity vis-à-visthreatsfromtheSouth.Comparedto creasingly relyonitspartnerstoguaranteesecu- Within thiscontext,theorganizationwillhavetoin- a lack of resources and focus from NATO members. tions towardNATO actionintheMediterranean,and comprehensive strategy, negativepublicpercep- fectively confrontthemislimitedbytheabsenceofa challenges onitssouthernflank.Itspotentialtoef- To sum up: NATO faces a daunting set of different its borders. cantly increasethe impact the alliance has beyond bilateral partnerships,butovertimecouldsignifi- replace NATO’s currentMediterraneanDialogueor cooperation. These partnerships would not have to cal institutionandframeworkforregionalmilitary benefit fromNATO’s experienceinbuildingapoliti- Cooperation Council.Theseorganizationscouldall Union, theArabLeague,G5SahelandGulf should seek(deeper)partnershipswiththeAfrican forNATOinterlocutors intheyearsahead.NATO ranean securityandcouldbecomemoresignificant tiatives havethepotentialtocontributeMediter- and responsetimes.Inaddition,otherregionalini- EU missionsinordertoimprovecrisisawareness done also to share information between NATO and erations with similar objectives. Much more can be comparative advantageratherthanduplicatingop- NATO shouldsupporttheEUinareaswhereithasa L esse r , Ian, , Ian, . B r an d s m a , Charlotte, , Charlotte, . June 2018. . June B asa www.gmfus.org/ g ni , Laura and and , Laura

IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2019 235 Strategic Sectors | Security & Politics Panorama