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NATO and the Mediterranean1 Strategic Sectors | Security & Politics 1 Panorama NATO and the Mediterranean Charlotte Brandsma play a central role in an effective strategy South. Senior Program Officer, Mediterranean Programme This article will take a closer look at the current The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Brussels and future challenges that the Mediterranean se- curity environment poses to the alliance, discuss Strategic Sectors | Security & Politics the evolving strategy of NATO towards the region 4 April 2019 marked the 70th anniversary of the and how that strategy is perceived by regional signing of the Washington Treaty, the founding stakeholders. It will argue that, to remain relevant document of the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- in the future, NATO must put more energy and re- tion (NATO). A time for celebration, but also a time sources into its partnerships and focus on the for reflection on the strengths and weaknesses of Mediterranean Dialogue partnership, as well as on the alliance, and its readiness to confront the cooperation with the European Union and other threats of the future from both within NATO and regional and international organizations.3 beyond its borders. As NATO Secretary General 232 Jens Stoltenberg noted in his speech in front of the United States Congress, the organization faces an Why the Mediterranean Matters unprecedented set of challenges, including a gen- erational fight against terrorism, containing a more The Mediterranean space holds an enormous assertive Russia, competition with China and the amount of challenges for NATO. Ongoing conflicts changing nature of warfare in the digital age. Inter- in Afghanistan and Iraq, the war in Syria, the col- nally, NATO is threatened by the uncertainty of en- lapse of Libya, the risk of further state-breakings in during American leadership, inadequate European the Middle East, North Africa and the Sahel due to defence strength and a drift from its core demo- economic, social and political inequality, and cli- cratic values by some of its members.2 mate change are among the factors that have con- Within this context, the Mediterranean, or NATO’s tributed to a situation of durable chaos, which will southern flank, is of crucial importance and con- be difficult for the alliance to keep at arm’s length. cern. It is a place where a lot of these external and Under these conditions, NATO faces a set of di- internal challenges come together, testing both verse, interlinked challenges. Some are familiar, the relevance and unity of the alliance. It is also a others new; some are from within the region, oth- place where NATO’s current and future role is am- ers from beyond its borders; and still others are 2019 biguous and contested, both by its members and looming on the horizon. by regional actors. Finally, it is a place where NA- The fight against terrorism remains a core concern. TO’s partnerships will be put to the test, as they Beyond the ongoing NATO-led combat operation 1 This article was finalized in April 2019. 2 Mediterranean Yearbook BURNS, R. Nicholas and LUTE, Doug. “NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis.” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School. February 2019. www.belfercenter.org/publication/nato-seventy-alliance-crisis. 3 The analysis and recommendations are based on open source research as well as interviews with officials and experts from NATO Member Med. Med. IE States and from Mediterranean Dialogue countries conducted in 2018. in Afghanistan and the debate on whether and South. And Russia is not the only actor with com- how to reconsider this mission, the alliance will be peting stakes in the Mediterranean. As NATO in- increasingly challenged by the foreign fighters’ creasingly focuses its attention on the looming Panorama phenomenon. Thousands of recruits from Europe, challenge of global competition with China, this Russia, North Africa and the Middle East have country’s growing diplomatic and economic pres- travelled to Iraq, Syria and Libya, or have taken up ence in the Mediterranean and Africa will become arms with jihadist groups in the Sahel and the more of a priority for the alliance. The Gulf states Horn of Africa. As ISIS strongholds in Syria and and Iran play an increasingly relevant role in affect- Iraq have been progressively eliminated, these ing Mediterranean stability, including the direct use fighters will return home or travel to battlegrounds of force in Syria, Iraq and Libya; the rivalry between elsewhere. This process will produce a steady mu- Qatar and Saudi Arabia; and in the case of Iran, its tation in the nature and capabilities of terrorist net- influence on Shia communities within countries in works across the Mediterranean region and NATO the Maghreb. Member States. Migration also continues to be What makes the Mediterranean especially prob- perceived as a major challenge and has increas- lematic for NATO is that issues related to Mediter- ingly driven the interest of the alliance European ranean security challenge the cohesion of the alli- Strategic Sectors | Security & Politics members in supporting NATO action in the Medi- ance itself. Europe and the United States clash on terranean. The traditional threat posed by ballistic the two fundamental pillars of Middle Eastern geo- missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) politics – Iran and Palestine – and are actively try- in the Mediterranean still poses a risk, but much ing to undermine each other’s actions in the re- less than a decade ago. The exception is Turkey, gion.5 Turkey is crucial for managing many of the which is affected by the situation in the Levant, security threats on NATO’s southern flank, but at where Iran’s capabilities and the spread of weap- the same time poses a challenge in itself. The US- ons to its proxies in Syria and Lebanon are an is- Turkey crisis over the Syrian Kurdish People’s Pro- 4 sue of major concern. tection Units in the fight against the Islamic State in 233 Syria, coupled with Turkey’s purchase of the Rus- sian S-400 missile defence system, have caused a The Mediterranean, is a place where serious rupture between the two NATO allies. A more existential threat is Turkey’s drift from NATO’s NATO’s current and future role is core values of democracy, individual liberty and the ambiguous and contested, both by rule of law. These values, and the adherence of its members and by regional actors NATO allies to them, are fundamental for the alli- ance cohesion. The democratic backsliding in Tur- key has posed the question of what the organization should do when its core values are attacked from A crucial feature of the Mediterranean security en- within. And for now it does not have an answer. vironment is the destabilizing presence of other ex- ternal powers in the region, notably Russia. Rus- sia’s military intervention in Syria, its engagement Why NATO Struggles with Its Strategy South in Libya, Egypt and Algeria, its presence in the Le- 2019 vant and renewed naval presence in the Mediter- Tackling these challenges will require strategy and ac- ranean suggest that confrontation with the West tions that go beyond traditional crisis management can not only happen in the East, but also in the operations and capacity building. For NATO today, an 4 For a more extensive analysis of the evolving Mediterranean security environment, see: LESSER, Ian, BRANDSMA, Charlotte, BASAGNI, Laura and LÉTÉ, Bruno. “The Future of NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue.” The German Marshall Fund of the United States. June 2018. www.gmfus.org/ Mediterranean Yearbook publications/future-natos-mediterranean-dialogue. 5 See KAUSch, Kristina. “Balancing Trumpism: Transatlantic Divergence in the Middle East.” The German Marshall Fund of the United States. Med. Med. 12 December 2018. www.gmfus.org/publications/balancing-trumpism-transatlantic-divergence-middle-east. IE existential question is how to divide its resources rection South (NSD-S) Hub was created, based at the and attention between the relatively simple but de- Allied Joint Forces Command in Naples. The NSD-S Panorama manding problem of defence against an eventual Hub’s mission is to contribute to NATO’s situational Russian aggression in the East, versus a diffuse, but awareness of the Mediterranean and adjacent areas arguably more likely, set of threats in the South. and to better understand how to address them. Tackling this dilemma is further complicated by the fact that NATO’s role in the Mediterranean is chal- lenged by individual alliance members, who question The democratic backsliding in Turkey the comparative advantage of NATO action in the has posed the question of what the region against a backdrop of political and military organization should do when its core engagement undertaken by its member states on a national and multilateral basis. NATO’s role is also values are attacked from within. And challenged by regional stakeholders. There is a gen- for now it does not have an answer eral uncertainty about the alliance aims in the South, and a sensitivity to questions of national sovereignty. Strategic Sectors | Security & Politics Some partners retain images of NATO based on At the Brussels Summit in 2018, the alliance leaders Cold War perceptions, others remain concerned declared the Hub fully operational and adopted a about the aftermath of the intervention in Libya. In package for the South, outlining three core objec- other cases, views of NATO are closely tied to per- tives: (1) to strengthen NATO’s deterrence and de- ceptions of specific allies, above all the United fence against threats emanating from the South; (2) States. Under these circumstances, it is worth con- to contribute to international crisis management ef- sidering how the organization sees its own role on forts in the region; and (3) to help NATO’s regional the southern flank – and what its Mediterranean partners build resilience against security threats.
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