We Need to De-‐Westernize International Non-‐Governmental Humanitarian

PERSPECTIVES 1

We Need to De-Westernize

International Non-Governmental

Humanitarian Aid

Pierre Micheletti

Issued by:

PERSPECTIVES

Papers presented under “Perspectives” introduce original contributions and points of view on issues related to risk and security management of non-profit aid organisations. They are not necessarily commissioned nor authored by SMI, but are issued by SMI as interesting contributions to the debate on risk and security management of non-profit aid organisations.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Pierre Micheletti is a physician and former president of Médecins du Monde France (Doctors of the World). He became program director of Médecins du Monde (MDM) in 1996 and was subsequently named member of the national office. From 2006 to 2009 he was President of MDM. Today, Pierre Micheletti teaches at the University of Grenoble, responsible for the program “Santé, solidarité précarité”, and is associate professor for the diploma "International Organisation: IGO-NGO" at the Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Grenoble. He publishes regularly and widely, among other in Le Monde Diplomatique. His recent book, “Humanitaire, s’adapter ou renoncer” (Marabout, 2008) (Humanitarianism, adapt or renounce) traces the history of humanitarianism, analysis violence suffered by some NGOs, and ponders possible solutions that would allow humanitarianism to evolve with its times.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Security Management Initiative (SMI) thanks Veronica Kelly for the translation of the initial French draft of this text and her editorial comments. A special thanks to Pierre Micheletti not only for his text but also for his patience throughout the lengthy process to see this text issued.

The Security Management Initiative wishes to express its gratitude to the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland for the financial support that made this issue of Perspectives possible.

De-Westernize International NGO Humanitarian Aid © Pierre Micheletti, October 2010 2

CONTENTS

PREFACE 4

I. INTRODUCTION 4

II. WHAT IS THE ANALYSIS, THE AETIOLOGICAL DIAGNOSIS? 5

a) The ‘genetic code’ of the NGO movement 5

A heterogeneous constellation 5 Humanitarian aid exports one model 6 A close relationship with the media 6 The symbolic dimension 7

b) The global environment is changing 7

The economic balance is being restored 7 The political balance is being restored 7 Strong assertions of identity 8

c) The “accelerators” of insecurity 8

The fall of the Berlin Wall (1989) 8 “Clash of civilizations” rhetoric 8 The Occupied Territories, in particular the Gaza Strip 8 Rising prominence of civil-military operations in military doctrine 9

III. RECOMMENDATIONS AND ASPECTS TO WORK ON 9

1) The obligation to be properly equipped in the field 9

Analysis of the local situation 9 Asserting our specific identity as Non-Governmental organisations 10 Changing our practice and using local skills. 10

2) Changing our positioning 10

Giving the same message “here and out there” 10 Boosting our capacity to communicate via the media 10

3) De-Westernizing the humanitarian movement 11

IV. FURTHER READING 13

ENDNOTES 14

De-Westernize International NGO Humanitarian Aid © Pierre Micheletti, October 2010 3

PREFACE

During my recent trip to Afghanistan, I was struck by seeing in many streets of Kabul huge billboards with logos of USAID and a major international NGO describing their partnership on an assistance program.

Since then, last summer, two international NGOs - International Assistance Mission (IAM) and OXFAM - have been attacked resulting in the death of some of their employees.

Is there, to some extent, a direct relationship between those different facts? From my point of view, there is a link. This is what I will try to analyze in the following article.

I. INTRODUCTION

The situations in which humanitarian agencies intervene are never completely interchangeable. But every day the main international NGOs are seeing a change in how these agents of international solidarity are perceived. Gone are the days when humanitarian actors arrived in the field armed with a kind of natural immunity which none of the belligerents appeared to challenge. Nowadays, we find ourselves faced with situations where the local people no longer automatically welcome us with open arms. On the contrary, we notice attitudes that may be enthusiastic, certainly, but can also reflect perceptions that go all the way from suspicion and caution to deliberate violence.

What follows concerns the NON-governmental movement, one that may be defined as a dynamic process in which players / citizens decide to come together freely in order to take action. According to the few documented studies available to us,1 2 local staff are the first to be exposed to this violence. These studies invite us, moreover, to put in place a more effective system for collecting and centralizing information on security issues. As they say in the medical sciences, “you only find what you’re looking for…”

Before getting down to my main argument I would like to make three points. First, I refer to NGOs of the so-called “without borders”, or second, generation – the one that emerged with the Biafran war (1968) and the creation of MSF (1971).3 These NGOs do not, of course, account for all humanitarian action. We cannot ignore the Red Cross movement, initiated a century earlier, nor the activities of the major NGOs founded at the start of the 20th century, including Oxfam, CARE, and many others. All these organizations work side by side in many complex crises. But the newest generation is undoubtedly the noisiest in proclaiming its positions and is

De-Westernize International NGO Humanitarian Aid © Pierre Micheletti, October 2010 4

therefore often the most visible. In the constellation of humanitarian agencies, how some behave inevitably affects how all are perceived. Thus, the latest generation of humanitarian organizations has “genetic” characteristics that influence how the whole movement is perceived. And the same is, of course, true of the older ones.

Second, the starting point I use to define non-governmental humanitarian action embodies a Western-centered view of the world. We can get round this shortcoming by using a sufficiently broad, all-encompassing definition of the humanitarian movement. The movement’s perimeter features typological criteria that make it possible to classify all the categories of players in the field.

Third, we must remember that what follows concerns the non-governmental movement, the one that is supposed to represent a dynamic process in which players / citizens decide to come together freely in order to take action.

II. WHAT IS THE ANALYSIS, THE AETIOLOGICAL DIAGNOSIS?

Why do we have these changes in the perception of humanitarian agencies in the field? Three types of mechanisms converge and are discussed in more detail below:

a) What we are as a sociological model: in the mistrust of us, there is a rejection of some of our characteristics, of our “genetic code”; b) The overall environment in which humanitarian intervention takes place has changed these past 40 years; c) More recent mechanisms have emerged and act as “accelerators” on the first two.

a) The ‘genetic code’ of the NGO movement

A heterogeneous The main NGOs with a significant presence in the field are primarily constellation organizations from Western countries. In 2005, of the 10 billion or so euro devoted to humanitarian work throughout the world, a large proportion was

spent by Western NGOs. Of these NGOs, the heavyweights are English-

speaking, such as WorldVision, Care, Save the Children and Oxfam and their

various sections, although there are also others in from Germany, France, 4 5 The Netherlands, Scandinavia, etc.

It does have other distinctive features, however. They come in very different sizes, from the heavyweights to a myriad of small, sometimes ad hoc, NGOs; they have a variety of areas of competence: health, farming, human rights, De-Westernize International NGO Humanitarian Aid © Pierre Micheletti, October 2010 5

etc.; whether an NGO is faith-based or not has become important. Last but not least, the relationship between NGOs and their State is crucial today. From this point of view there are three main NGO families: 6

a) The “Germano-Scandinavian” model: these NGOs have a close relationship with their State, and a large percentage of official

development aid is channelled through them.

b) The “Anglo-Saxon” model, which has two main traits: mistrust of the role

of the State, and strong patriotism. This group includes a good many

NGOs from Britain and the United States.

c) The “Mediterranean” model: these NGOs see themselves as providing a

counterweight to their governments. French and Spanish NGOs tend to follow this model.

The humanitarian movement is thus a heterogeneous constellation. In one and the same place you can find dozens, even hundreds of NGOs working side by side, all with their own distinctive features.

Humanitarian aid Western NGOs export one model of organization. In the field they develop exports one model team management and project implementation tools that are the product of professional patterns learnt in our universities and our companies. The development, and sometimes economic, model they export is now being challenged.

A close relationship Some speak of “mutual addiction” or “cross-dependence” between the with the media media and humanitarian agencies. For the “without borders” NGOs this relationship marks a break with the duty of reserve that prevailed in the Red Cross – a rule the young French doctors working in Biafra in 1968 were keen to abandon. The loud, highly mediatized voicing of opinion is closely linked

to the emergence of this generation. The media need us and we need them. The media use our logistical resources and talk about us. This impacts on how well-known we are and therefore how much funding we get, notably from the public. For some years now, however, we have been seeing a gradual curtailing of the Western monopoly in the treatment of international

current events. The creation of Al Jazeera in 1996 is one of the symbols of 7 this. The January 2009 Israeli offensive in the Gaza Strip was an opportunity to provide a fresh illustration of this breaking of the monopoly on the treatment of news.8 On this occasion – a first – Al Jazeera made available to the international media, free of charge, the images filmed by its teams, which

were the only ones there on the spot.

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The symbolic What we do is overvalued in relation to what we are. NGOs constitute a dimension symbolic sociological subject. The budget of MSF France is 120 million euro a year, the same as for the hospital in a medium-sized town such as Béziers, the sub-prefecture of a French département. The budget of Médecins du Monde is half that. At the same time, the expenditure incurred during an armed conflict is vast.9 For example, according to Joseph Stiglitz, winner of the Nobel Prize for Economics in 2008, the USA’s expenditure on the war effort in Iraq was 11 billion dollars a month. This prompts us to have a certain

degree of humility as regards what we can and what we cannot do. It also explains why we need to have a close relationship with the media: the solution to a problem is never going to be a humanitarian one. What we need to do is to set in motion the adoption of political solutions, which are the only realistic routes out of a crisis.

Today, the most extreme stakeholders in the field have also metabolized the

complex interplay between media / humanitarian agencies / public. When they attack or kidnap foreign NGO staff they are also taking on the real or supposed power – at once symbolic, economic and political – of a Western figure that is within reach. They know that their actions will attract huge media attention and may therefore “pay off well”.

b) The global environment is changing

The world and our areas of intervention are changing. Of the changes that have happened in 40 years of “without borders-ism”, which ones potentially affect how our actions may be perceived?

The economic People were almost surprised to see India buy Arcelor, a jewel in the crown balance is being of the French iron and steel industry. Two great British car brands, Jaguar restored and Land Rover, were bought by Tata, an Indian firm. Marionnaud perfumes have been bought by a Chinese company. Sergio Tacchini ready-to-wear clothing has also gone to Chinese buyers. This redress of the economic balance is no epiphenomenon - it is a tidal wave. Hubert Védrine analysed

these international movements. By 2007 some 40 of the world’s 500 leading firms were Chinese, and by now around 20 of them are Indian. In terms of financial flows, emerging countries already account for 15% of all mergers / acquisitions of enterprises and 37% of investment expenditure. 10

The political balance International relations are now organized on the basis of a multipolar world. is being restored Major powers are emerging on all continents, leading to clusters of allied countries or economic partners. In the lead are the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China). In Africa, three countries striving for seats as permanent Security Council members: Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa. We’ve come a long way

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since the 1968 Biafra situation, just after the decolonization of the African continent.

Strong assertions of Ethnic, tribal issues are now bound up in politicians who sometimes identity manipulate them for their own ends. Identity claims have been an inextricable part of some recent internal conflicts (former Yugoslavia, the

Ivory Coast, the Caucasus, the reigniting of the conflict in Niger, etc.). Generally speaking, the Western “white model” is no longer the one to imitate. Population groups are now proud to declare that their origins are Maya, Peul, Mhong, and so on. In the field, we need to take on board these assertions of identity, this aspiration to otherness.

c) The “accelerators” of insecurity

A number of events in contemporary history have acted as accelerators, and are also factors of mistrust of humanitarian actors or even violence against them.

The fall of the Berlin The fall of he Berlin Wall in 1989 put an end to the East/West polarization of Wall conflicts (e.g. Angola, Colombia, Afghanistan) and to the financial and logistical support previously enjoyed by those involved in them. To survive, and to support the war effort, guerrillas turned to highly lucrative activities such as kidnapping for ransom, big-company racketeering and drug trafficking. Adopting Mafia-style behaviour, they abandoned the political approach and form of struggle that until then had respected military-type reasoning and hierarchy. Organized crime does not acknowledge the thinking

behind the humanitarian worldview. If they are in the wrong place at the wrong time, humanitarian workers become a marketable commodity like any other.

“Clash of Huntington’s theories11 have resulted in the organization of a new civilizations” rhetoric Manichean polarity, with the rise to power of those who support a religious reading of conflicts. This new vocabulary employs polarities such as “Crusaders versus Infidels”, “Good versus Evil”, or “Human rights versus Islamo-Fascism”. The humanitarian movement, identified as a product of the

West, finds itself trapped in this new polarity. Humanitarian workers become potential, symbolic enemies. Enemies that are easier to attack.

The Occupied On one fringe of the Arab and Muslim population this conflict, which goes Territories, in back to 1947, fuels a posture of resentment. While on the one hand the particular the Gaza concern is genuine, the conflict also feeds into an identity-based discourse Strip and the symbolism of the martyr in the Middle East and beyond. The Arab media and political leaders use this conflict to stigmatize the foreign policy of Western countries, which is interpreted as a caricature of the asymmetrical

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handling of international affairs: the policy of double standards.

Rising prominence of During operations by the armed forces, actions presented as “humanitarian” civil-military are now a reality France (and others) cannot escape – not in operations in pronouncements by its Minister for Foreign Affairs,12 nor in those of the military doctrine Minister for Defence.13 Afghanistan has become the symbolic terrain where all the factors that spread confusion end up wiping out the borderlines

between NGOs and the other foreign players directly or indirectly involved in a conflict. Here is a country where all categories of players – a large proportion of whom are Western – rub shoulders. Soldiers who make war in uniform. Soldiers, still in uniform, who say they are doing humanitarian work via Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). People in civilian clothing, but armed, who take part in the activities of the occupying troops such as men recruited via PMCs (private military companies).14 And then there are others, also in civilian clothing who say they are only there to do humanitarian work. These are divided into two big ‘tribes’: those from the UN and those from the NGOs. In the NGO tribe, some say they have no connection with the foreign soldiers or their governments, while others have no qualms about parading themselves alongside them. For an Afghan, unless you’re a professional anthropologist, how are you supposed to make sense of this? How can you not be affected when militant Afghan groups argue that all these tribes are in collusion and working towards the same goal – to occupy the country and bring it to heel?

III. RECOMMENDATIONS AND ASPECTS TO WORK ON

What can we recommend to try and ensure the humanitarian movement maintains its capacity to intervene? How can we react to the confusion and

changes in perceptions? Some of the steps are necessary adaptations in the field. Others involve adopting and communicating a more coherent stance. The priority is to deal with the hegemonic, flamboyant nature of Western NGOs, especially when, whether through lack of inhibition or lack of tact, they flaunt themselves as a tool of their own State’s foreign policy.

1) The obligation to be properly equipped in the field

Analysis of the local In all crisis areas people are feeling the need for detailed analysis of the local situation situation before any project is set up. We have to know how to work amid the complex networks of local players. Our teams must be equipped with the

skills required for meeting the leaders present in the field – community, religious, military and political leaders – and analysing their positions. We have to be able to analyse their perception of a project that we want to set

De-Westernize International NGO Humanitarian Aid © Pierre Micheletti, October 2010 9

up, and judge how far they do or do not accept the project and us. Humanitarian emblems alone are not enough to gain acceptance. The motto

“Networks before Logos” must become a reflex.

Asserting our specific We have to do all we can to prevent the kind of confusion that can result in a identity as Non- situation like that in Afghanistan. We must constantly assert our specific Governmental identity as NGOs. Any confusion between what is humanitarian and what is organisations military serves to undermine the credibility we seek in terms of the impartiality and independence of our intervention. Confusion arises from the

new “bread and bombs” military dogmas. We must refuse to sign up to this – just as we must refuse to allow our logos to be manipulated as was done in 2009 in the operation by the Colombian army when Ingrid Betancourt was released.15 And this includes independence from our funding sources. Nowadays, in some situations, “money smells”.

Changing our Noting the emergence of identity claims means that we must take into practice and using account the assertions of otherness in the places where we work. It is no local skills longer possible to bring technical, medical, humanitarian aid that reflects, for example, a biomedical model straight out of Western faculties of medicine. It is imperative to take on board the representations made about, for example, health or illness of the people we work with and for. Professionals from the countries we work in can guarantee that these cultural representations will be taken into account. One of the great developments of the past 40 years has been that these countries now train their own doctors, nurses and other health professionals. These professionals are also a major asset in helping us overcome the language barrier in our dealings with local people.

2) Changing our positioning

Giving the same The humanitarian movement cannot be schizophrenic. At a time when the message “here and circulation of information is immediate, worldwide and sometimes out there” manipulated (and always ethno-centric), we cannot display solidarity and generosity abroad – say in Mali, Afghanistan, the DRC - while at home remain

indifferent to the treatment meted out here to migrants from these 16 countries. It is the same people we have in our waiting rooms, “here and out there”. Thus (medical) NGOs cannot be completely indifferent to practices such as the expulsion of sick foreigners or the use of DNA tests as part of migration policies. The expulsion of Afghan refugees from the French

port of Calais is a grim illustration of political inconsistency.

Boosting our For a generation of humanitarian workers whose relationship with the media capacity to was a pioneering one, an awareness of the changes in international relations communicate via the and the current balances of power is not without its consequences. The aim of being close to the media is to inform and challenge public opinion so that

media it can influence political decision-making and speed up crisis resolution processes. Today, Western countries no longer have a monopoly on the seats

of power, on the places where international affairs are settled. There is thus no reason why we should target only Western public opinion. In their relationship with the public in their own countries, humanitarian agencies have made extensive use of the “compassionate protocol”.17

Major non-Western media use a mirror image of this same mechanism in “covering” events, some of which rally public opinion from different geographical areas in an instinctive, visceral solidarity. Groupings are built, among other things, on the basis of identity (the feeling of belonging to a community) or religion. In Muslim countries these processes are in full swing. In countries where there is humanitarian intervention, NGOs need to develop a culture around informing local people: learning to say who we are, what we’re doing, why we’re doing it, what everyone’s networks and alliances are, where the funding comes from, and what the relationship between each NGO and the government of its country is, or is not. We have to affirm these concerns and acquire the know-how to do so.

3) De-Westernizing the humanitarian movement

Non-governmental humanitarian aid is currently dominated by one model of organization, funding and operational visibility. It comes from Western countries, and in terms of credibility, effectiveness and acceptability its own limits are inherent in it. Its hegemony has made it anachronistic in view of the international developments of recent decades. It must therefore develop and change. The price of this is a particular form of “de-Westernization”, which means neither denial nor disguise but a mingling of people and knowledge, which must be freely agreed to by those involved in international solidarity as we are.

It means de-Westernizing without lapsing into a dangerous, caricatures or culturalism, but de-Westernizing in the sense of walking away from a monopoly and looking for partners and allies outside Western countries. Looking for human, financial and technical resources where they are to be found today; in countries like India, South Africa, Brazil and Egypt (and others), this potential exists. We have a new challenge: to imagine a humanitarian movement that will not be a strict copy-and-paste reproduction of the model we bring with us today.

De-Westernizing humanitarian aid also means walking away from the interests of the major Western powers for which we might, in some circumstances, appear to be envoys. So, reaffirming, over and again, the fact that we are NON-governmental remains a vital necessity, although this

conviction is clearly not shared among some in the constellation of NGOs.

Will we have this adaptive intelligence? Will we have this conviction to work towards the necessary decentring? The future dynamics of the movement, whether it will be able to do its work in all kinds of crisis situations, and the safety of its teams will depend on the answers to these different questions. It is undoubtedly THE new challenge for what will, very soon, be the third generation of humanitarian workers.

IV. FURTHER READING

■ Debray, R., Un Candide en terre sainte, Paris, Gallimard, 2008.

■ Todd, E., Courbage, Y., Le Rendez-vous des civilisations, Paris, Seuil, 2007.

■ Wallerstein, I., European Universalism. The rhetoric of power, New York, The New Press, 2006.

■ Corm, G., La question religieuse au XXIème siècle, La Decouverte/Poche, Paris, 2007.

■ Bessis, S., L’Occident et les autres, La Découverte, Paris, 2003.

■ Questions internationales : "l'Occident en débat" n°41 Janvier-Frévrier 2010, Paris, La Documentation Française

ENDNOTES

1 Rowley, E., Crape, Byron L., Burnham, G., “Violence-related mortality and morbidity of humanitarian workers”, American Journal of disaster medicine, vol. 3(1), January-February 2008

2 Stoddard, Abby; Harmer, Adele; DiDomenico, Victoria; “Providing aid in insecure environments, 2009 Update”, HPG Policy Brief 34, Overseas Development Institute, London, April 2009

3 My analysis centres on French NGOs, not out of chauvinism but so that I can focus on the crucial issue of the links between an NGO and the government of its country of origin – an aspect that is, to my mind, of vital importance today.

4 Doucin, M., Les ONG : le contre-pouvoir?, pp. 229-231, Toogezer, Paris, 2007

5 Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA) has published a report entitled “Public support for humanitarian crises through NGOs”, updated in February 2009, in which it gives the origin of the funding for international humanitarian assistance. GHA collected financial information from 114 offices belonging to the 19 largest humanitarian NGOs worldwide. These fund-raising NGOs come from 23 countries all over the world. The sample represents 60% of total estimated relief expenditure by humanitarian NGOs. All 19 of these NGOs are originally from countries belonging to the Development Aid Committee – in other words, Western ones. Their private funds account for between 75 and 80% of all private NGO funds in the world.

6 Archambault, E., Le secteur associatif en France et dans le monde. In F. Bloch-Laine (Ed.), Faire société les associations au coeur du social. Paris: Syros.) See http://matisse.univ- paris1.fr/archambault/

7 The January 2009 Israeli offensive in the Gaza Strip was an opportunity to provide a fresh illustration of this breaking of the monopoly on the treatment of news. Al Jazeera made available to the international media, free of charge (a first), the images filmed by its teams, which were the only ones there on the spot. 8 El Oifi, Mohammed, “La couverture médiatique de la guerre de Gaza”, Moyen-Orient, August- September 2009, pp. 43-47

9 According to Joseph Stiglitz, winner of the Nobel Prize for Economics, in 2008 the USA’s expenditure on the war effort in Iraq was 11 billion dollars a month.

10 Védrine, H., with the collaboration of Adrien Abécassis and Mohamed Bouabdallah, Continuer l’Histoire, 50 pp., Paris, Fayard, 2007

11 Huntington, S., The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1996. 12 Kouchner, B., “Humanitarian et militaire”, Inflexions, No. 5, Paris, January-May 2007

13 For example, in March 2008, the death of a soldier from the French special forces, who was killed in Sudan, was described as an event occurring during a “humanitarian mission” – prompting the major NGOs to let him know they disapproved of his use of this term on such an occasion - Micheletti, P., Humanitaire: s’adapter ou renoncer, 217 pp., Paris, Marabout, 2008

14 PMC numbers compared with those of soldiers in regular troops have reached the – previously unheard-of – ratio of one to one.

15 cf. among other: http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/colombia-news- 060808?opendocument, 6 August 2008

16 The reaction, or lack thereof, to the expulsion of Afghan refugees from Calais is a grim illustration of political inconsistency.

17 Weber, Olivier, postscript to “Critique de la raison humanitaire”, le Cavalier bleu, 2006

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