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CROSSROADS: the FUTURE of IRAQ's MINORITIES AFTER ISIS 1 Introduction

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CROSSROADS: the FUTURE of IRAQ's MINORITIES AFTER ISIS 1 Introduction report Crossroads: The future of Iraq’s minorities after ISIS Yezidi girl, from Khanke camp, near Dohuk / Fernando Burgés Acknowledgements This publication is the result of a partnership with the Konrad For their support of the research, analysis, drafting and Adenauer Stiftung, which has financed this project with our design that went into this report, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, sincere thanks. Four organizations produced this report: the NPWJ, UNPO, MRG and IILHR would like to thank, in no Institute for International Law and Human Rights (IILHR), particular order: Martha Hudson; the International Minority Rights Group International (MRG), No Peace Organization for Migration; Yezidi Human Rights Organization Without Justice (NPWJ) and the Unrepresented Nations and International; International Federation of Iraqi Refugees; Peoples Organization (UNPO). William Spencer, Fernando the Hammurabi Human Rights Organization; the Turkmen Burgés, Alessandro Manno, Mays Al-Juboori, and Alison Rescue Foundation; the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq; Smith served as primary authors and researchers. Editorial and the Office of the Speaker of the Iraqi Council of support was provided by MRG’s Peter Grant, with copy Representatives. Special thanks are due to Louis Marcus editing Sophie Richmond. IILHR’s Iraq Director Najim Al Ayoub and Yohanna Youssif for their extra effort. Khaphaji, along with Athra Al-Juboori, also conducted extensive research and coordinated with Iraqi groups and In addition to the above named institutions, other individuals, leaders. Jibran Mansur oversaw translation. government officials, parliamentarians and organizations provided extensive support and analysis. Their names are not listed here for security and privacy reasons. This report has been produced with the financial assistance of the European Union, Government of the Netherlands and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. The contents of this report are the responsibility of IILHR, MRG, NPWJ and UNPO and can under no circumstances be regarded as reflecting the position of the European Union, Government of the Netherlands or the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. © 2017 IILHR, MRG, NPWJ and UNPO ISBN 978-1-907919-86-2. Published June 2017. Printed Brussels, Belgium. Crossroads: The future of Iraq’s minorities after ISIS is published in Belgium by the Institute for International Law and Human Rights, Minority Rights Group International, No Peace Without Justice, and the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission from the publisher, except in the case of brief quotations in critical articles and reviews. Crossroads: The future of Iraq’s minorities after ISIS Contents Acronyms 2 Key findings 3 Executive summary 4 1 Introduction 7 2 Background on affected minorities in the conflict zone 9 3 The treatment of minorities since the 2014 ISIS offensive 11 4 The current situation of IDPs 15 5 Ongoing challenges in areas retaken from ISIS 19 6 Approaches to transitional justice 25 7 Where next for Iraq’s minorities? 32 8 Recommendations 44 Appendix: Violations of international criminal law 48 Notes 56 About the authors of this report 63 Acronyms CTF Consultation Task Force on Reconciliation KRG Kurdistan Regional Government Mechanisms KR-I Kurdistan Region of Iraq DDR Demobilization, Disarmament, and NGO Non-governmental organization Reintegration NPF Ninewa Protection Forces ERW Explosive remnants of war NPU Ninewa Protection Units EU European Union OCHA UN Office for the Coordination of FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia Humanitarian Affairs GoI Government of Iraq OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human HHRO Hammurabi Human Rights Organization Rights HRP Humanitarian Response Plan PKK Partiya Karkaren Kurdistane/Kurdish HRW Human Rights Watch Workers’ Party ICC International Criminal Court PMU(s) Popular Mobilization Unit(s) ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former PPA Provincial Powers Act Yugoslavia TRF Turkmen Rescue Foundation IDP(s) Internally displaced person(s) UN United Nations IED Improvised explosive device UNAMI UN Assistance Mission for Iraq IHEC Independent High Electoral Commission UNESCO UN Educational and Scientific Organization IHL International humanitarian law UNHCR (Office of the) UN High Commissioner for IOM International Organization for Migration Refugees IQD Iraqi dinar WHO World Health Organization ISF Iraqi Security Forces YBS Sinjar Resistance Unit ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham YPG Yekineyen Parastina Gel KDP Kurdish Democratic Party 2 CROSSROADS: THE FUTURE OF IRAQ’S MINORITIES AFTER ISIS Key findings Key findings • Despite the recent retaking of Iraqi territory from ISIS • International reconstruction and stabilization efforts are forces, minority populations – already hampered by a cumbersome contracting process that disproportionately subjected to human rights abuses creates delays and difficulties in ‘scaling up’ — continue to diminish. Amidst competing land reconstruction, and inefficient and unwieldy Iraqi claims, the absence of clear security measures to government partners that sometimes pursue different protect, rebuild and encourage returns, these groups agendas. Combined with insufficient resources, this has – decimated by terror even before the fall of Mosul – resulted in a situation where millions of civilians still have fear for the future. little or no access to adequate shelter, sanitation or basic services such as education. • Emigration from Iraq has continued at a steady rate • The Iraqi government, Kurdish authorities and among minority communities. Meanwhile, some international community have so far failed to reach an observers predict as many as 600,000 to 1.2 million agreement on accountability, peace-building and persons will be displaced as a result of the Mosul reconciliation in the aftermath of the conflict. While this offensive. Returns to areas retaken from ISIS are very may in part be due to a desire to avoid disturbing the slow, due to an absence of adequate security and fragile coalition of groups fighting ISIS, it has also led reconstruction assistance, as well as outright to uncertainty about the prospects of return for the obstruction from political and military authorities in millions displaced by conflict and the likelihood of a retaken areas. stable political settlement post-ISIS, and continues to hinder reconstruction efforts. CROSSROADS: THE FUTURE OF IRAQ’S MINORITIES AFTER ISIS 3 Executive summary Despite the apparent pushback of ISIS (Islamic State of mass executions of civilians and use of local citizens as Iraq and al Sham) forces from many areas until recently human shields. under their control, the future of Iraq’s minority The military effort to oust ISIS from Iraq also has not populations is far from secure. Amid competing land been without controversy. Government forces, Popular claims, the proliferation of different armed militias and Mobilization Units (PMUs), and Kurdish Peshmerga and serious human rights abuses by parties on all sides to the intelligence units have all been accused of violations of conflict, all indications point to further persecution and international humanitarian and criminal law, including discrimination for Iraq’s minorities once ISIS has been the wholesale destruction of retaken villages to ensure that defeated. former inhabitants do not return. The result is Minority groups must contend with an Iraqi demographic change and restrictions on return. government that has yet to include them in post-conflict Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and explosive planning, a Kurdistan Regional Government that openly remnants of war (ERW) litter the landscape. states that lands that were once homes for Iraq’s minorities In retaken areas, almost all forces – representing various will be annexed to Kurdistan, and an international groups in the conflict – have looted homes and villages. community that appears to be indifferent to their fate. Personal security and safety are largely absent in the areas Given the existential threat facing minorities, emigration retaken from ISIS, and rebuilding and reconstruction from Iraq has continued at a steady rate among these assistance are not apparent. Security is currently controlled communities. Returns to retaken areas are very slow, due by diverse armed groups according to the different political to an absence of adequate security and reconstruction and military presences in these areas, without unified assistance, as well as outright obstruction from political command. In some areas retaken from ISIS, Kurdish and military authorities in retaken areas. security forces reportedly block displaced residents from When families leave existing camps for internally return, as well as supplies of food, equipment and other displaced persons (IDPs), vacancies in the camps are essentials. Kurdish security forces are also reportedly quickly filled by new IDPs. The retaking of Mosul, which blocking reinforcements and supplies to PMUs and other began in October 2016, has also created several hundred militias that are claiming to provide security in retaken areas. thousand new displaced persons: according to United International reconstruction and stabilization efforts Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as are hampered by a cumbersome contracting process that of April 2017, at least 441,720 persons have been verified creates delays and difficulties in ‘scaling up’ as displaced. Some observers predict as many as 600,000 reconstruction,
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