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Presidents, the Public, and American Foreign Policy Behavior

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Presidents, the Public, and American Foreign Policy Behavior Presidents, the Public, and American Foreign Policy Behavior DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Zachary M. Mears, B.A., M.A. ***** The Ohio State University 2009 Dissertation Committee: Approved by Professor Richard K. Herrmann, Adviser Professor John Mueller Adviser Professor Kathleen McGraw Graduate Program in Political Science ABSTRACT This dissertation is about the relationship between presidents, public opinion, and U.S. foreign policy. In particular, using a strategic choice approach, I develop a theory about how presidents behave while in office that provides new ways to think about the formation of U.S. foreign policy, the role of public opinion in the policy- making process, and the nature of audience costs and the credibility of U.S. foreign policy commitments. The result is a theory which contends that American presidents generally have great leeway in determining foreign policy, marshaling the public to at least tolerate particular policies, and avoiding electoral punishment for either poor foreign policy choices or for engaging the national honor and backing down. My dissertation project uses a multi-method approach to test my claims. This dissertation offers a new conception - a Presidential Agency Model - of the president-public relationship, differentiating from past analyses that have relied heav- ily on the preferences of the median voter. The Presidential Preference Model, in short, presumes that presidents try to achieve foreign policy outcomes as close to their preferred outcomes (p) as possible. Moreover, knowledge of preferences is asym- metric. That is, presidents are assumed to know the public's preferences, the public is assumed to be ignorant of the president's true preferences, and they behave as if everyone is trying to achieve their preferred outcome. For the president, this involves attaining a policy, and moving the public, as near to his preferred policy p as possible. ii The Presidential Agency Model also challenges the assumptions and theoretical underpinnings of the crisis bargaining literature, as well as the Kantian notion of the democratic peace, which argues that public opinion will act as a pacifying constraint on foreign policy makers. The Presidential Agency Model calls into question the va- lidity of this causal mechanism, offers a contending approach, and demonstrates that ex ante barriers to presidents' use of force and ex post checks on poor or unpopu- lar foreign policies decisions, and for engaging the national honor and subsequently backing down, are seldom present. iii For my father, Walter Gary Mears iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Faculty, friends, and family members have helped me complete this dissertation. No doubt, without their constant encouragement, advice, and, yes, prodding, I might still be writing. Thus, I would like to express my gratitude to these individuals for their support and assistance. However, before praising the many who helped me along the way, let me first praise the institution and department that made this dissertation possible. Ohio State is a wonderful place to study international relations, and I cannot imagine having written this dissertation anywhere else. The faculty provided me with a tremendous graduate education: they provided me with tremendous and rich academic experiences; they taught me how to think about political problems and to identify interesting research questions; they equipped me with the methodological skills to answer those questions{ yes, they turned me into a social scientist. For this, several individuals deserve special mention. Rick Herrmann has been a strong and supportive advisor to me throughout my graduate career. He helped me immeasurably in my professional socialization. He always took time to introduce me to people within the discipline; has always shown faith in my work; has always been a strong advocate for me. Rick did all of this while ensuring my ability to pursue independent work and the career path that was best for me. Not all (indeed, most) advisors would have been so supportive. He is as v dedicated and devoted of an advisor as one could ask for { anyone who knows Rick will be able to discern the ways in which his ideas and suggestions have influenced me and this dissertation. Again, Rick { thank you. John Mueller challenged me and my arguments like no other could. Throughout my graduate career he offered wonderful insight, pointed critiques, and clear direction. Without his scholarship and thoughtful arguments, my thoughts on the relationship between presidents, public opinion, and foreign policy formation most certainly would have suffered. Kathleen McGraw, quite simply, taught me how to think about political problems. From the first day of my graduate career in Political Science 684: Introduction to Political Science Research Methods to her final critique of this dissertation, Kathleen was always teaching me how to better present scientific evidence. Her approach to social science has strongly influenced this dissertation; indeed, she ensured the analysis was as rigorous as I hoped it to be. In addition to those professors who guided my professional development, my fellow graduate students have also been an enormous asset. Without the thoughtful advice and, more importantly, friendship of Brandon Bartels, Jong Kun Choi, Jim DeLaet, Corwin Smidt, and Nathan Toronto, this most certainly would have been a much more painful adventure. Additionally, a special mention for the staff at the Library of Congress is required. Without their efforts in providing me with material that contributed significantly to this dissertation project, the overall quality and depth of the cases studies offered herein would most certainly have been lacking. vi This dissertation would not have seen completion without the constant support of my family. Without the love and support (emotional, financial, and otherwise) of my parents, Danny and Janie Robinson, and my brother, Josh, grad school would have been much less bearable. Though this may seem a bit odd, these acknowledgments would surely be incom- plete if I did not mention my dog, Bruce. I experienced many late nights in the final year of this dissertation and I could not have had a better companion with which to burn the midnight oil. Thank you, Little Man. Finally, I most want to thank my wife, Sarah, for her love, sacrifice, and kind indulgence, and for inspiring and amazing me every day. In fact, she was every- thing that I needed. She stoically bore the weight of my impatience, stubbornness, frustration, procrastination, and poverty, and did it lovingly. This work is hers. OK, one final note: any deficiencies in this dissertation are solely mine, despite the best efforts of those praised above. vii VITA 2000 . .B.A., Political Science University of Tennessee, Knoxville 2000 . .Certificate of Attendance and Comple- tion University of Cambridge 2004 . .M.A., Political Science The Ohio State University 2004 . .Summer Workshop on Analysis of Mil- itary Operations and Strategy Columbia University 2001{07 . Graduate Teaching and Research Associate The Ohio State University FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: Political Science viii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract . ii Dedication . iv Acknowledgments . .v Vita......................................... viii List of Tables . xiv List of Figures . xv Chapters: 1. Introduction . .1 1.1 Introduction . .4 1.1.1 The Central Puzzle . .5 1.1.2 Scope . .7 1.2 Introduction to the Theoretical Argument . .7 1.2.1 Theoretical and Substantive Focus . 10 1.2.2 Regime Type Heterogeneity . 11 1.3 Domain . 13 1.3.1 Cases . 13 1.4 The Approach . 14 1.5 Methodology . 14 1.6 Results in Brief . 15 1.7 Overview . 17 ix 2. Theory . 21 2.1 Introduction . 22 2.2 Literature Review . 23 2.2.1 Responsiveness Theories . 24 2.2.2 Public Opinion and Foreign Policy . 26 2.2.3 Public Opinion and International Relations Theory . 31 2.2.3.1 Audience Costs . 33 2.3 The Theory . 35 2.3.1 An agency model of foreign policy decision-making . 35 2.3.2 Theoretical Assumptions . 37 2.4 A Presidential Agency Model . 39 2.4.1 Hypotheses . 44 2.4.1.1 Conventional Wisdom Hypotheses . 44 2.4.1.2 Presidential Agency Hypotheses . 46 2.5 The Presidential Agency Model and Audience Costs . 47 2.5.1 The Audience . 49 2.5.2 The Audience: Retrospective or Prospective Voters . 52 2.5.3 Audience Costs Hypotheses . 54 2.5.3.1 Conventional Audience Cost Hypotheses . 55 2.5.3.2 PAM Audience Cost Hypotheses . 56 2.6 Summary . 57 3. Methodology and Data . 58 3.1 Methodology . 59 3.1.1 Strategic Choice Model for Theory Construction . 60 3.1.2 Statistical Analysis . 63 3.1.3 Case Studies . 65 3.1.3.1 Case Study Questions: Public Influence Cases . 68 3.1.4 Case Study Questions: Audience Costs Cases . 69 3.1.5 Selecting the Cases . 69 3.1.5.1 Operationalizations . 70 3.1.6 Experiments . 74 3.1.6.1 Participants . 75 3.1.6.2 Procedure and Materials . 75 3.2 Analytic Restrictions . 76 4. Domestic Influence in Presidential Decisions to Use Force: Data Analysis and Cases . 78 x 4.1 Introduction . 79 4.2 Statistical Analysis . 82 4.2.1 Congruence of Executive and Public Foreign Policy Preference 82 4.2.2 Modeling the Use of Force . 87 4.2.2.1 Empirical Tests . 89 4.2.2.2 Analysis . 96 4.3 Case Studies . 107 4.3.1 George W. Bush and the second Iraq War . 108 4.3.1.1 Case background . 109 4.3.1.2 Actor preferences and policy choices . 112 4.3.1.3 Analysis . 150 4.3.2 Bill Clinton and the Kosovo war . 155 4.3.2.1 Case background . 157 4.3.2.2 Actor preferences and policy choices . 160 4.3.2.3 Analysis .
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