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Home , Emilio Betti, Karl Olivecrona

A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General

Volume 12 Legal Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: The Civil World

Tome 2: Main Orientations and Topics

edited by

Enrico Pattaro CIRSFID and Law Faculty, University o f Bologna

and Corrado Roversi Department o f Legal Studies and CIRSFID, University o f Bologna

with contributions by

Mauro Barberis, Guillaume Bernard, Uta Bindreiter, Giorgio Bongiovanni, Pierluigi Chiassoni, Eveline Feteris, Edoardo Fittipaldi, Davide Grossi, Stephan Kirste, Harm Kloosterhuis, Hanna Maria Kreuzbauer, Giuseppe Lorini, Carlos I. Massini Correas, Mate Paksy, Enrico Pattaro, Antonio-Enrique Perez Luno, Antonino Rotolo, Torben Spaak, Elena V. Timosina, Stamatios Tzitzis, Csaba Varga, Francesco Viola, Jan Wolenski, Mauro Zamboni, Wojciech Zelaniec

Assistant Editors: Erica Calardo, Francesca Faenza, Nicoletta Bersier Ladavac, Migle Laukyte, and Filippo Valente

Springer TABLE OF CONTENTS

A Note on the Authors and the Contributors - Tome2 XIX

Part One - Theory

Chapter 1 - Introduction: Natural Law Theories in the 2 0th Century (by Francesco Viola) 3 1.1. The First Revival 5 1.1.1. Natural Law and Legal Science 3 1.1.2. Catholic Natural Law Theory 7 1.1.3. Formalism and Natural Law 12 1.1.3.1. The Nature of Law 14 1.1.3.2. Law and Values 20 1.1.4. Anti-Formalism and Natural Law 24 1.1.4.1. The Living Law 25 1.1.4.2. Positivist Neo-Thomism 28 1.1.4.3. Filling the Gaps and Finding the Law 32 1.1.5. Beyond Formalism and Antiformalism 39 1.2. Natural Law and Totalitarianism 42 1.2.1. Nazi Law 43 1.2.2. The Nuremberg Trials 46 1.3. The Second Revival 49 1.3.1. The Enforcement o f Natural Law 49 1.3.2. Common Values and Natural Law 30 1.3.3. The Nature o f the Thing 34 1.3.3.1. Law as Experience 36 1.3.3.2. The Human Condition 57 1.3.3.3. The Ontological Structure of Law 60 1.3.3.4. Ipsa Res lust a 62 1.4. The Third Revival 63 1.4.1. Interpretation and Legal Reasoning 65 1.4.2. Christian Natural Law Philosophies 70 1.4.3. Evolution o f 75 1.4.4. The Third Theory o f Law 78 1.4.5. Non-Positivism and Natural Law 81 1.4.5.1. The Claim to Correctness 82 VI TREATISE, 12 (2) - 20TH CENTURY: THE CIVIL LAW WORLD

1.4 .5.2 . Law’s Normativity 84 1.4.5.3. A Natural Law of Positive Law 86 1.4.6. The Open Texture o f Practical Reason 88

Chapter 2 - Natural Law in Germany in the2 0th Century {by Stephan Kirste) 91 2.1. The Starting Point 92 2.2. Natural Law Theory in the First Third of the 20th Century 92 2.3. Natural Law During the Third Reich 96 2.3.1. Is There a National Socialist Natural Law? 96 2.3.2. Natural Law at the Foundation of the Resistance to Hitler 99 2.4. Natural Law after World War II 100 2.4.1. Natural law in the 100 2.4.2. Natural law in the German Constitutions after World War II 105 2.4.3. Natural Law in the Postwar Courts 106 2.5. Natural Law at the End of the Century 108

Chapter 3 - 20th-Century Philosophy of Natural Law in France (by Stamatios Tzitzis and Guillaume Bernard) 111 3.1. Introduction 111 3.2. Eclectic Natural Law: An Outcome of Sociology 112 3.3. A Moralizing Natural Law: An Outcome of Transcendence 114 3.4. Objective Natural Law: An Outcome of Dialectics 115 3.5. Conclusion: The Ineffectualness of Natural Law? 117

Chapter 4 - 2 0th-Century Natural Law Theory in Spain and Portugal (by Antonio-Enrique Perez Luno) 119 4.1. Method, Scope, and Philosophical Criteria 119 4.2. Natural Law in the Spanish and Portuguese Traditions 120 4.3. Natural Law Scholars and Tendencies in the 20th Century 121 4.3.1. Axiological and Neo-Kantian Approaches 121 4.3.2. Neo-Scholastic Natural Laiv Doctrines 122 4.3.3. Innovative Trends in Natural Law 126 4.4. Natural Law in Private Law 129 4.5. Natural Law and Human 131 4.6. 20th-Century Natural Law Theories in Portugal 134 4.7. Conclusion: Premises for an Assessment 138 TABLE O F CONTENTS VII

Chapter 5 - 2 0th-Century Natural Law Theory in (by Francesco Viola) 141 5.1. The Italian Tradition 141 5.2. The Natural Law of 145 5.3. Natural Law Theory as a Theory of Morality 148 5.4. The Return of Normative Ethics within Positive Law 151

Chapter 6 - 2 0th-Century Natural Law Theory in Hungary (by Mate Paksy and Csaba Varga) 155 6.1. Scholasticism and Neo-Kantianism in the Interwar Period 155 6.2. Natural Law in the Marxist Conception of Socialism 157 6.3. Between Social and Analytic Theories: Natural Law Today 158

Chapter 7 - 2 0th-Century Natural Law Theory in Latin America (by Carlos I. Massini Correas) 163 7.1. Introduction 163 7.2. 2 0th-Century Natural Law Theory in Argentina 163 7.3. 20th-Century Natural Law Theory in Brazil 167 7.4. 20th-Century Natural Law Theory in Mexico 169 7.5. 20th-Century Natural Law Theory in Colombia 172 7.6. 20th-Century Natural Law Theory in Uruguay 174 7.7. 20th-Century Natural Law Theory in Chile 174 7.8. Conclusion 177

Part Two -

Introduction: Legal Positivism in the2 0th Century (by Mauro Barberis) 181

Chapter 8 - Legal Positivism in the First Half of the 20th Century (by Giorgio Bongiovanni) 187 8.1. Philosophical Positivism and Neo-Kantian Philosophy of Law 187 8.2. The New Legal Positivism: ’s Reine Rechtslehre vs. Naturalismus in Legal Science and Natural Law Theory 191 8.3. Kelsen’s Theory of Norms: Between Nature and Morality 202 8.4. The Vienna School’s Theory of the Legal System: The Law as a Stufenbau and the Grundnorm 208 VIII TREATISE, 12 (2) - 20TI-I CENTURY: THE CIVIL LAW WORLD

8.5. Law and the State in France: Carre de Malberg, French Legicentrism, and “Organistic Tiering” 218 8.6. The Weimar Debate between Law and Politics: Rudolf Smend, , and Hermann Heller 220 8.7. Legal Institutionalism: Santi Romano and the “Illegitimate” Rendition of Carl Schmitt 231 8.8. Legal Positivism and Totalitarian Regimes: Italian Corporativism 239

Chapter 9 - Legal Positivism in the Postwar Debate {by Mauro Barberis and Giorgio Bongiovanni) 243 9.1. Law and : Radbruch’s Intolerable Injustice Argument 244 9.2. The Later Kelsen: From Transcendentalism to the “Sceptical Phase” 247 9.3. The Italian Contribution: Legal Positivism Analyzed 253 9.3.1. Bobbio and Methodological Legal Positivism 253 9.3.2. Scarpelli and Ideological Positivism 255 9.3.3. Italian 257 9.4. The French Contribution: Michel Troper 258 9.5. The Argentinian and Spanish Contribution 259

Chapter 10 - Neoconstitutionalist Challenges to Legal Positivism {by Mauro Barberis and Giorgio Bongiovanni) 263 10.1. Garzon Valdes and the Internal Point of View 265 10.2. Nino’s Justificatory Connection 266 10.3. ’s Nonpositivist Concept of Law 269 10.4. Jürgen Habermas and the Complementarity of Law and Morality 272 10.5. Ferrajoli’s Garantism 277 10.6. Zagrebelsky’sD iritto M ite 279

Chapter 11 - Legal Positivism’s Answers to the Neoconstitutionalist Challenge {by Mauro Barberis) 281 11.1. Bulygin’s “Simple” Positivism 283 11.2. Moreso from Soft Positivism to Neoconstitutionalism 285 11.3. Juan Carlos Bayon’s Arguments for Defeasibility 287 11.4. Jorge Rodriguez’s Arguments against Defeasibility 289 11.5. Conclusion on Legal Positivism 291 TABLE OF CONTENTS IX

Part Three - Legal Realism

Chapter 12 - Introduction: Continental Legal Realism {by Edoardo Fittipaldi) 297

12.1. The Problem of Defining the Main Tenets of Continental Realism 297 12.2. Realism.-. A Term with Several Meanings 298 12.3. Continental vs. American Legal Realists 301 12.4. Norms and Deontic Objects as Psychical Phenomena 302 12.5. From Projections, Objectifications, and Hypostatizations to the of Continental Realists 305 12.6. Caution and Suspicion Towards Performatives 310 12.7. Truth vs. Correctness 313 12.8. The Main Tenets of Continental Realism and How They Are Reciprocally Connected 317

Chapter 13 - Axel Hägerström at the Origins of the Uppsala School{by Enrico Pattaro) 319 13.1. Consciousness and the Reality of Things 319 13.1.1. A Five-Hundred- Year-Long Debate 319 13.1.2. The Revolt against German Idealism in Europe at the Beginning of the 20th Century 320 13.1.3. The Escape from Subjectivism at Uppsala through Axel Flägerström 320 13.1.4. Hägerström against the Backdrop o f Kant 321 13.2. Judgments and the Reality of Things; Pseudojudgments and the Unreality of Value and the Ought 322 13.2.1. Logical Reality, Judgments, and Effectual Reality 322 13.2.2. The Primacy of the External Spatiotemporal World 324 13.2.3. Pseudojudgments in General 325 13.2.4. Ought Judgments as Pseudojudgments 326 13.3. The Ought, the Right, and Norms Explained 328 13.3.1. Right versus Just: The World o f Duty 328 13.3.2. How the Idea of Right Develops within Us 329 13.3.3. What Is Right in the Abstract (Norms) and in the Concrete (Subjective Positions) 330 13.3.4. Norms versus Commands 331 13.4. Law 333 13.4.1. The Law in Force Is Made up o f Norms, and the Role of the Constitution 333 13.4.2. Judge-Made Law 335 X TREATISE, 12 (2) - 20TH CENTURY: THE CIVIL LAW WORLD

13.5.Rights and Transactions 338 13.5.1. Rights 338 13.5.1.1. Rights versus Interests 338 13.5.1.2. The Idea of a Right in Its Connection with That of Norms and Claims, and the Idea of a Right U nderstood as a Power 340 13.5.2. Transactions 343 13.6. How Rightness and Justice Figure into Coercion 350 13.7. More on Logical Reality and Effectual Reality 355 13.7.1. Kant behind Hägerström’s Thesis That No Judgment Is Possible without the Logical Reality of Its Object 355 13.7.1.1. Kant on Judgment and the Nothing 355 13.7.1.2. Hägerström on the Nothing, Logical Reality, and Effectual Reality 356 13.7.2. A Crucial Passage by Hägerström and a Number o f Misinterpretations 358

Chapter 14 - ’s Legal Philosophy {by Torben Spaak) 365 14.1.Introduction 365 14.2.The Concept of Law 365 14.3.Rights 371 14.4.Coercion 373 14.5.Law and Politics 376

Chapter 15 - Antlers Vilhelm Lundstedt: In Quest of Reality {by Uta Bindreiter) 379 15.1. Introduction 379 15.2. “The Law”: Legal Machinery in Action 382 15.2.1. Introduction 382 15.2.2. Legal Machinery in Action 383 15.2.3. “Situations o f Right” 386 15.2.3.1. Introduction 386 15.2.3.2. The Reality behind the “Right of Property” 388 15.2.4. The Theory of the General Moral-Forming Significance of the Maintenance o f Criminal Law 390 15.2.4.1. Introduction 390 15.2.4.2. The Social Function of the Maintenance of Criminal Law 391 15.2.5. The Theory of Social Welfare 393 15.2.5.1. Introduction 393 TABLE O F CONTENTS XI

15.2.5.2. The “Principle” of Social Welfare 394 15.2.6. "Constructive” Legal Science 397 15.2.6.1. Introduction 397 15.2.6.2. The Constructivity of Constructive Legal Science 397

Chapter 16 - ’s Legal Philosophy {by Mauro Zamboni) 401 16.1. Introduction 401 16.2. The Concept of Valid Law 403 16.3. Rights 405 16.4. Coercion 408 16.5. Law and Politics 410

Chapter 17 - Other Scandinavian Legal Realists 415 17.1. Tore Strömberg: A Conventionalist Legal Realist {by Uta Lindreiter) 415 17.1.1. Introduction 415 17.1.2. Strömberg’s Classification of Legal Rules 416 17.1.2.1. Rules of Action, Rules of Competence, and Rules of Qualification 416 17.1.2.2. Strömberg’s Views on “Rules about Rights” 422 17.1.2.3. “Legal Directions for Use” 423 17.1.3. Valid Law: A Social Convention 425 17.2. Per Olof Ekelöf{by Mauro Zamboni) 430 17.2.1. Introduction 430 17.2.2. Law, Its Making, and the Sense o f Duty 431 17.2.3. A Teleological Method 432 17.2.4. The Concept o f Rights 433 17.3. The Legal Philosophy of Ingemar Hedenius{by Torben Spaak) 435 17.3.1. Introduction 435 17.3.2. Internal and External Legal Statements 435 17.3.3. The Concept of a Valid Legal Rule 438 17.3.4. The Concept of Ownership 440 17.3.5. Performatives 442

Chapter 18 - Leon Petrazycki’s Theory of Law {by Edoardo Fittipaldi) 443 18.1. Introduction 443 18.2. The Concept of an Adequate Theory 444 18.3. Ethical Emotions 447 XII TREATISE, 12 (2) - 20TH CENTURY: THE CIVIL LAW WORLD

18.4. The Theory of Projections 451 18.5. Norms and Normative (or Ethical) Convictions 453 18.6. The Structure of Normative Convictions and the Distinction between Positive and Intuitive Ethics 456 18.6.1. Normative Hypotheses 457 18.6.2. Addressees 459 18.6.3. Normative Facts 461 18.7. Moral vs. Legal Phenomena 464 18.8. Features Associated with Moral vs. Legal Phenomena 469 18.8.1. Possible Fulfilment of Some Legal Obligations on the Part of Persons other than the Imperative Side 469 18.8.2. The Possibility of Representation in the Field o f Legal Phenomena 470 18.8.3. The Possibility of Coercion in the Field of Legal Phenomena 471 18.8.4. The Role of Intentions in the Field of Moral Phenomena 471 18.8.3. The Role of the Motives of Fulfilment in the Field of Moral Phenomena 472 18.8.6. The Conflict-Producing Nature of Legal Phenomena vs. the Peaceableness o f Moral Phenomena (and the Unifying Tendency of Law) 472 18.9. Kinds of Legal Relationships and Compound Legal Relationships 475 18.9.1. Facere - Accipere 476 18.9.2. Non Facere - Non Pati 476 18.9.3. Pati - Facere 477 18.9.4. Pati - Non Facere, Legal Non-Experience, and Repeal 479 18.9.3. Compound Legal Relationships 483 18.9.5.1. Ownership 483 18.9.5.2. Authority 484 18.10. The Different Kinds of Normative Facts and Positive Ethical Phenomena 484 18.10.1. Statute (Zakon) 484 18.10.2. Custom (Obycaj) 487 18.10.3. Kinds of Normative Facts Related to the Activity of the Courts 488 18.10.4. Books (Knigy) 489 18.10.3. Communis Doctorum Opinio 489 18.10.6. Doctrines of Individual Jurists or Groups Thereof 490 18.10.7. Legal Expertise (Juridiceskaja Expertiza) 490 18.10.8. Contracts and Treaties (Dogovory) 491 TABLE OF CONTENTS XIII

18.10.9. Promises (Obescanija), Programs (Programmy), and Acknowledgments (Priznanija) 492 18.10.10. Precedents (Precedenty) 493 18.10.11. Other Kinds o f Normative Facts 493 18.10.12. What Do Normative Facts Have in Common with One Another? 494 18.11. Authority(Viast’) 494 18.12. Official Law and the Role of Legal Dogmatics 498

Chapter• 19 - Jerzy Lande (by Edoardo Fittipaldi) 505 19.1. Introduction 505 19.2. From the Reply to Znamierowski to the Postulate of Uniqueness in Legal Dogmatics 506 19.3. The Task of Legal Dogmatics and how Legal Dogmaticians Choose theirGrundnorm 509 19.4. The Truth-Incapability of Legal-Dogmatic Judgments and Their Conditions of Correctness 516 19.5. Comparing Legal Dogmatics with Prescriptive Grammar to Understand the Nature of Dogmatic Sciences 524

Chapter 20 - Other Russian or Polish Legal Realists 527

2 0.1. Max Lazerson’s Psychological Theory of Law (by Elena V. Timoshina) 527 20.1.1. Introduction 527 20.1.2. The Object and Method of Legal Theory from the Standpoint o f Psychological Realism 527 20.1.3. A Realist Criticism of Normativism 531 20.1.4. The Psychological Theory of Law and Phenomenology534 20.1.3. Law without Norms? 537 20.1.6. The Realist Interpretation of Natural Law 539 2 0.2. Czeslaw Znamierowski: From Social Ontology to Legal Realism (by Giuseppe Lorini and Wojciech Zelaniec) 542 20.2.1. The Threefold Realist Dimension of Czeslaw Znamierowski s Philosophy of Law 542 20.2.2. On the Origins o f Social Ontology 543 20.2.3. Czeslaw Znamierowski’s Ontology of Social Reality 545 20.2.4. Czeslaw Znamierowski’s Ontology of Thetic Reality 548 20.2.3. The Ontology of Legal Reality and Occam’s Razor 555 XIV TREATISE, 12 (2) - 20TH CENTURY: THE CIVIL LAW WORLD

Part Four - Legal Reasoning

Introduction: A Note on Terminology and Purpose (,by Pierluigi Chiassoni and Eveline Feteris) 561

Chapter 21 - The Heritage of the 19th Century: The Age of Interpretive Cognitivism (by Pierluigi Chiassoni) 565 21.1. Foreword 565 21.2. The Exegetical School 565 21.2.1. The Professional Ideology o f the Exegetical Jurists 566 21.2.2. The Interpretive Codes o f the Exegetical Jurists (the Exegetical Codes) 570 21.3. The Organicistic Legal of Friedrich Carl von Savigny 582 21.3.1. An Organicistic Conception of Legal Interpretation: Savigny’s Interpretive Code 583 21.3.1.1. Interpreting Single, Non-defective, 583 21.3.1.2. Interpreting Defective Laws 586 21.3.1.3. Interpreting Legal Sources as a Whole: Antinomies and Gaps 588 21.4. Legal Interpretation in the Heaven of Concepts 589 21.4.1. 590 21.4.2. Bernhard Windscheid 597

Chapter 2 2 - The Age of Discontent: The Revolt against Interpretive Cognitivism (by Pierluigi Chiassoni) 601 22.1. Foreword 601 22.2. Frangois Geny:Critique de la rnethode traditionnelle and libre recherche scientifique 601 22.3. The Free Law Movement 608 22.3.1. Back to the Future: Ehrlich's Vindication o f Free Judicial Law-Finding 609 22.3.2. Down with “the Last Strongholds o f Scholasticism": Kantorowicz’s Free Legal Science 613 22.4. The Jurisprudence of Interests 618 22.5. The Pure Theory of Law 622 TABLE OF CONTENTS XV

Chapter 23 - Taking Stock of the Past: Rhetoric, Topics, Hermeneutics 627 23.1. Foreword{by Pierluigi Chiassoni) 627 23.2. The Rediscovery of Rhetoric{by Eveline Feteris) 627 23.2.1. Perelman’s New Rhetoric 627 23.2.2. Perelman’s General Argumentation Theory 628 23.2.3. Perelman’s Legal Argumentation Theory 629 23.3. Arguing by Topics{by Hanna Maria Kreuzbauer) 630 23.3.1. Theodor Viehweg’s Topics 631 23.3.2. The Two Styles of Reasoning: Topical and Deductive-Systematic Reasoning 631 23.3.3. Legal Reasoning Should Become Topical Reasoning 632 23.3.4. Critique 633 23.3.3. Conclusion 634 23.4. Legal Interpretation and Hermeneutics {by Pierluigi Chiassoni) 634 23.4.1. The Legal Hermeneutics of 635 23.4.2. Betti vs. Gadamer 643 23.4.3. Esser and the German Hermeneutical Movement 645

Chapter 24 - The Age of Analysis: Logical Empiricism, Ordinary Language, and the Simple Truth of the Matter {by Pierluigi Chiassoni) 647 24.1. Foreword 647 24.2. The Spell of Logical Positivism 647 24.2.1. ’s Linguistic Turn 647 24.2.2. Eugenio Bulygin’s Two-Tier Model 649 24.3. Analysis as a Plain Tool: Wroblewski’s Way 652 24.4. Analysis and Realism 655 24.4.1. A lf Ross’s Fundamental Break 655 24.4.2. Giovanni Tarello and Genoese Analytical Realism 658

Chapter 25 - Advancing Reason to Its Further Borders {by Eveline Feteris) 665 25.1. Introduction 665 25.2. MacCormick’s Institutional Theory of Legal Reasoning and Legal Justification 665 23.2.1. Introduction 665 23.2.2. An Institutional Approach to Law and Legal Justification667 23.2.3. Universalizability and Deductive Justification 668 XVI TREATISE, 12 (2) - 20TH CENTURY: THE CIVIL LAW WORLD

25.2.4. Problems with Deductive justification 669 25.2.5. Consequentialist Argumentation and Argumentation from Coherence 670 25.3. Habermas’s Discourse Theory and the Rationality of Legal Discourse 673 25.3.1. Introduction 673 25.3.2. The Theory o f Rational Practical Discourse and the Communicative Character of the Rational Acceptability of Moral Claims 67 3 25.3.3. The Rationality and Legitimacy o f Legal Discourse 676 25.3.4. Law, Morality, and the Relation between Legal Discourse and Moral Discourse 677 25.4. Alexy’s Theory of Legal Discourse as a Theory of Rational Practical Discourse in a Legal Context 679 25.4.1. Introduction 679 25.4.2. The Theory o f Rational Practical Discourse 679 25.4.3. The Theory of Legal Argumentation (by Eveline Feteris and Harm Kloosterhuis) 681 25.4.4. Legal and General Practical Discourse 685 25.5. Aarnio’s Theory of the Justification of Legal Interpretations 686 25.5.1. Introduction 686 25.5.2. The Interpretation of Legal Norms 687 25.5.3. The justification of an Interpretation Standpoint 688 25.5.4. Internal and External justification 688 25.5.5. The Rationality and Acceptability of Legal Interpretations 689 25.5.5.1. The Procedural Component of the Theory: The Rationality of Discussions about Legal Interpretations 689 25.5.5.2. The Substantial Component of the Theory: The Acceptability of Legal Interpretations 691 25.6. Peczenik’s Theory of Legal Reasoning and Legal Justification 693 25.6.1. Introduction 693 25.6.2. The Analytical-Reconstructive Component: The Reconstruction of the Different Levels of the Process of the justification of Legal Decisions 694 25.6.3. The Various Transformations in the justification o f Legal Decisions 695 25.6.3.1. The Transformation into the Law 695 25.6.3.2. The Transformation inside the Law 696 25.6.4. Different Levels of justification and Transformation 698 25.6.5. The Normative-Evaluative Component: The Deep justification o f Legal Reasoning 699 TABLE OF CONTENTS XVII

25.6.5.1. The Rationality of Legal Argumentation 699 25.6.5.2. The Legal Ideology 700 25.7. The Pragma-Dialectical Theory of Legal Argumentation in the Context of a Critical Discussion 701 25.7.1. Introduction 701 25.7.2. The General Theory of Argumentation as Tart o f a Critical Discussion 702 25.7.3. Legal Argumentation as Part of a Critical Discussion 704 25.7.4. The Analysis and Evaluation of Legal Argumentation in the Context of a Critical Discussion 706 25.7.5.Strategic Manoeuvring in Legal Argumentation 708

Chapter 26 - Law and Logic in the2 0th Century (by Jan Wolehski) 709 26.1. Introduction 709 26.2. Logic and Legal Logic 709 26.3. Notes on Normatives 714 26.4. The Jörgensen Dilemma 719 26.5. Prehistory of Normative Logic 721 26.6. Attempts at NL Construction from 1926 to 1951 728 26.7. Deontic Logic: The Standard System 733 26.8. The Issues Discussed in Deontic Logic 736 26.8.1. Paradoxes 736 26.8.2. Lessons from Paradoxes 737 26.8.3. Some Problems in Deontic Logic 738 26.9. Logic and Legal Arguments 741

Chapter 27 - Recent Developments in Legal Logic (by Davide Grossi and Antonino Rotolo) 743 27.1.Introduction 743 27.2.The Logic of Obligations: Beyond Standard Deontic Logic 743 27.2.1. Contrary-to-Duty Obligations and Preferences 743 27.2.2. Beyond Obligation and Permission 744 27.3.Normative Systems 745 27.3.1. Input/Output Logic 746 27.3.2. Algebras of Norma tive Systems 747 27.4.Defeasibility in Legal Reasoning 748 27.4.1. Meanings of “Defeasibility” in the Law 748 27.4.2. Defeasibility and Argumentation: Layers in the Law 750 XVIII TREATISE, 12 (2) - 20TI I CENTURY: THE CIVIL LAW WORLD

27.5. Legal Dynamics 27.5.1. AGM-based Approaches -j^ 27.5.2. Dynamic Logic Approaches 21. 6. Conclusions

Bibliography 7 _7

Index of Subjects ^ 9

Index o f N am es 837