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Home , Emilio Betti, Hermeneutics

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Hermeneutics 375

Further Readings from the Greek gods. was not simply a mes- Dewey, J. (1916). Democracy and education. London, senger, however. He was also a trickster. It was not England: Macmillan. always easy to determine which role Hermes was Dunkel, H. B. (1969). Herbart and education. New York, playing. NY: Random House. As Hermes’s story suggests, understanding and Dunkel, H. B. (1970). Herbart and Herbartianism: interpretation can be fraught. In education, for An educational ghost story. Chicago, IL: University of example, students sometimes struggle to understand Chicago Press. the meaning of texts. Teachers try to understand English, A. R. (2013). Discontinuity in learning: Dewey, students’ questions and may wonder about the Herbart, and education as transformation. New York, meaning of teaching for their own lives. Educational NY: Cambridge University Press. researchers who use qualitative and quantitative Herbart, J. F. (1852). Johann Friedrich Herbart’s methods make interpretive judgments (albeit for Sämmtliche Werke [Collected works] (12 vols.; G. different reasons) and must determine whether their Hartenstein, Ed.). Leipzig, Germany: Leopold Voss. interpretations are defensible. Hermeneutic theory (Original work published 1850) recognizes that interpretive challenges such as these Herbart, J. F. (1896). Herbart’s ABC of sense-perception can be analyzed from various perspectives that posit and minor pedagogical works (W. J. Eckoff, Ed. & different assumptions about what interpretation Trans.). New York, NY: D. Appleton. entails and what the goals of interpretation should Herbart, J. F. (1898). Letters and lectures on education be. familiar with debates in hermeneutic (H. M. Felkin & E. Felkin, Trans.). London, England: theory can help us appreciate the interpretive com- Swan Sonnenschei. plexities we encounter every day and permit us to Herbart, J. F. (1902). The science of education, its general become more thoughtful interpreters. principles deduced from its aim, and the aesthetic A key debate concerns how interpretation is revelation of the world (H. M. Felkin & E. Felkin, defined. One definition frames interpretation in Trans.). Boston, MA: D. C. Heath. terms of (the philosophy of knowing Herbart, J. F. (1912). Johann Friedrich Herbart’s Sämtliche and ). From this perspective, interpreta- Werke in Chronologischer Reihenfolge [Complete works in chronological order] (19 vols.; K. Kehrbach, Ed.). tion is a method or cognitive strategy we employ to Langensalza, Germany: Hermann Beyer und Söhne. clarify or construct meaning. The goal is to produce (Original work published 1887) valid understanding of meaningful “objects,” such Herbart, J. F. (1913). Outlines of educational doctrine as texts, artifacts, spoken words, , and (A. F. Lange, Trans.). New York, NY: Macmillan. intentions. The second definition frames interpretation in terms of (the philosophy of and Website ). In this view, interpretation is not an National Society for the Study of Education: https://nsse- act of cognition, a special method, or a theory of chicago.org/Home.asp knowledge. Interpretation, instead, characterizes how human naturally the world. Realized through our moods, concerns, self-under- standing, and practical engagements with people and things we encounter in our sociohistorical Hermeneutics—“a term whose Greek looks, theo- contexts, interpretation is an unavoidable aspect of logical past, and Herr Professor pretentiousness human existence. ought not put us off because, under the homelier The epistemological and ontological definitions and less fussy name of interpretation, it is what of interpretation interact as sibling rivals. The her- many of us at least have been talking all the time.” meneutic “family split” arose more than a century ago when beliefs about the practice and aim of inter- —Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge pretation intersected with the success of physical sci- (1983, p. 224) ence and the rise of . In the course of this entry, we examine the German branch of Hermeneutics is the theory and philosophy of under- the hermeneutic family tree beginning in the 19th standing and interpretation. The term derives from century with , who argued that Hermes, a son of Zeus, who interprets messages interpretation is both (a) a method and a theory of Copyright © 2014 SAGE Publications. Not for sale, reproduction, or distribution.

376 Hermeneutics knowledge for the human sciences and (b) the prere- Dilthey based his ideas on the , flective mode of everyday lived experience. As will be a method of interpretation that became prominent shown, Dilthey could not reconcile his aspiration for during the , when Protestant theolo- an epistemology of interpretive social science with gians sought to interpret the without appealing his realization that interpretation is an ontological to the Catholic Church to determine the meaning feature of human experience that cannot easily be of problematic passages or resolve interpretive dis- transformed into reflective scientific knowledge. putes. As its name suggests, the hermeneutic method In the 20th century, argued assumes that interpretation is circular. Because the that Dilthey was correct to intuit that “lived” meaning of the Bible was to be unified and understanding cannot be fully theorized or methodi- self-consistent, the meaning of any specific passage cally regulated. Unlike Dilthey, however, Heidegger could be determined by referring to the text as a maintained that scientific knowledge necessarily whole. But since understanding the text as a whole remains indebted to lived understanding. We will presumes understanding its problematic passages, explore why Heidegger argued for the primacy of determining the meaning of a problematic passage lived understanding. We will also see how Hans- depends on a preliminary intuitive grasp of the Georg Gadamer drew on Heidegger’s hermeneutics text’s entire meaning. Biblical thus revolves to develop an ontological model of social science, in a continuous cycle of anticipation and revision. which posits that interpretation in social science is Interpreting the meaning of any part of the Bible no different from interpretation in ordinary life. depends on having already grasped the meaning of Gadamer’s ideas have provoked a range of the Bible as a whole, even as one’s understanding of responses. We will look at two contemporary criti- the entire Bible will be reshaped as one clarifies the cisms. One seeks to replace Gadamer’s ontological meaning of its constituent parts. hermeneutics with epistemological hermeneutics. The Another Protestant theologian, Friedrich appreciates Gadamer’s ontological social science Schleiermacher (1768–1834), maintained that the but argues that it must be supplemented by method hermeneutic circle could ensure understanding not and theory. In conclusion, the entry will briefly review only of the Bible but also of all written and oral how educational use hermeneutics to expressions. Using this method correctly, inter- analyze educational practices, aims, and . preters could understand the meaning of linguistic expressions better than the authors who produced them. Schleiermacher transformed the hermeneu- Interpretive Social Science: Dilthey’s Dilemma tic circle from a method of Biblical exegesis into Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911), a Protestant a general theory of interpretation that explained theologian, devoted his life to developing the how understanding could be achieved in ordinary Geisteswissenschaften (German for social science, circumstances. also translated as the human or moral sciences, or Extending Schleiermacher, Dilthey contended sciences of mind or of the human spirit). Dilthey that the hermeneutic circle not only helps people thought that human beings express their under- reflectively interpret others’ meaningful expres- standing of life experience in the form of meaningful sions but also enables people to understand objects, such as texts, works of art, and various cul- themselves and their own lived experience. This tural expressions, and that interpreting these mean- is because life experiences do not unfold in linear ingful objects is fundamental for maintaining social fashion but, instead, are related to one another as life. Social science therefore requires a hermeneutic parts are related to wholes. On the one hand, we method, not the methods of physical science. It also understand specific life experiences in terms of how requires an epistemology of interpretive knowledge, we understand the meaning of our life as a whole. not a theory of knowledge concerned with causal At the same time, the way we understand our life explanation. The German word (inter- as a whole depends on how we understand specific pretation; commonly translated as understanding) life experiences. Understanding specific experiences captures Dilthey’s that the social sciences are thus shapes and also is shaped by understanding interpretive and, therefore, are distinct from the the overall meaning of our lives, even as under- physical sciences. Dilthey insisted that the two forms standing our life’s overall meaning both shapes of scientific knowledge, while different, are equally and is shaped by how we understand specific life rigorous. experiences. Copyright © 2014 SAGE Publications. Not for sale, reproduction, or distribution.

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Applying the hermeneutic circle to life, Dilthey it grounds. Interpretation consequently revolves in a realized that understanding is temporal. Past experi- never-ending circle, rendering historical knowledge ences constitute the “parts” of one’s biography. The provisional and incomplete. future makes it possible to fathom one’s life in toto. Although Dilthey believed that the interpretive Interpreting the meaning of the future depends on social sciences could be as rigorous as the physical and reshapes one’s understanding of the past, even sciences, the character of knowledge in interpretive as interpreting the meaning of the past anticipates social science nonetheless vexed him. What kind of and revises one’s understanding of the future. scientific knowledge is possible when the meaning Interpreting the meaning of time therefore is of that which is studied constantly changes? Such integral to interpreting the meaning of lived experi- knowledge is relativistic, not general and valid. ence. It is important to note that at the prereflective Moreover, insofar as the historian “belongs” to the level of interpreting lived experience, time is not an history he studies, historical knowledge cannot be object for interpretation. It is impossible to freeze or objective. Historical knowledge instead is subjective, objectify the past in order to interpret it. Neither is provisional, and partial. The circularity of interpreta- the future a stationary target at which interpretation tion raises the possibility that historical “knowledge” aims. One rather interprets the meaning of time as simply proves what it presupposes. one moves through time. Where lived experience is In an effort to reconcile understanding lived concerned, interpreting time and experiencing time experience with scientific knowledge, Dilthey turned arise together. to his younger contemporary Dilthey drew two conclusions from this insight. (1859–1938). Husserl demonstrated that science First, the meaning of life experience is fluid. With grows out of particular “” and necessar- the passage of time, the meaning of the past and the ily presupposes nonscientific understandings. But future shifts. At different points in the future, one’s while Husserl demonstrated that scientific knowledge past will mean different things. The meaning of the depends on prereflectively understanding particular future also changes, depending on the particular lifeworlds, he also subjected the to phenom- stage of life from which the future is anticipated. enological analysis to discover “essences” in lived Second, interpreting lived experience does not experience that make theoretical knowledge of the produce understanding that is abstracted from the lifeworld possible. In so doing, Husserl encountered experience of living. We cannot escape our situation a contradiction. On the one hand, pretheoretical to interpret it. Nor can we interpret our life and then understandings are relative to particular lifeworlds. experience it. Rather, we are practically engaged in On the other hand, phenomenological analysis aims living the life that we interpret. Prereflective inter- to produce knowledge of the lifeworld that is uni- pretation, in short, is situated, partial, practical, and versal and unconditionally valid. It was unclear how personal. phenomenological analysis could both transcend and Dilthey believed that prereflective understand- also remain indebted to pretheoretical understanding. ing of one’s own lived experience could evolve into Phenomenological analysis seemed both necessary reflective theoretical knowledge of how other people and also impossible. Husserl did not solve Dilthey’s understand their life experience. Theoretical knowl- dilemma but instead exposed another aspect of it. edge thereby extends and refines pretheoretical practical understanding. But Dilthey recognized that Ontological Hermeneutics: because theoretical knowledge is rooted in pretheo- Heidegger and Gadamer retical understanding, knowledge in the social sci- ences, particularly in history, differs from knowledge Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900–2002) believed that in the physical sciences. The historian who reflec- Dilthey was stymied by a false assumption. Dilthey tively examines the meaning of historical events assumed that prereflective understanding is subjective. himself is a historical being. The meaning of the past It therefore is biased and unreliable and cannot be the therefore cannot be established once and for all but basis for interpretive social science. Gadamer coun- instead varies with the perspective of the historian tered that prereflective understanding is not subjective who studies it. Moreover, theoretical understanding but instead is intimately and necessarily tied to criti- remains rooted in the pretheoretical understanding cal reflection. The intimate necessary relation between it aims to clarify, even as pretheoretical understand- prereflective understanding and critical reflection ing is changed by the theoretical understanding that provides an opening for the disclosure of . Copyright © 2014 SAGE Publications. Not for sale, reproduction, or distribution.

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Gadamer based his ideas on the work of his could become critical and reflective. But critical teacher, Martin Heidegger (1889–1976). In his reflection does not produce understanding where book (1962), Heidegger probed none had previously existed. Critical reflection two of Dilthey’s important insights: (1) we expe- instead remains indebted to the preunderstandings it rience the life that we prereflectively interpret and clarifies and corrects. (2) prereflective understanding exhibits a circular Heidegger coined the term thrown-projection to temporal structure. Dilthey believed that these two describe understanding as an experience of being conditions are contingent and apply only to pre- involved in the world. The term thrown indicates reflective understanding. Heidegger demonstrated that we do not construct the meaningful context(s) that both conditions are necessary and characterize in which we live. Rather, we are born into a social all understanding, including critical reflection. world that is inherently meaningful and that has Heidegger began by considering the question of already been interpreted by others. Interpretation existence. To exist, Heidegger reasoned, is to live is possible, because the world discloses meaning in the present. As Dilthey showed, the present does through the medium of language. We inherit this not arise in a historical vacuum but instead always social web of meaning as a linguistic “horizon” implicates the future and the past. Living in the pres- within which the construal of meaning for our own ent, we cannot help anticipate the future based on lives becomes possible. The term projection is not where we have been, even as our expectations for synonymous with planning, according to Heidegger. future experience color our understanding of the life Projection instead indicates that understanding is a we have lived. Heidegger used the term historicity to dynamic experience of anticipating future possibili- underscore the idea that human understanding is an ties. Because expectations for the future necessarily inescapably temporal experience. arise in the present, we cannot see them in their Insofar as understanding is an inescapably tem- entirety or with absolute clarity. Moreover, while poral experience, we do not choose to start (or future possibilities are open, they nonetheless are stop) understanding at a particular point in (or out partially circumscribed by possibilities that already of) time. Rather, understanding is a way of being have been fulfilled. that always is already going on (to use Heidegger’s Heidegger said that the human being who experi- phrase). It is true that understanding sometimes is ences understanding as a cycle of thrown-projection mistaken. But breakdowns in understanding signify is . Dasein means “there-being.” Unlike the misunderstanding, not an absence of understanding autonomous epistemological subject who lever- according to Heidegger. ages interpretation to grasp the meaning of objects As an experience that is always happening, under- (including objectified experiences), Dasein is not an standing does not grasp the meaning of objects that independent agent who confronts discrete objects, are “present-at-hand,” distinct from our interests the meaning of which he must deliberately choose and concerns. Understanding instead signifies being to discover or construct. Dasein rather is “there” in intimately involved with people and things. Our the world, spontaneously involved with things that world is composed of implements that are “ready- Dasein understands prior to any distinction between to-hand,” tied to our purposes, moods, interests, subjects and objects. Dasein does not initiate under- and so on. Heidegger described engaged practical standing and does not regulate the production of ongoing understanding in terms of “fore-having,” meaning. The fact of existing in an inherently mean- “fore-sight,” and “fore-conception.” The prefix ingful and already interpreted world—not Dasein’s fore- signifies that we are able to engage with imple- own initiative—is the condition that makes both ments in our world because we prereflectively sense prereflective and reflective understanding possible. how they are implicated with our interests and how Heidegger’s claim that understanding is a tem- they fit within the context of meaningful relations in porally conditioned way of experiencing the world which we find them. carries profound implications for social science, The fact that we prereflectively understand mean- Gadamer concluded. He developed these impli- ing does not imply that understanding is stuck in cations in his magnum opus the past. Prereflective understanding can change as (1960/1975). Before sketching Gadamer’s ontologi- human beings move into the future, reconsider prior cal view of social science, it is helpful to clarify two understanding, and anticipate new possibilities. points. First, while Gadamer challenged the “sci- Heidegger insisted that prereflective understanding ence” in social science, he nonetheless used the term Copyright © 2014 SAGE Publications. Not for sale, reproduction, or distribution.

Hermeneutics 379 social science (moral science and ). that does not belong exclusively to the text (or its According to Gadamer, science does not refer exclu- author) or the question or issue that the text voices sively to or exclude the . comes down through tradition and also concerns Like many Continental European thinkers, science the social scientist. Similarly, the social scientist for Gadamer refers to systematic study in fields as starts to understand another person not because diverse as , , and politics. she empathizes with him or is able to leap out of Second, Gadamer did not dismiss natural science. her own body to get inside his head but because On the contrary, he believed that natural science is understanding begins when the social scientist necessary and important. But Gadamer wanted to recognizes the question or issue that concerns the decenter the hegemony of in social other person and realizes that this question con- science. He feared that when we rely on method to cerns her as well. reflectively understand the social world, we tend Of course, neither party in the conversation to emphasize understanding that we regulate and can escape the situation into which each has been consciously produce. Consequently, we may dele- “thrown.” Understanding therefore does not aim to gitimize, occlude, or ignore understanding that we capture the meaning of a question. The meaning of do not control and cannot divorce from our self- a question rather is codetermined by the horizons understanding and historical situation. Insofar as of the people who interpret it. People who inhabit social science relies on method, Gadamer believed different horizons will understand the “same” ques- that it alienates us from important dimensions of our tion differently. Insofar as horizons are temporal ordinary life experience. Overemphasizing method and change over time, the “same” question will be also warps natural science, Gadamer claimed. While understood differently every time it is interpreted. method has a place in natural science, magnifying its If we necessarily bring our own horizon to under- role conflates natural science with instrumental pro- standing an issue, how can we recognize the horizon cedures that negate the importance of interpretive of our partner? What prevents us from appropri- judgment and modesty in scientific practice. ating our partner’s perspective or conflating it with Gadamer thus was not hostile to science. our own? Gadamer proposes two answers. First, he Nevertheless, he sought to significantly reframe notes that horizons are porous, not self-enclosed. In social science. Following Heidegger, Gadamer argued principle, therefore, horizons can interpenetrate. that interpretation in social science is a temporally Gadamer’s second answer concerns the disposi- conditioned experience or “” that we live tion of conversation partners. In a successful con- through, not a kind of knowledge that we achieve versation, each party is open to the possibility that by methodologically regulating our life experience the other’s perspective is true and may challenge or by abstracting and justifying critical reflection and even refute one’s own understanding. Gadamer outside of ordinary understanding. Understanding insists that one’s own understanding cannot be and interpretation in social science are no different clarified or corrected as long as one entertains the from understanding and interpretation in daily life. other’s perspective from afar and continues to main- In both cases, Gadamer maintained, we experience tain the truth of one’s own position. Change instead understanding and interpretation as a dialogue or requires one to risk one’s assumptions and to actu- conversation. ally experience the negation of one’s understanding. The notion that social science is a conversa- Gadamer acknowledges that negative experiences tion might seem startling. We typically think that are uncomfortable, nevertheless negative experi- social scientists collect and analyze data. But the ences can be openings for genuinely reflecting on people and texts that concern social scientists are prior understanding and arriving at new insight into not sources of data according to Gadamer. They are an issue. conversation partners. Thus, like prereflective understanding, critical Texts for Gadamer are conversation partners no reflection for Gadamer is an experience we undergo. less than people. Texts are not inanimate objects in In successful conversations, both parties are open which an author’s intended meaning is permanently to risking their assumptions. As a consequence of congealed. Texts are rather dynamic linguistic hori- being challenged, the understanding of both par- zons that disclose meaning over time. Gadamer’s ties can become more encompassing, perspicacious, social scientist starts to understand a text when critical, and reflective. Gadamer calls the reflective she recognizes that it raises a question or issue dimension of conversation a “fusion of horizons.” Copyright © 2014 SAGE Publications. Not for sale, reproduction, or distribution.

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Neither party can predict in advance how its hori- “self-interpreting animals” who always prereflectively zons will be fused. When one party tries to direct understand their theoretical conclusions and who the conversation or claims to know what the other inevitably appeal to intuitions and self-understanding is thinking, “talk” becomes something other than to justify their findings. Ruth Behar (1956–) provides conversation, Gadamer observes. But when a fusion a practical example of ontological social science. of horizons genuinely happens, both parties come Behar’s book, The Vulnerable Observer (1996), does to understand a truth about life’s meaning that not explicitly hermeneutics or Gadamer. neither could know outside of participating in the Nonetheless, she argues in it that anthropological conversation. insight necessarily implicates the anthropologist’s self- In sum, Gadamer’s reframing of social science understanding; the anthropologist’s self-understand- in terms of a conversation that we experience with ing, moreover, is vulnerable to (and affected by) the others differs from the way we typically character- people whom she studies. ize social science. Gadamer’s researcher does not try While a number of practitioners and scholars to empathize with those whom she studies. Neither embrace Gadamer, his work also provokes criti- does she regard them and their as exotic cism. Thinkers such as (1890–1968), and distant. Rather, she endeavors to recognize a E. D. Hirsch Jr. (1928–), and Dagfinn Follesdall question or issue that she and her partner share. (1932–) epitomize one line of response. According The meaning of the question cannot be determined to these critics, Gadamer’s claim that the interpret- “objectively” but instead is codetermined by the er’s situation influences meaning and that meaning horizon of both the researcher and her partner and is construed differently in each interpretive event changes with each interpretive event. The self-under- leads to . Moreover, Gadamer provides standing of Gadamer’s researcher is not controlled no basis for adjudicating conflicting interpretations. or kept out of play but instead is affected by allow- Adjudication must appeal to an extracontextual ing her partner to challenge her understanding of the criterion, which Gadamer is impossible. question that is of mutual concern. The researcher In short, these critics conclude that hermeneutics cannot direct this experience or predict the new should remain under the umbrella of epistemology. insight that the conversation will disclose. Instead, They endeavor to show how interpretation is or can she participates in an event that transforms both become a rigorous method and theory of knowl- herself and her partner in ways that neither party edge for producing valid objective understanding can imagine in advance. of texts. Insofar as method helps researchers regulate Jürgen Habermas (1929–) articulates a second understanding, Gadamer contends that it distances response. Unlike the critics noted above, Habermas them from their lived experience. Relying on method appreciates Gadamer’s insight into the ontological seduces people to underplay and even discount the of social science. are always experiential dimension of critical reflection. Social operating, Habermas notes. Understanding is irre- science becomes an intellectual exercise, not an ducibly contextual, historical, and bound up with opportunity for personal transformation. In place of the interpreter’s self-understanding. The social sci- honing methodological skill, Gadamer wants social entist consequently belongs to the social world that scientists to cultivate the to be open, take he interprets. Social science theories issue from the risks, and trust that they may have something to pretheoretical practices they strive to explain. learn from their interlocutors. Framing social science But despite these points of agreement, Habermas as a conversation we experience with others can questions Gadamer’s faith in the power of language rehabilitate the moral dimension of social science, and conversation to disclose truth and promote criti- Gadamer concludes. cal reflection. Language is not simply a communica- tive medium for understanding meaning, Habermas argues. Material conditions and power interests can Responses to Gadamer systematically and insidiously distort meaning in A number of contemporary scholars are develop- ways that language does not make apparent. Hence, ing the philosophical and practical implications of reflection must do more than simply clarify lived Gadamer’s social science. In his influential essay, understanding by means of conversation. Reflection “Interpretation and the Sciences of Man” (1971), must also help people distinguish lived understand- Charles Taylor (1931–) argues that social scientists are ing from . Becoming liberated from ideology Copyright © 2014 SAGE Publications. Not for sale, reproduction, or distribution.

Hermeneutics 381 requires a theory that can methodically explain the Epistemologically oriented qualitative researchers genesis of distortion by appealing to rationally self- wrestle with how they can control or at least reflec- evident causes. tively account for their own “positionality” and self- understanding so that they can accurately interpret how their subjects make sense of the world. A key Hermeneutics and Education question concerns whether and how self-reflection Contemporary scholars employ hermeneutics to on the part of researchers can be methodically analyze a range of educational issues, including chil- achieved. Are there methods that can help research- dren’s , teaching and teacher education, science ers address challenges to self-reflection that arise in education, medical education, curriculum theory, the field? If so, which methods should researchers inquiry-based learning, and validity in educational adopt and under which circumstances? assessment. Some scholars contrast epistemological An ontological view of self-understanding raises and ontological hermeneutics. Others focus on onto- different issues. Some collaborative - logical hermeneutics as a framework for critiquing ers maintain that research questions should be of and reframing educational practices and aims. These mutual interest to both “subjects” and researchers. scholars develop ideas articulated by Heidegger Reflective insight into these questions cannot arise and Gadamer, who sought to interrupt utilitarian, if researchers keep their understanding out of play. technical, and market-based influences on educa- Both parties—subjects and researchers—must allow tion that emphasize developing skills and mastering their understanding to be critically engaged by the knowledge. Heidegger and Gadamer countered that other so that they might become aware of assump- education is “Bildung”—an ongoing experience of tions they might otherwise fail to notice. From an self-formation and transformation—in which one ontological perspective, the key question is, “How learns to become receptive to ways of being that can researchers risk their self-understanding and be differ from and even challenge one’s own horizon. open to being challenged by their subjects (and vice Conceived as Bildung, education aims to help stu- versa)?” Learning to risk one’s self-understanding is dents become more reflective and humble as their not a methodological achievement. It rather requires horizons expand in ways that neither they nor their researchers to cultivate a certain disposition. teachers can foresee. Debates about research as conversation illustrate Hermeneutics also resounds in normative debates another of hermeneutic concerns. Some conclude about qualitative inquiry. From an epistemological that while conversation is an ideal to which qualita- perspective, the central issue for tive researchers should aspire, it is unclear whether is the dilemma that vexed Dilthey: Given that and how this ideal can be enacted. Institutional interpretation necessarily presupposes prior under- review board regulations assume that the rights standing that is personal, temporal, and situated of research subjects must be protected. This epis- within particular sociocultural contexts, how can temological assumption makes it difficult, if not interpretive conclusions be objective, generalizable, impossible, to approach research as a Gadamerian and valid? From an ontological perspective, the conversation that regards subjects and researchers as aim of qualitative inquiry is not simply to produce equal partners. knowledge about educational questions. Qualitative Some qualitative researchers adopt a research also should aim to be educative, catalyzing Habermasian view of conversation. They point to people to challenge their current understanding of a legacy of privilege and marginalization and warn education in order to arrive at new, more encom- that seemingly openhearted conversations can passing insights and questions concerning education exploit subjects. Scholars of color who conduct and the human condition. qualitative research in their home communities dis- Debates about specific issues appeal to both cuss how their university status distances them from Dilthey and Gadamer. For example, Dilthey and people with whom they were able to easily converse Gadamer maintained that interpretation necessar- before they became university researchers. For these ily implicates one’s self-understanding and sociohis- scholars, the unforeseen insights that arise during torical situation. While this idea is axiomatic among research conversations are experiences of alienation, qualitative researchers, it nevertheless raises ques- not Gadamerian solidarity. tions about the self-understanding of researchers in Finally, hermeneutics figures in debates about the relation to the people they study. scientific status of educational research. D. C. Phillips Copyright © 2014 SAGE Publications. Not for sale, reproduction, or distribution.

382 Hermeneutics has pursued this issue, arguing for the centrality of Issues in Educational Research: An Overview; interpretation in postpositivist science. While the Qualitative Versus Quantitative Methods and Beyond; postpositivist embrace of interpretation came by Schleiermacher, Friedrich way of Popper and Kuhn, not Dilthey, Heidegger, or Gadamer, the two views of interpretation are Further Readings remarkably similar. For example, postpositiv- ists acknowledge that research is mediated by the Behar, R. (1996). The vulnerable observer: Anthropology researcher’s historical/cultural situation; observation that breaks your heart. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. necessarily is theory laden. With respect to social sci- Bleicher, J. (1980). Contemporary hermeneutics: ence, postpositivists recognize that researchers strug- Hermeneutics as method, philosophy, and critique. gle to understand themselves as they endeavor to Boston, MA: Routledge & Kegan Paul. interpret others. Failing to acknowledge the need for Bredo, E., & Feinberg, W. (Eds.). (1982). Knowledge and interpretive judgment in science and social science values in social and educational research. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. results in a phenomenon that Phillips (2006) calls Brizuela, B. M., Stewart, J. P., Carillo, R. G., & Berger, J. “methodolatry.” Methodolatry conflates research G. (Eds.). (2000). Acts of inquiry in qualitative research with technical method (specifically, randomized field (Harvard Educational Review Reprint Series No. 34). trials) and discounts research as a uniquely human Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. practice. Ermarth, M. (1978). Wilhelm Dilthey: The critique of Phillips’s critique of methodolatry sounds historical reason. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Gadamerian. Unlike Gadamer, however, Phillips Press. takes an epistemological view of social science and Fairfield, P. (Ed.). (2011). Education, dialogue, and distinguishes claims about the empirical world from hermeneutics. New York, NY: Continuum. insights into the meaning of lived experience. The Gadamer, H.-G. (1975). Truth and method (Rev. ed.; latter implicate self-understanding. The former do J. Weinsheimer & D. G. Marshall, Trans.). London, not. Openness to being challenged may help social England: Sheed & Ward. (Original work published scientists recognize when their conclusions are 1960) wrong. But claims about the empirical world can Gadamer, H.-G. (1989). Truth and method (2nd ed.; be wrong, whether or not social scientists acknowl- J. Weinsheimer & D. G. Marshall, Trans.). London, edge that they are wrong. Claims about the empiri- England: Sheed & Ward. (Original work published 1960) cal world can and must be assessed on their own Gadamer, H.-G. (2004). Truth and method (2nd Rev. ed.; merit, Phillips stresses, irrespective of their origin or J. Weinsheimer & D. G. Marshall, Trans.). London, the self-awareness of the researcher who produced England: Bloomsbury Academic. (Original work them. Assessing the validity of empirical claims and published 1960) clarifying lived understanding are two different proj- Gallagher, S. (1992). Hermeneutics and education. Albany: ects, Phillips concludes. State University of New York Press. Geertz, C. (1983). Local knowledge: Further essays in interpretive anthropology. New York, NY: Basic Books. Conclusion Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and time (J. Macquarie & E. Hermeneutics addresses a range of enduring philo- Robinson, Trans.). San Francisco, CA: Harper & Row. sophical questions concerning how human beings (Original work published 1927) understand themselves and the social world. Misgeld, D., & Nicholson, G. (Eds.). (1992). Hans-Georg Questions about interpretation are not simply theo- Gadamer on education, , and history: Applied retical, however. As hermeneutic analyses of educa- hermeneutics (L. Smith & M. Reuss, Trans.). Albany: tion make plain, questions about interpretation are State University of New York Press. Palmer, R. E. (1969). Hermeneutics: Interpretation theory eminently practical. Questions of practice compli- in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer. cate interpretive theories, generating new questions Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. for theory to clarify and explain. Phillips, D. C. (2006). A guide for the perplexed: Scientific Deborah Kerdeman educational research, methodolatry, and the gold versus platinum standards. Educational Research Review, 1, See also Bildung; Continental/Analytic Divide in 15–26. ; ; Dialogue; Taylor, C. (1971). Interpretation and the sciences of man. Heidegger, Martin; Phenomenology; Philosophical Review of , 25(1), 3–51. Copyright © 2014 SAGE Publications. Not for sale, reproduction, or distribution.

Hidden Curriculum 383

Wachterhauser, B. R. (Ed.). (1986). Hermeneutics and This collateral learning, he argued, holds equal or . Albany: State University of greater educational significance than the explicit New York Press. curriculum because the habits and attitudes instilled Warnke, G. (1987). Gadamer: Hermeneutics, tradition, and have more lasting effects on students than the sub- reason. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. ject matter itself. There is now persuasive empirical in support of Dewey’s view, such as The Subject Matters: Classroom Activity in Math and HIDDEN CURRICULUM Social Studies (1988) by Susan S. Stodolsky. Philip W. Jackson is often credited with coining A curriculum is a program consisting of a series of the term hidden curriculum. In his influential book learning activities intended to realize some set of Life in Classrooms (1968), Jackson portrays hidden educational objectives. The mission of a school or curriculum in a manner related to, yet discernible other educational is understood to be the from, collateral learning as described by Dewey. delivery of a curriculum to some group of students Rather than being focused on the subject matters or other learners. Generally, the content of a curricu- of the curriculum, such as spelling and history, lum is announced so that students and other stake- Jackson is more concerned with how classroom life holders are aware of what learning opportunities socializes students to certain norms, expectations, are available at a given school or set of schools. It is and routines, such as working in a solitary fashion the case, however, that not all of a school’s learning among a crowd of other students. In a similar vein, opportunities are advertised—schools also feature he points out how schools reward certain behav- a hidden curriculum whose objectives and learning iors, such as compliance and patience. Jackson activities are seldom spelled out. This hidden cur- affords more significance to these types of factors riculum is implemented via routines and attitudes than to the particular subject matter under study. instilled through students’ experiences with the One way of summing up Jackson’s thesis is that pat- explicit curriculum and its milieu; these experiences terns of repeated behavior over thousands of hours may be consonant or dissonant with the explicit of classroom life, although seldom remarked on as curriculum. In any case, the instructional outcomes the salient feature of schooling, may have a bigger generated by these routines and attitudes are often cumulative effect on students than the formally judged by scholars and social critics to be more sig- announced curriculum. In a later book, Untaught nificant than those generated by the explicit curricu- Lessons (1992), Jackson further explored the lum. Therefore, ignoring the hidden curriculum is a implicit long-term effects teachers have on students. stumbling block to disclosing the true character and The attitude Jackson adopts toward the hid- outcomes of any curriculum. This entry discusses den curriculum in Life in Classrooms could be how the term hidden curriculum is used to refer to considered neutral. Nonetheless, his book and a variety of aspects of schooling, including collateral other works with related themes, such as Robert learning, socialization, and perpetuation of advan- Dreeben’s On What Is Learned in Schools (1968), tages based on gender or class. appeared during an era of widespread criticism of In the education , the term hidden cur- dominant societal values. Part of this criticism was riculum has been used in a number of different ways directed at schools, particularly their role in per- that are not always consistent. While all senses of petuating educational inequities. This context seems the expression imply that it is somehow obscured to have contributed to the keen interest educators from general notice, commentators otherwise define took in hidden curriculum at the time. Whereas tra- it variously and explain the intentions of its creators ditionally answers to what students take away from differently. Hidden curricula are often singled out to school referenced the objectives and content of the identify some educational ill, although it sometimes explicit curriculum, this type of response became is argued that they can also take benign or positive regarded as discordant with when outcome forms. measures showed that some groups benefited far John Dewey wrote about one meaning of hidden more from school programs than other groups. In curriculum in Experience and Education (1938). He particular, attention was now drawn to how the drew attention to how “collateral learning” (e.g., hidden curriculum discriminated among students of habits and attitudes) affects what students take on grounds of gender, race, social class, and, in away from their encounters with subject matter. time, sexual orientation.