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Arnold J. Toynbee and Islamism in Cold War – Era Turkey Civilizationism in the Writings of Sezai Karakoç

Cemil Aydin and Burhanettin Duran

tudies on the formation of modern Islamist thought in Turkey often provide a long-­term perspec- tive, linking the Islamist political orientations with Pan-­Islamist thought of the late Ottoman era. S This continuity thesis, however, neglects the crucial transformations in Islamism in the post – World War II period, when the international politics of Cold War and decolonization struggles coincided with the boom of Islamist intellectual writings in secular Republican Turkey. This article concentrates on the crucial additions to and reinterpretations of Islamist thought in Turkey during the Cold War and post – Cold War period by focusing on the civilizationist worldview of Sezai Karakoç (1933 – ), whose influ- ential writings on the civilizational resurrection (diriliş) of Islam have not received the scholarly attention they deserve. By deconstructing Karakoç’s ideas on civilizational Islam and putting them in relation to the writings and influence of British historian Arnold J. Toynbee (1889 – 1975), this article attempts to achieve several objectives: first, it tries to establish the connections between global intellectual history and Islamist thought in Cold War Turkey. Second, it traces the long-­term impact of the civilizational theory of world history and politics during the Cold War period on the relations of contemporary Turkey with Europe as well as the Muslim-­majority countries in the region. Finally, it aims to explain the resurfacing and popularity of civilizational theses promoted by post – Cold War theorists, be it in terms of “dialogue” or “clashes” among multiple civilizations. Karakoç was born in the year of 1933, in the Eastern Anatolian town Ergani, at the peak of the Westernist cultural revolutions implemented by the Kemalist elite in Turkey. He was raised during the one- ­party authoritarian secularist rule of the Republican People’s Party in Turkey, when school children in Anatolia were taught the virtues of Western civilization, modernization, and Turkish nationalism. At the same time, as a student without financial means, Karakoç benefited from the free public education of the young republic, completing almost all of his education on government scholarship, including his university training in the prestigious Faculty of Political Science of Ankara University. Upon graduation from university in 1955, Karakoç worked for the Turkish Ministry of Finance in various capacities, partly to fulfill the compulsory public service condition of his government scholarship. Since his resignation from public service in 1973, Karakoç has been earning his living from the sale of his publications on po- litical and cultural issues, as well as his poetry book.

310 Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East Vol. 35, No. 2, 2015 • doi 10.1215/1089201x-3139084 • © 2015 by Duke University Press Cemil Aydin and Burhanettin Duran • Civilizationism in the Writings of Sezai Karakoç 311

The period of Sezai Karakoç’s youth coin- titled “Mona Rosa,” in modern Turkish literature.1 cided with the destruction of Europe in WWII, More important, as a bookish intellectual and an the emergence of Cold War global politics, and avid follower of world trends, he wrote important the postwar period of decolonization in Muslim-­ essays on the politics of civilizational identities and majority countries all over Asia and Africa. Kara- his vision of Islamic civilization’s revival that are koç started to express his political ideas in the influential today. When he was selected for the lit- 1950s, during the first multiparty political experi- erature award by the Turkish Ministry of Culture ment of democratization in Turkey. In this Cold and Tourism in 2007, the documentary prepared War context, Karakoç was deeply interested in in his honor by the Turkish Television and Radio independence struggles in Tunis and Algeria as Company featured testimonies from leading poli- well as the question of Palestine. Meanwhile, other ticians and intellectuals in Turkey. At the age of Islamist writers like Necip Fazıl Kısakürek and eighty-­two, he still attracts visits and praises by Nurettin Topçu, who were older than Karakoç and leading politicians, even though he remains criti- influenced him, were trying to redefine secular cal of foreign and domestic policies in Turkey.2 Turkish nationalism by identifying it with Islam Karakoç’s current ascetic life did not prevent on the intellectual level. By merging nationalism him from shaping the Islamist thought of two gen- and Muslim faith, they were able to express Is- erations from the 1960s to the 1990s. When he was lamist ideas to criticize the secularism of Kemalist awarded Turkey’s presidential award for services reforms. However, the close relationship that was to Turkish literature in 2011, Karakoç declined to established by these intellectuals between Islam appear in the ceremony in his honor at the presi- and nationalism was reshaped by Karakoç in a dential palace.3 Yet, when the presidential award more internationalist and civilizationist manner, was announced, Turkish newspapers noted that employing Toynbee’s broader framework of world President Abdullah Gül himself was an avid reader history. Thus, Karakoç became a representative of Karakoç’s poetry and essays during his youth.4 figure in re-­internationalizing Islamism in Turkey His vision of the civilizational revival of Islam be- and connecting it with a new postcolonial third-­ came embraced by many politicians and ideolo- wordlist political vision through the language of gies of Turkish conservative Democrats. Part of civilizationism. Karakoç’s appeal and reputation comes from his Karakoç remained a kind of mystic intellec- detachment from power centers and his humble tual, preferring to stay outside the mainstream lifestyle. Yet, the main reason for his influence is organizations, parties, and movements. Thus, he the appeal of his civilizational framework for in- cannot be considered an ideologue of any of the terpreting history, religious issues, and the politics influential mass conservative democratic parties of educated publics in Turkey and beyond. There- such as the Justice and Development Party ( JDP). fore, Karakoç’s civilizationist worldview should be Yet, his critiques of Western civilization and his vi- examined in order to better understand the global sion of a Muslim civilizational revival exerted sig- intellectual history and political implications of nificant influence on several generations of con- the discourse of civilization in relation to the Cold servative intellectuals of Turkey, and they allow War, decolonization struggles, Westernization pro- us to better understand the content and nature cesses in Muslim societies, and the post – Cold War of Islamist political orientation in contemporary era rise of political Islam. Karakoç was an active Turkey. Karakoç is known as a very talented poet, witness to all of these processes and contributed to composing one of the most celebrated love poems, the general Muslim intellectual response to them.

1. For more information on Karakoç’s poetry, 3. Similarly, Sezai Karakoç earlier declined to 4. See “President Gül Giving an Award to this see Karataş, Doğu’nun Yedinci Oğlu, 211 – 19. appear in the ceremony when he was the re- Intellectual Mentor” (“Cumhurbaşkanı Gül’den cipient of the Turkish Ministry of Culture and ‘fikir hocasına’ ödül”), Sabah, December 27, 2. TRT Sezai Karakoç Belgeseli (the Turkish Radio Tourism Grand Award in 2007. 2011, www.sabah.com.tr/Gundem/2011/12/27 Television Corporation documentary on Sezai /cumhurbaskani-­gulden-­fikir-­hocasina-­odul. Karakoç) was first broadcast on September 10, 2010. It was titled “Gün Doğmadan” (“Before the Dawn”) in reference to a poem by Karakoç. 312 Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East • 35:2 • 2015

As a well-­educated writer familiar with European ficers explain to their loyal Muslim subjects the intellectuals, especially Toynbee, Karakoç illus- true nature of Muslim political theory on both trated the importance of the circulation of ideas the caliphate and the Ottoman Empire.8 Yet, even on a global scale. when the British Empire ruled over more Muslims than Christians, Toynbee considered it a represen- Toynbee as a Global Intellectual tative of Western civilization, while the Ottoman Before analyzing Karakoç’s civilizationism, it is Empire ruling over Armenians, Greeks, and Jews important to examine the importance of Toynbee was considered a representative of the Muslim as a global intellectual whose world history model world. Toynbee seemed relieved by the disintegra- influenced Karakoç tremendously.5 Toynbee was tion of the Ottoman Empire and abolishment of educated at Oxford and began teaching at Balliol the Ottoman Caliphate after WWI, and during College in 1912. He became a professor of modern the interwar years, Toynbee’s relationship with Greek and Byzantine history at King’s College Turkey improved as he became supportive of the of London upon his graduation. During WWI, new Turkish Republic and praised its radical west- Toynbee worked for the Political Intelligence ernization program.9 As for the overall direction Department of the British Foreign Office and of the future of British international order during served in the British delegation to the Paris Peace the interwar period, however, Toynbee put forward Conference.6 Toynbee also served as a director of an analysis that attributed problems of world order research at the Royal Institute for International to a general civilizational crisis about the superior Affairs for thirty years, from 1925 to 1955. During virtues of Hellenistic and Christian heritage. He WWII, Toynbee again worked for the British was one of the influential aristocratic intellectu- foreign office and attended the peace talks. als of Britain’s “morbid age,” according to Richard Throughout his active government service, Overy, convinced of the eventual civilizational de- Toynbee mobilized his analytical skills for the ser- cline of the West in relation to ironically western- vice of British imperial internationalism, and he izing non-­European civilizations.10 wrote extensively on the politics of the Muslim Toynbee became an international celebrity world, the Ottoman Empire, and modern Turkey. for his monumental twelve-­volume work of com- During WWI, Toynbee did contribute to the anti-­ parative world history (titled A Study of History, pub- Ottoman propaganda of the British Empire, and lished from 1934 to 1965). It was the one-­volume while he was doing that, he had to reflect on the abridgment of the first ten volumes of Toynbee’s geopolitics of Islam and the West and the ques- A Study of History by D. C. Somervell (in 1957), tion of Pan-­Islamism.7 When young Toynbee was rather than the large multivolume project itself, defending the war efforts of the British Empire that became an international best seller in mul- against the Ottoman call for jihad, the British tiple translations. To promote his books, Toynbee Empire ruled over five times more Muslim popu- lectured in almost every major city in the world lations than the Ottomans. Thus, he was deeply from the 1950s to the mid-­1970s. While the US troubled by Indian Muslims’ pro-­Ottoman sym- university campuses ranked at the top in terms of pathies and post – WWI Indian Khilafat movement Toynbee’s public lectures and visiting professor ap- in support of the Ottoman caliphate, for example, pointments, Toynbee visited and lectured in vari- and recommended that the British colonial of- ous Muslim countries to crowded audiences from

5. For good biographies of Arnold Toynbee, see 7. For his wartime reflections on British-­ does reflect the mood of early declaration of McNeill, Arnold Toynbee: A Life, and Perry, Ar- Ottoman relations, see Toynbee, Turkey. For jihad by the Ottoman Empire and Indian Mus- nold Toynbee and the Crisis of the West. The Toynbee’s anti-­Ottoman propaganda writings, lim public opinion. following brief biography relies mainly on Mc- see Toynbee, Armenian Atrocities, and Toynbee, 9. The change in Toynbee’s attitude toward Tur- Neill’s monograph. The Murderous Tyranny. key can be seen in his later writings. See, for ex- 6. Toynbee wrote an important reflection of his 8. See Toynbee, Nationality and the War, ample, Toynbee, The Western Question. experiences at the Paris Peace Conference. See 399 – 404. Toynbee’s introduction to the book 10. See Overy, The Morbid Age. Toynbee, The World after the Peace Conference. was written in February 1915, at the beginning of the war, before the Gallipoli campaigns. It Cemil Aydin and Burhanettin Duran • Civilizationism in the Writings of Sezai Karakoç 313

Cairo, Beirut, and Kabul to Tehran, Istanbul, and geopolitical views about the superiority of the West, Islamabad.11 Toynbee’s internationalism and humanism after Toynbee’s intellectual influence peaked dur- WWII demonstrate an impressive change of heart ing the early Cold War, between 1950 and 1975, and mind. Toynbee was highly influenced by his when, ironically, his main ideas seemed to be Greek history professor, Alfred Zimmern, a found- critical of and contradictory to the mainstream ing figure of the future UNESCO, who made an- modernization theory, in both its US and Soviet cient Greece very relevant for the legitimacy crisis versions.12 This raises an important question: How of the imperial world order and argued for a Third was Toynbee’s reception in countries where postco- British Empire based on their imagined model lonial forms of modernization were very powerful, of the Greek Commonwealth.15 For Zimmern, as such as Japan, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Lebanon, well as young Toynbee, the new British Empire’s and Egypt? In all of these Muslim countries, the rule could be different than Rome’s imperialism. elites were committed to modernizing and west- By the 1920s, both Zimmern and Toynbee moved ernizing their countries rather than reviving their away from the late nineteenth-­century notions of civilization. Some of Toynbee’s ideas, especially white man’s racial superiority. Yet, they continued those critical of Western materialism, militarism, to hold on to a civilizational view of world history and the viability of its alternatives in other civiliza- and international affairs, arguing for a dialogue of tions, are frequently quoted by intellectuals critical diverse global civilizations in a decolonizing world of westernization and modernization, especially while keeping their belief in the relative superi- those advocating Islamic, Confucian, or Buddhist ority of the West.16 As Prasenjit Duara has noted, revival.13 however, during the interwar period, civilizational Toynbee’s reproduction of the civilization- discourse became a tool of anticolonial national- ist reading of world history and world politics also ism, empowering claims for equality and national seemed contradictory to dominant trends in his- liberation rather than justifying British imperial torical scholarship and geopolitical discourses dur- rule.17 From Tagore and Okakura Tenshin to Sun ing the postcolonial Cold War period, when ideals Yat- ­Sen and Jawaharlal Nehru, Asian intellectuals of modernization and nationalism overshadowed used the idea of their civilizational heritage and the colonial-­era discourses of civilizational hierar- greatness to refute the claim of the civilizing mis- chies and comparisons. Toynbee’s civilizationism sion of Western colonialism.18 As decolonization was always more than a comparative study of world progressed, the intellectual circles who wanted to cultures, and it had its own political implications abandon a civilizational worldview in favor of a de- for the British Empire’s international relations as velopmentalist one (proto-­modernization theory) well. Toynbee represents a generation of British were becoming more vocal. imperial internationalists who had the chance to rethink the moral and philosophical foundations Cold War Political Implications of the changing world order from the 1900s to of Toynbee’s Civilizationism the 1970s.14 Given Toynbee’s earlier commitment As a British imperial internationalist, Toynbee re- to the ideal of a British commonwealth, his belief flected a confident belief in the superiority of Hel- in the superiority of Hellenistic Christian founda- lenistic and Christian civilization to other existing tions of modern world order, and his earlier racial-­ civilizations in his early training and writings. But

11. For the text of some of his speeches in the 13. For a good example of how Toynbee’s ideas 16. On imperial internationalism see Zimmern, Middle East and Asia, see Toynbee, The Toyn- can be in conversation with Buddhist revival in The Prospect of Civilization, and Zimmern, Spiri- bee Lectures on the Middle East, and Toynbee, Cold War – era Japan at the peak of its modern- tual Values and World Affairs. Four Lectures. ization, see Toynbee, Choose Life. 17. See Duara, “The Discourse of Civilization and 12. For modernization theory and Cold War con- 14. For this generation of British imperial inter- Pan-­Asianism.” nections, see Engerman et al., Staging Growth, nationalists, see Mazower, No Enchanted Pal- 18. For the broader politics of the discourse and Gilman, Mandarins of the Future. ace, esp. 66 – 103. of civilization, see Aydin, The Politics of Anti-­ 15. For a good summary of Alfred Zimmern’s Westernism in Asia. ideas on empire and world order, see ibid. 314 Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East • 35:2 • 2015

something changed in this confidence as the Brit- zation, was especially encouraging for Karokoç’s ish Empire retreated from the peak of its imperial vision of reviving Islamic civilization as a cure to hegemony, while Europe and the world witnessed the crisis of the modern world. Beyond that, this two destructive world wars. By the 1950s, Toynbee association of modernity with Western civilization no longer assumed or advocated the superiority tied all the dark sides of modern times (colonial- of Western civilization. In fact, part of his positive ism, destructive wars, and the corruption of third reputation in Muslim countries derives from the world political elites) to Western hegemony. In fact that, as a Western historian celebrity, Toynbee fact, the antimodernist implication of Toynbee’s wrote about the negative aspects of Western civili- critique of Western civilization was well under- zation while saying good things about Islamic civi- stood by Western commentators. Trevor-­Roper lization and its capacity to survive Western domi- wrote: “At the foundation of Toynbee’s version nation.19 This broader civilizational comparative of the present crisis of the West was a profound view had its political aspects as well. Toynbee gen- anti- ­modernism — a rejection of the contemporary erally said positive things about postcolonial na- secular decadence and a call for a neo-­medieval tionalism in Asia and Africa. When the news of the flight from this world. Karl Popper spoke for many Suez Crisis of 1956 reached Toynbee, for example, critics when he disparaged this view as ‘apocalyptic he was in Japan. He vehemently opposed the Brit- irrationalism.’ ”24 According to the Islamist readers ish attack on Egypt, which obviously added to his of Toynbee, one could escape from the decadence prestige in the Arab world. On the trip back home, of the secular modernism of the contemporary Toynbee visited Indonesia, Pakistan, and Iran and West to the utopian vision of Islamic civilization. often expressed his critique of Western imperial- Their imagined solution to the problems of the ism. In Pakistan, he was hosted by then Prime Min- modern world was to return to or to resurrect Is- ister Ayub Khan. During his visit to Mashhad Uni- lamic civilization, the proposed alternative to the versity in Iran, young Ali Shariati was a member West. In this way, Islamist intellectuals embraced of the student club that hosted him. Toynbee was Toynbee’s civilizationism as evidence in their cri- also critical of Zionism and supportive of Palestin- tiques of modernization theory of both the Ameri- ian demands.20 When Hugh Trevor-­Roper’s famous can and Soviet varieties. harsh critique of Toynbee was published in June Civilizational thinking in world politics was 1957, Toynbee was in Beirut.21 In 1958, an Iraqi in- not a preferred ideology promoted by the United tellectual, Zaki Saleh, wrote a book in defense of States or the Soviet Union, the superpowers of the Toynbee against Trevor-Roper’s critique.22 Cold War period. This way of thinking was asso- Because of Toynbee’s status as a global intel- ciated with old forms of empire before the Sec- lectual, as well as his critique of the West in an era ond World War, as imperial rule had to be based of decolonization, his writings on Turkey, Islam, on the legitimacy of the civilizing mission. Both and the Middle East were translated into Turk- superpowers of the Cold War competition had ish.23 Toynbee’s model of world civilizations was to deal with the reality of the postimperial and especially welcomed by intellectuals such as Kara- nation-­state-­based world, as well as the agency of koç who advocated an Islamic revival as an alter- new nationalist elites. They offered, instead, a path native to both socialism and capitalism. Toynbee’s of modernization that is open to any and every cul- critique of the US and Soviet models of modern- ture of the world, irrespective of their religious ization during the Cold War, as products of ma- and civilizational background.25 In this context, terialist and destructive Western Christian civili- however, the US version of liberal modernization

19. For an early example of his relatively posi- 21. See Trevor-­Roper, “Arnold Toynbee’s Millen- ferans (Civilization on Trial); Toynbee, Tarih Bil- tive assessment of the survival of Islamic civili- nium.” inci (A Study of History); and Toynbee, Medeni- zation despite the hegemony of the West, see yet Yargılanıyor (Civilization on Trial). 22. See Saleh, Trevor-­Roper’s Critique of Arnold “Islam, the West, and the Future,” in Toynbee, Toynbee. 24. Trevor-­Roper, “Arnold Toynbee’s Millen- Civilization on Trial, 164 – 87. nium,” 18. 23. For examples of Toynbee’s translation into 20. See McNeill, Arnold J. Toynbee: A Life, chap. Turkish, see Toynbee, Dünya ve Garp (The World 25. For a good discussion of this topic, see 10. and the West); Toynbee, Tarih Üzerine: İki Kon- Latham, Modernization as Ideology. Cemil Aydin and Burhanettin Duran • Civilizationism in the Writings of Sezai Karakoç 315

was able to reproduce civilizational dichotomy in Civilizational paradigms were especially en- new anthropological terminology by positing es- trenched in Muslim intellectual discourses, and sential cultures of the East, West, Asia, or Islam. on a popular level, Toynbee struck a chord with Thus, it should not be surprising that both Zim- Islamist internationalists in their belief in the mern and Toynbee found a receptive audience in continued survival and future resurrection of Is- Cold War America, where modernization theory lamic civilization against Western civilization. But, became a master narrative in the social sciences.26 in these civilizational interpretations, Toynbee’s One should not assume irreconcilable contradic- model made the modernization and westerniza- tions between US modernization theory and the tion of Muslim societies seem like a cultural be- British imperial internationalist civilizational trayal by relegating global modernity to an exten- worldview. While the new national leaders of the sion of Western civilization. Thus, a Toynbean postcolonial world were struggling with issues of model of world history would imply a critique of economic underdevelopment and developmental Kemalist westernization attempts in Turkey, as gap, culture and civilizational talk continued its Eurocentric modernization would mean leaving appeal to both American and European intellec- behind the legacy of Muslim civilization in favor tuals as well as to the educated elites of Asia and of an alien and rival Western civilization, which Africa. Thus, Toynbee’s writings on the history had many problems. Throughout the second half of world civilizations, their encounter, and their of the nineteenth century, Muslim reformist elites future viability did not seem completely obsolete, tried to strengthen their societies and political although there were clear tensions between this structures to be more in tune with the paradigm of civilizational view and modernization theory. This multiple modernities than the paradigm of West- tension was most obvious to socialists and to the ern modernity. Many did not see selective and cre- Left, who expressed their objections to Toynbee’s ative adoptions from Europe as an insult to their civilizationism, which they found antimodernist. religious and cultural heritage. Both in the Muslim and non-­Muslim intel- Thus, Toynbee’s main arguments about the lectual circles of Asia and Africa, Toynbee did incompatibility among encountering world civi- appeal to those who attempted to overcome Euro- lizations must have seemed disorienting and pa- centrism in world history perceptions. But in this tronizing, especially given that almost all the de- context, Toynbee was just confirming what was al- colonized Muslim nations were undergoing rapid ready known and accepted. Civilizationism was a modernization projects during the 1950s and the dominant anticolonial discourse in Pan-­Islamism, 1960s. Yet, oppositional intellectuals who were Pan- ­Africanism, and Pan-­Asianism, whereby na- critical of top-­down state modernization projects tionalists, ranging from Tagore and Ghandi to or the downsides of modernization projects could Sun Yat-­Sen and Mehmet Akif Ersoy, already chal- find Toynbee’s framework of analysis useful and lenged the idea of Western civilization’s supremacy empowering. According to an Islamist interpreta- by characterizing it as decadent, declined, and vio- tion of the Toynbean civilizational model, Ataturk, lent. Moreover, they depicted Islamic, Indian, Chi- Abd an-­Nasser, and Reza Shah would all look like nese, African, and Asian civilizations as spiritual culturally alienated traitors, and in fact, the asser- and moral alternatives.27 With Toynbee, we see a tive Islamism of the 1970s and the 1980s made that prominent British internationalist confirming, in argument forcefully.28 a new historical language, what anticolonial intel- lectuals have already been arguing for a century.

26. For Zimmern’s positive view of America as doomed.” The United States was the country 28. For an influential book that depicts all west- the leader of the Western civilization, see Zim- in which Arnold Toynbee visited and lectured ernization and modernization movements in mern, American Road to World Peace. Toynbee most. the late Ottoman and Republican periods in was featured on the cover of the influential Turkey as alienation from one’s native civiliza- 27. For the usage of civilizationism in anticolo- Time magazine on March 17, 1947, with a cap- tion, see Doğan, Batılılaşma İhaneti. nial discourses, see Hay, Asian Ideas of East and tion reading, “Our civilization is not inevitably West, and Aydin, “Beyond Civilization.” 316 Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East • 35:2 • 2015

Civilizationist Internationalism and Christianity. Karakoç was not a theologian, in Sezai Karakoç’s Islamism and he never advocated a revival of religiosity that Karakoç’s depiction of Islam as a civilizational al- we see in Pakistan’s Jamaat-­i Islami or Egypt’s Mus- ternative to the West was strikingly similar to Toyn- lim Brotherhood organizations. bee’s model of historical encounter among civiliza- Karakoç’s view that the idea of civilization is tions. Even though Karakoç read and often quoted not peculiar to the West or Islam but is a feature of Toynbee, it is less likely that he owes all of his ideas the history of human beings, and there have been to Toynbee exclusively. As mentioned earlier, civili- multiple civilizations in world history, is very simi- zationism already existed in late Ottoman thought lar to a Toynbean view of civilization. Yet, Karakoç as well as in broader anticolonial third world na- takes it a step further and merges the notion of rev- tionalism. Karakoç has presented a version of Is- elation in monotheistic religions with his vision of lamism around the notion of “the resurrection of supranational civilizations. For him, there is an un- Islamic civilization,” which is regarded as superior changing essential humanity, which people of the to the Western ideologies of capitalism and com- world could remember one day though they have munism. By proposing the idea of resurrection forgotten: the civilization of truth or revelation.29 (diriliş), Karakoç develops a method of perceiv- Once he situated divine knowledge as the basis ing Islam as a totality from a historical and civi- of his vision of ideal civilization, Karakoç could lizational perspective. Seen from this perspective, avoid civilizational relativism in comparing one Islam is a worldview, a manner of life and civiliza- civilization to another. For him, there emerged tion with a particular view of state, society, culture, an ideal civilization, namely Islamic civilization, and economics. which is most harmonious with revealed wisdom In this view of Islamic civilization, Karakoç from God. Accordingly, Karakoç’s definition of relies on but also departs from Toynbee: Karakoç civilization differs from the famous late Ottoman was initially a third worldist internationalist, cel- social theorist Ziya Gökalp’s view that a civiliza- ebrating the awakening of the non-­Western world tion is the sum total of common works created by and hoping that this process would ultimately end a group of nations. Karakoç finds this description the global political hegemony of the West. Accord- an over-­objectification and materialization, which ing to Karakoç’s utopian alternative teleology, the naturally makes industrialized Western civilization decolonizing trends will culminate in the revival superior to all others.30 Instead, Karakoç gives a re- of the dignity of the Muslim world and the East, ligiously based definition of civilization: “Human possibly giving birth to a new federation of Mus- being[s] can exist only with God. From this point lim states in the Middle East. Karakoç perceives of view, the ideal and goal of [a] human being is this resurrection almost as revenge on the West, divine in origin. This goal is to become a creature a sentiment that Toynbee would not share. More- according to God’s wishes.”31 over, for Karakoç, Islamic civilization is the main History is conceived by Karakoç as the story alternative to the West, while for Toynbee, Indian, of the rise, decline, and resurrection of civiliza- Chinese, and Japanese civilizations have their own tions. In his view, the old, “declined” civilizations merits and advantages, and no single civilization are the history of the human soul and should not should necessarily dominate world politics after be put aside. Mesopotamian, Egyptian, Greek, the decline of the West. Roman, Islamic, and post-­Renaissance Western Karakoç perceives the history of humanity as civilizations evidence the self-­realization of hu- the encounter and interaction of different civiliza- manity throughout history.32 In the flow of these tions, including Islamic and Western civilizations. multiple civilizations, Karakoç delineates two lines It is important to note that this is not a conflict that clash with each other. At this point, his civili- between the religious traditions and faiths of Islam zational reading of history is expressed in the form

29. See Karakoç, Çağ ve İlham III, 117. 31. Ibid., 10.

30. See Karakoç, Düşünceler I, 9 – 10. 32. See Karakoç, İnsanlığın Dirilişi, 10. Cemil Aydin and Burhanettin Duran • Civilizationism in the Writings of Sezai Karakoç 317

of dichotomies: “Two civilizations have clashed Toynbee exaggerated the relation between states with each other since the very beginning of hu- and civilizations. Civilization cannot be confined manity: civilization of good and civilization of evil, to the life of some particular states and nations. civilization of white and civilization of black . . . Karakoç makes a distinction between two concepts civilization of prophets and civilization of devils, of civilization: the first speaks to and involves hu- eastern civilization and western civilization.”33 In manity as a whole; the second concerns specific, these dichotomies, the term East is equal to Islamic concrete civilizations in history. Karakoç’s insis- civilization, while the birthplace of the “true” civi- tence on the humanism and internationalism of a lization is today’s Middle East. It is important to particular civilization illustrates his antinational- underline that, at the peak of Cold War conflicts, ist concerns. For him, concrete civilizations like Is- Karakoç still perceived an ongoing confrontation lamic and Western civilizations belong to human- between European/Western civilization, as the ity, not to a nation.36 representative of evil, and Islamic/Eastern civiliza- In A Study of History, Toynbee referred to tion, as the representative of good.34 civilizations as isolated spheres that can be under- We see Karakoç’s adoption of Toynbee’s idea stood in and of themselves, without reference to of multiple surviving civilizations in his critique other areas of the world — spheres where the links of the Kemalist notion of civilization. Kemalism in a causal sequence are contained within their as the official ideology of the Turkish nation-­ own time and space.37 But in Karakoç’s formula- state postulated that all civilizations other than tion, civilizations are political units as well. We can the superior Western civilization are doomed to perhaps see clear contradictions between Toyn- fade away. In his writings on the idea of civiliza- bee’s vision of postimperial British international- tion, Karakoç denies the positivist belief of Kemal- ism and Karakoç’s anticolonial Muslim interna- ist ideology of Turkish nationalism that there has tionalism. Despite Karakoç’s rejection of European been only one global civilization, namely Western and American hegemony in world politics, his eval- civilization, because of its hegemonic position in uation of the achievements of Western civilization modern history, science, and technology. In re- could be positive on many occasions. For him, the sponse, Karakoç argues that Islamic civilization reality of an encounter between civilizations may will not disappear in the face of the detrimental result in some kind of Hegelian synthesis, a com- effects of modern Western civilization, though the bination of the characteristics of each civilization. destructive effects of the West over other civiliza- But he also speaks of the clash between Islam and tions are definite. But, he writes, “The West could the West, which is an extreme form of encounter not kill the Islamic civilization. Islamic civilization, between civilizations.38 In Karakoç’s intellectual by taking a lesson from this life and death clash vision, technology is regarded as something to be with the Western culture, is reviving as the most used for recognizing the positive differences of original civilization.”35 As we see with Karakoç’s societies and even for preserving them. After all, use of Toynbee’s model to critique Kemalist no- technology can strengthen trends toward resem- tions of civilization, ideas in one British imperial blance, unification, or friendship of societies. This internationalist context can take on new meanings positive statement is accompanied by Karakoç’s in a different context, extending beyond the inten- strong emphasis that, like the materialist positivist tions of the original author. understanding of science, technology is not able Karakoç’s understanding of the laws of his- to bring a new meaning or a new civilization to tory is different than Toynbee’s analysis of the humanity.39 Technology seems to be confirming rise and fall of civilizations. Karakoç argues that Karakoç’s vision of shared humanity and inter-

33. Karakoç, Günlük Yazılar III: Sur, 59 – 60. 36. See Karakoç, Günlük Yazılar IV: Gün Saati, 38. For the history of the clash of the civilization 236 – 37. thesis, see Aydin, Politics of Anti-­Westernism in 34. See ibid. Asia, and Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution. 37. See Toynbee, A Study of History. 35. Karakoç, Sütun, 67. 39. See Karakoç, Çağ ve İlham III, 83, and Kara- koç, İnsanlığın Dirilişi, 7 – 10. 318 Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East • 35:2 • 2015

nationalism as he speaks of the softening effect Eastern intellectuals who feel inferior to the West of technology over the distinction between East (like Kemalists) are products of Western attempts and West. The advances in technology have eradi- to prevent the resurrection of Islamic civilization.42 cated the walls between the East and the West, Karakoç argues that the central issue for con- first against Eastern civilizations but today against temporary Muslims is the resurrection of Islam, Western civilization. By learning the achievements an objective that begins with the purification of of old civilizations, Europeans have lost their be- Muslims. When Muslims get rid of their “verbal lief that Europe is the only, absolute civilization muslimness” and become “real Muslim[s] in their on earth. Indeed, Karokoç finds in technological souls,” they will reach the resurrection by embrac- globalization the roots of the idea of world civili- ing the goodness, beauty, and truth of both the zation, which had been the ideal of the prophets East and the West.43 The resurrection of Islam from the beginning of humanity.40 means the resurrection of humanity or resurrec- tion of the “truth civilization.”44 This is the revival Resurrection (Diriliş) of Islamic Civilization of real humanism, or divine humanism, that will Resurrection is a central concept to Karakoç’s save humanity from capitalism. This revived Islam thought, and his analyses of politics, history, and is then presented as an alternative to both capital- philosophy are closely tied to this ideal. In his writ- ism and communism. Karakoç also reflects on de- ings on diriliş, we can see the legacy of anti – social tails such as the right to own property; unlike the Darwinist arguments of late Ottoman era Muslim capitalist idolization of, and the communist antag- intellectuals. At the peak of Western imperial hege- onism toward, property, Islam will institutionalize mony, many European intellectuals and Oriental- it as a duty and responsibility, a tool for the per- ists maintained the notion that Islamic civilization fection of society and humanity.45 He argues that had declined permanently, with no hope of revival. Western ideologies of communism, capitalism, fas- The European public’s view of the Ottoman Em- cism, and Nazism are masks that cover the truth pire as a “sick man” paralleled the harsh judgment under the claim of universality.46 about the impossibility of Muslim reform and re- Karakoç often talks about a crisis of Islamic newal that appeared in the writings and speeches civilization, which for him has emerged with the of figures such as Ernest Renan and Lord Cromer. impact of Western civilization in Muslim lands. In response, Muslim intellectuals conceded their He perceives the encounter between Islam and relative backwardness but insisted that their de- the West as the last major civilizational encounter, cline was temporary and that Muslims had the which results in the war waged by Western colo- historical potential to reawaken and revive. Kara- nialism against Muslims. Karakoç believes that koç reiterates this theme in Muslim modernism Islamic civilization will triumph over the West, with an exaggerated emphasis: “Birth and death though the Islamic world has been wounded seri- are two faces of the life but resurrection, which is ously by the West’s political power. In the ultimate born of the togetherness of birth and death, is the stage, Islam will revive the civilization of humanity real life. If we say in a Hegelian dialectic, birth is and consequently will give an end to the cruelty thesis, death is antithesis and resurrection is syn- and barbarism of the West.47 Karakoç is not against thesis.”41 Then, Karakoç elaborated extensively on intercivilizational learning, as he urges Muslims how Muslims were able to revive their civilization to be prepared to engage productively with other despite the East’s imitative Westernist reforms. Ac- civilizations, enriching themselves through civili- cording to Karakoç, westernization movements of zational encounters, conflicts, and challenges.48

40. See Karakoç, Çağ ve İlham II, 46 – 51. 44. Karakoç, Çağ ve İlham III, 26. 47. See Karakoç, Günlük Yazılar IV: Gün Saati, 161 – 62. 41. Karakoç, Çağ ve İlham III, 133. 45. See ibid., 28, 88 – 89. 48. See Karakoç, Fizik Ötesi Açısından Ufuklar ve 42. See Karakoç, Çağ ve İlham I, 38 – 39. 46. See ibid., 26 – 28, and Karakoç, Çağ ve İlham Daha Ötesi I, 139. I, 85. 43. Karakoç, Çağ ve İlham III, 87, and Karakoç, Çağ ve İlham I, 24. Cemil Aydin and Burhanettin Duran • Civilizationism in the Writings of Sezai Karakoç 319

On the other hand, Karakoç’s writings are full of societal life in the Ottoman state was very civilized passages trying to justify the superiority of Islam until just before its end. Karakoç argues, by quot- over other civilizations.49 One major reason for this ing Toynbee, that Ottoman civilization was not a superiority, for him, is Islamic civilization’s mono- dead civilization but an interrupted one, as a result theistic roots, which are not similar to those of of the intervention of external powers.53 Buddhism of the East.50 The reemergence of civilization conscious- According to Karakoç, writing during the ness among Islamists is directly related to disil- rivalries of the Cold War, the hope of humanity lusionment with the westernization movement. for a renaissance lies in the resurrection of Islamic As such, Karakoç describes the Ottoman-­Turkish civilization, not to the West, which has polluted modernization movement as a process of alien- nature and has been caught in the grips of false ation of the East from its own civilization. There humanism. This is the revenge of Islam but not is a clear amnesia on the part of Karakoç about a crude vengeance, even though the West, under the Christian populations of the Ottoman Empire, different names and under different periods, has which, until 1878, constituted almost 40 percent of often crusaded against Islam.51 The resurrection of the Ottoman population. Moreover, the Ottoman Islam places the duty of developing a new model Empire ruled over Southeastern Europe. There is of state, culture, and country on the shoulders of no mention of this Ottoman cosmopolitanism in Islamic countries. It is not possible to continue Karakoç’s writings. He only talks about the Otto- with the invented borders of the existing states in man Empire as a Muslim empire, representing the Muslim lands. The small nation-­states of the cur- Islamic civilization and the East. This erasure of rent Muslim world, which are created by Europe- the Armenian, Greek, and Jewish populations of ans, cannot be regarded as states in real terms. In the geographies of the Ottoman Empire and Turk- the near past, the only state in the Middle East was ish Republic in narratives of civilizational history the Ottoman state. Following this line of think- is true of other Islamist thinkers as well as the ma- ing, Karakoç calls for the establishment of three jority of secular nationalists throughout the Cold Islamic federations: an Eastern Islamic Federation War. in Eastern Asia, a Middle Islamic Federation in the The Westernist attempt at the civilizational Middle East, and a Western Islamic Federation in conversion of Turkey from the Islamic civiliza- Africa. Eventually these three federations will be tion to the Western one is vehemently rejected by part of the Great Federation of Islam.52 Karakoç on the grounds that civilization cannot Karakoç does not accept the argument that be imitated. Westernization is the loss of one’s the Ottoman state declined while the West was on own civilization in the name of acquiring another the rise. According to him, the Islamic world and civilization.54 It is in these sentiments and inter- the Ottoman state did not decline but progressed pretations where one can clearly see the impact at a slow pace. However, Europe has taken great of Toynbee’s world historical model on Karakoç. steps in material and technical fields at particular According to this interpretation, the westerniza- moments such as the Renaissance and the Indus- tion reforms from the Ottoman Tanzimat to Re- trial Revolution. There was no decline in absolute publican Turkey have been seen as a failure.55 The terms. It is meaningless to divide Ottoman history Westernist intellectual who desires to be a part of into three periods of rise, stagnation, and decline. the West is humiliated by his admiration of the The Ottoman state had been in progress from its West. In Karakoç’s eyes, these intellectuals are the beginning to the early nineteenth century. Even casualties of the war between Islam and the West.56

49. See, for example, Karakoç, Günlük Yazılar III: 52. For details see Karakoç, Çağ ve İlham IV, 54. See, for instance, Karakoç, Çağ ve İlham II, Sur , 29 – 30, and Karakoç, Çağ ve İlham IV, 23 – 29. 92 – 93; Karakoç, Yapı Taşları ve Kaderimizin 96 – 97; Karakoç, Günlük Yazılar IV: Gün Saati, Çağrısı I, 204 – 5; and Karakoç, Yapı Taşları ve 50 – 51; and Karakoç, Sütun, 345. 50. See Karakoç, Günlük Yazılar III: Sur, 43. Kaderimizin Çağrısı II, 163 – 64, 200. 55. See Karakoç, Dirilişin Çevresinde, 191. 51. Karakoç, Günlük Yazılar IV: Gün Saati, 213 – 14. 53. See Karakoç, Fizikötesi Açısından Ufuklar ve 56. See ibid., 53 – 54. Daha Ötesi I, 75 – 80, and Karakoç, Tarihin Yol Ağzında, 25. 320 Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East • 35:2 • 2015

What the Islamic world needs for the resurrection inevitable features of the corrupt Western civiliza- of Islamic civilization and the salvage of humanity tion. At one level, the Islamist conceptualization is the emergence of a Muslim intellectual who rep- of the West is similar to the Western Orientalist resents Islamic virtue and morality.57 depictions of the imagined Muslim world, as they both believed in the essential difference between Karakoç’s Essentialism the civilizations of the religiously oriented tradi- The very identity of Western civilization in Kara- tional Orient and the materially superior modern koç’s eyes is intimately bound up with its self-­ Occident. righteous sense of superiority and exploitation of The Western man is characterized by Kara- humanity, beginning with its Greco-­Roman heri- koç, above all, by commitment to nature, reason, tage and extending through the Renaissance to senses, objects, and this world: “[The] outward-­ the modern West. By the term West, Karakoç refers looking human see[s] himself as a force of nature. mainly to Europe, not the United States, which for Like it, he is destructive, shocking, striking and him is a derivate culture that could never depart even brutal. . . . Power is the right, or at least, right from the destiny of Europe.58 Modern European is nothing without material power. Reality means ac- civilization is predicated on power and the exploi- tivism. This activism sometimes reaches . . . the level tation of peoples in several parts of the world, and of aggression, but this situation does not hurt the thus, Karakoç constructs a negative correlation be- feelings of the Western man. The end is important tween the supremacy of Europe and the resurrec- for him. Shock, movement, change are the practical tion of humanity: “Whenever Europe resurrects, outcomes of the [W]estern attitude.”62 The Eastern humanity suffers pains and whenever there is an attitude is depicted by Karakoç as inward looking internal conflict within the West, humanity takes and reluctant toward nature, full of passivism and a breath.”59 His anti-­European rhetoric includes peace. As the middle way, Karakoç argues, the Is- strong anticolonialist connotations: “By the words lamic attitude is not a synthesis or combination of ‘human being’ in the documents that have been these two attitudes. It is activist but does not regard promulgated out of the French Revolution, the aggression as the principle of life. Karakoç’s ideal Russian revolution, and the movement of United Muslims love peace but still regard war and peace Nations, Europeans intend just themselves; in fact, as the necessary conditions for the existence of the they do not accept non-­Europeans as human.”60 divine order. Domination over nature by Karakoç’s According to Karakoç’s historical account, the idealized Muslims is to be realized not for shocking West is not able to escape from the Roman sense of humanity but for purifying it.63 superiority. Westerners/Romans are free citizens Karakoç respects Christianity’s spiritualism and masters; the rest are slaves. Karakoç added but does not think that it can save the West from that Christianity, despite its monotheistic moral materialism and greed. Religion in the modern teachings, could not kill this Roman spirit in the West cannot be a source of civilizational resurrec- hearts of the Westerners.61 tion.64 European Christians are far from the es- One major point that is central to Karakoç’s sence of their religion and many of their intellec- criticism of the West resonates with the critique tuals — like Friedrich Nietzsche, Karl Marx, Martin made by the Islamists during the late Ottoman Heidegger, Jean-­Paul Sartre, Albert Camus, Bert- period. They depicted the West in terms of eco- nard Russell, Sigmund Freud, Auguste Comte, and nomic and military power and materialism. For Is- André Gide — are against Christianity. Western im- lamists, the problems of colonialism and exploita- perialism has nothing to do with the Christian love tion are not features of Islamic civilization but are of human beings. The church in the West, accord-

57. See Karakoç, Çağ ve İlham I, 24, and Karakoç, 60. Ibid., 52. 63. See ibid., 139 – 41. İslamın Dirilişi, 23. 61. See Karakoç, Sütun, 384, and Karakoç, Yapı 64. See ibid., 29 – 30. 58. See Karakoç, Günlük Yazılar III: Sur, 81. Taşları ve Kaderimizin Çağrısı II, 177 – 81.

59. Ibid., 51. 62. Karakoç, Çağ ve İlham II, 139 – 40. Cemil Aydin and Burhanettin Duran • Civilizationism in the Writings of Sezai Karakoç 321

ing to Karakoç, is nothing more than a justifica- make geographical discoveries because they were tion for committing sin. It continues to legitimize rich and civilized.67 antireligious worldly changes in accordance with Karakoç’s discourse on civilization entails the commands of capitalism, while opposing the an anticolonialist element that was not so appar- truth.65 ent in other Islamists of the period such as Necip Partly in contradiction to his general nega- Fazıl Kısakürek and Nurettin Topçu. Karakoç’s call tive Islamist discourse on the rise of the West, for the establishment of the great Middle Eastern Karakoç comes to underline the contributions of State (ortadoğu devleti), which could be realized if Islamic civilization to the formation of the West’s Western colonialism over the Muslim lands was de- material supremacy. Although he reiterates the feated, was highly internationalist in Cold War Tur- fact that Greek civilization was passed on to the key. Karakoç noted that the anticolonial struggles Renaissance by Muslim scholars, unlike the Is- must not utilize Western ideologies if they need lamists of the late Ottoman period, he does not see to truly decolonize themselves. Racism, socialism, this as confirmation of the commonality between and humanism are produced by the West itself the modern West and Islamic civilization. The to meet and control the opposition coming from West appropriated some ideas and methods from non-­European countries. For non-­Europeans, to Andalusian Islamic civilization that were superior oppose the West by the means of Western coun- to Europe of the Middle Ages from the eleventh to terarguments, such as Marxism and socialism, is fifteenth centuries. But this learning was limited another way of westernization.68 In his analysis of to the appropriation of science. For Karakoç, the contemporary ideologies, which are different faces West could not penetrate the soul of Islamic civi- of the West, he regards the resistance of fascism lization. Moreover, Europe could not admit that it to capitalism and communism as a negative one, had learned from Islam. Europe has established which delayed the real resistance of humanity.69 a civilization of objects, a high level of material Expectedly, Karakoç has expressed several times achievement, by a materialist inspiration but has his opinion that Turkey’s membership in the Eu- caused decline in humanity in terms of spirit and ropean Union is unacceptable only because of the morality. Even the Renaissance was Christianity’s essential difference between Islamic civilization call for help from the ancient Western civilization and the West.70 against Islam. In other words, Christianity, the soul Karakoç’s Islamist response to Western su- of the Middle Ages, asked assistance from antiq- premacy is not a call for a retreat into the moun- uity to defend itself against Islam, the soul of the tains of Anatolia or into tradition and customs. As new age.66 In an attempt to explain the reasons we see in his book of poetry, Tale (Masal), Karakoç for both the decline of Islam and the rise of the describes a father whose seven sons have gone to the West, Karakoç provides us with a rather interest- West. Six of them lost their identities by falling for ing argument. Europeans have appropriated the the attractiveness of this civilization, and the last, historical, geographical, technological, and com- seventh son, who has refused to be changed and to mercial knowledge and experience produced by be converted, buried himself in a square of a West- Muslims in order to develop industrialization and ern city.71 This metaphor is partly his recognition of to establish their domination over the world. But the fact that there is no escape from the colonial why did Europeans succeed in areas where Mus- European experience and the only solution is to lims failed? Karakoç argues that Muslims benefit- face the challenge of the West by resisting its attrac- ted from the same heritage but did not need to tiveness without being changed. The only point of

65. Karakoç, Dirilişin Çevresinde, 130 – 32. 67. Karakoç, Fizikötesi Açısından Ufuklar ve 70. See Karakoç, Yapı Taşları ve Kaderimizin Daha Ötesi I, 119 – 20. Çağrısı I, 41 – 45, and Karakoç, Çıkış Yolu I: Ülke- 66. See Karakoç, Çağ ve İlham I, 83; Karakoç, mizin Geleceği, 10, 49. İnsanlığın Dirilişi, 21; Karakoç, Sütun, 393; Kara- 68. See Karakoç, Günlük Yazılar III: Sur, 144. koç, Günlük Yazılar III: Sur, 30; and Karakoç, 71. Karakoç, Şiirler IV: Zamana Adanmış Sözler, 69. See Karakoç, Çağ ve İlham III, 8. Fizikötesi Açısından Ufuklar ve Daha Ötesi I, 19. 109 – 10. 322 Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East • 35:2 • 2015

convergence between the West and Islam, for him, ences, humanities, history, and contemporary is the idea of Mediterranean civilization. The Medi- identity discourses. Similar historical reflections terranean is a place where major civilizations meet are gradually influencing the new cosmopolitan and have a dialogue. Yet, he believes that, unfortu- generations in Turkey and other Muslim societies nately, Europe has rejected this Mediterranean op- as well. There are fresh attempts to rewrite world tion. Thus, in Karakoç’s view, the attempt of saving history as connected and entangled narratives. humanity and civilization could be realized only by This new historical narrative is especially impor- Muslims, not by the arrogant Europeans, around tant for the pro – European Union public opinion the idea of Mediterranean civilization.72 in Turkey, which has to overcome the civilizational narratives of Islam versus the West. However, the A Critique of the Islamist Discourse on Civilization legacy of centuries-­long essentialist thinking, as Sezai Karakoç’s essentialism of the West or his seen in the writings of Toynbee and Karakoç, also discourse on a pure Islamic civilization does not coexist, often in tension with the actual lived ex- represent a continuity from late Ottoman era Pan-­ periences of Turkish and European societies and Islamism. Instead, it represents a search for an in contradiction of scholarly historical analysis. An alternative beyond the Kemalist monocultural na- intellectual project of civilizationist essentialism, tionalism and Eurocentric modernity during the produced first to justify Eurocentric colonial order Cold War – era westernization of Turkey. and then to challenge it, did not fade away and be Karakoç’s Islamist civilizationism shows replaced by a view of national or global narratives the complicity of Muslim intellectuals in the per- of world cultures. On the contrary, it got further re- sistence and survival of Islam-­West essentialism ified and revived during the Cold War era, and by through the periods of decolonization and the new means such as Toynbee’s world history frame- Cold War. Islamist internationalism was so depen- work and Islamists writers such as Karakoç. The dent on the late nineteenth-­century civilizationist post – September 11 era revival of the clash of civi- narrative of Islam versus the West that even after lization theories and Islamophobia, as well as the a century of international transformation that sig- new Pan-­Islamic identity of Muslim intellectuals in naled the end of empires and rise of a nation-­state the “alliance of civilizations” project, still relies on world order, Islamism continued to rely on older the conceptual heritage left by Cold War thinkers frameworks of Islam and the West, giving new en- such as Toynbee and Karakoç. It is time to reflect ergy and life to its political appeal. Karakoç does on and overcome this essentialist discourse. not find nationalism and the nation-­state forma- tion sufficient for getting Muslim societies out of References their colonial “humiliation.” He asks for both de­ Aydin, Cemil. “Beyond Civilization: Pan-­Islamism, Pan-­ westernizatinon and civilizational revival to com- Asianism, and the Revolt against the West.” Journal plete this decolonization process. of Modern European History 4, no. 2 (2006): 204 – 23. Like the civilizational discourse of Orien- ——— . The Politics of Anti-­Westernism in Asia: Visions of talism and Eurocentric narratives of supremacy, World Order in Pan-­Islamic and Pan-­Asian Thought, 1882 – 1945. New York: Columbia University Press, Islamist discourse rests on the basic conviction 2007. that Islamic civilization is ontologically and epis- temologically different from the West. It is clear Connelly, Matthew. A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post – Cold War that Islamist writers, in their understanding of the Era. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. West, have been caught by the same essentialist Doğan, Mehmet. Batılılaşma İhaneti (The Betrayal Called logic present in the Orientalist tradition. Recently, Westernization). İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1975. there have been important scholarly attempts to overcome the almost two-­centuries-­long domina- Duara, Prasenjit. “The Discourse of Civilization and Pan-­ Asianism.” Journal of World History 12, no. 1 (2001): tion of civilizational discourses in the social sci- 99 – 130.

72. See Karakoç, Günlük Yazılar III: Sur, 146 – 47. Cemil Aydin and Burhanettin Duran • Civilizationism in the Writings of Sezai Karakoç 323

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