Marc Ferguson University of Massachusetts, United States

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Marc Ferguson University of Massachusetts, United States HAOL, Núm. 5 (Otoño, 2004), 127-139 ISSN 1696-2060 WHY THE WEST? Marc Ferguson University of Massachusetts, United States. E-mail: [email protected] Recibido: 11 Julio 2004 / Revisado: 13 Agosto 2004 / Aceptado: 10 Septiembre 2004 / Publicado: 15 Octubre 2004 Resumen: The question of how 'the West' came f one wanted to tell the story of Europe to dominate the globe during the modern era has coming to dominate the globe during the been debated recently among historians. The Inineteenth and into the twentieth centuries debate has been polarized between those who as the parable of the big bad wolf and the three view 'modernity' as the result of a 'European little pigs, the passage quoted above from David miracle', the culturally unique and internally Landes's The Wealth and Poverty of Nations1 generated project of the West, and those who would seem to do nicely. However, in Landes's question this 'European miracle' paradigm as version of the Rise of the West, the Europeans Eurocentric, and look to other factors to are not the "bad guys," they are the heroes of the understand and explain Western economic and story. But whether they were villains or political world dominance. The traditional messengers of historical necessity, the question narrative, represented by David Landes in his of how Europeans acquired this dominance is recent The Wealth and Poverty of Nations, one of the most hotly contested problems today attributes European success to its unique cultural among historians concerned with world history. values, social institutions, and political In recent years the discussion has intensified as practices. This success was entirely 'internally non-Europeanists, particularly Asianists, have driven' by these characteristics. Recently, a entered the fray over this question and are number of historians have questioned this challenging many of the long-accepted 'European miracle' paradigm as Eurocentric, and explanations for European domination. look to other factors to understand and explain Western economic and political world I think at the heart of this debate is a quarrel dominance. After surveying the recent work of over the very nature of history and historical historians addressing this problem, this paper explanation. Does history run in a single argues for placing European expansion within a direction, to a definite destination, if only one global context, and understanding the Industrial takes the right path? Is it structured and driven Revolution as a global transformation. This by large forces, perhaps economic, perhaps perspective allows us to understand European geographic? Or, is it contingent on innumerable technological and economic changes within the factors with many possible directions and larger context of patterns of worldwide solutions to the dilemmas that are faced by economic and cultural interaction. societies? Scholars examining the problem of Palabras Clave: Eurocentric, European miracle, European global dominance have taken all of globe, Western, Western economic. these approaches in recent years, and not ______________________ surprisingly come to very different conclusions. "So the years passed, and the decades, and the The disagreements are not only over the reasons centuries. Europe left China far behind. At first for European dominance but also the timing, unbelieving and contemptuous, China grew anxious with vastly different interpretations of Europe's and frustrated. From asking and begging, the role in the world during the early modern period, Westerners became insistent and impatient. The British saw two embassies dismissed with contempt. 1500-1800 AD. The disputants in the current The third time, in 1839, they came in with gunboats debate have staked out clear positions, and the and blew the door down" rhetoric duplicates the academic culture wars (David Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations) over Western Civilization that for the past decade have occupied those concerned with how history is taught. Pursuing this large question © Historia Actual Online 2004 127 Why the West? Marc Ferguson requires shaking up a hornet's nest of difficult firepower: "Europe could now plant itself historical problems. This paper will examine the anywhere on the surface of the globe within recent debate over "the rise of the west," and reach of naval cannon"8. Pedro Alvares Cabral, will primarily focus on several recent works on commanding this fleet of thirteen ships, was sent this topic. The debate has been polarized by the Portuguese just to do a little business, it between those who view "modernity" as the seems. As Landes explains, "they sent him to result of a "European miracle"2, the culturally make money and told him not to look for unique and internally generated project of the trouble; but if a hostile vessel should try to do West, and those who question this "European him harm, he was not to let it come near, but miracle" paradigm as Eurocentric, and look to rather to stand off and blow it out of the water"9. other factors to understand and explain Western It is significant to Landes that shortly after this, economic and political world dominance. David European ships were regularly calling on ports Landes has written a recent book vigorously throughout the world, while no Asian ships stating the argument for European economic and appeared in Europe. China had abruptly stopped political dominance resulting from internal its voyages under Zheng He in the early 15th development, and attributing the motive force century, an example of its essentially static and for this development to culture. On the other inward-looking culture. hand, Andre Gunder Frank sees European economic ascendancy as a recent and temporary So Europeans had seized the world initiative, phenomenon, and attempts to place it in the and it was their unique cultural values that context of a longstanding world-economic allowed for them to do this. This European system3. R. Bin Wong4 and Kenneth Pomeranz5 exceptionalism goes back for Landes to classical use comparative strategies to account for the times, as "Europe had always thought of itself as energy transformation of the industrial different from the societies to the east"10. The revolution, which they see as crucial to Western difference, of course, was the distinction economic advantages. Jack Goldstone argues for between the "free city" of the West and the the importance of certain political, cultural, and despotisms of the East. Linked with Western scientific changes which occurred specifically in democracy was the notion of private property. England after 1688 in leading to the Landes finds that the Western conception of technological breakthroughs of the industrial property rights goes back to biblical times. revolution a century later6. I will look at the Judaic and Christian values play an important arguments of these historians, offer some role, particularly later during the early modern critique of their strengths and weaknesses, and period, in his argument for European finally suggest some directions for exceptionalism. More than this, however, "the conceptualizing the analysis and further very notion of economic development was a research. Western Invention"11. We are not surprised when Landes later explicitly invokes the David Landes attributes European success to its Weberian thesis of the relationship between unique cultural values, social institutions, and Protestant ethics and capitalism. He asserts that political practices. This success was entirely "the heart of the matter lay indeed in the making "internally driven" by these characteristics. of a new kind of man –rational, ordered, Europe was indeed "exceptional," and "took diligent, productive"12. Ah yes, the relationship another path," from the rest of the world's between values and economic success! Let's not societies. He argues that "for the last thousand forget those other European characteristic years, Europe (the West) has been the prime mentioned by Landes at various points: honesty mover of development and modernity"7. It took and thrift, as well as greed and passion. These 500 years of preparation to assume world factors in his argument cannot be stressed too dominance, but when Europeans appeared in the much, since he declares, "if we learn anything Indian Ocean around 1500 they already had the from the history of economic development, it is advantages necessary to dominate the world. that culture makes all the difference"13. This shift to European world supremacy is marked for Landes by the Portuguese fleet sent The dynamic nature of European technology is a out in 1500 to follow up on Vasco Da Gama's product of the Middle Ages, which Landes calls circumvention of Africa and entrance into the "one of the most inventive societies that history Indian Ocean in 1498. The Portuguese were had known"14. Not only did Europeans create superior to anyone they would find there, and the notion of economic development, they are they knew it. What made this so? In a word, also responsible for "the invention of invention," 128 © Historia Actual Online 2004 Marc Ferguson Why the West? the title of one of Landes's chapters. The quality Narrative of this approach, typified by such of European technology is of course for Landes thinkers as Karl Marx and Max Weber, was to a result of European culture's openness to see modernity as the great teleological project of innovation and change. He cites several the West. The practice of world history, using examples of European invention, or adoption the approaches of these European social and novel use of other's technology. These sciences, takes the history of Europe as the norm examples include the water wheel, eyeglasses, when examining the history of other parts of the gunpowder, and printing. He also writes of the globe. Therefore, revisionists start by superiority of European shipbuilding, and their questioning the fundamental assumptions of use of technology that allowed them to navigate historians who situate the origins of modernity the oceans.
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