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CAIMUN 2021

United Nations Security Council

Background Guide B CANADA INTERNATIONAL MODEL Tenth Annual Session | May 28-30, 2021

Dear Delegates,

Othman Mekhlouf My name is Emily Ni, and it is my utmost pleasure to welcome you Secretary-General to the United Nations Security Council at Canada International Model United Nations 2021.

Five years ago, I stumbled into the esoteric world of Model UN with the Angel Yuan intent of seeking academic enrichment. Twenty conferences later, at the Director-General end of this long journey, I can confdently say that the impact that Model UN has had on my life extends far beyond any intellectual beneft. Now, Nikki Wu I can only hope to instill the same passion in you, the delegate, as my Chief of directors did for me. Cherish the memories you make as a delegate, and learn today so that you may lead tomorrow.

Alongside me, Betty Pan will be serving as your Chair. Betty is a senior Matthew Leung Director of Logistics at West Point Grey Academy and is equally as excited to witness a weekend of riveting debate. Together, we look forward to welcoming you virtually come May! Madeline Kim USG of General Assemblies CAIMUN prides itself on its high level of educational discourse and professionalism. In the United Nations Security Council, delegates should come prepared with a comprehensive understanding of their Mikael Borres committee’s mandate, the topic at hand, and their country’s foreign USG of Specialized Agencies policy. These topics require thorough research and knowledge to allow for constructive debate; your work as a delegate will not only beneft Alec Yang yourself, but the committee as a whole. USG of Delegate Affairs The entire dais team welcomes you to the United Nations Security Council at CAIMUN 2021. Please do not hesitate to contact any of us at Caitlin Adams [email protected] if you have any questions or concerns; I look forward USG of Delegate Affairs to a weekend of rewarding debate.

Godspeed, Emily Hu USG of Media Emily Ni Director of the United Nations Security Council — CAIMUN 2021 Table of Contents

Committee Description ...... 2

Topic Overview ...... 3

Timeline of Events ...... 4

Historical Analysis ...... 6

Current Situation ...... 8

Past Involvement ...... 10

Potential Solutions ...... 12

Bloc Positions ...... 13

Discussion Questions ...... 15

Further Resources ...... 15

Bibliography ...... 16

Canada International Model United Nations 1 Committee Description

Following the two World Wars, delegates from over forty-six countries met in San Francisco in 1945 to prevent such tragedies from reoccurring. In the international system of their creation, “the maintenance of international peace and security” is entrusted to a body known as the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).1

As an organization belonging to the United Nations (UN), the UNSC consists of fifteen members. The United States (US), (UK), , Russia, and are the five designated permanent members given their status as victors of the Second World War2 and are commonly referred to as the P5. All substantive matters of the UNSC require consensus among the five permanent members, should one strongly disagree with the draft at hand, they can single-handedly defer it. This ability is known as the veto power. The other ten members of the Council are temporary and elected to two-year terms on a regional basis. The current temporary members of the UNSC are , the Dominican , Equatorial Guinea, Germany, Indonesia, the Ivory Coast, , Peru, Poland, South Africa.

Whereas the General Assembly and other international organizations create non-binding resolutions, the Security Council is unique in that all Member States of the UN are obligated to comply with its decisions.3 This power is monumental and unprecedented, yet has rarely been exercised to its full extent. For better or worse, the veto power held the Council in paralysis during the ,4 as the Communist bloc of the and China actively opposed almost all resolutions sought by the of the US, UK, and France. This level of dysfunction has dialled down since the end of the Cold War in 1991, and many regard the Council to be on an upward slope towards restoring its legitimacy.5 However, the Council’s inaction towards crises such as the Rwandan Genocide of 1994 and the Darfur Genocide of 2003 continues to draw significant criticism.

The Security Council is a central figure in international relations today. Beyond dealing with day- to-day issues regarding international affairs, it also responds to the crisis on an hourly basis as an authoritative voice. The Council handles many of the world’s most sophisticated issues, and its success is not only expected but also crucial to the stability of the international community.

1 Hurd 2008, p. 83. 2 Kennedy 2006. 3 Lagon, Arend 2014, p. 27 4 Manusama 2006, p. 20 5 Ibid.

Canada International Model United Nations 2 War in Topic Overview

Ever since the unification of Yemen in 1990, divisions within society have constantly impeded the harmony that was once envisioned. In the most recent crisis, which escalated into a civil war at the beginning of 2015, the Houthi insurgency successfully obtained control of a large portion of Yemeni territory along with the support of a significant portion of the Yemeni population.6

Many causes have been identified to explain the ongoing conflict, one of which is the denomination division within Islam. The Hadi government forces belong to the Sunni sect, and the Houthi insurgents the Shia sect.7 This sectarian division drew foreign involvement as the Sunni-majority and the Shia-majority were looking to expand their influence on the .8

To the international community, the war in Yemen was overshadowed by the and seen merely as another conflict in the Middle East for most of its duration. Around mid-2018, however, government and non-governmental groups began to heavily report the extent of the escalating humanitarian catastrophe.9 Yemen soon gained new attention from the international community, which has given the UN new opportunities to act on the crisis.

The Security Council has a duty to act against the war in Yemen as political and humanitarian relief are in demand. A solution, however difficult, must be reached. If the Council fails to produce effective resolutions, the conflict will further intensify and leave a permanent mark on the Council’s reputation.

6 https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen 7 https://www.cfr.org/sunni-shia-divide/ 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid.

Canada International Model United Nations 3 Timeline of Events

September 10, 2004 - Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, founder of the , is assassinated as part of a government crackdown towards the Houthi people. Followers of al-Houthi consolidate their militias and begin resistance against the government.10

February 2, 2011 - President promises to step down after 21 years in power. This transfer of power occurred as a result of the , which was a part of the Arab Spring protests that sprung all across the Middle East in the early 2010s.11

February 21, 2012 - The Houthis boycott the rigged election in favour of former Vice President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi, whose government continued to oppress opposition forces and violate human rights. Although several deals granted Houthi forces autonomy and political representation, many Houthi leaders remain discontent with the Hadi government.12

January 24, 2015 - Houthi fighters seize the presidential compound in Sana'a, placing Hadi under house arrest and forcing him to resign. It also dissolved the parliament and created the Revolutionary Committee to maintain order.13

February 21, 2015 - Hadi escapes from confinement to his hometown of , where he makes an address to the nation. In the speech, he reminds of his political legitimacy and denounces the Houthis. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon also began attending to the situation, subsequently calling for Hadi’s restoration.14

March 19, 2015 - Forces loyal to Hadi clash with opposition forces at the Aden Airport. Opposition forces are defeated, and the conflict soon spreads across all of Yemen. Within a week, Houthi fighters backed by forces loyal to former president Saleh capture , the third-largest city.15

March 20, 2015 - The Islamic State carries out its first attack in Yemen, killing 142 and wounding hundreds more at two mosques in the capital city of Sana’a during midday prayers. Both mosques were affiliated with the Houthis.16

10 AP. 2018. “Timeline of Yemen’s war as coalition attacks Hodeida”. June 13, 2018. 11 Ibid. 12 BBC. 2018. “Yemen profile - Timeline”. November 5, 2018. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 McDowall, Angus. “Timeline: Yemen's slide into political crisis and war”. . June 17, 2018.

Canada International Model United Nations 4

March 23, 2015 - begins. Opposition forces seize control of most of Aden, forcing Hadi to flee to Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia-led coalition with support from the United States begins air assault on Houthi forces and imposes a naval blockade. 17

October 8, 2016 - Airstrikes by the Saudi Arabia-led coalition on a funeral in the city of Sana’a kill 155 people and wounded hundreds. The attack is condemned by Secretary-General Ban Ki- Moon and numerous states and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).18

June-November 2017 - Cholera outbreak affects approximately 900,000 while claiming the life of at least 2,100. The World Health Organization (WHO) and others attribute partial responsibility to government forces, Houthi forces, and the Saudi Arabian government for denying access to health and sanitation services.19

June 7, 2018 - The International Committee of the Red Cross pulls 71 staffers out of Yemen following incidents and threats against aid workers. Similar issues have been experienced by foreign aid personnel from a variety of organizations.20

June 12, 2018 - Saudi forces hit Doctors Without Borders building despite health care markings on the roof and previous knowledge of its coordinates. The building was significantly damaged, however, no casualties resulted from the attack.21

August 9, 2018 - Saudi-led airstrikes kill 40 school children and 11 teachers on a school bus. The bomb used in the attack was purchased from the US who has been an active partner in the Saudi- led coalition.22

17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 20 Security Council Report. 2018. “Chronology of Events - Yemen”. December 6, 2018. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid.

Canada International Model United Nations 5 Historical Analysis

The conflict between the Yemeni government and Houthi forces has historical roots that can be traced far beyond the 21st century. At the most fundamental level, the Yemeni government belongs to the Sunni denomination of Islam, while Houthis follow the Shia sect.23 This division corresponds to the Sunni government in Saudi Arabia and the Shia government in Iran; both are heavily involved in the war in Yemen.

Both the Sunni and the Shia sect follow the teachings of the Qur’an, a collection of dialogue with God revealed by Prophet Muhammed, the final messenger from God in Islam.24 After Prophet Muhammad's death in A.D. 632, most followers endorsed his close companion Abu Bakr to serve as the next caliph, while a minority opted for Ali, Muhammad’s son-in-law and cousin. These followers became known as Sunni Muslims.25

The Shia rather, maintain that the prophet appointed his first cousin and son-in-law, Ali, as Muhammad's rightful successor to political and religious authority. From this early differentiation, further divisions and conflicts continued to arise surrounding the question of rightful leadership. After a period of time, the Shia themselves also became subdivided on this core question of rightful leadership. Abu Bakr eventually became the first caliph and Ali became the fourth.26 Although several battles and conflicts occurred, civilian members of the two groups lived together in harmony for the most part.

Disputes over governance and authority led to many conflicts, one of the most noted being Karbala.27 Fifty years after the assassination of Ali, Muawiyah I, the first caliph (religious and civil ruler) of the Umayyad caliphate passed away leaving his son Yazid as caliph. Yazid begins the battle of Karbala, leading the massacre of Ali’s family in which Ali’s son Husayn was said to have been stabbed 33 times.28 This event is still “commemorated by Shia Muslims during the ten- day mourning period known as Ashura.”29 The events that transcribed at Karbala were “arguably the theological beginning of unique Shia tradition and practice.” This is the same type of that can be seen today in but also in locations such as Iran and Saudi Arabia.

23 https://www.cfr.org/sunni-shia-divide/ 24 https://theconversation.com/what-is-the-shia-sunni-divide-78216 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 https://www.britannica.com/event/Battle-of-Karbala 28 Ibid. 29https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east- 16047713#:~:text=For%20Shia%20Muslims%2C%20Ashura%20is,plays%20re%2Denacting%20the%20martyrdo m.

Canada International Model United Nations 6 Throughout the middle ages and the modern era, diffused rapidly and gained a significant international fellowship. Since Islam’s two holiest sites, the Medina and the Mecca, are located in Saudi Arabia, the country is commonly seen as the leader of the Sunni Islam world.30 On the other end, became primarily based in Iran, with major populations in and Bahrain31. Many scholars today view the general situation in the Middle East as a Cold War between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Like the Cold War between the former Soviet Union and the United States of America, Saudi Arabia and Iran do not engage in direct confrontation. Instead, they sponsor regional proxies aligned with their ideologies with political, financial, and military support.

An example of a proxy conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia was the Iran- 1980-1988, in which Saudi Arabia provided substantial financial and military support to Iraq.32 The United States, the Soviet Union, France, and many Arab states also intervened either directly or indirectly in favour of Iraq.33 The ongoing Syrian Civil War is also partially a proxy conflict between the two. While the Assad government receives crucial backing from Iran, multiple opposition groups are connected to Saudi Arabia.34

In the Yemen context, the Houthi movement has long been accused of being proxies of the Iranian government, primarily because they both follow the Shia denomination.35 While the US government and Saudi Arabian government have alleged that the Houthis receive weapons and training from the Iranian government, no concrete evidence has been yet presented.36 Both the Houthis and the Iranian government deny the connection. Conversely, the Houthi movement has accused the Saudi-US-led coalition of supporting war crimes. Indeed, numerous governments and NGOs have reported attacks against civilians by Saudi forces, often with equipment purchased from the US. In 2018, the US itself reevaluated its involvement in Yemen, with many officials hinting towards the end of weapons and logistics supply.37

The two above perspectives outline the historical dilemma faced by the Security Council. While President Hadi has the most legitimate claim to govern Yemen, forces fighting for his restoration have forced nothing short of carnage upon the Yemen population.

30 https://www.britannica.com/place/Saudi-Arabia/Religion 31 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-16047709 32 https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/world/middleeast/iran-saudi-proxy-war.html 33 Ibid. 34 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-42008809 35 https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/yemen-crisis 36 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29319423 37 Weisbrot, Mark. 2018 “Congress is finally pushing the US to withdraw from Yemen. It's about time”. November 30, 2018

Canada International Model United Nations 7 Current Situation

Since mid-2018, the UN and other organizations have alerted the international community by releasing reports of the escalating humanitarian crisis in Yemen. Since then, many UN member states have started to reconsider their role in the conflict, thus increasing the possibility of Security Council action.

Through a quantitative lens, the Yemen economy has worsened dramatically over the past few years. The UN estimates that the poverty rate grew from 49% in 2017 to 79% currently, and the GDP per capita has cut by more than half.38 18 million people, which makes up 60% of the population, are experiencing food insecurity and in need of nutritional assistance either immediately or in the near future.39 Furthermore, 25% of all children are out of school.40

The qualitative characteristics are also dreadful. The initial crisis of power struggles among various factions and disparate groups in Yemen has escalated into a full-blown civil war. Zaidi Shia minorities, a branch of the Shia Imamya of Iran that is more commonly referred to as Houthi rebel forces, control vast territories in the North.41 In light of transnational terrorist groups such as Al- Qaeda taking control over coastal regions, the UN officially declares the circumstances in Yemen to be comparable to that of Iraq.42 Furthermore, Saudi-brokered blockades in response to arms shipments from Iran intensify the widespread food shortage and humanitarian crisis across the country. Amnesty International has stated that over 17 million civilians face extreme hunger on a quotidian basis, of which, 3.3 million are pregnant women and children suffering from malnutrition.43 Civilians all over the country live in fear of air assaults, have no means to protect themselves from sub-state militias, while law enforcement virtually does not exist.44 Medical institutions are also inaccessible in most parts of Yemen, allowing the sanitation crisis and various diseases to freely diffuse.45

Governments and NGOs have experienced a variety of challenges in their attempts to provide humanitarian aid. Both the Hadi and the opposition forces have actively attempted to block aid

38 https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/overview 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid. 41 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29319423 42 Ibid. 43https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/12/yemen-war-and-exclusion-leave-millions-of-people-with- disabilities-in-the-lurch/ 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid.

Canada International Model United Nations 8 from entering into regions held by the other.46 Lootings and bomb threats occur frequently, while hospitals and medical locations are also occasionally treated as military targets.47 Doctors Without Borders is a frequent victim of such interference. In January 2016 alone, three attacks were carried out against their facilities.48 As ambulances and temporary camps are also frequently harassed, numerous volunteer staff from the organization have died or been injured due to these attacks. Similarly, the International Committee of the Red Cross was forced to dismiss all of its foreign staffers in Yemen due to overwhelming security threats.

The Saudi-led coalition has also been accused of committing war crimes with compelling evidence. Primarily, Saudi Arabia has a notorious strategy of designating civilian constructions as military targets. In 2015 for example, a coalition spokesperson declared the entire city of Sa’dah as a military target.49 The city consisted of at least 50,000 civilians, and the Human Rights Watch found out days later that at least 34 children were killed in Sa’dah.50

The Human Right Watch has also accused the Saudi-led coalition of using cluster munitions supplied by the US and the UK51. Cluster bombs are illegal under international law due to the uncontrollable risks posed to civilians. Although all parties initially denied the allegations, Saudi officials acknowledged the presence of cluster bombs after Amnesty International provided and published the physical evidence.52 Several NGO reports have also traced the origins of the cluster munition to the US and the UK.

At the root of all the problems, however, there’s no foreseeable end to the ongoing violence. Neither the Hadi government nor the opposition forces have enough military advantage to overpower the other, while foreign powers are in complete disagreement over which side to stand behind. This stalemate is financially costly, and can further entrench social divisions into the already fractured Yemeni society.

46 https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/09/yemen-the-forgotten-war/ 47 Ibid. 48https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/11/world/middleeast/hospital-aided-by-doctors-without-borders-is-bombed-in- yemen.html 49https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/06/30/targeting-saada/unlawful-coalition-airstrikes--city- yemen#:~:text=On%20May%208%2C%202015%2C%20coalition,Marran%20to%20be%20military%20targets. 50 Ibid. 51 https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/yemen 52 https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/12/saudi-arabia-immediately-abandon-all-use-of-cluster-munitions/

Canada International Model United Nations 9 Past Involvement

The United Nations has actively followed the situation in Yemen since the beginning; however, the pressing circumstances in the Syrian Civil War often overshadowed the Yemen crisis.

Immediately following initial reports of violence in February 2015, the Security Council met and passed Resolution 2201, which “strongly deplored” Houthi actions to undermine democratic institutions.53 Two months later, Resolution 2216 demanded the Houthis give up arms and established an arms embargo on the Houthis and forces loyal to former President Saleh.54 In terms of finances, Resolution 2140 back in February 2014 established sanctions against individuals and groups who are threats to peace, security, and stability.55 The sanctions have since been extended three times, with the newest expired in February 2019.

On December 12, 2018, a UN-sponsored ceasefire agreement was signed at Hodeidah.56 All parties of the conflict agreed to not engage in fighting at the port cities of Hodeidah, Salif, and Ras Issa, and to accept increased UN presence of neutral forces and humanitarian aid personnel.57 Although the Hodeidah ceasefire is allowing more international humanitarian intervention, violence remains to be widespread across the rest of Yemen.

The United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Committee of the Red Cross, and other international institutions have also been involved in varying degrees to resolve civilian issues. While they’ve each brought in financial, humanitarian and material resources, their efforts are significantly insufficient. Hunger, lack of sanitation, homelessness, and extreme poverty are among issues crippling Yemeni society.

Non-UN involvement has been more substantial and frequent. The coalition led by Saudi Arabia includes the , , Kuwait, (until 2017), , , , Senegal, and .58 Furthermore, countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Spain, France, Germany (until 2018), Malaysia, Brazil, Finland, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Eritrea have also provided either logistical support or engaged in arms sales with the Hadi government and the Saudi-led coalition. 59

53 https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11781.doc.htm 54 https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11859.doc.htm 55 https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11296.doc.htm 56 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/13/yemen-ceasefire-agreed-for-vital-port-city-of-hodeidah 57 https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/sc13809.doc.htm 58 https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/yemen-crisis 59 Ibid.

Canada International Model United Nations 10

The Saudi-led coalition first became involved when President Hadi was deposed from power. The action was legally justified by the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) vote to intervene against the Houthis in response to Hadi’s request.60 Initial intervention was primarily based on logistics and equipment support, and eventually evolved to include air assaults and ground troops. According to Al Arabiya, a Saudi news outlet, Saudi Arabia alone contributed at least 150,000 soldiers and 100 warplanes.61

The level of involvement from the other members of the Saudi-led coalition is unclear. Several US reports in 2017 concluded that the coalition forces are not under the command of Hadi’s government, implying that the Saudi government could be the one in control.62 If this is true, foreign involvement in Yemen constitutes a clear violation of international law, as it is de facto assisting Saudi Arabia to undermine Yemeni sovereignty.

Another dimension of the war has been Al Qaeda and the Islamic State’s role in the war. Al Qaeda is a Sunni extremist terrorist group and the Islamic State is a Sunni fundamentalist terrorist group.63 While neither groups are in direct cooperation with the Hadi government, they actively conduct acts of terrorism against members of the Houthi insurgency. Examples of this include extortion, torture, and mass murder.

The argument that supporting the Hadi government is effectively working with Al Qaeda and the Islamic States has been a substantial obstacle to providing the Hadi government with military support. Many activists and political leaders across liberal democracies have in fact indicated their preference in favour of the Houthi movement due to their fight against terrorism.

60https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-and-comparative-law-quarterly/article/weathering-the- storm-legality-and-legal-implications-of-the-saudiled-military-intervention-in- yemen/8A63C1293723EC59BD0FDA8BD709B25E 61https://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/03/26/Saudi-deploys-100-fighter-jets-150-000-soldiers- for-anti-Houthi-campaign 62 https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/yemen-crisis 63 https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/exploiting-disorder-al-qaeda-and-islamic-state

Canada International Model United Nations 11 Potential Solutions

Military and Humanitarian Intervention

Under international law, most scholars view Hadi’s forces as the legitimate governing body. However, as concrete evidence of war crimes pile up, some have called for UN intervention on behalf of the Houthis, citing a doctrine known as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).64

The R2P was endorsed by all member states of the UN in 2005 and essentially declared that a state must protect the safety and welfare of all its citizens to maintain respect for its sovereignty.65 In other words, it gave way for the UN to prioritize providing international intervention over the sovereignty of a government that is intentionally not effectively utilizing all available resources to protect its population. It is undeniable that the Yemeni government under Hadi has failed the R2P; however, military intervention against the will of a legitimate government should always be regarded as a last resort.

On the other end, humanitarian intervention through the R2P seems more feasible and efficient. The Security Council possesses the authority and power to forcibly transport humanitarian aid to Yemen civilians without engaging in acts of war against either side. Food, clean water, sanitation tools, and medical supplies are potential objects that could be transported. Such a program would cost an enormous amount of money, however, it would also reduce the political backlash and set a precedent for future humanitarian situations that call for intervention.

Political Reforms

In terms of the conflict itself, most members of the Security Council are reluctant to divide Yemen into multiple states; yet, they are reluctant to restore the Hadi government or empower the Houthi rebels. As much as the Hadi government is historically legitimate, its three-year tenure from 2012 to 2015 was full of corruption, oppression, and human rights violations. The Houthis on the other hand have less political experience, and although the evidence is somewhat less convincing, they have also been accused of human rights violations in their use of child soldiers and human shielding.

Some scholars have brought up the possibility of consociationalism, a power-sharing political system designed to appease polarization. As opposed to majoritarian political systems, consociational systems place a heavier emphasis on protecting the interest of minority groups than benefiting the majority group. In the Yemeni context, this system would bring a less efficient

64 https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.shtml 65 https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.shtml

Canada International Model United Nations 12 government that would, however, antagonize fewer political groups. If military solutions are not viable, many view consociationalism as the only long-term solution for Yemen.

The other way out is the two-state settlement, which is to end the conflict by granting the Houthis their independent sovereign state within Yemen. The two-state settlement was famously used to end the Sudan Civil War, in which South Sudan, the international community’s newest member, was established at the end. Those aligned with President Hadi are opposed to granting sovereignty to the Houthis and wish to expand their slight military advantage into a political victory.

Economic Solutions

UN experts on Yemen have also called on the Security Council to mandate economic amenities to mitigate the devastation in Yemen. The current Yemeni economy is largely dysfunctional, most simply evident in the constant decrease of domestic production since 2015.66 For example, at the root of most economic problems is violence against businesses and entities, which is a barrier to trade. Some have proposed that the UNSC should enforce measures to open ports and trading routes in order to remove the barriers and allow the private sector to engage in economic activities. These measures, however, would either need consent from Yemeni parties or require military assistance to be well enforced.

Bloc Positions

Pro-Saudi Nations

Members of this bloc are in favour of restoring the Hadi government and support the Saudi-led coalition. The UK, France, Germany, Kuwait, and Indonesia belong to this group. The UK, France, and Germany’s primary interest is regional stability, which they argue would be better protected under the Hadi government. The UK in particular has made highly controversial weapon sales to the Saudi government–some of which, according to NGOs such as Amnesty International and the Human Rights Watch, were used against civilians in Yemen. Kuwait and Indonesia on the other end, are aligned with Saudi Arabia mostly because of their common Sunni Muslim identity. At the current moment, members of the Pro-Saudi bloc are reluctant to divide Yemen for the two-state solution. They would prefer Yemen to stay under the control of a stable, Sunni government, even if that means that Hadi may not necessarily be a part of it.

66 https://www.heritage.org/index/country/yemen

Canada International Model United Nations 13 Moderates Countries

For a variety of different reasons, nine members of the Council are in support of neither side of the conflict. The moderates include the USA, China, Belgium, Poland, Ivory Coast, Equatorial Guinea, South Africa, Peru, and the Dominican Republic. The US has a complex relationship with the Yemen Civil War. Since the beginning it has been the most significant supporter of the Saudi- led coalition, contributing financially, politically, and militarily. Since evidence of human rights violations by the Saudi-led coalition surfaced, however, the US conducted multiple investigations into its involvement in the war. In late 2018, the US Senate voted to end military assistance to Saudi Arabia due to the war crimes, however, the Pentagon continued American support regardless, leaving the future of US involvement unclear. China takes little actual interest in the war but looks to obtain financial or political gain by supporting either side. Belgium and Poland are also not clearly aligned; although they sometimes default to vote with their NATO allies in favour of the Saudi-led coalition, they remain concerned about the alleged human rights violations by both sides. Other members of this bloc do not take significant interests in the situation and are thus free to openly explore the question itself and develop a stance based on arguments and offers from the more engaged states.

Houthi Sympathizers

The Russian Federation is the only member of the Council that is aligned with the Houthi opposition forces. Well aware that international law prevents them from publicly voicing support for the Houthis, the Russian government’s role in supporting opposition groups is more political than military. The cause of Russia’s position is their alliance with Iran, whose Shia Islam identity closely aligned with the Houthi movement. While the Russian government is not ideologically concerned about the human rights violations in Yemen, the nation still utilizes them in arguments against Hadi’s government as an example of their failure. Russia is more willing to accept a divided Yemen, and potentially a two-state solution, than pro-Saudi members of the Security Council.

Canada International Model United Nations 14 Discussion Questions

1. What factors led to the outbreak of the Yemen Civil War back in 2015?

2. To what extent is foreign intervention in the war legal? Or justified?

3. What are ways to alleviate the humanitarian catastrophe while peace seems distant?

4. Is the fractured Yemeni society curable? If so, what are ways to cure it?

5. Should the Hadi government be held accountable for its human rights violations and war crimes? Or is it more important to restore the legitimate government of Yemen?

6. What are the long-term consequences for failing to find appropriate solutions for the war in Yemen? Will the reputation of the Security Council be further undermined?

Further Resources

Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention | Jeremy M. Sharp - US Congressional Research Service https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43960.pdf

Yemen’s Humanitarian Catastrophe, In One Chart | Alex Ward - Vox Media https://www.vox.com/2019/1/30/18203857/yemen-war-deaths-injured-chart-intelligence

Yemen conflict: Who controls What | Alia Chughtai, Faisal Edroos https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2016/08/yemen-conflict-controls- 160814132104300.html

Canada International Model United Nations 15 Bibliography

Al Arabiya. 2015. “Saudi deploys 100 fighter jets, 150,000 soldiers for anti-Houthi campaign”. March 26, 2015. http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/03/26/Saudi- deploys-100-fighter-jets-150-000-soldiers-for-anti-Houthi-campaign.html

AP. 2018. “Timeline of Yemen’s war as coalition attacks Hodeida”. June 13, 2018. https://www.apnews.com/d87ead12e88040a8956badd7baef0d6d

BBC. 2018. “Yemen profile - Timeline”. November 5, 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/world- middle-east-14704951

McDowall, Angus. “Timeline: Yemen's slide into political crisis and war”. Reuters World News. June 17, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-timeline/timeline- yemens-slide-into-political-crisis-and-war-idUSKBN1JD0BX

Orkaby, Asher. “The civil war and the failure of the Federation of South Arabia”. Middle Eastern Studies. Vol. 53. No. 1.

Security Council Report. 2018. “Chronology of Events - Yemen”. December 6, 2018. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/chronology/yemen.php

Seitz, Adam. C. 2017. “Houthi Expansionism, Internal War, Geopolitics, and the Yemen Quagmire”. Middle Eastern Studies. Vol. 8 No. 3.

Sharp, Jeremy. M. 2018 “Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention”. Congressional Research Service. August 24, 2018.

Strategic Comments. 2017. “The percolating proxy war in Yemen”. Vol. 23. No. 1.

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