A Non-Intellectualist Account of Epicurean Emotions

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

A Non-Intellectualist Account of Epicurean Emotions A Non-Intellectualist Account of Epicurean Emotions Margaret Róisín Hampson UCL MPhil Stud 1 I, Margaret Róisín Hampson confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis. 2 Abstract This thesis argues against the orthodox, intellectualist interpretation of Epicurean emotions, in favour of what I call an Appearances View. The intellectualist interpretation takes the Epicurean fragments to suggest that emotions are essentially based in beliefs or judgements and that it is sufficient to alter an emotion by altering the relevant belief(s). I argue, however, that this interpretation is not decisive and at best only weakly supported by the texts. Further, I believe that the reading faces conceptual and textual problems that it cannot adequately respond to, and we thus have reason to seek an alternative. To develop an alternative interpretation, I consider Aristotle's discussion of habituation and virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics, for insight into how Epicurus might understand the notion of ‘accustoming’ and what model of emotion must be assumed if we think that emotional dispositions can be altered through a process of habituation. I argue that the Rhetoric and the Ethics strongly suggest an Appearances View of emotion, in which emotion is constituted by a feeling of pleasure or pain, caused by an appearance (phantasia) of its intentional object. On this view, emotion is cognitive and intentional but not intellectual. I then explore how this model might be applied to the Epicurean fragments, drawing on Epicurus’ own account of phantasia to develop an Epicurean Appearances View. I show that both Epicurus’ physics and ethical writings can support this reading, and that the account can deal with those cases presented against the intellectualist account, thus giving us reason to prefer it. Finally, I consider how this account might be applied to the case of our fear of death, and suggest that changing the appearance of death and thus removing our fear requires that we live a good, Epicurean life and in this way achieve ataraxia. 3 Contents List of Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................ 6 Introduction Ataraxia and Emotion .............................................................................. 7 0.1. The Epicurean Telos ......................................................................................................... 7 0.2. Achieving Ataraxia ............................................................................................................. 8 0.3. Some Points on Methodology ........................................................................................ 10 Chapter 1 Against an Intellectualist Interpretation .................................................... 13 1.1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 13 1.2. An Intellectualist Interpretation ..................................................................................... 14 1.2.1. The Intellectualist Interpretation is Not Decisive ........................................................... 16 1.2.2. Infant, Animal and Recalcitrant Emotions ................................................................... 17 1.2.3. Accustoming Ourselves .................................................................................................. 20 1.2.4. Internalising Beliefs ....................................................................................................... 23 1.3. Alternative Therapy? ........................................................................................................ 26 1.3.1. Reconstructing Tsouna’s Argument .............................................................................. 27 1.3.2. An Intellectualist Response .......................................................................................... 29 1.4. Towards a Non-Intellectualist Account ....................................................................... 31 Chapter 2 Aristotle, Habituation and Emotion ........................................................... 33 2.1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 33 2.2. Insight from Aristotle ...................................................................................................... 34 2.2.1. Aristotle on Habituation .............................................................................................. 37 2.2.2. Aristotle on Emotion: the Appearances View ............................................................... 40 2.2.3. Habituation and the Appearances View ....................................................................... 45 2.2.4. Response to Dow ........................................................................................................... 47 2.3. Remembering Aristotle, Anticipating Epicurus ........................................................... 48 Chapter 3 An Epicurean Appearances View ............................................................... 50 3.1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 50 3.2. The Epicurean Appearances View ................................................................................. 52 3.2.1. Phantasia in Epicurus .................................................................................................. 53 3.2.2. The ‘truth’ of phantasia ............................................................................................... 55 3.2.3. Variance in phantasia ................................................................................................. 57 3.3. In Support of the Epicurean Appearances View ......................................................... 59 3.3.1. The Appearances View and Epicurean Ethics ............................................................. 60 3.3.2. Accustoming; Infant, Animal and Recalcitrant Emotions (revisited) ............................. 62 3.4. An Objection and Response ............................................................................................ 65 4 3.4.1. The Role of Epicurus’ Arguments ................................................................................. 66 3.4.2. Therapy for appearances ................................................................................................ 68 Chapter 4 The Fear of Death and the Epicurean Life ................................................. 72 4.1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 72 4.2. The Fear of Death and Problem of Experience ........................................................... 72 4.2.1. The Appearance of Death ............................................................................................ 73 4.2.2. Altering the Appearance of Death. ................................................................................ 76 4.3. Concluding remarks .......................................................................................................... 79 Bibliography ................................................................................................................ 81 i. Ancient Sources ................................................................................................................. 81 ii. Modern Sources ................................................................................................................. 82 5 List of Abbreviations DA Aristotle, De Anima DL Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers DRN Lucretius, De Rerum Natura Ep. Hed. Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus Ep. Men. Epicurus, Letter to Menoceus Ep. Pyth. Epicurus, Letter to Pythocles KD Epicurus, Kyrai Doxai LS AA.Long & D.N Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, Vol.1 M Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians NE Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics Rhet. Aristotle, Rhetoric VS Epicurus, Vatican Sayings 6 Introduction Ataraxia and Emotion 0.1. The Epicurean Telos Like many Hellenistic philosophers, Epicurus saw the practice of Philosophy not as an intellectual exercise, but as an art of living. Ethics, in particular, is characterised not as a search for moral truths, but as “about things worth choosing and avoiding and about ways of life and about the goal of life” (DL X.30); it is a deeply practical exercise, through which the philosopher aims to lead a good or eudaimon life. As Sextus Empiricus recounts: “Philosophy is an activity which by arguments and discussions brings about the happy life” (M 11.169) and Epicurus believed that if the principles formulated in his ethical writings were observed, then his followers could live a divine life on earth.1 What distinguishes the Epicureans from other Hellenistic schools, however, is their conception of the state of happiness towards which we aim. Epicurus equates happiness with pleasure, asserting that: “pleasure is the beginning and end of the blessed life. For we recognise pleasure as the good which is primary and congenital; from it we begin every choice and avoidance, and we come back to it, using the feeling as the yardstick for judging every good thing” (Ep. Men. 128). But in claiming that pleasure is the goal of human
Recommended publications
  • Philosophy Sunday, July 8, 2018 12:01 PM
    Philosophy Sunday, July 8, 2018 12:01 PM Western Pre-Socratics Fanon Heraclitus- Greek 535-475 Bayle Panta rhei Marshall Mcluhan • "Everything flows" Roman Jakobson • "No man ever steps in the same river twice" Saussure • Doctrine of flux Butler Logos Harris • "Reason" or "Argument" • "All entities come to be in accordance with the Logos" Dike eris • "Strife is justice" • Oppositional process of dissolving and generating known as strife "The Obscure" and "The Weeping Philosopher" "The path up and down are one and the same" • Theory about unity of opposites • Bow and lyre Native of Ephesus "Follow the common" "Character is fate" "Lighting steers the universe" Neitzshce said he was "eternally right" for "declaring that Being was an empty illusion" and embracing "becoming" Subject of Heideggar and Eugen Fink's lecture Fire was the origin of everything Influenced the Stoics Protagoras- Greek 490-420 BCE Most influential of the Sophists • Derided by Plato and Socrates for being mere rhetoricians "Man is the measure of all things" • Found many things to be unknowable • What is true for one person is not for another Could "make the worse case better" • Focused on persuasiveness of an argument Names a Socratic dialogue about whether virtue can be taught Pythagoras of Samos- Greek 570-495 BCE Metempsychosis • "Transmigration of souls" • Every soul is immortal and upon death enters a new body Pythagorean Theorem Pythagorean Tuning • System of musical tuning where frequency rations are on intervals based on ration 3:2 • "Pure" perfect fifth • Inspired
    [Show full text]
  • Philosophical Vignettes at Lucretius' De Rerum Natura 2.1-13
    Philosophical Vignettes at Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura 2.1-13 In a forthcoming article, Chris Eckerman offers a new interpretation of DRN 2.7-8, arguing that tenere…templa serena refers to practicing ataraxia. I am in agreement with Eckerman’s suggestion. The purpose of this talk is to consider interpretive ramifications, left unaddressed, deriving from his philological argument. I argue that Lucretius begins his proem by developing vignettes around cornerstone concepts in the Epicurean ethical doctrine. I suggest that Lucretius develops an argumentative tricolon, with two vignettes emphasizing aponia (1-2, 5-6) and one vignette emphasizing ataraxia (7-13). Scholars have already recognized that, in the proem, Lucretius develops the idea that the Epicurean life offers security (asphaleia) (cf. Konstan 2008, 32), but, since we have not recognized, until recently, that the third member of the tricolon references ataraxia, we have not recognized that Lucretius develops a tricolon dedicated specifically to reflection on aponia in the first two limbs and on ataraxia in the third. That is to say, the proem does not focus on security generally but on the security that may be had in aponia and ataraxia specifically. The first two lines provide Lucretius’ first vignette on aponia. Suave, mari magno turbantibus aequora ventis, e terra magnum alterius spectare laborem; Looking upon the great labor of another person from land when winds are upsetting the calm on the great sea is pleasant. The term laborem (2) is programmatic, for, as M. Gale (2013, 33) has shown, Lucretius uses labor and laborare to reference ‘the futile struggles of the non-Epicurean.’ Accordingly, readers, as they become familiar both with Epicurean doctrine and with Lucretius’ language, infer that the man is at sea for commercial reasons, pursuing the affluence that may result therefrom (cf.
    [Show full text]
  • The Problem: the Theory of Ideas in Ancient Atomism and Gilles Deleuze
    Duquesne University Duquesne Scholarship Collection Electronic Theses and Dissertations 2013 The rP oblem: The Theory of Ideas in Ancient Atomism and Gilles Deleuze Ryan J. Johnson Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/etd Recommended Citation Johnson, R. (2013). The rP oblem: The Theory of Ideas in Ancient Atomism and Gilles Deleuze (Doctoral dissertation, Duquesne University). Retrieved from https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/706 This Immediate Access is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE PROBLEM: THE THEORY OF IDEAS IN ANCIENT ATOMISM AND GILLES DELEUZE A Dissertation Submitted to the McAnulty College & Graduate School of Liberal Arts Duquesne University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy By Ryan J. Johnson May 2014 Copyright by Ryan J. Johnson 2014 ii THE PROBLEM: THE THEORY OF IDEAS IN ANCIENT ATOMISM AND GILLES DELEUZE By Ryan J. Johnson Approved December 6, 2013 _______________________________ ______________________________ Daniel Selcer, Ph.D Kelly Arenson, Ph.D Associate Professor of Philosophy Assistant Professor of Philosophy (Committee Chair) (Committee Member) ______________________________ John Protevi, Ph.D Professor of Philosophy (Committee Member) ______________________________ ______________________________ James Swindal, Ph.D. Ronald Polansky, Ph.D. Dean, McAnulty College & Graduate Chair, Department of Philosophy School of Liberal Arts Professor of Philosophy Professor of Philosophy iii ABSTRACT THE PROBLEM: THE THEORY OF IDEAS IN ANCIENT ATOMISM AND GILLES DELEUZE By Ryan J. Johnson May 2014 Dissertation supervised by Dr.
    [Show full text]
  • TREASURES from the VILLA DEI PAPIRI at the J. Paul Getty Museum, Getty Villa, June 26, 2019 – October 27, 2019
    1 EXHIBITION CHECKLIST BURIED BY VESUVIUS: TREASURES FROM THE VILLA DEI PAPIRI At the J. Paul Getty Museum, Getty Villa, June 26, 2019 – October 27, 2019 The Villa dei Papiri was a sumptuous private residence on the Bay of Naples, just outside the Roman town of Herculaneum. Deeply buried by the eruption of Mount Vesuvius in AD 79, it was rediscovered in 1750 when well diggers chanced upon its remains. Eighteenth-century excavators battled poisonous gases and underground collapses to extract elaborate floors, frescoes, and sculptures – the largest collection of statuary ever recovered from a single classical building. They also found more than one thousand carbonized papyrus book rolls, which gave the villa its modern Italian name. Because many of the scrolls contain the writings of the philosopher and poet Philodemus of Gadara, scholars believe that the villa originally belonged to his patron, Lucius Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus, father-in-law to Julius Caesar. The ancient villa fascinated oil magnate J. Paul Gh etty, w o decided to replicate it in Malibu, creating the Getty Villa in the early 1970s. Renewed excavations at Herculaneum in the 1990s and 2000s revealed additional parts of the building and narrowed the date of its initial construction to around 40 BC. This exhibition presents significant artifacts discovered in the 1750s, explores ongoing attempts to open and read the badly damaged papyri, and displays recent finds from the site for the first time. 1. Lucius Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus Pontifex Roman, 15 BC–AD 33 Bronze, H: 43.5 cm From Herculaneum Museo Archeologico Nazionale, Naples, 5601 VEX.2019.1.21 Exhibition catalog number 3 Image: Giorgio Albano Lucius Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus Pontifex (48 BC–AD 32) likely inherited the Villa dei Papiri from his father, and he may have been responsible for part of the building’s decoration and the expansion of its library.
    [Show full text]
  • Hedonism in Abstract Art: Minimalist Digital Abstract Photography Srdjan Jovanović Palacky University
    Hedonism in Abstract Art: Minimalist Digital Abstract Photography Srdjan Jovanović Palacky University Abstract In this piece of writing the writer/artist puts forward the view that art can be understood and taken in as sometimes purely hedonistic. By drawing upon the theories pertaining to hedonism, he applies this view to minimalist digital abstract photography and tries to justify his point of view with the help of three abstract photographs. Science is the one instance of human thought that has got the most explanatory power. Science explains, and that is wherefrom its importance comes. Its explanatory power is not only useful; however, it can also offer great amounts of pleasure for an intelligent being. Yet there are other instances of human effort in which pleasure is the only goal. From the Greek hedonist Democritus to today’s hedonist/atheist philosopher Michel Onfray, we can follow a line of pure pleasure in human thought. Hedonism, as a principle, is a philosophy of enjoyment. It is vastly misunderstood, though. It is a common error to say that hedonism simply means doing only and exclusively that which brings the subject intense pleasure. This line of thought falsely accuses and misinterprets the hedonist of taking joy as the only goal in life, sacrificing everything else to the unique goal of achieving greater states of gratification. This is incorrect on many a level. Rupkatha Journal on Interdisciplinary Studies in Humanities Summer Issue,Volume I, Number 1, 2009 URL of the journal: www.rupkatha.com/issue0109.php URL of the article: www.rupkatha.com/0109hedonisminabstractart.pdf © www.rupkatha.com Rupkatha Journal, Issue 1 2009 The designation ‘hedonism’ comes from the Greek word for ‘pleasure’, ήδονή.
    [Show full text]
  • Universidade Federal Do Rio Grande Do Norte Centro De Ciências Humanas, Letras E Artes Programa De Pós-Graduação Em Filosofia
    UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DO RIO GRANDE DO NORTE CENTRO DE CIÊNCIAS HUMANAS, LETRAS E ARTES PROGRAMA DE PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO EM FILOSOFIA MARCELO HENRIQUE PEREIRA COSTA CORPO, PRAZER E ESTILO: A ÉTICA HEDONISTA DE MICHEL ONFRAY NATAL 2020 MARCELO HENRIQUE PEREIRA COSTA CORPO, PRAZER E ESTILO: A ÉTICA HEDONISTA DE MICHEL ONFRAY Dissertação apresentada ao curso de Pós- graduação em Filosofia, da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte, como requisito parcial à obtenção do título de Mestre em Filosofia. Orientador: Prof. Dr. Markus Figueira da Silva. NATAL 2020 Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte - UFRN Sistema de Bibliotecas - SISBI Catalogação de Publicação na Fonte. UFRN - Biblioteca Setorial do Centro de Ciências Humanas, Letras e Artes – CCHLA Costa, Marcelo Henrique Pereira. Corpo, prazer e estilo: a ética hedonista de Michel Onfray / Marcelo Henrique Pereira Costa. - Natal, 2020. 254f. Dissertação (mestrado) - Centro de Ciências Humanas, Letras e Artes, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte, 2020. Orientador: Prof. Dr. Markus Figueira da Silva. 1. Onfray - Dissertação. 2. Hedonismo - Dissertação. 3. Ética - Dissertação. I. Silva, Markus Figueira da. II. Título. RN/UF/BS-CCHLA CDU 17.036.1 Elaborado por Heverton Thiago Luiz da Silva - CRB-15/710 MARCELO HENRIQUE PEREIRA COSTA CORPO, PRAZER E ESTILO: A ÉTICA HEDONISTA DE MICHEL ONFRAY Dissertação apresentada ao curso de Pós- graduação em Filosofia, da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte, como requisito parcial à obtenção do título de Mestre em Filosofia. Aprovada em: ______/______/______ BANCA EXAMINADORA ______________________________________ Prof. Dr. Markus Figueira da Silva. Orientador Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte ______________________________________ Prof.
    [Show full text]
  • Squaring the Epicurean Circle: Friendship and Happiness in the Garden
    Ancient Philosophy 37 (2017) ©Mathesis Publications 1 Squaring the Epicurean Circle: Friendship and Happiness in the Garden Benjamin Rossi Epicurean ethics has been subject to withering ancient and contemporary criti- cism for the supposed irreconcilability of Epicurus’s endorsement of friendship and his ethical egoism. On the one hand, Epicurus claims that friendship is an immortal good (VS 78), that it ‘dances round the world the world announcing to us all that we should wake up and felicitate one another’ (VS 52), and he even claims that every friendship is worth choosing for its own sake (VS 23).1 Clearly, for Epicurus, friendship is a central pillar of the good life. On the other hand, Epicurus is clear that the sole rational norms for evaluating actions and desires are one’s own pleasure and pain. For example, he writes that ‘[i]f you do not on every occasion refer each of your actions to the natural goal but turn prematurely to something else in avoiding or pursuing things, your actions will not accord with your reasoning’ (KD 25). The natural goal is aponia and ataraxia, the absence of physical and mental pain. Epicurus’s egoism seems to permit only a level of commitment to friendship commensurate with its hedo- nic value, and it definitely rules out endowing friendship with intrinsic value. This tension has been ably articulated by contemporary philosophers, most notably Mitsis 1988, ch. 3 and Annas 1993, ch. 11. More recently, Evans 2004 has suggested that a plausible Epicurean response begins by explaining why friendship is valuable for Epicurus.
    [Show full text]
  • Fear: a Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Therapy
    Fear: a conceptual analysis and philosophical therapy Sergio Starkstein, B.A. Philosophy (Honours) This thesis is presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of Murdoch University 2016 Declaration I declare that this thesis is my own account of my research and contains as its main content work which has not previously been submitted for a degree at any tertiary education institution. Sergio Starkstein 14/11/2016 Abstract Fear is a critical emotion in everyday life as it permeates many of our minor and major decisions. Explicitly or implicitly, fear is one of the emotions that most strongly shape human life. In this thesis fear and its philosophical remedies will be analysed through the work of western philosophers and thinkers selected based on their overall contributions in conceptualizing fear and suggesting therapies for reducing its more damaging effects. The study will show how Epicurus, Cicero and Seneca considered fear as the main obstacle in achieving peace of mind, and their ethical systems were primarily focused on dealing with this emotion by proposing eclectic philosophical therapies. Montaigne presented a humanist therapy of fear instrumented as a critical self-analysis. In contrast, a reductionist trend in thinking about fear emerged during the 17th century with the growth of materialistic philosophy. Thomas Hobbes reduced fear into a necessary tool for social control, whereas René Descartes demoted fear to a secondary emotion enacted by a dualist mechanism. This trend continued with William James’s conception of fear as a sensory-somatic reflex, and with Sigmund Freud’s hypothesis of a neurotic fear resulting from universal unconscious laws.
    [Show full text]
  • I Have Regained Memory’ (Smṛtir Labdhā): the Bhagavad Gītā As a Parrhesiastic Journey Against Forgetfulness
    Comparative Philosophy Volume 11, No. 2 (2020): 36-62 Open Access / ISSN 2151-6014 / www.comparativephilosophy.org https://doi.org/10.31979/2151-6014(2020).110205 ‘I HAVE REGAINED MEMORY’ (SMṚTIR LABDHĀ): THE BHAGAVAD GĪTĀ AS A PARRHESIASTIC JOURNEY AGAINST FORGETFULNESS RAQUEL FERRÁNDEZ-FORMOSO ABSTRACT: This paper proposes an interdisciplinary reading of the Bhagavad Gītā, presenting it as a parrhesiastic dialogue between Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna, and focusing on the importance attached to memory. Foucault’s studies on the exercise of parrhesia (“true speech”) in the Greco-Roman context, but also Heidegger's views on the original memory, and Abhinavagupta’s commentary to the Bhagavad Gītā have been used as important tools of interpretation. Devotion is described as the constant memory of Kṛṣṇa, through which the practitioner succeeds in substituting some subconscious dispositions (saṃskāras) for others, building a psychic memory that allows for liberation at the time of death. On the one hand, Kṛṣṇa’s goal is to awaken transcendental memory in Arjuna, on the other, at the end of the Gītā we are invited to remember and study this sacred conversation. This leads us to establish a comparison between the use of memory promoted in the Bhagavad Gītā and in the Epicurean school, highlighting important similarities and differences between the two pedagogies. Keywords: death, devotion, emotions, Epicurus, guṇa, happiness, parrhesia, remembrance, saṃskāras, truth 1. THE KAIROS OF THE SOUL In one of the Epictetus' most unique dissertations, a disciple asks the Stoic master why he never answers his questions. The answer of Epictetus is visceral in its frankness: the disciple in question does not move him to speak since he does not possess the competence to listen.
    [Show full text]
  • Appendix 5: Multilingual Dictionary for Multifaith and Multicultural Mediation and Education
    APPENDIX 5: MULTILINGUAL DICTIONARY FOR MULTIFAITH AND MULTICULTURAL MEDIATION AND EDUCATION © Thomas Clough Daffern This appendix consists of a work in progress: the attempt to compile an exhaustive dictionary of world languages, focusing on words that are of direct interest to the work of the multifaith and multicultural mediation: such terms include those on the one hand, relating to peace, non-violence, conflict, violence, war, justice, mediation, reparation, as well as terms relating to belief, values, ideas, identity, faith, deity, God, ultimate truth etc. The work presented here is very much a work in progress, as the accompanying table of languages makes clear; some languages have received more attention than others, some are absent, some are under-represented; this is due largely to the ways in which the dictionary has been compiled thus far, the limitations of resources at the editors disposal, and the scattering of volunteer helpers who have aided the research thus far. The editor owes a considerable debt of gratitude to various colleagues for assistance in bringing the project this far, including: Gordana Netkovska, Mary Napper, Sarah Kennedy, Agatha Haun, Surjit Singh, to name but a few. It is hoped in time to further complete this work, which is proving of use in the work of multifaith and multicultural mediation, for which purpose it is intended. It is included here as an appendix to the editor’s thesis, as a way of indicating something of the scope of one of the projects inspired by the work of the MMMS, and transpersonal historiography in action, applied to the study of comparative linguistics and the history of words and their meanings.
    [Show full text]
  • PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE1126 Journal of the APPA
    PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE1126 Journal of the APPA Volume 8 Number 1 March 2013 Editor Articles Lou Marinoff Lizeng Zhang Reviews Editor Distinguishing Philosophical Counseling from Psychotherapy Nancy Matchett Aleksandar Fatic Epicureanism as a Foundation for Philosophical Counseling Associate Editor Dena Hurst Sara Ellenbogen Against the Diagnosis of Evil: A Response to M. Scott Peck Technical Consultant Greg Goode Matthew Sharpe Camus’ Askesis: Reading Camus in Light of the Carnets Legal Consultant Thomas Griffith Reviews The Virtuous Psychiatrist: Character Ethics in Psychiatric Practice Elizabeth Purcell World, Affectivity, Trauma: Heidegger and Post-Cartesian Psychoanalysis Leslie Miller Finding the Truth in a World of Spin Rachel Browne A Mindful Nation Farzaneh Yazdani and Kellie Tune Biographies of Contributors www.appa.edu Nemo Veritatem Regit ISSN 1742-8181 Nobody Governs Truth Philosophical Practice, March 2013, 8.1: 1127-1141 1127 Epicureanism as a Foundation for Philosophical Counseling ALEKSANDAR FATIC THE UNIVERSITY OF BELGRADE, SERBIA Abstract: The paper discusses the manner and extent to which Epicurean ethics can serve as a general philosophy of life, capable of supporting philosophical practice in the form of philosophical coun- seling. Unlike the modern age academic philosophy, the philosophical practice movement portrays the philosopher as a personal or corporate advisor, one who helps people make sense of their experiences and find optimum solutions within the context of their values and general preferences. Philosophical coun- seling may rest on almost any school of philosophy, ranging — in the Western tradition— from Platonism to the philosophy of language or logic. While any specialist school of philosophy may serve valuable purposes by elucidating specific aspects of one’s experiences and directing future action, the more ‘gener- alist’ the philosophy used as the basis for counseling is, the broader and more far-reaching its potential impact on the counselee.
    [Show full text]
  • Political Science and Law Livro Completo Editado.Pdf
    3 Cover and graphic design: Manoela Massuchetto Jazar Layout: Manoela Massuchetto Jazar Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Knoerr, Fernando Gustavo, Author Séllos-Knoerr, Viviane Coêlho de, Author Teixeira, Alex V., Author Political science and law: citizenship under construction. Viviane Coêlho de Séllos-Knoerr / Fernando Gustavo Knoerr / Alex Volnei Teixeira. Regina, Saskatchewan, Canada, 2021. 253p.: Includes bibliographical references and indexes. ISBN 978-1-7777884-0-7 PREFACE It is a real honor and a great pleasure to present this work of my friends and colleagues, to the public, lay readers, as well as pro- fessionals will very much enjoy this scholarly book. The authors, pro- fessors of the University Center of Curitiba – UNICURITIBA, and the First Nations University of Canada - FNUNIV exhibit great ability and wisdom not merely in the understanding and interpretation of the great works of the philosophy of the law of the Western Civilization, but also an acute ease in explaining deep and complex ideas to rea- ders. In this narrative you will find the origins of political ideas and the sources of the law of our European descendent countries. The story begins with a discussion of the various types of thought, me- thods and science. In the second part, the authors dig deeper to un- ravel the intellectual foundations of the classical theory of law in Greece and Rome, dealing with authors of great importance such as Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and Cicero, as well as other smaller and more ancient ones. With Christian heritage, the Western philosophy of law demonstrates more religious characteristics, and the conflicts of the monarchies and the Church come to the fore.
    [Show full text]