Buy Now! Home Airland Battle Doctrine By Mark R. Schwartz Need for Something New n the late 1970s the US Army and Air Force developed a new doctrine for conventional war that was centered on the idea of being able I to rapidly defeat massed Soviet ground formations. Among other things, it shifted away from past reliance on tactical nuclear weaponry and instead emphasized a new way of fighting conventionally. Both services moved to the same concepts for different reasons, together creating what became known as “AirLand Battle Doctrine.” It would be applied in an adapted form during the First Gulf War in 1991. Soviet-era Russian artist V.S. Visotsky’s concept of what WW3 would’ve looked like in heavily urbanized terrain. 26 MODERN WAR 6 | JUL–AUG 2013 MODERN WAR 6 | JUL–AUG 2013 27 the rest of the operation would also the Forward Line of Own Troops or fall apart. The dilemma, then, was in FLOT), the Deep Battle Area (which having forces prepared to fight large- might extend to 120 or more miles scale mobile battles, actions that went beyond the FLOT), and the even more well beyond simply holding a line. distant Strategic Battle Area, in which Until the 1970s the US Army operations were reserved for airpower. doctrine for conventional warfare was Maneuver-unit commanders called “Active Defense.” It stressed fire- operated within an “area of interest.” power over maneuver, and its central Maneuver brigades at the FLOT idea was to attrit attacking forces to the generally influenced the battle to a point they halted their advance. Then depth of nine to 13 miles, while the reserves would be committed to push divisions did so out to 43 miles. In them back. The doctrine was unimagi- comparison, Soviet doctrine placed native, but it seemed to be the best follow-on maneuver formations in alternative in the face of Soviet and reserve at 18 to 30 miles from the above — The TRADOC ensignia. Warsaw Pact numerical superiority. FLOT. Thus the US would actually be right — Gen. William Dupuy. The US experience in the Vietnam fighting far deeper than would the War indicated attritional tactics were “deep operations” of the Soviets. unable to gain a decision, at least in Commanders were to plan to a politically acceptable timeframe fight within their areas of interest TRADOC: The US Army’s Intellectual Side and with politically acceptable losses. as determined not only by higher A formation of Soviet tanks moves out. Rather than fighting outnumbered headquarters’ guidance, but also by Douglas Skinner, a noted military analyst, described doctrine as “a level of and winning, the new concept that their own appreciation of the enemy’s abstraction and generality higher than strategy. Doctrine is a guide to thought on how Throughout the Cold War, Soviet up in predictable echelons, and its emerged was aimed at controlling actual and anticipated actions. That to employ strategy and tactics. Commanders formulate their strategy, employ tactics, and their Warsaw Pact allied armed technology was inferior. Further, the the larger “battle space” in order to area of interest concept was another then appeal to doctrine for how to combine these elements effectively in battle.” forces lacked the training and Warsaw Pact command and control reduce the strength and effectiveness new dimension of AirLand Battle: they In the 1950s and 1960s, US Army and Air Force doctrine for a future war in Europe technologically advanced weaponry of (C2) system was overly centralized. of enemy forces prior to the moment were to overlap between adjacent revolved around nuclear weapons. Both services intended to use them liberally against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Plans were made at the upper level, of main contact between opposing maneuver units, so more than one attacking Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces. Additionally, the army intended to disperse its (NATO). Rather, their advantage lay with higher headquarters retaining ground forces. That called for interdict- could be coordinated to concentrate formations across the battlefield to deny lucrative targets for Soviet nuclear weapons. in their ability to concentrate large control of all aspects of operational ing the adversary’s flow of men, mate- attacks against the same enemy force. Neglect of conventional war-fighting doctrine during Vietnam left an intellectual numbers of armor, artillery and execution down to the tactical level. riel and supplies using aerial assets, As a result the battlefield became vacuum as Soviet military power grew and technological innovations made their impact mechanized infantry divisions for At the same time, Soviet doctrine long-range artillery, and airmobility. increasingly non-linear, and the felt. The 1973 Yom Kippur War demonstrated the power of anti-tank guided missiles, what were expected to be decisive called for units to seize the initiative By immediately taking the fight importance assigned to an enemy suggesting massed enemy armor could be stopped. To bridge the doctrinal gap, the army battles and exploitation deep into and conduct complex, mobile opera- deep into the enemy’s rear area, NATO formation didn’t necessarily match its formed its Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in 1973 under Gen. William Dupuy. Western Europe. Soviet doctrine tions. Thus those centrally controlled could channel the attackers’ move- relative distance from the FLOT. All of TRADOC developed doctrine for the army, becoming the intellectual engine for all called for “deep operations,” using tactics would likely falter if an oppo- ment, open gaps among their forma- that demanded speed and initiative, such developments. TRADOC’s new look at land warfare determined armored warfare densely massed armies and air forces. nent could disrupt their execution. tions, and block follow-on echelons in order to be able to strike enemy was feasible in Europe while conflicts elsewhere would involve mostly light infantry. American military planners doubt- For example, Soviet doctrine called from joining the battle. All that would units deep in their own rear area as Dupuy counseled NATO weaponry could provide victory in initial European battles, ed the ability of then current NATO for second and third echelon forces then result in the disruption of their opportunities presented themselves. but formations would have to be concentrated. TRADOC evolved “Active Defense” doctrine to stop such an offensive to move through and exploit break- momentum and combat effectiveness. As stated in Field Manual (FM) 100-5, as a first – but transitory – doctrinal effort. The next TRADOC commander, Gen. Don without the employment of tactical throughs made by the first echelon. That, in turn, would force a “culminat- Operations: “Operations must be rapid, Starry, expanded that thinking in his 1978 Battlefield Development Plan. That advocated nuclear weapons. That was something Those two echelons weren’t flexible ing battle” in which NATO could unpredictable, violent, and disorient- attacks against enemy second echelon forces. Better force management techniques that would devastate Europe, regard- reserves; rather, they were rigidly slated maneuver to decisively counterattack ing to the enemy.” The overarching were also developed, as did viewing the “extended battlefield” as a dimension of time less of who “won” any such future war. as to when and where to move as part whatever had by then been identi- intent was to avoid engaging head on as well as distance. Under Starry, TRADOC made AirLand Battle ready for war. Of course, the Soviet system of the larger overall plan. Hence, were fied as the enemy center of gravity, the enemy’s main strength by first, b wasn’t infallible. Its tactics were the initial phase of the offensive to thereby gaining the final decision. disrupting his fighting capabilities relatively inflexible; its units formed be disrupted, US strategists expected and then shattering his will to fight. Extended Battlefield The USAF Tactical Air Command Before submitting requests for that Jointness (TAC), alongside the army’s Training kind of help, ground unit commanders AirLand Battle had four doctrinal and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), had to check if organic artillery could tenets: initiative, depth, agility and syn- The new army doctrine was formed the Air-Land Forces do the job. If so, the mission went chronization. To execute those tenets, aligned with close air support (CAS) Applications Agency (ALFA) and the to those assets. Air support requests the corps was to become the primary concepts the air force wanted to Joint Studies Group (JSG) in 1977. endorsed by the corps headquarters C2 headquarters, both utilizing divi- apply to its own evolving concept of ALFA tested the new A-10 CAS aircraft went to the theater-level C2 center to sions in operational-level engagements deep battle. The air force had always and attack helicopters, producing be matched with available aircraft. and also conducting the deeper fight, resisted the reduction of airpower joint tactics to focus air-delivered ALFA and JSG grouped Combat Air the latter by synchronizing organic to the mere status of flying artillery, weapons against tactical targets. Support (CAS) and Air Interdiction (AI) artillery assets with air power. preferring instead to operate against JSG also investigated methods to to form a new mission area, Offensive Corps were to attack enemy strategic and other targets beyond the interdict Warsaw Pact second-echelon Air Support (OAS), applying fixed-wing formations massing for combat up battlefield. Nonetheless, a working formations: each headquarters attack to the ground battle. Artillery to 100 miles away. The overall battle partnership with the army came into would have USAF tactical air control would also be used to suppress hostile space was partitioned into the Close place in forging the new doctrine. parties (TACP) to identify targets to air defense systems threatening OAS 9 miles 9 miles 56 miles Battle Area (up to 13 miles beyond be engaged by fixed-wing aircraft.