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Home Airland Battle Doctrine By Mark R. Schwartz

Need for Something New

n the late 1970s the US Army and Air Force developed a new doctrine for conventional war that was centered on the idea of being able I to rapidly defeat massed Soviet ground formations. Among other things, it shifted away from past reliance on tactical nuclear weaponry and instead emphasized a new way of fighting conventionally. Both services moved to the same concepts for different reasons, together creating what became known as “AirLand Battle Doctrine.” It would be applied in an adapted form during the First Gulf War in 1991.

Soviet-era Russian artist V.S. Visotsky’s concept of what WW3 would’ve looked like in heavily urbanized terrain.

26 MODERN WAR 6 | JUL–AUG 2013 MODERN WAR 6 | JUL–AUG 2013 27 the rest of the operation would also the Forward Line of Own Troops or fall apart. The dilemma, then, was in FLOT), the Deep Battle Area (which having forces prepared to fight large- might extend to 120 or more miles scale mobile battles, actions that went beyond the FLOT), and the even more well beyond simply holding a line. distant Strategic Battle Area, in which Until the 1970s the US Army operations were reserved for airpower. doctrine for conventional warfare was Maneuver-unit commanders called “Active Defense.” It stressed fire- operated within an “area of interest.” power over maneuver, and its central Maneuver brigades at the FLOT idea was to attrit attacking forces to the generally influenced the battle to a point they halted their advance. Then depth of nine to 13 miles, while the reserves would be committed to push divisions did so out to 43 miles. In them back. The doctrine was unimagi- comparison, Soviet doctrine placed native, but it seemed to be the best follow-on maneuver formations in alternative in the face of Soviet and reserve at 18 to 30 miles from the above — The TRADOC ensignia. Warsaw Pact numerical superiority. FLOT. Thus the US would actually be right — Gen. William Dupuy. The US experience in the Vietnam fighting far deeper than would the War indicated attritional tactics were “deep operations” of the Soviets. unable to gain a decision, at least in Commanders were to plan to a politically acceptable timeframe fight within their areas of interest TRADOC: The US Army’s Intellectual Side and with politically acceptable losses. as determined not only by higher A formation of Soviet tanks moves out. Rather than fighting outnumbered headquarters’ guidance, but also by Douglas Skinner, a noted military analyst, described doctrine as “a level of and winning, the new concept that their own appreciation of the enemy’s abstraction and generality higher than strategy. Doctrine is a guide to thought on how Throughout the Cold War, Soviet up in predictable echelons, and its emerged was aimed at controlling actual and anticipated actions. That to employ strategy and tactics. Commanders formulate their strategy, employ tactics, and their Warsaw Pact allied armed technology was inferior. Further, the the larger “battle space” in order to area of interest concept was another then appeal to doctrine for how to combine these elements effectively in battle.” forces lacked the training and Warsaw Pact command and control reduce the strength and effectiveness new dimension of AirLand Battle: they In the 1950s and 1960s, US Army and Air Force doctrine for a future war in Europe technologically advanced weaponry of (C2) system was overly centralized. of enemy forces prior to the moment were to overlap between adjacent revolved around nuclear weapons. Both services intended to use them liberally against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Plans were made at the upper level, of main contact between opposing maneuver units, so more than one attacking Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces. Additionally, the army intended to disperse its (NATO). Rather, their advantage lay with higher headquarters retaining ground forces. That called for interdict- could be coordinated to concentrate formations across the battlefield to deny lucrative targets for Soviet nuclear weapons. in their ability to concentrate large control of all aspects of operational ing the adversary’s flow of men, mate- attacks against the same enemy force. Neglect of conventional war-fighting doctrine during Vietnam left an intellectual numbers of armor, artillery and execution down to the tactical level. riel and supplies using aerial assets, As a result the battlefield became vacuum as Soviet military power grew and technological innovations made their impact mechanized infantry divisions for At the same time, Soviet doctrine long-range artillery, and airmobility. increasingly non-linear, and the felt. The 1973 Yom Kippur War demonstrated the power of anti-tank guided missiles, what were expected to be decisive called for units to seize the initiative By immediately taking the fight importance assigned to an enemy suggesting massed enemy armor could be stopped. To bridge the doctrinal gap, the army battles and exploitation deep into and conduct complex, mobile opera- deep into the enemy’s rear area, NATO formation didn’t necessarily match its formed its Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in 1973 under Gen. William Dupuy. Western Europe. Soviet doctrine tions. Thus those centrally controlled could channel the attackers’ move- relative distance from the FLOT. All of TRADOC developed doctrine for the army, becoming the intellectual engine for all called for “deep operations,” using tactics would likely falter if an oppo- ment, open gaps among their forma- that demanded speed and initiative, such developments. TRADOC’s new look at land warfare determined armored warfare densely massed armies and air forces. nent could disrupt their execution. tions, and block follow-on echelons in order to be able to strike enemy was feasible in Europe while conflicts elsewhere would involve mostly light infantry. American military planners doubt- For example, Soviet doctrine called from joining the battle. All that would units deep in their own rear area as Dupuy counseled NATO weaponry could provide victory in initial European battles, ed the ability of then current NATO for second and third echelon forces then result in the disruption of their opportunities presented themselves. but formations would have to be concentrated. TRADOC evolved “Active Defense” doctrine to stop such an offensive to move through and exploit break- momentum and combat effectiveness. As stated in Field Manual (FM) 100-5, as a first – but transitory – doctrinal effort. The next TRADOC commander, Gen. Don without the employment of tactical throughs made by the first echelon. That, in turn, would force a “culminat- Operations: “Operations must be rapid, Starry, expanded that thinking in his 1978 Battlefield Development Plan. That advocated nuclear weapons. That was something Those two echelons weren’t flexible ing battle” in which NATO could unpredictable, violent, and disorient- attacks against enemy second echelon forces. Better force management techniques that would devastate Europe, regard- reserves; rather, they were rigidly slated maneuver to decisively counterattack ing to the enemy.” The overarching were also developed, as did viewing the “extended battlefield” as a dimension of time less of who “won” any such future war. as to when and where to move as part whatever had by then been identi- intent was to avoid engaging head on as well as distance. Under Starry, TRADOC made AirLand Battle ready for war. Of course, the Soviet system of the larger overall plan. Hence, were fied as the enemy center of gravity, the enemy’s main strength by first, b wasn’t infallible. Its tactics were the initial phase of the offensive to thereby gaining the final decision. disrupting his fighting capabilities relatively inflexible; its units formed be disrupted, US strategists expected and then shattering his will to fight. Extended Battlefield The USAF Tactical Air Command Before submitting requests for that Jointness (TAC), alongside the army’s Training kind of help, ground unit commanders AirLand Battle had four doctrinal and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), had to check if organic artillery could tenets: initiative, depth, agility and syn- The new army doctrine was formed the Air-Land Forces do the job. If so, the mission went chronization. To execute those tenets, aligned with close air support (CAS) Applications Agency (ALFA) and the to those assets. Air support requests the corps was to become the primary concepts the air force wanted to Joint Studies Group (JSG) in 1977. endorsed by the corps headquarters C2 headquarters, both utilizing divi- apply to its own evolving concept of ALFA tested the new A-10 CAS aircraft went to the theater-level C2 center to sions in operational-level engagements deep battle. The air force had always and attack helicopters, producing be matched with available aircraft. and also conducting the deeper fight, resisted the reduction of airpower joint tactics to focus air-delivered ALFA and JSG grouped Combat Air the latter by synchronizing organic to the mere status of flying artillery, weapons against tactical targets. Support (CAS) and Air Interdiction (AI) artillery assets with air power. preferring instead to operate against JSG also investigated methods to to form a new mission area, Offensive Corps were to attack enemy strategic and other targets beyond the interdict Warsaw Pact second-echelon Air Support (OAS), applying fixed-wing formations massing for combat up battlefield. Nonetheless, a working formations: each headquarters attack to the ground battle. Artillery to 100 miles away. The overall battle partnership with the army came into would have USAF tactical air control would also be used to suppress hostile space was partitioned into the Close place in forging the new doctrine. parties (TACP) to identify targets to air defense systems threatening OAS 9 miles 9 miles 56 miles Battle Area (up to 13 miles beyond be engaged by fixed-wing aircraft. missions, thereby supporting airpower.

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CAS vs. AI vs. BAI For instance, one question was: should BAI be used at the point Home Like the US, NATO saw the corps as the spearhead of penetration? The figure above of deep operations. It developed a new fixed-wing illustrates that dilemma, with a Soviet OAS mission, Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI), to thrust approaching friendly lines and attack enemy follow-on echelons. The US in turn in CAS range. CAS could attack the accepted BAI as part of its doctrine in 1979, but flanks of the thrust, but the enemy the US Air Force said it should be a weapon of the could still shift troops laterally in theater-level air component commander (ACC) rather their mid- to deep-zones to position than any ground force corps. BAI thus became a focal for a breakthrough or exploit one. point for army vs. air force AirLand Battle debate. One proposal was that targets CAS supported close battle and required detailed beyond the FSCL be made solely integration with small-unit maneuver and fire plans, a USAF responsibility, especially if and safety measures were needed to protect ground dispersed across more than a one- troops from friendly fire. CAS could attack no deeper corps area of interest. That then led than the fire support coordination line (FSCL), a control to lobbying for centralized control measure giving the ground force commander authority of massed air assets, to be matched over air strikes to the range of his organic artillery by decentralized mission executions (usually out to 12 miles beyond the FLOT). The com- by the tactical air control parties. mander’s TACP proposed likely CAS missions inside That, in turn, would effectively have the FSCL, and he approved or denied those proposals. put BAI into command limbo. CAS thus remained a secure part of AirLand Battle, The army then further complicated but the question remained as to how enemy second matters with its deployment of longer- echelon forces moving toward friendly troops already range weapons. Corps could augment engaged against first echelon units could be struck. division fires with the Multiple Launch Col. John Boyd & the OODA Loop By mid-1981 air force and army staffs had endorsed Rocket System (MLRS), which could an agreement that set up OAS apportionment and hit targets up to 18 miles within the In his 1976 briefing, Patterns of Conflict, Col. John Boyd – a allocation procedures, and directed that corps Deep Battle Zone. The Army Tactical USAF fighter pilot and doctrinal theorist – proposed a new set commanders would select BAI targets. Theater-level Missile System (ATACMS) offered a of tactics with no set front line, utilizing hit-and-run attacks C2 allocated sorties to OAS missions with army-level range of up to 186 miles. Likewise, 3 miles against Soviet maneuver groups. He advocated a “deep battle” advice on their distribution to corps and divisions. Apache attack helicopters could 19 miles that would be fought in the Soviet rear area as well as via agile To integrate CAS with his unit’s scheme of range out to 62 miles into that zone. maneuver along the front. Its objective was to derail the Warsaw maneuver and fire, each commander required In 1985 it was suggested the FSCL Pact command system. Boyd asked the following questions. timely information on the location of enemy and be kept close to the FLOT, no more friendly formations. That level of situational aware- than 9.3 miles deep. That aligned with Why try to reduce your own friction and uncertainty? Why ness remained hard to achieve for brigade and the limits of observed fire (out to about not magnify the adversary’s friction and uncertainty? division commanders in fluid situations. Generally three miles from friendly positions) only the corps possessed information adequate to and troop safety needs. The idea was Why try to exhaust the adversary by increasing his efforts? Why decide if a CAS request was better served by organic the more controlled circumstances not paralyze him by denying opportunities to expend effort? artillery fire or needed higher-level commitment. inside the FSCL permitted BAI to target According to the 1981 inter-service agreement, BAI leading elements of the enemy second Why strike at one center of gravity where mass would engage enemy concentrations of sufficient size echelon. Failure to accept those pro- is concentrated? Why not strike at many smaller and importance to have a potentially decisive effect cedures would create a “No-Mission” 40 to 70 miles centers of gravity that sustain the larger system? on the overall land battle. BAI would therefore target zone within the FSCL, where neither only battalions or larger formations, especially those CAS nor BAI met the criteria for use. He suggested traditional strategists erred by viewing conflict spearheading an attack and the units following them to In 1986 the army revised AirLand rifts that still divided soldiers and placed air assets accordingly. It oper- from the top down. He emphasized adaptability by pushing deci- exploit penetrations. In 1981 the USAF high command Battle to synchronize ground opera- airmen. While the ground force ated on a 72-hour cycle paralleling the sions to lower levels as the battle tempo increased. He advocated declared that agreement to constitute official doctrine. tions with larger theater and campaign commander lamented the effective corps planning cycle of 72 to 96 hours. a coherent command and control (C2) structure by synchronizing all objectives, dictating that air-to-ground absence of BAI, the airmen applied There was a continuous evaluating of levels of command. Missions were to be contracts between supe- Further Debate operations support campaign objec- CAS across all the deep battle space intelligence against missions proposed riors, who dictated what must be accomplished, and subordinates tives rather than be subordinate to nominally given to BAI, irrespective for every 24-hour period, and it was who served their superiors’ intent with imagination and initiative. The 1982 edition of FM 100-5 officially premiered the needs of individual battles within of FSCL placement. Doctrinal sup- resolved by using the best mix of Boyd also coined the term “OODA Loop.” That was the AirLand Battle and defined BAI as the “primary means it. The proving ground for all that port for division-level deep battle missions. That system, controlled at decision-making process of: Observe, Orient, Decide and Act. The of fighting the deep battle at extended ranges. BAI theorizing would finally come in 1991. evaporated. Battlefield air interdiction the theater air commander level, mis- idea was to operate inside the adversary’s OODA time-cycle by isolates enemy forces by preventing their reinforce- was controlled and executed by the aligned with the 24 to 72 hour planning performing all of its elements faster, thereby controlling every ment and resupply and by restricting their maneuver. War in the Gulf air commander as part of his larger and execution cycle at division-level. level of conflict. That idea applied equally to overall ground It also destroys, delays, or disrupts follow-on enemy theater-level air interdiction campaign. It thereby effectively legislated BAI force commanders and individual fighter pilots and everyone units before they can enter the close battle.” In response to the Iraqi conquest The air force regulated their strikes operations out of the division’s reach. in between. Today that concept is advocated by most military The army intended to diminish Warsaw Pact supe- of Kuwait in 1990, the US committed through their method of planning and Doctrinal expectations for a schools of thought as well as many business strategists. riority along the FLOT by destroying follow-on rein- sizable land and air forces to fight executing the air war – Air Tasking European conflict evaporated with b forcements. AirLand Battle still omitted guidance on in the 1991 operation codenamed Orders (ATO). The ATO scheduled the realities of the war in the Persian resolving overlaps or gray areas between CAS and BAI. Desert Storm, a.k.a. the First Gulf air missions with inputs from all Gulf. CAS remained available for War. That fighting exposed doctrinal interested targeting agencies and the close battle, but the absence of

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