Security in Outer Space: Transatlantic Relations

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Perspectives on Transatlantic

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Report 66 October 2018

Short title: ESPI Report 66 ISSN: 2218-0931 (print), 2076-6688 (online) Published in October 2018

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ESPI Report 66 2 October 2018 Security in Outer Space: Perspectives on Transatlantic Relations

Table of Contents

1. Introduction ...... 5 1.1 Background and Rationale for the Study 5 1.2 Objectives of the Study 7 1.3 Research Scope and Key Concepts 7 1.4 Methodology 8

2. The United States: Consolidating Leadership for National Security ...... 10 2.1 Legacy of Successive U.S. Space Policies 10 2.2 New U.S. Policy Framework for Security in Outer Space 12 2.2.1 U.S. Strategies and Policy Directives Related to Space Security 12 2.2.2 Disentangling Key Tenets and Objectives of the United States 16 2.2.3 Preparing a National Approach to Space Traffic Management 18 2.2.4 U.S. Strategy and Policy Rationales for Security in Outer Space in a Nutshell 19 2.3 Overview of U.S. Activities and Capabilities 20 2.3.1 Space Situational Awareness 20 2.3.2 Space Environment Protection and Preservation 24 2.3.3 Space Infrastructure Security 25

3. Europe: Rising Space Security Stakes and Ambitions ...... 28 Adapted synthesis of ESPI public report 64 "Security in Outer Space: Rising Stakes for Europe" 3.1 Strategy and Policy Rationales 28 3.1.1 Protect the Value of the European Space Infrastructure 28 3.1.2 Contribute to a “Service-Oriented” Policy 29 3.1.3 Reinforce European Autonomy and Freedom of Action 30 3.1.4 Long-Term Stakes for Europe’s Position on the International Space Scene 30 3.2 Overview of European Activities and Capabilities 31 3.2.1 Space Situational Awareness 31 3.2.2 Space Environment Protection and Preservation 35 3.2.3 Space Infrastructure Security 37

4. Transatlantic Relations: State of Affairs ...... 39 4.1 A Privileged Partnership 39 4.1.1 Relations between Europe and the United States 39 4.1.2 Transatlantic Cooperation in Space 40 4.2 Security in Outer Space: A Mix of Arrangements 41 4.2.1 Cooperation in SSA Data Sharing 42 4.2.2 Space Environment Protection and Preservation 47 4.2.3 Space Infrastructure Security 48

5. Way Forward: Parallel Routes Towards Common Objectives ...... 50 5.1 Comparative analysis of U.S. and European approaches 50 5.1.1 Different Policy Drivers 50 5.1.2 Shared Perception of a Growing Vulnerability 52 5.1.3 Strong Reinforcement of the U.S. Space Security Policy 52 5.1.4 Rising Sensitivity to Space Security Issues in Europe 52 5.2 A Fertile Ground for a Reinforced Partnership 53 5.2.1 State of Play: A Complex Mix of Arrangements 53 5.2.2 Towards Reinforced Cooperation Seeking Mutual Benefit 55 5.3 What Scope for a Reinforced Transatlantic Partnership? 57 5.3.1 Shifting U.S. Posture Towards National Leadership 57 5.3.2 Potential for Transatlantic Cooperation 57 5.3.3 Space Traffic Management: Stakes and Implications for Europe 58 5.3.4 General Conclusion 60

ESPI Report 66 3 October 2018 Annex ...... 61 A.1 European national strategies addressing space security in Europe 61 A.2 List of national space legislation enacted by European countries 61 A.3 Overview of European SST capabilities 62 A.4 Overview of European and U.S. activities in security in outer space 66 A.5 Organizational chart of U.S. security in space in the Executive branch 68 A.6 Authority and role of departments as defined by the SPD-3 69 A.7 List of Interviewees in the United States 70 A.8 List of Interviewees in Europe 71

List of Acronyms ...... 72

Research Advisory Board ...... 77

About ESPI ...... 78

About George Washington University Space Policy Institute ...... 78

About the Authors ...... 78

ESPI Report 66 4 October 2018 Security in Outer Space: Perspectives on Transatlantic Relations

1. Introduction

 A secure service that can justifiably be 1.1 Background and Rationale trusted. for the Study From an infrastructure standpoint, these conditions translate into 1) operational capacities In the sixty years since the launch of the first that meet user performance requirements, 2) satellite in 1957, the global space economy continuity of programmes to ensure infra- has grown tremendously.1 Space-based ser- structure maintenance and upgrade, and 3) vices now bring substantial socio-economic appropriate measures to protect the infra- benefits to end-users, across numerous stra- structure against threats. The last encom- tegic domains and economic sectors.2 Simul- passes multiple and transverse aspects cover- taneously, the increasingly pervasive use of ing: space-based services by governments, businesses and consumers has resulted in a grow-  Access to space to ensure an autonomous ing dependence of society and economy on capacity to deploy space systems safely; space infrastructure. For example, it was re-  The integrity of the space segment, in- cently estimated that a large share of the Eu- cluding all systems in orbit; ropean Union GDP depends on space assets, and that an incapacitation of these assets  The ground segment that includes sta- would lead to a significant economic loss.3 tions and equipment for the operation and Similar proportional impacts could occur in delivery of services; other countries. In the future, the develop-  Downlinks and uplinks used to operate the ment of new space-based services, in synergy space system and receive its data. with terrestrial technologies (e.g. 5G networks, precision agriculture, smart energy Each of these components is vulnerable to a grids, autonomous vehicles), will increase the range of security concerns. Experts have rou- benefits of space assets but also deepen the tinely cautioned governments and space busi- dependence of governments, businesses and nesses that space is increasingly vulnerable, consumers on these assets. posing an intensifying challenge to guarantee- ing a safe, secure and sustainable environ- In Europe, the significant progress made by ment to deploy, operate and exploit space as- Galileo, EGNOS and Copernicus programmes sets. Rising challenges to the security of the and the introduction of new initiatives in the space infrastructure are numerous and in- field of GOVSATCOM have further emphasised clude: the importance of ensuring that all conditions for the delivery of operational space-based  Passive man-made hazards, in particular services conforming to user needs are met. the proliferation of space debris that jeop- This is a prerequisite to fostering the uptake of ardizes the sustainability of space activi- space services and, consequently, maximising ties and threatens unintentional jamming the benefits of the space infrastructure. This is of signals and equipment; also a key area of space policy development in  Active man-made threats such as Anti- light of the growing dependence of the Euro- Satellite capabilities and cyber-attacks; pean economy and society on space assets, including critical infrastructure such as telecom-  Natural hazards such as natural debris munications, energy and transport. The condi- and space weather events such as geo- tions to ensure an appropriate quality of ser- magnetic storms, solar radiation storms, vice include: and disturbances of the ionosphere.  A proven or certified level of performance; The deteriorating security situation has been acknowledged by the European Union, which  Long-term availability of services; made “the protection and resilience of critical European space infrastructure” a flagship objective of the Space Strategy for Europe

1 Space Foundation (2018). The Space Report 2018: The 3 PwC (2017). Dependence of the European Economy on Authoritative Guide to Global Space Activity. Space Infrastructures. Brussels: EU Publications. Retrie- 2 European Commission (2017). Dependence of the Euro- ved from: http://www.copernicus.eu/sites/default/files/li- pean Economy on Space Infrastructures: Potential Impacts brary/Copernicus_SocioEconomic_Impact_Octo- of Space Assets Loss, (March 2017). ber_2016.pdf

ESPI Report 66 5 October 2018

adopted in October 2016.4 The strategy under- end of 20188 as part of the U.S. Space Fence lines the objectives of the EU 1) to enhance programme.9 Noticeably, the United States the security of its space programme, 2) to en- has adopted a model of global SSA coopera- sure the protection and resilience of critical tion with close to 100 unclassified SSA Sharing European space infrastructure, in particular Agreements with commercial and international through the development of Space Situational partners,10 which also supports U.S. capabili- Awareness (SSA) capabilities, and 3) to rein- ties by improving the quality and quantity of force synergies between civil and security SSA information. More recently, a major de- space activities. For these objectives, the Eu- velopment in the U.S approach to security in ropean Union stresses the importance of coop- outer space was the adoption of Space Policy eration, first at European level with ESA, Directive 3 (SPD-3), which establishes the first EUMETSAT and Member States, but also at in- “approach to Space Traffic Management (STM) ternational level, in particular with the United that addresses current and future operational States (U.S.). The importance given to space risks.”11 The policy also announced that the security and international cooperation in this U.S. Department of Commerce (DoC) would field is shared by the European Union External be responsible for relations with commercial Actions Services (EEAS) and is addressed in and international partners for STM and SSA, the Global Strategy for the European Union’s shifting some of the responsibilities now han- Foreign and Security Policy, and in the Euro- dled by U.S. DoD. pean Defence Action Plan. These elements Recent developments in space security in Eu- were again addressed in the draft regulation rope and the United States have reshuffled the for the Space Programme of the European Un- cards at strategic, policy and operational lev- ion published in June 2018 by the European els. In this context, an examination of the new Commission in preparation for the next Multi- state of affairs on each side of the Atlantic, and annual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021– of mutual transatlantic relations seems timely. 2027. 5 This document proposes several provi- More specifically, this study aims to provide el- sions in line with the existing strategic frame- ements of an answer to the following ques- work and recalls that “[Space Situational tions: Awareness] should have regard to cooperation with international partners, in particular the  What is the state of affairs in space secu- United States of America”.6 rity in Europe, the United States, and in transatlantic relations? Across the Atlantic, in the United States, space has always had a prominent defence and na-  How might recent developments impact tional security dimension, and securing space transatlantic relations in the short- to assets has long been a strategic priority, as long-term? witnessed by the development of an ambitious Space Situational Awareness (SSA) pro-  How can partners revisit or reinforce co- gramme by the U.S. Department of Defense operation frameworks for mutual benefit? (DoD). This programme relies on an extensive and advanced network of surveillance sensors7 including space and ground-based radars and optical telescopes operated by military and civilian entities, together making up the U.S. Space Surveillance Network (SSN). The out- standing tracking capabilities of this network are expected to be further improved by the

4 European Commission (2016). Space Strategy For Eu- 7 Space Traffic Management: Towards a Roadmap for im- rope. COM (2016) 705 final. Brussels: European Commis- plementation, IAA Cosmic Study (2017) 80. sion. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/transpar- 8 For completeness, it should be noted that the current ency/regdoc/rep/1/2016/EN/COM-2016-705-F1-EN- Space Fence project is to replace the previous Air Force MAIN.PDF Space Surveillance System, one of the SSN components 5 European Commission. (2018). Proposal for a active from 2008 to 2013. REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND 9 The Space Fence will utilise S-band ground-based ra- OF THE COUNCIL establishing the space policy pro- dars. http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/space- gramme of the European Union, relating to the European fence.html Union Agency for Space and repealing Regulations (EU) See also: http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineAr- No 1285/2013, No 377/2014 and No 912/2010 and Deci- chive/Pages/2017/August%202017/A-Closer-Watch-on- sion 541/2014/EU. Brussels Space.aspx 6 European Commission (2018). ‘Establishing the space 10 U.S. Strategic Command and Norway sign agreement programme of the Union and the European Union Agency to share space services, USSTRATCOM Public Affairs, for the Space Programme and repealing Regulations (EU) April 2017 http://www.stratcom.mil/Media/News/News-Arti- No 912/2010, (EU) No 1285/2013, (EU) No 377/2014 and cle-View/Article/1142970/us-strategic-command-norway- Decision 541/2014/EU’, COM(2018) 447 final (June 6, sign-agreement-to-share-space-services-data/ 2018). 11 Space Policy Directive-3, National Space Traffic Man- agement Policy, (June 18, 2018).

ESPI Report 66 6 October 2018 Security in Outer Space: Perspectives on Transatlantic Relations

from Outer Space’, may be addressed when 1.2 Objectives of the Study relevant in this study. The overarching objective of the research is to ‘Security in Outer Space’ itself encompasses raise awareness of the key stakes in transat- three areas of action that are investigated in lantic relations in the field of space security by this report and that correspond to three core providing useful perspectives on recent and objectives: 1) monitor the space environment, potential future developments in this domain. 2) mitigate threats to space infrastructure, Specifically, the study aims to achieve the fol- and 3) reduce vulnerability of space infrastruc- lowing: ture.  Review the U.S. and European approaches  Space Situational Awareness (SSA): to address challenges to space infrastruc- Current and predictive knowledge and un- ture security, including: derstanding of the outer space environment including space weather and loca- o Strategic and policy rationales, key tion of natural and manmade objects in priorities and objectives; orbit around the Earth; o Activities and capabilities in the field of security in outer space;  Space Environment Protection and Preservation (SEPP): Preventive and  Investigate past and current transatlantic curative mitigation of the negative effects relations in the field of space security and of human activity in outer space on the analyse the conditions to reinforce coop- safety and sustainability of the outer eration in this domain; space environment;  Examine the potential implications of on-  Space Infrastructure Security (SIS): going policy developments on future Assurance of infrastructure ability to de- transatlantic relations in space security. liver a service that can justifiably be trusted despite a hazardous environment. Measures directly targeting the source of the 1.3 Research Scope and Key threats, such as actions against cybercrime or Concepts signal jamming, are not included this report. Measures that are external to the space sec- The broad concept of space security can be de- tor, such as actions against cybercrime, dis- lineated in three conceptual dimensions as armament policies, and radio spectrum man- shown in Table 1:12 agement are not addressed here. By the same token, broader security and defence matters Security in Outer Space Security such as strategic stability in outer space, de- Outer Space for Security from Outer terrence and space superiority, although ex- Space ceedingly central in the posture of many space powers, will not be directly covered by the re- The protec- The use of The protec- port. tion of the space sys- tion of human Space infrastructure can be described as a space infra- tems for se- life and the network of space-based and ground-based structure curity and de- Earth envi- systems interconnected by communication against natu- fence pur- ronment channels and enabled by access to space ca- ral and man- poses. against natu- pabilities. It includes a space segment, a made threats ral threats ground segment, a user segment, and down- or risks, en- and risks links and up-links to interface between these suring the coming from segments. As the present report focuses on sustainability space. ‘Security in Outer Space’, the analysis ad- of space ac- dresses predominantly security challenges to tivities. the ‘space segment’ and, whenever relevant, to the down-link and up-link data. However, Table 1: Complementary dimensions of Space Security the report does not address security chal- In this report, ‘Space Security’ is understood lenges specific to ground and user segments, primarily as ‘Security in Outer Space’ as de- such as Earth natural hazards, physical attacks fined in Table 1. Given the strong interrelation on facilities, or eavesdropping. between the three dimensions of space security, ‘Outer Space for Security’ and ‘Security

12 Mayence J-F (2010). ‘Space security: transatlantic ap- and confidence-building measures in space. (ESPI 2010, proach to space governance’, Prospects for transparency p. 35).

ESPI Report 66 7 October 2018

The analysis focuses predominantly on chal- design and supply chain security. These challenges to space infrastructure in operation (up lenges are addressed as part of the Space In- to system disposal) but also addresses, when- frastructure Security (SIS) component: ever relevant, security challenges during other stages of the infrastructure lifecycle including, in particular, challenges related to security-by-

Supply Chain Access to Space Security by Design Security in Operation Security Security

Development Production Deployment Operation

Figure 1: Security challenges throughout the space infrastructure lifecycle This study focuses primarily on security chal-  An assessment of common space security lenges to space infrastructure in operation, in- challenges; cluding system disposal. Security challenges  A common understanding of each part- at earlier stages of space programmes (e.g. ners’ priorities; security-by-design, supply chain security) are mentioned whenever relevant but have not  Insights on the respective approaches to been investigated specifically. By extension, the issue; the security architecture of space programmes (e.g. Security Accreditation, Threat Response  A sound evaluation of drivers and obsta- Architecture), which requires to be adapted to cles to cooperation. the specificities of each infrastructure, is not To this effect, the research has followed a addressed in this study which focuses on com- methodology based on: a comparative analy- mon and external dimensions of security in sis of the European and American approaches outer space. to security in outer space; a review of current transatlantic relations in this domain; and the identification of drivers and barriers to a reinforced framework. The research has been sup- 1.4 Methodology ported by an extensive literature review, face- to-face interviews of key stakeholders in Eu- With the objective of providing a common un- rope and in the United States, and a review of derstanding of space security challenges and the study’s progress by a board of recognised analysing a potential way forward in transat- international experts. An overview of the gen- lantic relations in security in outer space, the eral methodology is provided below: study aims to provide:

Figure 2: General approach to the problematic

ESPI Report 66 8 October 2018 Security in Outer Space: Perspectives on Transatlantic Relations

The review of European and U.S. approaches Space Situational Awareness, Space Environ- aimed to disentangle the strategy and policy ment Protection and Preservation, Space In- frameworks adopted in this field in Europe and frastructure Security). This overview takes in the United States, in order to identify ele- into account three fields of action: ments that influence each partner’s attitude to  Capacity-building programmes; cooperation/coordination. The analysis is based on the collection and review of relevant  Legal and regulatory regimes; strategy (i.e. general long-term direction), and policy (i.e. statement of position directing  Diplomatic and cooperation frameworks. responses or actions) documents, upon which For this overview, the study followed the cat- activities and decisions are based. egorization matrix prepared by ESPI for a pre- The analysis of strategy and policy frameworks vious report in order to organise actions and was complemented with a comprehensive measures related to security in outer space by overview of implementing activities across the domain and field of action as shown in the fig- three areas of security in outer space (i.e. ure below:

Awareness (SSA) • SST capabilities development • Space objects registration • SSA data sharing agreements Monitor space envi- • Space weather models devel- obligations and procedures • Transparency and Confi- ronment threats opment • SSA data policy dence-Building Measures • SSA services delivery

Space Environment Examples: Examples: Examples: Protection and • Curative technologies devel- • Space law (e.g. end-of-life • Space Debris Mitigation Preservation (SEPP) opment (e.g. active debris re- obligations) Guidelines Keep the space envi- moval solutions) • Standards for space environ- • Long-term sustainability ronment safe to oper- ment-friendly satellite design guidelines ate in (e.g. passivation devices) • International Code of Con- duct proposal Space Infrastructure Examples: Examples: Examples: Security (SIS) • Security enhancing technolo- • Space programme security • Collision avoidance proce- Protect the space in- gies development (e.g. se- rules and procedures dures and coordination frastructure from cure links) • Security and safety standards • Deterrence through hosted threats • Resilient system architec- • Supply chain control pro- payloads on allies’ satellites Security in Outer Space subdomain Space Outer in Security tures (e.g. fragmented sys- cesses (e.g. export/import tems) rules, testing procedures)

Table 2: Examples of ‘Security in Outer Space’ measures by field and domain category The analysis of European and U.S. approaches For this last point, an assessment of the way was completed with a review of current trans- forward was conducted through a significant atlantic relations and cooperation frameworks. number of interviews both in Europe and in the The analysis then focused on the assessment United States. The information collected from of space security transatlantic collaboration the interviewees listed below helped shape the with the overarching aim of supporting the findings and later recommendations by identi- identification of key areas of reinforced coop- fying potential areas for reinforced coopera- eration/coordination. This assessment was tion. The results of the previous analytical performed through: work and of the discussions with stakeholders across the Atlantic paved the way for the prep-  An analysis of the integration of transat- aration of main takeaways in the context of lantic cooperation in respective ap- space security from a transatlantic perspec- proaches to space security; tive, and the identification of key areas and  A review of the achievements of, and lim- potential options for transatlantic cooperation its to, current transatlantic cooperation development in the field. The third part of the frameworks; analysis was therefore to provide recommendations regarding areas of cooperation, and  The identification and analysis of drivers models to enhance bilateral coordination, to of and barriers to reinforced transatlantic policy makers and interested stakeholders in cooperation at the strategic, political and the field of space security. operational levels.

ESPI Report 66 9 October 2018

2. The United States: Consolidating Leadership for National Security

With this sentiment, the administration established the National Space Policy (2006), an 2.1 Legacy of Successive U.S. overarching national policy that governed the conduct of U.S. space activities and envisioned Space Policies space activities to strengthen and maintain national security.16 The document implied the The current U.S. strategy for security in outer objective of ‘dominance and control’ in the space largely builds on the legacy of previous space domain by prioritising U.S. defence and administrations. Hence, understanding the security above all else. Equally important, the key tenets and objectives of the incumbent ad- document underscored a patent unilateral at- ministration’s approach to space security first titude to space security issues and character- requires an assessment of the policy develop- ised the role of U.S. space diplomacy merely ments made under the presidencies of George in terms of persuading other nations to sup- W. Bush and Barack Obama. port U.S. policy.17 The United States entered the 21st century The year 2007 brought two issues to the top with a rising dependence on space systems, of the security agenda for space: the chal- with GPS, alone, enabling 16 of the 18 Critical lenges posed by anti-satellite (ASAT) weap- Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR).13 As ons, and orbital debris. In response to the Chi- a result, the posture of the G.W. Bush admin- nese ASAT test of 2007, the U.S. government istration reflected the fact that space had be- adopted an even more aggressive approach to come an even more important component of space security, drafting documents that envi- U.S. economic security and national security. sioned a restructuring of military commands President G.W. Bush envisioned that the and increased funding for research and devel- United States would establish “space leader- opment of space-relevant technologies, in- ship and ensure that space capabilities are cluding counter-space developments, im- available in time to further U.S. national secu- proved tracking of space objects and light- rity, homeland security, and foreign policy ob- weight sensors. jectives”.14 The events of 9/11 and the Second While U.S. leadership in space remained the Gulf War further deepened U.S. military reli- core focus of the Obama administration (2009- ance on space systems and led to a departure 2017), from 2009 the U.S. government shifted from the approach of the previous administra- away from the unilateral stance of the Bush tion towards a more assertive stance. More administration and took a more internationally specifically, the military operational and tacti- focused approach, promoting U.S. space secu- cal advantages offered by space promoted the rity through cooperation where the United idea that the United States ought to take con- States would “lead in the enhancement of se- trol of the ‘ultimate high-ground’, by further- curity, stability, and responsible behaviour in ing the country’s ability to use space for its space.”18,19 own purposes while denying it to potential adversaries.15

13 United States Department of Homeland Security. is only one part of the system that can be attacked. Offen- (2012). GPS Critical Infrastructure Timing Study. sive capabilities can be used to deceive, disrupt, deny, de- 14 National Space Policy. (1996). Presidential Decision Di- grade, or destroy any of the three elements of a space sys- rective/NSC-49/NSTC-8, [September 14, 1996]. tem: the satellite, the ground system, or the communica- 15 This ability is generally referred to as space superiority, tion links between them” (Weeden & Samson). whereas the set of capabilities or techniques that are used 16 National Space Policy of the United States of America. to gain space superiority are referred to as space control (2006). or counterspace. “Counterspace capabilities have both of- 17 Kaufman, M. (2006). ‘Bush Sets Defense As Space Pri- fensive and defensive elements, which are both supported ority’. The Washington Post, [October 18, 2006]. by SSA. Defensive counterspace helps protect one’s own 18 Broad, W. & Chang, K. (2010). ‘Obama Reverses space assets from attack, while offensive counterspace Bush’s Space Policy’. The New York Times, [June 28, tries to prevent the adversary from using their space as- 2010]. sets. Antisatellite (ASAT) weapons are a subset of offen- 19 United States National Space Policy (2010). sive counterspace capabilities, although the satellite itself

ESPI Report 66 10 October 2018 Security in Outer Space: Perspectives on Transatlantic Relations

Influenced by debris producing events, such nearly reached geostationary orbit (GEO), as the 2007 Chinese ASAT test and the 2009 36.000 kilometres, without any prior an- Iridium-Cosmos collision, the U.S. leadership nouncement. China announced that the launch became increasingly concerned about the mul- was for scientific purposes but an assessment tiplicity of hazards to its space capabilities and by the United States Air Force found China’s activities. The principal objective of most statement to be false. The rocket did not de- space security initiatives became to protect ploy any objects, which implies the possibility the space environment as well as space infra- of the test being a test of counterspace related structure from natural and man-made risks technologies. The launch and destination came and threats. Consistently, the concept of space as a surprise to the United States, as well as security was broadened to include “space sus- the world, and drew similarities to the Chinese tainability, stability, safety, and free access to, ASAT test of 2007, even without hitting any and use of, space to support vital national in- target.23 While it is impossible to know the true terests of all nations.”20 intentions of China in this case, the test generated worst-case assessments within the In terms of policy initiatives, Barack Obama’s American intelligence and security community. administration released a National Space Pol- They viewed the test as an important new icy in 2010 and a National Security Space threat to an orbit where many U.S. high-value Strategy (NSSS) in 2011. These two docu- intelligence satellites reside. In the same year, ments highlighted the current and future both Russia and China had also tested ma- space environment. The point stressed by the noeuvrable satellites in LEO,24 a capability pre- NSSS was that outer space had become in- viously demonstrated only by the United creasingly “congested, contested, and com- States. Such developments raised the ques- petitive”21 and – in contrast to the Bush policy tion of whether Russia and China were trying – prioritised orbital debris and space weather to catch up to the United States with their as two risks for U.S. space systems.22 space capabilities, and further exacerbated Overall, through those two documents the anxieties in the Pentagon and intelligence Obama administration directed the United community. States away from the national-security-ori- In 2013, the heightened threat perception re- ented strategy focused on U.S. “domination newed fears about a “Pearl Harbour in space”, and control” of space that had prevailed during leading policy-makers to openly speak about the George W. Bush administration, toward a space being a war-fighting domain. They also more cooperative, civilian, and commercial- compelled President Obama to order the Na- oriented programme overall. In terms of space tional Security Council to lead a Strategic security strategy, the pre-Bush approach of Space Portfolio Review (SPR) during the sum- “strategic restraint” was again favoured, mer of 2014.25 The effort led to changes in whereby the United States would restrain itself force posture, development programs and from introducing offensive capabilities, while budgets, toward a more robust U.S. national seeking to moderate the behaviour of both security space strategy.26 Following the SPR, friends and potential foes. Instead, it would fo- the Pentagon and the Air Force began an ag- cus on technology development in areas such gressive public diplomacy effort, notifying po- as space situational awareness (SSA) and tential threatening actors that the United Space Weather (SWE), two areas where coop- States would respond to threats with force. eration could also be promoted. Such rhetoric was reminiscent of the Bush ad- The Obama administration’s approach to ministration’s “domination and control” motif. space security faced a major turning point in

May 2013, when China launched a rocket that

20 Rose, F. (2012). Space Sustainability through Interna- 25 The SPR concluded “there was a need to identify tional Cooperation. U.S. Department of State, [March 01, threats in space, be able to withstand aggressive counter- 0212]. https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/rls/184897.htm space programs, and counter adversary space capabilities. 21 United States National Security Space Strategy (2011). Following the SPR, senior military leadership began to talk It was congested with space debris and new satellites, publicly about the inevitability of conflict on earth extending contested with new threats coming from old and new to space and the need for the military to prepare to defend spacefaring nations, and competitive with the rise of com- itself in space. There was also increased focus on prepar- mercial actors. ing to “fight a war in space”, even though senior U.S. mili- 22 See National Space Policy of the United States of tary leaders expressed no desire to start one. A similar America, (2010). https://www.nasa.gov/sites/.../na- shift in tone can also be seen in academic writings from tional_space_policy_6-28-10.pdf U.S. military journals calling for renewed focus on fighting 23 Mike Gruss (2015) SpaceNews. https://space- wars in space and offensive space control. The U.S. Con- news.com/pentagon-says-2013-chinese-launch-may-have- gress also weighed in, calling for a study on how to deter tested-antisatellite-technology/ and defeat adversary attacks on U.S. space systems, and 24 Weeden, B. (2014), ‘Through a Glass, Darkly: Chinese, specifically the role of offensive space operations.” American, and Russian Anti-satellite Testing in Space’, 26 Hitchens, T., Johnson-Freese, J. (2016), Toward a New Space Review. National Security Space Strategy, Atlantic Council, p.iii.

ESPI Report 66 11 October 2018

The United States has maintained a similar new privatised and commercial space capabil- stance on space security with the “America ities into all national space activities, to field- First” theme set by the Trump administration. ing new and dominant space deterrence and Marked by a strong interest in space and the war-fighting capabilities and doctrine.27 In or- security dimension of space activities, the der to get a more comprehensive understand- agenda for the White House on space policy ing of the current administration’s approach to remains substantial and overarching, from ra- space security, the various policy initiatives tionalising space launch, to fully integrating undertaken under President Donald Trump’s tenure must be outlined. term goals for space activities. The executive order clarifies that the NSpC is "a central hub 2.2 New U.S. Policy Frame- guiding space policy within the administration" and is responsible for fostering “close coordi- work for Security in Outer nation, cooperation, and technology and information exchange” among government agen- Space cies and the commercial space sector.29 The council has met three times since its re-institution, first on October 5, 2017, second on 2.2.1 U.S. Strategies and Policy Directives Re- February 21, 2018, and third on June 18, lated to Space Security 2018. President Trump’s first measure to promote The re-establishment of the NSpC was a step- security in Outer Space came on June 30, ping-stone in the development of the admin- 2017, when he re-established the National istration’s posture to space security issues. In Space Council (NSpC) through an executive part, building on the outcome of the Council’s order. The National Space Council was last ac- meetings and advice on national security con- tive at the end of the administration of Presi- cerns, the administration issued three policy dent George H.W. Bush in 1993. The National directives, one after each meeting. These doc- Space Council's role is to “provide a coordi- uments outline and modify the basic U.S. pos- nated process for developing and monitoring ture in key areas of outer space activities. A the implementation of national space policy timeline of these policy documents is provided and strategy”28 and review the nation's long- in Figure 3.

June 18, 2018 June 30, 2017 SPD-3 directing the U.S. Executive Order March 23, 2018 to lead the reviving the Unveiled management of traffic National Space National Space & mitigate the effects Council Strategy of debris in space

December 11,2017 May 24, 2018 SPD-1 instructing SPD-2 NASA to return the reforming U.S. to the Moon space regulatory framework

Figure 3: Review of key strategy and policy documents provisions (ESPI)

27 Space News (2017). ‘President Trump reestablishes https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presiden- National Space Council’. Available at: https://space- tial-executive-order-reviving-national-space-council/ news.com/breaking-president-trump-reestablishes-na- 29 White House (2017). Presidential Executive Order on tional-space-council/, (June 30, 2017). Reviving the National Space Council, (June 30, 2017). 28 White House (2017). Presidential Executive Order on Reviving the National Space Council, (June 30, 2017).

ESPI Report 66 12 October 2018 Security in Outer Space: Perspectives on Transatlantic Relations

Space Policy Directive-1 United States will seek to achieve these priorities through regulatory reform, public-private Drawing on the discussions and results of the partnerships, and by leveraging the National first NSpC meeting, President Trump issued Space Council to develop goals and strategies Space Directive-1 (SPD-1) on December 11, and promote innovation. 2017. The policy directs NASA to focus its human spaceflight efforts on return to the Moon, Additionally, the document declares the United and on to Mars after establishing a long term States will strengthen its space capabilities presence on the Moon.30 Rather than replacing through partnerships. The operative language the National Space Policy (2010) set in place reads as follows: “allies and partners magnify by Obama, the new directive merely modifies our power. We expect them to shoulder a fair and adds to the existing policy. The new direc- share of the burden of responsibility to protect tion for space exploration set by SPD-1 draws against common threats.” Such language illus- similarities to President Bush’s Vision for trates the administration policy of ‘America Space Exploration of 2004, which envisioned a first but not alone.’36 human return to the Moon by the year National Defense Strategy 2020.31,32 The first step in the United States establishing a permanent lunar presence is the The NSS was followed by the National Defense Lunar Orbital Platform – Gateway (LOP-G, or Strategy (NDS), released on 19 January 2018. Deep Space Gateway), a small human-tended The document articulates the U.S. strategy to facility in the lunar vicinity that will serve as a compete, deter, and win in an increasingly technology test bed, enabling human explor- complex security environment defined by ers to tackle the challenges and risks of explo- rapid technological change and challenges ration beyond low earth orbit.33 The LOP-G is from adversaries in every operating domain. to be constructed with the help of a large num- The Strategy acknowledges contested space ber of U.S. international partners. as a top challenge to be taken up by the U.S. military by stating, “attacks against our critical National Security Strategy defence, government, and economic infra- A few weeks after the release of the first space structure must be anticipated” during con- policy directive, the Trump administration is- flicts.37 The document also identifies space as sued the National Security Strategy (NSS), war-fighting domain together with cyber- setting the tone for the administration’s na- space. In this respect, the U.S. plans to “pri- tional security policy. Space constitutes an in- oritize investments in resilience, reconstitu- tegral part of the December 2017 NSS under tion, and operations to assure our space capa- the third pillar entitled “Preserve Peace bilities.” through Strength.” The pillar highlights the As a matter of continuity in this new environ- importance of "U.S. leadership in space activ- ment, the administration has increased the ities [which] has benefited the global econ- military budget for space programs by 14 per- omy, enhanced national security, strength- cent. The new strategy stresses the im- ened international relationships, advanced sci- portance of sustained, long-term investment entific discovery, and improved way of life.”34 in the modernization of key capabilities. Figure To retain U.S. dominance in space, the strat- 4 (below) illustrates the long-term budget egy lists three priority actions — to “advance forecast to reinforce such capabilities through space as a priority domain,” “promote space fiscal years 2019-2023. commerce,” and “maintain leadership in exploration.”35 The document outlines that the

30 The White House (2017). Presidential Memorandum on 33 NASA (2018). ‘The Global Exploration Roadmap’ Reinvigorating America’s Human Space Exploration Pro- https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/at- gram. Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/presiden- oms/files/ger_2018_small_mobile.pdf tial-actions/presidential-memorandum-reinvigorating-amer- 34 National Security Strategy of the United States of Amer- icas-human-space-exploration-program/. ica (2017). 31 NASA (2017). 'New Space Policy Directive Calls for Hu- 35 Ibid. man Expansion Across Solar System', NASA Release 17- 36 http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/344531-ad- 097. Available at: https://www.nasa.gov/press-re- ministration-policy-is-america-first-its-not-america-alone lease/new-space-policy-directive-calls-for-human-expan- 37 National Defense Strategy of the United States of sion-across-solar-system, (December 11, 2017). America (2018). 32 National Aeronautics and Space Administration (2004). The Vision for Space Exploration.

ESPI Report 66 13 October 2018

Figure 4: Overview of DoD Space budget38 As the National Defense Strategy notes, “in- the broader motifs set by the National Security vestments will prioritize ground, air, sea and Strategy, emphasising peace through strength space forces that can deploy, survive, operate, in the space domain: manoeuvre, and regenerate in all domains  Protect the U.S. vital interest in space – to while under attack.” The U.S. space invest- ensure unfettered access to, and freedom ments include: to operate in space, in order to advance  5 Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles - America’s security, economic prosperity, $2.0 billion; and scientific knowledge;  Global Positioning System - $1.5 billion;  Affirm that any harmful interference with or attack upon critical components of U.S.  Space Based Infrared System - $0.8 bil- space architecture that directly affects lion. this vital interest will be met with a delib- Like the National Security Strategy, the Na- erate response at a time, place, manner, tional Defense Strategy stresses the need to and domain of our choosing; strengthen alliances and attract new partners.  Recognize that their competitors and ad- By working together with allies and partners, versaries have turned space into a war- the United States recognises that when pool- fighting domain; ing “resources and sharing responsibility for our common defence, our security burden be-  Seek to deter, counter, and defeat threats comes lighter. Our allies and partners provide in the space domain that are hostile to the complementary capabilities and forces along national interests of the United States and with unique perspectives, regional relation- their allies.41 ships, and information that improve our un- The strategy also features four “essential pil- derstanding of the environment and expand lars” that constitute a “whole-of-government” our options.”39 approach to United States leadership in space, National Space Strategy in close partnership with the private sector and allies. Three of those pillars are related to na- Soon after the NSS and NDS documents, Pres- tional security activities in space, including a ident Trump unveiled a new National Space shift to more resilient space architectures, Strategy in March 2018. The new strategy is strengthening deterrence and war-fighting op- meant to fit into the “America First” theme of tions in space, while the fourth pillar is de- the Trump administration, seeking to protect voted to developing “conducive” environments American interests in space through revised for working with commercial and international military space approaches and commercial partners. regulatory reform.40 The document reinforces

38 SagasIT Analytics. (2018). The Space Budget. 39 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (2018). 40 Mike Wall (2017). SpaceNews. https://www.space.com/40700-trump-space-policy-private-spaceflight-deregulation.html 41 National Space Strategy of the United States of America (2018).

ESPI Report 66 14 October 2018 Security in Outer Space: Perspectives on Transatlantic Relations

Finally, the strategy backs cooperation with in-  Advance SSA and STM Science and Tech- ternational partners as done in previous poli- nology; cies, however emphasising that international  Mitigate the effect of orbital debris on agreements need to “put the interests of space activities; American people, workers, and businesses first.”42 This refers to the strong economic pro-  Encourage and facilitate U.S. commercial tection promoted by the United States for the leadership in S&T, SSA, and STM; space industry.  Provide U.S. Government-supported basic Space Policy Directive-2 SSA data and basic STM services to the public at no cost; In line with his Administration’s priority to bolster the space economy, the President released the  Improve SSA data interoperability and en- Space Policy Directive-2 (SPD-2) in May 2017. able greater SSA data sharing; SPD-2 instructs the Secretary of Transporta- tion to devise a new regulatory regime for  Develop STM standards and best prac- launch and re-entry activities, and to consider tices; requiring just a single license for all such com-  Prevent unintentional radio frequency mercial operations.43 With this policy, the ad- (RF) interference; ministration is “committed to ensuring that the federal government streamlines the process  Improve the U.S. domestic space object and helps private enterprise in supporting the registry; 44 economic success of the United States.”  Develop policies and regulations for future Space Policy Directive 2 then directly instructs U.S. orbital operations. the Commerce Department to consolidate its various space responsibilities into a “one-stop SPD-3 shifts responsibility for disseminating shop” regulatory office. space situational awareness (SSA) data to satellite operators from the Department of De- Space Policy Directive-3 fense to the Department of Commerce (DoC), Continuing from SPD-2, and also coming at the by directing the DoC to provide a basic level of recommendation of the National Space Coun- space situational awareness “free of direct 48 cil, President Trump signed a third Space Pol- user fees.” icy Directive (SPD-3) on June 18, 2018. The The Directive instructs the DoC “to develop primary focus of SPD-3 is on space traffic stronger relationships with private organiza- 45 management, which is a highly critical issue tions to more easily share SSA data.”49 To fa- to ensuring the security of operation of U.S. cilitate greater data sharing with satellite op- private actors in space. The House Science erators and enable the commercial develop- Committee reinforced the position of the Pres- ment of enhanced space safety services, the ident with the approval of the American Space Directive tasks the DoC to “be responsible for Situational Awareness and Framework for En- the publicly releasable portion of the DoD cat- tity (SAFE) Management Act, on June 27, alogue and for administering an open architec- 46 2018. The bill tasks the Commerce Depart- ture data repository.”50 The DoC is also in- ment to provide space traffic management structed to develop standards and best prac- services, such as collision warnings, to civil tices for pre-launch risk and on-orbit collision and commercial satellite operators within one assessments. year of the bill’s enactment.47 Development of a regulatory framework for STM has become a NASA was given the responsibility of leading top priority as more actors join the space do- efforts in updating the U.S. Orbital Debris Mit- main, furthering the challenges of the con- igation Standard Practices (ODMSP), “but also gested space environment. The overarching incorporate sections to address operating goals of the new Directive are: practices for large constellations, rendezvous and proximity operations, small satellites, and

42 Ibid. 46 H.R. 6226, the American Space Situational Awareness 43 Mike Wall (2018). SpaceNews. and Framework for Entity Management Act is yet to be https://www.space.com/40700-trump-space-policy-private- voted on by the House. spaceflight-deregulation.html 47 Foust, J. (2018). ‘House Science Committee approves 44 U.S. Government. (2018). Space Policy Directive-2, space traffic management bill’, SpaceNews, (June 27, Streamlining Regulations on Commercial Use of Space . 2018). 45 U.S. Government. (2018). Space Policy Directive-3, Na- 48 U.S. Government. (2018). Space Policy Directive-3, Na- tional Space Traffic Management Policy, (June 18, 2018). tional Space Traffic Management Policy, (June 18, 2018). Note: “Space Traffic Management shall mean the planning, (Sec. 5. (a)(ii)). coordination, and on-orbit synchronization of activities to 49 Ibid. enhance the safety, stability, and sustainability of opera- 50 Ibid. tions in the space environment.”

ESPI Report 66 15 October 2018

other classes of space operations.”51 The De- 2.2.2 Disentangling Key Tenets and Objectives partment of Transportation (DoT) will then of the United States work with the Commerce Department and the FCC to incorporate the updated debris mitiga- A comprehensive assessment of the various tion standards into their respective licensing policy documents released during the first 18 processes. months of President Trump’s tenure illustrates the key tenets and objectives of the administration posture vis-à-vis space security. These can be depicted under a ‘triad’ of concepts corresponding to technical, martial and diplomatic measures, as detailed in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Elements of Defending the U.S. National Space Assets52 System Protection Measures and the Role future, including in the security domain (e.g. of Commercial Space through military-commercial partnerships for meeting some military necessities in various The first element, system protection fields). The National Space Strategy holds that measures, includes activities that serve the teaming up with commercial firms is a strong security objectives of preventing and deterring way to improve System Protection Measures aggression, defeating attacks and operating in and enhance the resiliency of the U.S. space a degraded environment. These are primarily architecture. This is not surprising considering technological solutions to enhance the safety that the lines between military, civil and com- and survivability of space systems. System mercial assets are increasingly blurred (see protection involves upgrading current systems Figure 6), and the United States is gradually where possible, and constructing future sys- becoming more reliant on commercial space tems to be more survivable and thus less vul- for national security (e.g. the DoD relies on nerable to collision, interference, or attack.53 commercial satellite communications systems What is also noteworthy about the U.S. pos- for more than 40% of its communications ture is the ever-growing prominence of com- needs).54 mercial space. For the United States, private space entities will play a significant role in the

51 U.S. Government. (2018). Space Policy Directive-3, Na- 53 National Security Space Defense and Protection: Public tional Space Traffic Management Policy, (June 18, 2018). Report (2016), p.25-29. (Sec. 5. (a)(iii)). 54 Department of Defense, Chief Information Officer, “Sat- 52 Adapted from U.S. Space Strategy (2018) and inspired ellite Communications Strategy ReportAugust 14, 2014. by the triad model build in National Security Space De- fense and Protection: Public Report (2016).

ESPI Report 66 16 October 2018 Security in Outer Space: Perspectives on Transatlantic Relations

Figure 6: Growing convergence of sectors, products, and services55 While opening new options for U.S. national cost of doing so is too high. Through the 2018 security, military-commercial partnerships National Space Strategy, the United States also bring new vulnerabilities, as commercial makes clear that it is ready to retaliate to at- assets can also become targets of potential attacks in any necessary and proportional re- tacks from adversaries. It is in that vein that sponse, but not necessarily solely in space as the administration is also considering extend- deterrence measures draw upon the full array ing national security protections to govern- of elements of national power, including diplo- ment private sector partners as needed. To matic, intelligence, military, and economic address their vulnerabilities, commercial ac- tools. tors are required to evaluate the information What is noticeable about the current U.S. ap- security recommendations of the Defense De- proach is the token consideration given to the partment, National Institute of Standards and military aspects of deterrence. The admin- Technology and the International Organization istration openly envisions space as a war- for Standards.56 Fleet operators such as In- fighting domain, placing an increased focus on marsat, Intelsat, SES and Eutelsat follow ex- the topic of space superiority and on preparing tensive requirements included in government to ‘fight a war in space’, thereby challenging regulations and government contracts, rang- long-standing maxims on the need to avoid ing from encryption of spacecraft commands space confrontations because of the high risks to protecting ground stations from cyber and of escalation. There have been explicit sugges- physical intrusion.57 Another way companies tions on focusing on how to fight a “limited” improve the security of their assets is by shar- space war. Even though senior U.S. military ing information with one another and with leaders have expressed no desire to start government agencies, including the Depart- one.59 In addition, as a recent report by Se- ment of Homeland Security and the Defense cure World foundation reported, a similar shift Department.58 in tone can also be seen in academic writings Deterrence and Space as a Warfighting from U.S. military journals calling for renewed Domain focus on fighting wars in space and offensive space control. The U.S. Congress has also The second key tenet in the U.S. approach to weighed in, calling for a study on how to deter space security is deterrence: discouraging ad- and defeat adversary attacks on U.S. space versaries from interfering with or attacking systems, and specifically the role of offensive U.S. space systems either because there is no space operations.60 value in doing so or the actual or threatened

55 National Security Space Defense and Protection: Public Report (2016), p. 15. 56 Werner, D. (2018). ‘Satellite communications firms remain vigilant as cyber threats evolve’, SpaceNews, (February 20, 2018). 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid. 59 Elbridge Colby, From Sanctuary to Battlefield, Center for New American Security, January 27, 2016. https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/from-sanctuary-to-battlefield-a-framework-for-a-us-defense-and-deterrence-strategy- for-space 60 U.S. Congress. (2018). https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/3979/text

ESPI Report 66 17 October 2018

Early indications are that the overt develop- favourable. “The new strategy ensures that in- ment of space weapons will be pursued, alt- ternational agreements put the interests of hough only a small amount of funding has American people, workers, and businesses been allocated to space control in the public first”. In short, it can be argued that the basic DoD budget. In addition, the United States American strategy for dealing with space se- “continues to hold annual space war games curity challenges at the diplomatic level is to and exercises that increasingly involve close bring other states that are willing to team-up allies and commercial partners.” It is under with the United States into a coalition that this “space control” tenet that the present ad- would be able to set rules and standards for ministration has been also considering the es- the enhancement of security, stability, and re- tablishment of a “Space Force” within the De- sponsible behaviour in outer space. As under fense Department. the Obama administration, partnering with like-minded states continues to be given more Diplomacy and Regime Formation prominence than working with international The third tenet of the space security triad is organisations, which may lessen U.S. bargain- coalition formation and international regimes. ing power. Cooperation in space security is perceived as unavoidable for the overall success and efficiency of a variety of actions and measures, 2.2.3 Preparing a National Approach to Space including in the development of advanced SSA Traffic Management capabilities and safety of operations in outer The most important stakeholder in civil SSA is space. currently the Department of Defense but, as In January 2018, U.S. Vice President Pence discussed above, the United States has shifted declared that, even though his policies always many SSA responsibilities to the Department aim to put America first, this “does not mean of Commerce. The recent Space Policy Direc- America alone.” With specific respect to space tives have placed a focus on Space Traffic security, the various strategic documents re- Management, which is becoming a key area of leased under the Trump presidency all men- relevance for promoting space infrastructure tion the need to strengthen alliances and at- security. The development of a Space Traffic tract new partners to provide complementarity Management (STM) framework that can be ap- to “improve our understanding of the environ- plied internationally is part of the “soft power” ment and expand our options.” To this end, strategy of creating coalitions and proposing U.S. space security actors intend to establish regulations. Through a series of key policy partnerships with commercial, governmental, documents and meetings, the current admin- and international organizations in the field of istration is laying the ground work for global SSA, space environment protection, and space STM. With the SPD-3, the United States aims infrastructure security. More specifically, the to remain a leader in providing a safe and se- benefits of alliances and partnerships con- cure environment as commercial and civil tribute to the four lines of effort described in space traffic increases. The policy reads: the implementation plan for the National “To maintain U.S. leadership in space, we Space Strategy, namely:61 must develop a new approach to space traffic  Mission assurance management (STM) that addresses current and future operational risks. This new ap-  Deterrence and war-fighting proach must set priorities for space situational  Organisational support awareness (SSA) and STM innovation in science and technology (S&T), incorporate na-  Creating conducive domestic and international security considerations, encourage tional environments for U.S. space objec- growth of the U.S. commercial space sector, tives. establish an updated STM architecture, and Each of these lines of effort can be strength- promote space safety standards and best ened with the involvement of allies and part- practices across the international commu- ners. Thus, “America first does not mean nity.”62 America alone” is a meaningful phrase for the According to the SPD-3, the Department of future of space collaboration in the United Transportation and Department of Commerce States. While the National Defence strategy will assist in working toward developing STM backs cooperation with international partners, standards and best practices. This includes it also emphasizes that the United States will “technical guidelines, minimum safety stand- do so only on terms the administration deems

61 Assistant Secretary of Defense Kenneth Rapuano in 62 White House (2018), Space Policy Directive-3, National his testimony to the House Armed Services Subcommit- Space Traffic Management Policy. tee on Strategic Forces [March 2018].

ESPI Report 66 18 October 2018 Security in Outer Space: Perspectives on Transatlantic Relations

ards, behavioural norms, and orbital conjunc- tendency to panic when other, potentially tion prevention protocols related to pre-launch hostile, nations develop the same capabil- risk assessment and on-orbit collision avoid- ities, such as satellite manoeuvring. ance support services.”63 Moreover, the State  National security: The United States Department is instructed to lead discussions has and will prioritize its national security. with international partners to develop non- The notion is comparable to military supe- binding guidelines on how to increase interna- riority, however, it considers the notion of tional transparency for STM (see Annex 6). ‘country, defence, and security’ rather The State Department was instructed to lead than domination and power in the field. It discussions with international partners to de- stresses the gathering of data and intelli- velop non-binding guidelines on how to in- gence (knowing what others are doing in crease international transparency for STM. view of monitoring and detecting a This could potentially pave the way to new in- threat). With such a large infrastructure in ternational cooperation with key partners, place, the United States logically has huge while enhancing U.S. global leadership in strategic stakes in space activities. In ad- space. The authority of the Department of De- dition, as the uptake of space services is fense to provide space situational awareness further integrating in the economy, grow- data to commercial and foreign entities will ing reliance on the space infrastructure terminate on January 1, 2024.64 International becomes highly critical, but increasingly cooperation can also be driven by larger policy vulnerable. objectives and be part of a strategy to advance  Foster Commercial Space: The United foreign policy, innovation, or trade policy States views its commercial space sector goals. as the key to its future success in its space security infrastructure. The United States 2.2.4 U.S. Strategy and Policy Rationales for Se- has taken a hands-off regulatory ap- curity in Outer Space in a Nutshell proach in nurturing the development of the commercial space industry. This ap- The US has made major strides in embedding proach has seen a boom in innovation and space as a core component of the political, development of new space capabilities. economic, and national security framework. This is most notably seen in the recent The new policies have simply reorganized and Space Policy Directives; rather than pro- restructured the space infrastructure into a hibiting commercial actors, the Directives new framework. This can be seen from the are meant to streamline the regulatory start of the 21st century to today. Though process, making it easier for commercial there have been multiple administration actors to operate. As such, the Directives changes, the overall rationales that drive U.S. have been met with near universal praise space security policy have remained con- from commercial actors. The goal is to sistent. The rationales are as follows: nurture companies and even individual projects beyond public programs in order  Military superiority: space assets are to increase competitiveness within the critical for U.S. military operations; hence budding space economy. Competitiveness space assets must be secured. This is a between these actors has brought tre- component of the resilience of national as- mendous innovation to the U.S. industrial sets. For decades, Administrations have base while having a positive impact on the adopted the idea of “peace through economy. While commercial actors are strength” by outspending and out-devel- not necessarily pillars of the space secu- oping the rest of the world in space tech- rity infrastructure, they are set to play a nologies. Deterrence from attack and mit- major role in the future of space security. igating vulnerabilities currently found in Some of the greatest innovations in debris the U.S. space infrastructure are currently mitigation, satellite servicing, and satellite a top priority across all space actors within capability development are coming from the nation. The proposed Space Force is a the commercial sector. Additionally, com- way to reinforce the deterrence measures panies such as Analytical Graphics, Inc. of the nation while also reorganizing cur- (AGI) have become hugely important to rent military space capabilities to possibly the processing of SSA data. react and counter any threats U.S. space infrastructure might face. The United  Global leadership in space: Leadership States wants to be the only country in the in the space security domain (e.g. capa- world with certain capabilities and has the bilities, best practices, standards…) has

63 U.S. Government. (2018). Space Policy Directive-3, Na- 64 House Armed Services Committee (2018), Section tional Space Traffic Management Policy, (June 18, 2018). 1603 of the chairman’s bill, “Space Situational Awareness (Sec. 6. (f)). Services and Information.”

ESPI Report 66 19 October 2018

become a key lever for global leadership Force Space Command provides military in the space sector at large. The U.S is focused space capabilities; leveraging its space capabilities and polit-  The National Aeronautics and Space ical power to utilize the concept of ‘soft Administration (NASA), which is ac- leadership’ where it leads by example. tively involved in Space Security at oper- The general stance of the United States is ational level as it operates its own satel- that it considers space as a strategic high lites, sometimes in collaboration with ground, where the preservation of the other federal agencies, designs and man- U.S. technological edge has been deemed ages a number of projects with security necessary to promote national security dimensions. NASA dedicates more than and maximise the country’s overall inter- 15% of its USD 18.1 billion budget to national power. However, it also recog- safety and security programmes;66 nises the need for international partnerships for strengthening geopolitical rela-  The Federal Aviation Administration tionships, redundancy, and collaboration. (FAA) oversees the issuing of launch li- Without these partnerships, United States censes for launch providers; space security infrastructure would be no- where near where it is today. This stance  The National Oceanic and Atmos- will be further expanded on in the next pheric Administration (NOAA), which chapter. is under the responsibility of DoC, operates and exploits weather monitoring satellites;  The Federal Communications Com- 2.3 Overview of U.S. Activi- mission (FCC) issues licenses for satel- ties and Capabilities lite constellations for which requirements have been produced; To prevent a loss or disruption of its space ca-  Commercial Operators, such as Intel- pabilities from occurring, the U.S military is sat, Orbcomm, Globalstar, which operate charged with protecting the space infrastruc- and exploit their own fleet and have al- ture from harm and ensuring reliable space ready gained experience in participation in operations. However, many civilian entities space security-related activities, are also participate in the protection of the U.S. funded through the DoD. space infrastructure, notably federal agencies, NGOs, and even commercial companies. Six United States space security is primarily main actors – both public and private – can be viewed as a subset of security policies, considered as having major roles in the secu- measures aimed at enhancing the protection rity of U.S. space activities. They are as fol- of space assets have been implemented in ac- lows: cordance with U.S. national security strategies. Notably, these have guided a wide range  The Department of Defence (DoD), of technical, legal, military and diplomatic ac- which plays a highly strategic role in the tions intended to both advance the resiliency field of space security, as it operates the of U.S. space systems and to deter possible US SSA system through the US Strategic aggression while also promoting norms of re- Command and was, until recently, the of- sponsible behaviour in space. ficial interlocutor for fostering cooperation schemes with international partners. DoD Consistent with the space security compo- also funds many projects related to Space nents outlined in the previous chapter of this Security. The Defense Advanced Research report, this next section focuses on current Projects Agency (DARPA) is an agency of U.S. activities in the field of Space Situational the DoD that conducts fundamental R&D Awareness (SSA), Space Environment Protec- for the government. DARPA’s scope of re- tion and Preservation (SEPP) and Space Infra- search also covers key areas in Space Se- structure Security (SIS). curity, such as launchers and Space Situ- 65 ational Awareness; 2.3.1 Space Situational Awareness  The Armed Forces are the primary role in defence and security matters related to Over the past two decades, the United States outer space. Within the U.S. Armed has had growing concerns over the increase in Forces, most space activities are funded the number of space objects and the develop- through the Air Force budget. The Air ment of ASAT capabilities by adversaries.

65 Foust, J. Space News. (2015) https://space- 66 https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquar- news.com/darpa-space-efforts-address-u-s-reliance-on- ters.../2018_AST_Compendium.pdf space/

ESPI Report 66 20 October 2018 Security in Outer Space: Perspectives on Transatlantic Relations

These concerns have elevated the importance through the Joint Space Operations Center, re- of space surveillance as a tool for measuring ferred to as JSpOC or 18th Space Control the increase in space debris and other poten- Squadron (SPCS).70 The initial purpose of tial security challenges posed to operational JspOC was to track artificial objects in Earth satellites. Space situational awareness (SSA) orbit for military purposes but was extended in indicates that the focus is not just on tracking 2005 to monitoring and cataloguing objects for space objects but also on generating infor- public use. The SSN is composed of ground- mation about the entire space environment, based radars and optical sensors that produce including space weather, Near-Earth Objects orbiting objects’ ephemeris, or approximate and radio frequency interference (RFI).67 location, and allow the US military to monitor global launch activity on an unprecedented Space Surveillance and Tracking scale.71 The U.S. budget for SST efforts aver- The U.S. orbital tracking system is the most ages about $ 1.0 billion per year for fiscal advanced in the world and relies on a wide na- years 2015 through 2020. tional infrastructure called the U.S. Space Sur- Currently, the U.S. system has the capability veillance Network (SSN), a network of 30 sur- of tracking approximately 22,000 objects veillance sensors, including radars and optical about 10 cms in LEO and 1m in GEO. However, telescopes operated by military and civilian the deployment of the U.S. Space Fence, a entities.68 The DoD, including U.S. Strategic $1.594 million programme72 expected to be Command (USSTRATCOM), NASA, the FAA Of- operational in 2019,73 will drastically improve fice of Commercial Space Transportation and these performances, as the new system, once NOAA, are the federal organisations currently operational, will be able to track 500.000 ob- involved in the provision of civil SST services. jects between 1 and 10 centimetres and Figure 7 shows the activities covered by civil 200.000 objects as small as 5 centimetres. and military SST in the United States. This large-scale project is also going to increase the accuracy of payload identifications and risk conjunction predictions.74 A future second site is planned to go online in 2021.75 JspOC also maintains unclassified versions of SST data sets and generates warnings in the form of Conjunction Data Messages (CDMs) that are sent out to operators around the world. In addition, JspOC provides deorbit, re- entry, and disposal/end-of-life support. The U.S. stance on SSA cooperation has evolved over time. The Commercial and Foreign Enti- ties (CFE) Pilot Program formalised and streamlined the U.S. cooperation approach to SSA sharing in 2004, and was upgraded into a full-fledged SSA Sharing Program managed by Figure 7: Division of Labour between Civil and National the USSSTRATCOM in 2009. More than 70 Security SSA Data69 agreements of this kind have been signed with primarily commercial operators, such as launch providers, etc., and institutional actors. The authority in charge of the SST system is The main objective of entering into these the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRACOM), agreements pursued by the United States is part of the Joint Functional Component Com- indeed to promote international security and mand for Space, which operates the SSN safety cooperation among allies, to promote

67 Evaluating Options for Civil Space Situational Aware- internazionale, n.29,p. 5. Rome: Istituto Affari ness, IDA (2016). Internazionali 68 International Academy of Astronautics. (2017). Space 72 GAO (2015). Defense Acquisitions Assessments Of Se- Traffic Management: Towards a Roadmap for implementa- lected Weapon Programs. United States Government Ac- tion. Paris: IAA Cosmic Study countability Office Report to Congressional Committees: 69 Weeden (2014). Washington. Retrieved from https://www.gao.gov/as- Notes: Civil SSA data includes those data that are essen- sets/670/668986.pdf#page=133 tial to providing safety of space flight services. National Se- 73 Note: Just for needs of completeness, it should be no- curity SSA data builds upon the civil SSA data and in- ticed that the current Space Fence project goes to replace cludes data essential to characterizing actions and behav- the previous Air Force Space Surveillance System, one of iour in space and assessing potential threats. the SSN components active from 2008 to 2013. 70 Phillips, C. (2017). Time for common sense with the 74 NASA (2010). What Is Orbital Debris? Retrieved from satellite catalog. The Space Review. Retrieved from https://www.nasa.gov/audience/forstudents/5-8/fea- http://www.thespacereview.com/article/3215/1 tures/nasa-knows/what-is-orbital-debris-58.html 71 Briani, V. (2011). La Sicurezza nello Spazio: Risvolti 75 Lockheed Martin, (2018). Space Fence. Italiani e Internazionali, in Osservatorio di politica

ESPI Report 66 21 October 2018

the transparency of outer space activities, and U.S. service delivery system.76,77 Three ser- last but not least, to enhance the quality of the vice delivery levels can be identified:

Figure 8: Data access to the U.S. SSA System SpOC provides three different levels of access the Space Fence, a next-generation space sur- to SSN data as shown in the above graph. At veillance system; the Space Based Space Sur- the ‘Basic’ level, the Space-Track Platform is veillance satellite follow-on; and the Joint accessible online at www.space-track.org and Space Operations Center Mission System, a offers a catalogue of about 16,000 objects. three-phase hardware and software upgrade The Space Track catalogue provides the orbital intended to improve the precision and timeli- ephemeris of space objects through the Two- ness of space situational awareness infor- Line Element sets (TLEs), the Satellite Cata- mation.79 logue data and the Satellite Decay & Re-entry In addition to these programmes, the Defense Data. In addition to that service, the ‘Emer- Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) gency notification service’ is aimed at identify- has contributed to the creation of capabilities ing close approaches for active payloads – 20 for realising space domain awareness in real- to 30 warnings to operators through e-mails time. Two DARPA projects are particularly rel- and Conjunction Summary Messages (CSMs) evant in this regard: are issued every day. Finally, the ‘advanced service’ involves the establishment of a full-  Hallmark, for integrating real-time space fledged SSA sharing agreement that includes domain command and control (C2) capa- information exchange such as conjunction as- bilities for the U.S. space enterprise; sessment, anomaly resolution, electromagnetic interference investigation, and support  OrbitOutlook (O2), for improving the SSN to space activities.78 Recently, based on guid- through real-time detection using live ance in Space Policy Directive-3 to support the data feeds incorporated from seven SSA Department of Commerce’s transition as the data providers. lead U.S. authority for Space Traffic Manage- These two programmes envision unprece- ment, Space-Track.org began to receive addi- dented, real-time command, control, detec- tional data about some space objects that was tion, and tracking of space assets. DARPA’s not previously available. envisioned system could fuse information from Notwithstanding that U.S. SST capabilities are diverse sources, allowing potential actions to unmatched, the United States has also placed be simulated and effects determined in ad- continuous emphasis on the upgrading of its vance, and vastly reduce the overall time re- SST system so as to tackle the lengthy acqui- quired to make and execute decisions and ob- 80 sition timelines and keep pace with the ever- serve results. Such technologies are there- growing tracking requirements. In 2015, the fore not only valuable to the military, but to Air Force Space Command announced three the space community as a whole. unclassified Air Force programmes in the field:

76 Helms, S. (meeting of June 3, 2010). Space Situational 78 Major Courtland B. McLeod (2012). Space Situational Awareness. Power Point presentation for the United Na- Awareness (SSA) Sharing. United States Strategic Com- tions Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. mand 77 USSTRATCOM Public Affairs (2017). U.S. Strategic Space Policy. Retrieved from Command, Norway sign agreement to share space ser- http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/pres/stsc2012/tech-40E.pdf vices, data. Retrieved from U.S. Strategic Command 79 Gruss M. (2015). ‘U.S. Spending on Space Protection Peace is our Profession. Retrieved from http://www.strat- Could Hit $8 Billion through 2020’, referring to the words of com.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Arti- Gen. John Hyten, SpaceNews. (July 2, 2015). cle/1142970/us-strategic-command-norway-sign-agree- 80 DARPA (2018). ‘Hallmark’. Available at: ment-to-share-space-services-data/ https://www.darpa.mil/program/hallmark.

ESPI Report 66 22 October 2018 Security in Outer Space: Perspectives on Transatlantic Relations

Regarding the civil side of SSA, NASA is both tions and resiliency needs. The project was en- a provider and consumer of SSA data and is abled by Cooperative Research and Develop- heavily invested in and integrated into the cur- ment Agreements (CRADAs) approved by the rent JspOC system. NASA’s Conjunction As- Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL). Within sessment Risk Analysis (CARA) mission at the framework of that project, JspOC collabo- Goddard Space Flight Center is responsible for rated with Intelsat General Corp, SES- the safety of NASA robotic missions along with Government Solutions, Eutelsat-America, Irid- selected robotic missions from other civil and ium, Inmarsat, and Digital Globe.82 Daily ex- commercial customers, and engages in con- change with operators facilitated information junction assessment risk analyses for these sharing at operational level, bringing commer- missions. cial perspectives to the table – such as technical solutions, concerns, and best practices. NASA’s Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis Cooperation areas included theatre support, (CARA) is primarily concerned with the safe SSA, resiliency, threat mitigation and exer- operations of the International Earth Observ- cises including conjunction assessment and ing Constellations at the 705 km orbit. The space object catalogue maintenance, rapid CARA team works closely with the United identification, diagnosis, resolution. Satellite States Air Force’s JspOC to assess the risk of operators participated in the definition of the predicted potential close approaches between concept of operations (CONOP) through the NASA and International Earth observing assets establishment of relationships between stake- and other space objects. If a potential threat holders, procedures, and joint contingency from a secondary space object is detected, plans for space. CARA notifies the affected mission team. This is a three-step process between the JspOC, The involvement of commercial operators in the CARA team, and the mission Owner/Oper- DoD’s activities is beneficial not only for the ators (O/O): enhancement of the U.S. SSA system but also for strengthening interrelationships with them,  Identification of close approaches (i.e. especially in case of attack. Many satellite op- Conjunction Assessment); erators view JspOC’s Conjunction Summary  Screening to determine the risk posed by Messages as sufficient for their mission needs, a given conjunction event (i.e. Conjunc- but some commercial and governmental oper- tion Assessment Risk Analysis); and ators with more investment in space have seen the need to protect their assets by joining  Planning and execution of any risk mitiga- the Space Data Association (SDA) or purchas- tion strategies (i.e. Collision Avoidance). ing services from SSA companies.83 The DoD NOAA is also both a provider and consumer of estimates that more than 350 potential SSA SSA data and is increasingly integrated into sensors exist outside of the SSN.84 Many sat- the current JspOC system. As a provider, ellite operators view JspOC’s Conjunction NOAA’s activities mainly focus on Space Summary Messages as sufficient for their mis- Weather phenomena. Together with NASA and sion needs, but some commercial and govern- NOAA, and consistent with the current U.S. mental operators with greater investments in posture, commercial companies are becoming space have seen the need to protect their as- involved in the JspOC system. In 2018, JspOC sets by joining the Space Data Association conducted a commercial-military cooperation (SDA) or purchasing services from SSA com- pilot programme: the Commercial Integration panies. 81 Cell (CIC). The CIC aimed at building synergies between DoD and commercial space operators in the space sector for more coordination, timely responses to critical space opera-

81 See Intelsat website: https://www.intelsatgen- The analytical core of the SDA is the Space Data Center eral.com/blog/inside-the-commercial-integration-cell-pro- (SDC), run by Analytical Graphics, Inc. (AGI), and it project/http://www.stratcom.mil/Portals/8/Docu- vides the ability to ingest many different types of owner/opments/JSpOC%20Fact- erator positional data and manoeuvre plans. The Commer- sheet%20FINAL%20CAO.pdf?ver=2018-04-12-134128- cial Space Operations Center (ComSpOC) fuses satellite 903 tracking measurements from a global network of commer- 82 Buck, D. J. (2017), Statement before the House Armed cial sensors. ComSpOC is tracking 5,000+ total space ob- Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces on Fiscal Year jects, 75% of all active global GEO satellites and 100% of 2018 Priorities and Posture of the National Security Space all active GEO satellites over the continental U.S. Network Enterprise https://docs.house.gov/meet- of globally distributed optical, radio frequency, radar and ings/AS/AS29/20170519/105974/HHRG-115-AS29- space-based sensors. ComSpOC has more than 28 optical Wstate-BuckD-20170519.pdf sensors and one radar site. See: SSA Services - Current 83 The Space Data Association (SDA) is a membership- and Future US Capabilities, IDA (2018) based organization of satellite owner/operators that want 84 Government Accountability Office (2015). more accurate and up-to-date collision avoidance data.

ESPI Report 66 23 October 2018

Space Weather Near Earth Objects Together with object tracking, Space Weather A focus of U.S. SSA activities is Near Earth Ob- has received increased attention in the United jects (NEOs). In January 2016, the National States. The Obama administration released a Science and Technology Council (NSTC) con- dedicated policy for Space Weather Events in vened to define, coordinate, and oversee the 2015.85 The document coordinated inter- goals and programmatic priorities of Federal agency efforts to improve the nation’s ability science and technology activities related to po- to prepare, avoid, mitigate, respond to, and tentially hazardous near-Earth objects (NEOs). recover from the potentially devastating im- The primary goal of the Interagency Working pacts of space weather events. These efforts Group on Detecting and Mitigating the Impact included the establishment of the interagency of Earth-bound Near-Earth Objects (DAMIEN) Space Weather Operations, Research, and Mit- was to develop a National NEO Preparedness igation (SWORM) Task Force in 2014. The goal Strategy and Action Plan to improve capabili- of the SWORM Task Force was to unite the na- ties for prediction (detection, characterization, tional and homeland security enterprise with and monitoring) and National preparedness the science and technology enterprise to for- (protection, mitigation, response, and recov- mulate a cohesive vision to enhance national ery). preparedness to face space weather hazards. In 2016, the Obama administration released The strategy also invited other countries the National Near-Earth Object Preparedness around the world to collaborate to improve sit- Strategy and the National Near-Earth Object uational awareness, and forecasting. Preparedness Action Plan, which identified NASA is active in providing a better under- goals and activities to “enhance the understanding of space weather. Under its Living standing of risk from, and national prepared- With a Star programme (LWS), the Agency is ness for, NEO impacts.”88 In June 2018, the developing several missions on space weather Trump administration released its National in cooperation with European partners.86 Near-Earth Object Preparedness Strategy and Action Plan. The strategy improves U.S. pre- The space weather forecast is delivered by the paredness to “address the hazard of NEO im- Space Weather Prediction Center (SWPC) of pacts by leveraging and enhancing existing the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin- national and international assets and adding istration (NOAA). The NOAA Space Weather important capabilities across government.”89 Prediction Center monitors and provides fore- casts, alerts, and warnings to a broad user Operationally, the NASA Center for Near Earth community spanning the public and private Object Studies (CNEOS) computes high-preci- sectors for space weather phenomena (e.g. sion orbits for Near-Earth Objects in support solar flares and geomagnetic storms) that of NASA’s Planetary Defense Coordination Of- could have a negative impact on technological fice. The NEO Observations Program supports systems on the Earth’s surface or in orbit. This NEO surveys that contribute to a sustained forecasting and warning service is important and productive campaign to find and track both for satellite launch and operations, and NEOs, collecting data of sufficient precision to for human space flight. NOAA’s first space allow accurate predictions of the future trajec- weather satellite, DSCOVR, has been opera- tories of discovered objects. In addition, the tional since 2016, replacing NASA’s aging re- Program devotes a limited amount of funding search satellite, the Advanced Composition to research into NEO impact mitigation and de- Explorer (ACE). In 2017, the U.S. Senate flection strategies and techniques. passed the Space Weather Research and Fore- casting Act. The legislation directs NOAA to propose options to replace solar imaging data 2.3.2 Space Environment Protection and Preser- provided by NASA’s Solar and Heliospheric Ob- vation servatory (SOHO) spacecraft. NOAA requested $1,414,263, but the space weather program NASA and the Department of Defense have actually received $5 million, double the been directed to pursue research and develop- amount in NOAA’s original request.87 The ment of technologies and techniques to miti- Space Weather Follow On satellite will launch gate and remove on-orbit debris, reduce haz- by 2024. ards, and increase the understanding of the current and future debris environment.

85 The White House. (2015). Coordinating Efforts To Pre- 88 Interagency Working Group (IWG) for Detecting and pare the Nation for Space Weather Events. Mitigating the Impact of Earth-bound Near-Earth Objects 86 National Aeronautics and Space Administration. (2014). (NEOs) (DAMIEN), (2016). https://obamawhitehouse.ar- Global Reach. chives.gov/.../9.25A%20Drew%20A..p... 87 Wolfe, (2018), ‘FY19 Budget Request: 20% NOAA Cut 89 U.S. government (2018). National Near-Earth Object Targets Research, Forecasters’, American Institute of Preparedness Strategy and Action Plan. Physics, (February, 2018).

ESPI Report 66 24 October 2018 Security in Outer Space: Perspectives on Transatlantic Relations

Debris Mitigation Active Debris Removal Since 1988 the official policy of the United NASA and the Department of Defense have States, as with most space faring nations, has also been directed to pursue research and de- been to minimize the creation of new orbital velopment of technologies and techniques to debris. The most recent National Space Policy mitigate and remove on-orbit debris, reduce (2010) addresses the importance of preserv- hazards, and increase the understanding of ing the space environment, including orbital the current and future debris environment. debris mitigation. A set of U.S. Government While there is a great deal of effort to limit new Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices debris in orbit, very little attention is being was developed in 1997 and approved in 2001. paid to eliminating the debris already there. Major focuses of the practices are the control Within Obama Administration’s 2010 National of debris released during normal operations, Space Policy, the Department of Defense, and minimizing debris generated by accidental ex- NASA were tasked to jointly research and de- plosions, limiting the probability of on-orbit velop technologies and techniques for debris collisions, and the post-mission disposal of remediation. But NASA plans for active debris space structures.90 The standards set in place removal are tied to other planned projects, remain the foundation for specific debris miti- such as Restore-L, RRM3 and Raven. The idea gation requirements issued by individual U.S. is that technologies developed for refuelling Government departments and agencies.91 satellites — robot arms, grapple tools, and software — could also be eventually applied to The FCC requires a debris mitigation plan to be clean-up the NEO environment (see Annex included in every license application. It must 4).95 address measures to limit operational debris, collision risk, and avoidance of accidental ex- In parallel to these ‘in-house’ missions, NASA plosions for both during and after mission has held two Satellite Servicing Technology completion. Included in this requirement are Transfer Industry Days, to nurture the growth an end-of-life disposal plan and a 25-year of commercial satellite servicing actors. Utiliz- maximum disposal time for a single satel- ing the capabilities of U.S. based space com- lite.92,93 With the establishment of SPD-2 and panies is a key component in NASA’s plan for 3, the licensing process is set to face a large making satellite servicing ubiquitous over overhaul and will see significant changes in the time. The current focus is the Transfer of ser- near future. The NASA Orbital Debris Program vicing technologies to interested U.S. com- Office has taken the international lead in con- mercial actors, in tandem with development. ducting measurements of the environment From this, NASA hopes to foster the growth of and in developing the technical consensus for a robust satellite servicing industry within the adopting mitigation measures to protect users United States.96 The growth of the commercial of the orbital environment. The Inter-Agency industry could lead to a cleansing of the Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) crowded space environment through debris grew out of the NASA-ESA coordination meet- removal, servicing, or repurposing. Some ma- ings and was set up as a formal organization jor U.S. space companies, such as NanoRacks in 1993. The role of the Inter-Agency Commit- and Orbital ATK, have begun testing and op- tee is to coordinate research on space debris erations in this field (see Annex 4). between NASA and other space agencies. This resulted in the creation of the 2007 IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, which 2.3.3 Space Infrastructure Security were subsequently endorsed by the United Na- 94 Due to the reliance the United States has on tions in 2008. space systems, the National Space Policy of 2010 and the policies of the Trump Admin- istration state that the protection of all critical

90 U.S. Government Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Chilehttps://www.itu.int/en/ITU-R/space/workshops/2016- Practices (2001) small-sat/Documents/Ken- 91 UNOOSA (2017), Space Debris Mitigation Standards singer%20ITU%20Small%20Sat%20Symposium- Adopted by States and International Organisations, See: 110716.pdf http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/space- 94 United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, (2010). law/sd/Space_Debris_Compendium_COPUOS_6_-April- Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on 2017.pdf the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. 92 Aerospace Corporation, (2017), Commercial Space Ac- 95 National Aeronautics and Space Administration, (2018). tivity and Its Impact on U.S. Space Debris Regulatory Mission: Restore-L. https://sspd.gsfc.nasa.gov/restore- Structure. https://aerospace.org/paper/commercial-space- l.html activity-and-debris-regulation 96 NASA (2018), NASA to Hold Second Satellite Servicing 93 Kensinger, K. (2016), U.S. Small Satellite Licensing and Technology Transfer Industry Day, the Federal Communications Commission, FCC, https://www.nasa.gov/feature/goddard/2018/nasa-to-hold- ITU Symposium and Workshop on small satellite regula- second-satellite-servicing-technology-transfer-industry-day tion and communication systems, Santiago de Chile,

ESPI Report 66 25 October 2018

space systems and supporting infrastructure tication safeguards and adherence to best pro- needs to be bolstered. To this effect, invest- gramming practices.100 As a result, to support ments are being made throughout the supply- the demands of military and government us- chain to enhance Space Infrastructure Secu- ers, many satellite operators are already com- rity (SIS), thereby boosting the resilience of plying with various controls, checklists, and satellites.97 In parallel, efforts have been di- certifications – including DoD Information As- rected to tackling the space security challenge surance requirements, international stand- by enhancing the redundancy of space infra- ards, and other criteria.101 structure (e.g. small satellites mega-constel- The Department of Defense creates and lations) and by introducing a set of policies en- adopts standards for materials, facilities, and abling Space Traffic Management (STM). engineering practices to improve military op- Resilience to Harmful Interferences erational readiness and reduce ownership costs and acquisition cycle time. To meet DoD The U.S. government recognises the security standards, owners of space assets must care- challenge posed by malicious or accidental ra- fully manage their supply chains, verifying dio-frequency jamming, spoofing and cyber that their suppliers are trustworthy and effec- operations to its space systems. According to tive in their own security protocols, to ensure the 2018 National Security Strategy, the that defective or compromised components United States “considers unfettered access to are not introduced. and freedom to operate in space to be a vital interest. Any harmful interference with or an Along with its role in the market as a regulator, attack upon critical components of our space the government exerts considerable influence architecture that directly affects this vital U.S. in SIS through its role as a customer. The gov- interest will be met with a deliberate response ernment is increasingly utilising public-private at a time, place, manner, and domain of our partnership-based approaches to engage the choosing.” private sector. When doing so, the United States allocates a certain amount of funding, Due to the increased government and military while specifying some basic requirements.102 reliance on commercial systems, the United The U.S. Department of Commerce has a well- States has been encouraging commercial ac- practiced approach for investigating the indus- tors to manage their supply chain and develop trial base of high-technology sectors. This ap- a security by design approach. Commercial ac- proach includes widely disseminated surveys tors do not currently have the same level of that seek to uncover potential vulnerabilities protection as the government, thus making from the perspective of U.S. competitiveness the U.S. government increasingly vulnerable and national security.103 to attack as reliance on commercial space increases.98 In 2010, the National Space Strat- To mitigate some existing vulnerabilities, sup- egy called on all U.S. Departments to “engage port has been given to the development of ad- with industrial partners to improve processes vanced technologies, such as the optical and effectively manage the supply chains.” beam, which could bring the cyber risk close The Trump administration too, in the National to zero. The size of an RF beam pattern trans- Security Strategy, has highlighted the need to mitted from LEO is around 100 kilometres improve critical infrastructure cyber security, wide. In comparison, the width of a laser beam addressing security threats to space opera- from an identical altitude would be just 300 tions.99 meters. This technology also enables data rates way over the RF domain, making it ex- As mentioned above, security by design is tremely attractive to operators of telecommu- based on the idea of making systems as free nications satellites. It is expected that NASA of vulnerabilities as possible through will greatly benefit from laser optical commu- measures such as continuous testing, authen- nication to address its RF issue.104

97 Agence France-Presse (2017). ‘The US military is pre- 103 Bryce Space and Technology (2017), New kids on the paring for war without GPS’, AFP, (December 20, 2017). block: How New Start-Up Space Companies Have Influ- 98 See National Space Policy 2017. enced the U.S. Supply Chain. 99 See National Security Space Strategy (2017). 104 ViaSat’s next-gen satellite’s security infrastructure will 100 Dougherty, C. et al. (2009). "Secure Design Patterns.” feature “distributed cybersensors, visualization techniques, CMU. and greater automation of attack response.” “Many things Strict quality control is therefore essential to the manufac- are occurring at machine time, and people can’t respond turing of space hardware because the system cannot eas- quickly enough to the threats. So there’s a lot of research ily be repaired or maintained once delivered to orbit. going on to figure out better ways to handle it.”Potential se- 101 CSRIC (2015). CYBERSECURITY RISK curity threats are among the reasons that the engineers MANAGEMENT AND BEST PRACTICES WORKING working on Lockheed Martin’s Advanced Extremely High- GROUP 4: Final Report (March 2015). Frequency (AEHF) satellite communications designed it to 102 Logan, T. (2018), ‘The U.S. must secure its supply be one of the world’s most resilient satellite communica- chain in the face of anti-satellite weapons’, C4isrnet. tions systems. AEHF serves not only the U.S., but also

ESPI Report 66 26 October 2018 Security in Outer Space: Perspectives on Transatlantic Relations

Space Infrastructure Security by Redun- dancy Another measure the United States has adopted to promote SIS is through space systems redundancy. The National space strategy of 2010 urged to “implement, as necessary and appropriate, redundant and back-up systems or approaches for critical infrastructure, key resources, and mission-essential functions.” Redundancy is the duplication of critical functions with the intention of increasing reliability and actual system performance. To reach redundancy, the United States is taking the following measures:  Deployment of a larger quantity of satellites;  Improving launch responsiveness;  Partnering with foreign actors. Achieving more operational availability by increasing redundancy requires greater complexity and development costs. Since deploy- ing large satellites can be costly, the United States has supported the development of large swarms of small satellites as they are cheaper to launch and cheaper to develop, rather than one large satellite. Redundancy allows for satellites to go out of service without having a major impact on the space infrastructure. An example of this is the GPS constellation, which consists of more than 30 satellites in six orbital planes. Potential attackers would have to successfully disable at least six GPS satellites to meaningfully impact U.S. performance. Additionally, the United States relies heavily on commercial launch companies for space launch. This market is developing rapidly. The annual number of launches by the three primary providers in the U.S. market (United Launch Alliance, SpaceX, and Orbital ATK/Northrup) and new entrants (Blue Origin and Virgin Galactic) is continuing to increase.105 By utilizing multiple launch providers, the United States reinforces its own industrial base while strengthening its economy through competition.

partner nations Canada, the Netherlands, and the United 105 Beyer, B. (2018). ‘A new governance model to grow Kingdom. See http://mil-embedded.com/articles/military- U.S. space launch capability’, SpaceNews, (April 30, communications-capacity-evolving-rapidly/ 2018).

ESPI Report 66 27 October 2018

3. Europe: Rising Space Security Stakes and Ambitions

This chapter provides an adapted synthesis of information presented in ESPI Report 64 “Security in Outer Space: Rising Stakes for Europe”. A more thorough analysis of the European approach to security in outer space can be found in this report which is available for download on ESPI website (www.espi.or.at).

if space assets were to be incapacitated, even partially. With the intensification of challenges 3.1 Strategy and Policy Ra- to the security of space systems, the need to protect space assets to safeguard the benefits tionales they enable can be considered, alone, as a reasonable argument for Europe to position The growing importance awarded to security security at the top of the space policy agenda. in European space policies is driven by four The elaboration of increasingly sophisticated key policy rationales: space policies, involving a growing number of  Secure the results of the continuous actors and sectors is driven by the political and substantial investment made by willingness to fully exploit the socio-economic public and private actors; value of the European space infrastructure. The thriving downstream space sector pro-  Protect the European economy and cesses and exploits space-derived data de- society against risks related to its perva- rived from that infrastructure in increasingly sive and sizeable dependence on the innovative ways. More and more turnkey ser- space infrastructure; vices are available to end-users – households,  Contribute to a service-oriented pol- companies, and public actors – which are in- icy by assuring the ability of the infra- creasingly disseminating them through their structure to deliver a service that can jus- business models in the form of new applica- tifiably be trusted, in particular for users tions. As a result, the exploitation of space ser- in defence and security; vices stimulates growth and generates considerable benefits for the European economy.  Guarantee European autonomy and More than 10% of the EU GDP depends on freedom of action in the field of security space infrastructure.106 The European GNSS in outer space, and in the space domain system, Galileo, now has more than 200 mil- at large. lion users107 and its full potential has yet to be reached. Financial assessments investigating 3.1.1 Protect the Value of the European Space In- the downstream sector and economic benefits to end-user sectors conclude that the total frastructure economic benefit is around € 53.5 billion per The value of the European space infrastruc- year in Gross Value Added, supporting 1 mil- ture, which is the result of a continuous and lion workers directly or indirectly. The Euro- substantial investment by public and private pean Earth Observation programme, Coperni- actors, lies first and foremost in the substan- cus, is expected to generate more than € 13, tial socio-economic benefits it enables across 5 billion of cumulated economic benefits in a multitude of economic and strategic sectors gross value added by 2020. The European for Europe. However, as the use of space- space infrastructure is also a critical asset for based solutions becomes more pervasive and the implementation of governmental policies part of business-as-usual, the dependence of benefiting society and the environment at governments, businesses and individuals on large. The uptake of space-based solutions for space infrastructure grows, creating new risks EU sectoral policies is already a reality for the

106 PwC (2016). Study to examine the socioeconomic im- 107 https://www.numerama.com/politique/386721-galileo- pact of Copernicus in the EU. Report on The socio-eco- le-gps-europeen-compte-200-millions-dutilisateurs-dans- nomic impact of the le-monde.html Copernicus programme. Brussels: European Commission. Retrieved from European Commission: http://www.copernicus.eu/sites/default/files/library/Copernicus_SocioEco- nomic_Impact_October_2016.pdf

ESPI Report 66 28 October 2018 Security in Outer Space: Perspectives on Transatlantic Relations

EU Digital Agenda dealing with the digital di- From this standpoint, four main challenges vide, the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), and were identified for Europe, namely: further ad- the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) for nat- vance EU space programmes and meet new ural resources management or the Energy Un- user needs, encourage the uptake of space ion’s policies.108 The role of space systems is services and data, ensure the protection and also critical for defence and security policies resilience of critical European space infrastruc- dealing with traffic monitoring, border surveil- ture, and reinforce synergies between civil and lance, and humanitarian aid. Additionally, the security space activities. As a matter of fact, uptake of space technology plays a huge part the security needs of the EU are growing, in- in Innovation Policy, laying the groundwork for asmuch as common foreign, security and de- the development of new services in Europe. In fence policy objectives are increasingly being this context, NewSpace is defined by ESPI as incorporated into the agenda and DNA of the a disruptive sectoral dynamic featuring various European Union. The EU’s role in such matters end-to-end efficiency-driven concepts driving was reinforced and institutionalised by a num- the space sector towards a more business- and ber of policy documents which are briefly de- service-oriented paradigm, laying the founda- scribed below: tions for the cross-fertilisation of space tech-  The Common Security and Defence nologies with ground technologies is indeed Policy (CSDP), which defined an institu- important to allow the on-going digital trans- tional structure for the EU to assume its formation to move forward, in which space new role in the field of security and de- systems are likely to be key enablers for 5G fence; networks, precision agriculture, forestry, air traffic management, smart energy grids, and  The European Agenda on Security, autonomous vehicles. which defined EU priorities and its role as a support for Member States’ own activities in the field of security; 3.1.2 Contribute to a “Service-Oriented” Policy  The European Defence Action Plan,109 The rising need for enhanced space security in which proposed the establishment of a Eu- Europe also lies in the significant progress of ropean Defence Fund to promote interop- EU programmes (i.e. Galileo, EGNOS, Coper- erability and support R&D in defence, fos- nicus) and in the potential introduction of new ter investments in SMEs, mid-caps, and initiatives such as GOVSATCOM. These devel- other suppliers, and to create a Single opments are amplifying the importance of a Market for defence. The European De- service-driven policy to build user confidence, fence Fund was enacted in June 2017 encourage the uptake of space services, and budgeting € 90 Million until the end of consequently maximise the benefits of the Eu- 2019, €500 Million per year after 2020 for ropean space infrastructure. Such policy en- research, and for development and acqui- compasses 1) operational capacities meeting sition, € 500 Million for 2019-2020, then user performance requirements, 2) continuity € 1 Billion per year after 2020.110 of programmes to ensure infrastructure maintenance, upgrade and evolution, and 3) These recent developments indicate the grow- 111 appropriate measures to protect the infra- ing importance of security in EU Policy. The structure against threats. These requirements European GNSS System Galileo will play a piv- are even more stringent for governmental and otal role in the implementation of national and defence and security users that the EU seeks European security policies for localisation and to support to leverage synergies between the navigation for troops and vehicles, mission civil and defence domains. To do so, protecting planning, delivery of cargos, and search and the space infrastructure and meeting the most stringent security requirements is a prerequisite.

108 PwC (2016). Study to examine the socioeconomic im- 110 European Commission. (2017). A European Defence pact of Copernicus in the EU. Report on The socio-eco- Fund: €5.5 billion per year to boost Europe's defence ca- nomic impact of the pabilities. Brussels. Retrieved from European Commission Copernicus programme. Brussels: European Commission. Press release: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17- Retrieved from European Commission: http://www.coperni- 1508_en.htm cus.eu/sites/default/files/library/Copernicus_SocioEco- 111 European Commission (2016). Communication From nomic_Impact_October_2016.pdf The Commission To The European Parliament, The Coun- 109 European Commission. (2015). The European Agenda cil, The European Economic And Social Committee And on Security. Brussels. Retrieved from European Commis- The Committee Of The Regions Space Strategy For Eu- sion: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaf- rope. COM (2016) 705 final. Brussels: European Commis- fairs/files/e-library/documents/basic-docu- sion. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/transpar- ments/docs/eu_agenda_on_security_en.pdf ency/regdoc/rep/1/2016/EN/COM-2016-705-F1-EN- MAIN.PDF

ESPI Report 66 29 October 2018

rescue.112 GNSS-based services are also key limitations (i.e. unverified warnings) and co- in case of conflict for guidance, strikes, and operative agreements do not accommodate other related operations.113 The Copernicus accountability mechanisms.117 And last but not programme will provide critical data for poli- least, the U.S. government has the right to cies related to the atmosphere, marine envi- terminate the user account, to limit both ac- ronment, land, climate change, emergency cess duration and data amount, to deny access management, and security. The new to SSA data and information, and to change or GOVSATCOM initiative aimed at ensuring reli- modify the terms and conditions at any time able, secure and cost-effective satellite com- for any reason and without prior notifica- munication services for EU and national public tion.118 authorities will also elaborate on security aspects. 3.1.4 Long-Term Stakes for Europe’s Position on the International Space Scene 3.1.3 Reinforce European Autonomy and Free- dom of Action Beyond short-term policy stakes, the need for a reinforced approach to space security in Eu- From a strategic perspective, Europe also rope is also driven by longer-term considera- seeks to guarantee the security of its space in- tions stemming from the strategic ambition of frastructure autonomously through independ- Europe to “promote its position as a leader in ent capabilities (i.e. systems, data, and tech- space, increase its share on the world space nologies). Here, and although cooperation markets, and seize the benefits and opportu- with third countries is essential in the field of nities offered by space.” space security, Europe must ensure a capacity As space security now holds a central position to control the level of reliance on its partners in space diplomacy, playing a prominent role and to maintain it within acceptable bounda- in international dialogues and negotiations in ries. this field, and promote a clear, united and con- That policy rationale is acknowledged in the sistent ‘European way’, will be essential to Space Strategy for Europe stating that ‘rein- build European leadership in the global space forcing Europe’s autonomy in accessing and sector at large. Taking this into account, using space in a secure and safe environment’ equipping Europe with a comprehensive and is a pillar objective.114 Elaborating further, the independent capability to protect its space in- EC seeks to ‘ensure [Europe’s] freedom of ac- frastructure is a priority to position Europe as tion and autonomy.’115 Such strategic goals a credible interlocutor on the international are not being pursued at the expense of coop- scene. eration, however, as cooperation in this field is Last but not least, space security will play an a necessity (i.e. data sharing, efficiency of increasing role in commercial space markets. measures, transparency, and coordination). First, the implementation of new practices The level of reliance European seeks to (e.g. laws, regulations, standards, proce- achieve remains an open question, as there is dures) promoting space security and impact- no well-defined level of strategically accepta- ing the way space activities are conducted will ble capabilities. At the moment, Europe relies inevitably create a competitive bias for the in- on U.S. data for its operational SSA needs. dustry. Second, space security may open up a This position underscores a number of rising business opportunity for private industry seek- issues. First, are the SSA data and service re- ing to enhance public capabilities with com- strictions that mean that the United States mercial data and value-added services. For does not grant full access to its database be- these two reasons, Europe must contribute ac- cause of its intrinsic military nature.116 Addi- tively to future developments in the field of tionally, the U.S. system has its own technical space security to support the competitiveness

112 Mutschler, M. M. (2010). Keeping Space Safe. To- 115 Ibid wards A Long-Term Strategy to Arms Control in Space. 116 Specifically, DoD resistance to open SSA data sets, Frankfurt: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt. algorithms, and processes to external review and scrutiny, 113 Sitruk, A., & Plattard, S. (2017). The Governance of results in the uncertainty of the data and in possible false Galileo. Vienna: European Space Policy Institute. Re- positive rates. See: https://www.ida.org/idamedia/Corpo- trieved from ESPI: https://www.espi.or.at/im- rate/Files/Publications/STPIPubs/2016/P-8038.ashx ages/Rep62_online_170203_1142.pdf 117 Froeliger, J. L. (2017). Greater Industry Cooperation 114 European Commission (2016). Communication From Needed to Avoid Space Collisions. INTELSAT The Commission To The European Parliament, The Coun- http://www.intelsat.com/news/blog/greater-industry-cooper- cil, The European Economic And Social Committee And ation-needed-to-avoid-space-collisions/ The Committee Of The Regions Space Strategy For Eu- 118 Space-Track. User agreement. Retrieved from rope. COM (2016) 705 final. Brussels: European Commis- https://www.space-track.org/documentation#/user_agree sion. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2016/EN/COM-2016-705-F1-EN- MAIN.PDF

ESPI Report 66 30 October 2018 Security in Outer Space: Perspectives on Transatlantic Relations

of its industry and reap the benefits of new po- tabases, and collision assessment algo- tential markets. rithms.119 As part of its engagement in Space Security, in 2009 ESA launched an SSA programme aimed at supporting ‘the European independent utilisation of, and access to, space 3.2 Overview of European Ac- for research or services, through the provision of timely and quality data, information, ser- tivities and Capabilities vices and knowledge regarding the space environment, the threats and the sustainable ex- 3.2.1 Space Situational Awareness ploitation of the outer space surrounding our planet Earth.’120 The objectives of the pro- The field of Space Situational Awareness gramme were to produce an independent da- (SSA), which encompasses all activities aimed tabase, support R&D in industry, and at monitoring space environment threats, con- strengthen the accuracy of available data stitutes the bulk of activities in the field of Se- through greater focus on European space as- curity in Outer Space. sets. 121 For the period 2009-2020, € 200 Mil- lion was budgeted, including the contributions In Europe, just as in many parts of the world, of 19 Member States. The programme covers interest in SSA data is growing to meet the R&D, the creation of data and coordination challenges of the space environment. Several centres, systems development and procure- countries are implementing various national ment. The programme has awarded over 100 SSA programmes, although the main stake- industrial contacts. ESA is building on the solid holders – France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and base of existing capabilities, relying on the ex- the UK – still rely on data sharing agreements pertise of European and international actors for their operational needs. This subsection (e.g. the United States), and seeks to actively provides an overview of European SSA capa- contribute with additional data to strengthen bilities. However, assessing the operational them. The SSA Programme is coordinated needs of European end-users on the basis of from ESOC in Darmstadt (Germany), but also open source documents is a challenging task. other centres such as ESRIN and ESTEC. In investigating national SSA capabilities, the research team focused mainly on the five most ESA has developed its SSA programme around involved countries in the field. Organisational three major areas, which are: culture is diverse, although one can see that  The Space Surveillance & Tracking in most cases, the military plays a predomi- (SST) Segment: which aims at maintain- nant role in SSA activities, highlighting the ing a data catalogue up to date. Funding strategic stakes for the military. Indeed, Euro- allocated to that segment has been re- pean states pursue SSA development strate- duced and part of ESA activities have been gies that involve updating existing systems, transferred to the EU SST Consortium; funding complementary software able to double check data, and others. However, that very  The Space Weather (SWE) Segment: data is still required for manoeuvres and mak- which aims at developing the European ing well-informed decisions. Two tables in An- ability to monitor solar activity in a timely nex 4 present European Space Security strat- matter and inform the main stakeholders egies in a synthesised manner. – public and private – by enhancing existing capabilities; In the field of Space Security, the development of national sensors was the first step  The Near-Earth Objects (NEO) Seg- when securing space assets first emerged as a ment: which aims at generating data on national security priority. However, in an at- NEOs – asteroids or comets, making im- tempt to create synergies between European pact likelihood assessments and develop- countries and avoid duplication of efforts, the ing deflection methods. There are esti- European Space Agency was considered as the mated to be around 17,000 threatening most competent body to manage consolidation NEOs that require monitoring. efforts. The agency today is especially active in the field of space debris, in which it develops Part of ESA’s mandate in Space Security deals software to incorporate raw SSA data into da- not only with the management of centres and data integrity processes, but also the conduct

119 ESA. (2012). ESA deploys first orbital debris test radar 120 ESA. Space Situational Awareness. in Spain. Retrieved from http://www.esa.int/Our_Activi- https://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Operations/Space_Situ- ties/Operations/Space_Situational_Aware- ational_Awareness ness/ESA_deploys_first_orbital_debris_test_radar_in_Spai 121 Suzuki, K. Space Security: Is Europe a Credible Diplo- n matic Actor? Hokkaido University / Princeton University. Retrieved from https://swfound.org/media/91262/su- zuki_kazuto.pdf

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of studies on hosted payload and sensor de- telescope, conducting daily sky surveys for ob- velopment deployments, and asteroid impact jects from 15 meter up to 30 meter. The Con- mitigation studies. Funding is also allocated to sortium in charge is led by OHB. The recently developing new infrastructure such as data- proposed Hera mission will aim at testing plan- bases, software tools, applications, and hard- etary defence mechanisms and will be comple- ware (optical telescopes and radars). Several mentary to the NASA DART mission whose ob- achievements illustrate ESA’s SSA Programme jective is to destroy an asteroid.122 The Hera objectives: funder of preliminary studies of a mission will be instrumental in investigating future space weather satellite, two new radars the kinetic effects of such explosion.123 built in Spain and France to support SST for The emergence of the European Union as a civilian uses, ESA’s Proba-2 solar observatory major player in Space Security is one of the satellite, the establishment of the ESA Space most important developments of European Security and Education Centre (ESEC) in Redu Space Policy as a whole. As the European Un- (Belgium), the Space Surveillance and Track- ion does not have to deal with institutional ing Data Centre at ESAC in Madrid, three co- constraints, such as ESA in several areas, es- ordination centres both at Space Pole in Brus- pecially those with strong security dimensions, sels for space weather and at ESRIN in Frascati the EU has more agency to implement pro- (Italy) for NEOs, and one at ESOC in Darm- grammes in this respect. The European Union stadt. Test-bed optical telescopes were in- funds projects related to ‘Security in Outer stalled in Cebreros (Spain) and are being in- Space’ under the umbrella of large R&D pro- stalled at la Silla (Chile). The project ‘FlyEye’, grammes. The FP7 work programme 2007- which is an initial automated telescope with 2018 already included the EU’s objective to high-tech European optical hardware, will be ‘reduce the vulnerability of space assets’ deployed by 2018 and is expected to contrib- through ‘techniques for the identification, in- ute to a global asteroid survey system to be ventory, monitoring and early warning of updated every day. ESA’s involvement in events that could affect the space assets’.124 Space Security also requires constant interac- In 2007, the EU funded a space weather fore- tions with the operational entities dealing with casting project called SOTERIA with € 5 Mil- SSA at national levels, where ESA actively par- lion.125 The 2009 FP7 work programme of ticipates in the coordination of efforts. In the 2009 included a list of external events includ- field of Security in Outer Space, ESA fuses ing ‘space debris, hostile laser or Anti SATellite data from various sources, primarily from the systems (ASAT), jamming, viruses, natural or U.S. SSA System, to provide them to Euro- man-made electro-magnetic disturbances.’126 pean stakeholders. In this sense, ESA acts as The work programme of 2010 supported 15 an SSA-providing platform for European users. R&D projects. While the 2011 work pro- ESA is also actively involved in the field of gramme included NEOs,127 space debris and Space Weather (SWE). It coordinates a Euro- weather were respectively covered in 2013. pean network SWE Expert Service Centres Horizon 2020 included a section on ‘Protection (ESCs). Additionally, the agency is conducting of European assets in and from space’ (H2020- a mission at the Lagrangian point L5 (LGR) in PROTEC) in the 2014-2015 work pro- cooperation with the United States expected to gramme,128 and a section called ‘Secure and take place after 2019. safe space environment’ in the work programme 2018-2020.129 Within FP7, additional In the field of NEOs, ESA is maintaining its financial contributions were allocated to the work in developing the field-of-view ‘Fly-Eye’

122 ESA. (2018) Earth’s first mission to a binary asteroid Biotechnology. European Commission (2008)4598 of 28 for planetary defence. Retrieved from: August 2008. Retrieved from European Commission: https://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Space_Engineer- http://ec.europa.eu/research/partici- ing_Technology/Hera/Earth_s_first_mission_to_a_bi- pants/data/ref/fp7/88711/b_wp_200901_en.pdf nary_asteroid_for_planetary_defence 127 European Commission (2010). Work Programme 2011 123Jeff Foust. (2018) ESA plans second attempt at plane- Cooperation Theme 10 Security. European Commission tary defense mission. Retrieved from: C(2010)4900 of 19 July 2010) Retrieved from http://ec.eu- https://spacenews.com/esa-plans-second-attempt-at-plan- ropa.eu/research/participants/data/ref/fp7/89287/k-wp- etary-defense-mission/ 201101_en.pdf 124 European Commission (2007). Work Programme 128 European Commission (2016). EN Horizon 2020 Work 2007-2008 Cooperation Theme 9 Space. European Com- Programme 2016 - 2017 5 iii. Leadership in Enabling and mission C (2007)2460 of 11 June 2007. Retrieved from Industrial Technologies – Space. European Commission http://ec.europa.eu/research/partici- Decision C (2016)4614. Retrieved from European Com- pants/data/ref/fp7/88321/j_wp_200702_en.pdf mission: https://ec.europa.eu/research/partici- 125 European Commission (2008). Solar-TERrestrial In- pants/data/ref/h2020/wp/2016_2017/main/h2020-wp1617- vestigations and Archives. Retrieved from European Com- leit-space_en.pdf mission: https://cordis.europa.eu/pro- 129 European Commission (2018). EN Horizon 2020 Work ject/rcn/89460_en.html Programme 2018-2020 5.iii. Leadership in Enabling and 126 European Commission (2008). Work Programme 2009 Industrial Technologies – Space. European Commission Cooperation Theme 2 Food, Agriculture and Fisheries, and Decision C (2017)7124 of 27 October 2017. Retrieved

ESPI Report 66 32 October 2018 Security in Outer Space: Perspectives on Transatlantic Relations

PEOPLE Programme distributing grants for has switched from R&D projects to operational training and career development, under which capacity-building. the SpaceDebEMC (Space Debris Evolution, In addition to initiatives funded through pro- Collision risk and Mitigation), and the grammatic investments, the EU has launched STARDUST (the Asteroid and Space Debris the EU Space Surveillance and Tracking Sup- Network), benefited.130 The EC SME Instru- port Framework (http://www.eusst.eu/) ment also rewarded a Space Security initia- aimed at supporting the long-term sustainabil- tive. ity of space activities of European stakehold- To conclude, since 2010, the EU has almost ers.131 The overarching purpose of the Consor- continuously supported R&D projects directly tium is to leverage the networking of already linked to ‘Security in Outer Space’ as part of existing national capabilities to deliver Euro- FP7-SPACE and H2020-SPACE, but also pean SST services. To achieve that goal, the through other non-space instruments. In total, Consortium is expected to produce services the EU has supported at least 35 R&D projects driven by civilian user requirements, comple- in this domain for a total of € 66 Million over 7 mentary to R&D activities conducted within years (i.e. excluding funding to the EU SST Horizon 2020, to engage with international support framework). These projects have cov- partners, particularly with the United States, ered a wide scope of activities including topics and to promote the update of capabilities after such as space debris mitigation, in-orbit colli- the networking phase. sion avoidance, and space weather. A spike in In 2018, the European Commission and the EU contributions can be observed in 2010 cor- European Parliament published a report on the responding to financial support for a number implementation of the EU SST Framework Pro- of large projects. It is important to note that gramme for the 2014-2017 period comparing since 2014, the EU has also funded the SST the capabilities of the sensor function as of to- support framework (roughly at around €28 day and in 2021:132 million per year) through H2020-SPACE grants, and also through funds allocated to the Copernicus and Galileo programmes. Contri- butions to the SST support framework are not included in this figure. The decrease observed since 2013 actually indicates that EU support

2017 (initial architecture) 2021 (expected architecture) MS architecture Total observed Total well –ob- Total observed Total well – (orbit and ob- (%)* served (% of the (%)* observed (% ject size) total) ** of the total)** LEO (> 7 cm) 19% 14% 35% 19% LEO (> 50 cm) 79% 72% 95% 80% LEO (> 1 m) 96% 95% 98% 97% MEO (> 40 cm) 18% 7% 62% 7% GEO (> 50 cm) 40% 30% 66% 42% * Observed objects are objects that were observed at least once during the 14-day period of the simulation. ** Well-observed objects are those observed objects that were observed every day in LEO and every three days in MEO/GEO

Table 3: Estimated level of coverage by size of object and orbit of the initial architecture (2017) and expected architecture (2021)

from European Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/re- The Council. Retrieved from EUR-Lex: https://eur-lex.eu- search/participants/data/ref/h2020/wp/2018- ropa.eu/eli/dec/2014/541(1)/oj 2020/main/h2020-wp1820-leit-space_en.pdf 132 European Commission (2014). Decision No 130 See Annex for projects list from ESPI (2018). ESPI 541/2014/Eu Of The European Parliament And Of The Report 64 “Security in Outer Space: Rising Stakes for Eu- Council. Retrieved form EUR-Lex: https://eur lex.europe” ropa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:fbafc703-4eb8-11e8- 131 Official Journal of the European Union (2014). Deci- be1d-01aa75ed71a1.0021.02/DOC_1&format=PDF sion No 541/2014/Eu Of The European Parliament And Of

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On the basis of a documentation review, Nevertheless, stakeholders also underline that stakeholders’ consultations (including member various issues remain and that serious chal- states, users and other public stakeholders) lenges lie ahead of the consortium to take a and with the support of independent experts, more prominent role, and achieve more ambi- the European Commission identified the fol- tious objectives in line with the rising space lowing key achievements of the support security stakes in Europe. Key stakes ahead of framework:133 the consortium identified by the European Commission assessment include:134  availability of the EU SST services (i.e. collision avoidance, in-orbit fragmentation  effectiveness and European added-value and re-entry services) since July 1st 2016, optimisation to avoid duplication of efforts through the EU SST portal to all European and support an efficient development of institutional users and spacecraft owners EU SST capabilities; and operators free of charge and on a  achievement of an acceptable level of Eu- 24/7 basis; ropean autonomy based on further net-  outreach to users including identification working and development effort in line of potential users, documentation of their with a level of ambition to be decided by needs and awareness raising of space the European Union and with, as a first risks and the need to protect space infra- step, the delivery of a common EU data- structure; base of orbital objects building on national data;  cooperation and collection of shared know-how with the establishment of reg-  development of EU SST services in com- ular communication between NOCs and pliance with users’ needs requiring addi- increased cooperation between national tional outreach effort to raise awareness experts through working groups; and collect feedback but also the development of common operational procedures  mapping and pooling of European assets and standards; with 33 sensors contributing to the initial EU SST operations, a complete mapping  synergies with other components of secu- of national and European sensors and be- rity in outer space to cover the range of ginning of national sensors upgrades; space hazards over the entire space mission lifecycle;  outreach to other Member States to collaborate with or to join the SST Consor-  governance optimisation to accommodate tium. a broader Member State participation, an enhanced role of the European Commis- Stakeholders interviewed by ESPI unani- sion for guidance and monitoring at the mously acknowledged the multiple achieve- strategic, policy and organisational levels ments of the consortium so far, particularly for and to explore of the role of EU SatCen as the complex systems networking and the ini- EU SST services front-desk. tial steps towards a full-fledged European Un- ion SST service, while complying with both With regards to financial management, other civil and military frameworks. An important issues will have to be addressed by future ar- achievement of the consortium, difficult to rangements revision including: measure but often praised by consortium part-  simplification of funding sources to avoid ners, has been the reinforcement of European unnecessary burdens affecting the results coordination and the confidence-building achieved by the consortium; and among partners. Achieving consensus among France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK –  budget allocation, to adapt current rules which speak today with a clear and unified (i.e. sharing on an equal base between voice – has been a challenge that the consor- the members of the consortium, inde- tium successfully took on. Today, EU Member pendently from their current capabilities) States established national databases and are to the enlargement of the consortium. currently building a common European database of unclassified data. The consortium also A more comprehensive description of the EU continues its efforts to promote the exchange SST Consortium and associated stakes and of classified data through bilateral agreements challenges is provided in ESPI Report 64 “Se- and the construction of a secure data sharing curity in Outer Space: Rising Stakes for Eu- 135 exchange network. From this standpoint the rope”. consortium is certainly achieving its purpose.

133 Ibid 135 European Space Policy Institute (2018). Security in 134 Ibid Outer Space: Rising Stakes for Europe, Report 64 August 2018. Retrieved from: https://espi.or.at/publications/espi-

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3.2.2 Space Environment Protection and Preser- report restated the value of accommodating vation visits to launch sites, command and control centres, and technology demonstrations. Space Environment Protection and Preserva- Additionally, the Working Group on the Long- tion (SEPP) is another subdomain of Security term Sustainability of Space Activities (WG- in Outer Space. This encompasses all under- LTS) was setup by the UN COPUOS in 2010 to takings aimed at keeping the space environ- investigate possible measures to ensure the ment safe to operate in and proactively pro- safe and sustainable use of outer space for moting its preservation. peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all European Countries countries. The final product of that work was to compile best-practice guidelines and to Several Member States are adopting national have them endorsed at the 61st session of the legislation aimed at regulating space activities. UNCOPUOS in June 2018. Unfortunately, con- In seeking to establish a legal framework for sensus was not reached. Work on WG-LTS their activities, Member States have devel- guidelines was initiated under the chairman- oped requirements, conditions and restrictions ship of France. However, moving forward for licenses facilitating entities that are eager within the UN framework remains a major to engage in space activity.136 Several jurisdic- challenge as no enforcement mechanisms are tions also include enforcement mechanisms, foreseen and there are major discrepancies in actively contributing to Space Environment the way states see the implementation of Protection and Preservation. Already, Austria, guidelines. Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Nor- way, Sweden, and the United Kingdom have The role of states in Security in Outer Space is passed such laws, a list of which is at Annex pivotal to addressing sustainability issues, and 2.137 the need for cooperation among countries is frequently restated in policy documents. In In international fora, a handful of European this respect, the French Ministry of Defence states have been vocal about the need for declared that ‘a European approach to this greater coordination on Space Security. Good topic of mutual interest will be promoted, tak- examples are the Inter-Agency Space Debris ing advantage of existing resources and devel- Coordination Committee (IADC), the United oping new concrete projects.’139 Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS), the Conference on European states also conduct national feasibil- Disarmament (CD) and the Committee on ity studies, research projects and experiments Space Research (COSPAR). Among other ma- on possible technologies that can contribute to jor initiatives, European states actively con- space sustainability. Among others, the UK is tributed to the report of the Group of Govern- particularly active on these matters. The Uni- mental Experts (GCE) on Transparency and versity of Surrey coordinates the Re- Confidence-Building Measures (TCBMs). On moveDEBRIS project, which is an international the occasion, several experts appointed by Eu- consortium aimed at developing deorbiting ropean states elaborated a strategy towards and capturing solutions for space debris.140 promoting mutual understanding, and reduc- Consortium members include Airbus Defence ing risks of mishaps in outer space.138 The GGE and Space (France, Germany, and UK), Ari- was adopted at the 68th session of the UN Gen- aneGroup (France), SSTL (UK), ISIS (Nether- eral Assembly in late 2013, and advocated in- lands), CSEM (Switzerland), Inria (France), formation exchange not only on national space and Stellenbosch University (South Africa). policies and strategies, but also on ongoing Prior to that, the University completed the De- space activities and their parameters – OrbitSail project aimed at developing wind launches, natural space hazards, and sched- sails to redirect satellites into the atmosphere uled manoeuvres. The document also made for disposal.141 The Defence Science and Tech- the case for the use of notifications for risk re- nology Laboratory (DSTL) launched the Daed- duction, emergency situations, high-risk re- alus project that will be tested in 2019 and has entries, and intentional break-ups. Lastly, the similar objectives.142 The British company

public-reports/send/2-public-espi-reports/371-security-in- 139 Ministère de la Défense. (2013). Defence And Natio- outer-space-rising-stakes-for-europe nal Security. French White Paper. Retrieved from 136 Ibid https://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/down- 137 Lucien Rapp. (2018) Space lawmaking. Retrieved load/215253/2394121/White%20paper%20on%20de- from: fense%20%202013.pdf http://thespacereview.com/article/3523/1 140 https://www.surrey.ac.uk/surrey-space-centre/mis- 138 Note: Representatives of China, France, Russia, the sions/removedebris United Kingdom and the United States as permanent 141 https://www.surrey.ac.uk/surrey-space-centre/mis- members of the UN Security Council and representatives sions/deorbitsail of Brazil, Chile, Italy, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Romania, South 142 The IET. (2017). https://eandt.theiet.org/content/arti- Africa, South Korea, Sri Lanka and Ukraine. cles/2017/07/satellites-to-be-fitted-with-sails-to-take-them- out-of-orbit-and-prevent-space-junk/

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Clyde Space has its own deorbiting project target characterisation, capture mecha- called AEOLDOS (Aerodynamic End-of-Life De- nisms, and disposal methods. One major Orbit System). The Italian company D-Orbit is output aim of this project section is to developing debris removal solutions.143 Other capture an ESA-owned defunct satellite in European legacy companies are also looking LEO by 2023 and make it re-enter the at- into these services at conceptual level. mosphere. Two concepts for this are being studied: a net or a robotic arm. However, as in any field, pooling national resources into budgets allocated at European International cooperation is continuing, mainly level remains the top line of action for greater under the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses coordination. As such, European institutions of Outer Space (UN-COPUOS) and through the are also active in that domain. European Space Weather Week conference organised annually. ESA has also been chairing European Institutions the Space Missions Planning Advisory Group The European Space Agency is significantly (UN- SMPAG) and co-organised the Planetary contributing through the development of more Defence Conference. Finally, the Space Debris sustainable standards and technologies.144 Conference 2017 also organised by ESA pro- ESA’s CleanSpace initiative is ‘a technology vided an excellent opportunity to address the project aiming at developing the necessary very closely-related SST aspects. technologies to support the compliance of fu- In Brussels, the European Union’s political dis- ture satellites with Space Debris Mitigation cussions on how to sustain a safe to operate (SDM) requirements’. The overarching goal is in space environment have been growing to develop an eco-friendly and sustainable ap- steadily in recent years. When the European proach to space activities through the devel- Union became an active actor in space, development of industrial materials, processes and oping a strategy at global level for Space Se- technologies that limit the environmental im- curity appeared to be the next necessary step. pact of space activity by addressing weaknesses and shortages in the entire lifecycle of In this respect, the most sophisticated diplo- space systems from conceptual phase to end matic initiative was the ill-fated International of life and disposal. ESA’s CleanSpace revolves Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities around three main core activities: EcoDesign, (IcoC), a non-legally binding and voluntary- CleanSat, E.Deorbit. based document aimed at regulating outer space activities. More specifically, the Code  EcoDesign: deals with environmental im- sought ‘to enhance the safety, security, and pact assessments (e.g. Life Cycle Assess- sustainability of all outer space activities’ and ment), compliance with legal frameworks to ‘establish transparency and confidence- (e.g. RoHS directive, REACH regulation), building measures, with the aim of enhancing and the development of green technolo- mutual understanding and trust and helping gies. both to prevent confrontation and foster na-  CleanSat:145 deals with the development tional, regional and global security and stabil- of technical solutions and standards to ity’.147 Areas of focus included ‘Outer Space mitigate space debris proliferation. This Operations and Space Debris Mitigation’, ‘No- includes several solutions such as end-of- tification of Outer Space Activities’, ‘Infor- life passivation, design for demise, 146 and mation on Outer Space Activities’ and a ‘Con- space debris environmental modelling. sultation Mechanism’.148,149 The Code bene- CleanSat is the leading programme of ESA fited from a certain level of support, but was in the field of Space Environment Protec- criticised at organizational level for the nego- tion and Preservation. tiation process and the lack of non-EU countries participation in the drafting, and at con-  E.Deorbit: deals with Active Debris Re- tent level for lacking clear definitions, removal and associated capabilities such as

143 http://www.deorbitaldevices.com/ 147 Code of conduct Working Document 21 (2014). Draft 144 Jessica. (2017) The clean space blog. Retrieved from International Code of Conduct For Outer Space Activities. ESA: http://blogs.esa.int/cleanspace/2017/02/03/cleansat- Retrieved from https://eeas.eu- an-exciting-opportunity-for-the-european-space-industry/ ropa.eu/sites/eeas/files/space_code_con- 145 ESA. Clean Space: Cleansat. Retrieved from ESA: duct_draft_vers_31-march-2014_en.pd f http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Space_Engineer- 148 Ibid ing_Technology/Clean_Space/CleanSat 149 Johnson, C. (2014). Draft International Code of Con- 146 Peter M.B. Waswa , Michael Elliot, Jeffrey A. Hoffman duct for Outer Space Activities Fact Sheet. Retrieved from (2012). Spacecraft Design-for-Demise implementation Secure Word Foundation: https://swfound.org/me- strategy 3 & decision-making methodology for low earth or- dia/166384/swf_draft_international_code_of_con- bit missions. ScieVerse Science Direct. Retrieved from duct_for_outer_space_activities_fact_sheet_febru- Scinece Direct: https://aiaa.kavi.com/apps/group_pub- ary_2014.pdf lic/download.php/4546/Design%20for%20De- mise%20JASR_11188_PRINT.pdf

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striction methods, and the scope of the docu- aimed at studying the effects of solar flares on ment. This resulted in a failure to adopt the bipolar electronic components.154 latest draft outside the official UN framework, Member States are also playing a role in Space as procedures became the showstoppers of Infrastructure Security through the involve- that project.150 ment of their industries. Indeed, defining se- The EU has played an important role in other curity standards and requirements is also to a diplomatic initiatives that include WG-LTS ne- large extent determined at industry level, alt- gotiations at UNCOPUOS, the GGE, the UN hough the standardisation of these require- General Assembly Resolution 71/42 regarding ments has not yet been reached. For instance, the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space Leonardo, an Italian aerospace company, was (PAROS), projects related to the ‘Prevention of selected for a data security project on the Gal- the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the ileo constellation.155 Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space In developing security protocols and technical Objects’ (PPWT) and ‘No First Placement of standards, ESA has played an important role Weapons in Outer Space’ (NFP), and the Prin- in Security in Outer Space. ESA’s involvement ciples of Responsible Behaviour for Outer in Security in Outer Space includes: Space (PORBOS) that are also designed to prevent an arms race in outer space151 among  Definition of a workable regulatory frame- others.152 work encompassing security agreement, security regulations, and implementing Interestingly, the European approach to SEPP procedures and facilities to receive, store, comprises different strategies that interact and produce classified information to set with each other for greater efficiency. Moreo- up a regulatory framework (Security ver, these activities are also complemented by Agreement, Security Regulations and Im- a series of measures in the field of Space In- plementing Procedures and Facilities), to frastructure Security. build a capability to receive, store, and produce classified information and ex- 3.2.3 Space Infrastructure Security change classified information with third parties; The focal point of Space Infrastructure Secu- rity is the protection of the space infrastruc-  Development of standards for space pro- ture from threats that diminish its proper func- ject management, assurance, and system tioning. More precisely, it covers the exploita- engineering. For example, a branch re- tion of space systems’ vulnerabilities and can lated to space sustainability was added to be unintentional or intentional. Space Infra- the ECSS set of standards incorporated in structure Security includes security-by-de- ESA projects; sign, program security architecture, and sup-  Establishment of the European Space Se- ply chain security covering the field of engi- curity and Education Centre at Redu neering, safety standards, and regulations. (ESEC) as a centre of excellence for space As European approaches to Space Security cyber security services; first developed at national level, Member  Contributions to the security aspects of EU States all have their own objectives and ambi- space programmes such as Galileo and tions for the protection of their assets. In the Copernicus; field of Space Infrastructure Security, a number of small projects are conducted by national  ESA’s participation in international fora space agencies. A few can mentioned such as (IADC, IAC, COSPAR, IADC, IAA, the upgrading of the French Syracuse telecom UNCOPUOS). satellites that include an anti-jamming sys- ESA is also supporting R&D in the field of Se- 153 tem. More anecdotic projects can also be curity in Outer Space through the funding of mentioned such as the Robusta programme projects. that is a student led nano satellite project

150 Listner, M., J., (2015). The International Code of Con- 152 EEAS (2016). Conference on Disarmament – Working duct: Comments on changes in the latest draft and post- Group of the “Way Ahead”. Geneva. Retrieved from Euro- mortem thoughts. Retrieved from Space Review: pean Union External Action: https://eeas.europa.eu/head- http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2851/1 quarters/headquarters-homepage/28329/conference-dis- 151 EEAS (2017). Conference on Disarmament - Working armament-working-group-way-ahead-eu-statement-pre- Group on the "Way Ahead" - EU Statement on the Preven- vention-arms-race-outer-space_en tion of an Arms Race in Outer Space. Retrieved from Euro- 153Retrieved from CNES (2018): https://syra- pean Union-External Action: https://eeas.europa.eu/head- cuse4.cnes.fr/fr/syracuse-4 quarters/headquarters-homepage/28329/conference-dis- 154Retrieved from CNES: https://ro- armament-working-group-way-ahead-eu-statement-pre- busta.cnes.fr/fr/ROBUSTA/Fr/index.htm vention-arms-race-outer-space_en 155Leonardo. (2017) Press release: http://www.leonar- docompany.com/en/-/esa-galileo-cyber

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Similarly, the European Union funds a great number of research projects in that field but also conducts its own Space Security activities, mostly related to the EU flagship programmes. A good example is the establishment of an independent Security Accreditation Board (SAB) within the European GNSS Agency (GSA) to verify the compliance of the programme with applicable security protocols and regulations.156 Additionally, the Galileo Open Service will soon feature an Open Ser- vice Navigation Message Authentication (OS- NMA) option to address jamming and spoofing attacks, and a Galileo High Accuracy Service to enhance the quality and resilience of signals and the Open Service. The European Union is actively supporting Space Infrastructure Secu- rity through the funding of R&D projects in that subdomain in member states. Considera- tions regarding resilience are seriously treated by the European Union, for which space resilience is a key objective. Its role can be expected to evolve with the greater integration of the Galileo system into the European economy. In this respect, the European Commis- sion recently issued a proposal for the setting- up of a new EU Agency for the Space Pro- gramme. Accordingly, an increased budget share will be dedicated to defence spending on R&D and procurement, which also means more opportunities to strengthen the EU’s involvement in that particular field. Security in Outer Space is being addressed in Europe at different levels. The Member States are actively conducting R&D activities in the field of SSA, SEPP, and SIS to protect their space assets. These efforts are to be considered in a broader context, as a significant share of national budgets is being invested in European endeavours. ESA, acting as an intergovernmental body, is pooling such efforts under the umbrella of its SSA programme but also remains a proactive player in the field of SEPP and SIS. The agency’s scope of action is also up for further interpretation, should the institution take on a more prominent role in these matters. Additionally, the European Un- ion, as a supranational actor, is becoming increasingly involved in Space Security, as it operates its own constellations. Other policy developments indicate the EU’s willingness to increasingly incorporate security policy considerations in its strategy and will likely take a more instrumental role in conducting security related projects for that reason.

156 European GNSS Agency (2016). Security Accredita- tion. Retrieved from European GNSS Agency: https://www.gsa.europa.eu/security/accreditation

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4. Transatlantic Relations: State of Affairs

Exceptionally close transatlantic cooperation 4.1 A Privileged Partnership emerged as a consequence of broader political dynamics following the Second World War and 4.1.1 Relations between Europe and the United related wartime and post-war developments. The current result is the many formalised co- States operative frameworks between the partners The singularity of transatlantic relations lies in on different shores of the Atlantic Ocean (on their extraordinary steadiness throughout the multiple political levels and across various sec- decades. Since the United States has historic tors). Although diplomatic relations between ties to Europe, transatlantic cooperation the United States and European Union were comes across as a logical follow-up of a long- established already in the early 1950s, the for- shared history and value-based proximity be- malization of general political cooperative ties tween state subjects from North America and between the transatlantic partners took place th their counterparts in Europe. The emergence only at the end of the 20 century. The follow- of close inter-regional bonds has a strong his- ing table summarises the relevant formal co- torical foundation and many formal and infor- operative frameworks. Some other additional mal ties. Despite this internal strength, the re- initiatives (such as TAFTA or TTIP talks) un- lationship is presently facing turbulent political derline that the challenging nature of interna- developments that are shaping the future de- tional collaborative efforts does not automati- velopment of the transatlantic partnership. cally lead any given initiative to a successful conclusion in a short timeframe. Year Item Note Since North Atlantic Treaty Or- Political military alliance currently with 29 member states, 1949 ganization based on the principle of collective defence. 1995 First official document of the two partners after the EU and New Transatlantic Agenda CFSP were established in 1993 with the Treaty of Maastricht, calling for joint action in 4 thematic priorities. 1998 Transatlantic Economic Initiative aimed at providing impetus for further transatlantic Partnership cooperation in the field of trade and investment. 2007 Transatlantic Economic Formal body established to direct EU – U.S. economic rela- Council tions, meets at least once a year.

Table 4: Selected formalised collaborative instruments in transatlantic relations Interestingly, historical analysis of the trans- been fatally wounded by cyclical events of a atlantic cooperation suggests that transatlan- deteriorating nature. The recent challenging tic ties have been going through periods of ups developments within the realm of transatlantic (reconstruction of post-war Europe, collapse of relations have momentarily changed the over- the Soviet Union, aftermath of 9/11 terrorist all perception of the state of play in general attacks…) and downs (Vietnam War, environ- ties between the two sides of this partnership. mental agenda, current tensions…) relatively Explicit recognition of Europe as a trade foe by frequently. The cyclical nature of such devel- the U.S. administration157 or strong assertive opments calls for a proper evaluation of these criticism of allied defence spending and the fu- trends with regards to the historical patterns. ture of military alliance158 are developments Following up on specific developments in sev- that display unprecedented tensions.159 De- eral politically sensitive topics or particular spite their unprecedented impact, the opera- events that have taken place over the last 60 tional aspects of long-lasting EU-US partner- years, it can be argued that fundamental as- ships (in particular in trade, defence or science pects of transatlantic cooperation have not yet

157 Trump calls European Union a "foe" of the USA on 159 On the other hand, some warming of relations have trade, Euronews, (July 15, 2018). been recently recorded – a meeting between U.S. Presi- 158 Trump presses Nato allies to lift defence spending to dent Donald Trump and European Commission President 4% of GDP, Financial Times (July 11, 2018). Jean-Claude Juncker, on July 25, 2018, resulted in a declared ceasefire in U.S.-EU trade rules tensions.

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and innovation) do not seem to be diminish- Trade statistics between the EU and the United ing, and this conveys the important message States suggest historically close ties supported of the stability of the transatlantic bonds. by the status quo, which showcase that from an EU perspective, the United States consti- Security and Defence tutes the largest export and second largest With regards to the security aspects of trans- (after China) import partner for the EU28.162 atlantic ties, the primary platform of coopera- From the opposite perspective the overall pic- tion is the NATO framework in the form of a ture is similar. The EU is the largest exporter political and military alliance of 29 member of goods and services to the U.S. market and states across the Atlantic in the northern hem- is the second largest import partner (also after isphere. Recently NATO has added more east- China) of U.S. goods and services.163 ern European countries, thus forming an alliance with substantial regional reach within the European continent, it remains valid today as 4.1.2 Transatlantic Cooperation in Space it adjusts to the new security environment Europe and the United States also have a long with emerging threats coming from state as history of cooperation in space, which has well as non-state actors. No other relevant taken place at various levels, in different multilateral transatlantic cooperative frame- frameworks and – thematically – in a plethora works in security and defence (comparable in of fields. According to the type of participating size and scope to the NATO) have emerged, actor, cooperative frameworks can be divided though it is not rare to see European countries into government, agency, and industry levels cooperate with the United States on a bilateral of cooperation. Concerning specific activities, basis. Some smaller multilateral cooperative the deepest ties of transatlantic space cooper- frameworks applicable in this section include ation are traditionally to be found in activities the EU-U.S. Security and Development Dia- such as space science and exploration (fol- logue since 2010 and a framework agreement lowed later by cooperation patterns in earth on U.S. participation in EU crisis management observation data sharing and the GNSS operations signed in 2011. Recent develop- agenda). Cooperative agency-level undertak- ments in Europe could also lead to EU member ings in space science and space exploration states taking greater responsibility for security have been present since the very beginning of outside NATO-related mechanisms. It should the space era, and have been continuously re- also be noted, that for a few years NATO has inforced over the last two decades as well, as been showing a dedicated interest in develop- evidenced by various formalised means of co- ing a formal approach to space capabilities, operation between ESA and NASA (Agreement although it does not own or operate space sys- on Future Cooperation from 2007,164 Memo- 160 tems and relies for these on member states. randum of Understanding on Space Transpor- 165 Economy and Trade tation from 2009, Sentinel Data Sharing 166 According to World Bank data, the combined Agreement from 2016) or through specific nominal GDP of the United States and Euro- programmatic cooperation on selected joint bi- pean Union represented 45,4% of global GDP or multilateral projects. Probably the clearest in 2017161 making the United States and the example (supported also by an intergovern- EU the two largest economic blocks in the mental agreement) is the International Space world. Economic aspects of transatlantic rela- Station programme. The productive nature of tions date further back to the international transatlantic space cooperation is further doc- trade of European states with the new Union umented by the collaborative nature of pro- formed on American soil in 1776 As a result of grams such as Rosetta, Cassini-Huygens, the emerging and later continuing processes of Hubble Space Telescope, the Infrared Space globalization, economic ties in the transatlan- Observatory (ISO), the Solar and Heliospheric tic region have further deepened and widened. Observatory (SOHO) and the International

160 For More information concerning NATO’s approach to 164 NASA and ESA Sign Agreements for Future Coopera- space see https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/govern- tion, NASA, (June 2007). Retrieved from ment/uploads/system/uploads/attach- https://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2007/jun/HQ_07139_ ment_data/file/624137/doc- Paris_MOUs.html trine_nato_air_space_ops_ajp_3_3.pdf 165 ESA and NASA Sign Memorandum of Understanding 161 For detailed data see https://data.worldbank.org/indi- on Cooperation in Space Transportation, European Space cator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD. Agency, (September 14, 2009). Retrieved from 162 USA-EU - international trade in goods statistics, Euro- http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Space_Transporta- stat, 2018. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/station/ESA_and_NASA_sign_Memorandum_of_Understandi tistics-explained/index.php?title=USA-EU_- ng_on_cooperation_in_space_transportation _international_trade_in_goods_statistics 166 Sentinel Data Wanted, European Space Agency, 163 European Union, Office of the United States Trade (March 15, 2016), Retrieved from Representative, 2018. Retrieved from http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Observ- https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/europe-middle-east/eu- ing_the_Earth/Sentinel_data_wanted rope/european-union

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Gamma-Ray Astrophysics Laboratory between the USA and European partners (EU, (INTEGRAL). Future projected endeavours in- ESA, individual countries) it should be noted clude among others the James Webb Space that the cooperative framework is not all-en- Telescope and joint Mars Sample Return cam- compassing and has occasionally gone paign. Continuation of transatlantic space co- through hardships (development of launchers, operation is further confirmed by recent initial phases of Galileo development, cooper- budget statistics, which show a growing ratio ation with third countries, uncertainties of of U.S. space programmes that include the long-term support for certain programs and participation of European subjects.167 missions). These tensions have not significantly affected transatlantic space cooperation EU-U.S. cooperation on Earth observation overall. As international cooperative efforts dates back to case-to-case assistance followed are naturally challenging endeavours, it is nat- by a collaborative back-up framework (1989) ural that they should struggle to overcome between the NOAA and EUMETSAT, to provide barriers in their pursuit. Some transatlantic coverage of the Atlantic Ocean and respective cooperative efforts (both space and non-space continents at times when the other party related) have not been able to overcome these might not have or might temporarily lose such challenges, some, and arguably more, have capability through its own systems. The concluded successfully. Space cooperation is EUMETSAT-NOAA partnership has remained usually protected from any deterioration in relevant until the present day, through re- diplomatic relations. This can be seen in the newed agreements on joint projects and pro- example of the ongoing utilization of Russian vision of access to data acquired by space sys- RD-180 engines in U.S. Atlas V launch vehicle. tems of the other partner (e.g. Landsat, Co- pernicus). Following the GMES / Copernicus agenda evolution at the European level, the EU - U.S. agreement on the facilitation of sharing 4.2 Security in Outer Space: of Copernicus EO data was signed by the two parties in 2015.168 A more operational agree- A Mix of Arrangements ment on a lower ESA – NASA / NOAA / USGS level was signed in 2016 (as noted above), this The issue of security in space is already one time with a particular focus on access to Sen- area of transatlantic space cooperation frame- tinel data. The GNSS dimension of transatlan- works but remains limited by comparison to tic space cooperation has been mainly in- the rising stakes in this domain. Some areas volved two priority issues – interoperability, of transatlantic space cooperation are not pri- and access to service. With the emergence of marily concerned with security in outer space European efforts to pursue an autonomous but inherently include activities that have ex- GNSS system, a transatlantic GNSS coopera- plicit space security considerations – SSA data tion scheme was developed by the two parties sharing contributing to the SSA capabilities in 2004, through an Agreement on the Promo- across the Atlantic, GNSS interoperability, and tion, Provision and Use of Galileo and GPS Sat- access to service improving the resilience of ellite-based navigation Systems and Related the satellite navigation capabilities owned by Applications.169 Galileo’s initial services are either party. fully interoperable with GPS and interoperabil- An overview of the strategic positions of Eu- ity with GPS will be valid in achieving full op- rope and the United States concerning security erational capability by 2020. Besides creating in outer space highlights differences in vital in- end-user benefits (increased precision, availa- terests in pursuit of cooperative frameworks bility of service), interoperability and access to relevant to security in outer space. Whereas signals leads to the increased resilience of the United States aims to maintain strategic GNSS capabilities. superiority (dominance), supported by soft Space cooperation between the EU and the leadership and redundancy of capability United States has also been supported through through collaboration, the European approach diplomatic channels in the form of Space Dia- largely reflects pursuit of autonomy and free- logues between the two partners, which have dom of action, followed by expanding interests been repeatedly taking place for more than a in maintaining its position as one of the global decade (the most recent – the 9th session – space powers, yet being unable to operate being in January 2018). Despite the prevail- self-sufficient capabilities in space situational ingly positive assessment of space relations

167 Machay, M. and Hajko, V. (2015). ‘Transatlantic space http://www.copernicus.eu/news/european-union-and- cooperation: An empirical evidence’. Space Policy, Volume united-states-sign-cooperation-arrangement-copernicus- 32, 2015, pp. 37-43, ISSN 0265-9646. earth-observation-data 168 European Union and United States Sign Cooperation 169 Agreement on the Promotion, Provision and Use of Arrangement on Copernicus Earth Observation Data, Co- Galileo and GPS Satellite-Based Navigation Systems and pernicus, (20 October 2015). Retrieved from Related Applications. (2004).

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awareness supporting the security dimension United States have displayed complementary of European space interests. positions on international space governance efforts, such as a mutual interest in adoption The matrix of actions, used in previous chap- of TCBMs and active participation in the long- ters (SSA, SEPP, SIS), also serves comfortably term sustainability of outer space activities as a methodical benchmark in this chapter. agenda. Concerning the space infrastructure Outlining specific cooperative frameworks security segment of the matrix, data sharing should begin with SSA data sharing instru- cooperation in earth observation and interop- ments and exercises between two partners, erability and mutual access to signals of GNSS usually taking form of agreement between systems have contributed to the resilience of USSTRATCOM on one side and a European service in these two critical capabilities. In ad- stakeholder (national – defence ministries, dition to this, European countries and the armed forces branches, intergovernmental – United States participated in the adoption of ESA, EUMETSAT), on the other. In space envi- international standards related to space activ- ronment protection and preservation, the key ities under the auspices of the International evidence of transatlantic cooperation dates Organization for Standardization and adopted back to the end of the 1980s when the first specific measures concerned with security by bilateral meetings on space debris took place design measures related to the ISS pro- between NASA and ESA and later evolved into gramme. multilateral IADC platform. More recently, Eu- ropean countries, the EU in general and the

(Transatlantic) Diplomacy and cooperation frameworks Harmonise and coordinate space security efforts among stakeholders

Space Situational Aware- Examples: ness (SSA) • SSA Data Sharing Agreements of a bilateral nature

Monitor space environment • Compatible academic environment with favourable schemes for SSA threats related research Space Environment Protec- Examples: tion and Preservation • IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines (guidelines modelled on EU (SEPP) / U.S. best practices) Keep the space environment • Interest in TCBMs and space sustainability agenda safe to operate Space Infrastructure Secu- Examples: rity (SIS)  Interoperability of GNSS systems and access to signals Protect the space infrastruc-  EO data sharing cooperation  NASA – ESA cooperation on security by design concerning ISS pro-

Security in Outer Space subdomain ture from threats gramme missions  Participation of transatlantic actors in development of space-related ISO standards

Table 5: Transatlantic space security cooperation areas 4.2.1 Cooperation in SSA Data Sharing of the near-Earth space, the incentive for information and data sharing is a natural logical Bilateral SSA data sharing agreements be- step to improving capabilities to protect one’s tween the United States and its European (also own space infrastructure. non-European) counterparts constitute the primary instrument of transatlantic coopera- The U.S. stance on SSA cooperation has tion in space situational awareness. Addition- evolved over time. The Commercial and For- ally, several recurrent practical exercises at eign Entities (CFE) Pilot Program formalised the operational level between transatlantic and streamlined the U.S. cooperation ap- partners have taken place in recent years. By proach to SSA sharing in 2004 and was up- sharing interests in the need for protection of graded into a full-fledged SSA Sharing Pro- space infrastructure from threats and hazards gram managed by the USSSTRATCOM in 2009.170 The main U.S. objective of entering

170 The Secure World Foundation argues that the key mo- https://swfound.org/media/3584/ssa_sharing_program_is- tivation for this formalization in 2009, was the Iridium-Cos- sue_brief_nov2011.pdf mos collision, which occurred in February 2009, see

ESPI Report 66 42 October 2018 Security in Outer Space: Perspectives on Transatlantic Relations

into these agreements was indeed to promote crisis or conflict. It sought to expand mutually international security and safety cooperation beneficial agreements with key partners to uti- among allies, encourage the transparency of lise existing and planned capabilities that outer space activities, and enhance the quality could improve the security of U.S. national of the U.S. service delivery system. This policy space capabilities. Growth in the number of envisioned the combined development of SSA sharing agreements in recent years is il- space doctrine with principles, goals, and ob- lustrated in Figure 9, below. jectives that opened the possibility of collaborative sharing of space capabilities in case of

Figure 9: Data sharing agreements signed by USSTRATCOM (IDA) As of October 2018, the U.S. Strategic Com- were signed with European countries or inter- mand manages the data sharing programme national organizations, as seen in Table 6:7, established through 19 (inter)governmental, 2 below. Among the commercial actors partici- classified and more than 70 commercial (e.g. pating in SSA sharing with USSTRATCOM, pri- satellite operators or launch providers) SSA vate European space companies (such as Eu- data sharing agreements.171 The majority of telsat or SES) can be easily identified. agreements pursued at the government level

European Countries and Organisations (11) Other Countries (8)

Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Neth- Australia, Brazil, Canada, Israel, Japan, South erlands, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom, ESA, Korea, Thailand, United Arab Emirates EUMETSAT

Table 6: National SSA DATA Sharing Agreements of the U.S. These SSA sharing agreements are essential dealing with the national security considera- for a number of European institutions and options of SST through ESA)172, under the EU erators for the management of in-orbit opera- umbrella. The SST consortium with so far 5 tions. Given the limited SSA capabilities of Eu- participating countries (France, Germany, It- ropean countries, the European approach to aly, Spain, UK) was established after the Eu- SSA has evolved into an international Euro- ropean Union launched the EU SST Support pean effort. The dedicated SSA programme is Framework in 2014. The history of cooperative run by the European Space Agency (which is space efforts in Europe created a good foun- more focussed on Space Weather and NEOs as dation for European countries to be eager to member states have been rather hesitant in cooperate with their neighbours, on SSA. This

171 USSTRATCOM, Brazil sign agreement to share space 172 McCormick, C. (2015). Space Situational Awareness services, data, USSTRATCOM, August 2018. Retrieved in Europe: The Fractures and the Federative Aspects of from http://www.stratcom.mil/Media/News/ European Space Efforts, Astropolitics: The International News-Article-View/Article/1607213/usstratcom-brazil-sign- Journal of Space Politics & Policy, Volume 13, 2015, Issue agreement-to-share-space-services-data/ 1, ISSN 1477-7622

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was further underlined by the critical im- stakeholders approach SSA sharing agree- portance of space in national and European ments with a strategic interest in mind, fearing policies. The latest European development, a that their SSA capabilities would be seriously proposal for a new Regulation of the European weakened should SSA sharing become una- Parliament and of the Council establishing the vailable, U.S. SSA capabilities do not rely that space programme of the Union and the Euro- critically on data acquired through SSA sharing pean Union Agency for the Space Pro- instruments. gramme,173 presented by the Commission in As such, the USA does not need to approach June 2018, tackles also SSA, which has been international SSA sharing agreements with the now developed into a component of the space same strategic concerns as European coun- programme. Its multilateral nature – among tries. From U.S. standpoint, the purpose of European countries, but also through interna- data sharing is to increase the transparency tional cooperation with other countries, mainly and visibility of space operations, promote co- the United States - has been clearly articulated operation in security, and improve the quality in the text. of American SSA information by gaining ac- In recent years there has been an increased cess to other databases.174 Witnessing the frequency of new SSA data sharing agree- 2009 Iridium-Cosmos collision served as a ments between the United States and its Eu- wakeup call, having realised that although ropean partners, which suggests deepening of global and relatively well developed, U.S. SSA SSA cooperation across the Atlantic. In gen- capabilities were not able to predict this de- eral, lopsided capabilities between the U.S. structive event – there was no warning issued and European space surveillance network give of a potential collision between the Iridium 33 way to a rather unbalanced exchange of infor- and Cosmos 2251 before the collision.175 Con- mation and the approach to these agreements sequently, SSA sharing instruments have been of the different partners follows different ob- recognised as having the potential to provide jectives. This exchange of information enables U.S. capabilities with an additional layer of European countries to operate with more cred- threat detection, in case U.S. sensors fall short ible data and services to secure their space in detecting potentially dangerous in-orbit sit- systems, while giving the United States some uations. A list of transatlantic SSA sharing form of redundancy and duplicity of capability agreements has been made publicly available as a safety measure in case of disruption of by USSTRATCOM, and is provided in Table 7: this capability or where domestic coverage is 8, below. considered inadequate. So, whereas European

173 Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN 174 Helms, S. 2010. Space Situational Awareness. Power PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing the Point presentation for the United Nations Committee on space programme of the Union and the European Union Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS). Retrieved from Agency for the Space Programme and repealing Regula- http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/pres/copuos2010/tech-01E.pdf. tions (EU) No 912/2010, (EU) No 1285/2013, (EU) No 175 Weeden, B. (2010). 2009 Iridium-Cosmos Collision 377/2014 and Decision 541/2014/EU, European Commis- Fact Sheet, Secure World Foundation. Retrieved from sion, 2018. Retrieved from https://eur-lex.europa.eu/re- https://swfound.org/media/6575/swf_iridium_cosmos_colli- source.html?uri=cellar:33f7d93e-6af6-11e8-9483- sion_fact_sheet_updated_2012.pdf 01aa75ed71a1.0003.03/DOC_1&format=PDF

ESPI Report 66 44 October 2018 Security in Outer Space: Perspectives on Transatlantic Relations

European partners Direct interlocutor Identified benefits for Nature of cooperation USSTRATCOM Deepening of partnership with Dutch military, step to- Netherlands Royal Netherlands Air ward establishing interna- Data sharing (2018)176 Force tional norms in the space domain Data sharing, Norwegian Ministry of Reinforcement and Protection Norway (2018)177 Technical cooperation Defence of EO capabilities in the Artic procedures

Data sharing, Defence Ministry of Supporting Danish responsi- Cooperation in sensors Denmark (2018)178 Denmark / Defence bilities in mapping in the Artic and platform develop- Command ment

Liaison Officer (LNO) participating in general planning and Data sharing, promotion Germany – MoU German Air Force mutual training opportunities, of mutual understand- (2017)179 Member of the EU SST Con- ings sortium Spain – MoU Member of EU SST Consor- Spanish Air Force Data sharing (2016)180 tium, host country of SatCen

Belgium Federal Office Supporting Belgium’s space Belgium (2014)181 Data sharing for Science Policy regulations Exchange officer based at United Kingdom JSpOC,183 Five Eye partner, UK Royal Air Force Data sharing (2014)182 Member of the EU SST Con- sortium French Ministry of De- Interoperability with Graves France (2014)184 Data sharing fence systems, CAESAR

Better insight over ESA’s ESA (2014)185 Data sharing space operations

Protection of EUMETSAT as- EUMETSAT (2014)186 sets working in collaboration Data sharing, scientific – in partnership with with NOAA on the Initial Joint cooperation NOAA Polar System Italian Ministry of De- Italy Member of EU SST Consortium Data sharing fence Table 7: SSA Data sharing agreements between the USA and European countries

176 U.S. Strategic Command and Royal Netherlands Air Force sign agreement to share space services data, USSTRATCOM Public Affairs, (September 2018). Retrieved from http://www.stratcom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1647946/us- strategic-command-and-royal-netherlands-air-force-sign-agreement-to-share-sp/ 177 U.S. Strategic Command and Norway sign agreement to share space services, USSTRATCOM Public Affairs, (April 2017), 178 USSTRATCOM, Denmark sign agreement to share space services, data, USSTRATCOM Public Affairs, (April 2018). 179 USSTRATCOM, German air force sign liaison officer agreement, USSTRATCOM Public Affairs, (June 2017). 180 USSTRATCOM, Spain sign memorandum to share space services, data, USSTRATCOM Public Affairs, (February 2017). 181 U.S. Strategic Command, Belgium sign agreement to share space services, data, USSTRATCOM Public Affairs, (February 2017). 182 DOD Signs Space Data Sharing Agreement with UK, USSTRATCOM Public Affairs, (September 2014). 183 U.S. Strategic Command Fact Sheet Joint Space Operations Center / 614th Air Operations Center, USSTRACTOM, (April 2018), 184 U.S. Strategic Command, France Enhance Space Data Sharing Agreement, USSTRATCOM Public Affairs, (April 2015). 185 USSTRATCOM signs Space-Data Sharing Agreement with ESA, USSTRATCOM Public Affairs, (October 2014). 186 USSTRATCOM enters into Space-Data Sharing Agreement with EUMETSAT, USSTRATCOM Public Affairs, (August 2014).

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Based on this list and related sources, some building oriented experiments, or cooper- observations about the nature of SSA sharing ation in development of future (joint or in- agreements in the transatlantic context can be dividual but complimentary) SSA sensors made: or facilities.  The United States has pursued SSA Shar- USSTRATCOM’s outreach and openness strat- ing agreements with countries that appar- egy is also beneficial in promoting mutual un- ently have the most developed SSA capa- derstanding in transatlantic relations. Senior bilities in the European environment, all of officials from various countries have been vis- the 5 participating countries in the EU SST iting USSTRATCOM over recent years; a few consortium have signed bilateral SSA examples include: French Commander Ber- sharing agreements with the United nard Schuler in 2014, UK Royal Air Force Mar- States shal Phil Osborn and German Army Brigadier General Dirk H. Backen, Roberto Vittori, ESA  With the exception of Belgium, all other Astronaut, and the Air Force Brigadier General national SSA sharing agreements (exclud- and ASI Head at the Italian Embassy in the ing ESA and EUMETSAT) showcase either United States In addition to bilateral forms of the defence ministry or armed forces of- cooperation on SSA data sharing, fice as a responsible counterpart for SSA USSTRATCOM has initiated the recurrent or- sharing at the “European side” of each ganization of SSA experiments and exercises SSA sharing agreement. This underscores with its international partners. Four such ex- that although SSA-related R&D is often periments have taken place so far, with the conducted at agency level (DLR, CNES…), latest taking place in 2017 at the Lockheed operation of SST assets continues to be Martin Facility in Virginia. European partners left mostly to military actors. have participated regularly at these events.  Media releases by USSTRATCOM following During the fourth SSA experiment in 2017, signing of SSA sharing agreements tradi- each participating nation maintained a space tionally highlight the importance of SSA operations centre (SpOC) to command and sharing with the following quote: “The in- control (C2) their respective SSA assets and formation is crucial for launch support, experimented with fully integrated, notional satellite manoeuvre planning, support for Federation SpOC (FedSpOC) to demonstrate on-orbit anomalies, electromagnetic in- the value of a combined and integrated C2 ca- terference reporting and investigation, pability.189 Scenarios in this exercise, as well satellite decommissioning activities and as in previous exercises, included conjunc- on-orbit conjunction assessments.”187 tions, manoeuvres, breakups, and launches, as well as specific unusual events (all based on  Statements by USSTRATCOM also high- unclassified SSA data).190 Assessments of light that formalized agreements stream- foreign military officials participating in these line the process of requesting information exercises and adjacent discussions and forums 188 gathered by JSpOC. This confirms the have highlighted the synergistic nature of such aforementioned assessment that the activities and best practices sharing opportu- amount of data shared is somewhat im- nities including both tactical coordination and balanced in favour of the provision of U.S. operational level activities (techniques, proce- data / service to its international partners. dures, manoeuvres).191  SSA sharing agreements explicitly estab- Several challenges remain present when con- lish channels for direct information ex- sidering the future of transatlantic cooperation change. Additionally, they also open doors in space situational awareness. To start with, for future activities under the agreement one can highlight that there is no standardiza- framework, such as practical capacity- tion of international data formatting concerning SSA data.192 The reliance of European

187 E.g. http://www.stratcom.mil/Media/News/News-Arti- 190 Schiff, B. (2017). Attaining Situational Understanding cle-View/Article/1497343/usstratcom-denmark-sign-agree- in the Space Domain, Amos Conference. Retrieved from ment-to-share-space-services-data/ or http://www.strat- https://amostech.com/TechnicalPa- com.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Arti- pers/2017/SSA/Schiff.pdf cle/1607213/usstratcom-brazil-sign-agreement-to-share- 191 USSTRATCOM hosts space exercise with interna- space-services-data/ tional partners, USSTRATCOM Public Affairs, (October 188188 DoD Agrees to Share Space Data with South Ko- 2016). Retrieved from http://www.stratcom.mil/Me- rea, U.S. Department of Defense, (September 2014), dia/News/News-Article-View/Article/984307/usstratcom- http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsar- hosts-space-exercise-with-international-partners/ ticle.aspx?id=123097 192 As such, different stakeholders are using different for- 189 USSTRATCOM Hosts Fourth SSA Experiment with In- mats for data used in SSA sharing, which makes effective ternational Partners, USSTRATCOM Public Affairs, (Octo- SSA data sharing more complicated. ber 2017). Retrieved from http://www.stratcom.mil/Me- dia/News/News-Article-View/Article/1340856/usstratcom- hosts-fourth-ssa-experiment-with-international-partners/.

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partners on U.S. SSA assets opens up the pact of extreme space weather on critical in- question of the completeness and resilience of frastructures. Within the NEOs segment of the U.S. data. The reliance of European stakehold- SSA issue, national space agencies in Europe, ers could also be easily assessed as depend- together with ESA and NASA, have played a ence. Efforts to tackle this state of affairs have pivotal role in the work of the UN-mandated been continuously ongoing in Europe, most Space Mission Planning Advisory Group, a notably through the development of a dedi- multilateral forum to discuss international re- cated EU SST support framework in a form of sponses to NEO threats. SST consortium. European stakeholders con- stantly present statements highlighting the importance of and need for SSA data sharing, 4.2.2 Space Environment Protection and Preser- with a prominent position in these endeavours vation being put on cooperation with the United States. The strategic concerns of the United States and Europe in this domain display more com- The new draft regulation, presented in June plementarity than in the previous section – 2018 by the European Commission also reaf- predominantly a mutual interest in space de- firms this notion, while at the same time fos- bris mitigation. Still, it could be argued, that tering further development of European SSA whereas the U.S. approach reflects strong na- capabilities, which should eventually lead to tional security considerations related to the the development of an autonomous European need to protect its space systems, the Euro- catalogue of space objects. So far, no opera- pean approach highlights the synergistic po- tional provisions regarding potential transat- tential of space as an enabler in more econ- lantic cooperation in SSA sharing through the omy-driven policies (agriculture, meteorology EU SST consortium have been introduced in banking, transportation…). Both the US and Europe, though the new draft regulation Europe in this domain are concerned with soft clearly highlights the importance of interna- leadership, reflecting the interests of both tional cooperative endeavours. For the time partners in promoting the importance of space being, the state of European dependence on sustainability, which effectively serves soft the United States in SSA remains valid. The power-related aspects of regional policy objec- sensitive issue of national SSA assets, such as tives (pursuit of TCBMs, LTS agenda). A slight common military ownership of SST sensors, discrepancy can be observed in active debris brings another layer of insecurity into main- removal technology development, on which taining stable international SSA sharing ef- Europe is placing a comparatively higher pri- forts. The declared increased role of a civil ac- ority.193 tor – the U.S. Department of Commerce, is expected to enable the establishment of closer Transatlantic cooperation on the coordination ties with commercial actors; its impact on SSA of the space debris problem established a sharing with other countries cannot currently foundation for the future creation of the Inter- be evaluated since it is still in a process of re- Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee organization. (IADC). NASA – ESA bilateral meetings on space debris starting from 1987 later evolved The potential for further and deeper coopera- into a multilateral platform, first by including tion in the SSA domain is supported by gener- Japan and later through creating a dedicated ally favourable R&D environments for transat- platform in the form of the IADC. Although lantic cooperation in both the United States some other cooperative arrangements related and Europe. Within the SSA, some cooperative to space debris were pursued at that time both endeavours that have included the participa- by NASA and ESA, e.g. with Russia, the IADC tion of European and U.S. institutions have al- has been a child of initially bilateral NASA – ready displayed good results, such as the ESA coordination meetings on space debris SOHO program for the Space Weather part of mitigation. It was at the 8th of such meetings, the SSA, or the planetary protection campaign in 1992 (which at that time already included PPOSS, ESA SSA’s NEO Segment and the pro- the participation of Japan) that the need for a posed AIDA mission in the NEOs domain. Late formalised multilateral platform was recog- 2016 also witnessed a Space Weather and nized, circulated for review and eventually ap- Critical Infrastructures workshop, an initiative proved.194 funded by the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre with the participation of U.S. The IADC functions today as the most promi- and European experts to investigate the im- nent international forum of governmental bod- ies for the coordination of activities related to

193 Weeden, B. (2017). US space policy, organizational 194 Johnson, N. (2015). Origin of the Inter-Agency Space incentives, and orbital debris removal, The Space Review. Debris Coordination Committee. Retrieved from Retrieved from https://ntrs.nasa.gov/ar- http://www.thespacereview.com/article/3361/1 chive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20150003818.pdf.

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the issues of man-made and natural debris in (concerning programme security architecture space,195 with its main achievement being pre- of ISS utilization) and participation of transat- sented in the form of IADC Space Debris Miti- lantic space actors in development of space- gation Guidelines in 2002, which later served related standards under the auspices of the In- as a basis for the adoption of UN Space Debris ternational Organisation for Standardization Mitigation Guidelines in 2007. It can be argued could also be highlighted. that transatlantic models of Space Debris Mit- The technical details of these cooperative igation served as a model for developing the frameworks in GNSS and EO suggest that the IADC guidelines. In essence, partnership and concept of resilience applies rather to the re- coordination of efforts between the USA and silience of service than to the actual hardening its European partners led to the creation of of systems in a way that they have more ca- mechanisms that transcended the transatlan- pacity to withstand destructive effects. tic perspective and provided a useful tool on a Through a cooperation agreement on Galileo universal level. The IADC continues its work on and GPS, followed by more operational work an annual basis. on the basis of this cooperation, the EU and The relevance of space debris mitigation ef- the United States were able to achieve a level forts was strongly embedded in the recent of resilience, in which the negative conse- pursuit of the Guidelines on the Long-term quences of service dropout of one’s own sys- Sustainability of Space Activities (LTS) at the tem could be mitigated by reliance on contin- UNCOPUOS, resulting in the recently produced uous service provision from the other partner. compendium of LTS guidelines.196 The ra- Resilience is further supported through the dif- tionale of the LTS agenda brought together not ferent operational characteristics of each sys- just transatlantic partners – there was wide- tem, such as signal formats of frequencies, spread approval of its necessity. Its relevance which make it impossible for a potential at- was strongly supported by the fact that the tacker to jam both with one single disruptive United States and several European countries effort.197 In such a case however, further work took deep interest in its work plan and actively needs to be done on the end-user side to fos- participated in developing the set of guide- ter development of receivers able to process lines, thus providing a credible diplomatic signals from both GPS and Galileo. Some of foundation. More generally speaking, shared the technical and operative details of all possi- interests in pursuing space TCBMs over the ble scenarios, including access to restricted last decade provide another example of space- signals, have been areas with a limited level of security related cooperation in a transatlantic formalised cooperation. The concept of service perspective. Similarly, even though most of resilience applies to the EO satellites infra- these initiatives in addition to the LTS agenda, structure. The most prominent in this regard such as the Group of Governmental Experts on is a long lasting partnership between NOAA TCBMs in space, or support provided by the and EUMETSAT, through joint projects and the United States to the International Code of provision of coverage when requested. Conduct for Outer Space Activities, were pur- The inability of transatlantic partners to sued on a broader multilateral level, they de- achieve consensus on U.S. access to Galileo’s serve to be mentioned, as they all included no- PRS signal over the last years, leaves the topic ticeable transatlantic support. open for multiple possible future developments. At the same time, it casts a negative 4.2.3 Space Infrastructure Security light on shared responsibility for this so far un- resolved issue. On the other hand, both GNSS In terms of space infrastructure security two and EO cooperative frameworks do have the primary transatlantic cooperative patterns for potential to affect global perspectives in their advancing the concept of resilience of space respective domains, such as through the initi- systems are to be acknowledged (GNSS in- ative of the Global Earth Observation System teroperability followed by access to signals, of Systems198 or collective efforts in achieving and EO data sharing). Additionally, some co- the benefits stemming from the Global Navi- operative patterns between NASA and ESA on gation System of Systems capabilities. The the International Space Station Programme

195 IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, United Na- 197 Hein, G. (2006). GNSS Interoperability: Achieving a tions Office for Outer Space Affairs, (September 2017). Global System of Systems or “Does Everything Have to Be Retrieved from http://www.unoosa.org/docu- the Same?”, Working Paper, Inside GNSS. Retrieved from ments/pdf/spacelaw/sd/IADC-2002-01-IADC- http://insidegnss.com/auto/0106_Working_Pa- Space_Debris-Guidelines-Revision1.pdf. pers_IGM.pdf. 196 For the time being, LTS guidelines require further 198 About GEOSS’, Group on Earth Observations, (July elaboration at the national level, since the 2018 session of 2018). Retrieved from https://www.earthobserva- the UNCOPUOS did not result in consensus with respect tions.org/geoss.php. to the form in which the guidelines will be presented to the UN General Assembly.

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prominent position of European and U.S. actors in discussions conducted on these issues, together with the declared interest to pursue future GNSS compatibility and interoperability as well as EO data sharing on a global level, creates a credible force in efforts to find universal common grounds in GNSS compatibility and interoperability and Earth observation data sharing. Concerning the International Space Station programme, this multilateral cooperation established in 1998 among five primary partners (NASA, JAXA, Roscosmos, CSA and ESA for 11 European participating governments) brought another form of transatlantic cooperation on issues related to security in outer space, this time within a broader multilateral effort. The model of work for ISS utilization is based on the Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) from 1998. In addition to some safety obligations regarding the utilization of the station being anchored already in the IGA, in 2002 a charter was signed establishing a closer relationship between NASA and ESA payload safety panels concerning the ISS missions,199 to foster closer collaboration and reduction of duplici- ties in payload safety review processes. Space infrastructure security stood also at the beginning of the ATV utilization, which emerged initially as a result of the Materials and Pro- cesses Reciprocal Agreement defining the process for selection and certification of materials used in the Space Shuttle and the Interna- tional Space Station, signed between ESA and NASA in 2000.200 Both national as well as international standards are applicable to U.S. and European space stakeholders, who need to comply with them to be eligible to take part in space programmes in the United States or Europe. In the United States, NASA and DoD set different security procedures and standards applicable to space missions; in Europe, the European Cooperation for Space Standardization has been at the forefront of European space standards development. In addition to different national standards, the International Organisa- tion for Standardization maintains a compendium of international standards applicable to security in outer space. Both the United States and European countries took part in the international working groups leading to the publication of these ISO standards.

199 Closer ties between NASA and ESA Safety Organisa- 200 Orlandi, M. et al. (2013). ‘The role of ESA TEC-QTE in tions, European Space Agency, (July 23, 2002). Retrieved the ISS Safety Process’, 6th IAASS Conference. Retrieved from https://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Human_Space- from http://iaassconference2013.space-safety.org/wp-con- flight/International_Space_Station/Closer_ties_be- tent/uploads/sites/28/2013/06/0900_Orlandi.pdf. tween_NASA_and_ESA_safety_organisations.

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5. Way Forward: Parallel Routes Towards Common Objectives

 Commercial policy / Role of private indus- 5.1 Comparative analysis of try; and U.S. and European ap-  Legal & Regulatory framework / Interna- proaches tional cooperation. The following table presents a brief synthesis of the overall assessment resulting from the 5.1.1 Different Policy Drivers description made above of the respective space & security policy and operational frame- When comparing the U.S. and European ap- works on each side of the Atlantic. This com- proaches to security in outer space, a series of parative analysis is necessarily based on a parameters should be considered: simplified assessment of different concepts to  Strategy & Policy / Institutional organisa- capture key areas of convergence and diver- tion gence.  Operational implementation / Activities and Capabilities

Parameter United States Europe Strategy & Policy / Institutional organisation National security; Military superior- Protection of economy and society; Strategy and ity; Global leadership; Promotion of Meeting security requirements for ser- ambitions commercial market vices; Achieve autonomy Responsibility sharing among institutional actors (intricate decision-mak- Loosely coordinated multiple levels of Organisa- ing process as a consequence of a a actors and decision-makers (national, tional culture higher number of national actors); intergovernmental, supranational) top down approach to military/civil domains New national space security strat- New regulation proposal by the EC egy; Initiation of a national STM pol- (SSA component of the Space Pro- Ongoing policy, gramme; EU Agency for the Space icy-making Initiation of establishment of the Programme…); new Defence Space milestones Space Force/Command within the Strategies (UK & France); Greater co- DoD; Review of private space regu- ordination in security and defence pol- lations icies under consideration Operational implementation / Activities and Capabilities Reliance on non-European SSA data Self-sufficient (unmatched SSA ca- sources; Improvement of SSA capa- Capabilities pabilities, coverage to be comple- bilities expected as a result of a mented) greater effort EU SST Consortium; Proposed SSA Improvement of SSA capabilities component of the Union Space Pro- (various programmes, Space Fence); gramme; EU Agency for the Space Major under- Expansion of SSA sharing agree- Programme (security accreditation takings ments; Further integration of com- across the Union Space Programme); mercial capabilities National assets development; EU co- owned SST sensors European countries (mainly MoDs with Sharing of responsibilities between support from national agencies); EU DoD and DoC (SSA/STM); Other na- Key actors and its agencies (evolving role under tional institutions (NASA, NOAA, consideration: EC, EEAS, GSA, FCC, FAA) SatCen); ESA (capability-building)

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Commercial policy / Role of private industry

Private capa- Developing commercial activity in Mostly contractors (R&D projects, de- bilities SSA data and related services velopment and manufacturing)

Congressional support for commercial endeavours;Mature technologies Involvement Repeated calls for more industry-led catering for operational defence of private ac- initiatives; Weak market dynamics for needs; USSTRATCOM relationships tors space security with industry; Expansion of Office of Space Commerce within DoC

Legal & Regulatory framework / International cooperation Active in international fora; Prefer- Active in international fora; Reluc- ence for pursuit of TCBMs; Ill-fated International tance to enter legally binding inter- ICoC (possible upcoming renewed ini- initiatives national regulations; Agreement on tiative); Supportive of binding inter- pursuit of TCBMs national regulations Existing regulatory framework in National space legislations; Security Domestic process of updating and reorganiz- accreditation in EU programmes; regulatory ing; Security protocols developed at ECSS standards applicable at opera- aspects operational level tional level Predominantly SSA data sharing: in- Views of Predominantly SSA data sharing: po- creasing political will to secure own transatlantic tential to complement and enhance infrastructure with domestic critical cooperation domestic capabilities capabilities.

Table 8: Summary Table of U.S. and European approaches to Space Security Key Takeaways Based on the comparative analysis above, the overview of strategic considerations of security in outer space in the United States and Europe can be summarised as follows:

European approach: Synthesis U.S. approach: Synthesis The European approach to security in outer The U.S. approach to security in outer space is space builds upon a multi-layered institutional relatively more straightforward since suprana- structure of European space activities, which tional governance issues are not an area of con- creates a European governance model that can cern. There is a stronger military dimension in come across as difficult to fathom by external space security issues, which is highlighted by actors. Security considerations with relation to the critical importance of space systems in for- space were first initiated at national level, inte- eign and national security policies. Security as- grated within space programs of European pects of space activities have been leveraged in countries. From the inception of their govern- the United States for a longer period of time (in mental space systems, Member States have set comparison with Europe) and have historically up national policies. Security in space gained reflected the relevant position that space has significant attention at the international institu- had across various administrations. U.S. capa- tional level through the work of ESA and bilities related to security in outer space largely EUMETSAT, as well as at the top political level outweigh those of other spacefaring nations in- of the EU, following the recognition of strategic cluding Europe as a single actor in space secu- European interests in maintaining and operating rity. One recent trend suggests that the U.S. ad- space systems. Strategic concerns and the im- ministration is more inclined to pursue a more portance of space security are well acknowl- commercially focused space policy and, notably edged in key political documents adopted at EU in national security areas. Greater focus is also level. Even though the nature of these space se- visible in rather assertive statements on the im- curity related concerns still remains mostly ci- portance of space control, dominance and lead- vilian, the pivotal role of space as an enabler for ership in space, with variations in the wording other key policies such as agriculture, digital, or depending on the incumbent administration. On defence, is well understood. Further European the other hand, the importance of partnerships integration calls for harmonisation and setting- has also been stressed and appears to be a focal up of a new governance model, which is com- point in current U.S. Space Policy. A more prom- plex since it implies sharing sensitive infor- inent role of civil space actors in SSA data gath- mation and some transfer of sovereignty. ering and sharing is also expected.

Table 9: Overview of European and U.S. approach to security in outer space

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It is clear that the mechanisms and drivers at the moment around such option, which will ul- work on both sides of the Atlantic for the defi- timately be arbitrated by the Congress. nition and the implementation of respective In parallel, the announcement of the national space security policies greatly differ. Space traffic Management initiative under the Nevertheless, both the United States and Eu- authority of the Department of Commerce is rope are concerned by the emergence of new the civilian complement. threats that might compromise their interests In fact, if at first glance the U.S. governance in space and on the ground. As a consequence, model displays a seemingly fully integrated outer space security is gaining priority in re- structure, several interviewees stressed that spective civil and defence space agendas. U.S. bureaucratic processes can be intricate as In this respect, despite the discrepancies high- a consequence of the multiplicity of engaged lighted above in the respective approaches to stakeholders. At this point in time, it is clear outer space security, many factors contribute that there will be a strong military side in the to the expectation of a higher degree of con- United States concerning the on-going devel- vergence in these matters in the near and me- opment of the various outer space security dium terms. challenges. The balance that will be found with civilian options and the potential diplomatic implications are still to be determined. 5.1.2 Shared Perception of a Growing Vulnera- bility 5.1.4 Rising Sensitivity to Space Security Issues The United States and Europe share a largely in Europe common assessment of space security challenges ahead. However, given cultural differ- In comparison, in Europe, public debates on ences ranging from strategic vision to opera- outer space security issues are just starting tional considerations, they prioritize these and no consensus has emerged among policy challenges differently in their respective space makers to tackle them as short-term, pressing policy frameworks, in particular in the civil and operational priorities. military segments of space activities. European stakeholders are fully aware of the As a consequence, this initial joint assessment multiple challenges ahead but the European leads to quite different concrete results in space security ecosystem remains complex terms of a vision of the way forward. The need and multi-layered, structured along a general to recognize that potential misunderstanding principle of national leadership and sover- will occur has to be understood and resolved. eignty. The prominent place of security concerns in the EU strategy for space, the inclu- sion of the SST/SSA programme under the 5.1.3 Strong Reinforcement of the U.S. Space Se- umbrella of the European Union, the achieve- curity Policy ments of the EU SST Consortium to pool resources and the multiple initiatives of ESA, are The U.S. National Space Policy prioritizes clear indications that these issues are now an space security as a prerequisite for the protec- integral part of the European space policy. tion of its national security. In this context, the However, priorities continue to differ between U.S. approach to outer space security is the various stakeholders, resulting in delays in driven, first and foremost, by the perception actually translating the perception of vulnera- of a growing vulnerability of key national space bility into concrete operational cooperative de- assets. This assessment drives the need to cisions addressing the full range of potential protect space infrastructures against a number threats. of risks, in particular military threats (e.g. ASAT, cyberattacks, and intentional interfer- In this context, the announcement of the first ences), and to prepare a tactical response. The UK and French Space Defence Strategies, as proposal of President Trump to create a Space well as the latest statements of the German Force - a military organisation separate from government, are strong signals. These moves the Air Force for the conduct of in-space mili- highlight a change of attitude towards space tary operations - is a symbol of this vision. security. However, although this proposal seems quite  The German Defence Minister Ursula von in line with the overall U.S. approach to space der Leyen has supported the forging of ‘a and security issues, it is raising a number of common strategic culture for Europe’201 concerns and there is a vivid public debate at and the German government has stated that the development of an ‘independent

201 German Governement. (2018). Speech by Federal Min- Munich. Retrived from: https://www.bmvg.de/re- ister of Defence Dr Ursula von der Leyen on the occasion source/blob/22180/a4b7d92394e5ff6b7689c79cc71fa9d9/ of the opening of the 54th Munich Security Conference in 20180216-download-eroeffnungsrede-englisch-data.pdf. (16 February 2018). ESPI Report 66 52 October 2018 Security in Outer Space: Perspectives on Transatlantic Relations

space surveillance capacity of the EU’ is must be revisited’ - notably in the field of key,202 giving momentum to a bolder ap- cybersecurity, chemical weapons, classi- proach to European autonomy in this mat- cal warfare, territorial conflicts, space se- ter. curity, and artic areas.204 He has announced the establishment of a Defence  The French Minister for Armed Forces, Space Strategy to be ready by 2019.205 Mrs. Florence Parly, made the case for a space defence policy building on European  UK Foreign Minister Gavin Williamson has cooperation in September 2018 when de- announced the launch of a UK Defence nouncing the behaviour of the Russian spy Space Strategy.206 satellite Louch-Olymp orbiting around the The rising political significance of space secu- French-Italian military telecom satellite rity could very well trigger a reassessment of Athena-Fidus.203 European ambitions and accelerate the consol-  In a similar vein, French President Em- idation of the European approach to the issue manuel Macron has stated that ‘European across the different stakeholders (governance, defence cannot be solely structured objectives, architecture, and more). around relationships with the U.S’ and

that ‘equilibriums, automatisms on which alliances were built [since the Cold War]  Europe-wide to U.S. channel, which includes: 5.2 A Fertile Ground for a o Permanent EU – U.S. Space Dialogue Reinforced Partnership at diplomatic level (most recently held in January 2018 with the participation of various U.S. and European officials. 5.2.1 State of Play: A Complex Mix of Arrange- (Space security was put forward as a ments major agenda item). o Case-by-case cooperation between Current transatlantic relations in space secu- U.S. and European organisations (e.g. rity encompass a complex mix of dialogues NOAA/EUMETSAT, NASA/ESA) on spe- and cooperation frameworks involving differ- cific programmatic topics: space ex- ent U.S. and European stakeholders. They are ploration, remote sensing, meteorol- organised through multiple channels, includ- ogy and the ISS programme. ing: o GNSS issues, concerning mainly EU –  Bilateral government-to-government U.S. relations on the compatibility and channels: these revolve predominantly complementarity of the GPS and Gali- around 11 data sharing agreements of leo systems. After initial U.S. concerns USSTRATCOM with European countries following the EU decision to proceed and international governmental organisa- with Galileo development, both parties tions (ESA, EUMETSAT). This model of co- reached an agreement on GPS / Gali- operation is augmented by regular practi- leo interoperability in 2004, and con- cal exercises for partner nations and liai- tinue to cooperate in satellite position- son officers posted to the United States to ing, navigation and timing at bilateral work in close cooperation with their coun- as well as multilateral level. At the terparts. Bilateral cooperation on other same time however, talks on U.S. ac- space projects (e.g. in space exploration cess to Galileo’s PRS have not yet or space science) beyond security in outer been finalised given the sensitive na- space can further foster transatlantic re- ture of this issue. lations in outer space activities.  Multilateral channels: U.S. and Euro- pean stakeholders have been displaying

202 Deutscher Bundestag. (2018). Deutschland gut in der https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2018/08/27/eu- Raumfahrtforschung. Retrieved from: rope-syrie-libye-macron-devoile-sa-feuille-de-route-diplo- https://www.bundestag.de/presse/hib/-/566972. matique_5346644_3210.html. (27 July 2018). 203 Le Monde. (2018). La France accuse la Russie de ten- 205French Government. (2018). Discours du Président de tative d’espionnage par satellite. Retrieved from: la République Emmanuel Macron à l’Hôtel de Brienne. Re- https://www.lemonde.fr/international/arti- trieved from: http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/dis- cle/2018/09/07/paris-revele-une-tentative-d-espionnage- cours-du-president-de-la-republique-emmanuel-macron-a- russe-sur-un-satellite-franco-italien-en- l-hotel-de-brienne/ (13 July 2018). 2017_5351908_3210.html. (7 Septembre 2018). 206 The Guardian. (2018). Defence secretary unveils strat- 204 Le Monde. (2018). Les orientations diplomatiques egy to protect UK satellites. Retrieved from: d’Emmanuel Macron : «sécurité» en Europe et «crise hu- https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/may/21/de- manitaire» en Syrie. Retrieved from: fence-secretary-unveils-strategy-to-protect-uk-satellites (21 May 2018). ESPI Report 66 53 October 2018

converging views and positions on space Involvement of private industry in space security at space-related international security is bound to increase. fora, such as UN COPUOS, Conference on Despite these various successful collaborative Disarmament, IADC, ITU, Cospas-Sarsat, frameworks, or maybe because of their multi- ICG, and others Mutual interest in pursuit plicity, no formal and inclusive framework has of international space TCBMs was visible yet been established at political level between e.g. in the recent “long-term sustainability the United States and Europe. As a conse- of outer space activities” agenda within quence, so far, transatlantic cooperation has the UNCOPUOS. The example of ESA – been confined to a case-by-case-basis, and as NASA cooperation on debris mitigation, far as outer space security is concerned, to bi- which evolved from bilateral coordination lateral, government-to-government agree- meetings into a full-fledged multilateral ments. platform in the form of the IADC, is particularly relevant here. Recently, NATO Several factors can explain the somewhat has expressed interest in further elaborat- fragmented transatlantic cooperation frame- ing a proper space policy. At the moment, work. Among them, the dual and multi-layered it fully relies on its member states when it organisational structure of both U.S. and Eu- comes to space capabilities and neither ropean governance may very likely be a major owns nor operates its own space assets. obstacle to a more integrated approach. In- deed, while Europe still faces difficulties in  Government-to-Industry and Indus- translating stakeholders’ positions into Eu- try-to-Industry cooperation: This rope-wide policies and programmes, inter- channel is becoming increasingly relevant viewed U.S. officials also stressed that, alt- in the wake of the expansion of private hough the integration of the U.S. line of com- capabilities, in particular in the field of mand suggest a capacity to federate and co- SSA. A number of USSTRATCOM SSA data ordinate on the U.S. side, decision-making still sharing agreements with commercial op- faces hurdles to align positions and interests erators (including European) illustrates of the different organisations and departments this trend, as well as the case of the Space involved. Data Association, a commercial operators’ non-profit cooperation relying on govern- Overall, interviewed U.S. and European stake- mental and private services to foster ex- holders and experts highlighted the following change of information and best practices strengths and weaknesses of current transat- concerning responsible space behaviour. lantic relations:

Strengths Weaknesses

- Overall shared concerns (with - Different sensitivities in diplomatic different priorities) creating common relations interests in a number of areas - Divergent attitudes to international - Long history of cooperation fosters agreements an ability to further cooperate - Loosely institutionalized framework - Europe/U.S. are natural, privileged - European governance complexity partners requiring multiple channels - Benefits from work on common - Lopsided levels of investment space standards and system leading to an unbalanced interoperability relationship - Various existing arrangements in different areas

Figure 10: Interviewees’ views on strengths and weaknesses of transatlantic cooperation

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5.2.2 Towards Reinforced Cooperation Seeking open up opportunities for new areas of co- Mutual Benefit operation such as Space Traffic Manage- ment. Interviewees uniformly underlined that estab-  In Europe, the declared ambition to lishing a more comprehensive and inclusive strengthen European autonomy in space relationship, based on reinforced cooperation security will result in an increase in re- seeking mutual benefits, will require several sources for capacity-building and in the preliminary steps: consolidation of the European approach.  A joint assessment of the situation, At the same time, expected further space policy and programmatic developments  Mutual understanding of each partner’s might encourage a fresh look at coopera- priorities, tion with third countries, in particular with  Shared interest in cooperation based on the United States. mutual benefits, Opportunities offered by this changing envi-  The capacity to converge on common ob- ronment for reinforced cooperation are dis- jectives, cussed in more detail in chapter 5.3 below.  A balanced contribution from the actors. The future of transatlantic relations in space security will also be influenced by the develop- Notwithstanding these prerequisites, recent ment of general political and diplomatic rela- and planned developments in the field of space tions between the United States and Europe. security policy on both sides seem to provide From this perspective, and although coopera- a fertile ground for the United States and Eu- tion in space is usually unaffected by political rope to broaden the scope of their current ups and downs, transatlantic relations are cur- space-related relations and to consider what rently experiencing a serious deterioration in a could be the drivers for a reinforced coopera- number of fields including security and de- tion in space security: fence. The implications of this deterioration in  In the United States, the Space Strategy the domain of space security remain unclear 2018 and Space Policy Directive-3 will at this stage. profoundly alter the way space security is Overall, interviewed U.S. and European stake- envisioned and organized across military holders and experts highlighted the following and civil/commercial branches. Upcoming opportunities and challenges for reinforced developments will have consequences for transatlantic cooperation in security in outer international partners. Beyond changes in space: arrangements, these developments also

Opportunities Challenges

- Intensifying threats requiring joint - Overall deterioration of efforts (interdependence of actors) transatlantic relations at the political - Enhanced capabilities on each side level creating an opportunity to foster - Different sensitivities to threats reciprocity and burden sharing (military/civil ratio) - Convergence on a number of new - Transatlantic cooperation policy issues dependent on better coordination of - Transatlantic framework as a national/regional actors within the testbed for enlarged global respective governance frameworks collaborative schemes - Fairness of commercial competition - Commerial policies fostering open - Duplication of efforts competitive markets and industry- to-industry cooperation

Figure 11: Interviewees’ views on opportunities and threats for reinforcement of transatlantic cooperation

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Operational implementation / Activities leverage technical know-how in senior tech- and Capabilities nologies to more effectively address quickly emerging space threats. The United States and Europe conduct activities in similar domains (SSA, SEPP, and SIS) In addition, U.S. policy makers frequently but the current state of affairs including policy, stress the merits of making commercial op- resources, and capabilities, is strongly lop- tions available as a means of globally improv- sided. As a consequence, the resulting imbal- ing the security of operations in orbit. Indeed, anced relationship impacts Europe’s bargain- the present analysis confirms that U.S. indus- ing power in future potential negotiations, as try has gained a high degree of maturity in the well as its attractiveness for a reinforced part- field of SSA data gathering and advanced ex- nership. While U.S. capabilities relevant to se- ploitation through a growing number of SMEs curity in outer space (in particular SSA capa- and other legacy companies. In Europe, the bilities) are technically mature and designed number of private initiatives targeting this line for self-sufficiency (although coverage can al- of business is much more limited, partially ow- ways be complemented), European capabili- ing to weaker domestic market dynamics ties are still under development, both at na- and/or unclear perspectives regarding critical tional and European levels. Therefore, Europe data policy. still relies on U.S. SSA data and services for In fact, SSA services are at the convergence several of applications. of two key priorities of the long-established On the European side, SSA-related activities U.S. space strategy: space commerce and na- are mostly handled through dual use publicly tional security. As a consequence, the U.S. owned and operated facilities, although no re- Congress has displayed great political support sponsibility sharing scheme similar to that cur- for these private initiatives, stressing the po- rently taking shape in the United States be- tential benefits from the expected higher effi- tween DoD and DoC has been announced so ciency of private management, as well as the far. At the same time, recent developments will to support the competitiveness of the do- suggest an increasing role of the European Un- mestic industry. This materialised in particular ion in ownership and management of SST as- in the creation of the Office of Space Com- sets along the lines of the draft resolution sub- merce at DOC, which has no equivalent in Eu- mitted in October 2018 by the European Com- rope. mission to its member states for the next Legal & Regulatory framework / Interna- Multi-Annual Financial Framework. Another il- tional cooperation lustration of this trend is the positioning of SatCen as the front desk for the distribution of The United States and Europe share the vision information and services exploiting the SST that outer space security issues will be better data currently delivered by the Consortium. addressed through pooling of resources, in particular with each other. A prerequisite for In a nutshell, there are obvious discrepancies this is to be able to converge on some legal between the U.S. and European approaches to and regulatory provisions. outer space security, as well as a strong im- balance in the level of resources allocated to For the time being, the difference in the ap- such activities. However, recent trends from preciation of the stakes related to space secu- both shores of the Atlantic suggest a conver- rity, as well as the need to comply with the gence on the assessment that outer space se- current overarching diplomatic framework, curity requires additional efforts and re- complicates the process of finding common sources, as well as a redefined institutional grounds for balanced cooperation. Addition- framework (Space Fence, Space Force, SSA ally, the international legal implications of component of the EU Space Programme). The such endeavour must be assessed against the conjunction of these factors might open a win- provisions of the various national space legis- dow of opportunity to consider the potential lations and strategies in Europe. mutual benefits of closer transatlantic coordination / cooperation / collaboration in these matters. Commercial policy / Role of private industry Over the last few years, the U.S. private sector has been particularly active in developing the basis for a commercial offer for SSA services. Given the nature of activities to be performed, such as visualization, advanced computing, big-data analytics and Artificial Intelligence, the expertise of industry is envisioned to help

ESPI Report 66 56 October 2018 Security in Outer Space: Perspectives on Transatlantic Relations

This situation, which is expected to further de- 5.3 What Scope for a Rein- teriorate in the future, ultimately creates risks forced Transatlantic Partner- for the economy, society and security at large. With the recent adoption of Space Policy Di- ship? rective 3 (i.e. National Space Traffic Manage- ment Policy), the United States made an im- 5.3.1 Shifting U.S. Posture Towards National portant step forward in recognising the sever- ity of issues at stake and the urgency of set- Leadership ting up a framework to prevent and mitigate The growing importance placed on security in space security threats. More specifically, the outer space by the United States and Europe policy recognises that “the future space oper- in their respective strategy and policy frame- ating environment will be shaped by a signifi- works is based on the shared assessment that cant increase in the volume and diversity of space infrastructures are exposed to increas- commercial activity in space” and that “as the ingly serious security challenges. In an ever number of space objects increases, [the cur- more congested and contested space environ- rent] limited traffic management activity and ment, space security challenges are: architecture will become inadequate.”207 In this context, the U.S. policy aims to “develop a  Multiple and diverse in nature and new approach to space traffic management origin and as a consequence require a co- that addresses current and future operational herent set of diverse preventive, opera- risks.” 208 tive and curative measures (i.e. holistic approach). The new policy directive marks a shift in the U.S. posture and underlines a clear political  Interrelated and interdependent, cre- willingness to accelerate activities through na- ating a situation of mutual dependence tional-led engagements. and responsibility between the different actors involved in space activities (coun- The policy does not necessarily challenge the tries, civil / military, public / commercial, relevance of multilateral efforts in space secu- agencies / industry…). rity. In fact, the policy recalls that “it is a shared interest and responsibility of all space-  Ubiquitous and inclusive, although the faring nations to create the conditions for a degree of exposure and vulnerability of safe, stable, and operationally sustainable space systems to specific threats (e.g. space environment”,209 recalling that a fully ef- collision, cyberattacks, spoofing, jam- fective approach can only be envisioned as the ming) may vary. outcome of a coherent and inclusive global ef-  Intensifying, driven by endogenous and fort. Notwithstanding, such a national-led ap- exogenous trends including: proach can be understood as a reaction to the limited progress achieved at the international o Increasing space activity in terms of level on space security and sustainability top- the number of launches and objects in ics. Indeed, the multilateral efforts in which orbit but also the number of govern- both the United States and Europe actively mental and commercial actors operat- participate (e.g. IADC space debris mitigation ing space systems; guidelines, Long-Term Sustainability guidelines, International Code of Conduct, Preven- o New concepts, technologies and capa- tion of an Arms Race in Outer Space – bilities (e.g. mega-constellations, min- PAROS…) are significantly slowed down by the iaturized systems, in-orbit servicing); recurring difficulty of making actors with di- o An ever more connected space infra- verging views and interests converge on nec- structure to ground networks and sys- essarily constraining international measures. tems; o The increasing importance of space in- 5.3.2 Potential for Transatlantic Cooperation frastructure, which makes it a key target for a variety of actors pursuing dif- No transatlantic collaboration at pan-European ferent objectives; level can be envisioned in the field of the military activities that are currently being consid- o The rehabilitation of a ‘space warfare’ ered by the U.S. Administration in the field of doctrine encompassing activities to Space Security. None of the partners would develop ‘space control’ capabilities. probably consider this as an option at this point in time.

207 U.S. Government. (2018). Space Policy Directive-3, Na- 208 Ibid. tional Space Traffic Management Policy, (June 18, 2018). 209 Ibid. ESPI Report 66 57 October 2018

On the civilian side, the establishment of a na- related to the expected boom in space traffic, tional Space Traffic Management framework is especially related to the deployment of mega- the next step implied in U.S. space security constellations and of non-manoeuvrable policy. If this example is followed by other spacecraft (e.g. cubesats). With the aim of countries, the development of multiple, possi- providing a structure for the control and man- bly divergent, national and regional STM agement of in-orbit operations, STM is charac- frameworks in parallel to international negoti- terised by the development of a normative ap- ations may occur. proach through “best practices, technical guidelines, safety standards, behavioural The implementation of this U.S. policy, which norms, pre-launch risk assessments, and on- will have consequences across the entire spec- orbit collision avoidance services”.210 trum of preventive, operative and curative space security measures, has major implica- The development and implementation of a full- tions for Europe and transatlantic relations, fledged Space Traffic Management architec- and is clearly the main driver for revisiting ture is a difficult task. Beyond intricate policy transatlantic cooperation in line with develop- and governance aspects, STM involves the su- ments on the European scene. pervision of a complex chain of information/data to support operational decision making. 5.3.3 Space Traffic Management: Stakes and Im- plications for Europe The U.S. Space Traffic Management policy aims to tackle a number of security challenges

Figure 12: Portrayal of SSA data value chain for STM (Analytical Graphics)

More specifically, the development of an STM  Specification of STM best practicies architecture raises the following major stakes: and norms to enhance the safety, stability, and sustainability of operations in the  SSA data enhancement to reach the ap- space environment across different stake- propriate accuracy required to safely plan, holders (military, civil, commercial); coordinate, and synchronize in-orbit activities and mitigate collision risks; This study argues that transatlantic relations should be revisited and potentially reinforced  SSA data policy to set up appropriate in- along these lines taking into account the com- formation management structures (col- plementarity between political and operational lection, fusion, distribution) safeguarding cooperation frameworks. data integrity, reliance and confidentiality;

210 U.S. Government. (2018). Space Policy Directive-3, Na- tional Space Traffic Management Policy, (June 18, 2018). ESPI Report 66 58 October 2018 Security in Outer Space: Perspectives on Transatlantic Relations

SSA data enhancement and data policy gap and increase Europe’s bargain- ing power; “Timely, accurate, and actionable data are essential for effective SSA and STM.” 211 For this o A suitable balance between the de- reason, the United States seeks to enhance sire for European autonomy and SSA capabilities through the development of transatlantic complementarity in new sensors, the improvement of SSA data the prioritisation of European SSA sharing (i.e. interoperability and greater data capabilities development; sharing) and the purchase of SSA data and o services. The progressive emergence of Eu- ropean leadership through the at- Enhancing SSA data precision and accuracy tribution of specific mandates to the necessarily implies relying on multiple data European Union to lead SSA inter- sources including: national cooperation;  National SSA data (based on domestic  Enhanced data sharing will imply revis- systems); iting arrangements regarding data policy. This implies:  SSA data from third parties (based on foreign/commercial SSA systems) o A compatible data policy;  Satellite operators’ data (incl. satellite or- o Provisions to ensure the integrity of bital parameters and manoeuvres). the data and address cyber threats; Improving currently available SSA data o Provisions to ensure the confidenti- through multiple data sources, or ality of the data along a shared de- “crowdsourcing”, will also bring new chal- lineation of military/civil domains. lenges related to data availability, reliability and integrity. Effective management of these  Europe needs a clear policy to frame issues will involve 1) a revisit of data sharing the role of the private sector as a key agreements with international and private stakeholder in an integrated approach partners and, 2) a clear policy for the integra- to SSA/STM. Beyond the involvement tion of commercial SSA data and services. of private operators as providers and users of SSA data and STM services, The distribution of information to diverse such a policy should also address: stakeholders will also require establishing a o robust data policy to ensure confidentiality The integration of commercial SSA across military and civil branches and between data in European capabilities and partners. the necessary provisions to ensure effective data fusion; An essential aspect of this issue will be to de- o lineate military and civil domains in terms of The conditions to be met to enable data access. Developments observed in the the emergence of an open transat- United States suggest that a top-down ap- lantic market for SSA/STM-related proach is currently the preferred option with data and services. the military branch in charge of domestic SSA capabilities and responsible for the establishment of a public catalogue corresponding to a Specification of STM best practicies and subset of information and data available to norms them. In Europe, such a top-down approach Switching from an informative to a normative enabling a delineation of military/civil domains approach to STM implies the specification of has not been implemented, as so far, SST co- norms of behaviour through non-binding best operation efforts have been mainly dedicated practices, as a preparatory first step, and to networking national capabilities that are eventually through standards to be integrated based on integrated dual frameworks. in the regulatory regime governing space activities. From this standpoint, standards and Implications for Europe and transatlantic best practices will have to be considered in a cooperation consistent manner encompassing preventive,  Data sharing agreements will remain operative, and curative measures across the the backbone of transatlantic coopera- full life cycle of space systems: tion. A revisit of these agreements to-  Spacecraft and launcher design and man- wards more balanced cooperation for ufacturing, mutual benefit should be based on:  Launch operations and separation, o An enhancement of European SSA  In-orbit operations, capabilities to close the capability  End of life and deorbiting.

211 Ibid. ESPI Report 66 59 October 2018

In this respect, the U.S. Administration in- players including, in particular, the United tends to “support the development of opera- States. tional standards and best practices to promote An important near-term step for Europe is to safe and responsible behaviour in space. A define the desired degree of autonomy to be critical first step in carrying out that goal is to achieved and subsequently, to assess the develop U.S.-led minimum safety standards means necessary to meet these requirements. and best practices to coordinate space traffic This will also highlight the need to establish a […] and to use them to inform and help shape European space security policy and to optimise international consensus, practices, and stand- the current intricate framework to foster co- ards.” 212 herence, cost-effectiveness and leadership. Even though the United States will work on the This is a matter of driving the emerging politi- development of a national approach, in coor- cal will across European countries towards dination with its own industry, such an ap- common views, joint objectives and rational proach ultimately needs to be coordinated at responsibility sharing. international level to be fully effective given The rise of space security as a priority of U.S: the strong interdependence between global and European space policies, respectively, and actors. the changing political and operational environ- In particular, it remains to be seen whether ments on each side of the Atlantic create new the ultimate goal of Space Traffic Management opportunities to revisit the currently loosely is the setting up of a centralised authority de- organised transatlantic relations. On the Euro- fining the details of avoidance manoeuvres to pean side, fostering reinforced transatlantic be implemented and directing the operators to cooperation in space security, as intended by execute them, or if it will be left up to the op- the Space Strategy for Europe, would require: erators to define and implement the most ap-  Taking full advantage of the new opportu- propriate actions. nities offered by a more ambitious Euro- Implications for Europe and transatlantic pean effort in SSA. Also a desirable rein- cooperation forcement of regional cooperation in this field is essential to improve Europe’s bar-  Europe must play a role in the develop- gaining power though: ment of best practices and standards that will shape a future international o Consideration of the added-value of approach to STM to remain a key actor European SSA capabilities for the in the global space scene and to miti- United States (complementarity, resil- gate the competitive bias that such ience, interoperability) in European norms might create for industry. SSA capability-building roadmaps and data policies;  To participate in the elaboration of STM norms, Europe must, at least, converge o Fostering the emergence of European on its own approach to STM. This re- commercial actors able to com- quires, as a first essential step, to set pete/cooperate in an open transatlan- up a dedicated forum gathering all rel- tic SSA market; evant European key stakeholders:  Preparing a European approach to Space EEAS, EU, ESA, member states, manu- Traffic Managament. This implies, first of facturers, operators as well as military all, setting up a dedicated forum to coor- organisations. dinate the views, needs and possible con-  The development of a set of common tributions of different stakeholders such (or at least compatible) norms of be- as the EU, ESA, member states, manufac- havior in space could form a second turers and operators. backbone for transatlantic cooperation.

5.3.4 General Conclusion A global effort is necessary to achieve security in outer space. To be positioned as a key player in the international space scene, Europe must contribute its share to this endeavour. Much needs to be done on the European side to ensure balanced cooperation with other key

212 U.S. Government. (2018). Space Policy Directive-3, Na- tional Space Traffic Management Policy, (June 18, 2018). ESPI Report 66 60 October 2018 Security in Outer Space: Perspectives on Transatlantic Relations

Annex

A.1 European national strategies addressing space security in Eu- rope

France Germany Italy United King- Spain dom National space Centre national Deutschen Agenzia Spaziale UK Space Centro para el agency d'Etudes Spa- Zentrums für Italiana Agency Desarrollo tiales (CNES) Luft- und (ASI) (UKSA) Tecnologico Raumfahrt Industrial (DLR) (CDTI) Last space pol- French Space The Space ASI Strategic Vi- UK National Strategic Plan icy / strategy Strategy Strategy of the sion Document Space Policy for the Space document (2012) German Federal 2016-2025 (2015) Sector 2007- Government (2016) 2011 (2010) (2006) Other policy / White Paper for White Paper on White Paper for UK National National Secu- strategy docu- Defence and Na- German Secu- International Se- Space Security rity Strategy ment address- tional Security rity Policy and curity and De- Policy (2013) (2013) the Future of fence (2014) ing space secu- the Bundeswehr (2015) rity (2016)

Table 10: European national strategies addressing space security in Europe

A.2 List of national space legislation enacted by European countries

Country Name Document Austria Austrian Outer Space Act, in force since 2011 Belgium Law on the Activities of Launching, Flight Operations or Guidance of Space Ob- jects, 2015 (amended) Denmark Danish Outer Space Act of 2016 France French Space Operations Act, No. 2008-518 of 2008 Germany Satellite Data Security Act, 2007 Luxembourg Law on the exploration and use of Space resources, 2017 Netherlands Space Activities Act, 2007 Norway Act on launching objects from Norwegian territory into outer space, No. 38, 13/06/1969 Sweden Act on Space Activities (1982:963) Decree on Space Activities (1982:1069) United Kingdom Space Industry Act 2018 Draft Spaceflight Bill (in progress) Outer Space Act (OSA) of 1986

Table 11: List of national space legislation enacted by European countries

ESPI Report 66 61 October 2018

A.3 Overview of European SST capabilities

France missile tracking, is occasionally used to provide more precise data on objects in LEO. Ad- Although experimental, France operates the ditional optical capabilities complement this most advanced SSA system in Europe. The list with, among others, the French systems GRAVES radar (Grand Réseau Adapté à la SPOC (Système Probatoire d’Observation du Veille Spatiale) is under the responsibility of a Ciel), ROSETTE and TAROT (Télescope à Ac- special military division of the CDAOA (Com- tion Rapide pour les Objets Transitoires). The mandement de la Défense Aérienne et des French SSA System draws on a number of Opérations Aériennes). Designed by the sources including DoD data, the national cata- French Aerospace Lab (ONERA) and opera- logue Almanac, and inputs from satellite own- tional since 2005, this bistatic radar relies on ers and operators. GRAVE is able to detect the two ground stations located in France (i.e. presence of a satellite, a satellite manoeuvre, near Dijon and on the Albion plateau) and co- the launch of a new satellite, or the disappear- vers a database of over 2,200 orbiting objects. ance of one. For the last, the system is able to The French Monge ship, equipped with five ra- assess the ephemeris of space debris to deter- dars including ARMOR, which was designed for mine their origin.

CAESAR - Conjunction Analysis and Evaluation Service: Alerts and Recommendations

(Flight Dynamics System) Space-Track.org (JSpOC)

CAESAR END USER Flight Dynamics System JOCC JWD = JOD

↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ CASR WARN ALERT phone O/O ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓

On Call Analyst On Call O/O Improved OD

Screening Almanac

CNES SPOD Flight Dynamics System

Figure 13: French CESAR process At operational level, the Conjunction Analysis Expert is used by Canada, the United States, and Evaluation Service, Alerts, and Recom- Malaysia, and the UK. JAC Basic includes Can- mendations (CAESAR), processes flows of in- ada, Japan, France, the US, Malaysia, South formation and can autonomously generate the Korea, Indonesia, Germany. Spain, manoeuvres of the satellite for which they pro- Luxemburg, Taiwan, Brazil, Qatar, the UK, duce Conjunction Analysis (CA).213 The soft- Monaco, and Israel. The CS Communication ware Java for Assessment of Conjunctions and Systems in France offers software solu- (JAC) contributes to the work of operational tions on a variety of applications such as com- teams in charge of in-orbit collision risks. JAC mand and control, flight dynamics – now used is tasked to analyse close approach alerts and by the French government - and on-board sat- provide a synthetic vision of each close ap- ellite software. The GRAVES system enables proach described by CDMs. The overall proce- the French military to track satellites in LEO – dure is to evaluate the level of risk using own of roughly the size of a micro satellite. Inter- criteria. France also offers JAC Basic (support estingly, the system can spot spy satellites, it for CA) and JAC Expert (relying for CA). JAC is estimated that about 30 of them have been

213 IDA Report SSA Global Trends 2018: https://www.ida.org/idamedia/Corporate/Files/Publica- tions/STPIPubs/2018/D-9074.pdf

ESPI Report 66 62 October 2018 Security in Outer Space: Perspectives on Transatlantic Relations

identified – both Chinese and American. 214 in L and Ku Band and its imaging capability Since 2016 the GRAVES system has been go- gives room for synergies with the French ing through a modernisation phase for about € GRAVES system, as it contributes to the iden- 20-30 million to address the weaknesses of tification of spotted objects. Germany aggre- the system.215 gates data from open sources, cooperation (through a USSTRATCOM data sharing agree- Germany ment), civil organizations (e.g. ESOC), domes- In Germany, the TIRA (Tracking and Imaging tic sensors, military intelligence, and space Radar) system is operated by the Research Es- weather reports, as shown in the following fig- tablishment for Applied Science (FHR) in ure. Wachtberg, near Bonn. TIRA can track objects

- Open Sources - Space Weather Re- (Internet) port - International Coopera- German Space Situational Awareness - Own Sensors tion (e.g. USA / FRA) Centre - Military Intelligence - Civil Organizations (e.g. ESOC) Data Processing

Recognized Space Picture

Overflight Warning Collision Warning Reentry Warning Catalog of Space Objects Space Weather Warning

Figure 14: German SSA data processing

As far as software is concerned, the DLR’s In- of a new radar equipped with an electronically stitute for Simulation and Software Technol- steerable antenna that is able to scan large ar- ogy is developing a software framework for eas of sky within milliseconds thanks to ad- distributed computing for the Backbone Cata- vanced semiconductor technology. GESTRA is logue of Relational Debris Information also a mobile and portable system. The system (BACARDI) project using high performance is expected to become operational by 2019 computer technology. It is an informational and to be operated by GSSAC. GESTRA will system used to process sensor-derived data. create a catalogue of space debris present in In 2015, the German Space Situational Aware- near-Earth space (orbital heights up to 3,000 ness Center (GSSAC) was set up to take the km). In 2011, the German Space Agency lead on SSA activities. Among other tasks, funded a small satellite project for € 15 Million GSSAC will operate the new GESTRA system. to better monitor asteroids.217 GESTRA (German Experimental Space Surveil- lance and Tracking Radar) is the wide-range space surveillance project conducted by the Frauenhofer Institute for High Frequency Physics and Radar Techniques for the Space Administration of DLR.216 The project consists

214 ONERA. (2017).Retrived from: https://www.on- https://www.fhr.fraunhofer.de/en/press-media/press-re- era.fr/sites/default/files/.../pdf/.../20161212-CP-Graves- leases/gestra-new-space-surveillance-capabilities-in-ger- ONERA.pdf many.html 215 Michel Cabirol. (2016) Surveillance spatiale. Retrieved 217 Frankfurter Rundschau. (2008) DLR will "kosmische from: http://www.latribune.fr/entreprises-finance/indus- Geschosse" besser aufspüren. Retrieved from: trie/aeronautique-defense/surveillance-spatiale-la-france- http://www.fr.de/wissen/astronomieraumfahrt/asteroiden- modernise-le-systeme-graves-a-minima-602219.html dlr-will-kosmische-geschosse-besser-aufspueren-a- 216 Andreas Brenner. (2018) GESTRA New space surveil- 1181242 lance capabilities in Germany. Fraunhofer FHR. Retrieved from:

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Italy orbiting at 620 km, which is made of four satellites.218 From 2018 onwards, the next gener- In Italy, the Croce del Norte system, ASI’s ation of satellites will be launched.219 Although multistatic radar system, was built to detect that system is designed for Earth Observation, debris and Near Earth Objects (NEO). The Ital- the bistatic radar sensitivity is evaluated for ian Space Agency and the Ministry of Defence both catalogued and uncatalogued objects in also developed the COSMO-SkyMed (Constel- the surroundings of the COSMO-Skymed con- lation of Small Satellites for Mediterranean ba- stellation. Other valuable SSA assets can be sin Observation) radar satellite constellation found in Italy, as summarized in the following figure:

SPADE (optical telescope) (Matera – MT)  Owner: ASI under installation at ASI/CGS, operated by e-GEOS.  Performed Tests: GEO and LEO space debris campaign to support IADC research, made by “Univ. La Sapienza. (Matera – MT; Medicina - BO; Noto – SR)  Owner: INAF/IRA (Medicina and Noto).  Owner: ASI, Operated by e-GEOS (Matera).  Medicina: space debris monitoring and NEO detection in bistatic configuration (As RX).  Noto: Space Debris activities.

MLRO (Matera Laser Ranging Observatory) (Matera – MT)  Owner: ASI, operated by e-GEOS.  Very precise Laser ranging for Satellites and Moon. Suitable for Precise Tracking applications. Not yet tested on uncooperative objects (Space Debris).

Figure 15: Italian SSA assets Particularly noteworthy is the creation of and solar indices archive and forecast, and at- SpaceDyS, a spin-off company of the Celestial mospheric effect estimations.223 In the field of Mechanics Group of the University of Pisa that SST, the company has built a complete prod- develops SSA data-related software.220 Among uct chain covering system simulations, sensor various services and products, SpaceDys of- systems, image processing systems, space fers orbital determination services for natural object operators, re-entry notifications, and and artificial objects orbiting the Earth. The identification of space objects. The system in NEODyS website (Near Earth Objects Dynam- charge of performing such missions is called ics Site) provides daily data on the probability Deimos Sky Survey, based in Puertollano. As of impact monitoring. far as asteroids are concerned, also referred to as Near Earth Objects (NEO), Elecnor Deimos Spain is developing orbit determination and cata- In Spain, SSA’s greatest assets are its tele- loguing capabilities. Prior to that, the company scope Fabra-ROA in Montsec and the La Sagra developed ESA’s SSA CO-I NEO system re- Sky Survey Telescope, both able to survey and quirements, contributed to the establishment track debris. Their telescopes feed the EU SST of a NEO coordination centre, and performed Consortium with SSA data. Spain recently in- analysis for ESA’s P2 SWE X Project. vested € 20 Million in the development of a United Kingdom national Space Security system.221 On the private sector side, it is noteworthy that the In the UK, the British Chilbolton Facility for At- Spanish company Elecnor Deimos is also ac- mospheric and Radio Research, operated by tively involved in SSA development across the the Rutherford Appleton Laboratory, also sup- three domains.222 In the field of Space ports the characterization of orbital objects Weather, the company offers geomagnetic thanks to a 25-metre steerable parabolic dish

218 e-Geos. (2018). COSMO-SkyMed. Retrived from: http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/lang/en/gobierno/news/Pagi- http://www.e-geos.it/cosmo-skymed.html nas/2014/20141202-eu-space-agency.aspx 219 Corriere Comunicazioni. (2017). Cosmo-SkyMed 222 Elecnor Deimos Group. (2018). What we do. Re- pronto alla sfida “second generation.” Retrived from: trieved from: http://www.elecnor-deimos.com/activi- https://www.corrierecomunicazioni.it/cyber-security/cosmo- ties/space/ skymed-pronto-alla-sfida-secondo-generation/ 223 Elecnor Deimos Group. (2018). Space Situational 220 http://www.spacedys.com/about-us/ Awareness. Retrieved from: http://www.elecnor-dei- 221 La Moncloa. (2014) Spain invests 344.5 million euros mos.com/activities/space/space-situational-awareness/ in space programmes. Retrieved from:

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meteorological S-band radar called the Warning System (BMEWS) operated by the CAMRa. Other systems include the Starbrook Royal Air Force Base in Fylingdales. Questions wide-field telescope based in the Royal Air have been raised about the possibility of get- Force Troödos station in Cyprus, funded by the ting data from that system for an independent UK Space Agency, and the EISCAT (European European catalogue. CAMRa (advanced Mete- Incoherent Scatter Scientific Association) sys- orological Radar) and Starbrook are radar and tem, featuring a monostatic VHF radar in optical sensors owned by UK civil and private Tromsø, with two reception stations in Sweden entities but that may contribute to SST. In the (Kiruna) and Finland (Sodankylä), able to field of space weather, the CIRCE project is monitor orbits, especially polar ones. The Brit- studying the effects of space weather, notably ish PIMS (Passive Imaging Metric Sensor) uses ionospheric disturbances, on telecommunica- a telescope at Herstmonceux in the United tions.224 Kingdom, another in Gibraltar and a third in Summary Cyprus, which have the potential to contribute to space tracking activities. Another valuable The following table summarizes European ca- asset of the country –owned, however, by the pabilities in the field of SSA: United States - is the Ballistic Missile Early

Country Data Collection Data Processing Data Products OCM UK France Germany Italy Spain ? Poland ESA SSA ESA SST

Table 12: European capabilities in the field of SSA The overview of European SSA capabilities radar capabilities to play a role in Space Secu- shows a true disparity, also among the Mem- rity. This heterogeneity of interests is chal- bers of the EU SST Consortium. This is to be lenging at governance level as it brings up the explained by different national strategies and question of how to harmonize them and put political motives, and different levels of invest- synergies in place between different strate- ment. The EU SST Consortium pools national gies. Ultimately, the level of autonomy the Eu- capabilities under the same umbrella, however ropean Union wants to achieve, which still it appears clear that European SSA capabilities needs to be defined, will depend on the level are far from sufficient for meeting European of investments it is willing to commit. Cooper- countries’ operational needs. SSA develop- ation will, however, still play a vital role for ment strategies are different depending on European stakeholders, especially taking into each country, with some countries, such as consideration the evolving nature of the space France, pushing for independence and other environment. countries that are leveraging their optical and

224 Berenice Baker (2018) A journey through space and https://www.airforce-technology.com/features/journey- time: the UK’s space programme. Retrieved from: space-time-uks-space-programme/

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A.4 Overview of European and U.S. activities in security in outer space

The following tables, based on the ESPI security in outer space matrix, provide a list of European and U.S. activities and measures related to ‘Security in Outer Space’ organised by domain and field of action. These lists are intended to be illustrative rather than comprehensive:

1 2 Field of action 3 4 5 Capacity-building programmes7 Legal and regulatory regimes9 Diplomacy and cooperation 6 Develop and deploy operational8 Establish a reference frame- frameworks capacities to ensure security in work to conduct space activities10 Harmonise and coordinate outer space in compliance with space secu- space security efforts among rity requirements stakeholders 11 Space Situational • ESA SSA programme (SST, • Compliance with space ob- • SSA data sharing agreements Awareness (SSA) SWE and NEO components) jects registration obligations 12 Monitor space envi- • EU FP7 and H2020 grants (re- and procedures ronment threats search into space weather13 events, security of space assets from in-orbit collisions) • EU SST Support Framework (sensor, processing and service delivery functions) • Member States SST systems development and upgrade

14 Space Environment • ESA CleanSpace initiative • National space legislations in • Contribution of ESA and na-

Protection and (EcoDesign, CleanSat and European Member States tional space agencies to IADC Preservation (SEPP) eDeorbit components) (e.g. end-of-life obligations) and vote on space debris mit- 15 Keep the space envi- • ECSS standards – Branch16 U igation guidelines ronment safe to op- (space sustainability) • European Union proposal for erate in • EU FP7 and H2020 grants (re- an International Code of Con- search into secure and safe duct for Outer Space Activi- space environment) ties • Contribution to COPUOS and Conference on Disarmament initiatives (LTS guidelines PAROS, GGE, PORBOS) • Space debris mitigation guidelines endorsement

17 Space Infrastructure • EU FP7 and H2020 grants (re- • European space programme • Collision avoidance proce-

Security in Outer Space subdomain Space Outer in Security Security (SIS) search into reducing the vul- security rules and procedures dures and coordination with 18 Protect the space in- nerability of space assets, se- (e.g. independent Security foreign agencies and opera- frastructure from curity of space assets from in- Accreditation, Galileo Secu- tors threats orbit collisions) rity Monitoring Centre) • Development of technolo- • Supply chain control pro- gies, standard and proce- cesses (e.g. export/import dures by a variety of stake- rules, testing procedures) holders (ESA, national space agencies, commercial operators, industry and non-space governmental actors)

Table 13: European actions and measures related to ‘Security in Outer Space’ (ESPI)

ESPI Report 66 66 October 2018 Security in Outer Space: Perspectives on Transatlantic Relations

Field of action Capacity-building programmes Legal and regulatory regimes Diplomacy and cooperation Develop and deploy operational Establish a reference frame- frameworks capacities to ensure security in work to conduct space activities Harmonise and coordinate outer space in compliance with space secu- space security efforts among rity requirements stakeholders • Space Surveillance Network • Space objects registration • SSA data sharing agreements Space Situational (SSN) obligations and procedures • Space-Track.org Awareness (SSA) • Space Fence • STM framework develop- • NASA Space Weather mis- • Hallmark ment sions partnerships Monitor space en- • OrbitOutlook • Space Policy Directive-3 • NOAA-EUMETSAT data ex- vironment threats • NOAA’s Space Weather Predic- • Policy for Space Weather change tion Center Events • Emergency notification ser- • NASA’s Solar and Heliospheric • National NEO Preparedness vice Observatory Strategy and Action Plan • DoC front office

• NASA Center for Near Earth Ob- ject Studies

Space Environ- • Linked technologies develop- • Space law (e.g. end-of-life • IADC Space Debris Mitiga- ment Protection ment (e.g. Restore-L) obligations) tion Guidelines and Preservation • NASA’s Restore-L, RRM3 and • Standards for space environ- (SEPP) Raven ment-friendly satellite design Keep the space • NanoRacks and Orbital ATK (e.g. passivation devices) environment safe • Government Orbital Debris to operate Mitigation Standard Practices • SPD-2 and 3 licensing process

• Security enhancing technolo- • Space programme security  Strategic partnerships Space Infrastruc- gies development (e.g. secure rules and procedures with commercial firms Security in Outer Space subdomain Space Outer in Security ture Security (SIS) links) • Security standards  Develop international • Security-by-design know-how • Supply chain control pro- processes Protect the space • Advanced security and technol- cesses (e.g. export/import infrastructure ogy development in the frame rules, testing procedures) from threats of military programmes • Supply-chain management • Development of optical beam guidelines technology • DoD Information Assurance requirements

Table 14: U.S. actions and measures related to ‘Security in Outer Space’ (ESPI)

ESPI Report 66 67 October 2018

A.5 Organizational chart of U.S. security in space in the Executive branch

Figure 16: Organizational chart of U.S. security in space in the Executive branch (ESPI)

ESPI Report 66 68 October 2018 Security in Outer Space: Perspectives on Transatlantic Relations

A.6 Authority and role of departments as defined by the SPD -3

Figure 17: Authority and role of departments as defined by the SPD-3 (ESPI adapted from SPD-3)

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A.7 List of Interviewees in the United States

Name Position Organisation Michael Gleason Senior Policy Analyst Aerospace Corporation

Daniel Oltrogge Director, Centre for Space Standards Analytical Graphics and Innovation

Jeffrey Trauber- Vice President of Space, Intelligence Boeing man and Missile Defense (Ret.)

Jonathan Margolis Acting Deputy Assistant for Science, Bureau of Oceans and International Space and Health Environmental and Scientific Affairs

Frank Rose Lead Researcher Brookings Institution

Constanze Cooperation Lead Researcher Brookings Institution Stelzenmüller Richard H. Senior Space Policy Advisor U.S. Department of State Buenneke Kenneth Hodgkins Director of Space and Advanced Tech- U.S. Department of State nology David Koplow Lecturer Georgetown University Law

Henry Hertzfeld Director and Professor GWU’s Space Policy Institute

John Logsdon Historian and Professor GWU’s Space Policy Institute

Benjamin Corbin Research Fellow IDA Science & Technology Policy Institute

Reina Buencon- Research Fellow IDA Science & Technology Policy sejo Institute

Bhavya Lal Research Fellow IDA Science & Technology Policy Institute

Asha Balakrish- Research Fellow IDA Science & Technology Policy nan Institute

Marina Hague Research Assistant Innovative Analytics & Training Kevin O’Connell President and CEO Innovative Analytics & Training

Joe Pelton Executive Board Member International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety Chirag Parikh Office Director National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Scott Pace Executive Secretary National Space Council

John Giles Senior Policy Advisor National Space Council

Victoria Samson Head of Washington Office Secure World Foundation Brian Israel General Counsel Planetary Resources

Timothy Stryker Outreach and Collaboration Branch USGS Land Remote Sensing Chief Program

Table 15: List of Interviewees in the United States

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A.8 List of Interviewees in Europe

Name Position Organisation Jens Utzmann Project Manager in Security in Space Airbus Defence and Space

Willsch Klaus-Peter Chairman of the Aviation and Space Deutsches Bundestag Group Ruben Wright Head of SSA Deimos Space UK

Jean-Luc Bald First Secretary for space European External Action Service

Florent Mazurelle Space and Security Coordination European Space Agency Officer Denis Moura CNES Delegate to SatCen European Union Satellite Centre

Regina Peldszus Co-Chair, DLR Delegate European Union SST Consortium

Jean-Francois Bu- Head of Institutional Affairs Eutelsat reau Gustav Lindstrom Director EU Institute for Security Studies

Jean-Marie Bockel Chairman of the Interparlamentary French Senate Space Group Xavier Pasco Director Foundation for Strategic Research

Gerarld Braun Head of SSA Department German SSA Center

Nayef Al-Rodhan Director Geneva Centre for Security Policy Jana Robinson Space Security Program Manager Prague Security Studies Institute

Jean-Claude Director for Space ONERA Traineau Florent Müller Programme Manager ONERA

Norbert Paluch CNES representative European representatives

Micheline Tabache ESA representative European representatives

Marc Jochemich DLR representative European representatives

Table 16: List of Interviewees in Europe

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List of Acronyms

Acronym Explanation A ACCORD Alignment of Capability and Capacity for the Objective of Reducing Debris AEOLDOS Aerodynamic End-of-Life De-Orbit System ADR Active Debris Removal AFFECTS Advanced Forecast For Ensuring Communications Through Space AFFECTS AFRL Air Force Research Laboratory APT Advanced Persistent Threat ARMOR Advanced Radar for Meteorological and Operational Research ASI Agenzia Spaziale Italiana (Italian Space Agency) ASAT Anti-Satellite ATMOP Advanced Thermosphere Modelling for Orbit Prediction B BMEWS Ballistic Missile Early Warning Sys-tem C CAMRa Chilbolton Advanced Meteorological Radar CAP Common Agricultural Policy CARA Conjunction Assessment Risk Analysis CESAR Conjunction Analysis and Evaluation Service, Alerts, and Recom-mendations C2 Command and Control CD Conference on Disarmament CDAOA Commandement de la Défense Aérienne et des Opérations Aériennes CFE Commercial and Foreign Entities CFP Common Fisheries Policy CFPS Common Foreign & Security Policy CNES Centre Nationale D’Etudes Spatiales (French Space Agency) CNEOS Center for Near Earth Object Studies CONOP Concept of Operations COSMO-SkyMed Constel-lation of Small Satellites for Mediterranean ba-sin Observation ComSpOC Commercial Space Operations Center UN COPUOS United Nations Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space COSPAR Committee on Space Research CIRCE Climate Change and Impact Research CIKR Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy CSMs Conjunction Summary Messages

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Acronym Explanation D DEW Direct Energy Weapons DAMIEN Detecting and Mitigating the Impact of Earth-bound Near-Earth Objects DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship, and DG GROW SMEs DLR Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt (German Space Agency) U.S. DoC United States Department of Commerce U.S. DoD United States Department of Defense U.S. DoT United States Department of Transportation DSTL Defence Science and Tech-nology Laboratory E EC European Commission ECSS European Cooperation for Space Standardization EDA European Defence Agency EEAS European External Action Services EGNOS The European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service EISCAT European Incoherent Scatter Scientific Association ESA European Space Agency ESC Expert Service Centre ESEC Space Security and Education Centre EU European Union EUMETSAT European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites EU SST European Union support framework for Space Surveillance & Tracking F FAA Federal Aviation Administration FedSpOC Federation SpOC FCC Federal Communications Commission G GDP Gross Domestic product GEO Geostationary Orbit GESTRA German Experimental Space Surveil-lance and Tracking Radar) GGE Group of Governmental Experts GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System GRAVES Grand Réseau Adapté à la Veille Spatiale GSMC Galileo Security Monitoring Centre GTRA GNSS Threat Response Architecture GVA Gross Value Added GOVSATCOM Governmental Satellite Communications GSA European GNSS Agency

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Acronym Explanation GSSAC German Space Situational Aware-ness Center H H2020 Horizon 2020 HEO Highly Eccentric Earth Orbit I IADC Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee ICoC International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities ICT Information and Communication Technologies INTEGRAL International Gamma-Ray Astrophysics Laboratory ITU International Telecommunications Union ISO Infrared Space Observatory ISS International Space Station J JAC Conjunction Analysis and Evaluation Service, Alerts, and Recom-mendations JFSCC Joint Force Space Component JspOC Joint Space Operations Center L LEO Low Earth Orbit LWS Living With a Star M MEO Medium Earth Orbit MFF Multi-annual Financial Framework of the European Union N NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NEO Near Earth Objects NEODyS Near Earth Ob-jects Dynamics Site NDS National Defense Strategy NFP No First Placement of Weapons in Outer Space NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration NSpC National Space Council NSS National Security Strategy NSSS National Security Space Strategy NSTC National Science and Technology Council O OSCE Organization For Security and Co-operation ODMSP Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices O2 OrbitOutlook O/O Owner/Operators

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Acronym Explanation ONERA Office National d'Etudes et de Recherches Aérospatiales (French Aerospace Lab) P PAROS Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space PIMS Passive Imaging Metric Sensor PNT Positioning, Navigation and Timing PORBOS Promotion of initiatives such as the Principles of Responsible Behaviour for Outer Space PPWT Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects PRS Public Regulated Service PSSI Prague Security Studies Institute QoS Quality of Service R RFI Radio Frequency Interferences R&D Research and Development RFW Radio Frequency Weapons RPO Rendez-vous and Proximity Operations S SAB Security Accreditation Board SAFE Space Situational Awareness and Framework for Entity SatCen European Union Satellite Centre SDA Space Data Association SDC Space Data Centre SEPP Space Environment Protection and Preservation SES Société Européenne des Satellites SIS Space Infrastructure Security SPCS Space Control Squadron SpaceDebEMC Space Debris Evolution, Collision risk and Mitigation SPD Space Directive SPOC Système Probatoire d’Observation du Ciel SPR Strategic Space Portfofio Review SOHO Solar and Heliospheric Ob-servatory SSA Space Situational Awareness SSN U.S. Space Surveillance Network SST Space Surveillance and Tracking S&T Science and Technology STM Space Traffic Management SWAMI Space Weather Atmosphere Model and Indices SWE Space Weather

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Acronym Explanation SWIFF Space Weather Integrated Forecasting Framework SWPC Space Weather Prediction Cemter SWORM Space Weather Operations Research and Mitigation T TAROT Télescope à Action Rapide pour les Objets Transitoires TCBMs Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities TeSeR Technology for Self Removal of Spacecraft TEU Treaty on European Union TIRA Tracking and Imaging Radar TLE Two-Line Element sets TT&C Telemetry, Tracking and Control U UKSA United Kingdom Space Agency ULS Up-Link Stations UNIDIR United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research UNOOSA United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs UNCOPUOS United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space UN-SMPAG United Nations Space Missions Planning Ad-visory Group U.S. United States USGS United States Geological Survey USSTRATCOM U.S. Strategic Command W WG-LTS Working Group on the Long-term Sustainability of Space Activities

ESPI Report 66 76 October 2018 Security in Outer Space: Perspectives on Transatlantic Relations

Research Advisory Board

An Advisory Board was established to provide  Dr. David Koplow, Director of the Aero- guidance for this study and to provide expert space Security Project, Georgetown Uni- perspectives on key findings of the research versity; team. More specifically, the Advisory Board  Dr. Brian Israel: General Counsel, Plane- contributed to: tary Resources;  Validating the study findings at the end of  Dr. Jana Robinson, Space Security Pro- the interview phase; gram Manager, Prague Security Studies  Providing expert perspectives throughout Institute; the research;  Dr. Gustav Lindstrom, Director, European  Discussing elements and conclusions pro- Union Institute for Security Studies; posed by the research team; The research team would like to express its The Advisory Board was composed of the fol- sincere gratitude to the Advisory Board mem- lowing members: bers for their insightful contributions to the study and useful guidance throughout the  Dr. Henry Hertzfeld: Director, Space Pol- writing of the report. Their support was instru- icy Institute. mental to shaping the project and brought  Dr. Xavier Pasco, Director, Fondation pour fresh perspectives both for the report itself la Recherche Stratégique; and potential follow-up projects.

ESPI Report 66 77 October 2018 Security in Outer Space: Perspectives on Transatlantic Relations

About ESPI

The European Space Policy Institute (ESPI) is ESPI fulfils its objectives through various mul- an association ruled by Austrian Law, based in tidisciplinary research activities leading to the Vienna, funded at its inception (2003) by the publication of books, reports, papers, articles, Austrian Space Agency and ESA, and now sup- executive briefs, proceedings and position pa- ported by 17 members that include European pers, and to the organisation of conferences national space agencies, the European Com- and events including the annual ESPI Autumn mission, and main European space services Conference. Located in the heart of Vienna, companies and manufacturers. the Institute has developed a privileged relationship with the United Nations Office for The Institute provides decision-makers with Outer Space Affairs and with a network of re- an informed view on mid-to-long-term issues searchers and experts in Europe and across relevant to Europe’s space activities. In this the globe. context, ESPI acts as an independent platform for developing positions and strategies. More information on ESPI is available on our website: www.espi.or.at

About George Washington University Space Policy Institute

The George Washington University Elliott research, offers graduate courses and organ- School of International Affairs, a world leader izes seminars, symposia, and conferences on in research, graduate study, and informed dis- topics related to domestic and international cussion related to issues of science, technol- space policy. ogy, and public policy, established a Space More information on the GWU SPI is available Policy Institute in 1987. The Institute conducts online: https://spi.elliott.gwu.edu/

About the Authors

This report was prepared with contributions Publicly available data and information were from the following ESPI researchers: completed with stakeholders and expert interviews. The list of interviewees is provided in - Marco Aliberti, Senior Research Fellow Annex to this report. - Martin Sarret, Research Fellow - Tomas Hrozensky, Research Fellow ESPI is grateful to the many stakeholders that - Lisa Perrichon, Research Intern accepted to be interviewed and provided sub- - John Rowley, Research Intern stantial information for this report.

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Mission Statement of ESPI

The European Space Policy Institute (ESPI) provides decision-makers with an informed view on mid- to long-term issues relevant to Europe’s space activities. In this context, ESPI acts as an independent platform for developing positions and strategies.