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Security in Outer Space: Transatlantic Relations In collaboration with the Security in Outer Space: Perspectives on Transatlantic Relations Report 66 October 2018 Short title: ESPI Report 66 ISSN: 2218-0931 (print), 2076-6688 (online) Published in October 2018 Editor and publisher: European Space Policy Institute, ESPI Schwarzenbergplatz 6 • 1030 Vienna • Austria http://www.espi.or.at Tel. +43 1 7181118-0; Fax -99 Rights reserved – No part of this report may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or for any purpose without permission from ESPI. Citations and extracts to be published by other means are subject to mentioning “Source: ESPI Report 66; October 2018. All rights reserved” and sample transmission to ESPI before publishing. ESPI is not responsible for any losses, injury or damage caused to any person or property (including under contract, by negligence, product liability or otherwise) whether they may be direct or indirect, special, incidental or consequential, resulting from the information contained in this publication. Design: Panthera.cc ESPI Report 66 2 October 2018 Security in Outer Space: Perspectives on Transatlantic Relations Table of Contents 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................. 5 1.1 Background and Rationale for the Study 5 1.2 Objectives of the Study 7 1.3 Research Scope and Key Concepts 7 1.4 Methodology 8 2. The United States: Consolidating Leadership for National Security ............................ 10 2.1 Legacy of Successive U.S. Space Policies 10 2.2 New U.S. Policy Framework for Security in Outer Space 12 2.2.1 U.S. Strategies and Policy Directives Related to Space Security 12 2.2.2 Disentangling Key Tenets and Objectives of the United States 16 2.2.3 Preparing a National Approach to Space Traffic Management 18 2.2.4 U.S. Strategy and Policy Rationales for Security in Outer Space in a Nutshell 19 2.3 Overview of U.S. Activities and Capabilities 20 2.3.1 Space Situational Awareness 20 2.3.2 Space Environment Protection and Preservation 24 2.3.3 Space Infrastructure Security 25 3. Europe: Rising Space Security Stakes and Ambitions ................................................. 28 Adapted synthesis of ESPI public report 64 "Security in Outer Space: Rising Stakes for Europe" 3.1 Strategy and Policy Rationales 28 3.1.1 Protect the Value of the European Space Infrastructure 28 3.1.2 Contribute to a “Service-Oriented” Policy 29 3.1.3 Reinforce European Autonomy and Freedom of Action 30 3.1.4 Long-Term Stakes for Europe’s Position on the International Space Scene 30 3.2 Overview of European Activities and Capabilities 31 3.2.1 Space Situational Awareness 31 3.2.2 Space Environment Protection and Preservation 35 3.2.3 Space Infrastructure Security 37 4. Transatlantic Relations: State of Affairs ..................................................................... 39 4.1 A Privileged Partnership 39 4.1.1 Relations between Europe and the United States 39 4.1.2 Transatlantic Cooperation in Space 40 4.2 Security in Outer Space: A Mix of Arrangements 41 4.2.1 Cooperation in SSA Data Sharing 42 4.2.2 Space Environment Protection and Preservation 47 4.2.3 Space Infrastructure Security 48 5. Way Forward: Parallel Routes Towards Common Objectives ...................................... 50 5.1 Comparative analysis of U.S. and European approaches 50 5.1.1 Different Policy Drivers 50 5.1.2 Shared Perception of a Growing Vulnerability 52 5.1.3 Strong Reinforcement of the U.S. Space Security Policy 52 5.1.4 Rising Sensitivity to Space Security Issues in Europe 52 5.2 A Fertile Ground for a Reinforced Partnership 53 5.2.1 State of Play: A Complex Mix of Arrangements 53 5.2.2 Towards Reinforced Cooperation Seeking Mutual Benefit 55 5.3 What Scope for a Reinforced Transatlantic Partnership? 57 5.3.1 Shifting U.S. Posture Towards National Leadership 57 5.3.2 Potential for Transatlantic Cooperation 57 5.3.3 Space Traffic Management: Stakes and Implications for Europe 58 5.3.4 General Conclusion 60 ESPI Report 66 3 October 2018 Annex ............................................................................................................................. 61 A.1 European national strategies addressing space security in Europe 61 A.2 List of national space legislation enacted by European countries 61 A.3 Overview of European SST capabilities 62 A.4 Overview of European and U.S. activities in security in outer space 66 A.5 Organizational chart of U.S. security in space in the Executive branch 68 A.6 Authority and role of departments as defined by the SPD-3 69 A.7 List of Interviewees in the United States 70 A.8 List of Interviewees in Europe 71 List of Acronyms ............................................................................................................. 72 Research Advisory Board ................................................................................................ 77 About ESPI ..................................................................................................................... 78 About George Washington University Space Policy Institute .......................................... 78 About the Authors .......................................................................................................... 78 ESPI Report 66 4 October 2018 Security in Outer Space: Perspectives on Transatlantic Relations 1. Introduction A secure service that can justifiably be 1.1 Background and Rationale trusted. for the Study From an infrastructure standpoint, these con- ditions translate into 1) operational capacities In the sixty years since the launch of the first that meet user performance requirements, 2) satellite in 1957, the global space economy continuity of programmes to ensure infra- has grown tremendously.1 Space-based ser- structure maintenance and upgrade, and 3) vices now bring substantial socio-economic appropriate measures to protect the infra- benefits to end-users, across numerous stra- structure against threats. The last encom- tegic domains and economic sectors.2 Simul- passes multiple and transverse aspects cover- taneously, the increasingly pervasive use of ing: space-based services by governments, busi- nesses and consumers has resulted in a grow- Access to space to ensure an autonomous ing dependence of society and economy on capacity to deploy space systems safely; space infrastructure. For example, it was re- The integrity of the space segment, in- cently estimated that a large share of the Eu- cluding all systems in orbit; ropean Union GDP depends on space assets, and that an incapacitation of these assets The ground segment that includes sta- would lead to a significant economic loss.3 tions and equipment for the operation and Similar proportional impacts could occur in delivery of services; other countries. In the future, the develop- Downlinks and uplinks used to operate the ment of new space-based services, in synergy space system and receive its data. with terrestrial technologies (e.g. 5G net- works, precision agriculture, smart energy Each of these components is vulnerable to a grids, autonomous vehicles), will increase the range of security concerns. Experts have rou- benefits of space assets but also deepen the tinely cautioned governments and space busi- dependence of governments, businesses and nesses that space is increasingly vulnerable, consumers on these assets. posing an intensifying challenge to guarantee- ing a safe, secure and sustainable environ- In Europe, the significant progress made by ment to deploy, operate and exploit space as- Galileo, EGNOS and Copernicus programmes sets. Rising challenges to the security of the and the introduction of new initiatives in the space infrastructure are numerous and in- field of GOVSATCOM have further emphasised clude: the importance of ensuring that all conditions for the delivery of operational space-based Passive man-made hazards, in particular services conforming to user needs are met. the proliferation of space debris that jeop- This is a prerequisite to fostering the uptake of ardizes the sustainability of space activi- space services and, consequently, maximising ties and threatens unintentional jamming the benefits of the space infrastructure. This is of signals and equipment; also a key area of space policy development in Active man-made threats such as Anti- light of the growing dependence of the Euro- Satellite capabilities and cyber-attacks; pean economy and society on space assets, in- cluding critical infrastructure such as telecom- Natural hazards such as natural debris munications, energy and transport. The condi- and space weather events such as geo- tions to ensure an appropriate quality of ser- magnetic storms, solar radiation storms, vice include: and disturbances of the ionosphere. A proven or certified level of performance; The deteriorating security situation has been acknowledged by the European Union, which Long-term availability of services; made “the protection and resilience of critical European space infrastructure” a flagship ob- jective of the Space Strategy for Europe 1 Space Foundation (2018). The Space Report 2018: The 3 PwC (2017). Dependence of the European Economy on Authoritative Guide to Global Space Activity. Space Infrastructures. Brussels: EU Publications. Retrie- 2 European Commission (2017). Dependence of the Euro- ved from: http://www.copernicus.eu/sites/default/files/li- pean Economy on Space Infrastructures: Potential Impacts brary/Copernicus_SocioEconomic_Impact_Octo- of Space Assets Loss, (March 2017).
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