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RCEM – Reclamation Consequence Estimating Methodology Interim – DRAFT Dam Failure and Flood Event Case History Compilation Lawn Lake Dam failure flood in 1982 at Estes Park, CO (Reclamation photograph) U.S. Department of the Interior Bureau of Reclamation February 2014 Mission Statements The U.S. Department of the Interior protects America’s natural resources and heritage, honors our cultures and tribal communities, and supplies the energy to power our future. The mission of the Bureau of Reclamation is to manage, develop, and protect water and related resources in an environmentally and economically sound manner in the interest of the American public. Interim – DRAFT RCEM – Reclamation Consequence Estimating Methodology Dam Failure and Flood Event Case History Compilation U.S. Department of the Interior Bureau of Reclamation February 2014 RCEM – Case History Compilation Interim – DRAFT Table of Contents List of Figures ......................................................................................................................... iii Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 1 High Severity Dam Failure and Flooding Case Histories ..................................................... 4 Vega de Tera Dam - Failed January 9, 1959 ....................................................................... 4 St. Francis Dam – Failed March 12-13, 1928 ...................................................................... 6 Nevado del Ruiz Lahar Mudflow – November 13, 1985 ..................................................... 8 Stava Tailings Dam – July 19, 1985 .................................................................................. 10 Vajont Dam – October 9, 1963 ........................................................................................... 12 Malpasset Dam – December 2, 1959 ................................................................................. 14 Walnut Grove Dam, Overtopping Failure, February 21, 1890 ......................................... 16 Taum Sauk Upper Dam, Overtopping Failure, December 14, 2005 ................................ 18 Gleno Dam, Sudden Failure, December 1, 1923 .............................................................. 20 Japan Tsunami – Coastal Flooding March 11, 2011........................................................ 22 Medium Severity Dam Failure and Flooding Case Histories ............................................. 25 Austin (Bayless) Dam – Failed September 30, 1911 ........................................................ 25 Bear Wallow Dam – Failed February 22, 1976 ................................................................. 27 Little Deer Creek Dam –Failed June 16, 1963 .................................................................. 28 Laurel Run Dam – Failed July 20, 1977 ............................................................................ 30 Kelly Barnes Dam –Failed November 6, 1977 .................................................................. 32 Mill River Dam (Williamsburg Dam) – May 16, 1874 ........................................................ 35 Lawn Lake Dam and Cascade Lake Dam – Failed July 15, 1982 .................................... 37 South Fork Dam (Johnstown Flood) – Failed May 31, 1889 ........................................... 42 Big Thompson River Flash Flood – July 31 - August 1, 1976 ........................................ 44 Buffalo Creek Coal Waste Dam – Failed February 26 1972 ............................................ 47 Teton Dam – Failed June 5, 1976 ...................................................................................... 49 Baldwin Hills Dam – Failed December 14, 1963 .............................................................. 51 Shadyside, Ohio Flash Flood – June 14, 1990 ................................................................. 53 Heppner, Oregon (Willow Creek) Flash Flood – June 14, 1903 ...................................... 55 Black Hills Flood/Canyon Lake Dam Failure – June 9, 1972 .......................................... 57 Arkansas River Flood – June, 1921 .................................................................................. 59 Machhu II Dam, Overtopping Failure, August 11, 1979 ................................................... 61 Ka Loko Dam, Overtopping Failure, March 14, 2006 ....................................................... 63 Big Bay Dam, Sudden Failure, March 12, 2004 ................................................................ 65 Banqiao and Shimantan Dams, Failed – August 8, 1975 ................................................ 67 Lijaizui Dam – Failed April 27, 1973 .................................................................................. 71 Shijiagou Dam – Failed August 25, 1973 .......................................................................... 72 Liujaitai Dam – Failed August 8, 1963 .............................................................................. 73 Hengjiang Dam – Failed September 15, 1970 .................................................................. 75 Situ Gintung Dam – Failed March 27, 2009 ...................................................................... 77 Timberlake Dam – Failed June 22, 1995 ........................................................................... 78 Arno River Flood – Flash Flood November 3/4, 1966 ...................................................... 81 Manitou Springs Flash Flood, August 9, 2013 ................................................................. 82 Low Severity Dam Failure and Flooding Case Histories .................................................... 84 S. Davis County Water Impr. Dist., Res. No. 1 Dam – Failed Sept. 24, 1961 ................. 84 Seminary Hill Reservoir No. 3 – Failed October 5, 1991 ................................................ 86 i RCEM – Case History Compilation Interim – DRAFT Allegheny County, Pennsylvania Flash Flooding, 1986 ................................................ 87 Mohegan Park (Spaulding Pond) Dam – Failed March 6, 1963 ...................................... 89 Lee Lake Dam – Failed March 24, 1968 ............................................................................ 90 Quail Creek Dike - Failed January 1, 1989 ....................................................................... 91 D.M.A.D. Dam – Failed June 23, 1983 ............................................................................... 93 Bushy Hill Pond Dam – Failed June 6, 1982 .................................................................... 95 Austin, Texas Flood – May 24-25, 1981 ............................................................................ 97 Texas Hill Country Flood - August 1-3, 1978 ................................................................... 99 Kansas River Flood – July, 1951 .................................................................................... 100 Great Flood of 1993, Upper Midwestern United States, April to October 1993 ........... 101 Hurricane Agnes Floods- June/July 1972 ...................................................................... 103 Phoenix Area Flood – February, 1980 ............................................................................ 104 Prospect Dam – Failed February 10, 1980 ..................................................................... 106 Brush Creek Flash Flood – September 12, 1977 ........................................................... 107 South Platte River Flood – June 16, 1965 ...................................................................... 108 Passaic River Basin Flood – April 1984 ......................................................................... 110 Dongkoumiao Dam – Failed June 2, 1971 ...................................................................... 111 Hurricane Katrina at New Orleans – Coastal Flooding August 29, 2005 ..................... 112 Cyclone Xynthia, France – Coastal Flooding February 28, 2010 ................................. 115 Meadow (Bergeron) Pond Dam – Failed March 13, 1996 .............................................. 117 Appendix A – Fatality Rate vs. DV Plots with new cases and DSO-99-06 cases differentiated Appendix B – Case History Data Summary ii RCEM – Case History Compilation Interim – DRAFT List of Figures (to be added in subsequent version of this document) iii RCEM – Case History Compilation Interim – DRAFT Introduction Dam failure and non-dam related flooding case histories can form the basis of an empirical method of estimating dam failure flood fatalities. The DSO-99-06 was developed in 1999 by Reclamation, and is based on forty such case histories. All of the original case histories presented in DSO-99-06 are contained in this document, plus additional cases. Many of the case histories are located in the United States, but included are notable dam failure or other types of flooding events which occurred in Europe, South America, India, China, Indonesia and Japan. The estimation of life loss from dam failure is an important part of the risk analysis process which attempts to evaluate a group of dams within a portfolio on equal terms. Potential failure modes (PFM) are developed, and an annual failure probability is estimated for each PFM. Estimated life loss numbers are generated for the PFM and the analysis results are plotted on an fN chart to evaluate the need for further action and to develop a ranking of the dam’s needs relative to other dams in the portfolio. This document
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