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The Battle for the Homelands 326 This Period Was One of Military Rule For

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The Battle for the Homelands 326 This Period Was One of Military Rule For THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT VIOLENT CONFLICT ERUPTED IN SEVERAL PARTS OF THE EASTERN CAPE DURING THE 1990S — BETWEEN THE ANC AND PAC IN FORT BEAUFORT AND STEYNSBURG AND BETWEEN THE ANC AND AMAAFRIKA IN UITENHAGE. THIS CONFLICT RESULTED IN KILLINGS AND INJURIES ON BOTH SIDES AND WAS FUELLED BY POLITICAL INTOLERANCE. THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT KILLINGS, ATTEMPTED KILLINGS AND INCIDENTS OF SEVERE ILL TREATMENT RELATED TO THIS CONFLICT WERE GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, FOR WHICH THE ORGANISATIONS INVOLVED IN THE CONFLICT ARE HELD ACCOUNTABLE. The battle for the homelands 326 This period was one of military rule for both Ciskei and Transkei. The Transkei had been under constant military rule since Major-General Bantu Holomisa’s second coup on 31 December 1987, the first successful coup in a South African homeland. In Ciskei, Brigadier Oupa Gqozo took over on 4 March 1990, shortly after the national unbannings, riding on a wave of rural resistance to the rule of former Ciskei president, Mr Lennox Sebe. It appears that neither of these coups was initiated by South African security forces, as has been speculated; rather they seem to have emerged from the homeland militaries themselves. By the 1990s, there was an ongoing dispute between the Transkei military government and the South African government: this soon became a dispute over whether or not Transkei was offering the newly unbanned liberation movements weapons, military training and bases from which to launch attacks. A few months after Gqozo took over in Ciskei, the SADF MI set up a front operation in Ciskei deliberately aimed at turning Gqozo against the ANC. The (IR-CIS)33, which Gqozo was unaware was an MI project, operated in Ciskei from mid-1990 until the formal structure was closed down by the SADF following adverse publicity in August 1991. 327 During this period there was constant conflict in the Eastern Cape between the Transkei government and the ANC and PAC on the one hand, and the Ciskei and South African governments on the other. Within these broad alliances, there were other conflicts: the Ciskei and South African governments, for example, clashed frequently. These conflicts resulted, inter alia, in the abortive coup attempt against Major General Holomisa in November 1990 by Colonel Craig Duli, acting together with the South African security forces; the killing of Ciskei rebels Mr Charles Sebe and Mr Onward Guzana, and a plot to kill Mr Chris Hani and Holomisa in Transkei. The African Democratic Movement (ADM), which was set up under Gqozo with SADF MI assistance, was involved in conflict with ANC members in the Border- Ciskei region, particularly after the September 1992 Bisho massacre. 33 International Researchers–Ciskei Intelligence Services, an intelligence organisation which operated out of Ciskei while being a front for the SADF. It was first known as International Researchers and later as Ciskei Intelligence Services. VOLUME 3 CHAPTER 2 Regional Profile: Eastern Cape PAGE 125 The Gqozo coup in Ciskei 328 On 4 March 1990, the Ciskei military overthrew Mr Lennox Sebe’s civilian government and installed a military government headed by Brigadier Oupa Gqozo. The take-over was followed by a wave of violence, with widespread burning and looting reported in some areas, especially in Mdantsane. Township councillors and officials of Sebe’s Ciskei National Independence Party (CNIP) were attacked. 329 Mr David and Ms Nomutile Zenzile [EC0932/96CCK], who were accused of being CNIP members (although they denied it), were stoned and their house in the Zwelitsha rural area was burnt down. Mr Zenile told the Commission that “the youth were toyi-toying and collecting CNIP membership cards from the relevant people with the aim probably of burning these”. Mr Steve Nene [EC1032/96CCK] was a councillor in Mdantsane and had been associated with Sebe’s government during the 1983 bus boycott. On the day of the coup, the Nenes’ house and shop in Mdantsane were burnt down. Nene (66) was detained; his family eventually found him a week later in hospital where he had been unconscious for three days. His wife, Ms Nomalanga Rhyline Nene, told the Commission: He was injured in his head. Even today he is mentally impaired … He said that the police would take his head to the toilet and they would flush the toilet, which rendered him unconscious. 330 The police believed that Nene was in contact with Sebe, who had not returned to Ciskei since the coup. The Duli coup attempt in Transkei 331 In 1990, Lieutenant Colonel Craig Duli [EC0236/96UTA] attempted a coup against the Transkei military government. Duli was a former member of the Transkei military council who had resigned his position in May 1989 and been detained shortly afterwards; he later fled to South Africa and was discharged from the Transkei Defence Force (TDF) in February 1990. 332 His abortive coup attempt on 22 November 1990 was carried out with the active support of the South African security forces. They started with an attack at the Ncise military base outside Umtata, early in the morning. Four TDF members and several of Duli’s men were killed here. The TDF members were an instructor, Mr VOLUME 3 CHAPTER 2 Regional Profile: Eastern Cape PAGE 126.
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