Aircraft Survivability 14SPRING ISSUE Program Office SURVIVABILITY

AIRCRAFT published by the Joint Aircraft Survivability 14SPRING ISSUE Program Office SURVIVABILITY

PROPULSION SURVIVABILITY Large Engine Vulnerability to MANPADS page 6

F135 Propulsion System LFT page 12

PT6A Engine Vulnerability page 22

Lightweight Integrally Armored Helicopter Floor page 25 Aircraft Survivability is published three times a year by the Joint Aircraft Survivability Program TABLE OF CONTENTS Office (JASPO) chartered by the US Army Aviation & Missile Command, US Air Force Aeronautical Systems Center, and US Navy Naval Air Systems Command. 4 NEWS NOTES by Dennis Lindell 5 JCAT CORNER by CAPT Cliff Burnette, Lt Col Douglas Jankovich, and CW5 Mike Apple 6 LARGE ENGINE VULNERABILITY TO MANPADS by Greg Czarnecki, John Haas, Brian Sexton, Joe Manchor, and Gautam Shah This article summarizes an assessment of large aircraft engine vulnerability to the man- portable air defense system (MANPADS) missile threat. Testing and modeling involved MANPADS shots into operating/rotating CF6-50 engines, which are typical of large transport aircraft. 12 F135 PROPULSION SYSTEM LIVE FIRE TEST (LFT) by Charles Frankenberger JAS Program Office As part of the F-35 LFT Program, the LFT team recently conducted a series of LFTs to assess 735 S Courthouse Road Suite 1100 the Pratt & Whitney F135 propulsion system against ballistic damage. The F-35 LFT Master Plan Arlington, VA 22204-2489 http://jaspo.csd.disa.mil includes a series of propulsion system tests designed to better understand the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the F135, once damaged, and to address assumptions used in the F-35 vulner-

Views and comments are welcome ability assessment. and may be addressed to the: 15 EXCELLENCE IN SURVIVABILITY— Editor Dennis Lindell DR. MARK ROBESON by Ken Branham

Assistant Editor The Joint Aircraft Survivability Program (JASP) takes great honor in recognizing Dr. Mark Dale B. Atkinson Robeson for his outstanding contributions to combat aircraft advances, his leadership within JASP, and his Excellence in Survivability. Mark is an aerospace engineer at the US Army’s Aviation Development Directorate – Aviation Applied Technology Directorate (ADD–AATD) To order back issues of the AS Journal, please visit located at Joint Base Langley-Eustis, VA. http://www.bahdayton.com/ surviac/inquiry.aspx 19 LESSONS LEARNED FROM LIVE FIRE TEST

On the cover: AND EVALUATION (LFT&E) Jacksonville, Fla. (Nov. 29, 2013) by James O’Bryon Aviation Electronics Technician 3rd Class Christopher Davis, assigned to One of the major benefits coming out of the 30 years of LFT&E has been the abundance of insights Patrol Squadron (VP) 16, prepares to gained on how to build and field more survivable defense platforms and more effective weapons. launch a P-8A Poseidon aircraft. VP-16 is the first operational squadron to deploy with the P-8A. Congress passed its first LFT&E legislation in FY86, requiring that all tracked and wheeled (U.S. Navy photo by Mass combat vehicles that provided protection to the soldier be realistically tested, and tested not just to Communication Specialist 2nd Class Eric A. Pastor/Released). assess how well the vehicle would hold up in combat, but more importantly, how well the soldiers inside would survive in anticipated combat-realistic scenarios.

AS Journal 14 / SPRING http://jaspo.csd.disa.mil Mailing list additions, deletions, changes, and calendar items may be directed to:

22 PT6A ENGINE VULNERABILITY SURVIAC Satellite Office by Brent Mills 13200 Woodland Park Road Suite 6047 Many Department of Defense (DOD) aircraft (e.g., A-29, C-12, RC-12, U-21, U-21C, PC-12, Herndon, VA 20171 Fax: 703/984-0756 T-6, T-34C, T-44, DHC-6, and C-23) are used in theater for delivering small cargo shipments, Email: [email protected] gathering intelligence, providing training, and transporting VIPs. For these aircraft, which have limited protection from ballistic threats, little ballistic vulnerability data exists. Promotional Director Jerri Limer 25 LIGHTWEIGHT INTEGRALLY ARMORED Creative Director HELICOPTER FLOOR Michelle Meehan by Mark Robeson Art Director United Technologies Research Center (UTRC), Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation (SAC), and the Karim Ramzy US Army’s Aviation Development Directorate (ADD) – Aviation Applied Technology Directorate (AATD), with additional funding from the Joint Aircraft Survivability Program Office (JASPO), Technical Editor developed and demonstrated an affordable, lightweight integrally armored helicopter floor. The Alexandra Sveum floor was designed using the architecture of the Sikorsky H-60 platform, and was required to Journal Design perform all of the functions of the current floor while also providing ballistic protection from a Donald Rowe 7.62 mm ball threat. Illustrations, Cover Design, Layout 29 AN OPTIMAL CONCEPTUAL DESIGN OF Isma’il Rashada A MISSILE WARNING SYSTEM (MWS) by Yeondeog Koo and Jongmin Lee Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; This paper introduces an optimal conceptual design of a MWS that improves survivability of distribution unlimited, as submitted under OSD/DOT&E Public Release low speed aircrafts. The design is implemented by fusing data of both an ultraviolet (UV) sensor Authorization 14-S-0997. and a radar sensor. The proposed MWS system is able to detect threats of infrared (IR)-based man portable air defense system (MANPADS) as well as radar/laser-guided missiles and unguided rockets more effectively. 32 RASE EXPERIMENTS IMPROVE AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY by Dennis Duquette and Kevin Gross “Five, Four, Three, Two, One, Fire!” In September 2013, the Fire Control Officer issued this command 811 times before shooting more than 10,900 rounds of ammunition during the Rotorcraft Aircraft Survivability Equipment (RASE) Experiment, a 12-day live fire venue. The RASE 2013 experiment was conducted at a remote test site at Weapons Survivability Laboratory (WSL), Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division (NAWCWD), China Lake, CA.

http://jaspo.csd.disa.mil AS Journal 14 / SPRING by Dennis NEWS NOTES Lindell

KEITH JOCHUM the AVSF improvements, including construction of the Range 3 Upper Test Platform, above ground storage tanks, installation of the 50-ton crane, major upgrades to the control room, and greatly improving the data acquisition and control systems. He was also the manager when the AVSF was included in BRAC 2005, and he ensured the seam- less transition of critical equipment to China Lake in support of Air Force LFT&E. Keith ensured that no Air Force test It is with great sadness that we fidelity was lost due to lack of equipment, announce the passing of Mr. Keith instrumentation, or data collection. Jochum. Keith fought a long, valiant Weapons systems tested during his battle with cancer, passing on 1 June tenure included the F-22, F-35 JSF, A-10, 2013. Keith’s constant smile and upbeat B-1B, C-130J, C-17, C-5, KC-46, Predator, Headquarters in Mountain View, CA, approach to management and life is CF-6 engines, and a host of new from 14–18 October 2013. The main sorely missed. state-of-the-art aircraft vulnerability purpose of the camp, which was reduction suites and technologies. sponsored and hosted by Google’s Open Keith came to the Air Force Research Source Programs Office and FLOSS Laboratory, Flight Dynamics Directorate, Keith was a pleasure to work with and Manuals, was to plan and conduct a “Doc Aircraft Survivability Branch, Vehicle was the “behind-the-scenes” glue that Sprint.” Doc Sprints are a unique Equipment Division, as a Major in the US kept the AVSF and LGTF facilities running approach to collaboratively plan, write, Air Force in April 1995, and remained smoothly, ensuring accurate data and and publish a complete user’s manual in until March 1998. After his retirement timely test completion. His constant less than a week. BRL-CAD was one of from the Air Force on 31 March 1998, he dedication to completing of the mission three software projects selected to transitioned to civilian life, but did not has contributed significantly to the participate in this year’s sprints. stay away long. He came back as the well-being of our airmen and the 46th Test Wing (now 96th Test Group), survivability of our weapons systems. The camp’s 20 participant “sprinters” Aerospace Survivability and Safety came from eight different countries. The Operating Location, Aerospace BRL-CAD CONTRIBUTOR’S manual the BRL-CAD team produced, Vulnerability Survivability Facility (AVSF) GUIDE PUBLISHED AT titled HACKING BRL-CAD: A Contributor’s operations and maintenance (O&M) Guide, is primarily targeted at attracting contract manager in June 2001. In 2011, GOOGLE DOC CAMP and assisting new BRL-CAD developers the Landing Gear Test Facility (LGTF) was Individuals from the US Army Research and documenters in the open source rolled under the Eglin O&M contract, so Laboratory (ARL); Quantum Research community. Included are sections on Keith was charged with managing both International; the SURVICE Engineering working with code, contributing needed facilities. Keith managed the AVSF test Company; and open source contributors documentation, and performing other support for many of the joint live fire and from Cameroon, India, and New Zealand types of support tasks. Code snippets are live fire test & evaluation (LFT&E) were recently part of a seven-member also included to demonstrate several programs. He ensured tests were BRL-CAD documentation team selected common BRL-CAD operations. completed in a timely and accurate to participate in the 2013 Google Summer manner. He was instrumental in many of of Code Doc Camp at Google

AS Journal 14 / SPRING http://jaspo.csd.disa.mil 4 Figure 1 BRL-CAD Doc Sprint Team Figure 2 BRL-CAD Doc Sprint Team BRL-CAD is a solid modeling package THREAT WEAPONS combat experience to provide a complete picture on threat lethality. This training (and Survivability/Vulnerability EFFECTS TRAINING 2014 Information Analysis Center [SURVIAC] provides hands-on experience with product) developed by ARL more than 30 The 2014 Threat Weapons Effects threat munitions/missiles, test articles, years ago and used throughout the Training will take place on Hurlburt Field and damaged aircraft. Experienced tri-service community to create geomet- and Eglin Air Force Base, FL from 22–24 professionals provide current, relevant ric target descriptions and assist in April, 2014. information on threat system upgrades, vulnerability analyses. In addition, the proliferation, and lethality. package has been an open source project Conflicts and threats have highlighted the since 2004, receiving development need for the survivability of our aircraft The following are encouraged to attend: assistance from contributors around the and force protection of our soldiers. This aviation operations personnel, world. It was recently cited as being the training will address issues related to the intelligence professionals, weaponeering oldest, continuously developed open lethality of enemy weapon systems from staff, individuals involved with battle source repository in existence. small caliber munitions to anti-aircraft damage and repair, US government and missiles within the broad considerations industry executives, survivability To view the online version of HACKING of system design and employment. This engineers, and research, development, BRL-CAD: A Contributor’s Guide, visit annual training is a collaborative effort test, and evaluation professionals. http://en.flossmanuals.net/contributors- between the Joint Combat Assessment Anyone with an interest in threat guide-to-brl-cad/. For more information Team (sponsored by the Joint Aircraft weapons, intelligence, or aviation about the 2013 Google Doc Camp, visit Survivability Program Office), the Army survivability is welcome. The training will http://www.booksprintsnet/2013/10/2013- Research Laboratory, Naval Air Systems be held at the SECRET/NOFORN level. google-doc-camp-done/. Command, Air Force Aeronautical Systems Center, the Missile and Space Intelligence Center, National Ground Intelligence Center, and other agencies. The training draws information from threat exploitation, live fire testing, and JCAT CORNER by CAPT Cliff Burnette, Lt Col Douglas Jankovich, and CW5 Mike Apple

NAVY JCAT ISEL Det B to simulate combat conditions sites to better prepare our teams as they for the Phase II course. Instructor cadre go forward. When fully completed, the The Naval Air Systems Command will stage several scenarios based on JCAT Range will provide a training area (NAVAIR) Reserve In-Service Engineering real-world events that JCAT has to better prepare JCAT assessors for the & Logistics, Detachment B (ISEL Det B) assessed in the last 10 years. The rigors of conducting an assessment established the Joint Combat training sites will feature widely scat- outside the wire in remote, rugged, and Assessment Team (JCAT) Forensic tered debris, missing pieces, post-crash hostile environments. Staging of downed Training Range (JCAT Range). The JCAT fire, night versus day, and hostile crash Range is a 350 acre site that will allow continued on page 17

5 http://jaspo.csd.disa.mil AS Journal 14 / SPRING by Greg Czarnecki, LARGE ENGINE John Haas, Brian Sexton, Joe Manchor,

COVER STORY VULNERABILITY TO MANPADS and Gautam Shah

AS Journal 14 / SPRING http://jaspo.csd.disa.mil 6 This article summarizes an assessment of large aircraft engine vulnerability to the man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) missile threat. Testing and modeling involved MANPADS shots into operating/rotating CF6-50 engines, which are typical of large transport aircraft.

MANPADS missiles represent a significant threat to both civil and military aviation. Large wide-body military and commercial transport aircraft continue to be attractive targets and are particularly susceptible to MANPADS during takeoff and landing due to large infrared emissions, slow speeds, predictable flight paths, unencrypted air traffic communications, and publicly available commercial schedules. Recent events raised the level of awareness and the desire to find ways to counter this missile threat (see Figure 1).

An important first step in making Figure 1 Example Outcome of MANPADS Encounter with Commercial Aircraft investment decisions—involving large collaborated to assess MANPADS and hit points, as well as the test scope. aircraft susceptibility and vulnerability damage effects on a large transport Two shotlines were selected, each reduction measures necessary to counter aircraft engine. GEAE’s CF6-50 turbofan involving missile intersection of rotating the MANPADS threat—is to understand engine (see Figure 2), in combination with engine parts. Shotline #1 (Test #1 on and determine the likely outcome of a a Boeing B747 nacelle and outboard operating Engine #1) selection assumed a MANPADS missile encounter. Analysis pylon, were test assets for the current likely outcome of moderate engine and combat data reveal that the most investigation. Selection was based on damage and limited collateral damage. likely impact point for a MANPADS is on test asset relevancy and availability. Shotline #2 (Test #2 on operating Engine an aircraft’s engine; however, the level of MANPADS missile selection was based #2) selection assumed a likely outcome of damage and the potential for collateral on a combination of worldwide prolifera- substantial engine damage with wide- effects leading to aircraft loss was tion, missile hardware availability, missile ranging collateral damage. unclear. Given an engine hit, the aircraft model availability, availability of some survivability community needed to engine-damage predictions using this After the team defined shotlines and hit understand the extent of propulsion threat, and the proven ability to launch points, GEAE (under contract with the 96 system damage and the likelihood of this missile in a precisely controlled TG and with co-funding from Joint engine uncontainment, collateral manner for the test. Aircraft Survivability Program [JASP] and damage, and sustained fire. AFLCMC) generated damage predictions The effort consisted of combined for each planned impact location. Using a APPROACH modeling and testing, and began with high-fidelity MANPADS missile model The Joint Live Fire (JLF) - Aircraft hardware-in-the-loop simulations developed by RHAMM Technologies, Systems, Department of Homeland (performed by the 96 TG Wing’s Guided GEAE created an engine versus Security (DHS), Air Force Life Cycle Weapons Evaluation Facility) to identify MANPADS modeling procedure with the Management Center (AFLCMC), 96th Test possible missile approach directions and LS-DYNA finite element modeling code. Group (96 TG), Naval Air Warfare Center impact locations as a function of aircraft GEAE applied this modeling process to (NAWC), National Aeronautics and Space flight scenario. Based on simulation generate damage predictions for live and Administration (NASA), and General results, JLF, DHS, the Institute for inert MANPADS impacts on operating Electric Aircraft Engines (GEAE) Defense Analysis, AFLCMC, and the 96 and non-operating CF6-50 engines. By TG collaborated on selecting of shotlines virtue of merging a fully functional missile

7 http://jaspo.csd.disa.mil AS Journal 14 / SPRING Figure 3 displays the airflow from NAWC’s nine-engine SHiVAS facility (upper right) and how it is ducted into the CF6-50 engine mounted on the load- reaction fixture (upper left). The METS Missile Launcher is in the center-foreground.

Figure 2 GEAE Model of the CF6-50 Engine Figure 3 SHiVAS and METS Under direction and assistance of the 96 model with a counter-rotating engine assembling all necessary engine, nacelle, TG, NAWC performed successful model and having sufficient fidelity in and pylon elements of the test articles; MANPADS shots into the two CF6-50 each model to yield credible damage designing and fabricating the steel engine test articles. In each test, the predictions, this was not only a first-ever load-reaction fixture; instrumenting the missile shotline angle, impact velocity, for the aircraft vulnerability assessment test articles and load-reaction fixture; hit-point, and detonation location community, but also one of the most preparing control algorithms for remote correlated to modeled conditions within a complex modeling endeavors ever engine operation; and, with GEAE’s few feet per second, fractions of a attempted. Damage predictions for Test assistance, verifying engine and instru- degree, and fraction of an inch, respec- #1 proved in line with original expecta- mentation operation. Prior to declaring tively. This degree of test control was tions, suggesting limited uncontained readiness for testing, the 96 TG and necessary for direct correlation between engine debris (mostly turbine blades) and GEAE conducted engine pretests that test and model outcomes. Additionally, collateral damage. Conversely, damage included dry motoring, wet motoring, this degree of test control was essential predictions for Test #2 were not aligned ground idle, and flight idle. All engine to test success. Not only did the missile with original expectations of substantial serviceability and controllability issues have to exit the METS launcher flaw- engine damage. Instead, Test #2 were corrected on the spot at WPAFB lessly (to include separation of the pusher predictions showed reduced damage before shipping the engines and load- sabot), but the missile had to maintain its levels based on shotline nuances. reaction fixture to the NAWC Weapons predicted path over 50 feet of travel, Nevertheless, because of the investment Division’s Weapon Survivability enter the engine thrust flow-field, pass in damage predictions, the test team Laboratory at China Lake, CA for through a powered ring just slightly agreed to proceed as planned. full-up testing. greater than the missiles diameter, and then hit the engine at a pre-designated Formal predictions of fire were not NAWC installed the load-reaction fixture point. As can be seen in Figure 4, there prepared. Instead, the test team used and engines on their live fire test pad. As was no margin for error. With little more engineering judgment and predicted a was done at WPAFB, GEAE assisted with than an inch clearance, the missile had to high likelihood of fires given high-speed a series of pretests leading up to each pass through a powered ring (left-center) missile hits on hot engine components test-for-score. Pretests began with dry/ and detonate on queue to ensure a containing numerous pressurized wet motoring and ground/flight idle successful test. Gridded witness plates flammable fluid lines. A remaining speeds, and then extended to greater were positioned above and beside the question, whether fire might endanger measures of engine thrust, first without engine to score uncontained engine aircraft safety-of-flight, was resolved airflow and then with external airflow debris that might lead to collateral through a combination of testing and applied. NAWC’s Super High Velocity damage. Any miscalculation (to include post-test analysis. Airflow System (SHiVAS) generated accounting for solar heating of the METS external airflow over the CF6 engines and barrel) would have resulted in a failed TEST SUMMARY pylon. NAWC’s Missile Engagement test, possibly with the missile hitting and Threat Simulator (METS) was used to destroying itself on the powered ring The 96th Test Group’s Aerospace precisely control the missile’s shotline, fixture, then the debris field flying into Survivability and Safety Operating impact velocity, hit-point, and detonation and destroying the engine. Location (96 TG/OL-AC) at Wright- delay for 1:1 correspondence with Patterson Air Force Base (WPAFB), OH modeled conditions. prepared the CF6-50 engines for test. Preparations included acquiring and

AS Journal 14 / SPRING http://jaspo.csd.disa.mil 8 Figure 4 No Margin for Error – Figure 5 Generic Transport Aircraft Model in the Figure 6 NASA Flight Simulator METS Missile Launcher NASA 14x22 Wind Tunnel Instrumentation data were collected for several damage scenarios—those CONCLUSIONS both tests and provided a good indication directly recorded in the tests to those of loads and accelerations experienced that were assumed based on collateral Data produced by these tests by the engine and pylon mounts. Key damage estimations. NASA modeling and demonstrated credibility of the high- engine data monitored and recorded simulation began by measuring changes fidelity engine-MANPADS modeling during the test included engine rotation to aerodynamic characteristics as a procedure developed by GEAE. Test rates, such as N1 (fan, low pressure function of damage location and damage results correlated closely with damage compressor, and low pressure turbine) magnitude. For this task, NASA used predictions. This judgment is based on and N2 (high pressure compressor and data from tests of their Generic Transport comparing the final damage state to the high pressure turbine), and engine Model configuration, where they LS-DYNA predictions coupled with temperatures, such as compressor inlet removed potential damaged elements engineering judgments for how the temperatures, turbine intake tempera- from the airframe, and “flew” the damage would propagate over the tures, and exhaust gas temperatures. damaged model within a wind tunnel (see remainder of the test. Based on combined Other key data elements included strains Figure 5). Wind tunnel tests measured test and model results, pilots should be along key load-paths (to assess missile- and modeled changes to the aerodynam- aware of and ready for situations in generated loads transferred through the ics as a function of degraded engine which they are simultaneously presented pylon); blast-induced pressures within the thrust and estimated collateral damage with a loss of thrust, an engine fire, and engine-core; accelerometers to assess on the airframe. Measured changes to degraded flight control. engine vibration; high-speed video of the the aircraft’s aerodynamics then were impact event (to verify correct missile applied to the NASA flight simulator. The combined model-test-model position and function); and post-test While flying the generic transport aircraft engine-MANPADS effort represented a quantification of the damage (for direct simulation, NASA research pilots and cost effective and low-risk method of correlation with modeled pretest damage engineers had to react to aircraft stability determining the likely outcome of a predictions and for transition to NASA for and control characteristics that abruptly MANPADS incident. The overall effort the safety-of-flight assessment). changed (accounting for various damage completes a first look at MANPADS High-speed cameras provided excellent states). Pilots had to maintain control of damage effects on operating engines and views of missile impact and detonation. the aircraft, evaluate controllability the outcome on aircraft safety-of-flight. characteristics, and then attempt a safe Such information will prove valuable to POST-TEST ANALYSES landing. Pilot control inputs and aircraft decision makers charged with operational responses were recorded and supple- risk assessments and the development of Engine damage conditions and expecta- mented by post-flight debriefings. Within counter-MANPADS technologies. tions for collateral damage were provided the NASA flight simulator, pilots reacted to NASA Langley researchers for a final to the aircraft’s sudden change of state ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS round of modeling and simulation. This and determined courses of action Work was co-funded by, and received work involved post-test aerodynamic necessary to achieve safe landings guidance from, the Department of modeling of the aircraft’s damage state (see Figure 6). to assess controllability and safety-of- Defense’s Director, Operational Test and flight implications. Analyses spanned Evaluation’s (DOT&E’s) JLF Program,

9 http://jaspo.csd.disa.mil AS Journal 14 / SPRING DHS’s Counter-MANPADS Program, and Joint Combat Assessment pylon test assets; overseeing the test the USAF’s Large Commercial Derivative Team—Major Scott Quackenbush fixture design/fabrication effort; and Aircraft Program. In addition, the effort for assisting with post-test forensics ensuring all test assets were received supplemental funding from at the test site. delivered to the China Lake test site NASA and JASP. NAWC—Jay Kovar, Albert well in advance of planned tests. Bermudez, Jimmy Johns, Ronnie Mike Palumbo for conceptually Authors of the current article are a small Schiller, Will Heermann, Mike designing the engine support fixture fraction of the diverse and talented team O’Connell, and Chuck Frankenberger and then iterating the design based that together achieved test and modeling for accepting and minimizing test-risk on inputs from finite element goals within this large engine vulnerabil- associated with this first-ever and modelers and from NAWC. Jake ity to MANPADS effort. Authors thank highly complex test effort. Albert Wiggins for designing and implement- the following individuals and organiza- Bermudez for assisting with coordi- ing a test instrumentation setup that tions for their contributions: nating and guiding of the overall allowed for easy installation into the NAWC test-support effort, and for range, troubleshooting, and docu- DHS—Kerry Wilson for taking the ensuring test success at NAWC’s menting the report. Jared Hilgeman risk of investment in this first-ever premier test facility. Ronnie Schiller for assisting with reviving the CF6-50 and highly complex engine-MAN- and Mark Metelko for their inputs in engines from the as-purchased state PADS test effort. Alex Estorga, design iterations of the engine to a fully functional state and for Michael Paul, and Thanh Luu for support structure and the structure’s hands-on assistance with a smile expert guidance during test planning, ability to tie into the test pad. Will throughout testing at China Lake. shotline selection, and test execution. Heermann for help mitigating acoustic RHAMM—Ron Hinrichsen, Steve JLF and DOT&E—Robert Lyons and problems associated with running 10 Stratton, Brian Barlow, and Steve Rick Seymour for taking the risk of jet engines simultaneously and in Rosencrantz for developing and co-investing in this test effort and for close approximation; also for tuning the MANPADS missile model guidance/direction that ensured test resolving software and hardware for GEAE implementation. Steve success. Their investment (in requirements in a timely manner. Gary Stratton for generating, running, and combination with that from DHS) Ahr for helping with instrumentation analyzing countless design iterations ensured completion of the two full-up and overall test support. of the engine support structure to engine-MANPADS tests. METI—Matt Matthews and the ensure adequate factors of safety AFLCMC—John Funk and Gene entire METI team for hands-on were in place for the highly dynamic Gregory for taking the risk of support during test setup and test conditions. co-investing in this test effort. Their execution. Ray Hocker and Gary Skyward—Dan Cyphers for his investment enabled a test and Brown for their attention to detail and detailed test plan reviews, on-site modeling support contract with continued interaction with the test data collection support, and early-on GEAE, where GEAE’s support later engineer to ensure capture of optimal behind the scenes interactions that proved essential to ensuring engine video photography during the tests. helped secure project investors. Ralph operation and achieving test success. Wes Witt and Bruce Thompson for Lauzze for his broad background of NASA—Christine Belcastro and their help with pad setup and test experience that helped with test plan John Carter for sharing the engine- article preparation. Together, this development, and Ralph Speelman for MANPADS test and evaluation vision METI team maintained a professional guidance with articulation of an as early as 2004 and for securing can-do attitude during long hours and engine-MANPADS assessment vision funds necessary to acquire engine less than ideal weather conditions. enthusiastically adopted by team test assets. METI was instrumental to test members. JASP—Dennis Lindell and Ken success. GEAE—Gary Wollenweber and Branham for behind-the-scenes test InDyne—Jason Sawdy and Rob Danny Jones for helping to coordinate support. Crosby for coordinating and guiding and guide the overall GEAE support the overall InDyne test-support effort effort. Tom Beck and Jim Orth for to include identifying and economi- guidance and assistance with getting cally acquiring engine, cowling, and CF6-50 engine test assets ready for

AS Journal 14 / SPRING http://jaspo.csd.disa.mil 10 test, preparing the script necessary for engine operation during test, being present during every engine run to ensure correct engine function, candidly making real-time test readiness assessments and recommendations to the government test engineer, and for assessing the extent of engine damage after each test. Sunil Sinha for accepting the exceptional technical risk of developing a first-ever engine-MANPADS modeling procedure and for successfully implementing the procedure to produce useful and credible engine damage predictions. Figure 7 The Test Team and 11 Feet Diameter Engine Nacelle Institute for Defense Analyses— Joel Williamsen, Mark Couch, and Al Wearner for guidance and advice during test planning and test execution.

References

[1] In addition to the B747, the CF6-50 is common to McDonnell Douglas KC-10 and Airbus A300 aircraft. Advanced derivatives of the CF6-50 are also found on the Lockheed C-5, Boeing B767, and other aircraft.

11 http://jaspo.csd.disa.mil AS Journal 14 / SPRING OCCUPANTF135 PROPULSION SYSTEM CASUALTYLIVE FIRE TEST M&S (LFT) by Charles Frankenberger As part of the F-35 LFT Program, the LFT team recently conducted a series of LFTs to assess the Pratt & Whitney F135 propulsion system against ballistic damage. The F-35 LFT Master Plan includes a series of propulsion system tests designed to better understand the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the F135, once damaged, and to address assumptions used in the F-35 vulnerability assessment. Three F135 test series were conducted:

Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing (STOVL) Propulsion System Test—Designed to address the unique aspects of the F135 propulsion system, specifically related to the STOVL capability. Engine Ballistic Test—Aimed at better understanding the advance engine control system and the capabilities of the main engine with gas path damage. Fuel Ingestion Test—Conducted to assess the engine’s fuel ingestion tolerance.

All testing was conducted at the Weapon CTOL/CV Conventional Axial Duct Survivability Laboratory (WSL) in China LOAN Nozzle Lake, CA. Testing was conducted by • Classic Fighter Integration • High Internal • Rearward Installation and Removal Performance personnel from the WSL; Pratt and • Excellent Transient Response • Low External Drag Whitney; Hamilton Sundstrand; Lockheed Martin; Director, Operational Test and Common 3BSM Turbomachinery Evaluation; and the Institute for Auxiliary Inlet Defense Analysis.

Diverterless Supersonic Inlet F135 PROPULSION • Full Obscuration of Engine Face SYSTEM • No Bleed, Bypass, Driveshaft or Diverter Roll Posts The F-35B STOVL variant combines Lift Fan • Two-Stage Fan Clutch unique engineering technologies in a • Counter-Rotating STOVL fighter engine. The F-35B uses a single • Low Pressure Ratio F135 main engine coupled with a lift fan Figure 1 STOVL Propulsion System Components and roll posts to provide STOVL capabil- lift system together work to provide was collected to monitor the control ity. Differences between the veritcal thrust and attitude control for the system reaction, transient performance, conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) F-35B aircraft. and resultant steady state performance. and STOVL propulsion system include the Engine stability checks were then straight augmenter duct versus the 3 TEST SCENARIO performed by slowly increasing and bearing swivel module (3BSM), and the decreasing the throttle from part power addition of the lift fan shaft, clutch and F135 ballistic testing was conducted to to MIL power. The engine’s operability lift fan, roll posts, and a lift fan vane box assess the engine’s steady state and was assessed using snaps from Idle (see Figure 1). The F135 main engine and transient performance after damage. power setting (IDLE) to MIL, and chops Testing was conducted at part power and from MIL to IDLE. Military (MIL) power conditions. Data

AS Journal 14 / SPRING http://jaspo.csd.disa.mil 12 The STOVL propulsion system test installed with ramps to duct the live fire components easily accessible by ballistic required additional consideration of the air and hot engine exhaust away from the threats. A key part of this test series was mission scenario to define the test test article. This configuration allowed to evaluate the control system’s ability to conditions. The majority of an F-35B full engine operability in the conventional accommodate damage and to provide a mission is spent in the up-and-away, and vertical thrust modes. loss of capability indications to the pilot. wing-born mode (i.e., flying as a conven- Testing also addressed the potential of Test Platform STOVL Propulsion tional aircraft where the wings are System Test Stand fire initiation on fuel system components. providing the lift); therefore, it follows One vulnerability reduction technology that most of the flying and fighting will be assessed during this test series was a done in the up-and-away mode. In this fueldraulic fuse that was installed on the mode, the lift fan is static, the lift fan Test Platform Partially Removed to Expose Tunnel and Defectors clutch is disengaged, 3BSM is horizontal, Tunnel Under Test Platform and the roll post nozzles are closed. Ballistic testing was conducted with the Figure 2 STOVL Test Layout, WSL LFT Site propulsion system in the up-and-away mode. Then, with the system in a damaged state, the propulsion system Figure 4 F135 Ballistic Test Setup was commanded to transition from wing-born to jet-born propulsion mode. If convergent nozzle fueldraulic system. the transition was successful, a vertical landing script was run to assess the The test article used in this test series STOVL propulsion system capability was a STOVL ground test engine. The during the vertical landing scenario. test was conducted with the engine in a Figure 3 STOVL Test Setup, WSL conventional (CTOL) configuration. The A few key issues to be answered were: testing focused on those components Twenty tests were conducted on the that are common with the CTOL and Is the damage catastrophic? STOVL system components. Test results STOVL propulsion systems. Testing was Is the systems residual capability indicated that the STOVL propulsion conducted with the engine at part power sufficient to allow the aircraft to system was very tolerant of damage with and MIL power settings. Operability return to base? little performance loss over the course of checks conducted after damage included Does the control system alert the testing. When damage occurs to blades snaps and chops from IDLE to MIL. pilot of the reduced capability? and vanes in a static mode, the debris passes through the system without Fourteen dynamic (engine operating) For the STOVL system, two additional cascading. Through many of the testing tests and four static (engine off) tests issues were: events, the system successfully were conducted. The test results showed transitioned and performed the vertical that the propulsion control system is very Can the system safely transition to landing script with only minor performance capable in its ability to withstand and jet-born mode? losses. Control system component accommodate damage via built in Is the residual capability sufficient to damage was reported, ensuring the pilot redundancies. Impacts to fuel system conduct a vertical landing? was aware of damage to the system. components resulted in fuel leaks and, in some cases, fire (see Figure 5). For gas STOVL PROPULSION F135 ENGINE path components, the hardware was able SYSTEM TESTING BALLISTIC TEST to tolerate damage from smaller threats, providing significant capability in the Testing was conducted at the WSL LFT A second test series was conducted to damaged state. For these events, site (see Figure 2 and Figure 3). The pad assess the ballistic response of the F135 damage did not cascade to the point of arrangement includes a tunnel that runs propulsion system (see Figure 4). This test rendering the engine inoperable. down the center of the test pad. The series was designed to assess damage to tunnel is 15’ x 20’ x 100’ and was the control system and internal gas path

13 http://jaspo.csd.disa.mil AS Journal 14 / SPRING was taken to its limit, resulting in hot streaks during steady flow testing and engine stalls during quick dump events (see Figure 8). The engine showed a high tolerance to ingested fuel.

CONCLUSIONS

Figure 5 F135 Ballistic Test Events (Fuel System Component and Fan Case) Overall, the test results were favorable and in many cases the propulsion system performed better than predicted. Damage to blades and vanes in both the lift fan and main engine did not result in the catastrophic corn-cobbing often seen when gas path components are damaged. The control system is very capable in accommodating damage and providing Figure 6 Fuel Leak and Fire with Self-Extinguish information to the pilot. The data collected is being used to update assumptions and methodologies used in the vulnerability assessment. These updates will be available for the final F-35 aircraft assessment.

Figure 7 Fuel Ingestion Test Setup Figure 8 Quick Dump Ingestion, Stall Event

One vulnerability reduction technology the vulnerability and tolerance of the evaluated was a fueldraulic fuse F135 to fuel ingestion (see Figure 7). Fuel designed to shut off leaks to the ingestion is the result of ballistic damage convergent nozzle actuation system. The to the aircraft inlet with adjacent fuel fuse has a design set point based on tanks. Quick dump and steady flow fuel normal nozzle flow requirements within ingestion events result from this type of the operating envelope. Flow above the aircraft damage. Both types of events set point will cause the fuse to activate, were tested with fuel injectors from shutting off flow and isolating compo- several inlet locations. The injection nents downstream. During the test event, points represent different fuel tank the ballistic damage resulted in a very locations and ingestion scenarios, side large fuel leak and fire. The fuse success- dump or center dump that exist with the fully functioned within seconds of the F-35 aircraft configuration. The test also ballistic test event, stopping the fuel leak explored the effect of ram air on the and allowing the fire to self-extinguish ingestion event. Testing was conducted (see Figure 6). statically to 0.66 Mach.

F135 FUEL The test article used in this series was an INGESTION TEST early production flight test engine. The test was conducted with a representative The third propulsion test series con- F-35 inlet. Overall, 41 steady flow events ducted was the F135 Fuel Ingestion Test. and 32 quick dump events were con- This test series was conducted to define ducted at various conditions. The engine

AS Journal 14 / SPRING http://jaspo.csd.disa.mil 14 EXCELLENCE IN SURVIVABILITY DR. MARK ROBESON

by Ken Branham The Joint Aircraft Survivability Program (JASP) takes great honor in recognizing Dr. Mark Robeson for his outstanding contributions to combat aircraft advances, his leadership within JASP, and his Excellence in Survivability. Mark is an aerospace engineer at the US Army’s Aviation Development Directorate – Aviation Applied Technology Directorate (ADD–AATD) located at Joint Base Langley- Eustis, VA. His areas of specialization are advanced composite airframe structures, structural contributions to vulnerability reduction, multifunctional structures, and structural airworthiness—all with a primary focus on rotorcraft. Mark has accumulated over 23 years of research and development experience with advanced aircraft structures, and holds multiple degrees including an MS (1992) and PhD (1998) in engineering mechanics—both awarded by Old Dominion University.

Mark began his Electrical Attenuating Core • Develop and demonstrate a career in the Structures (EACS)—The objective conformal, broad-spectrum research of of EACS was to develop a radar antenna, structurally integrated advanced absorbing structure based on the into primary composite structure composite X-Cor structural sandwich core Integrally Armored Floor (IAF) aircraft configuration. and Lightweight Integrally structures as a Pultruded Lightweight Integral Armored Floor (LIAF)—The graduate Rotorcraft Armor (PLIRA)—The objectives of IAF and LIAF were to student at objective of PLIRA was to develop develop and demonstrate affordable National Aeronautics and Space low-cost structural aircraft armor. multifunctional integral armor Administration (NASA) Langley Research High Strain-Rate Modeling and solutions for a helicopter floor that Center (LaRC) in 1990. He stayed at Conductivity for Composite provide 7.62 x 39 mm ballistic NASA after graduation as a National Structures (HSMCCS)—The protection (armor piercing for IAF, ball Research Council Post-Doctoral Fellow, objective of HSMCCS was to for LIAF) at reduced weight, as accepting his current position with • Develop and validate improved compared to current technology. ADD–AATD in 2000. Mark is a technical high strain-rate modeling Integrated Aircraft & Crew specialist in the structures technical area, capability for highly loaded Protection (IACP)—The objective planning, coordinating, and executing structural fittings, energy of IACP was to select technology to aviation science and technology efforts absorbing composite structures, enhance aircraft / occupant protec- as part of an integrated strategy to and ballistic penetration of tion, improve durability, and reduce support research, development, test, and composite laminates environmental vulnerability, as well evaluation. His research efforts have • Demonstrate the effectiveness of as to define a technology maturation supported all current and future Army lightning strike protection and demonstration approach for a aviation systems. He has led multiple appliqué for rotorcraft primary follow-on technology demonstration. complex, multi-million-dollar, composite structure and anten- Blast Attenuating Aircraft multi-faceted technology development nae/radomes Structure (BAAS)—The objective efforts. Several of his most significant of BAAS is to develop and mature a efforts in the survivability arena include: durable structural sandwich core concept to efficiently mitigate the

15 http://jaspo.csd.disa.mil AS Journal 14 / SPRING effects of blast overpressure on evaluating the technical merit of efforts); 2012 JASP Engineer of the Year enclosed volumes representative of proposals, and providing recommenda- Award; 2013 AHS Harry T. Jensen rotorcraft structures. tions on the establishment of JASP Award (AH-64 CTB Team efforts); 2013 Hydraulic Ram Compliant funding priorities. He is constantly sought AHS–HRC John White Engineer of the Structure (HRCS)—The objective to participate with other JASP projects, Year Award (career accomplishments of HRCS is to develop and mature such as “Thermal Degradation of and community involvement); and durable structural concepts to Composites” and “Laser Weapon Effects numerous ADD–AATD Commander’s efficiently mitigate hydrodynamic ram on Aircraft Materials,” demonstrating his Award nominations. effects on rotorcraft structures due to breadth of knowledge and professional ballistic and crash events. acumen. He is also a leader in the JASP Mark is the epitome of the strong family Combat Tempered Aft Fuselage Crew and Passenger Survivability effort man and anchored in his church. He (CTAF)—The objective of CTAF is to and briefed at the Technology workshop. attended high school in Yorktown, VA at develop, mature, and demonstrate As the go-to guy in JASP for giving Tabb High School, and married his high primary rotorcraft structures that impressive and articulate briefings, Mark school sweetheart, the former Paula enhance operational durability and has been invited to present at numerous Thomas. They have been married for 22 damage tolerance (including tolerance JASP meetings. years. Mark spends much of his free time of high-energy ballistic threats), with his son, Luke (10), and daughter, focusing on the composite tail boom Staying engaged in a multitude of Sarah (14), helping out with homework (CTB) targeted for insertion on the professional organizations outside of the and attending their sporting events, like Apache aircraft (AH-64). Army, Mark has and continues to be basketball and volleyball. He has served thoroughly involved in the local and on his Homeowners’ Association Board of Mark has been a key part of the joint national rotary-wing engineering Directors for the past several years. Mark multi-role (JMR) technology demonstra- community. He has been an American and Paula are also involved in several tion efforts, advising JMR leadership on Helicopter Society (AHS) member since aspects of their church, where Mark structures and vulnerability reduction 2000, serving as the Hampton Roads serves as a Deacon. Recreationally, Mark topics that drive the survivability Chapter (HRC) Vice President / Program still enjoys shooting, having participated requirements. JMR aircraft technology Chairman in 2006 and President in 2007. in competitive rifle marksmanship will serve the soldier for decades in the He is currently a member of two AHS throughout high school. future. As a recognized structures expert, technical committees: Structures & Mark serves on various standing and Materials and Aircraft Design. Mark has It is with great pleasure that JASP temporary safety of flight review boards, been a member of the Army Aviation recognizes Dr. Mark Robeson for his advising airworthiness authorities on Association of America since 2000, the Excellence in Survivability for his issues related to rotary-wing and American Institute of Aeronautics & contributions to the survivability disci- fixed-wing aircraft systems. To date, he Astronautics since 1990 (currently a pline, aircraft community, and the soldier. has signed findings documents for over Senior Member), and the American Well done! 450 airworthiness releases. Mark has Society of Mechanical Engineers planned, budgeted, scheduled, and since 1990. executed multiple complex structural testing programs, including the rotary Mark has authored and peer-reviewed wing structure technology demonstration, journal articles, numerous ADD–AATD which was a Sikorsky structural technical reports, and a multitude of testing effort. conference papers. His professional accomplishments have been appropri- Serving as the Structures & Materials ately recognized by his peers and include Committee co-chair for the JASP the 2002 Department of the Army Vulnerability Reduction Subgroup, Mark Commendation (Hellfire Missile Debris is an integral member of the JASP Deflector design and test efforts); 2004 survivability community. His expertise AHS Robert L. Pinckney Award (Complex and knowledge are highly valued when Composite Structural Concepts Team

AS Journal 14 / SPRING http://jaspo.csd.disa.mil 16 JCAT CORNER continued from page 5 aircraft to simulate a realistic aircraft support the JCAT mission in OEF. He Hoover has served our nation for nearly battle damage scenario began in October was competitively selected over more 23 years in both Active Duty and Reserve 2013, and will continue into 2014 to senior officers to deploy as the Officer in roles and has been involved with JCAT conduct training in spring 2014. Charge (OIC). This will be his second since 2002, making him one of the most Lieutenant Commander (LCDR) Scott Navy JCAT mobilization. tenured JCAT members. CMSgt Hoover Quackenbush and Ensign (ENS) Mark first encountered JCAT in 2002. JCAT Buffum have spearheaded the project for AIR FORCE JCAT saw the need for a formalized training Navy JCAT. ENS Buffum will deploy to program and reached out for aircraft Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) in Air Force continues to support the battle damage assessors to train in their the spring 2014. overseas JCAT mission. Captain (Capt) initial class. CMSgt Hoover, then a Gary Roos has rotated back stateside, Master Sergeant, volunteered for the LCDR JAMES P. and Major (Maj) Cory Cooper is now in training at China Lake Naval Air Weapons place at Bagram, Afghanistan. He comes MCDONNELL SELECTED Station and never looked back. He spent to JCAT from the Joint Strike Fighter most of 2003 on loan to JCAT, travelling JUNIOR OFFICER OF THE Program Office, and brings a wealth of to units as they returned from Operation YEAR, NAVAIR RESERVE engineering and aircraft battle damage IRAQI FREEDOM, gathering battle PROGRAM (NRP) repair expertise to the team. Additionally, damage data and delivering threat Maj Dave Garner is in the final weeks of briefings. In 2004, he deployed to Al NAVAIR Reserve In-Service Engineering his deployment, and will be replaced by Asad, Iraq with the 3rd Marine Air Wing. & Logistics is proud to announce that the 1st Lieutenant (Lt) Kelli Walker at When his replacement was not able to NPR selected LCDR McDonnell (see Kandahar, Afghanistan, who comes to us deploy, he stayed for his tour as well. Figure 3) as its 2013 Junior Officer of the from the Materials Directorate of the Air After returning, he became the full-time Year 2013. LCDR McDonnell combined his Force Research Laboratory. face of Air Force JCAT at Wright Patterson Air Force Base (AFB), providing Lieutenant Colonel (Lt Col) Arild Barrett support to the deployed assessors. In recently returned from a quick reaction 2006, he deployed again to Al Asad in plus up to Air Force JCAT manpower support of the Marines. Since this in Afghanistan. Lt Col Barrett deployed deployment, CMSgt Hoover has concen- for 30 days, bringing his expertise in trated on mentoring and formalizing the helicopter fatigue analysis and fracture training program. mechanics gained as a structural engineer for Sikorsky, and over 20 years ARMY JCAT of Air Force operational and engineering assignments. While deployed, he The Army JCAT team, Aviation Shoot Figure 3 LCDR James P. McDonnell assisted in numerous investigations Down Assessment Team (ASDAT), civilian NAVAIR acquisition expertise and provided real-time operational inputs continues to transition from multiple with his Navy Reserve experience to and lessons learned on quick reaction catastrophic assessments a year to provide exceptional support to the AIR deploying and investigative techniques training lessons learned from the 4.1.8 Aircraft Survivability Group, train 27 to the Air Force team. incidents in the past. The reduction of new JCAT assessors, track and manage assessments is partly due to downsizing 679-total man-days of contributory Also, the multi-service JCAT team is the footprint in Afghanistan, but more support to the NRP, and present two losing a vital resource and its most importantly indicates the training and classified ISEL briefings to world-experts tenured JCAT member. Chief Master tactics that have been developed in the field of survivability and Sergeant (CMSgt) Rick Hoover has throughout the years to combat the vulnerability. LCDR McDonnell recently announced his retirement from the Air enemy’s latest techniques. As the Army volunteered to mobilize in May 2014 to Force Reserves in early 2014. CMSgt is changing, ASDAT has changed to allow

17 http://jaspo.csd.disa.mil AS Journal 14 / SPRING further progress in survivability and JTAPIC program. JTAPIC is well versed in trained 3,698 personnel. ASDAT is also vulnerability aspects in aviation. Some of the analysis of combat injuries because busy updating the team’s secure website: the latest projects ASDAT is working are of ground combat incidents, but has not http://www.usaace.army.smil.mil/asdat. to standardize Army aircraft combat data been involved in the analysis of aviation On this site, you can download and collection and casualty data collection incidents. The USAARL and the JCAT’s review numerous JCAT tools used in with medical information, JCAT Phase 1 Army component received a commitment conducting assessments, actual inci- preparation, Phase 3 support to the from the JTAPIC Program Manager to dents, and worldwide threat intelligent Threat Weapons Effects Training, and find a way to leverage their expertise in summaries. ASDAT have received great continued education to the Army aircrews combat injury analysis to the aviation feedback, but are always looking to and leadership. community. This collaboration will improve the website. In FY13, the improve the data JCAT, USAARL, and website had 39,118 visits. ASDAT is in the process of staffing an AR JTAPIC provides to their respective 95-1 change to aircraft combat data communities in pursuit of more survivable The ASDAT team would like to thank and collection. The previous version of AR combat systems. recognize the Navy and Air Force JCAT 95-1 does not adequately describe the programs for their support and hard work roles and responsibilities of aircraft ASDAT will host the PCAT Phase 1 at Fort in collecting data and assessing aircraft combat data collection. The two pages of Rucker, AL on 27–31 January 2014. The throughout the years in support of Army changes very thoroughly describe the team is looking forward to training the aviation and its aircrews. Your dedication responsibilities of the Commander, new JCAT officers and preparing them and hard work have been paramount in ASDAT team, JCAT personnel attached for their deployment to Afghanistan. Each the survivability program. Thanks! to Army Combat Aviation Brigades, and service will get eight student slots for the the data collection roles of the Army training, and the week of training will be TACOPS or maintenance officer if there is split up between classroom and field no support of ASDAT or JCAT. The practical exercises. Phase 3 in the JCAT change also allows the ASDAT team certification is the “Threat Weapons more authority to deploy and assess Effects Training” at Eglin AFB, FL on catastrophic events, without burdening 22–24 April 2014. ASDAT is in the support the deployed unit of owning incident. The role of range operations and security, but biggest gain from the changes to AR 95-1 will help in any way they can. The “Threat will come from the data collected in the Weapons Effects Training” should be a incident that one day may improve the great training environment to learn more survivability or reduce the vulnerability to about threat weapons effects, along with our soldiers deployed in harm’s way. practical experience where JCATs will be JCAT are very excited about the changes able to evaluate the damaged aircraft. and the support that we are getting in the approval process. The final approval will The majority of ASDAT’s time currently is be in the next few months, and then the used in educating almost everyone that changes will be implemented. transitions through Fort Rucker, home of Army aviation. The education includes ASDAT has been working with the Army flight school, officer professional Aeromedical Research Lab (USAARL) to education, pre-command courses for O-3 develop a better process to collect data through O-6s, safety, TACOPS, mainte- on injuries incurred from a combat nance courses, and advanced aircraft incident. This data will be used in studies qualification courses. We also brief units to improve aircraft and crew survivability. as part of their pre-deployment training As a JTAPIC (Joint Trauma Analysis and and education, and inform as many Prevention of Injury in Combat) partner, aircrews as possible in hopes that it could the USAARL is well placed to be the save lives in decisions made while flying connection between JCAT and the and fighting the enemy. In FY13, ASDAT

AS Journal 14 / SPRING http://jaspo.csd.disa.mil 18 OCCUPANTLESSONS LEARNED FROM CASUALTYLIVE FIRE TEST M&S AND EVALUATION (LFT&E) by James F. O’Bryon George Santayana was the first to make the widely-quoted statement that, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” Unfortunately, history has reinforced the truth of this statement over and over again, and often with tragic consequences or at least wasted time and money.

One of the major benefits coming out of the 30 years of LFT&E has been the abundance of insights gained on how to build and field more survivable defense platforms and more effective weapons.

Congress passed its first LFT&E legislation in FY86, requiring that all tracked and wheeled combat vehicles that provided protection to the soldier be realistically tested, and tested not just to assess how well the vehicle would hold Figure 1 LFT Shot vs. Keelson of the F-22 Raptor, Tulalip, WA up in combat, but more importantly, how well the soldiers inside would survive in to include shots against the complete committees of Congress prior to the anticipated combat-realistic scenarios. system configured for combat. Pentagon’s decision to move into This became known as full-up, full-rate production. LFT&E BREAKING system-level testing. Threats against which these vehicles NEW GROUND ADDITIONAL were to be tested were to include not REQUIREMENTS This new LFT&E legislation was not only current threats in the field, but simply a formalization of how testing had also expected threats anticipated to Seeing the major benefits from LFT&E of been conducted throughout the military challenge these platforms when tracked and wheeled vehicles from the services for decades; it broke new ground fielded and beyond. FY86 legislation, Congress expanded on several levels: LFT&E test plans were to be prepared LFT&E requirements to air and sea by the services and submitted to the systems as well in FY87 legislation. It required the primary emphasis Office of the Secretary of Defense be on assuring that reduced crew (OSD) for review and approval prior to In addition to these statutory LFT&E casualties was the primary emphasis. test initiation. requirements, OSD also required that It required that realistic threats OSD was required to prepare an pre-test predictions be submitted to be tested, not merely against independent report on the results of assess the credibility of the modeling and components or subsystems (Fig. 1) of each system’s LFT&E program and simulations being exercised as well as to these platforms, but also testing was submit them to the defense assist in sequencing the test series,

19 http://jaspo.csd.disa.mil AS Journal 14 / SPRING each system’s description to enable analysts with the needed clearances and need-to-know to benefit from these lessons as well.

LFT&E SHORT COURSE: “BUILDING MORE Figure 2 Dynamic Helicopter Joint Live Fire and Figure 3 Small Design Changes from LFT&E in F-22 LFT&E Testing, APG, MD Longerons Led to Major Increase in Survivability: SURVIVABLE SYSTEMS Some Composite Longerons Replaced with Titanium AND MORE EFFECTIVE hopefully from least to most damaging. Longerons Clearly this pre-shot requirement brought WEAPONS” Learned compendium. These systems clarity to the need to develop more were nearly evenly divided between In the fall of 2003, I was asked to teach a realistic modeling techniques and to weapons and platforms. 3-day LFT course, which required the acknowledge and account for the preparation of a syllabus that included multiplicity of potential materiel damage SORTING THE DATA not only LFT lessons learned, but also: a mechanisms and personnel injury brief history of LFT&E, the requirements mechanisms in such modeling. As data collection progressed, several of the Congressional statutes governing categories of lessons learned emerged. LFT&E, LFT&E test planning, the role and Furthermore, it was quickly recognized The seven categories settled upon were: adequacy of modeling and simulation in that this kind of testing required that test support of LFT, LFT best business platforms be repeatedly used, which 1. Design Insights/ practices, role of battle damage and requires that they be repaired and Shortcomings/Changes (Fig. 2 & 3) repair, shot selection process, threat restored prior to subsequent shots; 2. Safety and User Casualties definition, casualty assessment methods, therefore, battle damage and repair 3. Tactics, Training and Doctrine range facilities available for LFT&E, teams became a valuable and integral 4. Battle Damage Assessment development of an LFT&E strategy, part of the LFT&E process. and Repair funding and resourcing, and a host of 5. Modeling and Simulation other of related topics. DOCUMENTING LFT&E 6. Test Planning, Design, LESSONS LEARNED Instrumentation, and Resources LFT&E COURSE 7. Other Related Insights/Comments Shortly after my retirement from OSD, OFFERINGS I was asked by the Live Fire Testing For each of the LFT&E candidate While the first class was held in the fall Office to write a compendium of lessons systems included, this same format was of 2003, as of December 2013, over 40 learned from the LFT&E program. These used to enable a simple parallel structure classes with a total of over 700 students lessons learned could serve not only as a to the compilation. completed the LFT&E Short Course. The historical document as to what lessons students who have completed this 3-day were learned over the first 20 years of Clearly, when examining lessons course include: military and civilian the program, but also to be used as a learned involving a system’s vulnerability, personnel from program management resource for those who were facing the survivability, or lethality, some of those offices (PMOs) from all services, test LFT&E requirement. Those people could lessons learned will be classified. planning and test set-up professionals, benefit from the lessons already learned, vulnerability and lethality analysts, some of them anticipated, others totally While these lessons learned were noted instrumentation and test range person- unexpected, but nearly all resulting in a in the data collection process, they were nel, hardware contractors, contractors more effective system. not included in the compendium to enable supporting PMOs, national lab scientists, it to have wider circulation; however, Department of Homeland Security Nearly 100 weapons and platforms references to classified lessons learned personnel, independent oversight had either completed LFT&E or were documents were included in the representatives from OSD and Institute sufficiently far along in their LFT&E extensive bibliographies that followed for Defense Analyses, battle damage programs to be included in the Lessons

AS Journal 14 / SPRING http://jaspo.csd.disa.mil 20 assessors, environmental and safety prepare an LFT&E test strategy and personnel, data collectors, and a host of present it to the rest of the class in a others. couple hours.

CLASS SIZE This simple exercise helps the class integrate what they have been learning The course class size is purposely kept about over the past couple of days and small to enable healthy dialogue between then apply and present it to the rest of the students and instructor. For this the class. It also enables the instructor to reason, classes are typically kept to no correct any misunderstandings that might more than 20 students, although a few emerge as the presenters make their have been slightly larger. The syllabus case to the other class teams. includes more than 1,000 slides, which are presented during the 3 days of COURSE OFFERINGS instruction; there are also approximately 20 videos that help show what the actual This unique short course continues to be LFT&E testing looks like, and that help offered in two distinct forms: visualize certain concepts involving Figure 4. AIAA Book Used in Course modeling and simulation, shot selection, The first is offered as open enrollment of Ground Combat System Ballistic and test range capability. where anyone with a valid need to Vulnerability/Lethality (Fig.4), which know may enroll in the course describes the vulnerability/lethality addressing air, land, and sea KEEPING THE process, modeling and simulation tools, system survivability, vulnerability, COURSE CURRENT and methods as well as a couple of study and lethality. illustrations to assist in applying the The course is continually being updated The second type of course offering is methods described. as new lessons are learned; new systems typically a tailored LFT&E short are placed on oversight; legislative course that focuses on the specific In this era of sequestration and budget requirements are promulgated; additional systems of interest to the requesting tightening, it is incumbent upon all of us policies are introduced by OSD that contractor and offered exclusively to to avoid spending money twice to learn impact LFT&E, such as Risk-Benefit their personnel at their facility. and apply the same lessons. Learning Analysis, Application of Design of from those who have gone before us in Experiments (DoE); new facilities are To date, industrial organizations, such as this testing activity just makes sense. made available; and advances in Navistar, BAE, Sikorsky, General analytical techniques are made. Dynamics Land Systems, and Raytheon, Questions regarding this LFT&E have requested and received tailored short course should be directed to onsite LFT&E short courses. Furthermore, CLASS CASE STUDY James O’Bryon. defense organizations, such as China Perhaps the most useful part of the short Lake, Picatinny Arsenal, NAVSEA, David course is the class case study. This case Taylor Model Basin, Eglin AFB, and study is given to the class on the last day Bolling AFB, have had courses specifically just before the course wrap-up. The class limited to their personnel is divided up into teams of between five and focused on their specific systems and seven people each. They are then and technology. given a hypothetical LFT&E system that has just been placed on the LFT&E Other materials provided to each student oversight list. They are then given some include an 800-page compilation of technical and operational details about LFT&E lessons learned on a DVD as well this hypothetical system, and told to as a hardback copy of a recently-published AIAA book entitled Fundamentals

21 http://jaspo.csd.disa.mil AS Journal 14 / SPRING PT6A ENGINE VULNERABILITY by Brent Mills

Many Department of Defense (DoD) aircraft (e.g., A-29, C-12, RC-12, U-21, U-21C, PC-12, T-6, T-34C, T-44, DHC-6, and C-23) are used in theater for delivering small cargo shipments, gathering intelligence, providing training, and transporting VIPs. For these aircraft, which have limited protection from ballistic threats, little ballistic vulnerability data exists. As a result of theater incidents highlighting the target- ing of these aircraft and the proliferation of the PT6A engine across the spectrum of small aircraft, the Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation – Live Fire Testing (DOT&E – LFT) funded Joint Live Fire Aircraft Systems (JLF-Air) project T-12-01 to characterize the ballistic vulnerability of the PT6A engine series.

OVERVIEW OF JLF-T-12-01 Because of the limited number of assets JLF-T-12-01 available for this testing, prioritization TEST LOCATION The objective of T-12-01 is to determine was required. One engine was desig- the vulnerability of the PT6A engine nated for the ballistic testing of unloaded, The US Army Research Laboratory, series to a number of fielded threats and non-operating engine components, which Survivability/Lethality Analysis to provide this information in a form that is intended to determine the minimum Directorate (ARL/SLAD) is conducting can be used in future analyses of aircraft velocities and threat sizes that would Phase I and II testing at ARL’s Rotorcraft containing the PT6A engine. Historically, affect the engine’s performance. Once Survivability Assessment Facility (see engine vulnerability testing is considered the fringe area has been identified during Figure 1) located at Experimental Facility high cost and high risk due to the Phase I, the remaining assets can be used 6/7 (EF6/7), Aberdeen Proving Ground, availability, cost, and risk for catastrophic in controlled damage testing and ballistic MD. EF6/7 is an integrated group of loss of test engines; therefore, most testing of operating PT6A-41 engines indoor and outdoor firing locations and engine programs are conducted as using a simulated power profile during support facilities, which provides multi-phase programs. This program is no Phase II. This phased design ensures that essential ballistic and high explosives different in this regard and, therefore, is none of the ballistic tests of operating test/experimentation capabilities and being conducted as a systematic PT6A-41 engines using a simulated services to the Army, DoD, and DoD two-phase, 3-year JLF-Air program. power profile are considered overmatch- contractors. The ranges enable ballistic During the course of the program, three ing, causing unnecessary damage to experiments with targets from compo- distinct tests will be conducted: assets and not providing functional data. nents through full-scale operating aircraft Due to the necessities of the tests, the (and other combat vehicles) against direct Ballistic testing of unloaded, non- program is anticipating the catastrophic fire munitions up to caliber 120 mm and operating engine components loss of at least one, if not both, of the warhead/explosive charge weights up to Controlled damage testing of dynamic assets. 50 lbs. EF6/7 utilizes state-of-the-art operating PT6A-41 engines using a data acquisition, recording, and process- simulated power profile ing equipment to support vulnerability Ballistic testing of operating methodology development, vulnerability PT6A-41 engines using a simulated reduction studies, warhead lethality power profile studies, and Vulnerability/Lethality model

AS Journal 14 / SPRING http://jaspo.csd.disa.mil 22 Figure 1 EF6/7’s Rotorcraft Survivability Assessment Facility inputs, such as criticality analyses, component dysfunction algorithms, and behind armor debris.

SUMMARY OF JLF-T-12-01 PHASE I Figure 2 Test Setup for JLFT-12-01 Phase I Phase I, completed in 2012, examined damage effects produced by ball, armor-piercing incendiary, and fragment- simulating projectile threats against unloaded, non-operating components of the PT6A-34 engine. There, the focus was on the degree of mechanical damage caused by the impact and penetration as a primary failure mechanism. In most Figure 3 Damage to the Gas Generator Figure 4 RC-12 with PT6A-41 Engines Installed cases, component failure could be Turbine Rotor Phase I. Phase II will address inconclusive assessed by unaided visual examination OVERVIEW OF Phase I test results and assess the of the damaged item. Figure 2 shows the minimum threat size and velocity test setup used for Phase I testing. JLF-T-12-01 PHASE II combination required to mechanically Phase II will involve 15 ballistic tests defeat select components not included in Twenty-nine tests were conducted to against unloaded, non-operating PT6-34 Phase I, such as turbine disks. Controlled systematically assess the minimum engine components. Phase II will also damage tests will primarily consist of threat size and velocity combination include 31 controlled damage tests and components with fluid leakage as the required to mechanically defeat compo- three ballistic tests against operating primary failure mechanism (e.g., nents (e.g., fracture gears, sever rotor PT6A-41 engines, installed in an RC-12 combustor, fuel lines, and lubrication blades, or disconnect a main shaft). ground test vehicle, using a simulated lines). Phase II ballistic tests on dynamic Additionally, threat-hole-size data for power profile (see Figure 4). The Phase II engines will characterize cascading compressor, combustor, and turbine ballistic testing on unloaded, non- damage effects and catastrophic casings was recorded. Figure 3 shows operating PT6-34 engine components is engine failure. damage to the gas generator scheduled to begin in 2014. The con- turbine rotor. trolled damage and ballistic testing on Testing an operating engine in simulated operating PT6A-41 engines is schedule to flight profile can be challenging because begin in the third quarter of 2014. the tester has to control the engine remotely, shoot it, and still maintain Phase II ballistic testing on unloaded, control of the engine without destroying non-operating PT6-34 engine compo- the asset. The level of complexity of the nents will utilize the same test setup as test is rewarded by the invaluable data

23 http://jaspo.csd.disa.mil AS Journal 14 / SPRING that the opportunity to test a fully and II test data will also be used to operating engine in flight simulation identify vulnerability reduction measures provides. for the engine.

HOW THE DATA BENEFITS OF JLF-T-12-01 WILL BE USED Though the program requires scarce and Phase I and II test data will be used to expensive assets, and presents a determine dysfunction criteria for critical challenging test setup, the needs the engine components (e.g., rotors, bearings, program meets and the benefits that will shafts, etc.). Engine vulnerability is be realized to the soldier are great. First, defined by the dysfunction of individual the empirical data generated during the critical components, not the aircraft program will be used to improve vulnerability. For components with more vulnerability estimates used for all than one failure mode, there may be more aircraft models using the PT6A engine, than one probability of component increasing our understanding of a dysfunction given a hit, (Pcd|h). As an multitude of different aircrafts. Perhaps example, a generic gearbox has two most important is the opportunity to failure modes associated with engine increase our understanding of the failure, mechanical damage resulting vulnerability of the many aircraft that do in an immediate loss of torque, and not undergo traditional live fire test and mechanical damage resulting in a loss evaluation, but are being targeted in of lubrication. Each failure mode current combat operations. would have its own Pcd|h, which is analyzed separately in the ballistic Due to the PT6A engine’s extensive use vulnerability model. across the services and the large impact that JLF-T-12-01 will have on understand- The Pcd|h is a function of the threat, ing the vulnerability of those aircraft is velocity, vulnerable area, presented area, illustrated in the upcoming array of and dysfunction criteria. For example, applications for the test data. The new combustor failure is a function of air vulnerability curves created using this leakage, which in turn, is a function of new data may be used with respect to hole size. Controlled damage testing will the EMARSS aircraft. As the US Air Force determine the hole size critical for engine makes decisions on its light attack failure. That hole size is the dysfunction aircraft, the vulnerability analysis of criteria for the combustor. Then, the those would also benefit from this presented areas and sensitive areas are program. In addition, Homeland Security calculated for each isometric face of the aircraft will benefit by using the improved component. A combination of engineering vulnerability curves developed codes and analysis will create a threat/ during JLF-T-12-01. velocity step function of the dysfunction probability averaged over multiple views. This step function is the component Pcd|h. The Pcd|h data for the engine can then be linked to aircraft probability of kill given component dysfunction data for aircraft vulnerability studies. The Phase I

AS Journal 14 / SPRING http://jaspo.csd.disa.mil 24 OCCUPANTLIGHTWEIGHT CASUALTYINTEGRALLY M&S ARMORED HELICOPTER FLOOR

by Mark E. Robeson United Technologies Research Center (UTRC), Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation (SAC), and the US Army’s Aviation Development Directorate (ADD) – Aviation Applied Technology Directorate (AATD), with additional funding from the Joint Aircraft Survivability Program Office (JASPO), developed and demonstrated an affordable, lightweight integrally armored helicopter floor. The floor was designed using the architecture of the Sikorsky H-60 platform, and was required to perform all of the functions of the current floor while also providing ballistic protection from a 7.62 mm ball threat. While various floor designs and ballistic material systems were initially considered, the lightweight integrally armored floor (LIAF) design eventually evolved into a three-layer stack configuration, consisting of a structural strike face, backed by a ballistic material layer, and a sandwich core layer for stiffness and to add depth for recessing floor fittings. Through fabrication trials and ballistic tests, a reduced-weight system that defeated the specified threat, while meeting the load and durability requirements, was developed.

REQUIREMENTS & BASELINES The LIAF was required to provide ballistic protection from the 7.62 mm ball (i.e., not armor-piercing) threat, while still performing all of the functions of the current floor. The LIAF also had weight goals of at least 33% less than a baseline floor/armor system using parasitic (add-on) steel armor, and less than the currently fielded optimized polyethylene- based floor armor. In addition, the LIAF had to meet load bearing and durability requirements, including a challenging 200 Figure 1 Baseline Floor / Steel Armor System lb wood box-drop test. CONFIGURATION TRADES ballistic material, such as Dyneema™, AND DOWN SELECT reducing the thickness of the ballistic Baseline systems of the current UH-60 material required while providing some floor with parasitic steel armor (Figure 1) UTRC, Sikorsky, and ADD–AATD structural material. An added top skin and the current floor with fielded parasitic developed design concepts for the LIAF. would provide a walking surface, fluid polyethylene armor (Figure 2) were The ballistic protection would be provided barrier, and barrier against damage. The defined, with weights corresponding to by the use of a structural strike face purpose of the strike face is to strip the an area of typical cabin coverage. combined with a layer of non-structural jacket, slow the round, and provide

25 http://jaspo.csd.disa.mil AS Journal 14 / SPRING LIAF test specimen using a CMC strike face due to its high resistance to ballistic penetration.

UTRC and Sikorsky detailed the five proposed LIAF configurations for fabrication and testing. An additional panel using 3D woven S-2 glass ballistic material infiltrated with toughened epoxy resin (excess from another project) was detailed. Six 12 in by 12 in floor sections were fabricated in the selected configurations.

Figure 2 Baseline Floor/ Polyethylene Armor System Each panel was statically load tested with edges supported and an 11 psi Mini-Core distributed load applied. There was nothing that would indicate that the Dyneema™ LIAF sections were damaged under this loading.

Strike face Ballistic testing was conducted at Figure 3 Floor Configurations with Integral Armor ADD–AATD. [1] Two panels were able to stop the threat at the required velocity. in-plane strength to carry distributed One of these two panels used the CMC loads. The materials considered for the material strike face, and the other panel strike face included metals, laminated used commercially available laminates. composites, and ceramic matrix compos- With equivalent performance and weight, ite (CMC) laminates. The walking surface the design using the laminate strike face was expected to confine the ballistic was selected as the design for further material, so reduced back-face deflection development of the LIAF. This panel was was considered a desirable property. A cross-sectioned through the shot version of Dyneema™ with low back-face locations (Figure 4). The penetrator deflection was selected. For the walking was captured in the Dyneema™ layer, surface material system, the alternate as intended. choices were a composite laminate and a sandwich panel with a thin Nomex® LIAF VALIDATION core (mini-core) and composite skins. While a composite-laminated panel Figure 4 Cross Sections Revealing The validation of the LIAF included Projectile Location would be very thin, the sandwich panel evaluation of box-drop performance, would be stiffer and provide low density highest scoring configurations included ballistic tests, as well as pre- and thickness for recessing floor features. mini-core for the walking surface, as well post-ballistic impact static load tests. as continuous Dyneema™ and strike face Testing required that the LIAF sections be Forty-eight potential LIAF configurations under the features (Figure 3). Two mounted to a tub-section representative were formulated from the design options. different composite strike face materials of the floor support structure, replicating Weights and thicknesses were calcu- were selected. The team further decided the boundary conditions the LIAF would lated, and five configurations were to reduce risk by fabricating light and experience in use. Four 18 in by 18 in selected to be fabricated and tested heavy versions of these configurations. In sub-elements (representative of the size ballistically and structurally. The two addition, it was decided to make a single required to span a section of the UH-60

AS Journal 14 / SPRING http://jaspo.csd.disa.mil 26 Ballistic testing of three floor sub-ele- to the top surface. The maximum ments was conducted by ADD–AATD. [2] pre-shot deflection increased slightly to One floor sub-element was mounted 0.30 in from 0.26 in. There is no stiffness vertically in a test fixture (Figure 6) and requirement for the LIAF. There was shot once with the specified round at the nothing that would indicate that the required velocity. A second sub-element LIAF sections were damaged under was shot three times. The last sub- this loading. element was shot five times. In total, the Figure 5 Box-Drop Test Setup sub-elements were shot nine times. The The optimized LIAF sub-element was additional impacts were performed to ballistically tested by ADD–AATD. [3] generate more test data. It was clear that ADD–AATD shot the panel a total of the impact damage was localized and seven times with 7.62 mm ball rounds at that there was enough undamaged space various velocities to calculate a V50. V50 to allow for the additional tests. All of the is the velocity at which 50% of the shots rounds (except one impacting an area of go through and 50% are stopped by the reduced thickness) were partial penetra- armor, and serves to quantify the tions, with the projectile stopped by the effectiveness of the armor. Of the seven panel as intended. shots, five were stopped (partial penetrations). Four shots (two partial and The floor sub-element subjected to a two complete penetrations) were used to Figure 6 Sub-Element in Ballistic Test Fixture single shot was exposed to a distributed determine the V50. The calculated floor support structure) were manufac- static load of just over 11 psi. As before, four-shot V50 is above the required tured, one for the box-drop test, and there was nothing that would indicate velocity for the optimized LIAF design. three for ballistic testing. that the LIAF sections were damaged Two of the impacts were cross-sectioned under this loading. The maximum (Figure 7). The round remained vertical in The box-drop test was performed on one deflection of the pre-shot top surface of one, but turned completely horizontal in of the sub-elements. A 200 lb box was the floor was 0.26 in, which increased to the other. In both cases, there is a raised 15 in above the floor and dropped 0.32 in after impact. residual un-penetrated thickness of the onto the center of the floor panel so that Dyneema™. As with the previous one corner of the box impacted the floor LIAF OPTIMIZATION (heavier) LIAF design, there was no (Figure 5). The requirement for passing indication of loss of integrity or strength. the box-drop test is that the permanent Due to the better-than-expected results local deformation in the floor caused by in the LIAF sub-element ballistic tests, an this impact not exceed a depth of 0.3 in. optimized (lighter) LIAF configuration was The LIAF panel sustained very little considered. Based on engineering damage due to the box-drop impact; the estimates, it was proposed to decrease dent was measured to be 0.021 in deep. the weight by reducing the thickness of Finite element modeling had predicted a the strike face by 40%. The panel that 0.149 in deep dent, so the model was had previously been box-drop tested was conservative. The LIAF passed the test. modified to the optimized LIAF configuration. The strike face was Two of the three LIAF sub-elements were removed and replaced with one 40% tested with a distributed static load of lighter. The core and the Dyneema™ just over 11 psi. There was nothing that layers remained unchanged. Figure 7 Cross Section Views through Impact Locations would indicate that the LIAF sections were damaged under this loading. The lighter LIAF configuration was The earlier box-drop test was performed quasi-statically load tested. The LIAF was on the heavier LIAF panel, and was not mounted to the tub section during the repeated for the optimized (lighter) test and slightly over 11 psi was applied design. The conservative finite element

27 http://jaspo.csd.disa.mil AS Journal 14 / SPRING model predicted that the lighter design combination of the current floor with the would pass the box-drop test and the fielded, optimized polyethylene-based maximum stress in the strike face would armor system. The LIAF demonstrated a increase from 38,000 psi to 44,000 psi, V50 above the requirement, verifying its still well below the 100,000 psi strength ballistic adequacy. Load carrying of this material. The dent in the top capability and box-drop test performance surface was now predicted to be 0.121 in were satisfied through a combination of using the conservative model. test and analysis. Furthermore, the ballistic tests demonstrated that the LIAF The optimized LIAF design was has multi-strike capability. considered validated at this point. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS WEIGHT ANALYSIS This project was partially funded by the The optimized LIAF is predicted to weigh AATD under Agreement No. W911W6- 338 lbs (for an area of typical cabin 06-2-0001 and by JASPO as Project No. coverage), including features and V-06-01. The US government is autho- attachment hardware. A weight compari- rized to reproduce and distribute reprints son for the various floors and armor for government purposes notwithstand- systems (representing the baseline ing any copyright notation thereon. The systems) in an H-60 installation corre- views and conclusions contained in this sponding to an area of typical cabin document are those of the authors and coverage (Table 1) shows that the should not be interpreted as representing optimized LIAF is 40.5% and 17.2% the official policies, either expressed or lighter than the steel-based and opti- implied, of the AATD, JASPO, or the US mized polyethylene-based fielded government. floor-armor combinations, respectively. The author wishes to thank Connie Bird Floor Armor System Weight (United Technologies Aerospace Systems, Weight Comparisom formerly with UTRC), Alan Goodworth Nomex® Core Steel (Sikorsky), Ken Branham (JASPO), and 568 lb Baseline A Floor 435 lb Dennis Lindell (JASPO), without 133 lb whom this project would not have Nomex® Baseline B been possible. Core Poly 408 lb 28.2% less Floor 275 lb than A 133 lb REFERENCES Lightweight 40.5 % less Integrally Armored than A [1] Robeson, M., “Lightweight Integrally Armored 338 lb Floor 17.2 % less Floor (LIAF) Ballistic Testing,” ADD–AATD Technical 338 lb than B Report TR 11-D-33, DTIC AD Number ADA542655, March 2011. Table 1 Installed Floor Weight Comparison [2] Robeson, M., “Lightweight Integrally Armored Floor (LIAF) Ballistic Validation Testing,” CONCLUSIONS ADD–AATD Technical Report TR 12-D-19, DTIC AD Number ADB378930, January 2012. The LIAF met all of the weight, ballistic performance, and durability requirements [3] Robeson, M., “Lightweight Integrally Armored Floor (LIAF) Ballistic Optimization Testing,” identified at the beginning of this project. ADD–AATD Technical Report TR 12-D-55, The LIAF is 40.5% lighter than combina- May 2012. tion of the current floor with parasitic steel armor, and 17.2% lighter than

AS Journal 14 / SPRING http://jaspo.csd.disa.mil 28 OCCUPANTAN OPTIMAL CONCEPTUAL CASUALTYDESIGN OF AM&S MISSILE WARNING SYSTEM (MWS)

by Yeondeog Koo and Jongmin Lee This paper introduces an optimal conceptual design of a MWS that improves survivability of low speed aircrafts. The design is implemented by fusing data of both an ultraviolet (UV) sensor and a radar sensor. The proposed MWS system is able to detect threats of infrared (IR)-based man portable air defense system (MANPADS) as well as radar/laser-guided missiles and unguided rockets more effectively. INTRODUCTION threat to aircrafts performing takeoff/ detection is performed by detecting and landing or flying over a short distance analyzing Doppler signals of the radar The main threats to low-speed aircrafts from them. Rockets are usually detect- signal reflected from the missile. are ground-launched weapons, such as able by MWS, and can be avoided by the missiles (IR, radar, or laser guided), performance of an evasion maneuver. The critical performances of MWS are rockets, and anti-aircraft artillery high detection probability, low false alarm systems. IR-guided missiles, or Among the reviewed threats, MANPADS rate, short detection and warning time, MANPADS, track the IR signature of is the most critical and widespread threat information of attack angle and missile aircrafts. These types of missiles are for low-speed aircrafts, such as helicop- arrival time, covertness, low cost and detected by MWS, while flares or ters, freighters, and civil planes. Its high power consumption, and light weight. directional infrared countermeasures mobility, easiness of operation, and cost Table 1 lists a comparison of features (DIRCMs) are used to decoy this threat. effectiveness boost the spread speed of among three major types of MWS. Radar-guided missiles use a detection MANPADS over the world. In fact, more radar and a tracking radar. This kind of than 1,000,000 units have been produced Based on the author’s research and missile threat can be detected by the since 1970. [1] Although MANPADS is development and test & evaluation radar warning receiver (RWR) and detected by MWS, the current detection experiences, most MWS have the distracted by chaffs. Laser-guided reliability of MWS is not as high as RWR following common issues during mission missiles operate using either the laser and LWR because of a relatively high operation: target designator or the laser beam rider. false alarm rate. This study presents the These types of missiles can be detected design of an effective MWS system to 1. They have a relatively high false by the laser warning receiver (LWR) and detect not only most missile types, but alarm rate. can be avoided by performing a sudden also MANPADS. 2. It is impossible to know the estimated evasion maneuver. Most anti-aircraft arrival time of missiles when the artillery systems use the laser range MWS STATUS, CURRENT passive sensor is in operation. finder (LRF) and radars. LWR and RWR ISSUES, AND POSSIBLE are able to detect the signals of LRF and Once a threat alarm is activated, both radars, and either evasion maneuver or IMPROVEMENT aircraft pilot and crew experience chaff is implemented to avoid the threat There are two types of MWS: passive extreme levels of stress. In addition, false of anti-aircraft artillery systems. Rockets and active. Passive detection technology alarms may result in a waste of chaffs that are not guided and have a relatively tracks an IR or UV emitted by the and flares, and ultimately lead to a short effective fire range can be a critical after-burn flames of the missile. Active shortage of countermeasures against real

29 http://jaspo.csd.disa.mil AS Journal 14 / SPRING MWS Types Strengths Weaknesses Time delay minimization by radar UV sensor Robust performance against Shorter detection range coupled signal processing for target (compared to ground clutter noise Detection range affected by particles detection: In the case of the UV IR sensor) Compact size (e.g., dust, fog) sensor being used independently, the IR sensor Longer detection range (preferable Detection range affected by humidity (compared to UV) for air-to-air missile detection) Relatively high ground clutter noise time duration for fundamental signal and large size process is around 500 ms normally; Radar sensor Missile arrival time estimation Possible to be detected due to therefore, the UV sensor should send (compared to Robust against weather conditions radar beam target information to the radar sensor, passive sensor) Possible to detect most types Limited detection range and attack of threats angle accuracy (360 degree detection right after detecting the signal with four antennas) exceeding the threshold value and

Table 1 Comparison of MWS Sensor Technology just before the classification procedure for the time of radar threats. As the missile arrival time cannot The detection threshold value of the operation and signal process. be known with a passive sensor, chaffs UV sensor is set to be lower than Target detection sensitivity increase and flares are immediately used once an usual applications, generally having by controlling the threshold value. alert is activated, resulting in a shortage one time of false alarm rate per 1 or 2 of mission operation time. hours, so that the detection 3.2 Radar Performance probability can be increased. Requirements As a solution, an integrated sensor based The radar is designed to minimize on both passive and active sensors may target identification period, so that Small, light weight, and low cost provide an optimal approach for MWS. the time delay is minimized through Fast operation and signal processing By integrating data of different sensors, the overall detection process. Acquisition of target information the false alarm rate can be minimized and The weight, size, and cost should be (speed, distance, and arrival time) missile arrival time can be acquired. optimized for installation. Maximum detection distance: 3 km Major design considerations for this The radar uses one pencil beam (missile RCS: 0.01 m2, target integrated MWS are as follows: antenna to have an increased maximum speed: < 700 m/s) - detection range against small missile By assuming a missile speed of A passive sensor is used as the main objects with limited power, and uses 500-600 m/s, the maximum detection sensor for covertness, and a radar- a stabilized driving device to direct range should be at least 3 km to based active sensor is used to the radar antenna toward the object have 5-6 seconds for complement the main sensor by indicated from the UV sensor. countermeasure actions. increasing target detecting reliability and acquiring missile arrival time. The PERFORMANCE 3.3 Radar Conceptual Design target information detected by the REQUIREMENTS AND passive sensor is transferred to the CONCEPTUAL DESIGN To design a radar that satisfies the radar so that the target can be requirements, the following conceptual tracked by Doppler signals. In this chapter, design requirements design is performed: A UV-based sensor, which is are introduced, and a conceptual design relatively robust to ground clutter is performed based on the derived Antenna actuation toward the target effects, is used as the passive sensor. requirements. based on information of the UV The radar transmits a radar beam detection sensor only when a target is detected by the 3.1 UV Sensor Requirements A 2-axis, pitch, and yaw stabilization UV sensor. During normal situations, actuation system the radar is in readiness condition, Detection accuracy: 2 degrees Detection angle: 6 degrees but not activated. This operation (considering interface with DIRCM) Antenna type: a patch antenna or a approach minimizes radar operation Maximum detection distance: 5km horn antenna time for covertness. (considering effective fire range Pulse Doppler method (mono pulse) of MANPADS) Tracking accuracy: lower than 0.5 degree

AS Journal 14 / SPRING http://jaspo.csd.disa.mil 30 RWR

ASE COMPUTER COUNTERMEASURE (CHAFFF, FLARE,DIRCM) LWR

UV SENSOR RADAR INS

Figure 1 Proposed Integrated Sensor System, an Optimal MWS, in ASE

Frequency: K band (20 Khz) conceptual design of an optimal MWS Antenna size: maximum 16 cm × 16 cm using integrated data from both a UV Output power: 150 W (SSPA [solid sensor and a radar. The detection data state power amplifier] technology) sensed by the UV sensor is sent to the Pulse width: 1 μsec (minimum radar to rotate the radar antenna toward detection range: 150 m) the approaching threat and to transmit a Pulse compression: 10 (range pencil beam. This approach is able to resolution: 15 m) greatly minimize the false alarm rate and Detection target renewal enables the aircraft to make an optimal period: < 0.05 s countermeasure’s effort based on the estimated threat arrival time information. The antenna design and motor selection In addition, the designed system is able should be done so the antenna can to detect radar- and laser-based actuate 90 degrees in a 100 ms time threats and unguided rockets with period. For fast signal processing, the higher reliability. radar should be able to detect the target within 300-400 ms including antenna References movement. Figure 1 shows the block diagram of the integrated sensor system, [1] Bolkcom, Christopher, Andrew Feickert, and Elias Bartholomew. “Homeland Security: Protecting an optimal MWS, in aircraft survivability Airlines from Terrorist Missiles.” Congressional equipment (ASE). Research Service (CRS), Report for Congress, Order Code RL31741, October 22, 2004.

CONCLUSION [2] United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, “TRADOC 3u Bulletin: Soviet RPG-7 To increase survivability of low-speed Antitank Grenade Launcher,” Nov. 1976, aircrafts, such as helicopters, against http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/row/rpg-7.pdf. MANPADS threats, this study showed a

31 http://jaspo.csd.disa.mil AS Journal 14 / SPRING OCCUPANTRASE EXPERIMENTS CASUALTYIMPROVE AIRCRAFT M&S SURVIVABILITY by Dennis Duquette and Kevin Gross “Five, Four, Three, Two, One, Fire!” In September 2013, the Fire Control Officer issued this command 811 times before shooting more than 10,900 rounds of ammunition during the Rotorcraft Aircraft Survivability Equipment (RASE) Experiment, a 12-day live fire venue. The RASE 2013 experiment was conducted at a remote test site at Weapons Survivability Laboratory (WSL), Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division (NAWCWD), China Lake, CA. Figure 1 shows the platform, a decommissioned, unmanned SH-60B mounted on a 30-foot pedestal. Joint services, international partners, and industry developers installed 23 systems with over 100 individual sensors on or near the Hover Helicopter.

WHY RASE? warfighter requirements. The vision for RASE was to enhance decision makers’ Irregular warfare that is associated with understanding of ASE performance and overseas contingency operations has improve the state of the art of ASE underscored a need for investment in testing. RASE, held annually since 2011, aircraft survivability equipment (ASE), took positive steps in implementing study particularly hostile fire indication (HFI) recommendations associated with HFI systems. The Office of the systems while serving as a catalyst for Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition, innovation within the ASE community. Technology, and Logistics) report to RASE improved realism and standardiza- Congress, Study on Rotorcraft Safety and tion in the testing of ASE, improved the Survivability (September 2009), investi- extent of testing prior to fielding, and gated conditions that led to loss of life leveraged modest Department of and rotary wing aircraft from October Defense investment to save overall Figure 1 Hover Helicopter (RASE 2012 & 2013) 2001 through September 2009, and experimentation costs. provided safety and survivability experiment plan and the general structure to conduct effective experimen- recommendations. One specific recom- RASE BACKGROUND mendation was to improve rotorcraft tation in technical and combat-relevant situational awareness and threat RASE was sponsored by the Assistant conditions. The RASE venue provided the detection capability with better ASE Secretary of Defense for Research and only way some developers could assess systems. RASE was established in 2011 Engineering (ASD[R&E]) Director, their system’s performance against to satisfy this requirement. The effort Electronic Warfare and Countermeasures actual threat weapons. continued through 2013. Office and led by the Joint Electronic Advanced Technology (JEAT) Project RASE program offices and HFI developers The goals for RASE were to fill data Office, NAWCWD, Point Mugu, CA. from private industry gathered a large collection gaps on fielded and soon-to- Leveraging a modest investment, the amount of system and sensor perfor- be-fielded ASE systems and to help RASE venue provided range resources, mance data at a fraction of the cost of accelerate the development of ASE- platforms, weapons, ammunition, and individual test and evaluation efforts. related capabilities based on current data management, as well as a detailed Due to equipment commonality, RASE

AS Journal 14 / SPRING http://jaspo.csd.disa.mil 32 data were available to address some ASE issues applicable to both fixed-wing and EMT rotary-wing aircraft. Other participants, such as threat signature model developers and instrumentation developers who Experiment Test Conductor Director (CCM) (WSL) China Lake needed threat signature and prototype ground truth data, participated in the experiments on a non-interference basis. Data Management International Instrumentation Tower Integration Weapons and Analysis Coordination Team Lead Team Lead & Ammo (TAPO, Team Lead Team Lead (AEDC) (PMA-272) PMA-272, JEAT) EXPERIMENT (JEAT) (NRL)

MANAGEMENT Figure 2 RASE 2013 Organization

As a joint services experiment led by a Technology Applications Program technology. Participants understood this small project office, the experiment Office (TAPO) construct and reported truthfully without management team (EMT) was critical to Weapons Survivability Laboratory fear of negative repercussion. During the planning and execution of the event. Yuma Proving Ground (YPG) RASE 2013, foreign participation included The JEAT project manager collaborated personnel and systems from Australia, with service programs of record, who Figure 2 provides an overview of the Canada, and the United Kingdom in enthusiastically provided resources such RASE organization. accordance with The Technical as personnel, material, and funding. The Cooperation Program. EMT determined the venue for each year PARTICIPANTS as well as experiment objectives, gun WEAPONS AND types, and ammunition required (foreign Participants were predominately from and North Atlantic Treaty Organization organizations responsible for passive AMMUNITION [NATO]). The EMT leadership included sensor systems who wanted to collect The successful firing of nearly 11,000 HFI experts from the following data to address threat detection, rounds of ammunition in 2013 was made organizations: geo-location, and situational awareness possible through a collaborative, requirements. The systems detected multidisciplinary effort. Weapons and Arnold Engineering and Development threats in ultraviolet, near infrared, ammunition were hot topics for the team Center (AEDC) shortwave infrared, mid-wave infrared, as the scope, objectives, and detailed Center for Countermeasures (CCM) and radio frequency portions of the shot matrix were developed. Plans were Intelligence and Information Warfare electro-magnetic spectrum, or detected developed to shoot foreign manufactured Directorate projectiles by their acoustic signatures. ammunition and weapons, including small Missile and Space Intelligence Center The US government provided the venue, arms, anti-aircraft artillery, rocket Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) weapons, ammunition, range time, and propelled grenades, rockets, and missiles. Naval Surface Warfare Center, host platforms (SORDAC Maverick NATO small arms and ammunition were Corona Division Unmanned R-22 helicopters and YPG also included to evaluate differences PMA-272 Advanced Tactical Aircraft fixed tower; see Figure 3). Participants between NATO and foreign ammunition Protection Systems reciprocated by providing government signatures. The joint ASE community Program Management Office sponsorship, self-funding for development showed support by sharing truth data – Aircraft Survivability Equipment and travel costs, and system perfor- instrumentation, large caliber weapons, Redstone Test Center (RTC) mance self-assessment for inclusion in and ammunition. Table 1 summarizes Special Operations Research, the final report to OSD with the promise RASE metrics for 2011 through 2013. [1] Development and Acquisition Center that comparative assessments among (SORDAC) systems would not be made. RASE was EXPERIMENT OBJECTIVES Survivability and Vulnerability an experimental venue that welcomed Information Analysis Center failure or setback within the spirit of RASE objectives flowed from program (SURVIAC) discovery while encouraging the requirements with traceability to collaborative innovation of new developer goals as documented in the

33 http://jaspo.csd.disa.mil AS Journal 14 / SPRING The CCM collected similar data from the hilltop behind the Hover helicopter. China Lake Range personnel provided radar truth data to establish time-space- position-information (TSPI) for projectile trajectories to verify projectile miss distances and assist with experiment Figure 3 Maverick Helicopter (RASE 2011 and 2012) and Fixed Tower (RASE 2011) control. Three Oehler acoustic systems, composed of 16 microphone arrays, RASE Metrics 2011 2012 2013 served as alternate projectile TSPI OSD Investment $3.0M $4.5M $1.5M sources during scenarios where the use Venue YPG YPG and WSL WSL of the Doppler radar was not possible. Maverick Helicopter Maverick at YPG Hover Test Assets Hover Helicopter at WSL The systems use shockwave times of and Fixed Tower Helicopter at WSL arrival to compute firing times and Rounds 2,622 7,092 10,912 characterize miss distance. RPGs 133 76 18 Rockets 22 24 6 RASE AT YUMA ATGMs 0 19 0 Laser Events 0 0 121 PROVING GROUND Maverick Sorties / 33 / 36.0 35 / 44.0 0 / 0.0 A significant source of ground truth and Flight Time(hours) situational awareness at the Yuma Hover Helicopter 0.0 7.7 55.4 Flight Time (hours) Maverick event in 2012 was a mobile range control and instrumentation Table 1 RASE Metrics system-of-systems developed by data management and analysis plan under/close to the Hover helicopter to Redstone Test Center (RTC), called the (DMAP). In 2013, the participants’ determine how the ASE sensors RTC Architecture for Test and Evaluation objectives were collected and classified the sudden stoppage of of Hostile Fire Detection System (RATH). incorporated into the experiment design. projectiles. In the Own Ship Return Fire Optimized for testing aviation hostile-fire The data collection objectives were and Wingman Return Fire scenarios, sensors, RATH provided state-of-the-art as follows: NATO machine guns returned fire close tracking capabilities, centralized com- to the hostile fire point of origin. The High mand and control, real-time situational Inspire Innovation Angle of Approach/Over Rotor scenario awareness, and efficient data-capture Advance Key Technologies detected and classified hostile fire above capabilities. RASE 2012 was the first time Fill Data Gaps the rotor disk. RATH was deployed outside RTC. Employ Operationally Relevant Weapon Types TRUTH DATA AND ANALYSIS Advance ASE Experimentation INSTRUMENTATION Following each RASE experiment, truth RASE 2013 SCENARIOS Truth data for RASE 2013 were provided data products, such as TSPI, radar by instrumentation from the AEDC, CCM, ballistic truth data, shot trajectories, and To meet the objectives, the EMT China Lake Range, and TAPO. shot signatures, were distributed and developed multi-gun and multi-axis Instrumentation included time-synchro- analyzed in accordance with the DMAP. scenarios relevant to ongoing combat nized signature data from radiometers Analysis of the objectives, experiment conditions. Specifically, the EMT and imagers, a flash detector at the gun, results, conclusions, and recommenda- developed a three-gun, three-axis as well as radar data and meteorological tions were documented in a final report. ambush scenario with staggering data. The AEDC collected projectile There were no Pass/Fail criteria for and simultaneous fire to replicate signature data broadside to the gun using participating systems, and comparative an actual ambush. The Embankment high-speed radiometers, high-speed performance analyses were not scenario replicated the impact of rounds visible imagery, and atmospheric sensors. conducted.

AS Journal 14 / SPRING http://jaspo.csd.disa.mil 34 Wide angle, multi-gun fire presented in hover and missile warning systems, exploring ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS dynamic flight (2012) break-through technologies, and fusing The JEAT Project Office offers sincere Horizontal slewing of gunfire (manual 2012, sensor data. RASE produced many automated 2013) close to a platform in hover and appreciation to the men and women of “firsts” for the ASE community including first automated vertical slewing (2012) the many sponsoring and participating those in Table 2. Data collection with simultaneous hostile and organizations that made RASE possible. friendly fire (2012) Special thanks go to Brent Sedler, Data collection with multiple hostile gun types firing simultaneously (2012) RECOMMENDATIONS Michael Reese, Michael Kline, and Data signature collection for various anti-tank The primary recommendation is to Benjamin Chitty, whose leadership guided weapons (2012) continue the RASE venue that contains and expertise forged successful RASE Multi-gun and multi-axis scenarios (2013) both a baseline set of threat conditions events. Three-gun, three-axis ambush Own ship return fire and adds new features that address Wingman return fire developer data gaps to accommodate the References Embankment fire maturation of HFI technology readiness High angle of approach/over rotor fire [1] “Rotorcraft Aircraft Survivability Equipment levels. Additional recommendations Three different laser systems (2013) Experiment (RASE) 2011 Final Report.” DTIC include the following: Accession # SURVIAC-2000425, April 2012 Simultaneous laser and hostile fire (2013) (UNCLASSIFIED). 23 systems with more than 100 individual sensors installed on the Hover helicopter (2013) Add shots with greater miss distances from different firing points for Table 2 RASE Firsts dynamic flights COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS Encourage sharing of RATH technologies with other ASE test ranges From conception, the RASE venue was Promote the development of an designed to improve ASE testing in a automatic firing solution for close-in cost-effective manner. In 2012, the net firing during dynamic flight cost savings was $37.5M and produced a Explore multi-static or monopulse savings-to-cost ratio of 6.96, or $6.96 Doppler radars to provide real-time saved for every dollar spent. The net cost truth data savings was the difference between the Encourage the use of slewed hostile total costs of testing (if conducted fire that produces more operationally separately) and the total actual costs of relevant gunfire data for developers the venue. For individual developers, a more relevant metric is cost leverage (the dollars-worth of data received for the WHAT’S NEXT? cost of effort). On average, developers Considerable work still needs to be received $39 worth of data for every done: improving hostile fire detection, dollar they spent. identification, and geo-location; reporting hostile fire across the network; and RESULTS returning non-kinetic fire at those who wish to do us harm. ASD (R&E) has RASE encouraged teaming and innova- sponsored RASE for the past 3 years and tion among participating programs and is seeking service and/or program of ASE developers. Improvements to ASE record sponsorship to continue this vital included adapting the proven ground and worthy effort. The JEAT Project acoustic technology to the rotary wing Office is available to provide advice to flight environment, reducing the weight of the next RASE sponsor(s), but is tasked in sensor system components, improving other business areas and no longer able threat identification and geo-location to plan, execute, or report on ASE capabilities, adapting new technologies experiments. Who is up for the challenge? to the form-fit constraints of existing

35 http://jaspo.csd.disa.mil AS Journal 14 / SPRING COMMANDER PRSRT STD NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND (4.1.8J) U.S. POSTAGE 47123 BUSE ROAD PAID PATUXENT RIVER, MD 20670-1547 PAX RIVER MD Permit No. 22 Official Business

CALENDAR OF EVENTS

APR MAY JUN AUSA ILW LANPAC Symposium 2014 Army Aviation: 5th Annual Joint Integrated Air and Exposition Mission Solutions Summit and Missile Defense Symposium 8–10 April 2014 4–6 May 2014 12 June 2014 Honolulu, HI Nashville, TN Laurel, MD http://www.ausa.org/meetings/Pages/ http://www.quad-a.org/index.php/ http://www.ion.org/meetings/?conf=jnc&CFID=1797 AUSAILWLANPACSymposiumandExposition.aspx article-layout/27-pagesconventions/426-2014- aamss-registration-date 15th Annual Science & Engineering Technology Conference/Defense Tech 2014 AAAA Professional Forum Exposition and Exposition 8–10 April 2014 4–7 May 2014 Hyattsville, MD Nashville, TN http://www.ndia.org/meetings/4720/Pages/ http://www.quad-a.org default.aspx 2014 Tactical Wheeled Vehicles Conference Threat Weapons Effects Training 5–7 May 2014 22–24 April 2014 Reston, VA Hurlburt Field and Eglin Air Force Base, FL http://www.ndia.org/meetings/3890/Pages/ default.aspx Global Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Conference and Exhibition AUVSI’s Unmanned Systems 2014 30–1 May 2014 12–15 May 2014 Fort Walton Beach, FL Orlando, FL http://www.ndia.org/meetings/4950/Pages/ http://www.auvsi.org/AUVSI/Events1/ default.aspx UpcomingEvents 17th Annual Test Instrumentation: T&E on a Sustainment Budget 19–23 May 2014 Las Vegas, NV http://itea.org/learn/conferences-and-workshops/ 35-share/conferences/240-2013-test- instrumentation-t-e-on-a-sustainment-budget.html

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