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Research Essay
GENERAL SLIM’S FAILURE AND SUCCESS IN GENERALSHIP
AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL
Colonel Dennis C. Tabbernor, CD
Advanced Military Studies Course 1
Canadian Forces College
November 1998
Tabbernor 2/36
GENERAL SLIM’S FAILURE AND SUCCESS IN GENERALSHIP AT THE
OPERATIONAL LEVEL
Preparation for war is an expensive, burdensome business, yet
there is one important part of it that costs little – study. However
changed and strange the new conditions of war may be, not only
generals, but politicians and ordinary citizens, may find there is
much to be learned from the past that can be applied to the future
and, in their search for it, that some campaigns have more than
others foreshadowed the coming pattern of modern war. I believe
ours in Burma was one of those.
Slim1
Introduction
The object of war is to impose one’s own will upon the enemy. Operations or
battles to defeat the enemy are carried out by units and formations all working to a
strategic goal. The battles are fought, won, or lost by sections, platoons, companies,
battalions, brigades, divisions, corps, armies, and army groups. Regardless of the size of
the organization involved in the battle, they all have a common element, and that is a
superior who issued the orders. Whether the commander is a sergeant or a general, he
1 Slim, Field-Marshal Viscount, GCB, GCMG, GCVD, GBE, DSO, MC. Defeat Into Victory. London: PAPERMAC, 1986. 535. A large number of the footnotes for this paper are taken from Slim’s book. Defeat Into Victory is one of the best written accounts of the Burmese campaign and is recognized as the unofficial history of the British campaign in Burma. During his tenure as Governor General in Australia, while Slim was writing his book, he was in constant contact with the authors of the official British war history of the Burma Campaign. Slim was asked to proof their manuscripts for accuracy. See Lewin, Ronald. Slim The Standardbearer. London: Leo Cooper Ltd., 1990, Chapter 17.
Tabbernor 3/36
has to take the orders received from his superior and translate them into orders to be
carried out by the soldiers under his command. At the lowest level, it could be as simple
as ‘We will do a right flanking’. At the highest level it could be complicated by the
addition of political concerns such as ‘In achieving your mission, keep in mind the
political sensitivities of our allies’. The skill of translating this strategic direction into
meaningful military action at the tactical level is often referred to as the operational art.2
It is the application of the operational art that identifies the good commander, someone
who can “… understand the current state of the battlefield, … communicating intent and
making the desired end state a reality.”3 A commander who can successfully accomplish this is likely to defeat his enemy. A commander who cannot accomplish this is likely to be defeated.
A commander’s understanding of the operational art can be enhanced by the study of war. To paraphrase Slim, the study of war is the cheapest way to understand war.
There is a great deal to be learned from the past that is applicable to the future. To examine the reasons for winning and losing at the operational level, World War II provides many theatres of operation and many commanders from which to choose.
2 Canadian doctrine describes operational art as “… the skill of translating strategic direction into operational and tactical action. It is that vital link between the setting of military strategic objectives and the tactical employment of forces on the battlefield through the skilful execution of command at the operational level. … In its simplest expression, operational art determines when, where, and for what purpose major forces will fight. … Using operational art, the commander applies intellect to the situation in order to establish and transmit a vision for the accomplishment of the strategic objective.” CONDUCT OF LAND OPERATIONS – OPERATIONAL DOCTRINE FOR THE CANADIAN ARMY B-GL-300- 001/FP-000. National Defence, Canada 1996-09-15, pages 4-1 to 4-2.
3 Reisweber, Major Deborah, US Army. “Battle Command: Will We Have It When We Need It?” Military Review. Vol LXXVII, No. 5. 49. In her article, Major Reisweber refers to this as Battle Command.
Tabbernor 4/36
For the purposes of this paper, the Burma Theatre provides a particularly good setting. From the Allied point of view, it encompassed defeat, victory, joint, and combined operations. Additionally, one commander is present throughout. Slim4 was brought into the Burma Theatre, in March 1942 during the long retreat, and given command of a Corps. He ended the campaign as Allied Land Force Commander, having contributed greatly to the defeat of the Japanese Forces in Burma.
Slim’s success in the battle for Burma was based upon his understanding of what had contributed to the initial defeat of the British Forces in Burma, and his application of these lessons in the successful conduct of the subsequent campaign at the operational level. The remainder of this paper will examine Slim’s leadership in the Burma Theatre of Operations from the initial defeat, through the rebuilding of the British Forces, and finally to victory.
4 In 1942, when he was appointed to command what was to become Burma Corps, Slim was an acting Lieutenant-General. He had joined the Birmingham University OTC in 1912 and enrolled in the Army in 1914 for the Great War. He was wounded twice during the War and in 1919, as a temporary Major, transferred from the British to the Indian Army. At the outbreak of World War II, having commanded the 2/7th Gurkhas, he was promoted Brigadier in command of 10 Indian Brigade. He was wounded in Eritrea in operations against the Italians and evacuated to India. In June 1941 he was promoted acting Major- General and commanded a division in operations in Iraq, Syria and Iran. He had not been a particularly spectacular commander, achieving only limited successes in these commands, however the campaigns provided him experience and seasoning which he brought with him to Burma. For a short over view of Slim’s life, please see Anderson, Duncan. “Slim.” In Keegan, John, ed. Churchill’s Generals. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1991.
Tabbernor 5/36
Burma – The Defeat – An Historical Overview56
Not long after the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, the armies of the
Japanese Empire began their invasion of Burma. On 16 December 1941, they crossed
into Burma from Thailand and shortly thereafter captured an important airfield at Victoria
Point. Using the airfield as a base of operations, the Japanese 15th Army pushed
Northward. Their objectives were to:
sever the Burma Road supply route to China;
seize Mandalay;
threaten the Eastern states of India:
cut British links between India and Malaya;
isolate the Chinese Nationalist Forces of Chiang Kai-shek from their allies;
secure the Burmese oil fields;7 and
destroy the British forces.8
Their long-term plan called for the establishment of a firm base in Burma for the invasion of India.
5 Pimlott, John. The Historical Atlas of World War II. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1995. The information for this part has been taken almost exclusively from this reference. 94.
6 See map at end of paper.
7 Pimlott, 94.
8 Slim, 118.
Tabbernor 6/36
Two British Divisions (1st Burma and 17th Indian) under the command of
Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Hutton9 defended against the advances of the Japanese
15th Army. The 17th Division was trained for desert warfare and the “… 1st Burma
Division was made up of three brigades which had no collective training and which were short of artillery, engineers and transport. The forces were extremely short of aircraft....”10 11 Their overall standards of training were mediocre and no match for the
tactics employed by the Japanese. Their equipment was poor and they were heavily
reliant on the Burmese road system. Although plans were developed for a strategic
withdrawal to a defensible line behind the Sittang River, the senior commander, General
Archibald Wavell12, “… would not allow this claiming it would destroy morale.”13
When the Japanese commenced their offensive, panic broke out amongst the
defenders. The 17th Indian Division was poorly deployed to meet the onslaught and gradually withdrew behind the Sittang River. Disaster after disaster occurred. The single bridge across the Sittang was ordered destroyed by the commander 17th Division, Major-
General J.G. Smyth, as the 48th Brigade was crossing it “… leaving two-thirds of the
9 Hutton was Commander, Army in Burma. Slim, 10.
10 Keegan, John, ed. The Rand McNally Encyclopedia of World War II. Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1977. 43.
11 The explanation for this apparent lack of preparedness on the part of the British Forces is mentioned later in the paper. For more information, the reader is directed to Slim’s Defeat Into Victory, chapters 1 to 3.
12 At this point in time, Archibald Percival Wavell (later Field-Marshal Earl Wavell) was C-in-C India, an appointment held since 22 June 1941. On 3 January 1942 he relinquished command as C-in-C India and was appointed Supreme Allied Commander, South West Pacific (American, British, Dutch and Australian, ABDA Command) which supposedly embraced all Allied forces in Burma, Singapore, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines and from 24 January, North-West Australia. Hutton reported to Wavell as the commander of the Army in Burma. Beckett, Ian. “Wavell.” In Keegan, John, ed. Churchill’s Generals. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1991. 70, 80-81, 87.
13 Keegan, 44.
Tabbernor 7/36
brigade to swim across.”14 Hutton ordered the evacuation of Rangoon, which eventually cost him his job as Wavell replaced him with Lieutenant-General Sir Harold Alexander.15
After the occupation of Rangoon, the Japanese continued with their offensive
pushing the British back towards the Irrawaddy River. At this point, Chiang Kai-shek
intervened to assist his allies and sent a small Chinese force, under the command of
Lieutenant-General Joseph (Vinegar Joe) Stilwell, South into Burma.
As the situation rapidly deteriorated it was decided to form a Corps from 1st
Burma Division and 17th Indian Division to ease the command and control responsibilities of General Alexander. The command of the Corps was given to
Lieutenant-General Slim who reported directly to Alexander.
Slim took over Burma Corps on 14 March 1942.16 Within two days of taking command of the Corps, he noted several factors that detracted from the British’s ability to achieve success. These were a lack of intelligence; inadequate training and equipment for jungle operations; low combat strength; unfriendly Burmese; inadequate mutual support between formations and poor morale.17
Slim knew what was wrong; however, as he said:
14 Keegan, 44.
15 In February 1942, Alexander (the Hon. Harold Rupert Leofric George Alexander, later Field-Marshal Earl Alexander) took over as Commander, Army in Burma, from Hutton, which Slim, in retrospect, regarded as an impossible mission. In this position he had to deal with the British Allies, in particular the Chinese, commanded by General Stilwell. Reid, Brian Holden, “Alexander.” In Keegan, John, ed. Churchill’s Generals. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1991. 105, 110-111, 129
16 Anderson, Duncan. “Slim.” In Keegan, John, ed. Churchill’s Generals. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1991. 321.
17 Slim, 28 – 30.
Tabbernor 8/36
It is one thing to know what is wrong; it is another to put it right. I
have no doubt that Hutton, if he had been given even a few months
in which to prepare, would have corrected much of this and a lot
more too. But I was to find, as he had, that to retrieve the past in
the midst of a fierce and relentless present is no easy matter.18
Slim was right. On 30 March 1942, after very heavy fighting, the Chinese, no match for the Japanese onslaught, were forced to withdraw. General Alexander ordered his forces to withdraw to the Northwest across the Burmese central plain. The Japanese followed up the British withdrawal and quickly captured the Burmese oilfields at
Yenangyaung, hastening the British retreat. On 1 May 1942, the rearguard of the Burma
Corps crossed the Irrawaddy River and blew the bridge behind them. The Japanese carried on with their offensive and soon seized Mandalay. Burma was effectively in
Japanese hands.
The battle was not over for the British, however. Continuing to withdraw towards the Indian border, they used all available means of transport. When these failed, they walked. To complicate matters, the monsoon season burst on them on 12 May.19 The soldiers continued to withdraw. As Slim recalls:
Ploughing their way up slopes, over a track inches deep in slippery
mud, soaked to the skin, rotten with fever, ill fed and
18 Slim, 31.
19 Slim, 109.
Tabbernor 9/36
shivering as the air grew cooler, the troops went on, hour after
hour, day after day. Their only rest at night was to lie on the
sodden ground under the dripping trees, without even a blanket to
cover them. Yet the monsoon which so nearly destroyed us and
whose rain beat so mercilessly on our bodies did us one good turn
– it stopped dead the Japanese pursuit. … On the last day of the
nine-hundred-mile retreat I stood on a bank beside the road and
watched the rearguard march into India. All of them, British,
Indian, and Gurhka, were gaunt and ragged as scarecrows. Yet as
they trudged behind their surviving officers in groups pitifully
small, they still carried their arms and kept their ranks, they were
still recognizable as fighting units. They might look like
scarecrows, but they looked like soldiers too.20
The first battle for Burma was complete. The Japanese had prevailed, but they had failed to destroy the British fighting force. Burma Corps had lost “… over 13,000 men and had the dubious privilege of having conducted the longest retreat in the history of the British Army. Recovery would take a lot of effort and time.”21
20 Slim, 109-110.
21 Pimlott, 94.
Tabbernor 10/36
Burma – The Defeat – Operational Factors That Contributed to the Defeat22
Once back in India, Slim had a chance to reflect on what had gone wrong. He allowed that:
The outstanding and incontrovertible fact was that we had taken a
thorough beating. We, the Allies, had been outmanoeuvred,
outfought, and outgeneralled. It was easy, of course, as it always
is, to find excuses for our failure, but excuses are no use for the
next time; what is wanted are causes and remedies.23
The operational reasons for failure can be grouped as follows:
Strategic direction;
Preparation
Sustainment; and
Generalship.24
Strategic Direction. No one in the military or civilian chain of command had expected a Japanese invasion of Burma until it was too late. Those responsible, both civilian and military leaders, may have been concerned with strategic matters in other parts of the world, but no one took firm responsibility for the defence of Burma. There
22 Slim, 115-121. The Operational Factors That Contributed to the Defeat are taken from this part of Slim’s book.
23 Slim, 115.
24 Slim, 116-119.
Tabbernor 11/36
was no political or military strategic guidance from which the commanders on the ground
could develop operational and tactical level plans for the coming onslaught. Because of
this lack of preparation, “[t]he two great errors that grew from this were the military
separation of Burma from India and the division of operational from administrative
control.”25 These errors did not allow for the “… continued unity of command in spite of the friction, chaos and uncertainty of [the] conflict.”26 These oversights resulted in a campaign plan that was based on fundamental errors in organization and, without an overwhelming superiority of troops and materiel, was doomed to failure. This lack of sound direction continued during the actual fighting. For example, when General
Alexander had arrived in theatre, he had orders to hold Rangoon. “On his arrival he found the decisive battle of the campaign, the Sittang bridge, had already been lost, and with it the fate of Rangoon sealed.”27 Slim summed up the dilemma of the commanders
when he stated:
It was then that we needed from the highest national authority a
clear direction of what was to be our purpose in Burma. Were we
to risk all in a desperate attempt to destroy the Japanese Army and
recover all that has been lost? Ought we to fight to the end on
some line to retain at least a part of Burma? Or was our task to
withdraw slowly, keeping our forces intact, while the defence of
India was prepared? Had we been given any one of these as our
25 Slim, 115.
26 B-GL-300-001/FP-000, page 4-7.
27 Slim, 118
Tabbernor 12/36
great overall object it would have had an effect, not only on the
major tactics of the campaign, but on the morale of the troops. No
such directive was ever received…. Whoever was responsible,
there was no doubt that we had been weakened basically by this
lack of a clear object.28
Preparation. The troops chosen for the operation were not adequate in numbers and had not been properly prepared for the operations they were to undertake. The 17th
Division had been equipped and trained for the desert. The 1st Burma Division was made
up of raw, inexperienced and unreliable Burmese troops. Neither of these Divisions had
been adequately trained to fight in the jungle. The jungle was seen as an unfriendly
place, almost as dangerous as the enemy was. It was considered impenetrable, especially
to troops that relied on wheeled transport to survive. On the other hand, the Japanese
used the jungle to their advantage. If the British had been trained to operate in the jungle,
they “…could have, if not defeated the Japanese, at least made a much better fight of it
with even the small force of reliable troops [they] possessed….”29
The Burmese civil government had not taken adequate measures to prepare or
educate the people for the possibility of a war. When it became evident that there would
be a war, the civil authorities were reluctant to organize evacuation schemes, refugee
control, intelligence machinery, and the militarization of the railways, or anything in the
nature of a Home Guard. There was a fear that if the people were told unpleasant things
28 Slim, 118-119
29 Slim, 115.
Tabbernor 13/36
about an unpleasant situation they might become depressed and panic. Therefore, no one
was prepared for war and the series of British defeats was a stunning surprise.30
“Tactically [the British] had been completely outclassed.”31 The Japanese, on encountering British resistance, would leave a holding force to occupy them. They would then move around a flank and establish a blocking position behind the British.
These tactics were more often than not successful and British Commanders and troops
“began to develop a road block mentality which often developed into an inferiority complex.”32 The Japanese tactics were not new or innovative and there were many ways
to deal with them, had the British not been ‘road bound’ and lacking in the tactical ability
to do so. As Slim states, “[e]quipped and trained as we were in 1942, we had no
satisfactory answer to the Japanese road-block.”33 Although they had difficulty in dealing with the roadblocks, the British Forces were eventually able to withdraw.
The air force was also not prepared for the Japanese assault. The Japanese air force quickly dominated the skies. “The main destruction [of the British Air Force] happened on the ground, at Magwe, owing to bad dispersal on the airfield.”34 The planes
that were not destroyed had to be withdrawn as their airfields were threatened or overrun.
Eventually the skies over the battlefields belonged solely to the Japanese. This resulted
in inadequate air support for the army on the ground, and was a major disadvantage for
30 Slim, 115.
31 Slim, 119.
32 Slim, 119.
33 Slim, 120.
34 Lewin, Ronald. Slim The Standardbearer. London: Leo Cooper Ltd., 1990, 85.
Tabbernor 14/36
the British. They had lost one of their most important combat functions35 which hampered Slim’s ability to “… produce maximum combat power.”36 This lack of air support, combined with the inadequacy of the army on the ground, contributed to the overall defeat.
The British intelligence system was poor to non-existent. The air force could not be relied upon to provide information about the enemy. The army did not have light mobile reconnaissance units that could live in the jungle and report on the movements of the Japanese. According to Slim the “…extreme inefficiency of our whole intelligence system in Burma was probably our greatest single handicap.”37
Sustainment. The Army in Burma was supported through the ports of Rangoon.
When Rangoon fell and the Army was forced to withdraw towards India, the lack of a metalled road38 between Burma and India exacerbated the supply of the Army. Its ability
to sustain itself was almost non-existent.
Generalship. To Slim,
the most disastrous aspect of the whole campaign had been
the contrast between our generalship and the enemy’s. The
Japanese leadership was conf Tabbernor 15/36
they lose the initiative. …Their object, clear and definite,
was the destruction of our forces; ours a rather nebulous idea
of retaining territory. This lead to the initial dispersion of
our forces over wide areas, an error we continued to commit,
and worse still it lead to a defensive attitude of mind.39
Slim also dealt with his failings as a commander. As a general, he felt he had not been successful. He felt that he had been unable to take effective offensive action against the Japanese. In his own words he states:
I should have subordinated all else to the vital need to strike at
them and thus disrupt their plans, but I ought, in spite of everything
and at all risks, to have collected the whole strength of my corps
before I attempted any counter-offensive. Thus I might have
risked disaster, but I was more likely to have achieved success.
When in doubt as to two courses of action, a general should choose
the bolder. I reproached myself now that I had not. In preparation,
in execution, in strategy, and in tactics we had been worsted, and
we had paid the penalty – defeat.40
In summary, the Japanese had outfought their enemy. The British lack of strategic and operational preparedness contributed greatly to their defeat.
39 Slim, 118.
40 Slim, 121.
Tabbernor 16/36
Rebuilding the Weapon
In October 194341, Lieutenant-General Slim was given command of Fourteenth
Army. He immediately identified sustainment (supply), health, and morale as his three biggest areas of concern. He began to implement a number of measures to improve these, and by extension, the fighting efficiency of the army.
Sustainment. The first thing Slim did to address the sustainment problem was to appoint Major-General Snelling his Major-General in charge of Administration. In
Burma, supply was reliant on good communications. Measures were taken to improve the railway, increase supply by river and to improve what roads were available. The roads were built:
…with bricks, millions and millions of them. Every twenty miles
or so was a great brick kiln…. We imported skilled brick workers
from India, brought the necessary coal by rail, boat, and lorry and
baked our bricks. A brick road is terribly apt in rain to sink into
the earth, but constantly having fresh bricks relaid, it held, a
monument to ingenuity and determination.42
This is but one example of the ingenuity used to attack the supply problems. As
was stated earlier, Slim chose Snelling to address the problems and as he stated, the
41 In May 1942, Slim was given command of XV Corps in India. He commanded this formation in limited actions in Burma and civil action in India prior to commanding Fourteenth Army. Anderson 321-322 and chapter 16.
42 Slim, 172.
Tabbernor 17/36
…task was an immense one, and, having discussed it fully with
him and selected the key men to work under him, I gave him a
very free hand to carry it out. Soon, under his energetic direction,
there were signs of improvement, and, while my anxieties on the
supply side remained, I could see for myself wherever I went that
our difficulties were being grappled with throughout the army and
that we were getting increasing understanding and help from
India.43
Slim understood that if he were to win the upcoming battles with the Japanese, he would have to be able to adequately sustain his army. What he and Snelling could not get through normal channels, they found through improvisation. In Slim’s words:
… quick brains and willing hands could, from meagre resources,
produce astonishing results. Our mass production river shipyards,
our methods of building roads and airfields, our parajutes, our huge
market gardens almost in the battle line, our duck farms, our fish
saltings, and a hundred other things were gallant and successful
efforts by the army in the field to live up to its motto, ‘God helps
those who help themselves.’44
Health. Disease was a major concern throughout the campaign, especially malaria. Slim had to find a method to improve the health of his soldiers. He addressed
43 Slim, 176.
44 Slim, 540-541. Slim found an Indian firm that could produce almost anything out of jute. To address the shortage of parachutes for air resupply, Slim had the company produce parachutes out of jute – parajutes.
Tabbernor 18/36 this concern in four areas: application of the latest medical research; forward treatment of the sick; air evacuation of serious casualties and improving morale.45
To address some of the more pressing problems, Slim introduced Malaria
Forward Treatment Units. These units treated malaria casualties close to their formations and reduced the time required for a soldier to return to his unit from five months or more, to about 3-4 weeks.46 As well, for the wounded, forward surgical teams were introduced. Nurses were sent farther forward into the battle area than was the norm. Air evacuation of the seriously wounded direct to hospitals greatly reduced the mortality rate.
One such hospital took in over eleven thousand British casualties. The total deaths in that hospital were twenty-three. Air evacuation did more in the Fourteenth Army to save lives than any other agency.47
The fight against disease also required good unit discipline to ensure that soldiers took the required medicine to fight the disease. Slim instituted a policy of checking entire units to ensure that every man was taking the required medicine. If less than 95% of the unit had taken the required medicine, he would fire the commanding officer for lack of leadership. He stated that “I only had to sack three: by then the rest had got my meaning.”48
45 Slim, 178.
46 Slim 178.
47 Slim, 180.
48 Slim, 180.
Tabbernor 19/36
Morale. Upon taking command of Fourteenth Army, Slim found morale at “a dangerously low ebb.”49 He identified what he considered were his principles of morale stating them as the spiritual, intellectual and material.50
Slim allowed that “[i]t was one thing to marshal my principles but quite another to develop them, apply them, and get them recognized by the whole army.”51 The spiritual foundation of the army was considered by Slim to be good, both religiously and in the
Army’s belief in their noble cause, the defeat of the Japanese Army. He set about to improve the intellectual and the material principles.
Slim took a straightforward approach in dealing with these concerns by talking directly to the soldiers of Fourteenth Army, and encouraging his commanders to continue doing so. As he stated, “[w]henever I could get away from my headquarters, and that throughout the campaign was about a third of the time, I was in these first few months more like a parliamentary candidate than a general – except that I never made a promise.”52 Slim wanted to ensure that the soldiers of the army felt that:
… they shared directly in the triumphs of Fourteenth Army and
that its success and its honour were in their hands as much as
anybody’s. Another way in which we made every man feel he was
part of the show was by keeping him, whatever his rank, as far as
49 Slim, 181.
50 Slim, 182-183.
51 Slim, 183.
52 Slim, 184.
Tabbernor 20/36
was practicable in the picture of what was going on around him.
…It was in these ways that we laid the spiritual foundations…53
Slim had a major impact on his soldiers. In his biography on Slim,
Lewin states that:
… words would have remained words, without the man. Soldiers
are skeptical of mere words. It was during these peregrinations54,
however, that his Army began to think of Lieut[enant]-General
Slim as Uncle Bill. … Uncle Bill they came to see, was theirs and
they were his, linked in the brotherhood of battle. His evident
grasp of the present offered them hope for the future. His message
was that enshrined in the famous motto of the Royal Tank
Regiment: ‘From mud through blood to the green fields beyond.’55
Slim also had to convince the army that they could defeat the Japanese soldiers and, in so doing, to destroy the myth of the Japanese superman. Victories elsewhere, such as the Australian victory in New Guinea56, helped in these efforts. However, the
Fourteenth Army needed its own victories. The army had to get the feeling that it was
“[they] who were hunting the Jap, not he us.”57
53 Slim, 187.
54 Peregrinations = journeys.
55 Lewin, 136
56 Slim, 187.
57 Slim, 188.
Tabbernor 21/36
To improve their jungle skills all commanders were directed to concentrate on
successful patrolling. The best soldiers were initially chosen for this task. As they
became ever more successful in bringing back information and were successful in
skirmishes with the Japanese, the stories of their successes spread throughout the army.
One Gurkha patrol “… presented themselves before their general, proudly opened a large
basket, lifted from it three gory Japanese heads, and laid them on his table. They then
politely offered him for his dinner the freshly caught fish which filled the rest of the
basket.”58 Patrols continued to go out with new men and experienced leaders until the
army no longer thought of the Japanese as supermen. The jungle was no longer an
enemy, but was neutral.59
As the confidence of the individual soldier grew, Slim initiated actions at the unit
and formation level. He ensured that they were well planned, ably led and in
overwhelming strength, attacking Japanese companies with brigades. Slim knew that
they could not at this stage risk even small failures.60 By these series of actions Slim’s army had attained the first of the “…intellectual foundations of morale; everyone knew
[the army] could defeat the Japanese, [the army’s] object was obtainable.”61
Slim felt that these small successes helped the soldiers feel that Fourteenth Army
was efficient. As well, he set about ensuring that rations improved, mail arrived on a
58 Slim, 188.
59 For a more detailed look at this aspect of jungle warfare, The Jungle is Neutral, by Michael Calvert, is recommended.
60 Slim, 189.
61 Slim, 189. Emphasis Slim’s.
Tabbernor 22/36
more regular basis, a welfare service was evident, and a theatre newspaper was
published.62
Rest and reinforcement camps had been identified as a major weakener of morale.
These were reorganized, allocated to divisions: good officers and NCOs chosen to run
them; training was improved and realistic; discipline was enforced and “… in a few
months the Fourteenth Army reinforcement camps … were clean, cheerful, active parts of
the army.”63
Unit and formation commanders were carefully selected. Slim resisted taking
untried commanders.
[He] was often throughout the campaign pressed to take straight
into appointments as brigadiers or battalion commanders,
sometimes even as divisional commanders, officers from home or
India without war experience in command. [He] always resisted
this.64 65
Discipline was improved throughout the army. In Slim’s words this “… was
taken vigorously in hand by all commanders. We tried to make our discipline intelligent,
62 Slim, 189-190.
63 Slim, 190-191.
64 Slim, 191.
65 Montgomery, in his publication High Command in War seems to agree with Slim’s approach when he states: “Probably one of the most important requirements of a commander is that he must be a good judge of men. He must be able to choose as his subordinates men of ability and character who will inspire others.” Montgomery, Bernard L. High Command in War. Germany, June 1945. (Reprinted in Canada in 1946), 11/24.
Tabbernor 23/36
but we were an old-fashioned army and we insisted on its outward signs.”66 With improved discipline and the growing confidence of the army in its ability to defeat the
Japanese, “… the intellectual foundations of morale were laid.”67
The foundation of material was slowly being improved. Transportation and
rearward services were improving on a daily basis, though not to the standard of other
theatres. Where there were shortages, this was “… frankly put to the men by their
commanders at all levels and, whatever their race, they responded.”68 Fourteenth Army developed a fierce pride in their ability to overcome adversity. Everyone in the army was treated equally, no one received preferential treatment, and there were no favourites or elites. Slim even put his headquarters staff on half rations when limited quantities required the forward formations to be on half rations.69
These efforts were to prove fruitful. Slim found that:
In these and in many other ways we translated my rough notes on
the foundations of morale, spiritual, intellectual, and material, into
a fighting spirit for our men and a confidence in themselves and
their leaders that was to impress our friends and surprise our
enemies.70
66 Slim, 193.
67 Slim, 193.
68 Slim, 194.
69 Slim, 195.
70 Slim, 196.
Tabbernor 24/36
The weapon had been rebuilt and was now ready for the final test, the defeat of
the Japanese in Burma.
Burma – The Victory – An Historical Overview71
From November 1943 to November 1944, the British situation in Burma gradually improved. It was not however, without its setbacks. The Allied plan called for two campaigns, the British, under Slim, advancing from the West while the Chinese, under Stilwell, advanced from the North. Both advances were initially successful, but were disrupted by Japanese counter attacks in February 1944 and a major Japanese offensive in March 1944.
While Stilwell continued to drive from the North, Slim was fighting a major action to blunt the Japanese offensive. Major battles raged around Imphal and Kohima as the Japanese tried to destroy the British and to advance on India. The confidence that
Slim had instilled in his Army was now put to the test as units were surrounded and cut off from their normal supply. Slim re-supplied these units by air and they continued to fight. An airlift of the 5th Indian Division into Imphal and an attack from the British 2nd
Infantry Division proved successful, and after much fierce fighting, the Japanese began to withdraw. By June 1944, this had become a general retreat. “Slim’s pursuing forces
71 Pimlott, John. The information for this part has been taken almost exclusively from this reference. 180, 204. The Allies had, by this time, substantially increased the forces in the Burma Theatre. Slim commanded an Army of two Corps, the Chinese had two Armies under Stilwell and there were special organizations such as the Chindits and Merill’s Marauders, as well as air and naval support. The Japanese had approximately 115,000 troops facing the British. Slim, 378.
Tabbernor 25/36 reached the Chindwin in November, poised for an advance into central Burma. The
Japanese had suffered over 60,000 casualties.”72
By early December, Slim’s forces had crossed the Chindwin and were advancing towards the next major obstacle, the Irrawaddy. Needing time to regroup, the Japanese planned to use the Irrawaddy as an obstacle to counter Slim’s advance. Initial British attempts to cross the Irrawaddy were not successful as the Japanese north of Mandalay were still in good condition. “In such circumstances a more elaborate plan was needed and Slim already had one prepared.”73 His plan called for a diversion to draw the
Japanese North while using other forces to move South to cut off the Japanese withdrawal routes.
Slim concocted an elaborate plan to deceive the Japanese. The
Fourteenth Army’s XXXIII Corps – which had been fighting on
the Dimapur-Kohima front and had since been heavily reinforced –
would cross the river near Mandalay, openly and against
opposition, in order to suggest to the Japanese that this was the
main British attack. A dummy IV Corps headquarters, established
to the north of XXXIII Corps, would send and receive fake
messages, creating the illusion that the entire IV Corps was in the
vicinity. In reality, the IV Corps would be moving south under
radio silence; it would cross the Irrawaddy well below Mandalay,
72 Pimlott, 180.
73 Pimlott, 204
Tabbernor 26/36
building its own road through the jungle as it went, and attack the
Japanese rear.
Slim’s plan worked to perfection. Kimura [the Japanese
commander] denuded his commands, including those fighting
Sultan in the north, and massed them to oppose the British on the
Irrawaddy north and west of Mandalay. In the meantime, Slim’s
IV Corps not only had crossed the river to the south, but had done
so with such stealth that Japanese patrols believed the few British
troops they ran up against were no more than a small diversionary
force. By the time Kimura realized that he had the entire British
IV Corps behind him, XXXIII Corps was starting to break out of
the bridgeheads it had established across the Irrawaddy. The
XXXIII Corps now came charging down on Mandalay from the
north meeting only crumbling resistance on the way.74
The operational ruse was successful and Mandalay fell to the British on 20 March
1945. Slim immediately commenced a pursuit of the withdrawing Japanese, hoping to reach Rangoon before the monsoons arrived. The monsoon started on 1 May 1945 with the British still short of Rangoon. Slim ordered a sea landing of 26th Indian Division and a parachute landing by 50th Indian Parachute Brigade to seize Rangoon. Encountering little Japanese resistance, the 26th Indian Division entered Rangoon with ease finally linking up with the other British forces on 5 May 1945.75
74 Moser, Don. China-Burma-India. Alexandria, Virginia: World War II Time Life Books: 1978, 191-192.
75 Pimlott, 204.
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Although the Japanese had suffered a major defeat and had withdrawn behind the
Sittang, The Battle for Burma was not quite done. The last pockets of resistance were flushed out by August 1945.76 The atomic bombs dropped on the Japanese homeland ended all fighting in Burma.
Burma – The Victory – Operational Factors That Contributed to the Victory77
Slim’s and Fourteenth Army’s successes were part of an overall Allied strategic plan for victory in Burma. In examining the operational reasons for success, we will also touch on some aspects outside of Fourteenth Army.
The operational reasons for success can be grouped as follows:
Strategic direction;
Preparation
Sustainment; and
Generalship.
Strategic Direction. The British and their Allies had learned from their disasters in
Burma and elsewhere that an effective campaign could only be conducted if there was adequate guidance for the commanders on the ground. By this time in the war, the Allies had developed a strategy for defeating their enemies, and had put in place an effective command and control organization to implement this direction.
76 It was to take until August 1945 for the last pockets of Japanese forces to be flushed out. By then, the British were actively preparing for operations to liberate Malaya and Singapore, although theses were rendered unnecessary by the Japanese surrender. Pimlott, 204.
77 Slim, 535 –551. The operational factors that contributed to victory are fond in this portion of Slim’s book entitled “Afterthoughts”.
Tabbernor 28/36
In Burma, “[t]he first step towards ultimate victory … was the setting up of a supreme
command controlling all Allied forces, land, sea, and air, in the area.”78 Mountbatten was
made the Supreme Commander in South-East Asia79 and he was able to meld the strengths and weaknesses of the British, Chinese, and Americans into an effective warfighting organization. Mountbatten was also able to overcome the clash of personalities that occurred amongst his strong willed commanders, especially Stilwell and Chiang Kai-shek.80 Under his guidance and direction, Slim and the other commanders in Burma demonstrated proficiency in the operational art by taking his strategic direction and turning it into sound tactical operations to defeat the Japanese.
Preparation. Slim had gone to great lengths to ensure that his forces were better
trained, better disciplined, and better led than were the Japanese. He had impressed upon
his subordinates the importance of taking “… a balanced view of [the Japanese] as a
formidable fighting man, who nevertheless had certain weaknesses, and of [themselves]
as being able with training to beat [the Japanese] at his own, or any other game,….”81
Slim thought his divisions the best in the world. “They would go anywhere, do anything, go on doing it, and do it on very little.”82 As well, Slim and the Army had learned from
78 Slim, 536.
79 In August 1943, the British and United States Governments had formed a new South-East Asia Allied Command to control all forces in Burma, Ceylon, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, Siam and Indo-China. Admiral Mountbatten was appointed Supreme Commander, with, under him, three Commanders-in-Chief (C in C), for Sea, Land, and Air. General Sir George Giffard was to be the land C in C at 11th Army Group, and Slim as Commander of the newly formed Fourteenth Army was to serve under Giffard. Slim, 168
80 Slim, 536.
81 Slim, 539.
82 Slim, 539.
Tabbernor 29/36
the Japanese that it was not necessarily massive numbers of soldiers and equipment that
counted, but training and morale.83
Sustainment. The Army, under Slim’s direction and Snelling’s execution,
dramatically changed the way it sustained itself, from an Army that relied heavily on road
transport, at the expense of mobility, to one that could move anywhere and move quickly
using limited wheeled transportation, pack animals, air transport and their own feet.
“[They] discovered that, instead of the four hundred tons a day not considered excessive
to keep a division fighting in more generous theatres, [they] could maintain [their] Indian
divisions in action for long periods, without loss of battle efficiency or morale, on one
hundred and twenty.”84 This massive reduction in sustainment requirements reduced the
numbers of vehicles on the roads and tracks used by the army. It also improved the
Army’s ability to move quickly.
Slim had realized that to be successful operationally and tactically, he would have
to ensure his operational sustainment. His recognition of this aspect was echoed by John
English in his essay on “The Operational Art: Developments in the Theories of War”, where he stated that “…it is indeed these dimensions as much as sweeping battlefield maneuvers that characterize the operational art….”85 Slim’s Army perfected the aerial
resupply concepts and the procedures for support supplied by the air force. Whether it
was normal resupply to forward air fields or an emergency resupply to an encircled force,
83 Slim, 541
84 Slim, 540.
85 English, John. “The Operational Art: Developments in the Theories of War.” In McKercher, B.J.C. and Hennessy, Michael, A., eds. The Operational Art: Developments in the Theories of War. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996. 19.
Tabbernor 30/36
the techniques they discovered by trail and error would later pass into general use in the
remainder of the British forces.
Generalship. The formations in Burma were required to fight over large distances often beyond support of one another. Slim had to have absolute confidence in his
Generals and they in him. As Slim stated:
My corps and divisions were called upon to act with at least as
much freedom as armies and corps in other theatres. Commanders
at all levels had to act more on their own; they were given greater
latitude to work out their own plans to achieve what they knew was
the Army commander’s intention. In time, they developed to a
marked degree a flexibility of mind and a firmness of decision that
enabled them to act swiftly to take advantage of sudden
information or changing circumstances without reference from
their superiors.86
Slim felt that “[t]his acting without orders, in anticipation of orders, or without
waiting for approval, yet always within the overall intention, must become second nature
in any form of warfare where formations do not fight closely en cadre, and must go down
to the smallest units.”87 He chose “…competent, experienced commanders capable of making high-quality decisions in complex, volatile, ill-defined situations.”88 He took
86 Slim, 542.
87 Slim, 542. Emphasis Slim’s.
88 Halpin, Stanley M. “The Human Dimensions of Battle command: A Behavioral Science Perspective on the Art of Battle Command”. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Research Institute (ARI) Battle Command Task force Report, 1995, 19, 46 as quoted in Reisweber, Major Deborah, US Army. “Battle Command: Will We Have It When We Need It?” Military Review. Vol LXXVII, No. 5. 49.
Tabbernor 31/36
great effort to “…ensure the right people [were] in the right place at the right time to
make critical decisions and lead their forces through the fog of war."89
What the Fourteenth Army had accomplished in Burma was based on the Army’s abilities. It was also based on Slim’s personal abilities as General. Slim was considered a general of administrative genius, a brilliant defensive general, and an offensive commander in the same class as General Patton.90 Slim was a soldier who today would be called a transformational leader.91 He had the ability to inspire his soldiers to excel in
their performance. He was a role model. He was admired and respected by his
subordinates, peers, and superiors. He motivated and challenged his subordinates and
was instrumental in improving their morale. Slim told his soldiers what he expected from
them and they in turn did it. They used their imagination and ingenuity to overcome
hardships and deprivations. Slim knew that his Army was made up of many different
nationalities and races. He accepted this and built his Army on the strengths of this
diversity.92
89 Reisweber, 49.
90 Anderson, 319.
91 Bass, Bernard M. Transformational Leadership: Industrial, Military, and Educational Impact. Mahwah, New Jersey, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., 1998. 2 – 3. In this work, Bass describes two types of leadership, transactional and transformational. A transformational leader is one who does more with his colleagues and followers than set up simple exchanges or agreements. A transformational leader is: one whose leadership is charismatic such that the followers seek to identify with the leaders and emulate them; a leader that inspires the follower with challenge and persuasion providing a meaning and understanding; a leader that intellectually stimulates, expanding the follower’s use of their abilities; and is a leader that is individually considerate, providing the follower with support, mentoring and coaching.
92 Bass, 2 – 6.
Tabbernor 32/36
By way of illustration, in May of 1945, it looked like Slim was going to be
sacked93 by his superior, General Sir Oliver Leese.94 “Over the next two weeks, as news spread throughout Fourteenth Army, a storm of protest erupted. Troops became mutinous, officers threatened to resign, and Leese, who backtracked in embarrassment, found himself dismissed instead.”95
Conclusion
The success of the campaign in Burma was the result of a lot of hard work by all
members of the Allied Forces, by good operational leadership, and good generalship.
Slim had entered the theatre when all seemed lost. He had managed to conduct an
effective withdrawal and save a large part of the British Forces. He was instrumental in
re-building the Army and in commanding it successfully and defeating the Japanese.
Slim’s success was based on his ability to recognize failure and then to implement
measures to overcome the failure as well as his personal attributes as a transformational
leader.
In August 1945, Slim was appointed Commander-in-Chief Allied Land Forces
South East Asia. He was then appointed Commandant of the Imperial Defence College
in 1946 and Chief of the Imperial General Staff in 1948 and subsequently promoted to
93 Sacked = fired.
94 In November 1944, Leese had taken over command from Giffard as land C. in C. at 11th Army Group and as such was Slim’s immediate superior. Anderson, 318 .
95 Anderson, 320.
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Field-Marshal. In May 1953, he was sworn in as Governor-General of Australia. He was made a member of the aristocracy in 1960 and died in 1970 at the age of 79.96
96 Anderson, 322.
Tabbernor 34/36
Annotated List of Works Cited Anderson, Duncan. “Slim.” In Keegan, John, ed. Churchill’s Generals. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1991.298-322. This book examines the British Generals who worked for Prime Minister Churchill during World War II. It is a compendium of chapters, each devoted to a General Officer. Anderson has captured the essence of Slim in his chapter of the same title. This book is well worth reading for those who have an interest in the British portion of World War II.
Bass, Bernard M. Transformational Leadership: Industrial, Military, and Educational Impact. Mahwah, New Jersey, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., 1998. 1-17. This book looks at leadership, what makes an effective leader, and who is a leader. It examines new models of leadership. An interesting book for those interested in the theoretical aspect of leadership
Beckett, Ian. “Wavell.” In Keegan, John, ed. Churchill’s Generals. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1991. 70, 80-81, 87.
This book examines the British Generals who worked for Prime Minister Churchill during World War II. It is a compendium of chapters, each devoted to a General Officer. Beckett has captured the essence of Wavell in his chapter of the same title. This book is well worth reading for those who have an interest in the British portion of World War II.
English, John. “The Operational Art: Developments in the Theories of War.” In McKercher, B.J.C. and Hennessy, Michael, A., eds. The Operational Art: Developments in the Theories of War. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996. 7-27 This essay is found in the book The Operational Art. English’s essay examines the operational art from an intellectual foundation. It is recommended reading for a fundamental understanding of operational art.
Halpin, Stanley M. “The Human Dimensions of Battle command: A Behavioral Science Perspective on the Art of Battle Command”. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Research Institute (ARI) Battle Command Task force Report, 1995, 19, 46.
Halpin was quoted in Reisweber, Major Deborah, US Army. “Battle Command: Will We Have It When We Need It?” Military Review. Vol LXXVII, No. 5. 49.
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Keegan, John, ed. The Rand McNally Encyclopedia of World War II. Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1977.43-44. This Rand McNally publication provides a encyclopedic and alphabetic snapshot of World War II. The portion on Burma is very short but informative.
Lewin, Ronald. Slim The Standardbearer. London: Leo Cooper Ltd., 1990. This book is the official biography of Field-Marshal the Viscount Slim of Yarralumla and Bishopston. The book chronicles the life of Slim, including his pivotal role in Burma. This is an interesting book about a remarkable soldier and a remarkable man. There is little of controversy in this work on Slim.
Montgomery, Bernard L. High Command in War. Germany, June 1945. (Reprinted in Canada in 1946) Montgomery wrote this document for his subordinates. It is an interesting document that looks at senior command in war through the eyes of a great commander.
Moser, Don. China-Burma-India. Alexandria, Virginia: World War II Time Life Books: 1978. This Time Life book looks at the Chin-Burma-India theatre of operations. There are six chapters on different aspects of this theatre plus ten picture essays. Although not a definitive history, it does give a good overview of the theatre.
Pimlott, John. The Historical Atlas of World War II. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1995. 94-95, 130-131, 180-181, 204-205. This atlas of World War II deals with campaigns and battles. It is generously sprinkled with maps and pictures that provide context for the reader. This book provides a good overview of the war.
Reid, Brian Holden, “Alexander.” In Keegan, John, ed. Churchill’s Generals. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1991. 105, 110-111, 129
This book examines the British Generals who worked for Prime Minister Churchill during World War II. It is a compendium of chapters, each devoted to a General Officer. Reid has captured the essence of Alexander in his chapter of the same title. This book is well worth reading for those who have an interest in the British portion of World War II.
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Reisweber, Major Deborah, US Army. “Battle Command: Will We Have It When We Need It?” Military Review. Vol LXXVII, No. 5. 49-58. This is one of a number of articles found on the operational art in the Military Review. Reisweber looks at operational art in the area called ‘Battle Command’. This theoretical study provides some interesting aspects on leadership and operational art.
Slim, Field-Marshal Viscount, GCB, GCMG, GCVD, GBE, DSO, MC. Defeat Into Victory. London: PAPERMAC, 1986. The autobiography of the author during the Burma Campaign. This book is recognized as the best history of the campaign. It also provides insights into Slim as a commander. All officers should read this book for the insights it provides of leadership in war.
CONDUCT OF LAND OPERATIONS – OPERATIONAL DOCTRINE FOR THE CANADIAN ARMY B-GL-300-001/FP-000. National Defence, Canada 1996- 09-15. This publication is the Canadian Army’s cornerstone document on operational doctrine.