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Archived Content Information Archivée Dans Le Archived Content Information identified as archived on the Web is for reference, research or record-keeping purposes. It has not been altered or updated after the date of archiving. Web pages that are archived on the Web are not subject to the Government of Canada Web Standards. As per the Communications Policy of the Government of Canada, you can request alternate formats on the "Contact Us" page. Information archivée dans le Web Information archivée dans le Web à des fins de consultation, de recherche ou de tenue de documents. Cette dernière n’a aucunement été modifiée ni mise à jour depuis sa date de mise en archive. Les pages archivées dans le Web ne sont pas assujetties aux normes qui s’appliquent aux sites Web du gouvernement du Canada. Conformément à la Politique de communication du gouvernement du Canada, vous pouvez demander de recevoir cette information dans tout autre format de rechange à la page « Contactez-nous ». Research Essay GENERAL SLIM’S FAILURE AND SUCCESS IN GENERALSHIP AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL Colonel Dennis C. Tabbernor, CD Advanced Military Studies Course 1 Canadian Forces College November 1998 Tabbernor 2/36 GENERAL SLIM’S FAILURE AND SUCCESS IN GENERALSHIP AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL Preparation for war is an expensive, burdensome business, yet there is one important part of it that costs little – study. However changed and strange the new conditions of war may be, not only generals, but politicians and ordinary citizens, may find there is much to be learned from the past that can be applied to the future and, in their search for it, that some campaigns have more than others foreshadowed the coming pattern of modern war. I believe ours in Burma was one of those. Slim1 Introduction The object of war is to impose one’s own will upon the enemy. Operations or battles to defeat the enemy are carried out by units and formations all working to a strategic goal. The battles are fought, won, or lost by sections, platoons, companies, battalions, brigades, divisions, corps, armies, and army groups. Regardless of the size of the organization involved in the battle, they all have a common element, and that is a superior who issued the orders. Whether the commander is a sergeant or a general, he 1 Slim, Field-Marshal Viscount, GCB, GCMG, GCVD, GBE, DSO, MC. Defeat Into Victory. London: PAPERMAC, 1986. 535. A large number of the footnotes for this paper are taken from Slim’s book. Defeat Into Victory is one of the best written accounts of the Burmese campaign and is recognized as the unofficial history of the British campaign in Burma. During his tenure as Governor General in Australia, while Slim was writing his book, he was in constant contact with the authors of the official British war history of the Burma Campaign. Slim was asked to proof their manuscripts for accuracy. See Lewin, Ronald. Slim The Standardbearer. London: Leo Cooper Ltd., 1990, Chapter 17. Tabbernor 3/36 has to take the orders received from his superior and translate them into orders to be carried out by the soldiers under his command. At the lowest level, it could be as simple as ‘We will do a right flanking’. At the highest level it could be complicated by the addition of political concerns such as ‘In achieving your mission, keep in mind the political sensitivities of our allies’. The skill of translating this strategic direction into meaningful military action at the tactical level is often referred to as the operational art.2 It is the application of the operational art that identifies the good commander, someone who can “… understand the current state of the battlefield, … communicating intent and making the desired end state a reality.”3 A commander who can successfully accomplish this is likely to defeat his enemy. A commander who cannot accomplish this is likely to be defeated. A commander’s understanding of the operational art can be enhanced by the study of war. To paraphrase Slim, the study of war is the cheapest way to understand war. There is a great deal to be learned from the past that is applicable to the future. To examine the reasons for winning and losing at the operational level, World War II provides many theatres of operation and many commanders from which to choose. 2 Canadian doctrine describes operational art as “… the skill of translating strategic direction into operational and tactical action. It is that vital link between the setting of military strategic objectives and the tactical employment of forces on the battlefield through the skilful execution of command at the operational level. … In its simplest expression, operational art determines when, where, and for what purpose major forces will fight. … Using operational art, the commander applies intellect to the situation in order to establish and transmit a vision for the accomplishment of the strategic objective.” CONDUCT OF LAND OPERATIONS – OPERATIONAL DOCTRINE FOR THE CANADIAN ARMY B-GL-300- 001/FP-000. National Defence, Canada 1996-09-15, pages 4-1 to 4-2. 3 Reisweber, Major Deborah, US Army. “Battle Command: Will We Have It When We Need It?” Military Review. Vol LXXVII, No. 5. 49. In her article, Major Reisweber refers to this as Battle Command. Tabbernor 4/36 For the purposes of this paper, the Burma Theatre provides a particularly good setting. From the Allied point of view, it encompassed defeat, victory, joint, and combined operations. Additionally, one commander is present throughout. Slim4 was brought into the Burma Theatre, in March 1942 during the long retreat, and given command of a Corps. He ended the campaign as Allied Land Force Commander, having contributed greatly to the defeat of the Japanese Forces in Burma. Slim’s success in the battle for Burma was based upon his understanding of what had contributed to the initial defeat of the British Forces in Burma, and his application of these lessons in the successful conduct of the subsequent campaign at the operational level. The remainder of this paper will examine Slim’s leadership in the Burma Theatre of Operations from the initial defeat, through the rebuilding of the British Forces, and finally to victory. 4 In 1942, when he was appointed to command what was to become Burma Corps, Slim was an acting Lieutenant-General. He had joined the Birmingham University OTC in 1912 and enrolled in the Army in 1914 for the Great War. He was wounded twice during the War and in 1919, as a temporary Major, transferred from the British to the Indian Army. At the outbreak of World War II, having commanded the 2/7th Gurkhas, he was promoted Brigadier in command of 10 Indian Brigade. He was wounded in Eritrea in operations against the Italians and evacuated to India. In June 1941 he was promoted acting Major- General and commanded a division in operations in Iraq, Syria and Iran. He had not been a particularly spectacular commander, achieving only limited successes in these commands, however the campaigns provided him experience and seasoning which he brought with him to Burma. For a short over view of Slim’s life, please see Anderson, Duncan. “Slim.” In Keegan, John, ed. Churchill’s Generals. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1991. Tabbernor 5/36 Burma – The Defeat – An Historical Overview56 Not long after the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, the armies of the Japanese Empire began their invasion of Burma. On 16 December 1941, they crossed into Burma from Thailand and shortly thereafter captured an important airfield at Victoria Point. Using the airfield as a base of operations, the Japanese 15th Army pushed Northward. Their objectives were to: sever the Burma Road supply route to China; seize Mandalay; threaten the Eastern states of India: cut British links between India and Malaya; isolate the Chinese Nationalist Forces of Chiang Kai-shek from their allies; secure the Burmese oil fields;7 and destroy the British forces.8 Their long-term plan called for the establishment of a firm base in Burma for the invasion of India. 5 Pimlott, John. The Historical Atlas of World War II. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1995. The information for this part has been taken almost exclusively from this reference. 94. 6 See map at end of paper. 7 Pimlott, 94. 8 Slim, 118. Tabbernor 6/36 Two British Divisions (1st Burma and 17th Indian) under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Hutton9 defended against the advances of the Japanese 15th Army. The 17th Division was trained for desert warfare and the “… 1st Burma Division was made up of three brigades which had no collective training and which were short of artillery, engineers and transport. The forces were extremely short of aircraft....”10 11 Their overall standards of training were mediocre and no match for the tactics employed by the Japanese. Their equipment was poor and they were heavily reliant on the Burmese road system. Although plans were developed for a strategic withdrawal to a defensible line behind the Sittang River, the senior commander, General Archibald Wavell12, “… would not allow this claiming it would destroy morale.”13 When the Japanese commenced their offensive, panic broke out amongst the defenders. The 17th Indian Division was poorly deployed to meet the onslaught and gradually withdrew behind the Sittang River. Disaster after disaster occurred. The single bridge across the Sittang was ordered destroyed by the commander 17th Division, Major- General J.G. Smyth, as the 48th Brigade was crossing it “… leaving two-thirds of the 9 Hutton was Commander, Army in Burma. Slim, 10. 10 Keegan, John, ed. The Rand McNally Encyclopedia of World War II.
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