Section I Huitong Bridge

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Section I Huitong Bridge Songshan Counterattack By Mr. Zhu Dan Zhu Dan: This part will be in my book “The War Fought Against Japanese in Nujiang Valley”. Section I Huitong Bridge In May 20, 1942, 赤松寿源, Japanese senior captain, the division commander of the 56th had already commanded his army to chase Chinese Expeditionary Force up to Long Ling, a county in west of Yunnan province. May 4, they were at the west side of Nujiang, (怒 江)a big river with strong current(see photos). At that time, only one bridge named “HuiTong” (惠通) was suspended by wire ropes on Nujiang’s banks. Some of Japanese soldiers had already passed through the bridge to the east side of Nujiang by dressing as Chinese refugees. If Japanese major army did so, they would easily have attacked key cities such as Baoshan, Xiaguan and finally up to Kunming, the capital of Yunnan province. Kunming was so closed to Chongqing, the second capital of Chiang, Kai-shek government since the former capital Nanjing had already fell in 1939. If that happened, China would be over, and Japan would be able to control Asia. Huitong Bridge therefore was crucial at that time. Actually, when Chinese Expeditionary Force retreated from Burma to Longling, Ma Chongliu, an engineer chief of staff had already told Zhang Zuwu, a platoon commander of the HuiTong bridge’s guarders that they must blow up the bridge before Japanese came to it. History sometimes likes to joke. At that day, a truck went backwards to Tengchong county to carry marijuana for Long Shenwu, the third son of Long Yun who was the governor of Yunnan province. Because first, Huitong could only allowed empty truck to pass, so all trucks must be unloaded first, then it had to wait for labor-carry to another side and reloaded. Second, the truck went backwards against all Chinese soldiers and refugees, therefore the guarders of the Huitong bridge were very angry, and they argued vexed with the driver of the truck. The truck driver off cause couldn’t be convinced. Bustup was last for while. A platoon commander named Zhang, Zuwu let the guarders to push the truck down into the river. The driver was so angry that he beat the Zhang. Zhang was not an easy guy at all, especially at that moment. He immediately pulled out his gun and fired to the sky by the first two bullets, then he killed the truck driver by the third one. At the west side, Japanese who lie in wait for passing heard the gun, they thought that they might exposure to Chinese army, so they fired to the east side. This made Zhang, Zuwu suddenly realized Japanese’s intention. Immediately, Hong…..! he commanded to blow up the Huitong bridge. Japanese finally were blocked at the west side of Nujiang. Even though they tried many times in many ways to rebuilt a float bridge, all their attempts were washed into river by Nujiang’s onflow. (Photos) Section II Songshan Campaign Japanese occupied Songshan since they couldn’t reach the east side of Nujiang. Songshang ( 松 ⼭)means “pine tree mountain” in Chinese. It was an about 2000 meters high steeper mountain in west side of Nujiang, and one could overlook that Burma Road was pass through the mountain. Songshan held more than 10 sq. km. However, Japanese constructed a system of semi-permanent fortifications on the mountain for a long-term adhesion. They also constructed semi-permanent fortifications at another three different net positions: Gunlongpo, Dazhai, and Changlingan. These four major bastions together could form a completed commanding offensive-defensive system . Therefore, Japanese could easily control their lifeline – Burma Road, so west Yunnan’s battle field and southwest of Asia. (Photo of the Songshan’s peak) Songshang was guarded by Japanese’s 113 combine force. The commander named: 松井秀志 113 combine force had about 1200 soldiers garrisoned on Songshan. Their commander was ⾦光惠次郎, a second lieutenant whose previous major was mine exploitation. 113th combine force belonged to 赤松寿源 56th division, Since most soldiers in 56th division were previous miners from northern Japan (北海道), they were well experienced sappers and very good in such kind of life. They built a very strong three levels sap systems by using Shongshan’s high quality pine trees: the upper level was for fight, the middle one was for live and the lower was magazines. They also grew plants on the top, so it was very difficult to find them even one closed to there. All these works were done not by Japanese but by Chinese refugees and prisoners. After that, Japanese killed all of them by testing dead angles of fire. ⾦光惠次郎, the second lieutenant of Songshan garrisoned who wore a glass, looked like a gentle undergraduated student, but later he created a military wonder in Songshan campaign. (Photos of Japanese offensive-defensive net work system) In May 1944, Chinese the 28th and 39th divisions had increased soldiers and reorganized as the 11th (division commander Song, Xilian ), and the 20th (division commander Hou, Guizhang) army groups total about 160,000 soldiers for counterattack. Gaoligongshan was a big group of mountain, in which Burma Road extended to Burma. Actually, at the beginning, Chinese army wanted to attack Japanese in those major passes on Gaoligongshan. But because Japanese spy hided in Chinese army’s high position, Chinese army found its first military plan from a dead Japanese senior captain. Song, Xilian was so angry that he cursed the unknown spy for three days in the headquarter of the 11th army group, and they had to change their first plan. Since only 1200 Japanese garrisoned Songshan, Japanese sent the main force to each major pass in Gaoligongshan. Chinese army then decided to attack Songshan instead. The 11th army group started attack Songshan from left. The right wing, which was the 20th army group forced to cross Nujiang from Lichaiba to Sanjiankou, on about 30 km’s river surface. Japanese did not fight with the right wing. They intended to destroy Chinese later after they came to the west side of Nujiang, so that Chinese had no way to retreat. Chinese the 103th, 87th and 88th divisions attacked Longling heavily, and mean while the28th and 39th divisions quickly occupied an area between Longling and Songshan named “Daba”. They built an airbase in Daba for American Volunteer Group (AVG), also called the “flying tigers”, which was organized by retired Army Air Forces Col. Claire L. Chennault. Therefore, the “flying tigers” could help the campaign, and Chinese army would not win without it. Japanese did not think that Chinese would attack Longling, where was Japanese army’s logistic base. When Chinese 87th division fought for the last blockhouse, the sun set back to Gaoligongshan’s wavy line. The commander of the 11th army group, Song, Xilian telegraphed to Chongqing, told that they could capture Longling next morning. Chiang, Kai-shek was very happy and he even held a small cocktail party to announce the good news. Might be his cocktail had not over yet, when Japanese soon asked about 2000 source of soldiers to succor Longling, Chinese army lost a key bridge called “Longjiang” bridge, so that Japanese succors were able to fight at the back with Chinese 87th division. Longling was seized back by Japanese. Though both side continually fought furiously for Longling, after Japanese’ third attack, Chinese had to retreat to Daba, where Japanese would not dare to attack because of “flying tiger” s protection. In 1944, Japanese had lost their control in west Yunnan’s sky. Chiang Kai-shek was angry with Song, Xilian and dismiss him from his post. He let Hou, Guizhang commanded Tengchong attack. Chinese army besieged about 4800~5000 Japanese. Aided by “flying tigger” s violently bombing, Japanese the 148th combine force who garrisoned Tongchong county, fought to about 200 soldiers. Finally, they had to retreat to Gaoligongshan. Sooner or later, they were all killed by Chinese civilians. Chinese army had a big casualty too. Yet, 19 Allies’ soldiers lost their lives in Tengchong counterattack. Their ashes were brought back to their motherland. However, the government of Tengchong county built a monument for them in Tengchong Martyr Cemetery. We went to take photo for each of them, and we will never forget them; the Chinese will never forget them. At that time, Chinese the 28th and the 39th divisions besieged Songshan, and mean while they rushed to repair Huitong bridge. However, depended on their very well constructed and extremely strong works, many times, Japanese beat off Chinese army. Sometimes, only a few Japanese soldiers hided inside the works could block a whole battalion’s attack. After one and half months, Chinese army only captured Zhuzipo and Yindunshan. These two were still far from the main battle field --- peak of Songshan, and they had already lost their ability of attack. Chiang Kai-shek was very suspenseful and angry. He thought that Chinese army had “flying tiger” s bombing in the air, and most trees were fired over near the peak; the civilian supported on the ground, how could the campaign was so difficult? He gave a deadline to the 28th and 39th that they must capture Songshan no later than September 7, 1944. However, what could Chinese army do? The main peak was so high and steeper. They must capture it, or otherwise, there was no any other way for Chinese army to set up their firepower control to the rest of areas. With a very well constructed offensive-defensive net work system, Japanese would easily destroy their enemy. But, hundreds of Chinese cannons could not fire their works, even “flying tiger” s 500 b.
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