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Professor Yuen Yuen Ang Design a Module Date: 23 April 2020 Hanna 1 Global China (Winter 2020) Instructor: Professor Yuen Yuen Ang Design a Module Date: 23 April 2020 Studying the US-China Military Climate: From Nuclear Proliferation to the South China Sea By Douglas Hanna Poll 1. How do you think the US and China compare in nuclear capabilities? a. Major US advantage b. Slight US advantage c. Equal d. Slight Chinese advantage e. Major Chinese advantage 2. Based on what you know, how would you describe the current military relations between the US and China? a. Peaceful b. Peaceful in actions, some aggressive rhetoric c. Both some aggressive rhetoric and aggressive actions d. On the verge of war 3. On a scale of 1-10, how destructive do you feel any armed conflict between the US and China would become? Frequently Asked Questions What, if any, military tensions or events have occurred recently between the US and China? How comparable is China’s military force to the United States? What is the status of China’s nuclear program? What are China’s motivations in the South China Sea? Backgrounder On April 1, 2001, a US Navy EP-3 intelligence aircraft flying in waters off the coast of Hainan Island collided with a Chinese fighter jet in mid-air. The Chinese pilot was killed due to Hanna 2 complications with the ejection seat and the US aircraft was forced to emergency land either on water or on Hainan Island, which is Chinese territory. The crew chose the island, and the aftermath led to an 11-day standoff between both governments who each fostered different variations of the story. Though China held separate views, the US remained firm that the P-3 was flying in purely international waters and that the Chinese jet was performing dangerous aerobatic maneuvers around the intelligence plane1. Until tension finally thawed out, the American aircrew had been detained by Chinese authorities. This event proved a precursor to a continuing growth in China’s military might and increase in run-ins with US forces. US-China military relations is a topic that holds vast importance in world affairs and the average American may be surprised to find how much tension has already taken place, especially in the past several years. Though normal citizens might not be preoccupied with military movements across the world in the South China Sea or the development of the Chinese army, there are countless men and women across the globe with military or political roles who pay close attention to such events, and it is certainly worthwhile for others as well to understand the true status and magnitude of these tensions. There are a number of crucial categories to consider and understand in military action between the two great powers including China’s ideological background, the gradual build-up of Chinese forces and weapons, actual events that have taken place, rhetoric from each side, and military propaganda releases. When looking into the affairs of Chinese history, it is clear that a strong PRC military has been an eventuality emerging from a history of ideological lessons and tradition. In the 1940s, for instance, when the CCP faced both KMT opposition and foreign invasion from Japan, the party learned several valuable lessons that would become mainstays for future leaders. One of these lessons was that international affairs are about raw power, wealth, military might, and modernization2. Fast forward to President Xi’s rise to power and the same principles are still being ever promoted. According to Elizabeth Economy, Xi’s “third revolution” has a clear focus on international political, economic, and security presence3. He has a vision in being able to fight and win wars if it becomes necessary4. The build-up of China’s forces has been gradual but consistent. In 2007, China increased military spending by 18% to more than 45 billion dollars, a move that Vice President Cheney accused as being quite contrary to Chinese narratives of a peaceful rise5. Even before ’07, since 1990 in fact, the PRC enacted an average 15% yearly increase on defense spending6. For a more concrete understanding on the real status of Chinese military power, here is a portion of a study done by the think tank RAND that gives a “military scorecard” comparing the US military to China7. Hanna 3 The study evaluates two different military scenarios, one being closer to mainland China at the Taiwan Strait, the other being located at the more distant Spratly Islands. As you can see, especially in the scenario taking place closer to the Chinese mainland, there is an increasing level of parity between our forces by 2017. Still, the US clearly holds the advantage overall, notably in nuclear power, in which they dwarf China about 13 to 1. That being said, the level of “medium confidence” now granted to the Chinese nuclear arsenal is a result of “survivable second-strike capability” according to RAND, which simply means China is now more able to strike back effectively in the event of a nuclear attack from the US. This also means the US has objectively less incentive to attack with nuclear power in the first place since there is a high risk of danger from retaliation. Overall, while the scorecard is not necessarily definitive and war is a complicated subject dealing with many different fronts, this study sends a crucial signal to the global community. The parity shown here is evidence that any source of mass armed conflict between the United States and China would prove to be a devastating affair that would certainly cause major destruction before deescalating. If this study sparked your interest or you have more clarification questions, I highly Hanna 4 recommend accessing the link below to the RAND website for a more thorough analysis of each category. Reflecting China’s increasing military build-up are the recent events that have continued to extenuate tensions between the US and PRC, namely in the South China Sea. Lately the United States has been conducting various Naval operations in the sea called freedom of navigation operations or “FONOPS.8” These FONOPS are in response to China making major land claims in the region that have conflicted with surrounding countries including Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia9. Such claims are both in search of natural resources and in pursuit of building military installations that include locations like Woody, Paracel, and Spratly islands. Recently, as of April 2020, US ships have once again entered the waters of the South China Sea accompanied by Australian vessels in a joint exercise.10 In the heat of the coronavirus pandemic, Australia and others are wary that China might see the world distraction as an opportunity to quietly expand farther and farther into disputed territory11. From China’s point of view, they are disputing whether American military assets and intelligence planes (such as the new P-8 Poseidon aircraft, a successor to the old P-3) are allowed to fly unimpeded through the waters of the South China Sea. The US response here remains firm that it has the right to secure a peaceful and fair climate in the sea and protect surrounding nations from Chinese expansion. It is easy to see some of the parallels of these tensions to the 2001 dispute at Hainan Island, however the current affairs in the South China Sea are on a much greater and potentially dangerous scale. Perhaps even more concerning than the military events near Chinese territory is the rhetoric that has been exchanged between both sides. Even apart from the shots fired back and forth between President Trump and the Chinese government, military leaders from each side have continued to use inflammatory rhetoric on various defense issues. One example of rhetoric from China came in June 2019 when the defense minister Wei Fenghe warned of military action if Taiwan or any claims in the South China Sea were jeopardized12. From the US side, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper accused China in November of 2019 of intimidating smaller Asian nations and encouraged countries like Vietnam to stand firm and push back against Chinese influence13. A month later, Esper also expressed his wishes to move more troops out of Afghanistan in favor of stationing them in the Indo-Pacific region where he believes the greatest challenge exists14. The final and possibly the most intriguing subject to evaluate is military propaganda and national feeling in both the United States and lesser understood China. For more on this section, I have included an exercise below with links to military videos from each country. These are definitely eye-opening understandings of the governments’ promotional strategies on both sides. But looking more deeply, they are also important reminders of the real emotions and sacrifice made on a more individual level by each soldier, sailor, Marine, and their families, not only in the US but in China as well. Hanna 5 Video Clips Video #1 – “I am a Chinese Soldier” on CCTV (via the National Interest) https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/watch-chinas-military-just-released-new-video-showing- its-most-powerful-weapons-28267 *Scroll past the National Interest video to the second and smaller window below it which will include the CCTV video* To think about: • First, read the transcript at the bottom of the article that lists out the Chinese subtitles translated in English. o “Peace behind me, war in front of me”: suggesting future conflict? o “I am the guardian of a good life”: similar message to the American view of the military as standing up to protect our freedom and way of life? Video #2 – “A Nation’s Call” by US Marine Corps Recruiting https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wMqmP5C5WHI To think about: • This is a comparison to the second part of China’s video, a showcase of strength.
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