Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, ID: 11033141, DktEntry: 17-3, Page 1 of 232

Case No. 18-55717

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

MICHELLE FLANAGAN, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

XAVIER BECERRA, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California (CV 16-06164-JAK-AS)

APPELLANTS’ EXCERPTS OF RECORD VOLUME III OF X

C. D. Michel Paul D. Clement Sean A. Brady Counsel of Record Anna M. Barvir Erin E. Murphy MICHEL & ASSOCIATES, P.C. KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP 180 East Ocean Blvd., Suite 200 655 Fifteenth Street, NW Long Beach, CA 90802 Washington, DC 20005 (562) 216-4444 (202) 879-5000 [email protected] [email protected]

Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellants

October 2, 2018

Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, ID: 11033141, DktEntry: 17-3, Page 2 of 232

INDEX TO APPELLANTS’ EXCERPTS OF RECORD

VOLUME I Dkt Date Document Description Page 104 06.12.18 Amended Judgment 1 81 05.07.18 Ruling Re Plaintiffs’ and Defendant’s Motions for 3 Summary Judgment 80 05.07.18 Order Ruling on Plaintiffs’ Objections to the 15 Declaration of P. Patty Li & Evidence Submitted in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 59) 39 02.23.17 Order re Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint 34 for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

VOLUME II 105 06.15.18 Plaintiffs’ Amended Notice of Appeal and 42 Representation Statement 100 06.04.18 Plaintiffs’ Notice of Appeal and Representation 47 Statement 99 05.24.18 Judgment 52 82 05.14.18 Plaintiffs’ Objection to Defendant’s Proposed 54 Judgment 79 05.07.18 Order Ruling on Defendant’s Objections to Certain 58 Other Evidence Filed in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 66) 78 05.07.18 Order Ruling on Defendant’s Amended Objections to 63 Certain Evidence Filed in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 60) 75 11.13.17 Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Brief Re Summary Judgment 67 Standard for Competing Expert Evidence on Constitutional Questions 72-2 11.09.17 Notice of Errata: Defendant’s Amended Objections 73 to Evidence Filed in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

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Dkt Date Document Description Page 104 06.12.18 Amended Judgment 1 66 10.16.17 Defendant’s Objections to Evidence Submitted by 79 Plaintiffs in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment 64 10.16.17 Plaintiffs’ Request for Judicial Notice in Support of 88 Reply to Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment; Declaration of Anna M. Barvir; Exhibits 11-12 63-1 10.16.17 Declaration of John J. Donohue III Re Defendant’s 97 Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 63-2 10.16.17 Declaration of Jonathan M. Eisenberg Re Defendant’s 133 Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 63-3 10.16.17 Exhibit 1 to the Declaration of Jonathan M. 136 Eisenberg 63-4 10.16.17 Exhibit 2 to the Declaration of Jonathan M. 249 Eisenberg

VOLUME III 63-5 10.16.17 Exhibit 3 to the Declaration of Jonathan M. 330 Eisenberg 63-6 10.16.17 Exhibit 4 to the Declaration of Jonathan M. 408 Eisenberg 63-7 10.16.17 Exhibit 5 to the Declaration of Jonathan M. 421 Eisenberg 63-8 10.16.17 Exhibit 6 to the Declaration of Jonathan M. 450 Eisenberg 63-9 10.16.17 Notice of Amendment to Cal. Penal Code § 26400 472 60 10.03.17 Defendant’s Amended Objections to Evidence Filed 474 in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment 59 10.02.17 Plaintiffs’ Objections to the Declaration of P. Patty Li 480 & Evidence Submitted in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

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Dkt Date Document Description Page 59-1 10.02.17 Exhibit 1 to Plaintiffs’ Objections to the Declaration 500 of P. Patty Li & Evidence Submitted in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment 59-2 10.02.17 Exhibit 2 to Plaintiffs’ Objections to the Declaration 504 of P. Patty Li & Evidence Submitted in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

VOLUME IV 59-3 10.02.17 Part 1 of Exhibit 3 to Plaintiffs’ Objections to the 555 Declaration of P. Patty Li & Evidence Submitted in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

VOLUME V 59-3 10.02.17 Part 2 of Exhibit 3 to Plaintiffs’ Objections to the 786 Declaration of P. Patty Li & Evidence Submitted in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment 59-4 10.02.17 Exhibit 4 to Plaintiffs’ Objections to the Declaration 853 of P. Patty Li & Evidence Submitted in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment 58-1 10.02.17 Plaintiffs’ Additional Uncontroverted Facts & 1047 Conclusions of Law 57 10.02.17 Excerpts of Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s 1055 Motion for Summary Judgment on Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

VOLUME VI 57-1 10.02.17 Declaration of Sean A. Brady in Support of Plaintiffs’ 1066 Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment; Exhibits 1-8 56 10.02.17 Defendant’s Objections to Evidence Filed in Support 1333 of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment

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Dkt Date Document Description Page 50 09.11.17 Plaintiffs’ Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and 1337 Conclusions of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment

VOLUME VII 49 09.11.17 Plaintiffs’ Request for Judicial Notice in Support of 1349 Motion for Summary Judgment; Declaration of Anna M. Barvir in Support; Exhibits 8-10 48-1 09.11.17 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 1366 Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment 48-7 09.11.17 Declaration of Sean A. Brady in Support of Plaintiffs’ 1368 Motion for Summary Judgment 48-6 09.11.17 Declaration of Rick Travis in Support of Plaintiffs’ 1455 Motion for Summary Judgment 48-5 09.11.17 Declaration of Jacob Perkio in Support of Plaintiffs’ 1459 Motion for Summary Judgment 48-4 09.11.17 Declaration of Dominic Nardone in Support of 1465 Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment 48-3 09.11.17 Declaration of Samuel Golden in Support of 1471 Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment 48-2 09.11.17 Declaration of Michelle Flanagan in Support of 1475 Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment 46 09.11.17 Defendant’s Uncontroverted Facts and Conclusions 1481 of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment 45-15 09.11.17 Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice in Support of 1487 Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment 45-16 09.11.17 Exhibit 1 to Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice 1491 45-17 09.11.17 Exhibit 2 to Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice 1550

VOLUME VIII 45-18 09.11.17 Exhibit 3 and Part 1 of Exhibit 4 to Defendant’s 1624 Request for Judicial Notice

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Dkt Date Document Description Page 45-19 09.11.17 Part 2 of Exhibit 4 to Defendant’s Request for 1664 Judicial Notice 45-1 09.11.17 Declaration of P. Patty Li in Support of Defendant’s 1699 Motion for Summary Judgment 45-2 09.11.17 Exhibit 1 to the Declaration of P. Patty Li 1702 45-3 09.11.17 Exhibit 2 to the Declaration of P. Patty Li 1709 45-4 09.11.17 Exhibit 3 to the Declaration of P. Patty Li 1718 45-5 09.11.17 Exhibit 4 to the Declaration of P. Patty Li 1725 45-6 09.11.17 Exhibit 5 to the Declaration of P. Patty Li 1804 45-7 09.11.17 Exhibit 6 to the Declaration of P. Patty Li 1862

VOLUME IX 45-8 09.11.17 Exhibit 7 to the Declaration of P. Patty Li 1876 45-9 09.11.17 Part 1 of Exhibit 8 to the Declaration of P. Patty Li 1927 45-10 09.11.17 Part 2 of Exhibit 8 to the Declaration of P. Patty Li 1961 45-11 09.11.17 Part 1 of Exhibit 9 to the Declaration of P. Patty Li 2012 45-12 09.11.17 Part 2 of Exhibit 9 to the Declaration of P. Patty Li 2059 45-13 09.11.17 Exhibit 10 to the Declaration of P. Patty Li 2115 45-14 09.11.17 Exhibit 11 to the Declaration of P. Patty Li 2128

VOLUME X 40 03.08.17 Answer of Defendant (Kamala D. Harris) to 2161 Complaint 31 12.01.16 Excerpts of Plaintiffs’ Omnibus Opposition to 2184 Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Complaint 1 08.17.16 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief 2195 ** 09.27.18 District Court Docket 2216

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4 Eisenberg Deel. Ex. 3 -004

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MICHELLE FLANAGAN vs CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL XAVIER BECERRA Kleck, Gaiy

10

11 EXAMINATION

12 BY MR. EISENBERG:

13 Q Good morning. Please state your name for the

14 record.

15 A Gary Kleck.

16 Q Do you have a name that's preferred to go by

17 such as Mr. Kleck, Professor Kleck, Gary?

18 A Professor Kleck.

19 Q All right. I will refer to you that way. I'm

20 Jonathan Eisenberg. I'm a Deputy Attorney General for

21 the State of California. We're here, as I believe you

22 know, for the deposition of Flanagan v. Becerra case. I

23 wanted to present the first exhibit which has been

24 premarked, which is a deposition notice and ask you just

25 a couple of questions about it, and then I'll go over

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MICHELLE FLANAGAN vs CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL XAVIER BECERRA Kleck, Gary

1 first year that you testified as an expert witness?

2 A 1983.

6 Q You're aware of course that -- I think what you

7 called the Great American Gun Debate, that there is a

8 side that's sort of known as the gun control or anti-gun

9 side and another side that's known as the pro-gun side, 10 so to speak? You're aware of those terms?

11 A Yes.

12 Q Have you testified for the gun control or 13 so-called anti-gun side in any of the 14 cases? 14 MR. BRADY: Objection; calls for speculation, is 15 vague as to •gun control side.'' 16 THE WITNESS: No.

17 BY MR. EISENBERG:

18 Q Have you ever given testimony in litigation that 19 was in favor of a gun law becoming more restrictive? 20 A Can you repeat the question, please?

21 Q Okay. Have you ever testified in litigation 22 about a gun law -- sorry in support of a gun law

23 becoming more restrictive?

24 A No.

25 Q Other than at today's deposition, you're being

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1 years that you understood the organization to be

2 advocating for more restrictive firearm laws?

3 A Yes.

4 Q And was that one of the reasons that you were a

5 member of Common Cause?

6 MR. BRADY: Objection; right to privacy.

7 THE WITNESS: No.

8 BY MR. EISENBERG:

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MICHELLE FLANAGAN vs CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL XAVIER BECERRA Kleck, Gary

19 MR. BRADY: Object- -- well -­ 20 BY MR. EISENBERG:

21 Q Have you written any other papers that were 22 published where Kovandzic was a coauthor; in other words,

23 things not listed here, but they do exist?

24 A None that come to mind right now prior to 2007.

25 Q Have you served as an editor on any of any

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1 A Yes.

2 Q The competition of the group of researchers

3 changes from article to article; correct?

4 A Usually.

5 Q Is there any journal in this field where the

6 reviewers are always the same people?

7 A Not to my knowledge.

21 Q And do you have an opinion on the quality of 22 peer reviewing in statistics journals?

23 A No.

24 Q All right. I'd like to direct you to page six 25 of your rebuttal report in the -- I'm going to be just

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MICHELLE FLANAGAN vs CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL XAVIER BECERRA Kleck, Gary

1 injury is something short of death?

2 MR. BRADY: Objection.

3 BY MR. EISENBERG:

4 Q Do you understand my question?

5 MR. BRADY: Objection; calls for speculation,

6 confusing, compound.

7 THE WITNESS: I do understand it.

8 BY MR. EISENBERG:

9 Q Please answer it.

10 A No, it does not increase the violence generally.

11 Q When you said a moment ago that it increases the 12 lethality of violence across the board, what were you 13 referring to by "across the board"?

14 A I meant the entire category of violent attacks 15 without respect to the intent of the aggressor, which is 16 what your question had specifically pertained to.

24 MR. BRADY: Objection; assumes facts not in evidence.

25 THE WITNESS: No.

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1 BY MR. EISENBERG:

2 Q Have you heard or been informed of anything to

3 that effect?

4 A He had done an earlier study in which he did

5 that and I was aware of that earlier study.

6 Q Are you referring to the 2014 study where .the

7 person named Aneja is the lead author?

8 A Yes.

18 Q And if the results that came out showed at a

19 level of statistical significance that aggravated 20 assaults went up uniformly across the models studied, 21 et cetera, would you consider that to be valid evidence

22 that right-to-carry laws lead to increases in aggravated

23 assaults? 24 MR. BRADY: Objection; incomplete hypothetical,

25 assumes facts not in evidence, confusing, compound.

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1 diligence in writing out those reports?

2 MR. BRADY: Objection; calls for speculation,

3 incomplete hypothetical, beyond the scope of what the

4 witness was called to testify about.

5 THE WITNESS: That's certainly possible, but of

6 course it would apply to data aggregated up to any level.

7 I mean, ,it's the point of origin. It's the data as they

8 originally gathered any police-based crime statistics.

9 BY MR. EISENBERG:

10 Q So why again is county data less accurate in

11 your mind?

12 A Because you can have entire local agencies that 13 fail to report their crime statistics and thus get, you

14 know, grossly understated numbers of crimes reported to 15 the police simply as an artificial product of this

16 failure of the agency to submit Uniform Crime Reports to

17 the FBI or rather technically to the state Uniform Crime

18 Reporting agency.

19 Q Which then goes up to the FBI crime report?

20 A Correct.

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11 Q Have you criticized John Lott for doing studies 12 involving crime data where the crime is this county crime

13 data that you've described as inaccurate?

14 A Yes, although I'm not sure if it's in a 15 published report of any kind. I couldn't swear to that. 16 Certainly I've made the oral comments at professional 17 meetings, noting this same problem, and I even had the.

18 conversations directly with Professor Lott saying exactly

19 that, that the county-level data are problematic for that

20 reason.

21 Q Have you ever said words to the effect that no

22 credible criminologist believes that the data shows that

23 increasing the number of guns that people are carrying

24 has the effect of reducing crime?

25 A No, I don't recall significant saying anything

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MICHELLE FLANAGAN vs CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL XAVIER BECERRA Kleck, Gary

1 that are so seriously flawed, no conclusion at all can be

2 derived.

3 Q Would you say that in the Donohue study, which

4 is Exhibit 3 here, that the data is so bad that the

5 studies aren't even worth being done on that data?

6 A For aggravated assault, yes; and to the extent

7 that aggravated assault constitutes most of the violent

8 crime rate as he refers to it, yes. I think there is

9 little to be gained by analyzing that crime.

19 Q Is that a view that you've held for a long time,

20 let's say at least ten years?

21 A Yes.

22 Q Okay. Have you ever said words to the effect 23 of, Do I know of anybody who specifically believes with

24 more guns there are less crimes and they're a credible

25 criminologist? No.

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MICHELLE FLANAGAN vs CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL XAVIER BECERRA Kleck, Gary

1 (Exhibit 6 was marked for identification by. 2 the Certified Shorthand Reporter and is attached

3 hereto.)

4 BY MR. EISENBERG:

5 Q Wow. Your stack is all neat. My stack is a

6 mess. Have you ever seen this report before?

7 A Yes.

14 Q Now, what makes this study the best available 15 study on this topic?

16 A It relies on city-level data and thus is not 17 subject to the problem of crime counts being aggregated 18 up inappropriately. The crime counts are based on what a 19 single agency counted up; that is, the local city police.

20 Q And do you think that source of data is more 21 accurate than the state-level data? 22 A· Almost certainly, because even with the 23 state-level data, there's a problem with aggregating up 24 to the state level because even the FBI has to estimate 25 the effect of missing or nonreporting agencies and it is

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1 adjustment for missing nonreporting agencies.

2 Q And that adjustment's done by the FBI?

3 A Yes.

4 Q And so the FBI-adjusted data that you're

5 referring to, is it less accurate than city-level data as

6 used in the Kovandzic report here?

7 A It's necessarily subject to additional sources

8 of error because it's -- there's error in the estimation

9 process.

10 Q Are there any other -- strike that.

11 Is the city-level data more reliable, therefore, 12 than the FBI-adjusted state data?

13 A Yes.

18 .Q And is this

19 A Although if you want to quibble about·the

20 distinction between "no" and 11 little, 11 I guess, you know, 21 the way they phrase it is that there's little support for 22 that proposition.

23 Q What's the difference between "little" and "no"

24 there in a --

25 A They're being careful when they say "little"

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1 because there is hundreds of ways you can analyze a body

2 of data and some of the ways you analyze it might be

3 better than others, although you don't always know for

4 sure which way those are and they can yield different

5 results not necessarily because, you know, you're

6 studying different phenomena, but rather you're studying

7 it in different ways, some of which are better than

8 others, and so you get a variation in results, and

9 Kovandzic, Marvell, and Vieraitis are careful researchers 10 in that they at least concede that some ways of

11 impacting the right-to-carry laws indicate some 12 impact.

13 Q Is that true for any specific categories of 14 crimes?

15 A Is what true? That findings can vary because of 16 different methods being used?

17 Q Let me -- let me strike the question and 18 rephrase it.

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10 Q Do you understand that that statement about the 11 significance at the statistically significant level for 12 aggravated assault is contradicted by other data that's 13 reported in the same study?

14 A Could you repeat the question?

15 Q Okay. So let me rephrase. Earlier, I believe 16 you said that the Kovandzic study gets some results that 17 are statistically significant for aggravated assault but 18 other results where there's no statistical significance 19 for aggravated assault; correct?

20 A Correct.

21 Q So where in the study is the -- are the results 22 that show no statistically significant relationship 23 between shall-issue laws and aggravated assault?

24 A Well, the summary of all of the findings is in 25 Table 3. So that's a whole bunch of different estimates

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1 BY MR. EISENBERG:

2. Q So do you remember the question?

3 A Yes.

4 Q Okay. Are you able to answer?

5 A I have no position on it. I don't think there's

6 any relevant empirical evidence on it, so I have no

7 direct basis for an opinion.

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19 Q Couldn't you say then that what the scholars 20 have done is just gathered anecdotes on that topic? 21 MR. BRADY: Objection; argumentative. 22 THE WITNESS: I guess I really don't understand the

23 intent of the question. I mean, it's information 24 gathered by asking police officers what they think and

25 police officers telling them what they think. It's --

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1 used to generate that result?

2 A I haven't addressed it because it was just a

3 side issue.

21 BY MR. EISENBERG:

22 Q If you believed otherwise about the effect of 23 police strength on crime rates, wouldn't your answer have

24 to be different?

25 A Are you saying

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1 Q So as a scholar, you would think if I am doing 2 an analysis of the effect of what we'll call either shall

3 issue or right-to-carry laws on violent crimes in a city,

4 you would come up with one set of control variables, but

5 it wouldn't necessarily be the same as the control

6 variables that you would come up with if you were doing a

7 study of the effect .of shall issue or right-to-carry laws

8 on violent crime rates statewide?

9 A That's correct.

14 MR. BRADY: John, before you proceed, I'm sorry. I 15 don't mean to interrupt you. It's about to be 1:00. I 16 just wanted to check with you, do you anticipate us 17 having a break for lunch or are you going to power

18 through?

19 MR. EISENBERG: I can go either way. 20 MR. BRADY: Well, what do you -- maybe we should 21 ask

22 MR. EISENBERG: Yeah. Do you want to go off the

23 record and talk about lunch? Do you want to do this on

24 the record? I don't care.

25 MR. BRADY: Let's go off the record.

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1 THE WITNESS: "Robustness" means more than you just

2 get the same results because you did it a number of

3 different ways. There's an assumption that you're doing

4 it in multiple superior or arguably superior ways,

5 methodologically sound ways, but if you do it in eight

6 different incompetent ways and you get the same result,

7 it's possible you're getting the same screwed-up result

8 because of the same deficiencies in the methods. And in

9 this case, you know, Donohue tries out four different

10 sets of predictors, all of which are terrible selections

11 of predictors. I mean, he's -- they're very poor sets of

12 confound -- allegedly confounding variables, and the same

13 is true of the other three models in addition to the DAW

14 model that they prefer. I mean, that's what we were

15 talking about before

16 BY MR. EISENBERG:

17 Q Right.

18 A -- that the DAW model_only has two variables

19 that might be confounders and we don't even know that

20 they are confounders and it's basically just as bad for

21 the other three models they use. So they're all

22 inadequate. They're all failing to control for other

23 factors that affect crime. They're just failing to

24 control for slightly different sets of variables.

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14 Q The discussion so far has been on the panel data 15 analysis, but there's another approach used in the study 16 that's called Synthetic Controls.

17 A Uh-huh.

18 Q What's your understanding of what the synthetic 19 control tool is in statistical analysis?

20 A Well, it used to be in the old days that if you 21 wanted to know if passing a right-to-carry law increases

22 or decreases crime, you might compare one state that had

23 it with one other state that didn't enact a new

24 right-to-carry law, but everyone understood that was kind 25 of limited because there's lots of different control

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1 you have no basis for picking out which states are most

2 similar to the treatment state.

3 Q But if the trend lines are similar between the

4 control state and the state that you're studying, isn't

5 that all you need?

6 A Nope, not at all. That's a very weak foundation

7 for producing the result that you're trying to produce,

8 which is getting at what the crime rates in the

9 right-to-carry states would have been if they didn't pass 10 the right-to-carry law, the so-called counter-factual

11 situation.

12 Well, if you're not producing a set of control 13 states that have similar trends with regard to whatever 14 would have produced those different levels of post-law 15 crime rate, then it'll be sheer luck if they happen to be 16 good control variables for approximating what trends

17 would have occurred in crime in the right-to-carry states 18 if they had not passed the right-to-carry laws.

23 Q Have you written a paper in which you used

24 synthetic controls analysis as part of your analysis?

25 A No, not exactly. Once upon a time years ago, I

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1 THE WITNESS: I wouldn't have the slightest idea.

2 BY MR. EISENBERG:

3 Q So you don't know that his notion of NRA-backed

4 secrecy laws is only laws affecting police and private

5 investigators, as opposed to the general public?

6 A I didn't really understand that to be his

7 position. I -- I think he was vague as to exactly why it 8 was that NRA-backed secrecy laws would somehow prevent us 9 from discovering the misconduct of carry permit holders. 10 I don't recall him being that specific as to why that 11 worked out that way. In fact, it kind of stood out how 12 vague and unspecific he was, because he didn't explicitly 13 say, "Well, I think NRA-banned secrecy laws prevent 14 police from discovering the fact that a permit -- an 15 arrestee had a carry permit."

16 Q All right. So you criticize the gun~- I'm 17 sorry -- the concealedcarrykiller's.com website for 18 including reports about people who commit suicide as 19 related to those people's permits; correct?

20 A Correct.

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19 BY MR. EISENBERG:

20 Q Right, but there you're talking about the death 21 penalty; right?. You're talking about permits to carry 22 weapons.

23 A Precisely.

24 Q So you're saying that the scholarly consensus on

25 the effect of the premeditation element of the murder is

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1 firearm and thereby inspire the person to go ahead and

2 get a firearm?

3 MR. BRADY: Objection; incomplete hypothetical and

4 calls for speculation.

5 THE WITNESS: I would regard it as possible but

6 unlikely.

7 BY MR. EISENBERG:

8 Q Why do you say "possible but unlikely"? 9 A Because those who own guns think there's ample 10 utility without the ability to legally carry them, either 11 because they don't care about carrying them in public or 12 they do and they're willing to do it illegally without 13 benefit of the permit.

Eisenberg Deel. Ex. 3 -032

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23 Q So what makes somebody relatively law abiding -­

24 A They're doing

25 Q Let me finish as opposed to not relatively

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1 exhibit next in order, it's a paper called "Policy

2 Lessons from Recent Gun Control Research."

3 THE REPORTER: Exhibit 7.

4 (Exhibit 7 was marked for identification by 5 the Certified Shorthand Reporter and is attached

6 hereto.)

7 BY MR. EISENBERG:

8 Q This appears to be one of you·r scholarly papers.

9 Is that, in fact, what it is?

10 A Yes.

11 Q And it was -- it has a copyright date of 1986. 12 Is that an accurate date for the publication of this 13 paper?

14 A Yes.

15 Q And was it, in fact, published in a journal 16 called Law and Contemporary Problems? 17 A Yes.

18 Q Is that a law journal?

19 A It's a law and social science journal. 20 Q Is it affiliated with a particular university?

21 A I think it's Duke.

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14 Q What evidence are you speaking of in that 15 sentence?

16 A The best evidence pertains to robbery and the 17 notion that, you know, a robbery-linked assault would be 18 facilitated. It is supported by the fact that the more 19 of the intimidating or powerful reality applies to the

2.0 victim, the more -- the stronger they are, the bigger 21 they are, the fact that they're male rather than female,

22 the fact that they're in the vital ages of relatively 23 young adulthood rather than being very young or very old, 24 basically the more powerful the victim is, the more 25 likely it is that the aggressor was using a gun. And in

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1 A That was outside the scope of the statement,

2 although if you consider a robbery a property crime in

3 addition to a violent crime, then yeah, it encompassed

4 robberies. We actually know more about gun involvement

5 in robberies than any other crime other than murder.

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18 BY MR. EISENBERG:

19 Q Do you believe that certain crimes are 20 correlated with family economic conditions?

21 A Yes.

22 Q And what I meant there was by crime rates for 23 particular crimes. It's correlated with family economic 24 conditions. Does that change your answer?

25 A I don't see the distinction.

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MICHELLE FLANAGAN vs CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL XAVIER BECERRA Kleck, Gary

1 not an issue.

2 BY MR. EISENBERG:

3 Q Is response bias a problem in most surveys?

4 A There's always some response bias.

19 Q Do you have any opinion on that topic?

20 MR. BRADY: Objection; calls for speculation. It is

21 beyond the scope of what the expert was called to testify

22 about.

23 THE WITNESS: Could you repeat the question, please?

24 BY MR. EISENBERG:

25 Q Do you have any professional opinion about what

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1 "Although a minority of the laws," is that a fair summary

2 of the findings of the paper?

3 A Yes.

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MICHELLE FLANAGAN vs CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL XAVIER BECERRA Kleck, Gaiy

7 Q Right. Right. Yeah, I think you may have

8 thought that I was implying something negative and I

9 really wasn't. I just want to make that clear. I wasn't

10 implying that you are afraid to draw conclusions. I was

11 just saying that it seems that the results of many of

12 your studies show that there is some positive effects,

13 some negative effects, and the result is that there is

14 not -- that the net often just nets out to something I

15 wouldn't say meaningless but something close to zero. Is

16 that fair? Is that a fair summary of some -- of a lot of

17 your papers?

18 A Yes. I consider it a nuanced view. I mean,

19 it's an even-handed view which considers the possibility

20 of both good and bad effects of guns being out there.

21 Q So the Lott studies assert a more affirmative

22 relationship between the factors of public carrying of

23 firearms and crime rates than you have found to be

24 warranted; correct?

25 A Correct.

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MICHELLE FLANAGAN vs CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL XAVIER BECERRA Kleck, Gary

1 engages that literature in that sense, but that's not

2 what I was objecting to. That's a separate point.

3 BY MR. EISENBERG:

4 Q Okay. Is it meaningful for a scholar in your

5 field what is in the bibliography of a published study?

6 A Oh, you expect whatever was discuss.ed in the

7 text and cited in the text has a corresponding listing in

8 the bibliography and when it's published in a journal,

9 usually there's a copy editor who will tell you either,

10 A, you cited something in the text, but you don't have it

11 in the bibliography or you listed something in the 12 bibliography that you never cited in the text and that's

13 generally considered to be a no-no.

18 Q It just means that you may have reference to the

.19 study?

20 A Yes.

21 Q So if well, I'll move away from the

22 hypothetical. If you look at the Donohue study, which is

23 the one that's Exhibit 3, Exhibit B, he makes reference

24 to some work by a scholar named Zimmerman. Is Zimmerman

25 a professor or a scholar that you know at least by

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Corrections Need to Transcript of Deposition of Gary Kleck in Flanagan v. Becerra

All of the following corrections were made because of typographical errors.

Page Line Correction Needed 32 1 in Public 7 and Public 32 9 leadership 7 readership 35 2 competition 7 composition 37 14 opposite side 7 opposite sign 42 2 criteria of 7 criterion 74 14 key efficiency 7 coefficient 81 19 deemed 7 obtained 100 15 variability 7 variable 120 21 one 7 other

123 3 trends and 7 trends in 123 18 Francis Bacon 7 Taylor and Francis 124 13 possibility 7 possible 127 23 and 7 in

134 22 percent for urban 7 percent urban 137 22 muliplanarity 7 multicollinearity 141 15 will 7 we'll 141 24 and 7 in 151 2 goes 7 makes

155 2 caused 7 committed

155 20 irrelevant 7 is irrelevant 168 3 them 7 whom

177 12 who are 7 who are not 178 14 articulate 7 articulation

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185 2 have 7 have no 187 7 generalized ability 7 generalizability 192 21 survey 7 surveys 196 25 in context 7 in a context 236 3 sampling 7 sample

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MICHELLE FLANAGAN vs CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL XAVIER BECERRA Kleck, Gary

1 STAT.E OF CALIFORNIA

2

3 COUNTY OF' LO,S ANGELES 4

5 :r am th,~ witness in the foregoing depositiorL 6 I have read the deposition. Having made changes and· '7 corrections as I desire, I certify that the same is true 8 of my own knowledge, except as to those matters which are 9 therein stated upon my information or belief, and as to 10 those matters, I believe it to be true. 11 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of 12 the State of California that the foregoing is true and 13 correct.

14 15 16 Executed on St1r+~""'be-. ii GD!'] 17 at 41> ~ 1€ <:'hie CQv1l" ,Tq \\q h t\.S se f J P'L ")l31~ (Address) 18

19 20 21 22

23 GARY KLECK 24 25

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The Impact of /;Shall-Issue" Concealed Handgun Laws on Violent Crime Rates Evidence From Panel Data for Large Urban Cities

TOM!SLAV V. KOVANDZIC University of Alabama at Birmingham THOMAS B. MARVELL firstec Research LYNNE M. VIERAJTJS University ofAlabuma at Birmingfiam

Wltnt happens when states ease access to permits to cany concealed handguns in public places? Supporters maintai,n the laws can redz.tce violent crime rates by raising the expected costs ofcrfme, because of criminals rm ticipa ting greater risks of inju rt) and lower rates of success completing their crimes. 0pPonents argue that the Imps are likely t"o increase violent crirµe, especially homicide, as heated disputes involving permit Jwltlers are more likely to turn deadly because. ofthe greater lethality offirearms. This st11dy uses panel data for all U.S. cities with a 1990 population ofat least 100,000 for 1.980 to 2000 to exami1le the impact of"shall-issue" conceflled handgun laws on violent crime rates. The authors me,1sure the effects ofthe laws using a iime-trend varfrlble for the 1iwnberofyears after the law has been in effect, as opposed to the dummy variable approach used in prior research. Tiley also address many of tlie methodological problems encountered in p1'evious studies. The results provide 110 evidence that the laws reduce or i11crease rates of violent crime.

Keywords: gun control; right-lo-carty lmvs; homicide; violent crimei concealed­ carry laws; handg,ms

By 2001, at least 33 stales had adopted "right-to-carry" or "shal\­ issue" concealed firearms laws (SI laws), which require authori­ ties to issue concealed handgun permits to adult residents meet­ ing specified objed1ve criteria (U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2001, pp. 94-95). The laws replaced earlier locally administered, highly discret1onary, "may issue" carry permit Jaws in which

HOMICIDE STUDIES, Vol. 9 No. 41 November 2005 292-323 DOI: 10.1177 /1088767905279972 © 2005 Sage Publications

292

g:r:sltlon oim;Af::: --=:'."1".!i:Khlblt . .. t(/ For ldentltloatlon MarcQl'.la Mun@la, CSR 10420 Eisenberg IJecl. ex. 3 -047

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Kovandzic et al. / CONCEALED HANDGUN LAWS 293

local authorities could issue a carry license but were not required by law to do so. Supporters of SI laws maintain that all.owing citi­ zens to carry guns legally reduces crime, especially those commit­ ted in public places such as robbery, because prospective crimi­ nals fear encountering armed victims (Lott, 1998a, 1998b, 2000; Lott & Mustard, 1997). This position is based on theories of eco­ nomic choice which posit that" a person commits an offense if the expected utility to him exceeds the utility he can get by using his time and other resources at other activities" (Becker, 1968). Specif­ ically, proponents argue that SI laws can reduce levels of violence by deterring prospective criminals from even attempting crimes, presumably because would-be criminals perceive an increased risk of injury to themselves and a reduction in the rate of success in completing crimes (Lott, 1998a, 1998b, 2000; Lott & Mustard, 1997). SI laws, however, do not automatically increase criminals' fear that victims might be armed. They might not know about the law. The actual increase in self-protection gun carrying might be, or might be perceived as, slight in comparison with normal rates of self-protection gun carrying., most of which is probably done in violation of concealed weapons carrying laws (Kleck, 1997; Kovandzic & Marvell, 2003). And some newly licensed gun carri­ ers probably carried illegally before the new laws (Kleck, 1997; Kovandzic & Marvell, 2003; Lott, 1998; Ludwig, 1998). Opponents of SI laws argue that "threatening situations" (when someone is attacked or fears an attack) are more likely to turn fatal when more people carry guns (Cook, 1991; Ludwig, 1998; McDowall, Loftin, & Wiersema, 1995b; Webster, Vernick, Ludwig, & Leste1; 1997; Zirnring, 1968).' Other critics speculate that higher levels of self-protection gtm carrying by permit hold­ ers might prompt criminals to carry guns more often (Ayres & Donohue, 2003a; Cook, 1991; Green, 1987; Ludwig, 1998; McDowall et al., 1995a; but see Kleck, 1997, pp. 204-205). The present study examines the impact of SI laws on the four major forms of violent crime, using panel data from 1980 to 2000 for U.S. cities with a 1990 population of 100,000 or more. In the next section of the article, we examine the extensive prior research on SI laws and suggest procedures to mitigate methodological problems encountered there. We then describe our data and methods and present our results. In the final section, we consider the theoretical and policy implications of our findings.

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294 HOMICIDE STUDIES / November 2005

PREVIOUS RESEARCH'

The first evaluation of SI laws was Kleck and Patterson (1993), using cross-sectional data for 170 U.S. cities with a population greater than 100,000 in 1980. They separately assessed the effects of 19 different types of state and city gun controls, including those SI laws passed before the post-1986 wave of SI laws on rates of homicide, robbery, assault, rape, suicide, and fatal gun accidents, as well as the impact on gun ownership levels. The authors found no evidence that cities in states with SI laws have lower or higher rates of violence compared to cities in states without SI laws. There was also no evidence of higher rates of gun ownership in cities that reside in SI states, undercutting the idea by many that SI laws might lead to increases in gun ownership levels (Ayres & Donohue, 2003a; Lott, 2000). Because few SI laws existed in 1980, however, this evaluation is incomplete. The next study (McDowall et al., 1995a) used ARIMA time­ series analyses with monthly homicide mortality data (during 1973 to 1992) from five counties in Mississippi, Oregon, and Florida. They found positive, and usually significant, impacts on gun homicides, whereas the impacts on nongun homicide were mixed. The authors concluded that, at the least, there was no evi­ dence that SI laws reduce homicide. Several have criticized this study for failing to justify the selection of the five counties (Kleck 1997; Polsby, 1995). In response to Poslby's (1995) criticism that deterrence theory suggests that nongun homicides are also likely to be reduced by more gun carrying, McDowall et al. (1995a) examined annual total homicide data for all of Florida and found an overall decline following the passage of Florida's SI law (see second panel of their Table 2). The most publicized and controversial study of SI legislation is by Lott and Mustard (1997) in the Journal of Legal Studies and sub­ sequent follow-ups to that work, especially two books by Lott titled More Guns, Less Crime (Lott, 1998b, 2000). The initial study by Lott and Mustard (1997) evaluated SI laws in 10 states using county panel data for 1977 to 1992. The SI laws were entered as before-after dummy variables scored 1 starting the year after a law went into effect and O otherwise. Control variables included age structure, economic trends, and arrest rates. They conducted numerous alternate analyses, such as with differenced variables,

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Kovandzic et al. / CONCEALED HANDGUN LAWS 295

with individual state trends, and with laws represented by linear and nonlinear trends and permits issued in a single year. In gen­ eral, they concluded that SI laws reduce violent crime, including homicide, by some 4% to 7%, but increased property crimes. Fol­ low-up studies by Lott (1998a, 1998b, 2000), which added later years of data and new SI laws, largely confirmed the negative cor­ relations between enactment of SI laws and violent crimes observed in the original Lott and Mustard (1997) study. Given the obvious policy implications of Lott and Mustard's findings for the regulation of concealed gun carrying in public places, numerous academics have reanalyzed the Lott and Mus­ tard data, at least 15 by our count. Of these 15 studies, 8 of them found SI laws to be significantly and negatively correlated with violent crime in at least half of the model specifications presented (Benson & Mast, 2001; Bronars & Lott, 1998; Donohue, 2003; Duggan, 2001; Marvell, 1999; Moody, 2001; Olson & Maltz, 2001; Plassmann & Tideman, 2001; Plassmann & Whitley, 2003). Five studies generally found nonexistent effects of SI laws on violent crime rates (Black & Nagin, 1998; Dezhbakhsh & Rubin, 1998; Harrison, Kennison, & Macedon, 2000; Marvell, 2001 ), whereas the remaining three studies generally found SI laws in more than half of all model specifications presented to be, if anything, posi­ . lively related to violent crime rates (Ayres & Donohue, 2003a, 2003b; Ludwig, 1998). Especially important is Black and Nagin (1998), who relaxed the assmnption of uniform effects in the Lott and Mustard (1997) model by entering separate dummy val'iables fol' each state SI law. With l'espect to homicide and rape, the number of negative coefficients, significant and nonsignificant, only slightly ouh,um­ bered their positive cmmterpal'ts. Florida's large negative coeffi­ cients stood out, and without Florida the apparent impact of the laws when using an aggregate law dummy disappeared for murder and rape. Another reanalysis of Lott and Mustard's (1997) data was con­ ducted by Ludwig (1998). Ludwig suggests Lott and Mustard's results may be attributed to omitted variable bias because the fixed-effects approach cannot control for unobserved factors (e.g., crack markets, gang activity, poverty) that influence county crime rates but are not fixed across time. Ludwig argues that these fac­ tors may have influenced SI and non-SI states differently,

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resulling in spurious or partially spurious findings for the SI law variable. To address the problem of omitted variable bias, Ludwig uses the difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) estimator, which takes advantage of the fact that juveniles cannot obtain carry permits because of minimum age requirements. Ludwig argues juveniles serve as a natural control group for estimating the impact of SI laws on adult homicide victimization rates (i.e., the treatment group). According to Ludwig, the difference between the change in the adult and juvenile homicide victimiza­ tion rate eliminates the.effects of both fixed and time-varying fac­ tors that cause both homicide series to vary across time and iso­ lates those factors that impact the difference between adult and juvenile homicide victimizations. Ludwig also accounts for the possibility that nationwide factors may have influenced changes in adult and juvenile homicide victimization rates differently by comparing differences in the adult-juvenile trends.in SI states with the difference in adult-juvenile homicide rates in non-SI states. As a result, the DDD estimator is able to isolate those fac- . tors that are unique to states passing SI laws that will cause adult homicide rates to increase or decrease compared to juvenile homi­ cide rates. Using state panel data for 1977 through 1994, Ludwig found that adult homicide rates have increased, albeit nonsignifi­ cantly, in states passing SI laws. More specifically, Ludwig reports an increase of .16 homicides per 100,000 adults, implying an increase in adult homicide rates in SI states of roughly 1.4 %. Con­ sistent with the findings of Black and Nagin (1998), Ludwig also finds Florida to be a key player in the SI-crime debate. When excluding Florida from the sample, the estimated impact of SI laws on adult homicide rates become even greater in the positive direction (.76 homicides per 100,000 adult population, which equates toa 6.8% increase in the adult homicide rateinSistates).3 The most recent analysis of the Lott and Mustard (1997) data is by Ayres and Donohue (2003a, 2003b). Similar to Black and Nagin (1998), the authors found SI laws to be negatively and signifi­ cantly related to most violent crimes when using an aggregated "hybrid model," which includes a dummy variable and a linear trend variable in the model specifications to capture any immedi­ ate and long-term effects of the laws on crime (see Tables 10 and 11 i.J.1 Black & Nagin, 1998). However, when the authors used a sepa­ rate dummy and lime-trend variable for each state to estimate a

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state-specific effect for each of the 24 adopting states, they found every crime type in more states where SI laws were positively and significantly related to crime than in more states where SI laws were negatively and significantly related to crime. Of the 216 esti­ mated impacts reported (24 states by 9 crime types), 150 were in the positive direction and 59 of them were statistically significant, whereas only 17 were statistically significant in the negative direction. More important, there were 6 states which witnessed a statistically significant increase in violent crime, whereas only one state (Florida) experienced a statistically significant decrease. The authors attributed the differences between the aggregated and disaggregated hybrid models to two factors. First, weighting the regressions by population in the aggregated hybrid model gives undue influence to states with a large number of high popu­ lation counties like Florida and Texas-both of which witnessed statistically significant decreases in crime after they passed SI laws. Second, the aggregated model gives early-adopting states greater impact in the estimation than late-passing states. Because early- and large-passing states such as Florida and Georgia wit­ nessed drops in crime following the passage of Silaws, they had a greater impact on the estimated aggregate impact. A study not based on the Lott and Mustard (1997) data set is by Kovandzic and Marvell (2003). It evaluated Florida's SI law's impact using county-level Uniform Crime Report (UCR) data from Florida authorities. As discussed above, previous studies of SI laws have suggested that Florida plays a pivotal role in the SI law-crime debate. McDowall et al. (1995b) found that the Florida law, if anything, is associated with more gun homicides, whereas Ayres and Donahue (2003a), Lott and Mustard (1997), Lott (1998b, 2000), and Ludwig (1998) found that it reduced homicides. More important, Black and Nagin (1998) and Marvell (1999) argue that the Lott and Mustard (1997) and Lott (1998b, 2000) results for homicide and rape are entirely driven by the inclusion of Florida in their sample. Kovandzic and Marvell (2003) used panel data for 58 Florida counties from 1980 to 2000. The impact of SI laws on violent crime was measured using data on carry permits issued per 100,000 population rather than the dummy variable and time­ trend variaj:)le approach used in earlier evaluations. They con­ trolled for numerous confounding factors including age struc­ ture, economic deprivation, and prison population. 1he authors

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also addressed potential simultaneity problems between permit issuance rates and violent crime using the Granger causality test. The authors found little evidence of a relationship between per­ mit-issuing rates and violent crime. They also found no evidence of a deterrent or homicide-promoting effect of permit rate growth when using homicide victimization data from the Centers for Dis­ ease and Control (CDC) or when modeling UCR and CDC homi­ cide victimization rates as a Poisson distribution. Results from the Granger causality test also found little evidence that increases in violent crime lead to increases in pennit-issuance rates.

Methodological Shortcomings of Previous Research Although previous evaluations of SI laws and crime have attempted to address the various methodological shortcomings typically associated with macro~level evaluations of policy inter­ ventions, they have done so in a piecemeal fashion. It is important that research address all these shortcomings at once. We believe the major methodological deficiencies are the following: (a) the use of dummy variables to measure the treatment effects of SI laws on crime; (b) the use of aggregate law variables, which assume that SI!aw impacts are similar in all states; (c) the inability to address potential simultaneity problems between passage of SI laws and crime; (d) measurement problems surrounding the dates of passage of state SI laws; (e) the use of county-level UCR data, which is unreliable because of incomplete crime reporting and inadequate procedures to impute missing crime data; and (f) the overestimation of significance levels in county-level studies because of"clustering" of error terms atthe state level. We discuss each of these problems below and discuss how we attempt to address them in our research.

Using dummy variables to measure t/1e treatment effects of shall-issue laws. With several exceptions (e.g., Ayres & Donohue, 2003a, 2003b; Kovandzic & Marvell, 2003; Lott, 1998a, 1998b, 2000; Lott & Mustard, 1997), analysts' have relied solely on before-after dummy variables to measure the "treatment effects" of SI laws on violent crime. This assumes unrealistically that SI laws have a once-and-for-all impact on crime. More specifically, this dummy variable appmach implies that criminals know when SI laws go

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into effect, do not forget about them, and believe the chance of encountering an armed victim varies little across time. Although it is entirely plausible that the mere passage of a SI law could lead to irrunediate reductions in crime because of publicity campaigns and news coverage attendant to the passage of the laws (often referred to as announcement effects), it is unlikely that such effects would remain static across time (Ayres & Donohue, 2003a; Kovandzic & Marvell, 2003). Perhaps crime levels would have to return to normal as publicity fades. Perhaps the crime-reduction impact of SI laws is lagged for a year or so as the criminal popula­ tion leams about the laws via. word of mouth (Kleck, 1997; Kovandzic & Marvell, 2003). Quite likely the laws act as a deter­ rent according to the extent they increase the number of permits and adults carrying gun.s (Kovandzic & Marvell, 2003; Lott, 1998a, 1998b, 2000; Lott & Mustard, 1997). Because the number of adults with carry permits grows in approximately a linear fashion (Kovandzic & Marvell, 2003, p. 377; Lott, 2000, p.75), one might expect any deterrent impacts of SI laws on violent crime to increase across time as criminals respond to the increased risk of coming into contact with armed victims {Lott, 1998a, 1998b, 2000; Lott & Mustard, 1997). Data on the number of persons with carry permits is only avail­ . able in a few states such as Florida (see Kovandzic & Marvell, 2003), therefore we rely primarily on time trend variables to model the impact of the laws. This procedure is not without prece­ dent. Lott and Mustard {1997), for example, presented results using time and time-squared variables for the number of years before and after the law went into effect, and the results suggest that deterrent effects of SI laws increase across time, presumably because of increased self-protection carrying by prospective vic­ tims. Ayres and Donohue {2003a) also found evidence of growing deterrent effects of SI!aws on violent crime when using an aggre­ gated time-trend model (referred to as the Lott-spline model) and the hybrid model which we described earlier, but they discount these results because they are not based on their preferred model with disaggregated SI law variables. Black and Nagin (1998) also examined whether SI laws become more effective over time. They used a series of durruny variables indicating the number of years before and after the enactment of a SI law. Results indicated that homicide, rape, and assault were declining in counties residing in

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SI states prior to the adoption of the SI law and continued to decline thereafter. With respect to robbery, they found increases prior to and after of the adoption of a SI law, although the postintervention increase was at a much slower rate (Black & Nagin, 1998, p. 215).

Assuming uniform effects of SI laws on violent crime. A second problem is that most studies assume that SI law effects are homo­ geneous. As noted above, BlackandNagin (l.998), Marvell (1999), Ayres and Donohue (2003a) found substantial differences be­ tween states when the SI law variable is disaggregated and a ten­ dency for positive coefficients to outnumber negative ones. This work is consistent with recent econometric research by Pesaran and Smith (1995) and Baltagi and Griffin (1997), which concludes that the assumption in panel studies of homogeneous impacts across jurisdictions is probably not justified. In the present analy­ sis, we conduct the main analysis with an aggregated SI variable, and then use state-sped.fie SI law variables to see if the results are consistent.

Simultaneity problems. With the possible exception of Kovandzic and Marvell (2003), previous studies of SI laws have not adequately addressed simultaneity problems, which might arise because growing crime rates might prompt states to pass SI laws and prompt citizens to obtain permits. Such an effect would bias the SI law coefficients in a positive direction, understating any deterrent effect. Lott and Mustard (1997) and Lott (1998b, 2000) address potential simultaneity bias using two-stage least squares regressions but do not present the results of any standard diagnostic tests to ensure their excluded instrumental variables are reliable (i:e., the excluded instruments are correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable, passage of SI laws) and valid (i.e. the excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the error terms in the violent crime equations). Davidson and Mackinnon (1993) maintain that "tests of overidentifying restrictions should be calculated routinely whenever one computes 2SLS estimates" (p. 236). Sargan takes it a step further and argues that studies us­ ing 2SLS regression procedures without testing for overidenti­ fying restrictions is a "pious fraud" (as cited in Godfrey, 1988). In this article, we follow the lead of Kovandzic and Marvell (2003)

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Kovandzic et al. / CONCEALED HANDGUN LAWS 301

and use the Granger causality test to address the possible recipro­ cal relationship between the passage of SI!a ws and violent crime.

Incorrect dates for passage of SI laws. Lott and Mustard (1997) coded the effective dates of Silaws based on a compilation of pas­ sage dates provided in Cramer and Kopel (1995). As Kleck (1997) notes, relying on a single source of information for coding of gun laws often leads to measmement error for the gun law variables. In Lott and Mustard's case, they used the incorrect effective date for 5 of the 10 laws studied. The correct effective dates of the laws are given in Marvell (2001, p. 707; see also Vernick & Hepburn, 2003).

County-level UCR data problems. Most research on SI laws uses county-level UCR data, archived and produced by the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data (NAC)D). These data are highly suspect because reporting is spotty, especially in small counties, and attempts by NACJD to estimate missing data are incomplete and change across time (Maltz & Targonski, 2002; Marvell, 1999). NACJD obtains from the FBI the raw UCR figmes that are sent by police agencies to the FBI, and it combines agencies within each county to develop county-level crime data. However, NACJD has to deal with missing data to make reasonable county level esti­ mates of crime and permit year-to-year comparisons in crime. NAJCD imputed crime data for counties during the years 1977 to 1993 as follows: Within each county, any agency submitting less than 6 monthly reports is excluded when calculating the county's total crime and popufation counts. li, however, the agency sub­ mitted 6 to 11 monthly reports, the crime data were weighted to produce 12 monthly equivalents. As a result, crime rate calcula­ tions derived from the NACJD county crime dataset implicitly as­ sumes tl,at excluded law enforcement agencies have a crime rate that is identical to the rest of the county (Maltz & Targonski, 2002, p. 308). Lott and Mustard (1997), moreover, did not rely on popu­ lation figures from NACJD when calculating county crime rates, instead using countywide population counts from the U.S. Cen­ sus Bureau, such that they assume that agencies with missing data have no crime.' In the present study, we use cities as our unit of analy,is, and UCR city data does not suffer from the data-reporting problems

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described above for county-level crim.e data. Because the FBI only reports crime counts for a particular city in their annual report if the individual law enforcement agency responsible for that jmis­ diction submits 12 complete monthly reports, there is no need to impute missing crime data because of incomplete agency report­ ing. In addition, cities exhibit greater per-capita variation in crime rates than do large urban counties or states, which is exactly what SI law-crime research is trying to explain. Finally, cities are more internally homogenous than counties or states. and thus are less likely to be susceptible to aggregation bias (see also Lott, 2000, p. 30-33).

Overestimation of significance levels. Finally, Lott and Mustard (1997), Lott (1998a, 1998b, 2000), and those revisiting the SUaw­ crime question using county-level data have overestimated the statistical significance of their findings because of correlation of variables within states (Harrison, Kennison, & Macedon, 2000; Moody, 2001). In such a situation, standard errors can be seriously biased downward, leading to inflated t ratios for the SI law vari­ able (Greenwald, 1983; Moulton, 1990). Using Lott and Mustard's county-level data and robust Huber-White standard errors, which do not require independence of observations within "clus­ ters" (i.e., SI states),both Harrison et al. (2000) and Moody (2001) found that the robust standard errors for the SI law dummy vari­ ables in the homicide regressions were much larger than the con­ ventional standard errors. Coefficients on the dummy variables in the homicide regressions were rarely sigruficm1t at tl1e .05 level.

DATA AND METHOD

Research Pesign and Sample 'The present study examines the potential deterrent effects of SI laws using panel data for the period 1980 to 2000 from 189 cities witlrn population of 100,000 or more in 1990 for which there were Uniform Crirrie Reports data. Of the 189 cities with populations greater than 100,000 in 1990, 77 resided in states passing SI laws between 1980 and 2000. If SI laws have any deterrent impact, it is most likely to show up in cities, because the cities had more

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Kovandzic et al./ CONCEALED HANDGUN LAWS 303

restrictive permit practices under pre-SI laws then rural areas, such that the SI laws probably had a larger impact on self-protec­ tion gun carrying (Lott, 1998b, 2000; Lott & Mustard, 1997). Panel data have distinct advantages over more commonly used time-series or cross-sectional data. The most important is the abil­ ity to enter proxy variables for omitted variables that cause crime rates to vary across time and space. The proxy variables, which number more than 200 here, are discussed further below. Second, the highnumbe1· of degrees of freedom provides greater statistical power and permits numerous control variables, which gives us more confidence that nonsignilicant coefficients indicate the absence of an impact.

Methods for Panel Data We follow conventional strategies for the statistical modeling of panel data by using a fixed-effects model, in which there is a dununy variable for each city and year, except the first year and city to avoid pel'fect collinearity (Hsiao, 1986, p. 41-58; Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 1991, p. 224-226).5 Specifically, the city dummies con­ trol for unobserved (and unmeasurable) city-specific factors whose values remained approximately stable during the study period (i.e., time-invariant factors) that caused rates of violent crime to differ across cities (Hsiao, 1986). Examples of these fac­ tors might include demographic characteristics, political orienta­ tion of city, urbanity, climate, drug and gang-related activities, and deeply embedded cultural and social norms. The city dum­ mies also control for differences indty-level crime reporting prac­ tices that remained approximately stable during the study period. The year dummies control for unobserved time-varying factors· that could affect all cities in a given year in the same fashion. An example of a national event that may have affected violent crime throughout the nation would be the 1994 Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, which contained several major crime-reduction programs including truth-in-sentencing, the federal version of a three-strikes law; funds forl00,000 new officers; expansion of the death penalty; ban on possession of guns by juveniles; and enhanced penalties for drug offenses and for using firearms in crimes. Because the analysis includes fixed effects for both years and cities, the coefficient estimates for the SI law time-trend

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30,1 HOlvl!ClDE STUDIES / November 2005

variable and specific control variables (discussed below) are based solely on within-city changes across time. Finally, we fol­ low the recommendation of Ayres and Donohue (2003a) and Marvell and Moody (1996, 2001) and include separate linear trend variables for each city.' These control for unobserved factors that affect the time-series behavior of crime that can differ from city to city and depart from the nationwide trends caphtred by the year dummies. Without them, the coefficient on the SI law time-trend variable would simply measure whether crime rates are higher or lower for years after the law (relative to national trends captured by the year dummies), even if the change occurred before or well after the law went into effect.

Right-to-Carry Law Variables Between 1980 and 2000, 24 states switched to a nondiscretion­ ary permit system allowing applicants, who meet certain objec­ tive criteria, to obtain a permit to carry a concealed handgun. The 24 states and the years they began issuing permits on a nondis­ cretionary basis were obtained through statutory research con­ ducted by Marvell (2001). They are as follows: Alaska (1994), Ari­ zona (1994), Arkansas (1995), Florida (1987), Georgia (1989), Idaho (1990), Kentucky. (1996), Louisiana (1996), Maine (1980), Mississippi (1,990), Montana (1991), Nevada (1995), New Hamp­ shire (1994), North Carolina (1995), Oklahoma (1995), Oregon (1990), Pennsylvania (1989), South Carolina, (1996), Tennessee (1994), Vrrginia (1995), Texas (1995), Utah (1995), West Virginia (1988), and Wyoming (1994). Seven states had SI laws or their equivalents prior to 1980 (Alabama, Connecticut, hldiana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Washington).7 The SI laws include only those that did not give local authorities discretion to reject application~; they do not include laws that state that author­ ities "shall issue" permits but then proceed to give the issuing authority discretion to reject the application because, for example, the authority deems the applicant to lack"good moral character." As discussed above, the impact of SI laws on violent crime are measured using a time-trend variable, which is coded as zeroes for all the years up to and including the year the SI law was passed in each particular city and the values 1, 2, 3, and so forth for the

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following years. For example, consider a city located in Florida, which passed its SI!a win 1987. In this case, in 1990, the time-trend variable is equal to 3. Again, measuring the effects of SI laws in this manner allows us to test whether the impacts of the laws are more closely linked to the n~ber of people carrying guns in pub­ lic, which grows across time as more people obtain permits. Because it is possible, albeit unlikely, that the full deterrent impacts of the laws occur immediately (if prospective shooters quickly learn about the laws through "announcement effects" discussed earlier), we also present results of estimations in which the effects of SI laws are measured using a before-after dummy variable. Similar to prior SI law studies (e.g., Lott & Mustard, · 1997), the dummy variable is scored 1 the year after a law went into effect and O otherwise.'

Violent Crime Violent crime is measured by the four offenses in the UCR Crime Index involving force or threat of force: homicide, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault (Federal Bureau of Investi­ gation, 1981-2001). Rape and assault data are probably less reli­ able than homicide and robbery data, because reporting rates for assault and rape have changed within the past couple of decades because new laws encourage women to report domestic violence and because police are more likely to record assaults (Reiss & Roth, 1993, pp. 407-414). To the extent these reporting changes occurred nationwide, they would be captured by the year dum­ mies, but we cannot be sure that is the case. Consequently, results for these two crimes should be interpreted with caution. Seven cities were dropped from the sample because they failed to report crime data to the FBI for more than half of the years studied: Moreno Valley, CA; Rancho Cucamonga, CA; Santa Clarita, CA; Overland Park, KS; Kansas City, KS; Cedar Rapids, IA; and Lowell,MA.

Specific control variables. In addition to the year dummies, city dummies, and city-trend variables, we include eight specific con­ trol variables. These are selected based on a review of previous macro-level studies linking violence rates to the structural charac-

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teristics of geographical linits (Byrne, 1986; Kovandzic, Vieraitis, & Yeisley, 1998; Land, McCall, & Cohen, 1990; Parker, McCall, & Land, 1999; Sampson, 1986; Vieraitis, 2000, and the studies re­ viewed therein); they are percentage African American; percent­ age Hispanic; percentage ages 18 to 24 and 25 to 44; percentage households headed by females; percentage persons living below the poverty line, per-capita income; percentage population living alone, per-capita income; and percentage state prison population. Data for t:he first six are from the U.S. Census Bureau (1983, 1994), except that 2000 data were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau Web site using American Fact Finder. These measures are only available for decennial census years, and we estimate data be­ tween decennial census years via linear interpolation. Given the small changes in these variables between decennial cen.~us years, a linear trend is justified. Income data for 1980 to 2000 are from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis Web site. The income data are county-level estimates, and we use these values as imperfect sub­ stitutes for city-level income. Personal income data are converted from a current dollar estimate to a constant dollar 1967basis by di­ viding personal income by the consumer price index. Prison pop­ ulation is the number of inmates sentenced to state institutions for more than a year, available annually at the state level,' using data from the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics Web site. Because prison populations are year-end estimates, we take the average of the current year and prior year to estimate mid-year prison population. Continuous variables are expressed as natural logs to reduce the impact of outliers. I-Ieteroscedasticity was detected using the Breusch-Pagan test, mainly because violent crime rate variation is greater across time in the smaller cities. To avoid inefficient and biased estimated variances for the parameter estimates, we weighted the violence regressions by amounts determined by the test. Panel unit root tests (Levin & Lin, 1992; Wu, 1996) indicate that the violent crime data are stationary (i.e., the unit root hypo­ thesis is rejected, suggesting that t:he analysis be conducted in lev­ els and not first differences). Autocorrelation is mitigated by including a 1-year lag of the dependent variable in each violent crime regression (Hendry, 1995). The lagged dependent variable also has the added benefit of controlling for omitted lagged effects

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(Moody, 2001; Wooldridge, 2000). Examination of collinearity diagnostics developed by Belsley, Kuh, and Welsh (1980) revealed no serious collinearity problems for the SI law time-trend vari­ able. Although there were collinearity problems among the proxy variables, they did r\ot substantively alter the coefficients or the statistical significance of the SI law time-trend variable, and we only measured the significance of proxy variables as groups using the F test. Perfect collinearity among each set of proxy variables was avoided by dropping one year dummy (i.e., 1980), one city dummy (Birmingham, AL), and one city trend variable (Birrning­ ham, AL).

RESULTS

Table 1 presents the results for each violent crime type, using regression procedures described above. Specifically, we estimate the aggregate impact of SI laws on violent crime with the following model:

y11 = u,year, + w,D, + y(Shall/trend) + 'l',(D,*trend) + px,, + u11

where y11 is the natural logarithm of a particular violent crime per 100,000 people in city i in year I, year,is a vector of year dummies,

D, is a vector of city dummies, D 1*trend is a vector of individual city trends (equal to 1 in 1980, 2in 1981, and21 in2000),x11 isa vec­ tor of demographic and economic controls and u,. is an error term. The variable Shall/trend is a time-trend variable equal to the number of years after the law had been in effect and equal to Ofor the years before the law had been in effect. Additional analyses explore potential simultaneity bias problems using the Granger c<)usalify test and potential "announcement effects" of SI laws on violent crime using the dummy variable approach.

The Aggregate Impact of Shall-Issue Laws on Violent Crime The results in Table 1 provide no support for Lott and Mus­ tard's (1997) and Lott's (1998a, 1998b, 2000) thesis that the longer SI laws are in place, the greater their deterrent effect on violent

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w §l TABLE! The Estimated Impad of Shall-Issue Laws on Violent Crlme

Dependent Variable: Natural Ugof theCanitspomfing Violetit Crime Type Per 100,000 Resident Popu!ntion Homicide RDbbery AssaWt Rape Target Independent Variable Coefficient t ratio Coefficient trotio Coefficient tratio Coefficient t ratio

SI law time-trend variable .011 0.80 .010 0.91 .019 2.59 .012 133 Control variables (innaruntl Jogs) Percentage 18 to 24 years old :L,,:i 4.13 .532 2.22 -333 -1.59 -.097 -039 Percentage 25 to 44 years old -.867 --0.58 -.086 --0.17 -.379 --0.84 .824 1.59 Percentage Black .264 1.18 .276 2.45 .042 0.47 .071 0.30 Percentage Hispanic .085 0.97 .045 0.86 -.008 -0.15 -.105 -2.03 Percentage female-headed households .311 2.68 -.D30 -0.58 .028 0.46 .005 0.05 Perrentage persons < poverty line -.033 -0.11 .014 0.09 -.190 -1.22 .335 2.23 Percentage persons living alone -.737 -1.28 -.670 -2.48 .189 0.70 .558 1.09 Per-capita income, county .753 1.98 .177 0.92 -.ODS -0.06 .479 3.56 Prison population, state :.228 -3..57 "212. -3.78 .013 0.29 -.074 -1.39 Violent crime type, 1-year lag .llZll 1.97 .2il! 23.61 .si;; 17.77 &ll2 7.62 Sample size 3,863 3,863 3,863 3,773 m Adjusted R2 .897 .971 .941 .907 iii' Cl) NOT£; The vlolertt trn'rn! regtcis.ion.'t,em.t;mpass·_ts9 cit-i_es {in 45states) during 1980 to 2000~ The depent:letit variabfesa."e listed. atthe top of ea·ch: column. :I TiJconserv:€-Sf'ac'~:re~'u.Jts for ci'tydummies;ye,:trdum_missaOO cHytrend vari,ab~-atenot;iho-wu. U1esh.aU:..,iS$tle.faw i$.rep~nt~ ty a .. J.ime-trend-~'­ r:r ?ble'as.dest:ribet'.l:.tboV¢.Al! conHnt10U$VO.~abies_ared.ivjd¥ bypi,pul.a~onand lewd. :iiJl_re~ons;tr,e:v..,-:e!s;hteo by a functiml o!popt1iatkmasdetet'­ Cl) nitl1.e;:f. br thelfo':ti:Sda1-f'agnri Te.est Coefficients iliataiesigrrificantatthe-.OS.level aredisplayed in bold. Coeffidentsthnt-ar-e,s~iftcantM:ihe.. 01 tevel_ are ta both. tmdet·Tined and.displayed ln.bold. · 1:1 Cl) .!?. m !< w Q• 0, w

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crime. The coefficient on the aggregate SI law time-trend variable is in the unexpected positive direction for each of t]J.e four violent· crime regressions and is significant in the positive direction for aggravated assault. The t ratio for aggravated assault, however, is s.omewhat small given the large sample size and, as discussed above, the assault data are somewhat suspect. In any event, the results for the aggregate SI law time-trend variable imply an aver­ age increase of 0.2% in aggravated assault for each additional year SI laws are in effect, for a net effect of 1% higher aggravated assault rates after 5 years. Perhaps the most damaging finding in Table 1 to the more guns-less crime thesis, however, is the fact that robbery is not reduced by the increased presence of SI laws. If pro­ spective criminals afraid of encountering armed victims in public places are deterred from even attempting crimes in the first place, then robbery should be the crime most likely to decline because it is committed in public more than homicide, rape, and assault.

Examining Robustness of Findings Using Alternate Model Specifications Additional analyses, which are not reported in the interest of space, indicate that the lack of deten·ent effects of SI laws on vio­ lent crime rates revealed in Table 1 do not appear to be sensitive to model specification.10 The results are similar with a distributed lag (a trend that plateaus after 5 years), with first-differenced vari­ ables, dropping the city trend variables, without logging vari­ ables, without weighting the regressions, and without the lagged dependent variables. In contrast to Table 1, the SI law coefficient is not significant in the assault regressions. When we reestimated the regressions in Table 1 using robust standard errors without clustering by state, t ratios were greater than 2 in the robbery, assault, and rape regressions.

Addressing Potential Simultaneity Problems' One possible explanation for the lack of a negative and signifi­ cant coefficient for the SI law vru'iables is simultaneity, which can happen if citizens respond to increases in violent crime.by apply­ ing for and obtaining permits to cany guns or if state govern­ ments enact SI laws in response to high-crime rates. It does not

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310 H011,!10DE STUDIES/ November 2005

help to lag the independent variable because serial correlation between current and prior year crime rates can lead to simulta­ neity with the lagged dependent variable. If there is simul­ taneity, the SI variable coefficient might be biased in the positive direction-the opposite of any deterrent impact on violent crime. We explore this issue in two ways. The first is the Granger causal­ ity test, which entails regressing the SI law time-trend variable on one and 2-year lags ofitself and 1- and 2-yeai- lags of violent crime (Granger, 1969; Pind yck & Rubinfeld, 1991). The Granger test has . a drawback in that it misses purely contemporaneous (same year) causation (Wooldridge, 2000, p. 98). In the present situation, how­ ever, if violent crime has a contemporaneous impact on permit laws and permit use, it .must also have an impact lagged 1-year, because ittakes time fm legislatures and citizens to learn of crime trends and act on them. In addition, serial correlation of current and lagged crime rates would probably produce a significant coefficient on the lagged crime variable even if causation is com­ pletely contemporaneous. Thus, the absence of a lagged impact implies the absence of a current-year impact. The results of the Granger test showed no evidence of reverse causation. The lag­ ged homicide variables in the SI time-trend variable regression were far from significant, small in size, and in the unexpected neg­ ative direction. The second procedure, which only addresses possible simulta­ I neity involved in enacting the law (i.e., that the legislature might ' act in response to high crimes rates, as opposed to simultane­ ity because of citizens getting more permits), is to drop from the analysis observations occurring just before and just after the law was passed (i.e., three observations for each state with SI laws). This analysis produces results very similar to those in Table l. In sum, there is no evidence that individuals respond to increases in violent crime by acquiring concealed carry permits and, presum­ ably, begin lawfully carrying guns in public for purposes of self­ protection.

Models With Shall-Issue Law Dummy Variable

As discussed above, estimating the impact of SI laws on homi­ cide by the number of years the law is in existence might miss an

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impact that is due solely to the existence of the law or to "announcement" effects when the law went into effect. TI'lis is the traditional before-and-after model, operationalized by a dummy variable scored 1 for all years after the law went into effect. Although the coefficients on this SI law dummy variable are gen­ erally in the nega live direction, they are extreme!y small and far from significant (homicide, b = -.001, t =-.03; robbery,b = .009, t = .30; assault, b = -.021, t = -.94; rape, b = -.005, t = -0.23). The results do not differ substantially when using the alternate regression procedures listed above in reference to the regressions with SI trend variables. These "null" results for the SI law dummy vari­ ables differ from much previous work, which generally find a deterrent effect (e.g., Lott, 1998b, 2000; Lott & Mustard, 1997) or "homicide promoting effect" (e.g., McDowall et al., 1995b) for SI laws. To test the possibility of announcement effects (i.e., a short term impact resulting from publicity given the law when fust enacted), we constructed a dummy variable that is scored one only in the first 2 years after a SI law is enacted. Again, coefficients are small and far from significant, with the exception of the assault regres­ sion, where the coefficient is -.041 (t = -2.71). Although this sug­ gests a small rumouncement effect that deters assaults, it is not evidence that SI laws reduce assault because in the long run, SI laws appear to increase assault (see Table 1).

Estimating the State-Specific Impacts of Shall-Issue Laws on Violent Crime Based on the results in Table 1, there is no evidence to support the thesis that the longer SI laws are in place, the greater their deterrent effect on violent crime. However, the regressions in Table 1 estimated an aggregated effect for the laws across all cities residing in adopting SI states. If, for example, the impact of the laws on violent crime rates varies significantly across states then the models in Table 1 are misspecified. Moreover, as noted above, the dangers of estimating a single aggregated effect are particu­ larly acute because of differences in (a) permit fees and training requirements for a concealed handgun permit and where con­ cealed handguns ca11 be taken (Lott, 2000), (b) publicity and news

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312 HOWCIDE 511/D!ES / November2005

coverage surrounding passage of the laws, and (c) the number of persons in the adultpopulationwith concealed handgun permits. We address this problem by using separate SI law variables for each state. The variable is a postlaw trend for cities in a particular state and O for cities elsewhere. Table 2 presents these estimates for all four violent crime categories and shows that the coeffi­ cients on the SI law time-trend variabie for each of the 19 states that switched to a nondiscretionary carry permit system between 1980 and 2000---a total of 76 estimates. Similar to Ayres and Donohue (2003a), we are leery of the more constrained specifications of the aggregate regressions, which implicitly assumed that the impact of SI laws is uniform across states. Indeed, for each violent crime type, we were able to reject the hypothesis that the 19 SI law time-trend variables were jointly equal. But this heterogeneity does not lead us to revise the Table 1 results because for each violent crime category, there are more states where passage of SI laws lead to statistically significant increases in violent crime rates than states with statistically signif­ icant .decreases. For example, although there are two states that experienced significant declines in homicide, five states experi­ enced significant increases. Of the 76 estimated impacts of SI laws on violent crime rates presented in Table 2, 13 exhibited statisti­ cally significant decreases in violent crime upon passage of the laws, whereas 23 exhibited significant increases. Overall, Table 2 shows 33 decreases in violent crime and 43 increases. fo sum, the results of the state-specific effects of SI law suggests that for most states, the passage of SI Jaws are positively associated with violent crime rates. Examination of the SI law linle-trend variables for individual states reveals that cities in two states (Arkansas and Louisiana) show a statistically significant decrease in at least three violent categories without showing a significant increase in any category. Th.is result differs from Ayres and Donohue (2003a), who fom1d a positive association between passage of SI laws and violent crime rates in these states. On the other hand, the significant increases for cities in Pennsylvania and Nevada are similar to Ayres and Donohue's findings. Perhaps the most important finding in Table 2 is the lack of a significant relationship betwep.n passage of SI laws and homicide rates in Florida. As noted above, the

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TABLE2 The State-Specific Impact of Shall-lssue Laws on '1.olf!nt Crime

Dependent Variable: Natural Leg of the Corresponding Violent Crime Type Per 100,000 Reside_nt Population Homicide Robbery ASS111ilt Rope State Coefficient tratio Coejficient t ratio Coefficient t ratio Coefficient t mtio

Alaska -.021 -1.31 ~ dcA2 ::J!l!l dlJlo .Im ll.51 Arizona .!l£1. Mli Jl22 2.91 .015 1.92 Jl32 3.34 Arkansas =3.21 =-M!! -5.98 ~ -6.07 -.009 -0.75 Florida -.008 -0.81 =,!lZll -3.26 .m.a 2.10 Jl1.Z 2.76 Georgia -.020 1.37 .011 129 JlY 5.61 -.005 -0.61 Idaho -.010 --0.59 .!!ZJl 5.38 Ma 8.60 .017 1.85 Kentucky .l!52 2.84 .017 1.43 ,,Jl1li -2.17 cMl! -4.10 Louisiana =cJM5 -2.06 =,!Ml. -3.60 cJl.SD.. -5.% .001 0.12 M°LSsissippi -.023 -1.94 -.007 --0.91 -.002 --0.33 .Im 4.78 Nevada .llJi 8.19 Jl2I! 9,08 .02.1 4.13 JIM 8.35 North Carolina .010 0.58 .002 0.23 ,ll22. 2.15 -.004 --0.31 Oki~oma -.014 --0.97 =.!122 -3.07 -.010 -1.61 -020 -2.14 m Oregon -.OfJ7 --0.56 .002 0.35 &12 9.55 -.001 -0.26 iii' Pennsylvar.ia ,ll6ll 4.83 .ms 4.33 .osa 7.22 .&.; 6.55 Cl) South Carolina -.032 -0.% .!119 1.25 -.019 -1.08 =,lllZ ~ :::s 2.30 .019 1.82 .Dill 0.15 .016 1.75 CT Tennessee .im Cl) Texas -.014 -0,96 .llZ6 2.93 .006 0.94 -.003 -0.4s3 Utah .OIJ4 0.07 .035 1.71 .m 2.79 .009 0.19 ca Virginia. -fil4 --0.83 ~ 2.48 .034 1.96 -.009 -0.50 Cl Cl) "' (continued) ~ -"' m ~ c., 0• coOl

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:;;:"'

TABLE 2 (continued)

Dependent Variable: Nnturnl Log ofthe Ctmesp1.li1tfiilg Violent Crime Type Per 100,000 Resident Papttlatimt Homicide Robbery Assault Rape State Coefficient tratt"o C'.cefficient tratio ~cient tratio Crefficient t r.itio

Summary Negative and significant 2 5 3 3 Negative and no!: significant 9 1 4 6 Positive and significant 5 6 7 5 Positive and not si_F~t 3 7 5 5 NOTE: Th.is table presents violent crime regressions similar to those reported in Table 1 except that state-specific SI law time,-,trend variables are entered instead of the aggregate SI law tjme-trend variable. Coefficients that are significant at the .OS level are displayed in bold. Coefficients that are significant at m the .01 level are both. underlined and displayed in,bold. iii' CD :II CT CD ca C, CD .n ~ w 0 Ol ID

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disaggregated SI law analyses conducted by several researchers (e.g., Ayres & Donohue, 2003a; Black & Nagin, 1998; Marvell, .1999) revealed large drops in homicide .rates for Florida counties after its SI law, and they concluded that Florida is largely respon­ sible for the negative correlations observed between passage of SI laws and homicide when using aggregate law variables. The rea­ son for the disparate findings between those and the present study might be because there was a decline limited to rural areas or because of problems with the NAC)D county data.

Results for Specific Control Variables in Table 1 Finally, the results for the control variables in Table 1 yield sev­ eral key findings for future macro-level studies attempting to explain temporal variation in violent crime. First, increases in the number of African Americans and persons living below the pov­ erty line do not appear to increase violent crime, except that the former may increase robbery and the latter may increase rape. These results contradict the findings of most cross-sectional stud­ ies, which typically find both of these structural covariates to be positively associated to violent crime rates, especially homicide (Kovandzic et al., 1998; Land et al., 1990; Parker et al., 1999). The most likely explanation for the disparate findings is that cross­ sectional studies are reproducing cross-sectional variation pat­ terns established at some point in the distant past. That is, at some point in time increases in the size of the African American and the number of persons living in poverty lead to increases in violent crime rates, and a subsequent pattern of cross-sectional variation was established, but this pattern was established well before the study period examined here. Second, increases in state imprison­ ment rates are associated with lower homicide and robbery, although the elasticities are somewhat smaller than those found in state- and national-level shidies (Levitt, 1996; Marvell & Moody, 1997). As expected, increases in the number of persons between ages 18 to 24 are systematically related to increase in homicide and robbery. Finally, the number of families headed by females appears to be positively related to homicide rates. Although a common finding in macro-level cross-sectional stud­ ies, to our knowledge, this is the first time this variable has been related to cross temporal changes in homicide rates.

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316 HOtvIIODE STUDIES / November 2005

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

Our results provide little support for the findings by Lott and Mustard (1997) and Lott (1998b, 2000) that SI laws reduce violent crime. This does not automatically refute the theory that criminals are deterred by a greater possibility that victims are armed, because it is possible that this occurs butis counterbalanced by the theorized criminogenic effects of increased gun carrying that we discussed earlier. It seems unlikely, however, that the two would happen to balance so precisely for most violent crimes. More likely there is no detenent effect. A likely reason is that the laws do not significantly alter rates of civilian gun carrying for self-pro­ tection ru1d thus do not increase actual risks to criminals (Kleck, 1997, p. 372; Kovandzic & Marvell, 2003). Only about 1% of the adult population has concealed handgun permits (Kovandzic & Marvell, 2003), whereas survey research, such as the National Self-Defense Survey (Kleck & Gertz, 1998), indicate that at least 8% of adults carry a gun for protection each year. This suggests that upward of 90% of all self-protection canying is done in viola­ tion of concealed weapon laws. To the extent that jurisdictions with higher levels of permitted gun carrying also have higher rates of total self-protection carrying, it seems unlikely that such a modest increase in the number of prospective victims carrying guns in public places is perceptible to criminals (Kleck, 1997, p. 372). Also, the National Gun Policy Survey fmmd that 73% of adult gun carriers with permits reported no change in their level of gun carrying after they obtained a carry permit (Smith, 2001, p. 15). Most of the permits issued under SI laws, therefore, do not represent additional 1:,>un carrying. It is .important to stress, however, that the essential factor, according to tile deterrence hypothesis, is criminals' perception of the laws' impacts. To our knowledge, there is no information on this topic, and it is a prime candidate for further research. Although the problems with prior research on SI laws have largely been methodological, the impetus for increasing support for such laws is based on a simplistic view of criminal behavior. Proponents of SI laws have relied on early versions of tational choice theory, put forth by economists, but contemporary ver­ sions posit more complex explanations for criminal behavior. The basic idea that criminals make choices based on an analys\s of

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the perceived costs and benefits remains; however, we recognize that offenders' rationality is "bounded" or "limited" (Clarke & Cornish, 2002, p. 25). Offenders do not simply add and subtract the perceived costs and benefits of crime as efficiently as eco­ nomic theory suggests. The context in which they make their choices,including background factors and situational opportuni­ ties, is given greater consideration and specification in contempo­ rary rational choice theories. In addition, although economic theories of choice assume indi­ viduals use similar cost-benefit analyses, criminological rational choice theories consider a wider range of costs and benefits and explore in greater detail individual differences in the criminal decision-making process (Cornish & Clarke, 1986; Paternoster & Bachman, 2002; Tittle, 2000). Even if criminals have timely infor­ mation regarding the passage of Sllaws and the number of people lawfully carrying guns in public, such information is unlikely to have a: significant impact on their behavior and violent crime rates. According to ethnographic research on active offenders, most crime is opportunistic and does not involve elaborate plan­ ning and potential costs are given relatively little consideration (Jacobs, 2000; Jacobs, Topalli, & Wright, 2003; Shover, 1996; Wright & Decker, 1994, 1997). Even when offenders do calculate the costs, they also factor in their ability to manage or eliminate these poten­ tial costs (Hochstetler & Copes, 2003; Miller & Jacobs, 1998). Research suggests that criminals are extremely confident about theh' abilities to conh·ol a situation and deal with whatever may arise, including encountering an armed victim (Jacobs, 2000; Wright & Decker, 1997), Although the focus of the rational choice perspective as delin­ eated by Comish and Clarke (1986) concentrates on the impact of decision making on individual criminal behavior, the perspective has also been applied at the macro level. Routine activity theory explains variations in crime rates over time and place. Cohen and Felson (1979) contend that crime rates will be higher in the pres­ ence of motivated offenders, suitable targets, and in the absence of capable guardians and that the convergence of these three ele­ ments is dependent on the routine activities of persons in every­ day life. The presence of motivated offenders is assumed to be a constant; but the number of young males, particularly those residing in poor urban areas, is probably a better measure of the

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318 HOWCIOE STUDIES/ November 2005

number of motivated offenders. Depending on the type of crime to be studied, definitions of "suitable" targets vaiy, but for violent crime, the profile of victims mirrors that of offenders (i.e., young, poor, non-White males residing ln urban areas). Guardianship concerns any measure-human or nonhuman-,which would make a target difficult if not impossible to access. In this case, a gun serves as a capable guardian over a person. Theoretically,vio­ lent crime rates should decline with an increase in guardianship (i.e.,potential targets are armed),regardless oflevels of motivated offenders or suitable targets. Howeve1; because the ability of everyday routines to impact violent crime rates is dependent on the convergence of all three elements in time and space, it is unlikely that the passage of SI laws would significantly reduce violent crime rates because permit acquisition, much like gun ownership in general, is higher ainong Whites, middle-aged per­ sons, richer people, and in rural and suburban areas-patterns that are all the reverse of the way in which criminal victimization is distributed (Hood & Neeley, 2000). We should point out, however, that neither the present study nor previous evaluations of SI!aws have explicitly measured total rates of civiliai1 gun carrying. Consequently, conclusions regard­ ing the net effect of civilian gun carrying on violent crime rates based on this body ofresearch are not warranted." That is, the lack of a negative correlation between passage of SI laws and violent crime rates observed in the present study tells us nothing about the broad effects of civilian gun carrying rates on violent crime, especially homicide. Moreover, if "citizens arming" did reduce violent crime, much of the effect may have nothing to do with gun-carrying rates. The best documented effect of citizen arming on crime is the effect of ach,al defensive use of guns on whether crime victims are injured. Because homicide, by definition, requires that a victim be injured, anything that reduces injury is very likely to also reduce fatal injury. The evidence on the effects of actual defensive gun use uniformly indicates that it signifi- . cantly reduces the likelihood of victim injmy (see Kleck, 1997, chap. 5, for a review of the liternture). Neither the possible, albeit undocumented, effects of civilian gun carrying rates nor the docu­ mented effects of actual defensive gun use in any way require that states adopt SI laws for these effects to occur.

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NOTES

1. Analysis of.revocation data by Lott (2000, p. 221-222) provides little support for the Zimring-CookhypoUi.esls (i.e., gun violence among permit holders is nearly nonexistent), with less. than 0.5% of pennlts issued being revoked for any type of fireanns-related viola lions. 2. A summary of macro-level studies examining the impact of SI laws on crime rates by Kovandzic and Ma.rvelI (2003) can be found on the Internet at http:/ /www.nunarvell .com/ data.html. Studies examining the impact of SI laws on mass public shootings (Duwe, Kovandzic, & Moody, 2002) and police deaths (Mustard, 2001) are not included. 3. Lott and Mustard (1997) aL"lo examined the possibility that passage of SI laws would have differential effects on homidd~ rates for adults and juvenile.s. They find that passage of SI Jaws leads to reductions in homicide rates for both adults and juveniles. The authors argue that this evidence is not contradictory to the SI law efficacy hypothesis because (a) criminals may leave areas where adults carry concealed hand gum, and thus aJl a.ge groups benefit from 1:he increase in permitted gun carrying by adults, and (b) gun-carrying adults can protect juveniles in violent confrontations when they are physically present. Weare not persuaded .by either of these claims. 4. An extensive examination of the county-level crime datasets by Marvell (1999) also revealed extreme measurement problems with the county-level crime datasets produced by the NACJD. When comparing the sum of the county cr.hnedatalnstates as compiled by the NACJD to the state totals reported in the FBI's Crime in fhe llnited Stales, whkh adjusts estimates whenagendes fail to reporl, Marvell found the NACJD totals in 16 states to be off by at least 50% fron1. 1982 to 1985 ane murderers make up only 14.6% of the overall prison popula lion (U.S. BureauofJusticeStatistlcs~2003). ln any event, delet­ ing prison population from the homicide regressions has no impact on the results present­ ed in Table 1. 10. Results of these alternate model specifications are available upon request from the senior author. · 11. We thankone of the anonymous reviewers for pointing this out to 1.1s.

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least squares coefficient~, Jmm1al of Econometrics, 221 323-,338, Harrison, G. W., Kennison, D. F., & Macedon, K. E. (2000). Crime and concealed gun laws: A reconsiderntion. Unpublished manuscript, University of South Carolina. Hendry, D. F. (1995). Dynamic econometrics. New York: Oxford University Press. Hood, M. V. lll, & Neeley, G. W. (2000). Packi11' jn fuehood: Examining assumptions of con­ cealed-handgun research, Social Science Quarterly~ 81., 523-.537. Hochstetler, A., & Copes, H. (2003). Managing f(:!ar to commit felony theft. InP. Cromwell (Ed.), Iti tlieir own words: Criminals on crime (3rd ed., pp. 87-98). Los Angeles: Roxbury. Hsiao, C. (1986). Analysis of ptinel data. New Yr)rk: Cambridge University Press. Jacobs, B. A. (2000). Robbing drug dealero: Vtv/ence beyond the law. New York: Ald.ifJ.e de Gntyter.

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L9-nd, K. C., McCall, P. L,1 & Cohen, L. E. (1990), Siructuralcovariates of homicide rates:Aie iliere any hwariances across time and social space? American Journal ofSociology, 95, 92.2- 963. Levitt, S. D. (1996). Tite effect of prison population slze on crime rates: Evidence from prison overcrowding litigation. Quarterty Journal of Economics, 111, 319-351. Levin, A., & Lin, C. F. (1992). Unit root tests in panel data: Asymptotic aml finite-sample proper- ties (Diecu.ssion Paper No. 92-93). San Diego: University of CaJifornia, San Diego. Lott, J. R. (1998a). 'The concealed-handgun debale.Jourttnf ofLegal Studies, 27, 221-243. Lott,J. R. {1998b). More guns less crime. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Lott, J. R. (2000). More guns lt.ss cri1ne. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Lott, J. R.1 & Mustard, D. B. (1997). Crime, deterrence, and right-to-carry concealed hand# guns. /ournal of Legal Studies, 26, 1-68. Ludwig, J. (1998). Concealed-gun--canying Laws and violent crime: Evidence from state panel data. I11lernational Rev;w ofl,.Liw and Economic:$, 18, 239-254. Malb-,,M. D., & Targonski, J. (2002). A note on t.he use of county-level VCR data. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 18, 297-318. Marvell, T. B. {1999). Outline of remarks conceming Lott and Mustard e-valuation often "shall­ issue" handgun permit laws. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Soci­ ety of Criminology, Toronto, Canada. Marvell, T. B. (2001). The impactofbanningjuvenile gun possession. T11e Journal of I.11wand Ei:o,wmics, 4.4, 691-714. Marvell, T. B., & Moody, C. E. (1994). Prison population gmwth and crime reduction. Jour­ nal ofQmmtil-ative Criminology, 10, 109~14-0. MarveU,. T. B., & Moody, C. E. (1996). Spedf:ication problems, police levels, and crime rates. Ctiminology, 34, 609-64.-6. Marvell, T. B., & Moody, C. E. (1997). 'Ihe impact of prison growth on homicide . .Homicide Studies, 1, ·205-233. MarveU, T. 8., & Moody, C. E. {2001). Tiie letJml effects of three strikes laws, Journal of I.egal St11dies, .30, 89~ 106. McDowall, D., Loftin, C., & W~ersema, B. (1995a). Additional discussion about easing con­ cealed firearms laws. Jottrnal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 86, 221-?.26. McDo wall, D., Loftin, C., & Wiersema, B. (1995b). Easing concealed firearms laws: Effects

011 homicide in tlu·ee slates, Journal of Criminal Law and Crimi11ology, 861 193-206. Miller,J., & Jacobs, B. A. (1998). Crack dealing, gender and arrest avoidance. Social Prob­ lems, 45, SSD-569. Moody, C. E. (2001). 'Iesting for Ute effects of concealed weapons laws: Specification errors and robustness, Journnl Of Law and Economic.s, 44, 799-813. Moulton, B. R.. (1990).An iJ.lustratio11 of a pitfall in estimating the effects of aggregate vari­ ables on micro uni.ts. Review of Economics and Statistics, 72, 334-338.

Eisenberg Deel. Ex. 3 -076

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Must.uxl, D. (2001). The impact of gun laws on police deaths. Journal of Lmv and Economics, 44, 635-658. Olson, D. E., & Maltz, M. D. (2001). Right-to-carry concealed weapon laws and homicide Jn large U.S counties: The effect on weapon types, victim characteristics, and victim­ offender relationship. Journal of Law and Economics, 44, 747-771. Parker, K. F, McCall, P. L., & Land, K. C. (1999). Detemtlning social-structural predictors of homicide: Units of analysis and related methodological conc0.ms. In M. ~. Smith & M.A. Zahn (Eds.),Homicide: Asourcebookof social research (pp.127-134). Thousand Oaks, CA:Sage. . Pesara11,H. M., & Smith, R. (1995). Estimating long-.runrelationshipsfromdynarnlc hetero­ geneous PID)els, fournal of Econometrics, 68, 79-113. Pindyck, R. S., & Rublnfe1d, D. L. (1991). Econometric models and economic forecasts. New York: Mc:Grnw~lJilL Plassmann, R, & Tideman, T. N. (2001). Dm~s the right to <:ar.ry concealed handguns deter countable crimes? Only a count analysis can say. Journal ofliHv and Economics, 44, 771- 798, Plassrnann,R, & Whitley, J. (2003). Confirming mo:re guns, less crime. Stanford T...11w R1:mfow, 55, 1315-1370. Po Isby, D. D. {199.5). Firearms costs, fitea.r.rn benefits and the limits of knowledge.}Oumal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 86, 207-220. Reiss, A J., Jr., & Roth,J. A. (1993). Understanding and prevef!.ling violence. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. Sampson, R. J. (1986). Crime in cities. fn A J. Reiss Jr. & M. Tonry (JJds.), Communities and crime (pp, 271.-312). Chicago_: University of Chlcago Press. Shover, N. (1996). Great pretenders. Boulde~ CO: Westview.. Smith, 'f. {2001). 2001 National gun policy survey of the Nation11I Opinio11 Research Cente·r: · Research findings. Chicago: University of Chicago. Tittle, C.R. (2000). Theoretical d.evclopments·:incrlminology. In U.S.Department ofJustice, Office of Juc;tice Programs (Ed.), Tire nature of crime: Continuity and change: Volume 1 (pp. 51-101). Washington, DC: U.S.Govemment Printing Office.

U.S. Burea.u ofJustkeStatisilcs. (2001), Source book of criminnl justice statistics 2001. WashingA ton, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. U;S. Bureau of Justice Statistics; (2003). Prisoni:ro in 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Govel"n­ ment Printing Office. U.S. Census Bureau. (1983). CmmhJ and city data book, 1983. Washington, DC: U.S. Govem­ ment Printing Office. U.S. Census Bureau. (1994). Caimty and city data 1100k, 1994. Washington, DC: U.S. Govern­ ment Printing Office. Verni ck, J. S., & Hepburn, L. M. (2003). Ex11rnining state and federal gun laws: Tnmds from 1970- 1999. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins School of Public Ifoaltll. Vieraitis, L. M. (2000). Income inequality, poverty, and viofontaime: A.review of the empir­ ical evidence. Social Pathology, 6, 24-45. Webster, D. W., Vemick, J. S., Ludwig, J., & Lester, K. (1997). Flawed gun policy researdl could endanger public safety. American Journal of.Public I.[ealtlt, 87, 918-921. Wooldridge, J.M. (2000). I11lrod11clory econometrics. Mason, OH South-Western College Publishing. Wright, R. T., & Decker, S. fl. (1994). B11rglars 011 the job. Boston: Northeastern University Press. Wright, R T., & Decker, S. H. (1997). Anned robbers in action: Stickups and street Cltl~ titre. Boston: Northeastern University Press, Wu, Y. (1996). Are real exchange rates nonstationary? Evidence from a panel data set. Jour­ nal ofMoney, Credit, and Banking, 28, 54-63.

Eisenberg Deel. Ex. 3 -077

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Kovandzic et al. I CONC'EALED HANDGUN LAWS 323

Zimrlng, F. E. (1968). [s gun contrf?l likely to reduce violent killings? Univen1ity of Chicago IAw Review, as, 72l-7W,

Tomislav V. Kovandzic is an associate professor in the Department of Justice Sciences at the University of Alnbama at Birmingham. He received his Ph.D. in criminolog,J from Florida State University in 1999. Thomas B. Maroell is a lawyer-sociologist and is director of Justec Research. Lynne M. Vieraitis is an assistant professor in the Department of Justice Sci­ ences at the. University of Alabama al Birmingham. She received her Ph.D. in criminology from Florida State University in 1999.

Eisenberg Deel. Ex. 3 -078

407 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 63-6 11033141, Filed 10/16/17 DktEntry: Page17-3, 1Page of 13 85 Pageof 232 ID #:2609

EXHIB1T4

Eisenberg Decl. Ex. 4 - 001 408 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 63-6 11033141, Filed 10/16/17 DktEntry: Page17-3, 2Page of 13 86 Pageof 232 ID #:2610 KIM RANEY July 27, 2017 FLANAGAN vs CA ATTORNEY GENERAL 1 1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

3 WESTERN DIVISION

4

5 MICHELLE FLANAGAN, SAMUEL GOLDEN, DOMINIC NARDONE, 6 JACOB PERKIO, and THE CALIFORNIA RIFLE & PISTOL 7 ASSOCIATION,

8 Plaintiffs,

9 vs. CASE NO. 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS 10 CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL XAVIER BECERRA, in her 11 official capacity as Attorney General of the State of 12 California, SHERIFF JAMES McDONNELL, in his official 13 capacity as Sheriff of Los Angeles County, California, 14 and DOES 1-10,

15 Defendants. 16

17

18 DEPOSITION OF KIM RANEY

19

20 July 27, 2017 - 10:44 a.m. 21

22 300 South Spring Street Los Angeles, California 23

24 Dawn Schetne, CSR No. 5140 25

800.211.DEPO (3376) EsquireSo/utions.com Eisenberg Decl. Ex. 4 - 002 409 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 63-6 11033141, Filed 10/16/17 DktEntry: Page17-3, 3Page of 13 87 Pageof 232 ID #:2611 KIM RANEY July 27, 2017 FLANAGAN vs CA ATTORNEY GENERAL 2 1 APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

2

3 For the Plaintiffs:

4 MICHEL & ASSOCIATES, P.C. SEAN A. BRADY, ESQ. 5 180 East Ocean Boulevard, Suite 200 Long Beach, California 90802 6 562.216.4464 562. ·216. 4445 · Fax 7 [email protected]

8 For the Defendant Attorney General of the State of 9 California:

10 STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 11 OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL P. PATTY LI, DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 12 455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 San Francisco, California 94102-7004 13 415.703.1577 415.703.1234 Fax 14 [email protected] 15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

800.211.DEPO (3376) EsquireSolutions. com Eisenberg Decl. Ex. 4 - 003 410 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 63-6 11033141, Filed 10/16/17 DktEntry: Page17-3, 4Page of 13 88 Pageof 232 ID #:2612 KIM RANEY July 27, 2017 FLANAGAN vs CA ATTORNEY GENERAL 3 1 INDEX OF EXAMINATION 2 3 WITNESS: KIM RANEY

4 EXAMINATION PAGE 5 By Mr. Brady 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

16 17 18 19 20

21 22

23 24

25

800.211.DEPO (3376) ~ESQQ!Ji"~ EsquireSo/utions.com Eisenberg Decl. Ex. 4 - 004 411 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 63-6 11033141, Filed 10/16/17 DktEntry: Page17-3, 5Page of 13 89 Pageof 232 ID #:2613 KIM RANEY July 27, 2017 FLANAGAN vs CA ATTORNEY GENERAL 4

1 INDEX TO EXHIBITS

2

3 Exhibit Description Page

4 1 Plaintiffs' amended notice 5 of deposition of defendant's 5 expert witness Kim Raney

6 2 Expert witness report of 9 former Covina Chief of Police 7 Kim Raney

8 3 Article entitled Texas 61 Open-Carry Laws Blurred Lines 9 Between Suspects and Marchers

10 4 One-page document entitled 77 San Mateo County Sheriff's 11 Office "Unloaded Open Carry"

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

800.211.DEPO (3376) EsquireSolutions. com Eisenberg Decl. Ex. 4 - 005 412 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 63-6 11033141, Filed 10/16/17 DktEntry: Page17-3, 6Page of 13 90 Pageof 232 ID #:2614 KIM RANEY July 27, 2017 FLANAGAN vs CA ATTORNEY GENERAL 5

1 DEPOSITION OF KIM RANEY

2 July 27, 2017

3

4 KIM RANEY,

5 having been first duly sworn, testifies as follows:

6 EXAMINATION

7 BY MR. BRADY:

8 Q. Good morning. My name is Sean Brady. I am

9 counsel for the plaintiffs in the matter of Flanagan v 10 Becerra.

11 Can you state your name for the record, please. 12 A. Kim, K-i-m, Raney, R-a-n-e-y. 13 Q. May I call you Chief Raney?

14 A. Chief, Kim is fine. I'm retired.

15 Q. Okay. I'd like to mark as Exhibit 1.

16 (Exhibit 1 was marked.) 17 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

18 BY MR. BRADY: 19 Q. Have you seen this document before? 20 A. I have. 21 Q. I'm sorry. You have? 22 A. I believe I have. 23 Q. And it is a deposition notice with your name on

24 it asking that you appear today at this location at

25 9:00 A.M., although we agreed to 10:30 start time. Is

800.211.DEPO (3376) EsquireSo/utions.com Eisenberg Decl. Ex. 4 - 006 413 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 63-6 11033141, Filed 10/16/17 DktEntry: Page17-3, 7Page of 13 91 Pageof 232 ID #:2615 KIM RANEY July 27, 2017 FLANAGAN vs CA ATTORNEY GENERAL 104

1 any personal experience in the state of California with

2 lawful open carry, so wouldn't your conclusion that law

3 enforcement resources will be diverted -- what else

4 could it be based on other than speculation?

5 A. It's based upon my experience in the state of

6 California, 39 years of experience, 15 years as chief of

7 police, knowing my communities, knowing the region,

8 knowing people's concerns about visible firearms, and

9 some of the things that have gone on that are alarming

10 to a lot of people when a firearm is present. It's

11 based upon that.

12 Q. So, then, is it -- let me see if I -- I don't

13 want to misstate your testimony. Your statement that

14 critical law enforcement resources will be diverted 15 unnecessarily is based on your understanding of how

16 Californians, at least in the Los Angeles area, would

17 respond to seeing people carrying firearms in public; is

18 that a fair --

19 A. That's a fair assessment to the back half of

20 that. The first half deals with the current environment

21 that exists in California with staffing levels, with

22 POST realignment issues that are occurring in the state.

23 It's kind of a compound situation, but, yeah, that's the

24 back half of that. It's my opinion that law enforcement

25 resources would be diverted to handle calls from the

800.211.DEPO (3376) ~ESQQIJi~ EsquireSo/utions. com Eisenberg Decl. Ex. 4 - 007 414 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 63-6 11033141, Filed 10/16/17 DktEntry: Page17-3, 8Page of 13 92 Pageof 232 ID #:2616 KIM RANEY July 27, 2017 FLANAGAN vs CA ATTORNEY GENERAL 105

1 public about seeing open-carry firearms in our

2 communities.

3 Q. Have you seen any studies on Californians'

4 views of open carry?

5 A. No.

6 Q. Any surveys?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Polls?

9 A. No. 10 Q. Have you seen any from an open-carry

11 jurisdiction? And when I say any, a study.

12 A. I might have seen some figures in the context

13 of, you know, newspaper articles and different things

14 that I've read. .

15 Q. About the populous's feelings on the subject?

16 A. I'm sure that was within some of the articles, 17 yeah.

18 Q. But that wasn't included in your report? That

19 didn't influence your conclusions of your report? 20 A. No.

21 Q. I'd like to direct you to paragraph 28 of your

22 report, line 20.

23 It says: The presence of a firearm carried

24 openly, or (sometimes) concealed, in places visited by

25 the public, including parks, open retail or environment

800.211.DEPO (3376) ~ESQQIRJ~ EsquireSolutions. com Eisenberg Decl. Ex. 4 - 008 415 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 63-6 11033141, Filed 10/16/17 DktEntry: Page17-3, 9Page of 13 93 Pageof 232 ID #:2617 KIM RANEY July 27, 2017 FLANAGAN vs CA ATTORNEY GENERAL 106

1 venues, theaters, restaurants, or community or political

2 events, has the high potential to create panic and chaos

3 and would result in an immediate law enforcement

4 response.

5 Did I accurately quote your report?

6 A. You did.

7 Q. Do you agree with the contents of that

8 provision?

9 A. I do. 10 Q. Can you tell me on what you base your 11 conclusion? 12 A. Again, on the fact that people in an urban 13 environment want to feel safe in their communities and 14 where they recreate or they worship or they go to dine 15 or they take their families, and in the environment we 16 have in California, it's my opinion that the presence of 17 firearms is only going to create immediate anxiety, 18 fear, and result in law enforcement having to respond. 19 Q. But you didn't consult any studies or reports 20 or surveys in making this conclusion; correct? 21 A. Correct. 22 Q. And you didn't ask officers from open-carry 23 jurisdictions about how their populous reacts?

24 A. No.· Their population doesn't live in

25 California.

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1 Q. So it's a -- you don't think that the reactions

2 of, say, the residents of Colorado is relevant when

3 talking about Californians?

4 A. I think it has to be taken into consideration.

5 Q. Have you heard of any events or anecdotes where

6 the open carry of a firearm created panic or chaos?

7 A. I think in light of what has happened,

8 unfortunately, in a lot of high-profile, high-visibility

9 mass shootings, that the presence of a gun automatically

10 creates concern for those constituents, customers,

11 whatever, residents, and they've been preconditioned by

12 either their environment or by the media, and there

13 would be an immediate call for law enforcement services,

14 i.e., a movie theater, in light of what happened in

15 California, in light of what happened in Florida.

16 I mean, I don't want to run down the litany of

17 mass murders, but I think that's something that as law

18 enforcement executives we have to understand. Whether

19 we agree or not, that's the reality of the people that

20 live in our communities. That's their concern.

21 Q. In reaching your conclusions on that point, did

22 you research whether shootings are more common in

23 jurisdictions where open carry is lawful?

24 A. I did not.

25 Q. So you don't know if there are more shootings

800.211.DEPO (3376) EsquireSolutions. com Eisenberg Decl. Ex. 4 - 010 417 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 11033141, 63-6 Filed DktEntry: 10/16/17 17-3, Page Page 11 95of 13of 232 Page ID #:2619 KIM RANEY July 27. 2017 FLANAGAN vs CA ATrORNEY GENERAL 139 1 DEPOSITION ERRATA SHEET

2

3

4 Our Assignment No. J0623063 5 Case Caption:· Flanagan vs. California Attorney General 6 Xavier Becerra

7

8 DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY 9 I declare under penalty of perjury 10 that I have read the entire transcript of 11 my Deposition taken in the above captioned matter 12 or the same has been read to me, and 13 the same is true and accurate, save and 14 except for changes and/or corrections, if 15 any, as indicated by me on the DEPOSITION 16 ERRATA SHEET hereof, with the understanding I 17 that I offer these changes as if still under I 18 oath. -s::r:' I 19 Signed on the J-\ day of

20 ,_f=_u_c..._~_':::;._-•_-___ , 2 0 I J f 21

22 23 24

25

800.211.DEPO (3376) EsquireSolutions.com Eisenberg Decl. Ex. 4 - 011 418 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 11033141, 63-6 Filed DktEntry: 10/16/17 17-3, Page Page 12 96of 13of 232 Page ID #:2620 KIM RANEY July 27, 2017 FLANAGAN vs CAATIORNEY GENERAL 140 1 DEPOSITION ERRATA SHEET 2 Page No. 28 Line No. 12 Change to: properly supervised my 3 before, so task from the chief was to 4 Reason for change: ------Mistranscription 5 Page No. 29 Line No. 23 Chang·e to: the middle of one

6 of the worst crises of their life, so 7 Reason for change: ------Mistranscription 8 Page No. 31 Line No. 4 Change to: they're arraigned. And if they're remanded into custody 9 10 Reason for change: ------Mistranscription 11 Page No. 31 Line No. 8 Change to standards and 12 training for corrections, the grand jury, and 13 Reason for change: Mistranscription 14 Page No. 33 Line No. 7-8 Change to after the LA riots 15 and Los Angeles County was woefully unprepared 16 Reason for change: Mistranscription ------There was another 17 Page No. 48 Line No. 17 Change to: ------18 one. An army recruiter 19 Reason for change: Mistranscription 62 10 m;y concerns about 20 Page No. ___Line No. Change to: ___~~----- open carry, and I think I used an 21 22 Reason for change: ------Mistrancription 23 24 25

800.211.DEPO (3376) EsquiraSoJutions.com Eisenberg Decl. Ex. 4 - 012 419 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 11033141, 63-6 Filed DktEntry: 10/16/17 17-3, Page Page 13 97of 13of 232 Page ID #:2621 KIM RANEY July 27, 2017 FLANAGAN vs CA ATTORNEY GENERAL 141 1 DEPOSITION ERRATA SHEET

2 Page No. 102 Line No. 23 Change to justice system

3 over the last five years or so, and

4 Reason for change: Mistranscription 22 5 Page No. 104 Line No. Change to post-realignment

6 issues that are occurring in the state . 7 Reason for change: __M_i.:;.s.:;.t_r.:;.an.:;..:;.s_c_r.:..ip::..:..t.:;.i.:;.on ______

8 Page No. 110 Line No. 12 Change to: multiple purposes,

9 but one of them is the deescalation 10 Reason for change: Mistranscription

11 Page No. 118 Line No. 7 Change to: happened. Police chiefs are giving that authority to the 12 13 Reason for change: ·------Mistranscription 14 Page No. 118 Line No._9__ Change to:_m_a_k_i_'n_g_t_h_e____ _ 15 Second Amendment a big issue, and so the police 16 Reason for change: 17 Page No. __ Line No . ___Change to: ______18 19 Reason for change: 20 Page No. ____Line No. ___Change to: __~~--~------~ 21 22 Reason for change: 23

24 25

800.211.DEPO (3376) ~ ESQlllE.J.;;. EsqulreSolufions. com Eisenberg Decl. Ex. 4 - 013 420 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 63-7 11033141, Filed 10/16/17 DktEntry: Page17-3, 1Page of 29 98 Pageof 232 ID #:2622

EXHIBIT 5

Eisenberg Decl. Ex. 5 - 001 421 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 63-7 11033141, Filed 10/16/17 DktEntry: Page17-3, 2Page of 29 99 Pageof 232 ID #:2623

Guy A. Rossi July 17, 2017

IN THE ONITED S'.I'ATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHELLE FLANAGAN, SAMUEL GOLDEN, DOMINIC NARDONE, JACOB PERKIO, and THE CALIFORNIA RIFLE & PISTOL ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiffs,

v. No.: 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS

CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL XAV.IER BECER=, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of California, et al.,

Defendants.

Deposition Upon Oral Examination of:

Guy A. Rossi

Location: Alliance Court Reporting, Inc. 120 East Avenue, Suite 200 Rochester, New York 14604

Date: July 17, 2017

Time: 12:30 p.rn.

Reported By: KIMBERLY A. BONSIGNORE

Alliance Court Reporting, Inc.

120 East Avenue, Suite 200

Rochester, New York 14604

U.S. LEGAL SUPPORT (415) 362-4346

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·Guy A. Rossi July 17, 2017

1 A P P E A R A N C E S

2 Appearing (via videoconference) on Behalf of Plaintiffs: 3 Sean A. Brady, Esq. 4 Michel & Associates, P.C. 180 East Ocean Boulevard, Suite 200 5 Long Beach, California 90802 [email protected] 6

7 Appearing (via videoconference) on Behalf of Defendants: 8 P. Patty Li, Esq. 9 Deputy Attorney General 455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 10 San Francisco, California 94102-7004 [email protected] 11

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Guy A. Rossi July 17, 2017

1 W I T N E S S

2 Name Examination by Page

3 ------

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Guy A. Rossi July 17, 2017

. 1 E X H I B I T S

2 Exhibit Description Marked ID'ed

3 ------

4 EXH 1 Defendant Xavier Becerra's Notice of Deposition of Expert Witness 5 Guy Rossi 7 7

6 EXH 2 Expert Report of Guy Rossi 7 7

7 EXH 3 An article titled "Defending Against Physical Attack, An 8 Interview With Guy Ross" 74 74

9 EXH 4 Expert Witness Repot Of Former Covina Chief Of Police,Kim Raney 83 83 10 EXH 5 An article titled "Gun Carry Laws 11 Can Complicate Police Interactions" 103 103 12 EXH 6 Amicus brief - Peruta v. County. of 13 San Diego 119 119

14 * * * 15

16 EXHIBITS PREVIOUSLY MARKED

17 Exhibit Description Page

18 ------

19 EXH

20 (No Previously Marked Exhibits Presented) * * * 21

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Guy A. Rossi July 17, 2017

1 D O C U M E N T RE QUE S .TS

2 Request Page

3 ------

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5 (No Documents Requested) * * * 6

7 C E R T I F I E D Q U E S T ~ 0 N S

8 Question Page

9 ------~------

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Guy A. Rossi July 17, 2017

1 MONDAY, JULY 17, 2017;

2 (Proceedings in the above-titled matter

3 commencing at 12:27 p.m.)

4 * * *

5 GUY A. ROSSI,

6 called herein as a witness, first being sworn,

7 testified as follows:

8 EXAMINATION BY MS. LI:

9 Q. My name is Patty Li, and I represent the

10 Attorney General of California in this action, which

11 is the Flanagan versus Becerra matter.

12 And I'm going to ask you to state your

13 full name and spell your last name just for the

14 record.

15 A. Sure. My name is Guy Anthony Rossi, and

16 it's spelled R-0-S-S-I.

17 Q. And do you understand that you are

18 testifying today under the same oath that you would

19 take if you testified in a courtroom?

20 A. Absolutely.

21 Q. And is there anything that would prevent

22 you from thinking clearly and testifying truthfully

23 today?

24 A. No.

25 MS. LI: I'm going· to ask the court

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Guy A. Rossi July 17, 2017

1 Q. And after that, what was your next law

2 •enforcement position and what year did you start that?

3 A. I was hired by the Village of Fairport,

4 New York, as a patrol officer in the Village of

5 Fairport from 1978 through 1982.

6 Q. And after that?

7 A. I was I transferred to the Irondequoit

8 Police Department and that's the town I live in

9 now -- from 1982 to 1987.

10 And in 1987, I transferred to the

11 Rochester,. New York, Police Department.

12 From 1987 through 1998

13 Q. And at the Irondequoit -- pardon me if I

14 mispronounce that -- the Irondequoit Police

15 Department, what was your rank?

16 A. I was a patrol officer.

17 Q. And at the Rochester Police Department,

18 when you joined the department, what was your rank?

19 A. Patrol officer.

20 Q. And when you retired from the department,

21 what was your rank?

22 A. Sergeant.

23 Q. So when you retired in 1998, you were a

24 sergeant?

25 A. Yes.

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Guy A. Rossi July 17, 2017

1 Q. And is it correct to say that you retired

2 from being a sworn law enforcement officer in 1998?

3 A. Correct.

4 Q. So you have not been a sworn law

5 enforcement officer since then?

6 A. ~hat's correct.

7 Q. Can you describe your current occupation

8 for me? I understand from your report and your

9 curriculum vitae that you may have several lines of

10 work:, so I would appreciate if you could describe each

11 of those for me.

12 A. Sure. Following my retirement from the

13 police department, I was employed by, per se, the

14 police academy in Monroe County, New York, which is

15 called the Public Safety Training Facility of Monroe

16 Community College. I was employed there for

17 approximately eight and a half years. I was a program

18 coordinator in charge of all law enforcement training

19 for the region.

20 Following that -- although, I'm still an

21 adjunct instructor at that academy; it was a full-time

22 job -·- I worked full time for the Homeland Security

23 Management Institute of Monroe Community College for

24 five years, developing curriculum on personal safety

25 for civilians.

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Guy A. Rossi July 17, 2017

1 So I want to ask you about this analysis.

2 If a person is is there any difference between a

3 person carrying a knife and a person carrying a

4 firearm in terms of a law enforcement officer's

5 assessment of the, you know, possible dangers in that

6 situation?

7 A. Again, it depends on the threatening

8 action, but it also depends upon the proxemics, and it

9 also depends upon the nature of the weapon itself.

10 The example being a knife, a knife you would have to

11 be close in order to use a knife, that type of thing.

12 Q. And how far away would you have to be in

. 13 order to use a weapon? A firearm, excuse me.

14 A. I see firearms used point-blank range. It

15 can be -- there's no -- I mean, there's a range as far

16 as a maximum distance, but as far as proxemics, it

17 could be right on top of you, have close -- intimate

18 range, right on top of you.

19 Q. So let's imagine a situation in which

20 someone is very close to the officer, close enough to

21 either use a knife or a firearm, does it matter to the

22 officer whether that person is carrying a firearm or a

23 knife? Does it make a difference in the officer's

24 assessment of the safety of the situation?

25 A. Not really.

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Guy A. Rossi July 17, 2017

1 Q. So it sounds like what you're saying is

2 that it does not make a difference whether someone is

3 carrying a firearm versus carrying a knife, that both

4 are equally dangerous or both present no danger? I

5 can't quite tell.

6 A. Okay. Well, let me clarify it. What it

7 really comes down to is if the person possesses a

8 knife and they're not threatening or indicating that

9 they're going to be a threat by verbal or nonverbal

10 means, that person in the officer's mind is not a

11 threat.

12 If the person is carrying a gun and the

13 officer looks at him and there's no reason to believe

14 that he's committing a crime, and it's in a legal

15 state or location that they're able to carry a gun,

16 then it's not a crime.

17 So unless the person is a threat to the

18 officer or to someone else and I mean an imminent

19 threat, because we can say is the public alarmed,

20 sometimes that's not an imminent threat, depending on

21 the situation.

22 We're talking about an imminent personal

23 threat. You're talking about the officer, and

24 generally it's going to be that they're going to

25 respond based on their training and experience of

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Guy A. Rossi July 17, 2017

1 whether they believe that weapon is a threat.

2 Q. And are you saying it doesn't matter what

3 that weapon is?

4 MR. BRADY: Objection, argumentative.

5 Misstates testimony.

6 A. Any weapon -- any dangerous instrument

7 given malicious intent could be considered a threat.

8 Again, it's the intent that the subject is

9 demonstrating to the officer or to a third person

10 that's going to indicate his response.

11 Q. And what kind of a weapon is more

12 dangerous; a knife or a firearm?

13 MR. BRADY: Objection, vague as. to "more

14 dangerous." Incomplete hypothetical. Asked and

15 answered.

16 A. I think I've answered that.

17 Q. So is it correct to say that your

18 testimony is that both a firearm and a knife could

19 present a danger to a police officer?

20 A. Given malicious intent, the answer would

21 be yes.

22 Q. And is it your testimony that a knife and

23 a firearm present the same amount of danger to a

24 police officer?

25 MR. BRADY: Objection, misstates

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Guy A. Rossi July 17, 2017

1 testimony.

2 You can go ahead, Mr. Rossi.

3 A. Again, it depends on the perception of the

4 officer, the proxemics involved, the capabilities of

5 that weapon, whether it's a baseball bat or a knife or

6 a gun.

7 Q. Is there a way to make a general

8 assessment of whether a knife is a more dangerous

9 weapon than a firearm?

10 MR. BRADY: Objection, vague.

11 A. It's a hard question to answer without

12 more than the hypothetical.

13 Q. Are you able to say based on your

14 experience as a sworn law enforcement officer and

15 someone who has spent years offering training to sworn

16 law enforcement officers whether a firearm presents a

17 greater danger to officer safety than a knife?

18 MR. BRADY: Objection, confusing.

19 Misstates testimony. Incomplete hypothetical. Asked

20 and answered.

21 Q. Mr. Rossi, are you going to answer the

22 question?

23 A. Oh, I thought I answered it. It's a

24 difficult question. I've seen people shoot as close

25 as point-blank and miss with a firearm, and I've seen

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Guy A. Rossi July 17, 2017

1 people that have been cut to pieces with a knife that

2 started from distances. It depends on the intent,

3 motivation of the offender. It's depends on the

4 perception of the officer.

5 You know, we've all been cut cutting a

6 tomato or some object in our house for food, so we

7 know what that feels like. So most of us are more

8 afraid of knives than we are of guns, because we don't

9 know what it's like to be shot with a gun.

10 So personally neither one is something

11 that I would rather have done to me, and I'm sure most

12 officers wouldn't want that done to them either. It's

13 based on their perception. They deal with knives and

14 guns every day on the street.

15 Q. What is more common to find on the street;

16 someone carrying a knife or someone carrying a

17 firearm?

18 A. Mostly a knife.

19 Q. Can you please turn to page 4 of your

20 expert report.

21 A. Sure.

22 Q. At the very bottom of the page, the

23 sentence that continues on to the next page, it

24 begins, "Absent malicious Intent, presence of a weapon

25 is not the only factor that makes police-citizen

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Guy A. Rossi July 17, 2017

1 encounters easy or difficult.''

2 So I want to know what you think about the

3 presence of a weapon. How does it rank in terms of

4 factors that a law enforcement officer considers when

5 they first arrive to assess a situation and the

6 possible dangers?

7 A. It's a very important factor. I mean,

8 it's probably the most important in most officer's

9 minds when they respond to a situation.

10 But, again, it's based on what that is

11 there for, what the object of the weapon or whatever

12 is~- what's the reason for being there.

13 Q. And you refer to "malicious intent" here?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Can you describe that a little bit more

16 for me; what do you mean by "malicious intent"?

17 A. Well, threatening behavior, deceiving

18 behavior, distracting behavior, threatening behavi.or

19 by -- for sure. So I would say that that encapsulates

20 what I think is malicious intent.

21 Q. And then turning to page 5, I'm looking at

22 the -- the second paragraph on ·the page that's the

23 first full paragraph. The last sentence there says,

24 "It is the suspicion of criminal conduct along with

25 the threat of violence that first elevates this

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Guy A. Rossi July 17, 2017

1 Is that consistent with your knowledge of

2 what happens in states with open carry, that people

3 will still call the cops even though open carry is

4 legal?

5 .A. I believe so, yes.

6 Q. So even though open carry is legal, there

7 may be instances where members of the public are

8 alarmed by seeing a firearm and they will call the

9 police about something that you would describe as

10 lawful behavior; is that right?

11 A. Yes. That's why I mentioned that we have

12 to educate public and community and the officers.

13 Q. Is there anything to prevent someone from

14 calling the police when they see someone carrying a

15 gun in public, even if open carry is legal?

16 MR. BRADY: Objection, vague as to

17 "preventing."

18 Go ahead.

19 A. People call the police for the strangest

20 things. So I don't think you'll ever be able to stop

21 that, not totally. But then, again, there are

22 safeguards in place where telecommunicators or the

23 dispatchers and supervisors talk whether or not the

24 call is going to be handled at a lower priority or a

25 higher priority based upon the information that was

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Guy A. Rossi July 17, 2017

1 given. .

2 Q. I just want to ask about the comment

3 that's at the very end of the page, which we read

4 earlier, "When you have all these people running

5 around with guns and rifles, you don't know who the

6 bad guy is." This is the comment by the law

7 enforcement officer in Texas. Would you agree or

8 disagree with that statement?

9 A. I would disagree with that statement.

10 Generally it's pretty clear who the bad guy is based

11 on their body language, their behavior, what they're

12 doing with that weapon, you know, so I would generally

13 disagree with that statement.

14 Q. It sounds like as a general matter you

15 think it is possible to distinguish between the good

16 guys and the bad guys, even if they're both carrying

17 firearms; is that right?

18 A. Officers get very good at reading people's

19 body language and their nonverbal cues and many, many

20 things, and you.get to read it pretty good. And

21 officers fine-tune that skill over many, many years of

22 going to calls on a daily basis.

23 So I would think the majority of officers,

24 based on their training and experience, are able to

25 predict at a very high percentage who the good guy and

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Guy A. Rossi July 17, 2017

1 the bad guy is.

2 Q. In your experience, has a police officer

3 ever gotten it wrong in terms of distinguishing who

4 the good guys are and who the bad guys are, if

5 everyone is carrying a firearm?

6 A. Absolutely it's happened, and officers

7 have suffered for it, but it's the exception not the

8 rule.

9 Q. And in terms of it being the exception,

10 how big of an exception is that, or how small of an

11 exception is that? Is that 10 percent of the time, 5

12 percent of the time, 30 percent of the time?

13 MR. BRADY: Objection, calls for

14 speculation beyond what the expert was called to

15 testify about.

16 To the extent you can answer without

17 guessing, Mr. Rossi, you are free to do so.

18 A. Yeah, I would have a hard time. It's a

19 very small percentage.

20 Q. Very small as in single digits?

21 MR. BRADY: Objection, calls for

22 speculation. Beyond what the expert was called to

23 testify about.

24 A. I'm going to stick with my original

25 comment.

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Guy A. Rossi July 17, 2017

1 Q. If you look at -- again going back to your

2 curriculum vitae -- actually the page right after

3 that --

4 A. Uh-huh.

5 Q. -- so after page 20, it's actually the

6 page right after your curriculum vitae, the top of the

7 page says, "Guy Rossi Expert Trial and Deposition

8 Testimony."

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. So under the heading "Deposed," the first . 11 entry there says, you know, kind of towards the bottom

12 of the page, it says, "Ninth District Amicus Brief

13 2011, recognized as an expert and assisted in the

14 research and writing of Peruta versus City of San

15 Diego. 11

16 Does this refer to the amicus brief that

17 we were just discussing that's listed under Special

18 Publications on your curriculum vitae, page 17; are

19 those two the same amicus briefs?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. So it says that you assisted in research

22 and writing of that amicus brief from 2011 in the

23 Peruta matter; is that right?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Was that a brief submitted on behalf of

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Guy A. Rossi July 17., 2017

1 ILEETA as an amicus?

2 A. It may have, yes. · I believe it did. I

3 don't totally recall, but I believe it did.

4 MS. LI: I'm going to ask the court

5 reporter to mark Exhibit 6.

6 (The following exhibit was marked for

7 identification: EXH Number 6.)

8 Q. So Exhibit 6 is a copy of the amicus

9 submitted by the International Law Enforcement

10 Educators and Trainers Association, as well as another

11 group called the Independence Institute. And this was

12 submitted, you can tell from the very top line, on May

13 30, 2011, in the Peruta versus County of San Diego

14 matter.

15 Does this appear to be the amicus brief

16 that we were just discussing that's referenced on your

17 curriculum vitae?

18 A. Yes, I believe so.

19 Q. And did you help to research and to write

20 this brief?

21 A. I helped with certain parts of it, with

22 research -- yes, research.

23 Q. Do you recall what topics you helped to

24 research?

25 A. Predominantly my focus was in the area of

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Guy A. Rossi July 17, 2017

1 individuals that pose threats.

2 Q. So in terms, though, of a comparison

3 between police practices or police departments in

4 California and those in New York, are there any key I 5 differences that come to mind?

6 A. Well, the biggest key difference is local

7 laws and state laws. For the most part, police

8 officers around the country operate fairly the same

9 way as a result of accreditation training around the

10 country. So it's fairly consistent, I mean, with the

11 exception of local issues.

12 Q. Do you know under what circumstances it is

13 lawful to carry a firearm openly in public in

14 California?

15 A. No, I don't.

16 Q. When is it lawful to carry a firearm

17 openly in public in New York State, under what

18 circumstances?

19 MR. BRADY: Objection, beyond the scope of

20 what the deponent was called to testify about.

21 A. With the exception of hunting season, the

22 New York State area that I live in is a concealed

23 carry area by permit. It takes a very long time to

24 get one here, like it does there, I'm sure.

25 New York City has different rules and

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Guy A. Rossi July 17, 2017

1 . the exception of a justified use of force with a legal

2 handgun that's been cleared by a grand jury.

3 Q. So you're saying that you're not

4 personally aware of someone who lawfully had a

5 handgun, committing a crime with that handgun, tha·t' s

6 not something that you have ever personally been aware

7 of in your 35 years?

8 A. That's correct.

9 Q. So you've never encountered a domestic

10 violence situation where someone in lawful possession

11 of a handgun, you know, discharged that weapon at home

12 in the middle of an argument or something like that?

13 A. No.

14 MR. BRADY: Objection, incomplete

15 hypothetical. Argumentative. Misstates prior

16 testimony.

17 You can answer, Mr. Rossi, to the extent

18 understand the question.

19 A. 11 No" is the answer.

20 Q. And when you say "personally been aware,"

21 that means you didn't encounter that when you were

22 sergeant -- I guess, what does that mean, "personally

23 been aware"? Are you aware -- you're not counting

24 things you might read in the news?

25 A. I'm talking about my own personal

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Guy A. Rossi July 17, 2017

1 information that I've received either by being at the

2 situation, being involved in training and talking to

3 somebody, living in the community that I've been

4 living in, having been a police officer in this

5 community and living in this community for many years,

6 I'm not aware of anything other than justifiable use

7 of force with a handgun by a law-abiding citizen.

8 That's been my experience.

9 Q. Now, beyond your personal experience, are

10 you have you read about, have you heard about, are

11 you otherwise aware of instances in which someone who

12 lawfully owned a handgun then committed a crime with

13 that handgun?

14 A. No.

15 Q. And you say in the last sentence in that

16 paragraph we've been looking at, "Further, in my

17 interactions with law enforcement officers throughout

18 the country, including those who I have instructed in

19 police-citizen encounters, in their experience, the

20 same has been true."

21 Does that mean that based on what you've

22 heard from law enforcement officers that you have

23 provided training to they also have not encountered

24 situations where someone who had lawfully owned a

25 handgun had then committed a crime with that handgun?

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Guy A. Rossi July 17, 2017

1 A. That's correct.

2 Q. And is that a topic that you would discuss

3 with law enforcement officers in the normal course of

4 providing training?

5 A. Specifically when I've been doing the law

6 enforcement interaction with legally armed citizens,

7 it's something that we talk about at the introduction

8 of the course, "What has been your experience?"

9 Most of the officers seem to be more upset

10 about being videotaped than having to deal with the

11 person with the gun.

12 Q. I just want to make sure I understand your

13 opinion here. Because if I'm reading it correctly, it

14 suggests anyway that of all the crimes that you are

15 personally aware of or that have discussed with the .

16 law enforcement officers that you've trained, it

17 sounds like you're saying if any of those crimes have

18 involved a handgun, it's been a handgun that was not

19 used by its lawful owner, it was a handgun that was

20 stolen or otherwise obtained. Is that --

21 MR. BRADY: I'm sorry. Were you done with

22 your question? I didn't mean to jump on your

23 question, Ms. Li.

24 MS. LI: Oh, sorry. I was just finishing.

25 By a handgun that was, you know, stolen or not

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Guy A. Rossi July 17, 2017

1 lawfully obtained, was the end of my question.

2 MR. BRADY: Objection, misstates

3 testimony. Compound. Incomplete hypothetical.

4 You may answer, Mr. Rossi, to the extent

5 you understand the question.

6 A. I stand on what I said. My own personal

7 experience and people that I've talked to, the answer

8 has been 11 no. 11

9 Q. I just want to make sure we're on the same

10 page. The answer has been, no, you have not been

11 aware of a lawfully armed citizen committing a crime

12 with their handgun; is that correct?

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. Okay. So the implication is that the

15 crimes you are aware of involving handguns have been

16 crimes in which the handgun is being used by someone

17 who is not the lawful owner or someone who cannot

18 lawfully possess that weapon in the first place; is

19 that right?

20 A. Correct.

21 Q. And you would say the same is true in the

22 experience of the law enforcement officers that you

23 have provided training to; is that correct?

24 A. Correct.

25 MS. LI: I don't think I have any other

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Guy A. RO!!!!i ,______July 17, 2011

l A C .K N O W I, ll1 0 G M E N T

I, Guy A. Rossi, clscl.are, swear and aver

3 that I have read my testimony containocl herein and

4 that my answers an true and correct, with any

5 exceptions noted on the errata sheet, under ponalty of

6 perjury. , i._ _

8 Guy A. Rossi

10

11

12 in my presence 1:>y Guy A, Rossi on the .-,:;__•• day of

2017,

15

16 haw::! and affixed my seal of offlcs of Rochl!i11ter, New

York on this

20

21

22

23 My Co1111llission

24

25

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Case: 10-56971 05/30/2011 Page: 1 of 37 ID: 7767759 DktEntry: 24

No. 10-56971 [DC# CV 09-02371-IEG]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

EDWARD PERUTA, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT EDUCATORS AND .TRAINERS ASSOCIATION, AND THE INDEPEDENCE INSTITUTE IN SUPPORT OF NEITHER PARTY

David B. Kopel Counsel of record INDEPENDENCE INSTITUTE 13952 Denver West Pkwy., Suite 400 Golden, CO 80401 (303) 279-6536 Counsel for Amici Curiae

EXHIBIT {p KAB I 117117 nllinncecourh'eportfng~--- -·- .net

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Case: 10-56971 · 05/30/2011 Page: 33 of 37 ID: 7767759 DktEntry: 24

C. Fearful or phobic civilians may react inappropriately to open carry, and cause the waste of police time

A great deal of law enforcement time is already wasted by sincere

but mistaken civilian reports of perceived crime. Some civilians are

firearms aficionados, while other civilians loathe firearms. For a small

minority of the loathers, the aversion to guns may be so intense as to

constitute, according to at least some experts, a type of phobia. See

PHILIP T. NINAN & W. DUNLOP BOADIE, CONTEMPORARY DIAGNOSIS AND

MANAGEMENT OF ANXIETY DISORDERS 107 (2006) ("Hoplophobia" is a

phobic fear offirearms).15

When a civilian sees someone engaged in lawful open carry, the

civilian may not know that open. carry is lawful, or may be so

emotionally over-stimulated by the sight of a gun that he may call 911

and report "a man with gun." Such a report is likely to result in a swift

and aggressive response by multiple police units. At the least, the

15 Hoplophobia is a type of "specific phobia," that is, "a persistent and unreasonable fear of an object or situation coupled with a strong desire to avoid it." A "common" specific phobia is "aviatophobia," the fear of flying. Hoplophobia is an "unusual" specific phobia; examples of other unusual specific phobias include pyrophobia (fear of fire), iatrophobia (fear of doctors), and entomophobia (fear of insects.) Id. at 106-07. 24

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Case: 10-56971 05/30/2011 Page: 34 of 37 ID: 7767759 DktEntry: 24

response will be a tremendous waste of police time, and the worst, a

mistake could lead to the shooting of an innocent civilian.

Finally, it should be noted that under current California law,

unloaded open carry does not require training, whereas licensed,

concealed carry does. While amici recognize that the police, who have to

intervene in many diverse and complex situations, and therefore need

much more training than do civilians who only wish to protect

themselves while going about their daily routine, amici still believe that

some firearms training for civilians is helpful and constructive.

Accordingly, amici prefer to encourage civilians to adopt the form of

carry which will result in them receiving training.

CONCLUSION

The Court's decision should take into account the inadequacy of

unloaded open carry as a means of exercising the constitutional right of

self-defense.

Respectfully submitted,

David B. Kopel

Research Director, Independence

25

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EXHIB1T6

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John Cooke August 10, 2017

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHELLE FLANAGAN, SAMUEL 2:16-CV-06164-JAK-AS GOLDEN, DOMINIC NARDONE, JACOB PERKIO, and THE CALIFORNIA RIFLE & PISTOL ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL XAVIER BECERRA, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of California, et al.,

Defendants.

VIDEOCONFERENCED DEPOSITION OF JOHN COOKE August 10, 2017

PURSUANT TO WRITTEN NOTICE and the appropriate

Rules of Civil Procedure, the videoconferenced deposition

of JOHN COOKE, called for examination by the Defendants,

was taken at the offices of U.S. Legal Support, 1580

Lincoln Street, Suite 930, Denver, Colorado, commencing

at 10:28 a.m. on August 10, 2017, before Deborah A.

VanDernark, RPR, CRCR, and Notary Public in and for the

State of Colorado.

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John Cooke August 10, 2017

1 APPEARANCES:

2 ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFFS:

3 SEAN BRADY, ESQ. (via videoconference)

4 Michel & Associates, P.C.

5 180 East Ocean Boulevard, Suite 200

6 Long Beach, California 90802

7 Phone: 562-216-4444

8 Email: [email protected]

9

10 ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANTS:

11 P. PATTY LI, ESQ. (via videoconference)

12 California Attorney General's Office

13 455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000

14 San Francisco, California 94102

15 Phone: 415-703-1577

16 Email: [email protected]

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

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John Cooke August 10, 2017

1 I N D E X

2 EXAMINATION: PAGE

3 By Ms. Li 3

4 EXHIBITS: PAGE

5 Exh 1 Amended Notice of Deposition of 5 Expert Witness John Cooke 6 Exh 2 Expert Witness Report of Sen. John 21 7 Cooke

8 Exh 3 Greeley Tribute Article dated 3/15/13 54

9 Exh 4 Expert Witness Report of Former 82 Covina Chief of Police Kim Raney 10 Exh 5 Denver Post Article dated 12/21/15 94 11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

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John Cooke August 10, 2017

1 P R O C E E D I N G S

2 JOHN COOKE,

3 having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified

4 as follows:

5 EXAMINATION

6 BY MS. LI:

7 Q. Good morning.

8 A. Morning.

9 Q. My name is Patty Li. I'm from the

10 California Attorney General's Office, and I represent the

11 defendant in this matter. The defendant is Attorney

12 General Xavier Becerra, and this case is Flanagan v·ersus

13 Becerra.

14 Can you please state your name for the

15 record and spell your last name out.

16 A. Certainly. John Cooke, C-o-o-k-e.

17 Q. Do you understand that you are testifying

18 today under the same oath that you would take if you were

19 testifying in a courtroom?

20 A. I do.

21 Q. Have you ever been deposed before?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And when was that most recently?

24 A. Probably -- probably three - - about three

25 years ago, three and a half years ago.

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John Cooke August 10, 2017

1 police department, you might still be assisting or taking

2 over large investigations; is that right?

3 A. That's correct. If there's a homicide or

4 a serious rape case or something, we would usually handle

5 that for these smaller communities.

6 Q. Do you know what the most populated town

7 was for which the Weld County Sheriff's Office had

8 primary jurisdiction?

9 A. Let's see. They were pretty much all the

10 same size. I would say probably the town of Severance,

11 and that was 2,500, 3,000.

12 Q. In your career as a law enforcement

13 officer, were you ever disciplined for any actions you

14 took as a law enforcement officer?

15 A. Yes and no.

16 Q. Can you explain?

17 A. Certainly. When I was in Breckenridge, I

18 was up there for only about six, seven months. And there

19 was a jail escape, and it was a juvenile held on iike

20 four -- and I was at the police department, not at the

21 sheriff's office. So there was a jail escape of this

22 juvenile who was out on felony charges, and he was

23 running down Main Street. And word got out in the

24 newspaper or heard it.

25 So he -- the newspaper guy was running

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John Cooke August 10, 2017

1 sex offenders on law enforcement websites when in

2 2005 the Colorado legislature finally passed a law

3 allowing agencies to do so." Is that an accurate reading

4 of what's written there in Paragraph 11?

5 A. Yes, ma•am.

6 Q. So if I understand this paragraph

7 correctly, it sounds like Weld County was posting

8 information on registered sex offenders before 2005,

9 correct?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And in 2005 the Colorado legislature

12 passed a law permitting law enforcement agencies to post

13 this information about registered sex offenders; is that

14 correct?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. So it sounds like you were -- and I think

17 this is what it says. It sounds like the Weld County

18 Sheriff's Office was posting information on registered

19 sex offenders on its website before it was permissible to

20 do so under Colorado law; is that correct?

21 A. Yes.

22 MR. BRADY: Objection, calls for a legal

23 conclusion.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. (By Ms. Li) Can you tell me why you -- I

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John Cooke August 10, 2017

1 threatened -- the sheriff's office was threatened a few

2 times with litigation on this issue, but it neveT

3 materialized?

4 A. Correct.

5 Q. And it sounds like you -- you believe your

6 implementation of the law before 2005 met the standards

7 of the law at the time because you said on the website,

8 Welcome to the Weld County Sheriff's Office and the other

9 things you described. Is that your interpretation?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Okay. And you described it as pushing the

12 envelope, this interpretation?

13 A. Yes, I believe it was.

14 Q. Do you -- do you think that's in the -- do

15 you think that is kind of the best practice for law

16 enforcement officials to be pushing the envelope on the

17 interpretation of the law?

18 MR. BRADY: Objection, argumentative. Go

19 ahead.

20 A. Yes, I think that's our responsibility,

21 and we have discretion in law enforcement. You know,

22 laws aren't -- they're open for interpretation, a lot of

23 them. So that's why we have attorneys, and that's why we

24 have a court system.

25 Q. (By Ms. Li) The -- I think you mentioned

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John Cooke August 10, 2017

1 earlier that you as sheriff opposed the -- certain gun

2 control measures that were enacted in 2013; is that

3 right?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. And I think you said earlier was it a ban

6 on large-capacity magazines?

7 A. It was a ban on standard-capacity

8 magazines.

9 Q. Standard-capacity magazines. Can you

10 describe what that means for me?

11 A. Certainly. If you have an AR-15, the

12 standard capacity magazine is 30 rounds. You might have

13 a handgun where the standard capacity is 17 rounds, and

14 so the ban said you can't have anything more than 15

15 rounds. So they banned standard-capacity magazines for

16 certain weapons.

17 Q. So that was one piece of legislation that

18 was enacted in 2013 regarding firearms. Was there

19 another one?

20 A. Yes, there was.

21 Q. And what was that about?

22 A. There was another one that concerning

23 background checks and making -- anytime you transfer a

24 weapon to another individual, you had to go through a

25 background check.

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John Cooke August 10, 2017

1 Q. Okay. And did you make any -- or public

2 announcements or take a public position on this -- on

3 these -- on these laws?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Okay. What was your position on these

6 laws?

7 A. I opposed -- opposed those laws.

8 Q. By "opposed," does that mean before they

9 were enacted you were on record as saying they were a bad

10 idea?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Okay. And what about after they were

13 enacted?

14 A. Yes, very much so.

15 Q. Just to clarify, so after they were

16 enacted, you were also on record as indicating you did

17 not agree with these laws, and you thought they were a

18 bad idea essentially?

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. Okay. Did you ever make any public

21 statements or announcements about your intention to

22 enforce or not enforce these laws?

23 A. Yes, I did.

24 Q. And what was the substance·of those

25 statements?

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John Cooke August 10, 2017

1 A. That I wouldn't enforce them.

2 Q. Was that as to both laws?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Did you give any reasons for saying that

5 you would not enforce either law?

6 A. Yes. They were unenforceable. And I felt

7 they were in violation of people's rights, the

8 constitutional right or Second Amendment rights. You

9 know, as law enforcement we have discretion on what we

10 enforce and what we don't enforce sometimes. I said, you

11 know, they're unenforceable. I'm not going to waste my

12 time. I would rather be catching burglars, rapists, and

13 child molesters, drug dealers than I would going after

14 somebody that has a standard-capacity magazine. When I

15 say me, I meant the agency.

16 MS. LI: Okay. Let's go off the record

17 very quickly.

18 (Recess taken from 11: 45 a. rn. to 11: 52 a. rn.)

19 MS. LI: So we're just corning back from a

20 break now, and I would like to ask the court reporter to

21 mark Exhibit 3 and provide it to the witness.

22 (Exhibit 3 was marked.)

23 Q. (By Ms. Li) So Exhibit 3 is an article --

24 a reprint of an article from the Greeley Tribune dated

25 March 15, 2013. And the headline is, "Cooke won't

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John Cooke August 10, 2017

1 laws that we've been discussing passed in 2013. You

2 know, I would assume the legislature thought they were

3 important for public safety, and that was one of the

4 reasons -- one of the main reasons they were enacted.

5 With the jaywalking example, nothing happens when you

6 don't enforce that, when you don't give a ticket for

7 jaywalking; is that right? There's no immediate or dire

8 consequences?

9 MR. BRADY: Objection, assumes facts not

10 in evidence, calls for speculation. Go ahead.

11 A. There could be consequences for not

12 enforcing it. I assume they had the same reason on

13 public safety because somebody could get hit by a car,

14 ran over, something along those lines. I'm not sure the

15 legislature knows much about public safety. So I believe

16 they didn't have public safety in mind. Like I said in

17 the article, it was a knee-jerk reaction, I believe.

18 Q. (By Ms. Li) So it sounds like you disagree

19 with the legislature's public policies assessment of

20 what's necessary to protect public safety?

21 MR. BRADY: Objection, misstates

22 testimony, assumes facts not in evidence, argumentative.

23 A. Yes, I disagree with it.

24 Q. (By Ms. Li) And you think it's appropriate

25 as a law enforcement official to basically override the

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John Cooke August 10, 2017

1 did they ever have that policy?

2 A. No.

3 Q. But the sheriff's office did have a policy

4 of never enforcing these laws that were enacted in 2013

5 that we've been discussing?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And that was because, in your judgment,

8 the legislature got it wrong?

9 MR. BRADY: Objection, misstates

10 testimony.

11 A. Yes.

12 THE DEPONENT: Oh, sorry.

13 MR. BRADY: It's okay. Go ahead.

14 Q. (By Ms. Li) And doesn't a refusal to

15 enforce a law that's been enacted by the legislature

16 undermine your credibility as a law enforcement-expert?

17 MR. BRADY: Objection, argumentative,

18 ambiguous as to undermine credibility, misstates

19 testimony, assumes facts not in evidence, calls for

20 speculation. Go ahead.

21 A. No, I don't believe it does.

22 Q. (By Ms. Li) And can you explain why?

23 A. Because the legislature -- and I know this

24 from being down there -- doesn't always get it right.

25 And as a matter of fact, they get it wrong a lot of

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John Cooke August 10, 2017

1 times. And so I don't think it undermines my credibility

2 at all. And if anything, I think it might enhance my

3 credibility.

4 Q. But isn't there a separation-of-powers

5 problem there?

6 MR. BRADY: Objection, argumentative, asks

7 for a legal conclusion, beyond the scope of what the

8 expert was called to testify about, calls for

9 speculation, ambiguous. Go ahead.

10 A. I don't believe so. They're in charge of

11 writing the laws. We're in charge of enforcing or not

12 enforcing.

13 Q. (By Ms. Li) And what kind of discretion is

14 appropriate for law enforcement to have when it -- when

15 deciding whether to have a blanket policy of enforcing or

16 not enforcing a particular law?

17 MR. BRADY: Objection, ambiguous,

18 incomplete hypothetical, calls for speculation.

19 A. There are -- actually, we have a lot of

20 discretion unless the laws say "shall." Like on domestic

21 violence it says we shall arrest. On there we have no

22 discretion. There might be a couple other ones that have

23 we shall do something. Other t.han that, we have a lot of

24 discretion on what we enforce and don't enforce.

25 Q. (By Ms. Li) Well, I'm talking about having

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John Cooke August 10, 2017

1 a blanket policy of, you know, completely not enforcing

2 the law. When is that appropriate?

3 A. When the elected official from that

4 jurisdiction says that's bad for public safety of the

5 people that elected me.

6 Q. Elected you as the sheriff?

7 A. Correct, yes.

8 Q. When you were sheriff, what was the policy

9 of the sheriff's office with regard to conducting a law

10 enforcement stop of someone that was armed with a

11 firearm?

12 A. Can you give me a little more detail?

13 Q. Sure. I'll get a little more specific.

14 A. Okay.

15 Q. So if a deputy is conducting a stop of

16 someone who happens to be armed with a firearm, what is a

17 deputy supposed to do with that person's weapon?

18 MR. BRADY: Objection, incomplete

19 hypothetical.

20 A. With the firearm or the stop? And I -­

21 Q. (By Ms. Li) When conducting

22 A. Go ahead. I'm sorry.

23 Q. Sorry; Go ahead.

24 A. Well, I guess there's other -- so many

25 other factors that could be involved. Did the person

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John Cooke August 10, 2017

1 MR. BRADY: Objection, ambiguous.

2 A. Well, first off, I don't know -- I don't

3 remember anybody else shooting other than the cops and

4 the bad guys. So I don't know what he means by who the

5 good guys are versus the bad guys when everyone starts

6 shooting. I don't know who "everyone" ·means.

7 Q. (By Ms. Li) Do you remember that one

8 aspect of this active shooter situation was that there

9 were people at this protest who were exercising their

10 statutory rights to carry weapons openly? Do you

11 remember that about this event in reading of the news

12 accounts?

13 A. No, I don't remember that.

Q. Would the fact that there were people at a

15 community protest openly carrying long guns when the

16 sniper started shooting at police officers, would the

17 fact that those open carry persons were present, in your

18 opinion, would that complicate the police response to the

19 sniper situation?

20 MR. BRADY: Objection, incomplete

21 hypothetical, calls for speculation. Go ahead.

22 A. Maybe under that one particular incident

23 it's possible that it would cause some confusion.

24 Q. (By Ms. Li) So it sounds like you think

25 there are it is possible, at least sometimes, maybe

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John Cooke August 10, 2017

1 .not all the time, but at least sometimes for the presence

2 of someone carrying openly in the vicinity of a violent

3 crime to cause some confusion about who the perpetrator

4 is. Is that fair to say?

5 A. It's possible, sure.

6 Q. Did you ever experience -- or did the

7 sheriff's office ever have experience with a situation

8 like that while you were with the sheriff's department?

9 A. Like this? No.

10 Q. Well, I guess maybe not a community

11 protest where there was a sniper, but did the sheriff's

12 office have experience with a violent crime in progress

13 and having, you know, complications or confusion arise

14 from the presence of other people in the area who are

15 carrying weapons openly?

16 A. Not that I'm aware of, no.

17 Q. Did the Weld County Sheriff's Office ever

18 receive calls for service about, you know, someone

19 complaining, oh, there's someone -- someone on the street

20 carrying a firearm, can you come check it out? Did you

21 ever get calls for service like that?

22 A. Not that -- not that I could remember, no.

23 Q. What about calls in other contexts, not

24 just someone walking down the street? But were there

25 ever any calls for service generally complaining or

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John Cooke August 10, 2017

1 communities.

2 Q. (By Ms. Li) Do you know under what

3 circumstances it is lawful to carry a firearm openly in

4 California?.

5 A. From what --

6 MR. BRADY: Objection, assumes facts not

7 in evidence, calls for a legal conclusion.

8 A. From what I understand, there aren't any,

9 or there's very little bit that you can carry openly.

10 Q. (By Ms. Li) What's your understanding of

11 the law on open carry in California counties with a

12 population of less than 200,000?

13 MR. BRADY: Objection, calls for

14 Speculation, calls for a legal conclusion, beyond the

15 scope of what the witness was called to testify about.

16 Go ahead.

17 A. I don't know if -- I'm not sure of the

18 designation of 200 -- more than 200 or less than 200,000.

19 So I just thought it was statewide.

20 Q. (By Ms. Li) Would it surprise you to learn

21 that it is possible to receive a permit to carry a

22 firearm openly in California counties with a population

23 of less than 200,000? I 24 MR. BRADY: Objection, assumes facts not

25 in evidence.

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John Cooke August 10, 2017

1 A. Yeah, it would probably surprise me a

2 little bit.

3 Q. (By Ms. Li) Do you know how the population

4 density of California compares with the population

5 density of Colorado?

6 A. Well, you're probably five times larger or

7 more. But as far as the density, California is a large

8 state, so per mile, I don't know the difference.

9 Q. Well, five times is actually a good guess.

10 Would it surprise you to learn that California is almost

11 five times as densely populated as Colorado?

12 MR. BRADY: Objection, ambiguous, and

13 vague as to densely populated.

14 A. No, it wouldn't surprise me.

15 Q. (By Ms. Li) Do you have any sense of how

16 the population density of Weld County compares to the

17 population density of Los Angeles County here in

18 California?

19 A. Probably a lot less in Weld County.

20 Q. Would it surprise you to learn that

21 Los Angeles County is. about 37 times more densely

22 populated than Weld County?

23 A. Not at all.

24 MR. BRADY: Objection, vague, ambiguous as

25 to densely populated.

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John Cooke 1 2017

l I, JOHN COOKE, the deponent above 2 deposition, do hereby acknowledge that I

foregoing transcript of my testimony, and state under

oath that it, together with any attached Ame11dment to

5 Deposition pages, constitutoas my sworn testimony.

I have made changes to my deposition 7 I NOT made any changes to my d.epoi:!i tion

9

HJ

11 12

i4

16 l\!ly commission expires:

Hl 0

i 9

21 22

23 24

25

U.S. LEGAL SUPPORT ( 415 l 362-434 6

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Cooke won't enforce new state gun laws, 2013 WLNR 6647521

NewsRoom

3/15/13 Greeley Trib. (Pg. Unavail. Online) 2013 WLNR 6647521

Greeley Tribune (CO) Copyright© 2013 Greeley Tribune, Colo.

March 15, 2013

Cooke won't enforce new state gun laws

Whitney Phillips

Greeley Tdbtme, Colo.

March 15--Weld County Sheriff John Cooke said he won't enforce either gun-cpntrol measure waiting to be signed into law by Gov. John Hickenlooper, saying the Jaws are "unenforceable11 and would "give· a false sense of security. 11

One bill passed Friday would expand requirements to have background checks for fireann purchases.Hickenlooper is expected to sign it into.law within two weeks,

Earlier this week, Colorado lawmakers approved a l 5-round limit on ammunition magazines.It also is awaiting the expected approval of the governor.

Cooke_ said Democratic lawmakers are uninformed but are scrambling in reaction to recent tragedies in the nation.

"They're feel-good, knee-jerk reactions that arc unenforceable,u he said.

Cooke said the bill requiring a $1 O background check to legally transfer a gun would not keep firearms out of the hands of those who use them for violence.

11 Crimi11als are still going to get their.guns," he said.

Cooke said the other bill would also technically ban all maga,jnes because of a provision that outlaws any magazine that can be altered.He said all magazines can be altered to a higher capacity.

Cooke said he, like other county sheriffs, "won't bother enforcing" the laws because it will be impossible for them to keep track of how the requirements are being met by gun owners.He said he and other sheriffs are considedng a lawsuit against the state to block the measures if they are signed into law.

The vice president praised passage of the background check bill.

"Congrats to Colorado House and Senate for passing universal background checks," read a tweet sent by the office of Vice President Joe Bidon from his official @VP account.

WEST.LAW ((:> 2tJ-17 l"hormxm F

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Cooke won't enforce. new state gun laws, 2013 WLNR 6647521

It was followed by another tweet referring to the theater shooting that read, "The families of Aurorn deserved a vote and got one.Now U.S. Congress must act too."

Congress also is considering a number of.new firearm restrictions.

Colorado is the first state outside the East Coast to significantly ratchet back gun rights after the theater and school shootings.Colorado's gun debate was being watched closely because it's considered a swing state with both a gun-loving frontier past and an unfortunate history of mass shootings, including the 1999 Columbine High School attack.

"Are we going to stop all criminals from getting guus?No," said Democratic Rep. Beth McCann, a sponsor of the background checks bill. "But are we are going to put a barrier there, make it more difficult for them?Yes."

The move to expand background checks would be one of the most sweeping responses by Colorado to the shootings last year in Aurora and at the elementary school in Newtown, Conn.

In Colorado, expanded checks have been a top priority for Hickenlooper, who called for the proposal during his State of the State address in January.

The Associated Press contributed to this report.

(c)2013 Greeley T!'ibune (Greeley, Colo.)

Visit the Greeley Tribune (Greeley, Colo.) at www.greeleytribune.com

Distributed by MCT Info1mation Services

-··· Index References···,

News Subject: (Government (10080); Legislation (I LE97); Social Issues (1S005); U.S. Legislation (I US12); Gun Rights & Regulations (I GU97))

Industry: (U.S. National Healthcare Reform (IUS09); Healthcare (1HE06); Healthcare Regulatory (IHE04))

Region: (Americas (IAM92); NorthAmedca (IN039); U.S. West Region (IWE46); Colorado (IC026); USA (1US73))

Language: EN

Other Indexing: (Beth Mccann; John Cooke; Joe Biden; John Hickenlooper)

Word Count: 498

F.nd of nocumcui i'J 2017 Thomson Renters. No dnim to orighml U.S. Government \Vorb.

NewsRoom

WESTLAW @ 201 l Thomson Reuters, No claim to orlginal U.S, Govornrnoni Works. 2

Eisenberg Decl. Ex. 6 - 022 471 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 63-911033141, Filed DktEntry:10/16/17 17-3, Page Page 1 of 2149 Page of 232 ID #:2673

1 XAVIER BECERRA Attorney General of California 2 STEPAN A. HAYTAYAN Supervising Deputy Attorney General 3 JONATHAN M. EISENBERG Deputy Attorney General 4 P. PATTY LI Deputy Attorney General 5 State Bar No. 266937 455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 6 San Francisco, CA 94102-7004 Telephone: (415) 703-1577 7 Fax: (415) 703-1234 E-mail: [email protected] 8 Attorneys for Defendant Xavier Becerra, Attorney General of the State of California 9

10 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

11 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

12 WESTERN DIVISION

13 MICHELLE FLANAGAN, et al., Case No.: 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS

14 Plaintiffs, NOTICE OF AMENDMENT TO CAL. PENAL CODE § 26400 15 v.

16 CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY Judge: Hon. John A. Kronstadt GENERAL XAVIER BECERRA, in Action Filed: August 17, 2016 17 his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of California, et 18 al.,

19 Defendants.

20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

NOT. OF AMENDMENT TO CAL. PENAL CODE § 26400 (2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS) 472 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 63-911033141, Filed DktEntry:10/16/17 17-3, Page Page 2 of 2150 Page of 232 ID #:2674

1 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on October 13, 2017, Assembly Bill 7 (2017- 1 2 2018 Reg. Sess.) (“AB 7”) was signed into law. This legislation amends 3 California Penal Code section 26400 to include “[a] public place or a public street 4 in a prohibited area of an unincorporated area of a county” as places in which the 5 carrying of an unloaded firearm that is not a handgun is prohibited. AB 7 § 3. This 6 legislation will take effect on January 1, 2018. See Cal. Const. art. IV, § 8(c)(1) 7 and Cal. Gov. Code § 9600(a) (“a statute enacted at a regular session shall go into 8 effect on January 1 next following a 90-day period from the date of enactment of 9 the statute”). 10 11 Dated: October 16, 2017 Respectfully submitted, 12 XAVIER BECERRA 13 Attorney General of California STEPAN A. HAYTAYAN 14 Supervising Deputy Attorney General JONATHAN M. EISENBERG 15 Deputy Attorney General 16 17 /s/ P. Patty Li______P. PATTY LI 18 Deputy Attorney General Attorneys for Defendant Xavier 19 Becerra, Attorney General of the State of California 20 21

22 23 24 25 26

27 1 The text of the legislation is available at https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/ billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB7. 28

1 NOT. OF AMENDMENT TO CAL. PENAL N CODE § 26400 (2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS) 473 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 11033141,60 Filed 10/03/17 DktEntry: Page17-3, Page1 of 6 151 Page of 232ID #:2209

1 XAVIER BECERRA Attorney General of California 2 STEPAN A. HAYTAYAN Supervising Deputy Attorney General 3 P. PATTY LI Deputy Attorney General 4 JONATHAN M. EISENBERG Deputy Attorney General 5 State Bar No. 184162 300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 6 Los Angeles, CA 90013 Telephone: (213) 897-6505 7 Fax: (213) 897-5775 E-mail: [email protected] 8 Attorneys for Defendant Xavier Becerra, Attorney General of the State of California 9

10 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

11 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

12 WESTERN DIVISION

13 MICHELLE FLANAGAN, et al., Case No.: 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS

14 Plaintiffs, DEFENDANT’S AMENDED OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE 15 v. FILED IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR 16 CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY SUMMARY JUDGMENT GENERAL XAVIER BECERRA, in 17 his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of California, et Judge: Hon. John A. Kronstadt 18 al., Trial Date: February 6, 2018 Action Filed: August 17, 2016 19 Defendants.

20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

1 DEF’S AMENDED OBJS. TO EVIDENCE 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS 474 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 11033141,60 Filed 10/03/17 DktEntry: Page17-3, Page2 of 6 152 Page of 232ID #:2210

1 Defendant Xavier Becerra, Attorney General of the State of California, sued in 2 his official capacity (“Defendant”), submits the following amended objections to 3 evidence filed in support of the motion for summary judgment filed by Plaintiffs 4 Michelle Flanagan, Samuel Golden, Dominic Nardone, Jacob Perkio, and the 5 California Rifle and Pistol Association (“CRPA”; together with the other plaintiffs 6 herein, “Plaintiffs”). These amended objections replace the objections filed as ECF 7 No. 56. The initial objections did not comply with this Court’s Initial Standing 8 Order for Civil Case. The current objections have been amended as to form only. 9 10 DECLARATION OF OBJECTION COURT’S RICK TRAVIS (ECF No. RULING 11 48-6) 12 ¶ 1. I, Rick Travis, am the Executive Director for 13 Plaintiff CALIFORNIA 14 RIFLE & PISTOL ASSOCIATION, 15 INCORPORATED 16 (hereafter “CRPA”). I make this declaration of 17 my own personal 18 knowledge and, if called as a witness, I could and 19 would testify competently 20 to the truth of the matters set forth herein. 21 22 ¶ 2. CRPA is a non-profit membership and donor- 23 supported organization 24 classified under501(c)(4) [sic] and incorporated 25 under the laws of 26 California with its headquarters in Fullerton, 27 California. 28

2 DEF’S AMENDED OBJS. TO EVIDENCE 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS 475 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 11033141,60 Filed 10/03/17 DktEntry: Page17-3, Page3 of 6 153 Page of 232ID #:2211

1 ¶ 3. Founded in 1875, the 2 CRPA seeks to defend the Second Amendment and 3 advance laws that protect 4 the rights of individual citizens. CRPA works to 5 preserve the constitutional 6 and statutory rights of gun ownership, including the 7 right to self-defense, 8 the right to hunt, and the right to keep and bear 9 arms. CRPA is also 10 dedicated to promoting the shooting sports, providing 11 education, training, and 12 organized competition for adult and junior 13 shooters. 14 ¶ 4. CRPA’s members 15 include law enforcement 16 officers, prosecutors, professionals, firearm 17 experts, and members of 18 the public of all law- abiding individuals, 19 including the fundamental 20 right to “bear” or “carry” firearms for the core 21 lawful purpose of self- 22 defense.

23 [Objections 1 & 2] ¶ 5. I 1. Lacks foundation/personal 1. Sustained / 24 am informed and aware knowledge. Fed. R. Evid. 602. Overruled that law-abiding CRPA 25 members who reside in Los 2. Hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 801. 2. Sustained / 26 Angeles County applied for Overruled Carry Licenses to carry a Declarations made on 27 firearm for self-defense information and belief, not 28 and were denied. personal knowledge, are entitled

3 DEF’S AMENDED OBJS. TO EVIDENCE 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS 476 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 11033141,60 Filed 10/03/17 DktEntry: Page17-3, Page4 of 6 154 Page of 232ID #:2212

1 to little or no weight on a 2 motion for summary judgment, where the declarant lacks 3 personal knowledge. Bank 4 Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir. 1995) 5 (discussing declaration of 6 counsel); HTS, Inc. v. Boley, 954 F. Supp. 2d 927, 951 (D. 7 Ariz. 2013) (discussing 8 declaration of witness); accord Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 9 878, 890 (9th Cir. 2008) 10 (holding “insufficient” affidavits that are conclusory 11 and not based on personal 12 knowledge); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) (discussing 13 potential negative consequences 14 to party seeking summary judgment yet failing to support 15 assertion of fact). 16 Where a declarant was not 17 personally involved in the 18 matters at issue, did not personally review records 19 regarding such matters, and 20 instead relies on unsworn out- of-court statements by 21 unidentified persons, and the 22 source of these persons’ information is unclear, the 23 declaration is based on 24 inadmissible hearsay. See Block v. City of Los Angeles, 253 F.3d 25 410, 419 (9th Cir. 2001). 26 Travis conveys the alleged 27 statements of third parties 28 unidentified by name, and does

4 DEF’S AMENDED OBJS. TO EVIDENCE 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS 477 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 11033141,60 Filed 10/03/17 DktEntry: Page17-3, Page5 of 6 155 Page of 232ID #:2213

1 not state or explain how Travis 2 became informed of the statements. 3 4 [Objections 3 & 4] ¶ 6. I 3. Lacks foundation/personal 3. Sustained / am informed that law- knowledge. Fed. R. Evid. 602. Overruled 5 abiding CRPA members 6 who reside in Los Angeles 4. Hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 801. 4. Sustained / County wish to obtain a Overruled 7 Carry License, but refrain 8 from applying and wasting their time and financial 9 resources given that such 10 application would be futile in light of Los Angeles 11 County Sheriff James 12 McDonnell’s official “good cause” policy. 13 14 [Objections 5 & 6] ¶ 7. I 5. Lacks foundation/personal 5. Sustained / know members of Plaintiff knowledge. Fed. R. Evid. 602. Overruled 15 CRPA desire and intend to 16 exercise their constitutional 6. Hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 801. 6. Sustained / right to carry a firearm in Overruled 17 public for self-defense, but 18 they are precluded from doing so because they are 19 unable to obtain a license 20 to carry a firearm and California law generally 21 prohibits them from 22 carrying a firearm in any manner openly or 23 concealed, without such a 24 license.

25 [Objections 7 & 8] ¶ 8. But 7. Lacks foundation/personal 7. Sustained / 26 for California’s knowledge. Fed. R. Evid. 602. Overruled 27 comprehensive restrictions on the public carriage of 28

5 DEF’S AMENDED OBJS. TO EVIDENCE 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS 478 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 11033141,60 Filed 10/03/17 DktEntry: Page17-3, Page6 of 6 156 Page of 232ID #:2214

1 firearms and CRPA 8. Hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 801. 8. Sustained / 2 members’ inability to Overruled obtain a carry license, 3 CRPA members residing in 4 Los Angeles County would immediately begin carrying 5 a firearm in public for self- 6 defense, but they refrain from doing so for fear of 7 liabilities for violating one 8 or more of California’s laws that criminalize this 9 conduct. 10 ¶ 9. These CRPA members 11 are thus prohibited from 12 carrying a firearm for self- defense without risking 13 criminal prosecution for 14 exercising their constitutional right to bear 15 arms. 16 17 18 Dated: October 3, 2017 Respectfully submitted,

19 XAVIER BECERRA Attorney General of California 20 STEPAN A. HAYTAYAN Supervising Deputy Attorney General 21 P. PATTY LI Deputy Attorney General 22 23 /s/ Jonathan M. Eisenberg______24 JONATHAN M. EISENBERG Deputy Attorney General 25 Attorneys for Defendant Xavier Becerra, Attorney General of the State 26 of California

27

28

6 DEF’S AMENDED OBJS. TO EVIDENCE 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS 479 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 5911033141, Filed 10/02/17 DktEntry: Page 17-3, 1Page of 20 157 Page of 232 ID #:1640

1 C.D. Michel – SBN 144258 Email: [email protected] 2 Joshua R. Dale – SBN 209942 Sean A. Brady – SBN 262007 3 Anna M. Barvir – SBN 268728 MICHEL & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 4 180 E. Ocean Blvd., Suite 200 Long Beach, CA 90802 5 Telephone: (562) 216-4444 Facsimile: (562) 216-4445 6 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 7

8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10 WESTERN DIVISION

11 MICHELLE FLANAGAN, et al., Case No.: 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS

12 Plaintiffs, PLAINTIFFS’ OBJECTIONS TO THE DECLARATION OF P. PATTY 13 v. LI AND EVIDENCE SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S 14 CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY MOTION FOR SUMMARY GENERAL XAVIER BECERRA, in JUDGMENT 15 his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of California, et Judge: John A. Kronstadt 16 al., Hearing Date: November 6, 2017 Hearing Time: 8:30 AM 17 Defendants. Courtroom: 10B

18 Action Filed: August 17, 2016 Trial Date: February 6, 2018 19 20

21 Plaintiffs, Michelle Flanagan, Samuel Golden, Dominic Nardone, Jacob 22 Perkio, And The California Rifle & Pistol Association (collectively, the 23 “Plaintiffs”) make the following objections to the Declaration of Patty Li on 24 Professor Donohue’s deposition and evidence in support of defendants’ Motion for 25 Summary Judgment. 26 Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court rule on each of the following 27 objections prior to ruling on Defendants’ motion. 28 1 PLAINTIFFS’ OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE ISO DEFENDANT’S MSJ 480 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 5911033141, Filed 10/02/17 DktEntry: Page 17-3, 2Page of 20 158 Page of 232 ID #:1641

1 OBJECTIONS TO DECLARATION OF P. PATTY LEE, See Exhibit 1 ¶ 8. 2 3 EVIDENCE GROUNDS FOR OBJECTION COURT’S OBJECTED TO RULING 4 1. Exhibit 2 Professor Lacks foundation, confuses the 5 □ Sustained John J. Donohue’s issues, wastes time and presents 6 Expert Witness Report cumulative evidence: There is no 7 □ Overruled 8 (“Ex. 2”) at ¶32: While foundation for the assumption that 9 the empirical literature the literature about concealed 10 discussed above has carry can be used to make 11 largely focused on the predictions about open carry. FRE 12 impact of laws allowing 403, 702, 703. Scientific opinion 13 citizens to carry is not admissible when a court 14 concealed guns, this concludes “that there is simply too 15 literature can be used to great an analytical gap between 16 make informed the data and the opinion 17 predictions about the proffered.” See Gen. Elec. Co. v. 18 likely impact of allowing Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) 19 citizens to carry arms (“Trained experts commonly 20 openly. extrapolate from existing data. But 21 nothing in either Daubert or the 22 Federal Rules of Evidence 23 requires a district court to admit 24 opinion evidence that is connected 25 to existing data only by the ipse 26 dixit of the expert.”) In fact, 27 declarant admits that there is a 28 2 PLAINTIFFS’ OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE ISO DEFENDANT’S MSJ 481 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 5911033141, Filed 10/02/17 DktEntry: Page 17-3, 3Page of 20 159 Page of 232 ID #:1642

1 distinction between open and 2 concealed carry. Exhibit 3 3 Deposition Transcript of John J. 4 Donohue, Volume I (“Ex. 3”) at 5 197: 14-16. He further testified, 6 “any time I’m making a prediction 7 or estimate, I could be wrong” Ex. 8 3 at 220:12-18. The declarant has 9 not proffered any preliminary 10 evidence to lay the foundations 11 that he attempted to research what 12 open carry might be, as his 13 research is solely based on 14 concealed carry. FRE 702, 703. 15 2. Ex. 2 at ¶33: These Conclusory: Declaration which 16 □ Sustained facts suggest that open sets forth only conclusions 17 carry of guns would be opinions, or ultimate facts is 18 □ Overruled less socially desirable insufficient. (Kramer v Barnes 19 than concealed carry 91963) 212 Cal. App.2d 440, 446; 20 since the latter at least see also Powell v Kleinman (2007) 21 has the prospect of 151 Cal. App. 4th 112, 123 [“an 22 deterrence since expert’s opinion rendered without 23 criminals cannot know a reasoned explanation of why the 24 who is carrying underlying facts lead to the 25 weapons. ultimate conclusion has no 26 evidentiary value because an 27 expert opinion is worth no more 28 3 PLAINTIFFS’ OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE ISO DEFENDANT’S MSJ 482 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 5911033141, Filed 10/02/17 DktEntry: Page 17-3, 4Page of 20 160 Page of 232 ID #:1643

1 than the reasons and facts on 2 which it is based “].) FRE 602, 3 702. 4 Not Proper Scientific 5 Testimony: What is, or is not 6 “socially desirable” is a question 7 that does not require “scientific, 8 technical, or other specialized 9 knowledge[,]” meaning the issue 10 is not the proper subject of expert 11 testimony under FRE 702. See 12 Range Rd. Music, Inc. v. E. Coast 13 Foods, Inc., 668 F.3d 1148, 1153 14 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing FRE 702 15 and quoting the advisory 16 committee notes to FRE 701: 17 “[T]he distinction between lay and 18 expert witness testimony is that 19 lay testimony results from a 20 process of reasoning familiar in 21 everyday life, while expert 22 testimony results from a process 23 of reasoning which can be 24 mastered only by specialists in the 25 field.”) 26 27 28 4 PLAINTIFFS’ OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE ISO DEFENDANT’S MSJ 483 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 5911033141, Filed 10/02/17 DktEntry: Page 17-3, 5Page of 20 161 Page of 232 ID #:1644

1 3. Ex. 2 at ¶34: Spending Lacks Foundation: The statement Sustained 2 □ resources that shift fails to identify any factual 3 burdens of crime from evidence to show what his opinion □ Overruled 4 one ground to another is based on. (Taliaferro v 5 without reducing the Taliafferro (1962)203 Cal. App. 6 overall burden is a net 2d 649, 651; FRE 702, 703 7 waste of resources. [failure to state facts upon which 8 Indeed, the billions of opinion is based may warrant 9 dollars that are spent disregard of opinion, especially 10 each year buying guns where it is self-serving]; Powell v. 11 for self-protection Kleinman (2007) 151 Cal. App. 4th 12 without any statistical 112, 123 [“an expert’s opinion 13 support for the claim that rendered without a reasoned 14 they diminish crime explanation of why the underlying 15 could easily confer facts lead to the ultimate 16 substantial crime conclusion has no evidentiary 17 reducing benefits if the value because an expert opinion is 18 money were directed to worth no more than the reasons 19 known crime-reducing and facts on which it is based”].) 20 expenditures. 21 Speculative: The declarant does 22 not present any evidence to show 23 that open carry produces a net 24 waste of resources. Because there 25 is no evidence, the statement is 26 speculative. FRE 702, 703. In 27 fact, the declarant testified that he 28 5 PLAINTIFFS’ OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE ISO DEFENDANT’S MSJ 484 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 5911033141, Filed 10/02/17 DktEntry: Page 17-3, 6Page of 20 162 Page of 232 ID #:1645

1 didn’t rely upon any data to 2 measure the resource burdens that 3 open carry imposes. And these are 4 just his inferences. (Ex. 3 at 185:3- 5 8) 6 4. Ex. 2 at ¶36: Open carry Lacks Foundation: The declarant 7 □ Sustained 8 of guns can spread fear lacks foundation to testify and alarm in the regarding open carry. FRE 602, 9 □ Overruled 10 community. An openly 702-704. The declarant has not 11 displayed gun in public proffered any preliminary 12 also gives a muddy evidence to lay the foundations 13 signal about the gun that he attempted to research what 14 toter and could draw open carry might be, as his 15 undue attention from research is solely based on 16 police officers, directing concealed carry. FRE 602, 702- 17 law-enforcement 704. resources inefficiently, 18 Speculative: The declarant does which again makes law 19 not present any evidence to show enforcement less 20 that displaying guns in public can effective, thereby further 21 spread fear and alarm. Because 22 promoting crime. there is no evidence, the statement 23 is speculative. FRE 702, 703. 24 25 Conclusory: Declaration which 26 sets forth only conclusions 27 opinions, or ultimate facts is 28 6 PLAINTIFFS’ OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE ISO DEFENDANT’S MSJ 485 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 5911033141, Filed 10/02/17 DktEntry: Page 17-3, 7Page of 20 163 Page of 232 ID #:1646

1 insufficient (Kramer v Barnes 2 91963) 212 Cal. App.2d 440, 446; 3 see also Powell v Kleinman (2007) 4 151 Cal. App. 4th 112, 123 [“an 5 expert’s opinion rendered without 6 a reasoned explanation of why the 7 underlying facts lead to the 8 ultimate conclusion has no 9 evidentiary value because an 10 expert opinion is worth no more 11 than the reasons and facts on 12 which it is based “].) FRE 702, 13 703. 14 15 Not Proper Scientific 16 Testimony: Whatever “signal” an 17 “openly displayed gun” provides 18 to the public is, by definition, a 19 question that does not require 20 “scientific, technical, or other 21 specialized knowledge[,]” 22 meaning the issue is not the proper 23 subject of expert testimony under 24 FRE 702. See Range Rd. Music, 25 Inc. v. E. Coast Foods, Inc., 668 26 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 2012) 27 (citing FRE 702 and quoting the 28 7 PLAINTIFFS’ OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE ISO DEFENDANT’S MSJ 486 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 5911033141, Filed 10/02/17 DktEntry: Page 17-3, 8Page of 20 164 Page of 232 ID #:1647

1 advisory committee notes to FRE 2 701: “[T]he distinction between 3 lay and expert witness testimony 4 is that lay testimony results from a 5 process of reasoning familiar in 6 everyday life, while expert 7 testimony results from a process 8 of reasoning which can be 9 mastered only by specialists in the 10 field.”) Additionally, even 11 assuming arguendo the claim 12 about “undue attention” by police 13 is potentially a proper source of 14 expert opinion, the Declarant is 15 not a police officer. Indeed, he 16 states “I don't really have a strong 17 feeling on -- or a strong sense of 18 what police are estimating.” Ex. 3 19 at 114:22-23. 20 5. Ex. 2 at ¶¶1-36 Immaterial and Irrelevant: The 21 □ Sustained 22 study on concealed carry is not relevant to any material fact at 23 □ Overruled 24 issue in the case. FRE 402. Prof. 25 Donohue’s study is wholly 26 irrelevant because his study is 27 exclusively focused on concealed 28 8 PLAINTIFFS’ OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE ISO DEFENDANT’S MSJ 487 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 5911033141, Filed 10/02/17 DktEntry: Page 17-3, 9Page of 20 165 Page of 232 ID #:1648

1 carry. The declarant admits that he 2 did no research about open carry, 3 nor did he examine data from any 4 state that allows open carry. Ex. 3 5 at 178:3-12. The declarant further 6 testifies that everything he states 7 about open carry is inferred from 8 his work on concealed carry study. 9 (Ex. 3 at 185:17-20). And about 10 his study, he says “I didn’t focus 11 on open carry in this paper.” (Ex. 12 3 at 179:5). Further, he is not 13 aware of any research of open 14 carry’s potential impacts on 15 criminality [Ex. 3 at 179:20- 16 181:7]. Because this case is about 17 open carry, Professor Donohue’s 18 testimony and report will not 19 assist the court in deciding 20 Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary 21 Judgment. 22 23 24 OBJECTIONS TO DECLARATION OF P. PATTY LEE, See Exhibit 1 ¶ 5. 25 6. Exhibit 3 Deposition Lacks Foundation. Declarant’s □ Sustained 26 Transcript of John J. testimony is not based on an Donohue, Volume I adequate foundation of reliable 27 □ Overruled 28 9 PLAINTIFFS’ OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE ISO DEFENDANT’S MSJ 488 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 59 11033141, Filed 10/02/17 DktEntry: Page 17-3, 10 Page of 20 166 Page of 232 ID #:1649

1 (“Ex. 3”) at 114:22- data, and is not based on an 2 114:23: [the research on adequate methodology to support 3 disaggregated data for his conclusion. FRE 702. The 4 each category of violent research is not particularly clear 5 crime] pretty much on the impact of right to carry 6 conforms of what we laws on violent crime rates. 7 saw here [in the study]. Declarant had his staff run 8 regressions for the disaggregated 9 crimes in preparing the attached 10 report, but he did not include them 11 in the report. Scientific opinion is 12 not admissible when a court 13 concludes “that there is simply too 14 great an analytical gap between 15 the data and the opinion 16 proffered.” See Gen. Elec. Co. v. 17 Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) 18 (“Trained experts commonly 19 extrapolate from existing data. But 20 nothing in either Daubert or the 21 Federal Rules of Evidence 22 requires a district court to admit 23 opinion evidence that is connected 24 to existing data only by the ipse 25 dixit of the expert.”) 26 27 In fact, declarant admits that some 28 10 PLAINTIFFS’ OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE ISO DEFENDANT’S MSJ 489 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 59 11033141, Filed 10/02/17 DktEntry: Page 17-3, 11 Page of 20 167 Page of 232 ID #:1650

1 regressions are not consistent with 2 his conclusions in his study, and 3 that these regressions are very 4 misleading, by saying “if you run 5 enough regressions, [you can] pick 6 out one that you like, you can 7 really, really engineer results that 8 are very misleading” Ex. 3 at 9 35:20-24, 36: 6-8. 10 11 Lacks proper authentication: 12 The predictions relied upon lacks 13 proper authentication. FRE 403, 14 901, 902. The declarant has not 15 produced evidence sufficient to 16 support his finding that separate 17 disaggregated data for each 18 category of violent crime 19 conforms with aggregated data in 20 the study reported. 7. Ex. 3 at 147: 7-16: I Lacks proper authentication: 21 □ Sustained 22 think there were actually The predictions relied upon lacks some problems with proper authentication. FRE 403, 23 □ Overruled 24 [Concealed Carry 901, 902. The declarant has not 25 Killers] when they first produced evidence sufficient to 26 released that information support his finding that Concealed 27 and it was criticized, but Carry Killers is a reliable website. 28 11 PLAINTIFFS’ OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE ISO DEFENDANT’S MSJ 490 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 59 11033141, Filed 10/02/17 DktEntry: Page 17-3, 12 Page of 20 168 Page of 232 ID #:1651

1 they have cleaned up the Not Proper Scientific 2 website quite a bit since Testimony: The proffered 3 then… and it is a useful testimony here says a particular 4 resource of highlighting website, but not any particular 5 certain behaviors on the data thereon, is “a useful resource 6 part of permit holders, in highlighting certain behaviors 7 that show that they on the part of permit holders.” 8 engage in behavior that Inasmuch as the declarant is not 9 would either be criminal, offering testimony based on a 10 reckless, or suggestive of scientific analysis of data—and 11 not being the sort of because any layperson can see 12 person you want what is “highlighted” on the 13 carrying guns around. website—the issue is not the 14 proper subject of expert testimony 15 under FRE 702. See Range Rd. 16 Music, Inc. v. E. Coast Foods, 17 Inc., 668 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 18 2012) (citing FRE 702 and 19 quoting the advisory committee 20 notes to FRE 701: “[T]he 21 distinction between lay and expert 22 witness testimony is that lay 23 testimony results from a process 24 of reasoning familiar in everyday 25 life, while expert testimony results 26 from a process of reasoning which 27 can be mastered only by 28 12 PLAINTIFFS’ OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE ISO DEFENDANT’S MSJ 491 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 59 11033141, Filed 10/02/17 DktEntry: Page 17-3, 13 Page of 20 169 Page of 232 ID #:1652

1 specialists in the field.”) 2 3 8. Ex. 3 at 101: 6-25: Speculative: The expert witness’s Sustained 4 □ California, New York, “knowledge” must be based upon 5 and Washington, D.C., “more than subjective belief or □ Overruled 6 were areas with the unsupported speculation.” 7 worst crack problems. Daubert 509 U.S. at 590, 113 S. 8 Ct. at 2795, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 481). 9 FRE 702. The declarant does not 10 present any evidence to show that 11 states that do not have right to 12 carry laws are worse on crack than 13 adopters of right to carry states. 14 9. Ex. 3 at 123:16-20 We Lacks Foundation: The 15 □ Sustained 16 discussed sort of the declarant has not produced ambiguities about what evidence sufficient to support his 17 □ Overruled 18 the net effect is on finding that right to carry laws 19 property crime, but we result in increased property 20 said for just looking at crimes, including gun theft. FRE 21 gun thefts, right to carry 702, 703. Indeed, the declarant 22 laws theoretically necessarily, albeit impliedly, 23 increase gun theft. admits as much (“right to carry 24 laws theoretically increases gun 25 theft.”). 26 10. Ex. 3 at 203 4-23: Lacks Authentication: The 27 □ Sustained Carrying gun openly predictions relied upon lacks 28 13 PLAINTIFFS’ OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE ISO DEFENDANT’S MSJ 492 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 59 11033141, Filed 10/02/17 DktEntry: Page 17-3, 14 Page of 20 170 Page of 232 ID #:1653

1 where open carry is proper authentication. FRE 403, □ Overruled 2 allowed suddenly 901, 902. The declarant has not 3 triggers police produced evidence sufficient to 4 intervention…. We do support his finding that carrying 5 have the discussions of gun openly triggers police 6 police chiefs talking intervention. His testimony simply 7 about the amount of relies on anecdotal information. 8 attention that gun Hearsay: The statement 9 carriers can encourage summarizes a discussion but does 10 from the public. not verify or properly authenticate 11 12 the conversation. FRE 801.

13 Not Proper Scientific 14 Testimony: The proffered 15 testimony here says open carry 16 triggers police intervention. 17 Inasmuch as the declarant is not 18 offering testimony based on a 19 scientific analysis of data—and 20 because the claim about “police 21 intervention” is potentially a 22 proper source of expert opinion, 23 the Declarant is not a police 24 officer--the issue is not the proper 25 subject of expert testimony under 26 FRE 702. See Range Rd. Music, 27 Inc. v. E. Coast Foods, Inc., 668 28 14 PLAINTIFFS’ OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE ISO DEFENDANT’S MSJ 493 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 59 11033141, Filed 10/02/17 DktEntry: Page 17-3, 15 Page of 20 171 Page of 232 ID #:1654

1 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 2012) 2 (citing FRE 702 and quoting the 3 advisory committee notes to FRE 4 701: “[T]he distinction between 5 lay and expert witness testimony 6 is that lay testimony results from a 7 process of reasoning familiar in 8 everyday life, while expert 9 testimony results from a process 10 of reasoning which can be 11 mastered only by specialists in the 12 field.”) 13 11. Ex. 3 at 196:23- Lacks Foundation: The 14 □ Sustained 15 197:13: I think there declarant has not produced are strong reasons evidence sufficient to support his 16 □ Overruled 17 supported by police finding that open carry would 18 chief discussions that have more burdens and less 19 open carry would have benefits. FRE 702, 703. yet more burdens and 20 Hearsay: The statement less benefits. 21 summarizes a discussion but does 22 not verify or properly authenticate 23 the discussions by the chief of 24 police. FRE 801. 25 26 Not Proper Scientific 27 Testimony: The proffered 28 15 PLAINTIFFS’ OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE ISO DEFENDANT’S MSJ 494 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 59 11033141, Filed 10/02/17 DktEntry: Page 17-3, 16 Page of 20 172 Page of 232 ID #:1655

1 testimony here says open carry 2 would have more burdens and less 3 benefits. Inasmuch as the 4 declarant is not offering testimony 5 based on a scientific analysis of 6 data—and because the claim about 7 “burdens of open carry” is 8 potentially a proper source of 9 expert opinion, the Declarant is 10 not a police officer--the issue is 11 not the proper subject of expert 12 testimony under FRE 702. See 13 Range Rd. Music, Inc. v. E. Coast 14 Foods, Inc., 668 F.3d 1148, 1153 15 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing FRE 702 16 and quoting the advisory 17 committee notes to FRE 701: 18 “[T]he distinction between lay and 19 expert witness testimony is that 20 lay testimony results from a 21 process of reasoning familiar in 22 everyday life, while expert 23 testimony results from a process 24 of reasoning which can be 25 mastered only by specialists in the 26 field.”) 27 28 16 PLAINTIFFS’ OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE ISO DEFENDANT’S MSJ 495 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 59 11033141, Filed 10/02/17 DktEntry: Page 17-3, 17 Page of 20 173 Page of 232 ID #:1656

1 12. Ex. 3 at 212: 18-25; Speculative: The expert witness’s Sustained 2 □ 213: 1-15: I suspect, if “knowledge” must be based upon 3 anything, the open “more than subjective belief or □ Overruled 4 carriers would be much unsupported speculation.” 5 less law-abiding than Daubert 509 U.S. at 590, 113 S. 6 the concealed carriers. Ct. at 2795, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 481). 7 FRE 702. The declarant does not 8 present any evidence to show that 9 open carriers are less law-abiding 10 than concealed carriers. 11 12 Conclusory: Declaration which 13 sets forth only conclusions, 14 opinions or ultimate facts is 15 insufficient. (Kramper v Barnes 16 (1963) 212 Cal. App. 2d 440,446.) 17 FRE 702, 703.

18 19 OBJECTIONS TO DECLARATION OF P. PATTY LEE, See Exhibit 1 ¶ 6. 20 13. Exhibit 4 Deposition Speculative: The expert witness’s 21 □ Sustained Transcript of John J. “knowledge” must be based upon 22 Donohue, Volume II “more than subjective belief or Overruled 23 □ (“Ex. 4”) at 353: 16- unsupported speculation.” 24 353:20: The synthetic Daubert 509 U.S. at 590, 113 S. 25 controls estimates, Ct. at 2795, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 481). 26 regardless of the FRE 702. In this case, there has 27 particular set of been no showing that the facts or 28 17 PLAINTIFFS’ OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE ISO DEFENDANT’S MSJ 496 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 59 11033141, Filed 10/02/17 DktEntry: Page 17-3, 18 Page of 20 174 Page of 232 ID #:1657

1 explanatory variables data relied upon by Prof. Donohue 2 that was used, showed are of a type reasonably relied 3 a highly statistically upon by experts in the field. 4 significant impact on Accordingly, his opinion 5 aggravated assault regarding open carry does not 6 rising when right to meet the Daubert standard. 7 carry laws were 8 [adopted]. 9 14. Ex. 4 at 5-25; 328 1-4: Speculative: There is no evidence 10 □ Sustained 11 One huge way is guns presented to validate declarant’s are much more likely to belief that guns are more likely to 12 □ Overruled 13 be stolen when you’re be stolen when one is outside their 14 taking them around home, as he cannot recollect any 15 town and walking reports. FRE 702, 703. around. 16 Conclusory: Declaration which 17 sets forth only conclusions, 18 opinions or ultimate facts is 19 insufficient. (Kramper v Barnes 20 (1963) 212 Cal. App. 2d 440,446.) 21 FRE 702, 703. 22

23 15. Ex. 4 at 331:13-14, Speculative: The expert witness’s 24 □ Sustained 332:13-16: NRA was “knowledge” must be based upon 25 looking around for “more than subjective belief or 26 □ Overruled other ways to stimulate unsupported speculation.” 27 gun sales… the one Daubert 509 U.S. at 590, 113 S. 28 18 PLAINTIFFS’ OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE ISO DEFENDANT’S MSJ 497 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 59 11033141, Filed 10/02/17 DktEntry: Page 17-3, 19 Page of 20 175 Page of 232 ID #:1658

1 unifying theme in NRA Ct. at 2795, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 481). 2 conduct is, as far as I FRE 702. The declarant does not 3 can tell, that they favor present any evidence to show that 4 anything that stimulate NRA was looking to stimulate gun 5 gun sales and oppose sales. 6 anything that might Conclusory: Declaration which 7 reduce gun sales. sets forth only conclusions, 8 opinions or ultimate facts is 9 insufficient. (Kramper v Barnes 10 (1963) 212 Cal. App. 2d 440,446.) 11 12 FRE 702, 703. 13

14 Dated: October 2, 2017 MICHEL & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 15

16 /s/ Sean A. Brady Sean A. Brady 17 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 19 PLAINTIFFS’ OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE ISO DEFENDANT’S MSJ 498 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 59 11033141, Filed 10/02/17 DktEntry: Page 17-3, 20 Page of 20 176 Page of 232 ID #:1659

1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 2 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

3 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 4 WESTERN DIVISION

5 Case Name: Flanagan, et al. v. California Attorney General Xavier Becerra, et al. Case No.: 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS 6 IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED THAT: 7 I, the undersigned, am a citizen of the United States and am at least eighteen 8 years of age. My business address is 180 East Ocean Boulevard, Suite 200, Long Beach, California 90802. 9 I am not a party to the above-entitled action. I have caused service of: 10 PLAINTIFFS’ OBJECTIONS TO THE DECLARATION OF P. PATTY 11 LI AND EVIDENCE SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 12 on the following party by electronically filing the foregoing with the Clerk of the 13 District Court using its ECF System, which electronically notifies them.

14 Xavier Becerra, Attorney General of California Attorneys for Attorney P. Patty Li, Deputy Attorney General General of the State of 15 E-mail: [email protected] California Jonathan M. Eisenberg, Deputy Attorney General 16 E-mail: [email protected] 300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 17 Los Angeles, CA 90013

18 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

19 Executed October 2, 2017

20 /s/ Laura Palmerin 21 Laura Palmerin

22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 499

Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 59-111033141, Filed DktEntry:10/02/17 17-3, Page Page 1 of 4177 Page of 232 ID #:1660

EXHIBIT 1

Exhibit 1 - 1 500 CaseCase 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document Document ID: 59-111033141,45-1 Filed Filed DktEntry:10/02/17 09/11/17 17-3, Page Page Page 2 1 of of 41783 Page Page of 232 ID ID #:1661 #:383

1 XAVIER BECERRA Attorney General of California 2 STEPAN A. HAYTAYAN Supervising Deputy Attorney General 3 JONATHANM. EISENBERG Deputy Attorney General 4 P.PATTYLI Deputy Attorney General 5 State Bar No. 266937 455 Golden Gate Avenue" Suite 11000 6 San Francisco CA 9410L-7004 Telephone: (415)1 703-1577 7 Fax: (415) 703-1234 E-mail: [email protected] 8 Attorneys for Defendant Xavier Becerra, Attorney General of the State of California 9 10 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12 WESTERN DIVISION

13 MICHELLE FLANAGAN, et al., Case No.: 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS 14 Plaintiffs, DECLARATION OF P. PATTY LI IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 15 v. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 16 CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL XAVIER BECERRA, in 17 his official capacity as Attorney Date: November 6, 2017 General of the State of California, et Time: 8:30 a.m. 18 al., · Courtroom: lOB Judge: Hon. John A. Kronstadt 19 Defendants. Act10n Filed: August 17, 2016 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

LIDECL. ISODEF.'SMOT. SUM. JDGMNT Exhibit 1 - 2 (2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS) 501 CaseCase 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document Document ID: 59-111033141,45-1 Filed Filed DktEntry:10/02/17 09/11/17 17-3, Page Page Page 3 2 of of 41793 Page Page of 232 ID ID #:1662 #:384

1 I, P. Patty Li, declare as follows: 2 1. I am a Deputy Attorney General in the California Attorney General's 3 Office. I represent Defendant Xavier Becerra, in his official capacity as Attorney 4 General of California ("Defendant"), in the above-captioned matter. I have 5 personal lmowledge of each fact stated in this declaration, and if called as a witness 6 I could and would testify competently to them under oath. 7 2. On April 26, 2017, counsel for Defendant deposed Plaintiff Michelle 8 Flanagan. Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of excerpts from 9 the transcript of Ms. Flanagan's deposition. 10 3. On April 26, 2017, counsel for Defendant deposed Plaintiff Dominic 11 Nardone. Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy of excerpts from 12 the transcript of Mr. Nardone's deposition. 13 4. On May 1, 2017, counsel for Defendant deposed Plaintiff Samuel 14 Golden. Attached hereto as Exhibit 3 is a true and correct copy of excerpts from 15 the transcript of Mr. Golden's deposition. 16 5. On July 12, 2017, counsel for Plaintiffs deposed Defendant's expert 17 witness, Stanford Law Prof. John J. Donohue III. Attached hereto as Exhibit 4 is a 18 true and correct copy of excerpts from the transcript of Prof. Donohue's July 12, 19 2017 deposition. 20 6. On August 8, 2017, counsel for Plaintiffs deposed Prof. Donohue again. 21 Attached hereto as Exhibit 5 is a true and correct copy of excerpts from the 22 transcript of Prof. Donohue's August 8, 2017 deposition. 23 7. On July 27, 2017, counsel for Plaintiffs deposed Defendant's expert 24 witness, former Covina Chief of Police Kim Raney. Attached hereto as Exhibit 6 is 25 a true and correct copy of excerpts from the transcript of Chief Raney' s deposition: 26 8. On June 1, 2017, Defendant provided to Plaintiffs the expert report of 27 Prof. Donohue. Two exhibits were appended to Prof. Donohue's expert report: (1) 28 Prof. Donohue's curriculum vitae and (2) Prof. Donohue's (and two co-authors')

1 LI DECL. ISO DEF'S MTN. SUM. JDGMNT Exhibit 1 - 3 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS 502 CaseCase 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document Document ID: 59-111033141,45-1 Filed Filed DktEntry:10/02/17 09/11/17 17-3, Page Page Page 4 3 of of 41803 Page Page of 232 ID ID #:1663 #:385

1 academic study, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., Working Paper 2 Series, Working Paper w23510, "Right-to-Can-y Laws and Violent Crime: A 3 Comprehensive Assessment Using Panel Data and State-Level Synthetic Controls 4 Analysis" (the "Donohue Study"), dated May 23, 2017. Attached hereto as Exhibit 5 7 is a true and co1Tect copy of Prof. Donahue's expert report and cmTiculum vitae, 6 as appended to Prof. Donahue's expert report. Attached hereto as Exhibit 8 is a 7 true and con-ect copy of the Donohue Study, as appended to Prof. Donohue 's expe1i 8 report. 9 9. On July 21, 2017, Defendant provided to Plaintiffs an updated version of 10 the Donohue Study, dated June 2017. Attached hereto as Exhibit 9 is a true and 11 conect copy of the updated Donohue Study. 12 10. On June 1, 2017, Defendant provided to Plaintiffs the expe1i repo1i of 13 Chief Raney. Attached hereto as Exhibit 10 is a trne and c01Tect copy of Chief 14 Raney' s expe1i repmi. 1'5 11. Attached hereto as Exhibit 11 is a true and conect copy of "Easiness of 16 Legal Access to Concealed Firearms Pem1its and Homicide Rates in the US 17 States," by Boston University Prof. of Public Health Michael Siegel, et al., an 18 officially unpublished article in press with and under embargo until publication by 19 the American J oumal of Public Health. 20 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and conect. 21 Executed on September 11, 201 7, at San Francisco, Califmnia. 22 ~~--;i: 23 P. Patty Li 24 25 26 27 28

2 LI DECL. ISO DEF'S MTN. SUM. IDGMNT Exhibit 1 - 4 2: 16-cv-06164-J AK-AS 503 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 59-2 11033141, Filed 10/02/17DktEntry: 17-3,Page Page1 of 51 181 Page of 232 ID #:1664

EXHIBIT 2

Exhibit 2 - 1

504 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 59-2 11033141, Filed 10/02/17DktEntry: 17-3,Page Page2 of 51 182 Page of 232 ID #:1665

Expert Report of John J. Donohue Flanagan v. Becerra, United States District Court (C.D. Cal.), Case No. 2: 16-cv-06164-JAK-AS June 1,2017

BACKGROUND AND QUALIFICATIONS

1. I, John J. Donohue, am the C. Wendell and Edith M. Carlsmith Professor of Law at Stanford Law School. After earning a law degree from Harvard and a Ph.D. in economics from Yale, I have been a member of the legal academy since 1986. I have previously held tenured positions as a chaired professor at both Yale Law School and Northwestern Law School. I have also been a visiting professor at a number of prominent law schools, including Harvard, Yale, the University of Chicago, Cornell, the University of Virginia, Oxford, Toin University (Tokyo), St. Gallens (Switzerland), and Renmin University (Beijing). 2. For a number of years I have been teaching at Stanford a course on empirical law and economics issues involving crime and criminal justice, and I have previously taught similar courses at Yale Law School, Tel Aviv University Law School, the Gerzensee Study Center in Switzerland, and st. Gallen University School of Law in Switzerland. I have consistently taught courses on law and statistics for two decades. 3. I am a Research Associate ofthe National Bureau of Economic Research, and a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. I was a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies in Behavioral Sciences in 2000-01, and served as the co-editor (handling empirical articles) of the American Law and Economics Review for six years. I have also served as the President of the American Law and Economics Association and as Co-President of the Society of Empirical Legal Studies. 4. I am also a member of the Committee on Law and Justice ofthe National Research Council ("NRC"), which "reviews, synthesizes, and proposes research related to crime, law enforcement, and the administration of justice, and provides an intellectual resource for federal agencies and private groups." (See http://www7.national-academies.orglclajl online for more information about the NRC.) 5. My research and writing uses empirical analysis to determine the impact oflaw and public policy in a wide range of areas, and I have written extensively about the relationship between rates of violent crime and firearms regulation. My complete credentials and list of publications are stated in my curriculum vitae, a true and correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit A. 6. I filed an expert declaration in each of two cases involving a National Rifle Association ("NRA") challenge to city restrictions on the possession of high-capacity magazines: Fyock v. City o/Sunnyvale, United States District Court (N.D. Cal.), January 2014. Herrera v. San Francisco, United States District Court (N.D. Cal.), January 2014. I also filed an expert declaration in a case involving a challenge by NRA to Maryland's restrictions on assault weapons and high-capacity magazines: Tardy v. O'Malley, United States District Court (District of Maryland), February 2014.

1

Exhibit 2 - 2

505 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 59-2 11033141, Filed 10/02/17DktEntry: 17-3,Page Page3 of 51 183 Page of 232 ID #:1666

In all cases, the relevant gun regulations have (ultimately) been sustained in the relevant federal appellate courts. 7. I am charging a total of $21,250 to the California Department of Justice for preparation of this expert report. I will charge $850 per hour for deposition testimony, and $500 per hour for trial testimony, in connection with being an expert witness in the above-entitled case.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

1. A considerable body of credible statistical evidence based on both panel data analysis and the use of synthetic controls finds that the adoption of right-to-carry ("RTC") laws (sometimes called "concealed-carry laws" or "CCW laws"), permitting individuals otherwise allowed to possess firearms to carry them concealed on their bodies in public places, leads to increases in overall violent crime. 1 Earlier panel data studies that purported to find different results are less reliable because they have not analyzed the full array of data through 2014, which I have analyzed, or because the earlier panel data studies are marred by specification or other econometric problems.2 2. Given that the best statistical evidence suggests that the adoption of right to carry laws leads to statistically significant increases in violent crime, it is a sound, evidenced-based, and longstanding crime-fighting strategy for U.S. state and local governments to place substantial limits on the carrying of concealed weapons in pUblic. 3 3. While the vast bulk of the empirical literature on the impact of gun carrying on crime has focused on laws facilitating the concealed carry of weapons, one can use this literature to draw inferences about the likely consequences of allowing the open carry of guns. In general, there is no reason to think that the social harm from gun carrying imposed by R TC laws that was just referenced would be lower under a regime allowing open carry of guns. Indeed, there are valid reasons to believe that a policy of lawful open carry could impose even greater social costs in terms of further facilitating criminal activity, burdening the police, and elevating citizen fear and anxiety.

1 Panel data analysis has been the primary tool for evaluating the impact oflaw and policy interventions for at least the last 30 years. Synthetic controls is a newer technique designed to better approximate the type of treatment and control analysis that would be found in a randomized study. Further details of both are discussed below. 2 To generate credible results, panel data evaluations must be conducted according to sound statistical practices. If the models used do not have the appropriate mathematical form or do not capture the appropriate explanatory variables, then they would not be deemed to have an appropriate "specification." Since much of the development of the elements of modern panel data analysis came from economists who were trying to perfect these tools, any violations of the best practices in conducting such studies are often referred to as "econometric" problems. 3 All of our estimates of the impact ofRTC laws on crime are accompanied by measures designed to gauge whether the results are likely to be caused by chance variations as opposed to a true causal effect of the RTC law. If the estimated effect is large relative to the likely chance variation in crime, then we deem the estimate to be "statistically significant."

2

Exhibit 2 - 3

506 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 59-2 11033141, Filed 10/02/17DktEntry: 17-3,Page Page4 of 51 184 Page of 232 ID #:1667

DISCUSSION

Background on Panel Data Models

1. There is a very substantialliterature on the issue of the impact of laws allowing citizens to carry concealed handguns. My first published article in this literature appeared 18 years ago,4 and the latest of my 11 articles in this area was just issued as aNational Bureau of Economic Research working paper this month (attached as Exhibit B).5 2. Virtually all ofthe published literature on this question has employed an econometric approach referred to as a panel data model with state and year fixed effects. Panel data refers to the fact that the researcher will have crime data over a period of years for many different states (or counties or cities), which can then be analyzed to test whether some legal or policy intervention (such as the adoption of an RTC law) leads to a change in crime that is not seen in states that do not experience that legal or policy intervention (i.e., do not adopt RTC laws).6 3. Panel data models can be useful to examine a change adopted by selected states (preferably at different times) so that one can compare what happens in the states that adopt the legal change to the states that do not adopt the legal change. This is an appealing empirical strategy because it allows the researcher to separate the data into the treated group, which is the set of states that adopts the law during the relevant data period, and the set of all other states, which serves as a type of control. Nonetheless, it is now well-known that panel data crime estimates of crime can be inaccurate if they are not undertaken with meticulous care and substantial econometric sophistication.

The Most Up-to-Date Panel Data Estimates of the Impact ofRTC Laws on Violent Crime

4. Despite some initial claims that RTC laws could actually reduce violent crime, the 2004 report of a special committee the National Research Council ("NRC"; with only one dissenter out of 16 committee members) emphatically rejected this conclusion based on the committee's review of the then-current information with data through 2000.7 Noting that the estimated effects ofRTC laws were highly sensitive to the particular choice of explanatory variables, the report concluded that the evidence was too uncertain to determine the impact of these permissive gun laws on crime. The

4 Ian Ayres and John Donohue, "Nondiscretionary Concealed Weapons Law: A Case Study of Statistics, Standards of Proof, and Public Policy," American Law and Economics Review 436 (1999). 5 John Donohue, Abhay Aneja, and Kyle Weber, "Right-to-Carry Laws and Violent Crime: A Comprehensive Assessment Using Panel Data and a State-Level Synthetic Controls Analysis," NBER Working Paper ("DAW") May 2017. A true and correct copy of this working paper is attached as Exhibit B. We plan to have the article published in a peer-reviewed journal. 6 The state fixed effects simply capture the fact that some states have enduringly lower or higher rates of violent crime (for reasons that may not be fully reflected in the explanatory variables that are available to the researcher). The year fixed effects are designed to capture the common movements that occur in all states each year owing to factors that operate nationally (and which again may not be fully reflected in the explanatory variables that are available to the researcher). 7 National Research Council. Firearms and Violence: A Critical Review (Washington: National Academies Press, 2004).

3

Exhibit 2 - 4

507 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 59-2 11033141, Filed 10/02/17DktEntry: 17-3,Page Page5 of 51 185 Page of 232 ID #:1668

Committee suggested that more data and new and better statistical techniques would be necessary to resolve this uncertainty. 5. Since then, 14 more years of data with 11 more states adopting RTC laws have improved the previous panel data estimates. In addition, new statistical techniques have enabled much more compelling and consistent evidence on the impact of RTC laws on crime to emerge. 6. The best evidence now shows that RTC laws substantially increase violent crime rates, so that, ten years after adoption, an RTC state is estimated to have a 13-15 percent higher rate of violent crime than it would have had ifno RTC law had been adopted. A violent crime increase of this magnitude is obviously a major burden on a state and its citizens, and given current estimates of the elasticity of incarceration with respect to crime, a state would need to double its prison population to offset the violent crime increase imposed by RTC laws.s 7. Many ofthe early studies that tried to estimate the impact ofRTC laws - typically using panel data for all states across an extended period of time were undennined by the fact that the period from 1985 through the early 1990s was anomalous. Over that span, violent crime rose sharply in certain areas, such as California, New York, and the District of Columbia, owing to the introduction of crack cocaine. Since all three of those jurisdictions and a number of other states with the worst crack problems did not adopt RTC laws, any panel data analysis that could not properly control for the criminogenic influence of crack would necessarily generate a biased estimate of the impact ofRTC laws that would make them appear to be less hannful (or more beneficial) than they actually were in influencing crime. 8. This was a major problem for the original Lott and Mustard study and in fact plagues every panel data analysis ofRTC laws, except for those that started after the impact of crack had been fully dissipated (in the very late 1990s or early 2000S).9 9. One quick but admittedly crude way to address this problem is to present a difference-in- differences comparison between the 37 states that adopted RTC laws over the period 1977-2014 and the nine states (including the District of Columbia) that did not adopt these laws. By comparing the change in violent crime from a period before crack emerged to a year after its impact had dissipated, one can eliminate the impact of crack on crime (although of course this simple comparison does not control for other influences on crime that differed over this period for the two sets of states). Figure 1 shows that the nine non-RTC states enjoyed a 42.3 percent drop in their violent crime rate, while the 37 RTC-adopting states had a sharply smaller decline in violent crime over this period (a decline of only 8.7 percent over a 37-year period). The five states that had adopted RTC laws prior to 1977 similarly showed far smaller drops in crimes than the nine never-adopting states. This graphical display provides suggestive evidence that RTC laws tend to exacerbate violent crime (controlling for the influence of crack, albeit not for other explanatory variables).

8 Current consensus estimates suggest that doubling the incarceration rate will lead to a roughly 15 percent reduction in crime (which means the elasticity of crime with respect to incarceration is .15). Since RTC laws generate about a 15 percent increase in violent crime, one could offset this increase by doubling the prison population. See generally John J. Donohue, "Assessing the Relative Benefits ofIncarceration: The Overall Change Over the Previous Decades and the Benefits on the Margin," in Steven Raphael and Michael Stoll, eds., Do Prisons Make Us Safer? The Benefits and Costs ofthe Prison Boom 269-341 (2009). 9 See the discussion of Zimmerman (2015) below, which supports my fmding that RTC laws increase crime.

4

Exhibit 2 - 5

508 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 59-2 11033141, Filed 10/02/17DktEntry: 17-3,Page Page6 of 51 186 Page of 232 ID #:1669

Figure 1

The Decline in Violent Crime Rates has been Far Greater in States with No RTC Laws, 1977-2014

Data Sources: UCR for crime rates; Census for stale populations.

[;iJ 1977 o 2014 8r-.. -42.3%

S 0 ai g :2 a::~ 0 8 8 It) g -8.7% ..... 8 ~ ..;- /1------, (I) Rate: 668.8 -9.9% m 9 SJ<{tes a:: 60~~ People ~ /> .;:;~ 0 // c Rate '" 385.6 Rate: 372.3 (I) 8 / N 9 States 37 S1ates Rate =v335.3 :2 Rate =302.2 84.3M People 217.2M People 5. .5tates > tiM 5 States ~/ 17.5M People 0 0.-

0 States that have never States that have adopted RTC laws States that adopted RTC laws adopted RTC Laws between 1977 and 2014 priorto 1977

10. Obviously, Figure 1 would exaggerate the extent ofthe hann ofRTC laws if, say, the non­ adopting states had increased their per capita rates of either incarceration or police personnel more than the adopting states, thereby suppressing violent crime through those mechanisms (which could then potentially explain the relatively better experience with violent crime over the 1977-2014 period in the non-adopting states). In fact, the opposite is true. The states adopting RTC laws in the 1977-2014 period had considerably larger percentage increases over this span in their rates of incarceration (259% vs. 205%) and police staffing (55% vs. 16%) relative to the non-adopting states. lO The relatively better crime perfonnance of non-adopting states in the raw comparison of Figure 1 would be even greater if one were to control for the influence on violent crime of both police and incarceration. 11. Of course, many factors in addition to police, incarceration, and crack influence crime and the challenge for researchers who seek to find the impact of a single factor such as RTC laws is to develop an appropriately specified statistical model that accounts for those factors that may also be

10 The five states that had adopted RTC laws prior to 1977 had the largest percentage increase in their incarceration rate (262 percent), and a 38-percent growth in size of their police forces (per capita), which was more than double the growth in the police forces in the states not adopting RTC laws.

5

Exhibit 2 - 6

509 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 59-2 11033141, Filed 10/02/17DktEntry: 17-3,Page Page7 of 51 187 Page of 232 ID #:1670

correlated with RTC adoption. DAW (see footnote 2, supra, for full citation) begin their study with a state panel data analysis that extended the NRC data by 14 years, during which time 11 additional states adopted RTC laws. Table 1, below (which reproduces Table 4 in DAW), provides state panel data estimates of the impact ofRTC laws for the period 1979-2014 using state and year fixed effects, with both a dummy variable model (estimating a shift in the level of crime after RTC adoption) and a spline model (examining whether RTC laws induce a change in the trend of crime). Table 1 suggests that violent and property crime are both higher after adoption ofRTC laws. Specifically, the dummy model suggests that violent crime is 9.5 percent higher after adoption ofRTC laws, while the spline model results are not statistically significant. 11

Table 1: Panel Data Estimates Suggesting that RTC Laws increase Violent and Property Crime: State and Year Fixed Effects, DAW Regressors, 1979-2014

Murder Rate Murder Count Violent Crime Rate Property Crime Rate

Dummy Variable Model 0.30 (5.35) 1.050 (0.052) 9.49*** (2.96) 6.76*· (2.73)

Model -0.31 0.05 0.14 OLS estimations include year and state fixed effects and are weighted by state population. Robust standard errors (clustered at the state level) are provided next to point estimates in parentheses. Incidence Rate Ratios (IRR) estimated using Negative Binomial Regression, where state population is included as a control variable, are presented in Column 2. The null hypothesis is that the IRR equals 1. The source of all the crime rates is the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). Six demographic variables (based on different age-sex-race categories) are included as controls in the regression above. Other controls include the lagged incarceration rate, the lagged police employee rate, real per capita personal income, the unemployment rate, poverty rate, beer, and percentage of the population living in MSAs. * p < .1, ** P < .(,5, *** P < .01. All figures reported in percentage terms.

12. DAW then show that if one conducts a panel data analysis over this extended data period from 1979-2014 based on another major crime study that uses different but still plausible explanatory variables, one generates almost identical results. Specifically, taking the variables from the 2015 Brennan Center report (BC) on the crime decline and using the longer data time frame of

11 Both models control for the same additional factors that influence crime, such as police, incarceration, state income and unemployment, the demographics of the population, etc. (The full array of variables are set forth in DAW, Table 3.) The dummy variable model of Table I - a dummy variable is just an indicator of whether a state has an RTC law or not - estimates that on average crime is 9.49 percent higher after RTC adoption, holding other factors constant. The spline model of Table I is harder to interpret because it suggests that for each year over the entire 36-year data period, RTC states were experiencing a relative increase in violent crime relative to non-RTC states for reasons not well captured by the panel data model (and that this enduringly worse crime performance did not get significantly worse after adoption). It seems unlikely that an adverse linear trend could be projected to continue for so long without being buttressed by further exacerbating factors, which implies that the spline model is not informative about how much of the post­ treatment increases in violent crime is caused by the consequences ofRTC laws versus pre-existing but unknown attributes of the 33 states that happen to go on to adopt RTC laws. This suggests that the more precise identification of appropriate control comparisons for each treated (RTC-adopting) state that the synthetic controls approach provides is likely to yield superior pre-treatment equivalence, thereby better facilitating superior insight into the causal impact of RTC laws on crime.

6

Exhibit 2 - 7

510 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 59-2 11033141, Filed 10/02/17DktEntry: 17-3,Page Page8 of 51 188 Page of 232 ID #:1671

the DAW data period generates almost identical results, predicting an 11.0 percent increase in the rate of violent crime with the dummy variable model employed by BC. 12 These results are shown in Table 2.

Table 2: Panel Data Estimates Suggesting that RTC Laws increase Violent and Property Crime: State and Year Fixed Effects, Be Regressors, 1978-2014

Murder Rate Murder Count Violent Crime Hate Property Crime Rate (1) (2) (4) Dummy Variable I\Iodel 3.45 (.').67) 1.050 (0.051)

Model -0.49 0.19 0.12 01S estimations include year and state fixed effects and are weighted by state population. Robust standard enol'S (clustered at the state level) are provided next to point estimates in parentheses. Incidence Hate Ratios (IRR) estimated using Negative Billomi

13. Another post-NRC panel data crime study that also finds an association of RTC laws with higher rates of violent crime is Zimmerman (2015), which uses a state panel data set from 1999- 2010. The advantage of using this data period to explore the impact ofRTC laws is that it largely avoids the problem of omitted variable bias owing to the crack phenomenon, since the crack effect had ended by 1999.13 The disadvantage is that one has less data and can derive estimates based only on the eight states that adopted RTC laws over that twelve-year spel1.14 Zimmerman describes his finding as follows: "The shall-issue coefficient takes a positive sign in all regressions save for the rape model and is statistically significant in the murder, robbery, assault, burglary, and larceny

12 See Donohue, Aneja, and Weber, supra, Table 5.A (the same as Table 2 here). The official citation for the Brennan Center (the "BC") report is Roeder, et aI., "What Caused the Crime Decline? ," Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 15-28 (Feb. 12,2015). It conducted its analysis on the abbreviated period from 1990-2013, while we use more complete data from the late 1970s through 2014. Although the BC report did not estimate a spline model, Table 2 shows spline model estimates for four crime measures and again shows the same statistically insignificant results of the DAW model that are discussed in footnote 1 L 13 Because crack caused sharp crime increases in largely non-RTC states starting in the mid-1980s, and we do not have good measures to control for the criminogenic influence of crack, this variable is omitted from the Table 1 and 2 panel data estimates and likely biases the results in a way that obscures the criminogenic effects ofRTC laws. 14 The relatively short time span makes the assumption of state fixed effects more plausible, but also limits the amount of pre-adoption data for an early adopter such as Michigan (2001), with only one year of data prior to adoption, and the amount of post-adoption data for the late adopters Nebraska and Kansas (both 2007), leaving only three years after adoption to estimate the impact of the law.

7

Exhibit 2 - 8

511 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-AS Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 59-2 11033141, Filed 10/02/17DktEntry: 17-3,Page Page9 of 51 189 Page of 232 ID #:1672

models. These latter findings may imply that the passage of shall-issue laws increases the propensity for crime, as some recent research (e.g., Aneja, Donohue, & Zhang, 2012) has suggested.,,15 14. The next two tables (both part of Table 3) show further panel data confirmation ofthe Zimmerman findings using the DAW and BC specifications to estimate the impact ofRTC laws on crime over the 2000-2014 period. Both tables buttress the view that the states adopting RTC laws after 2000 suffered from relatively higher violent crime in the aftermath of doing so.

Table 3: Panel Data Estimates of the Impact of RTC Laws Using DAvVand BC specifications, 2000 - 2014

Panel A: Panel Data Est-imates Suggesting that RTC Laws increase lHurde1': State and Year F-ixed Effects, DA W Reg1'essors, 2000-2014 Murder Rate Murder Count Violent Crime Rate Property Crime Rate (1) (2) (3) (4) Dummy Variable Model 5.70 (3.59) 1.021 (0.043) 4.96 (3.49) -1.52 (2.25)

Spline Model 1.12** (0.56) 1.0l3*' (0.006) 0.53 (1.11) DAD (0.42)

Panel B: Panel Data Estimates SuggesUng that RTC Laws fncrcuse Violent Cr-ime: State and Year Ffu:ed Effects, Brennun Cente-,.. Regresso-,..s. 2000-2014

Murder Rate Murder Count Violent Crime Rate Property Crime Rate (1) (2) (3) (4) Dummy Variable Model 7.29* (4.10) 1.031 (0.042) 7.97** (3.56) -1.90 (2.44)

Model 0.9S 0.59 0.35

Synthetic Controls Estimates of the Impact of RTC Laws on Violent Crime

15. In addition to the benefit from having more years of data and more RTC adoptions to provide further evidence of the true impact ofRTC laws on crime, we now have a powerful new and already widely implemented statistical tool to assess the impact of a legal change - the synthetic controls analysis, first introduced in Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and expanded in Abadie, et al. (2010) and Abadie, et al. (2014).16 We have already alluded to some of the difficulties with the panel data methodology because of the inability to effectively control for the influence of crack and other

15 DAW also found that running their preferred model on post-crack-era data from 2000-2014 generated an estimate that murder rates rose about 1.1 percentage points each year that an RTC law was in effect. 16 A. Abadie, A. Diamond, and J. Hainmueller, "Synthetic Control Methods for Comparative Case Studies: Estimating the Effect of California's Tobacco Control Program," 105 Journal ofthe American Statistical Association 490, 493-505 (2010).

8

Exhibit 2 - 9

512 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-ASCase: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 11033141, 59-2 Filed DktEntry: 10/02/17 17-3, Page Page 10 190 of 51 of 232 Page ID #:1673

(known and unknown) explanatory variables that influence crime. 17 The synthetic controls approach is designed to address some of the challenges posed by panel data methods. The goal of this research is to find a set of states that do not have RTC laws that can be used to generate a good approximation of the pattern of crime prior to year X for a state that adopts a R TC law during that year. The pattern of crime for the synthetic control after year X can then be compared with the actual pattern of crime for the adopting state to generate an estimate of the causal impact of the RTC law adoption. 16. Figures 2 through 5 illustrate the synthetic controls estimates of the impact ofRTC laws on violent crime for four different states, beginning with Texas. As one can see in Figure 2, a weighted average of three states - California, Wisconsin, and Nebraska - mimics the time-series of violent crime in Texas rather well over the period from 1977 through adoption of the Texas RTC law in 1996. Although all states were benefitting from crime reductions in the 1990s, the fact that California, Wisconsin, and Nebraska did not have RTC laws led to their better performance in reducing violent crime. It is the comparison between the better performance of the synthetic control (the composite of California, Wisconsin, and Nebraska) with the actual performance of the state itself that generates the synthetic controls estimate that Texas's RTC law elevated crime by 16.6 percent above what it would have been if the state had not been burdened by an RTC law. 17. Similar results can be seen in the successive figures for Pennsylvania, North Carolina and Mississippi. It is worth noting in Figure 3 that Pennsylvania adopted its RTC laws in two phases (as indicated in the two vertical lines), with the second phase extending RTC to Philadelphia in 1996. Note that violent crime noticeably moved in an adverse direction in the wake of that legislative enactment. The attached paper by DAW (see Appendix D) also shows that when in 2003 Alaska moved from an RTC permitting system to a regime of unencumbered RTC, violent crime jumped noticeably.

17 As alluded to above, the assumptions of panel data analyses needed to ensure validity can be demanding. One can question whether it is plausible to assume implicitly that states like New York can serve as good controls for treatment states like South Dakota, that state ftxed effects remain ftxed over a 36-year data period, and that linear trends can be projected far into the future (as in the spline models run on the fu1136-year period).

9

Exhibit 2 - 10

513 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-ASCase: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 11033141, 59-2 Filed DktEntry: 10/02/17 17-3, Page Page 11 191 of 51 of 232 Page ID #:1674

Figure 2 Texas: Violent Crime Rate ~c: Effect of 1996 RTC Law 10 Years After Adoption: 16.6% Q) -c 'iii 0 a:::Q) g ~ 0 0 0 0 ..... I'- I.. Q) 0.. 0 Q) 0 .... CO a:::Cil Q) 0 0 .~.... It) () 0 -" '" c: 0 Q) " I'- o m o ..... N

--- treated unit synthetic control unit

Composition of SC: CA (57.8%), NE (8.6%), WI (33.6%) States Never Passing RTC Laws Included in Synthetic Control: CA RTC-Adopting States Included In SynthetiC Control: NE (2007). WI (2012)

Figure 3 Pennsylvania: Violent Crime Rate Effect of 1989 RTC Law 10 Years After Adoption: 26.5% ~c: Q) 8 -c It) 'iii Q) 0 a::: It) ~ " N 1977 1989 1996 1999

treated unit - - - - - synthetic control unit

Composition of sc: DE (1.1%), HI (10.6%), NE (4.3%), NJ (17.1)%). OH (25.6%), WI (34.8%) Stales Never Passing RTC Laws Induded in Synlt1etic Control: DE, HI. NJ RTC-Adopting States Included In Synlt1etic Control: NE (2007). OH (2004). WI (2012)

10

Exhibit 2 - 11

514 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-ASCase: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 11033141, 59-2 Filed DktEntry: 10/02/17 17-3, Page Page 12 192 of 51 of 232 Page ID #:1675

Figure 4 North Carolina: Violent Crime Rate J!l c:: Effect of 1996 RTC Law 10 Years After Adoption: 18.3% Q.) I "C 8 I 'iii r--. I Q.) I 0:: ,:I ~ ,..-, "- 0 a \ 0 a '<"" co \ .... \ Q.) \ a. ~ Q.) a -ttl a 0:: LO Q.) .~... () a C 0 Q.) ' r--. ..-(j)

--- treated unit - - - - - synthetic control unit

Composition of SC: DE (9.2%), IL (39.6%). NE (51.2%) S1ates Never Passing RTC Laws Included in Synthetic Control: DE RTC-Adopting States Included In Synthetic Control: IL (2014). NE (2007)

Figure 5 Mississippi: Violent Crime Rate CIl C Effect of 1990 RTC Law 10 Years After Adoption: 34.2% Q.) a "C a 'iii LO Q.) 0:: a ~ LO 0 ' r--. o (j) .,... ~

--- treated unit - - - - - synthetic control unit

Composition ofSC: HI (72.1%). IA (1.6%), NE (1.1%), OH (25.2%) States Never Passing RTC Laws Included in Synthetic Control: HI. RTC-Adopting States Included In Synthetic Control: IA (2011), NE (2007). OH (2004)

11

Exhibit 2 - 12

515 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-ASCase: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 11033141, 59-2 Filed DktEntry: 10/02/17 17-3, Page Page 13 193 of 51 of 232 Page ID #:1676

18. While the individual state synthetic controls estimates are interesting, a more useful estimate comes from generating an average estimated effect ofRTC laws on crime, since the average across 33 states will eliminate some ofthe noise (or random variation) in the state-specific estimates. 18 DAW use the synthetic controls approach over the fu111979-2014 period and find that, on average, RTC laws increase violent crime by 13-15 percent ten years after adoption. Importantly, the synthetic controls estimates do not show the sensitivity to specification changes that concerned the NRC panel. Whether one uses the specification ofDAW, the BC, Lott and Mustard, or Moody and Marvel, the synthetic controls estimate that RTC laws generate large increases in violent crime is highly robust. These results strongly support the panel data estimates cited above, so a body of evidence using the most complete data and different statistical approaches has now emerged that RTC laws tend to cause harmful increases in violent crime in the first ten years after adoption.

18 As Nate Silver writes, "The signal is the truth. The noise is what distracts us from the truth." The Signal and the Noise 17 (New York: Penguin Press, 2012). Thus, the average across over 30 estimates will bring us closer to the truth than any single observation because averaging cancels out some noise, allowing the signal to emerge more clearly.

12

Exhibit 2 - 13

516 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-ASCase: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 11033141, 59-2 Filed DktEntry: 10/02/17 17-3, Page Page 14 194 of 51 of 232 Page ID #:1677

Table 4: The Impact of RTC Laws on the Violent Crime Rate, DAW covariates, 1977-2014

Cnhuuu llIuulWffi imlk,ltt! rI4JSI»tmht.agt' yvar und.~r j'OIt-..}{{{,ratiou; N """ hlulllWf of hial('S in t: h(O-tWt"t'u lht ptn'f'ntagt'" flifff:rt'un.'! In t1w viuu'nt crimr. rate In trt'atmcllt and syndwrk control !>talr;s itt ~h'en txWt>trP.ttllllt'nt illt!'nn.i and at UnIt; (tf till' rn;altm'ut nesult" rqXl-rted for the t'(ln~tant term n~ldtil1:? fr'tUl thiH ft'gn'!!6iuu Stllh"l¥ in jt;wup: i\.K An AZ ('0 FL GA m 1\5 KY LA ME MJ M): MO !\IS MT !\C ND xr~ :-OM ~V ott ot{ on PA sc $f) TN TX CT VA \VV WY Tlw 1'}71tlwtir (ul\Unb tJM't1 tn gnwmle tlw pl.:lf"l'ho f'stirntlh'S in tlw tahu' ,ibnn' \\-trt' g'f"Pt'rakd u.:

Table 5: The Impact of RTC Laws on the Violent Crime Rate, BC covariates, 1977-2014

rrtnts Column numh.~ns indicatf' pnst·p:;~'JJndtkratkm; N 11l1rnlwr of :st1\h':S in sampk~ [h:pul{knt variahit! hJ thv diffctcnu! twt\\"l::eu the rwrn.mtagc dHf.:tnHT In the vj,)knt nime rate ill trenhUf.'llt ami !Iyntlwlk cot!ttol !!tat,;."i at giW;ll p1)!,t~lrriltlw:lll intcrv;tl auJ at time of the tfj.;aitlh.. 'ut Hn41llts IVfHll"h':ti fur til(' nmst;mt term n:':'>l1ltin~ f.olli ttl;" rl'gn:~ion State,; in group: AK AR AZ CO FL GA 111 1\:S KY LA ME ~n M:: :"10 ~1S MT NC ~D XE X~l ~V OH OK OR ?\ SC SD T~ TX VT VA WY WY ~ JJ < {t HI. h P < () nt.. "..... 11 <: OJH

Table 6: The Impact of RTC Laws on the Violent Crime Rate, LM covariates, 1977-2014

rqUlfu:nstaut tf·ml thw; ft"11;l"t"s''>inn State" ill gmuJ!. AK An. AZ co FL GA 11> K5 KY LA )'IE t..1l ll:S- MO !\L'1 MT XC XU SI::: !{M :\\' 011 OK OR PA S{' $1) T~'J TX UT VA \\Y WY

~ p <. lUll, •• J' <:: UJJ.), .. h P < 0,1)1

Table 7: The Impact of RTC Laws on the Violent Crime Rate, MlVI covariates, 1977-2014

Clyhuun nIlUlr.>{:ts iudkat(' p.."r.St-fJ.,"lSMgt' year tW..it'f n:msld!'ratJun; :-.; = tJumlx"r of I;ta(("'l;! iu s.atnph' Dt'p('tl

13

Exhibit 2 - 14

517 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-ASCase: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 11033141, 59-2 Filed DktEntry: 10/02/17 17-3, Page Page 15 195 of 51 of 232 Page ID #:1678

The Mechanisms by Which RTC Laws Increase Violent Crime

19. The prior discussion of the panel data evidence and particularly the consistent synthetic controls analysis illustrates that, on balance, RTC laws seem to increase violent crime. This implies that even ifthere are any benefits from private gun carrying, they are substantially outweighed by their costs. It is important to understand some of the mechanisms by which adoption ofRTC laws lead to increased crime, which the statistical studies do not directly address. 20. First, the supporters ofRTC laws frequently cite evidence that permit holders are arrested for violent crimes at relatively low rates. Since permit holders have been screened to try to remove known felons, it is not surprising that they will tend to have overall lower crime rates than the broader population that does include convicted felons. But claims about the prevalence of misconduct by permit holders need to be understood in context. For example, the fact that NRA­ sponsored laws have been passed to shield information about the permit status even of arrested criminals has made it hard to fully assess how often permit holders engage in criminal activity. 21. Advocates for more permissive gun-carrying - even among government officials - are often highly inaccurate in their claims about the behavior of permit holders. For example, in a 2013 speech, Sacramento County Sheriff Scott Jones told his audience that no one has ever "been shot by a holder of a concealed weapons permit issued by this office." Yet only a few months earlier, on October 31, 2012, a letter signed by Jones revoked the permit his office had granted to Hun Chu Saelee, after Saelee had shot a college student in the head at a Halloween party a few days earlier. 19 Indeed, since incidents involving the unlawful use of weapons, shootings, killings, and other violent crime by permit holders in California are not systematically collected and reported, any claims about the frequency of these events in California based on a reported number is necessarily an undercount of the true incidence. 22. The evidence that we do have from some early work in Texas when the number ofRTC permits was far lower than it is today suggests that the involvement of permit holders in aggravated assault and murder is many times higher than we might expect for a group with their demographic configuration.2o RTC permit holders in the early days in Texas had very low levels of criminal disposition as shown by their low arrest rates for rape -- 0.3 per 100,000 CHL holders, compared to 12 per 100,000 people for total Texas -- and for robbery -- 0.7 per 100,000 CHL holders, compared to 35 per 100,000 people for total Texas. In other words, the criminal propensity in the permit­ holding group was about 1/36 the average Texan (if we use rape as the baseline or even lower if we

19 John Donohue, "Be Skeptical About Claims Of Benefits Of Concealed Cany Permits," Sacramento Bee (Oct. 6, 2016) (available online at ). 20 Sturdevant, "An Analysis Of The Arrest Rate Of Texas Concealed Handgun License Holders," (2000) documents the arrest record for Texas concealed handgun license holders in the initial four years after Texas adopted its RTC law in 1996. See http://concealedguns. procon.org/sourcefiles/arrest -rate-texas. pdf.

14

Exhibit 2 - 15

518 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-ASCase: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 11033141, 59-2 Filed DktEntry: 10/02/17 17-3, Page Page 16 196 of 51 of 232 Page ID #:1679

use robbery). But now consider the involvement of these otherwise law-abiding citizens for the two crimes in which guns can play the biggest role: aggravated assault and murder. The arrest rate for aggravated assault in the Texas study was 56 per 100,000 permit holders, compared to 121 per 100,000 people for total Texas. Since 1136 of 121 = 3.4 per 100,000, it is clear that RTC permit holders commit assault at a highly disproportionate rate compared to the crime of rape. Specifically, early Texas permit holders committed aggravated assault at about 17 times the rate we would expect from their preferred demographic (as reflected by their underlying likelihood of criminality for the crime of rape). 23. Similarly, for the period of 1996-1999, there were 27 arrests of Texas permit holders for murder a rate of 4 arrests per 100,000 permit holders. In comparison, the total Texas arrest rate for murder during the same time period was 5.2 per 100,000 people. Since 1/36 of 5.2 = .144, we see that early Texas RTC permit holders were 27.7 times more likely to commit murder than we would expect based on their underlying level of criminality. 24. Some advocates ofRTC cite the low numbers of revocations oflicenses as proof that the concealed carry permit holder are exceptionally law-abiding and no threat to anyone. But revocations will clearly understate the misconduct of permit holders since many crimes are never solved. Moreover, the cases in which RTC permit holders have been killed during criminal behavior (thereby obviating the need to revoke their permits) shows that permit revocation and/or arrest is not a flawless reflection of misconduct. For example, on September 18, 2013, two Michigan drivers with RTC permits -- James Pullum (43 years old), driving with his wife and mother, and Robert Taylor (56) - were angered over a tailgating dispute. They pulled into a nearby car wash, stepped out of their cars and exchanged fire. Both were hit and died at the same hospital later that day. Neither oftheir RTC permits were revoked by the State ofMichigan.21 25. Inaccurate claims are often made that permit holders play an important role in stopping mass shootings, but a 2013 FBI study of 160 "active shootings" over a 13-year period when RTC laws were prevalent found that only one was stopped by an armed individual who was neither a police officer nor a security guard. But even this case in 2008 in a Nevada bar was not any average permit holder but an active-duty Marine, who was able to kill the shooter who had stopped to reload. Note, also, that the FBI study found that 21 times unarmed citizens disarmed the shooter. 26. Since 2007, the website Concealed Carry Killers has documented 885 homicides, accidental deaths, and suicides attributed to permit holders, including 29 mass shootings that killed 139 individuals, including the Orlando shooter who murdered 49. How many more deaths were caused by permit holders is difficult to know because the NRA-backed secrecy laws are designed to keep the public from knowing the full extent of this mayhem.

21 Hunter Stuart, "Two Concealed Carry Holders Kill Each Other In Road Rage Incident," Huffington Post, Sept. 19, 2013 (available online at

15

Exhibit 2 - 16

519 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-ASCase: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 11033141, 59-2 Filed DktEntry: 10/02/17 17-3, Page Page 17 197 of 51 of 232 Page ID #:1680

27. A second critical consideration must also be acknowledged: since the statistical evidence shows that RTC laws increase crime by an amount larger than that committed by RTC permit holders, then RTC laws must be increasing crime in many ways even if the permit holders are not committing it. The ability to carry a gun may embolden some permit holders to engage in provocative behavior inciting criminal responses in others, as some have alleged happened in the well-known George Zimmerman case leading to the death of Trayvon Martin. Criminals may also be more likely to carry weapons in response to RTC adoption and more likely to be aggressive towards their victims if they fear armed opposition. Guns carried outside the home because of R TC laws are potentially more likely to be lost or stolen, which is a major pathway to arming criminals. 28. Finally, the presence of more guns can complicate the job of police and simply take up more police time as they process applications and check for permit validity when they confront armed citizens.22 29. The primary cause of death to police officers from intentional assaults is from guns (which is the plurality cause of death for police officers), and the nature of the threat is reflected in the fact that states with high rates of civilian gun ownership are more dangerous for the police. A study published in the American Journal ofPublic Health examined data on the number of homicidal deaths of police in two groups of states with roughly equal number of police officers - the eight states with the lowest levels of gun ownership and the 23 states with the highest rate of gun ownership.23 The study found that, over the period from 1996 to 2010, the rate of police homicide in the high-gun-prevalence states was three times as high as the rate of police homicide in the low-gun­ prevalence states. Specifically, in the states with low-gun-ownership rates, there were 0.31 officer fatalities for every 10,000 employed officers over the study period, and contrasted with 0.95 fatalities per 10,000 officers in the high-gun-ownership states. Not surprisingly, only one of the low­ gun-prevalence states had an R TC law during the study period (Connecticut), while 21 of the 23 states with the high level of murders of police had RTC laws during all or part ofthe study period (and the other two - Iowa and Wisconsin - both adopted RTC laws in 2011).24 30. Anything that impairs police productivity or that serves as an effective "tax" on police serves to elevate criminal behavior, and RTC laws do both as police have to spend valuable time processing permits and contending with armed citizens. The more fear that police have, the greater the threat

22 Christopher Ingraham, "More Police Officers Die On The Job In States With More Guns," Wash. Post, JuI. 8,2016, (available online at

16

Exhibit 2 - 17

520 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-ASCase: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 11033141, 59-2 Filed DktEntry: 10/02/17 17-3, Page Page 18 198 of 51 of 232 Page ID #:1681 they will pose to the community, which can strain the bonds that are needed for effective law enforcement.

Open Carry Versus Concealed Carry

32. While the empirical literature discussed above has largely focused on the impact oflaws allowing citizens to carry concealed guns, this literature can be used to make informed predictions about the likely impact of allowing citizens to carry arms openly. 33. The concealed carry of guns has a potential advantage of deterring criminal conduct if it leads criminals to fear that someone they are considering to mistreat may be armed. But the prior discussion shows that whatever deterrence is generated by RTC laws, it is apparently outweighed by the factors just discussed that tend to encourage violent crime. These facts suggest that open carry of guns would be less socially desirable than concealed carry since the latter at least has the prospect of a deterrence since the criminals cannot know who is carrying weapons. 34. Open carry might conceivably confer a benefit if it could dissuade potential criminals from targeting certain individuals if they or someone nearby has a weapon, but in general the greatest effect of open carry would likely only be to move crime away from the armed target to an unarmed target. In general, spending resources that shift burdens of crime from one group to another without reducing the overall burden is a net waste of resources. Indeed, the billions of dollars that are spent each year buying guns for self-protection without any statistical support for the claim that they diminish crime could easily confer substantial crime-reducing benefits if the money were directed to known crime-reducing expenditures.25 35. Moreover, as we saw in the Boston Marathon bombing case, criminals can easily target open carriers of guns, either to eliminate the threat from gun carriers or to help the criminals secure a weapon (as the Boston bombers hoped to do when they killed an MIT policemen to obtain his gun). 36. In addition, open carry of guns can spread fear and alarm in the community. An openly displayed gun in public also gives a muddy signal about the gun toter and could draw undue attention from police officers, directing law-enforcement resources inefficiently, which again makes law enforcement less effective, thereby further promoting crime.

Respectfully submitted,

25 John Donohue, "Fighting Crime: An Economist's View," 7 The Milken Institute Review 46 (2005).

17

Exhibit 2 - 18

521 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-ASCase: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 11033141, 59-2 Filed DktEntry: 10/02/17 17-3, Page Page 19 199 of 51 of 232 Page ID #:1682

Exhibit A JOHN J. DONOHUE III Stanford Law School Stanford, CA 94305 Phone: 650721 6339 E-mail: [email protected] Web pages: http://works.bepress.comljohn_donohue/ https:lllaw.stanford.eduidirectory/john-j-donohue-iii/

EMPLOYMENT

Full-time Positions • Stanford Law School, C. Wendell and Edith M. Carlsrnith Professor of Law, September 2010 to the present. • Yale Law School, Leighton Horner Surbeck Professor of Law, July 2004 to August 2010. • Stanford Law School, Professor of Law, September 1995 to June 2004. William H. Neukom Professor of Law, February 2002 - June 2004. John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar, March 1997 - January 2002. Academic Associate Dean for Research, since July 2001 - July 2003. Stanford University Fellow, September 2001 - May 2003. • Northwestern University School of Law: Class of 1967 James B. Haddad Professor of Law, September 1994-August 1995 Harry B. Reese Teaching Professor, 1994-1995 Professor of Law, May 1991-September 1994 Associate Professor, May 1989-May 1991 Assistant Professor, September 1986-May 1989. • Research Fellow, American Bar Foundation, September 1986-August 1995. • Associate Attorney, Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C., October 1978-July 1981 (including last six months as Attorney, Neighborhood Legal Services) • Law Clerk to Chief Justice T. Emmet Clarie, U.S. District Court, Hartford, Connecticut, September 1977-August 1978.

Temporary Appointments • Fellow ofthe Society for Empirical Legal Studies, 2015-2016 • Visiting Professor, Bocconi University, Milan, Italy, October- November 2012, April 2014, and June 2015.

18

Exhibit 2 - 19

522 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-ASCase: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 11033141, 59-2 Filed DktEntry: 10/02/17 17-3, Page Page 20 200 of 51 of 232 Page ID #:1683

• 2011 Faculty Scholar in Residence, University of Denver Stunn College of Law, April 21-22,2011. • Visiting Fellow, The Milton Friedman Institute for Research in Economics, University of Chicago, October 2009 • Schmidheiny Visiting Professor of Law and Economics, St. Gallen University, November - December, 2007. • Visiting Lecturer in Law and Economics, Gerzensee Study Center, Switzerland, June 2007. • Visiting Professor, Tel Aviv University School of Law, May 2007. • Herbert Smith Visitor to the Law Faculty, University of Cambridge, England, February 2006. • Visiting Professor, Harvard Law School, January 2003. • Fellow, Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, California, Academic year 2000-01. • Visiting Professor, Yale Law School, Fall, 1999. • Professor, Center for the Study of American Law in China, Renmin University Law School, Beijing, July 1998. • Visiting Professor of Law and Economics, University of Virginia, January 1997. • Lecturer, Toin University School of Law, Yokohama, Japan, May-June 1996. • Cornell Law School, Distinguished Visiting Fellow in Law and Economics, April 8-12, 1996 and September 25-29,2000 • Visiting Professor, University of Chicago Law School, January 1992-June 1992. • Visiting Professor of Law and Economics, University of Virginia Law School, January 1990-May 1990. • Fellow, Yale Law School Program in Civil Liability, July 1985-August 1986. • Private Practice (part-time), New Haven, Connecticut, September 1981-August 1986. • Instructor in Economics, Yale College, September 1983-August 1985. • Summer Associate, Donovan Leisure Newton & Irvine, New York, Summer 1982. • Summer Associate, Perkins, Coie, Stone, Olsen & Williams, Seattle, Washington, Summer 1976. • Research Assistant, Prof. Laurence Lynn, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Summer 1975. • LSAT Tutor, Stanley Kaplan Education Center, Boston, Massachusetts; Research Assistant, Prof. Philip Heymann, Harvard Law School; Research Assistant, Prof. Gordon Chase, Harvard School of Public Health. (During Law School).

19

Exhibit 2 - 20

523 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-ASCase: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 11033141, 59-2 Filed DktEntry: 10/02/17 17-3, Page Page 21 201 of 51 of 232 Page ID #:1684

EDUCATION

Yale University, 1981-1986 • University Fellow in Economics; M.A. 1982, M. Phil. 1984, Ph.D. 1986. Dissertation: "A Continuous-Time Stochastic Model of Job Mobility: A Comparison of Male-Female Hazard Rates of Young Workers." Awarded with Distinction by Yale. Winner of the Michael E. Boros Award for best social science dissertation in the last three years making substantial use of the National Longitudinal Surveys--awarded by the Center for Human Research at Ohio State University on October 24, 1988. • National Research Service Award, National Institute of Health. • Member, Graduate Executive Committee; Graduate Affiliate, Jonathan Edwards College.

Harvard uaw School, 1974-1977 (J.D.) • Graduated Cum Laude.

• Activities: Law Clerk (Volunteer) for Judge John Forte, Appellate Division ofthe District Court of Central Middlesex; Civil Rights, Civil Liberties Law Review; Intra­ mural Athletics; Clinical Placement (Third Year): (a) First Semester: Massachusetts Advocacy Center; (b) Second Semester: Massachusetts Attorney General's Office--Civil Rights and Consumer Protection Divisions. Drafted comments for the Massachusetts Attorney General on the proposed U.S. Department of Justice settlement of its case against Bechtel Corporation's adherence to the Arab Boycott of Israeli companies.

Hamilton College, 1970-1974 (B.A.) • Departmental Honors in both Economics and Mathematics Phi Beta Kappa {Junior Year) • Graduated fourth in class with the following academic awards: o Brockway Prize o Edwin Huntington Memorial Mathematical Scholarship o Fayerweather Prize Scholarship o Oren Root Prize Scholarship in Mathematics • President, Root-Jessup Public Affairs Council.

20

Exhibit 2 - 21

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PUBLICATIONS

Books and Edited Volumes: • Law and Economics of Discrimination, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013. • Employment Discrimination: Law and Theory, Foundation Press, 2005, 2009 (2d edition) (with George Rutherglen). • Economics of Labor and Employment Law: Volumes I and II, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007. http://www.e-elgar.co.uk/bookentry_ main.lasso?id=4070. • Foundations of Employment Discrimination Law, Foundation Press, 2003 (2d edition). • Foundations of Employment Discrimination Law, Oxford University Press, 1997 (Initial edition).

Book Chapters: • "Drug Prohibitions and Its Alternatives." Chapter 2 in Cook, Philip J., Stephen Machin, Olivier Marie, and Giovanni Mastrobuoni, eds, Lessons from the Economics of Crime: What Reduces Offending? MIT Press. 45-66 (2013).

• "The Death Penalty," Chapter in Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Spring (2013).

• "Rethinking America's Illegal Drug Policy," in Philip J. Cook, Jens Ludwig, and Justin McCrary, eds, Controlling Crime: Strategies and Tradeoffs (2011), pp.215-289 (with Benjamin Ewing and David Peloquin).

• "Assessing the Relative Benefits of Incarceration: The Overall Change Over the Previous Decades and the Benefits on the Margin," in Steven Raphael and Michael Stoll, eds., Do Prisons Make Us Safer? The Benefits and Costs of the Prison Boom, pp. 269- 341 (2009).

• "Does Greater Managerial Freedom to Sacrifice Profits Lead to Higher Social Welfare?" In Bruce Hay, Robert Stavins, and Richard Vietor, eds., Environmental Protection and the Social Responsibility of Firms: Perspectives from Law, Economics, and Business (2005). • "The Evolution of Employment Discrimination Law in the 1990s: A Preliminary Empirical Evaluation" (with Peter Siegelman), in Laura Beth Nielsen and Robert L. Nelson, eds., Handbook of Employment Discrimination Research (2005). • "Divining the Impact of Concealed Carry Laws," in Jens Ludwig and Philip Cook, Evaluating Gun Policy: Effects on Crime and Violence (Washington D.C.: Brookings, 2003).

21

Exhibit 2 - 22

525 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-ASCase: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 11033141, 59-2 Filed DktEntry: 10/02/17 17-3, Page Page 23 203 of 51 of 232 Page ID #:1686

Articles: • "Right-to-Carry Laws and Violent Crime: A Comprehensive Assessment Using Panel Data and a State-Level Synthetic Controls Analysis" NBER Working Paper. May 2017 (with Abhay Aneja, and Kyle Weber).

III "Corney, Trump, and the Puzzling Pattern of Crime in 2015 and Beyond," Columbia Law Review (2017, forthcoming).

III "Did Jeff Sessions forget wanting to execute pot dealers?" The Conversation, January 23, 2017 (with Max Schoening), https:lltheconversation.comldid-jeff-sessions-forget­ wanting-to-execute-pot-dealers- 71694 o Reprinted in Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.comlthe-conversation­ us/did-jeff-sessions-forget_b _14344218.html o Reprinted in Salon, http://www.salon.coml2017/01/30/jeff-sessions-forgetting-he­ once-wanted-to-execute-pot-dealers/#comments

.. "Jeff Sessions, The Grim Reaper of Alabama," The New York Times, January 9,2017 (with Max Schoening), http://www.nytimes.coml2017/0l/08/opinionljeff-sessions-the­ grim-reaper-of-alabama.html

III "Testing the Immunity of the Firearm Industry to Tort Litigation," JAMA Intern Med. Published online November 14, 2016. http://jamanetwork.comljournals/jamainternalmedicine/fullarticlel2582991 (with David Studdert and Michelle Mello).

III "Empirical Analysis and the Fate of Capital Punishment," 11 Duke Journal of Constitutional Law and Public Policy 51-106 (2016). Available at: http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/djclpp/volll/issl/3

III "Firearms on College Campuses: Research Evidence and Policy Implications," Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, (October 15, 2016)(with Daniel Webster et al). http://www.jhsph.edulresearchlcenters-and-institutes/johns-hopkins-center-for-gun­ policy-and-researchl~dfs/GunsOnCampus.pdf

III "Be skeptical about claims of benefits of concealed carry permits." Sacramento Bee, (October 6, 2016), http://www.sacbee.comlopinionlop-ed/soapbox/articlel 06329677 .html

22

Exhibit 2 - 23

526 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-ASCase: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 11033141, 59-2 Filed DktEntry: 10/02/17 17-3, Page Page 24 204 of 51 of 232 Page ID #:1687

• "The Death Penalty Does Not Add Up to Smart Justice," California State Treasurer Intersections (September 2016), http://treasurer.ca.gov/newsletterl2016/201609/conversation.asp

• "Reducing civilian firepower would boost police and community safety, Stanford expert says," Stanford News (July 2016), http://news.stanford.edul2016/07115/reducing-civilian­ firepower-boost-police-community-safety/reviewl

• "Domestic Violence and Effectively Terminating the Gun Rights of the Dangerous," Legal Aggregate - Stanford Law School (June 2016), https:lllaw.stanford.edul2016/06/28/ domestic-violence-and-effectivel y-terminating-the­ gun-rights-of-the-dangerousl

• "4 Gun Control Steps U.S. Needs Now," CNN.com (June 2016), http://www.cnn.coml20 16/06/231opinionsl gun-control-donohue/index.html

• "The Demise of the Death Penalty in Connecticut, " Legal Aggregate - Stanford Law School (June 2016), https:lllaw.stanford.edul2016/06/07 Ithe-demise-of-the-death-penalty-in-connecticut!

• "Empirical Evaluation of Law: The Dream and the Nightmare," 17 American Law and Economics Review 313 2015.

• "Capital Punishment Does not Deter Homicides," Casetext, August 30,2015, https:llcasetext.comlposts/capital-punishment-does-not-deter-homicides

• "There's no evidence that death penalty is a deterrent against crime," The Conversation, August 8, 20 15. http://theconversation.comltheres-no-evidence-that-death-penalty-is-a­ deterrent -against -crime-4 3227

• "Glossip v. Gross: Examining Death Penalty Data for Clarity," Stanford Lawyer, June 29, 2015. http://stanfordlawyer.law.stanford.edul2015/06/glossip-v-gross-examining-death­ penalty-data-for-clarityl

• "How US Gun Control Compares to the Rest of the World," The Conversation, June 24, 2015. http://theconversation.comlhow-us-gun-control-compares-to-the-rest-of-the-world- 43590 o Reprinted in slightly modified form under the title "Ban guns, end shootings? How evidence stacks up around the world," in CNN.com on August 27, 2015 http://www.cnn.coml20 15/08/27lopinions/us-guns-evidencel

23

Exhibit 2 - 24

527 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-ASCase: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 11033141, 59-2 Filed DktEntry: 10/02/17 17-3, Page Page 25 205 of 51 of 232 Page ID #:1688

• "The 10 day period is reasonable," San Francisco Daily Journal, September 3, 2014.

• "An Empirical Evaluation of the Connecticut Death Penalty System Since 1973: Are There Unlawful Racial, Gender, and Geographic Disparities?" 11 J oumal of Empirical Legal Studies 637 (2014).

• "The Impact of Right to Carry Laws and the NRC Report: The Latest Lessons for the Empirical Evaluation of Law and Policy," NBER Working Paper 18294. Revised November 2014 (with Abhay Aneja and Alexandria Zhang), http://www.nber .org/papers/w 18294

• "Do Police Reduce Crime? A Reexamination of a Natural Experiment," in Yun-Chien Chang, ed., Empirical Legal Analysis: Assessing the Performance of Legal Institutions, London: Routledge, Chapt. 5, pp. 125-143,2014 (with Daniel E. Ho & Patrick Leahy)

• "Reflections on the Newtown Shooting One Year Later," Stanford Lawyer, December 5, 2013. http://stanfordlawyer.1aw.stanford.edul20 13112/reflections-on-the-newtown­ shooting-one-year-Iaterl

• Outlier Nation: Homicides, Incarceration, Guns and Gun Culture, TAR 9 (Verona, Italy: 2013).

• "Gun lunacy rides high in America," Special to CNN, September 13, 2013. http://www.cnn.coml20 13/09113/opinion!donohue-gun-control/index.html ?iref.=allsearch

• "Why the NRA fights background checks," Special to CNN, Wed April 10, 2013. http://www.cnn.coml20 13/041 1Olopinion! donohue-background -checks/index.html

• "Substance vs. Sideshows in the More Guns, Less Crime Debate: A Comment on Moody, Lott, and Marvell" (with Abhay Aneja, and Alexandria Zhang) ECON JOURNAL WATCH 10(1) January 2013: 32-39

• "More Guns, Less Crime Thesis," Guns in American Society: An Encyclopedia of History, Politics, Culture, and the Law (volume 2:G-Q, at page 585) (2012).

• "Jury Nullification in Modified Comparative Negligence Regimes," 79 The University of Chicago Law Review 945 (2012) (with Eli K. Best).

• "What Can Be Done to Stem Gun Violence?" San Francisco Chronicle, December 21, 2012. http://www.sfgate.comlopinioniarticlelWhat-can-be-done-to-stem-gun-violence- 4139575.php#ixzz2G4qIkJJ2

24

Exhibit 2 - 25

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• "When Will America Wake Up to Gun Violence?" CNN opinion, July 21,2012. Posted to: http://www.cnn.coml2012/07/20/opinionldonohue-gun-control/.

• "Time To Kill The Death Penalty?" The California Progress Report, June 28,2012.

• "Assessing Post-ADA Employment: Some Econometric Evidence and Policy Considerations." Journal of Empirical Legal Studies Vol. 8: No.3, September 2011, pp. 477-503 (with Michael Ashley Stein, Christopher L. Griffm, Jr. and Sascha Becker).

• "The Impact of Right-to-Carry Laws and the NRC Report: Lessons for the Empirical Evaluation of Law and Policy," Am Law Econ Rev (Fall 2011) l3 (2): 565-631 (with Abhay Aneja and Alex Zhang). See January 2014 Revision released as an NBER working paper above.

• "Punishment is a Cost, Not a Benefit," Review of Mark A. R. Kleiman's "When Brute Force Fails: How to Have Less Crime and Less Punishment," XLVII Journal of Economic Literature (March 2010), 168-172.

• "The Politics of Judicial Opposition: Comment," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 166(1), 108-114 (2010).

• "Introduction to the Death Penalty Symposium," 11 American Law and Economics Review. v (Fall 2009) (with Steve Shavell).

• "Estimating the Impact ofthe Death Penalty on Murder," 11 American Law and Economics Review 249 (Fall 2009) (with Justin Wolfers).

• "The Impact of the Death Penalty on Murder," Criminology & Public Policy (November 2009, Volume 8, Issue 4) at pp. 795-801.

• "The Impact of Legalized Abortion on Teen Childbearing," 11 American Law and Economics Review 24 (2009) (with Jeff Grogger and Steven Levitt).

• "More Guns, Less Crime Fails Again: The Latest Evidence from 1977-2006," 6 Econ Journal Watch 218-233 (May 2009)(with Ian Ayres).

• "Yet Another Refutation of the More Guns, Less Crime Hypothesis - With Some Help From Moody and Marvell," 6 Econ Journal Watch 35-59 (January 2009)(with Ian Ayres).

• "Measurement Error, Legalized Abortion, and the Decline in Crime: A Response to Foote and Goetz," The Quarterly Journal of Economics (2008) 123 (1): 425-440 (with Steven Levitt). http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/123/1/425.abstract

• "AntiDiscrimination Law," in Steven Durlauf and Lawrence Bloom, eds., The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2d Edition, 2008.

25

Exhibit 2 - 26

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• "Murder in Decline in the 1990s: Why the u.s. and N.Y.C. Were Not That Special," Punishment and Society 10: 333 (2008) at http://pun.sagepub.com

• "Understanding the 1990s Crime Drops in the U.S. and Canada," Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Vol 49, No.4, p. 552 (October 2007). • "The Law and Economics of Antidiscrimination Law," A. M. Polinsky and Steven Shavell, eds., Handbook of Law and Economics, Volume 2 (2007), Pages 1387-1472. • "Economic Models of Crime and Punishment," Social Research, Vol. 74: No.2, Summer 2007, pp. 379-412. • "Rethink the War on Drugs," Yale Law Reports, Summer 2007, pp. 46-47. • "More Cops," Brookings Policy Brief#158, March 2007 (with Jens Ludwig), http://www .brookings. edulpapers/2007 /03 crimejohn-j --donohue-iii.aspx. • "Studying Labor Market Institutions in the Lab: Minimum Wages, Employment Protection, and Workfare: Comment," Journal of Theoretical and Institutional Economics, 163(1),46-51 (March 2007).

• "The Impact of Damage Caps on Malpractice Claims: Randomization Inference with Difference-in-Differences," (with Daniel Ho), 4 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 69 (2007).

• "The Discretion of Judges and Corporate Executives: An Insider's View of the Disney Case," The Economists' Voice: Vol. 3: No.8, Article 4. Available at: http://www.bepress.com/ev/vo13/iss8/art4 • "The Knicks Boldly Go Where Companies Have Not," The New York Times, July 2, 2006 Sunday (with Ian Ayres). • "The Death Penalty: No Evidence of Deterrence," The Economists' Voice, (with Justin Wolfers) (April 2006), http://bpp. wharton. upenn.eduljwolfers/Press/DeathPenalty(BEPress). pdf. o Reprinted in Stiglitz, Edlin, and DeLong (eds), The Economists' Voice: Top Economists Take on Today's Problems (2008). • "The Costs of Wrongful-Discharge Laws," 88 Review of Economics and Statistics (with David Autor and Stewart Schwab)(2006), pp. 211-31.

• "Security, Democracy, and Restraint," 1 Opening Argument 4 (February 2006). o Reprinted in Loch Johnson and James Wirtz, Intelligence and National Security: An Anthology 406-407 (2d. ed. 2008). • "Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate," 58 Stanford Law Review 791 (2005) (with Justin Wolfers).

26

Exhibit 2 - 27

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o Reprinted in Steven Levitt and Thomas Miles, eds., The Economics of Criminal Law, Edward Elgar Publishing (2008). o Reprinted in Robert Cooter and Francesco Parisi, eds., Foundations of Law and Economics, Edward Elgar Publishing (2010) • "Does Terrorism Increase Crime? A Cautionary Tale," (with Daniel Ho), 2005.

• "Fighting Crime: An Economist's View," 7 The Milken Institute Review 46 (2005). o Reprinted in Kurt Finsterbusch, ed., Social Problems (McGraw-Hill, 2006). • "Guns, Crime, and the Impact of State Right-to-Carry Laws," 73 Fordham Law Review 623 (2004). • "Clinton and Bush's Report Cards on Crime Reduction: The Data Show Bush Policies Are Undermining Clinton Gains", The Economists' Voice: Vol. 1: No.1, Article 4.2004, http://www.bepress.comlev/volllissllart4 • "The Employment Consequences of Wrongful-Discharge Laws: Large, Small, or None at All?" American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings May, 2004 (with David Autor and Stewart Schwab). • "Further Evidence that Legalized Abortion Lowered Crime: A Reply To Joyce," 39 Journal of Human Resources 29 (Winter 2004)(with Steven Levitt). • "The Final Bullet in the Body ofthe More Guns, Less Crime Hypothesis," Criminology & Public Policy (July 2003, Volume 2, Issue 3) at pp. 397-410. • "Shooting Down the 'More Guns, Less Crime' Hypothesis," 55 Stanford Law Review 1193 (2003) (with Ian Ayres). • "The Latest Misfires in Support of the 'More Guns, Less Crime' Hypothesis," 55 Stanford Law Review 1371 (2003) (with Ian Ayres). • "Can Guns, Or Gun Violence, Be Controlled?" (Reviewing James Jacobs, Can Gun Control Work?), The American Prospect (December 16, 2002), p. 35. • "The Search for Truth: In Appreciation of James J. Heckman," 27 Law and Social Inquiry 23 (2002). • "The Schooling of Southern Blacks: The Roles of Social Activism and Private Philanthropy, 1910-1960," Quarterly Journal of Economics (Feb. 2002), (with James Heckman and Petra Todd), pp. 225 - 268. o Reprinted in Legal Decisionmaking section of the American Bar Foundation Anthology, ABF Press (2007). o Reprinted in American Bar Foundation, Anaylyzing Law's Reach: Empirical Research on Law and Society (2008)

27

Exhibit 2 - 28

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• "The Impact of Race on Policing and Arrests," Journal of Law and Economics, vol. XLIV October 2001)(with Steven Levitt), pp. 367 - 394. • "The Impact of Legalized Abortion on Crime," Quarterly Journal of Economics (Vol. CXVI, Issue 2, May 2001)(with Steven Levitt) pp. 379-420. o Reprinted in Steven Levitt and Thomas Miles, eds., The Economics of Criminal Law, Edward Elgar Publishing (2008). o Reprinted in Robert Cooter and Francesco Parisi, eds., Recent Developments In Law And Economics, Edward Elgar Publishing (2010). • "Understanding the Reasons for and Impact of Legislatively Mandated Benefits for Selected Workers," 53 Stanford Law Review 897 (2001). o Reprinted in Michael Zimmer, Charles Sullivan et aI, Cases and Materials on Emplovrnent Discrimination (6th edition)(2003). • "Nondiscretionary Concealed Weapons Law: A Case Study of Statistics, Standards of Proof, and Public Policy," American Law and Economics Review 436 (1999)(with Ian Ayres). o Reprinted in Steven Levitt and Thomas Miles, eds., The Economics of Criminal Law, Edward Elgar Publishing (2008). • "Why We Should Discount the Views of Those Who Discount Discounting," 108 Yale Law Journal 1901 (1999). • "Understanding The Time Path of Crime," 88 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 1423 (1998). • "Discrimination in Employment," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Law and Economics (1998). o Excerpted in Lynne Dallas, Law and Public Policy: A Socio-Economic Approach (2003). • "The Legal Response to Discrimination: Does Law Matter?" in Bryant Garth, Austin Sarat, eds., How Does Law Matter? Pp. 45 -75 (Northwestern University Press, 1998). • "Some Thoughts on Law and Economics and the Theory of the Second Best," 73 Chicago-Kent Law Review 257 (1998). • "Allocating Resources Among Prisons and Social Programs In the Battle Against Crime," 27 Journal of Legal Studies 1 (1998) (with Peter Siegelman). o Excerpted in Sanford Kadish & Stephen Schulhofer, Criminal Law and Its Processes (8 th ed. 2007) • "Guns, Violence, and the Efficiency of Illegal Markets," 88 American Economic Review 463 (May 1998)(with Steve Levitt). • "Did Miranda Diminish Police Effectiveness?" 50 Stanford Law Review 1147 (1998).

28

Exhibit 2 - 29

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• "Some Thoughts on Affirmative Action," 75 Washington University Law Quarterly 1590 (1997).

• "Executive Compensation," 3 Sta1.!ford Journal of Law, Business & Finance 1 (1997). • "Some Perspective on Crime and Criminal Justice Policy," Lawrence Friedman and George Fisher, eds., The Crime Conundrum: Essays on Criminal Justice 45 (1997). • "The Selection of Employment Discrimination Disputes for Litigation: Using Business Cycle Effects to Test the Priest/Klein Hypothesis," 24 Journal of Legal Studies 427 (1995) (with Peter Siegelman). • "Employment Discrimination Law in Perspective: Three Concepts of Equality," 92 Michigan Law Review 2583 (1994). • Reprinted in Frank Ravitch, Janis McDonald, and Pamela Sumners, Employment Discrimination Law (2004). o Translated into Chinese and published in Peking University Law Review (2007). • "The Effects of Joint and Several Liability on Settlement Rates: Mathematical Symmetries and Meta-Issues in the Analysis of Rational Litigant Behavior," 23 Journal of Legal Studies 543 (1994). • "Liberal Law and Economics," (reviewing Rethinking the Progressive Agenda by Susan Rose-Ackerman), 13 Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 192 (1994). • Review of Richard Epstein's Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Employment Discrimination Laws, 31 Journal of Economic Literature 1477 (1994). • "Law and Macroeconomics: Employment Discrimination Over the Business Cycle," 66 University of S. Calif. L. Rev. 709 (1993) (with Peter Siegelman).

• "Advocacy Versus Analysis In Assessing Employment Discrimination Law," 44 Stanford Law Review 1583 (1992). o Reprinted in Christopher McCrudden, Anti-Discrimination Law (2003).

• Excerpted in Professors Michael J. Zimmer, Charles A. Sullivan, & Rebecca Hanner White, Cases and Materials on Employment Discrimination (Seventh Edition 2008). • "The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation," 43 Stanford Law Review 983 (1991) (with Peter Siegelman). • "The Effects of Fee Shifting on the Settlement Rate: Theoretical Observations on Costs, Conflicts, and Contingency Fees," 54 Law and Contemporary Problems 195 (1991). • "Re-Evaluating Federal Civil Rights Policy," 79 Georgetown Law Journal 1713 (1991) (with James Heckman).

29

Exhibit 2 - 30

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• "Opting for the British Rule; Or, If Posner and Shavell Can't Remember the Coase Theorem, Who Will?" 104 Harvard Law Review 1093 (1991). o Reprinted in Saul Levmore, Foundations of Tort Law 160 (1994).

• "Continuous versus Episodic Change: The Impact of Civil Rights Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks," 29 Journal of Economic Literature 1603 (December 1991) (with James Heckman). o Reprinted in Paul Burstein, ed., Equal Employment Opportunity, Aldine De Gruyter, New York (1994).

• "The Impact of Federal Civil Rights Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks," 14 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 41 (1991).

• "Studying the Iceberg From Its Tip: A Comparison of Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases," 24 Law and Society Review 1133 (1990) (with Peter Siegelman).

• "Prohibiting Sex Discrimination in the Workplace: An Economic Perspective," 56 University of Chicago Law Review 1337 (1989).

• "The Law & Economics of Tort Law: The Profound Revolution," 102 Harvard Law Review 1047 (1989).

• "Using Market Incentives to Promote Auto Occupant Safety," 7 Yale Law and Policy Review 449 (1989).

• "Diverting the Coasean River: Incentive Schemes to Reduce Unemployment Spells," 99 Yale Law Journal 549 (1989). o Winner of the 1989 Scholarly Paper Competition, Association of American Law Schools.

• "Replyto Professors Ellickson and Stigler," 99 Yale Law Journal 635 (1989).

• "Law and Economics: The Road Not Taken," 22 Law and Society Review 903 (1988).

• "Further Thoughts on Employment Discrimination Legislation: A Reply to Judge Posner," 136 U. Pa. L. Rev. 523 (1987).

• "Judge Bork, Anti-Trust Law, and the Bending of 'Original Intent' ," Chicago Tribune, sec.l, pg. 15, July 22, 1987.

• "Posner's Third Symphony: Thinking about the Unthinkable," 39 Stanford Law Review 791 (1987)(with Ian Ayres).

• "Determinants of Job Turnover of Young Men and Women in the U.S.--A Hazard Rate Analysis," in Schultz, T.P., ed., Research in Population Economics, vo1.6, Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press (1987).

30

Exhibit 2 - 31

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• "A Comparison of Male-Female Hazard Rates of Young Workers, 1968-1971," Working Paper #48, Center for Studies in Law, Economics and Public Policy; Yale Law School (1986).

• "Hazard Rates of Young Male and Female Workers--Recent Developments," Working Paper #51, Center for Studies in Law, Economics and Public Policy; Yale Law School (1986).

• "Is Title VII Efficient?" 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1411 (1986). o Reprinted in Paul Burstein, ed., Equal Employment Opportunity, Aldine De Gruyter, New York (1994).

• "Section I Cases," Sherman's Summations, Vol.3, No.2, Sherman Act Committee of the A.B.A. Antitrust Section, Fall, 1982, at 49.

• "An Evaluation of the Constitutionality of S. 114, The Proposed Federal Death Penalty Statute," Hearings before the u.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, April 27, 1981, at 151.

• "Godfrey v. Georgia: Creative Federalism, the Eighth Amendment, and the Evolving Law of Death," 30 Catholic University Law Review 13 (1980).

• "Criminal Code Revision--Contempt of Court and Related Offenses," Hearings before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice ofthe House Judiciary Committee, July 18, 1979, at 1087. Blog Posts: • "Moore v. Texas and the Pathologies that Still Mar Capital Punishment in the U.S.," March 29, 2017, https:lllaw.stanford.edu/2017/03129/moore-v-texas-and-the-pathologies­ that-mar-capital-punishment-in-the-u-sl

• "Trump and Gun Policy," Stanford Law School Legal Aggregate Blog, November 12, 2016, http://stanford.io/2eo W nna

• "Facts Do Not Support Claim That Guns Make Us Safer" Stanford Law School Legal Aggregate Blog, October 12,2015, https:lllaw.stanford.edu/2015/10112/professor-john­ donohue-facts-do-not -support-claim-that -guns-make-us-saferl

• "When will America wake up to gun violence? ," CNNcom, July 20,2012, http://www.cnn.coml20 12/0712010pinion/donohue-gun-controllindex.html

• "It Takes Laws to Control the Bad Guys," The New York Times -- Room For Debate: http://www.nytimes.comlroomfordebate/2011101111/more-guns-less-crime (January 11, 2011).

• "Have 'Woman-Protective' Studies Resolved the Abortion Debate? Don't Bet on It," http://balkin.blogspot.coml2008/09lhave-woman-protective-studies-resolved.html (September 2008).

31

Exhibit 2 - 32

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• "Dodging the Death Penalty Bullet On Child Rape," http://balkin.blogspot.coml200S/07/dodging-death-penalty-bullet-on-child.html (July 200S). • "Why I'd Stick With Yale Clerks-- Some Econometric Ruminations," http://balkin.blogspot. coml200S/04/why-id-stick -with-yale-c1erks-some.html (April 200S).

WORKSHOPS AND ADDRESSES

• "Corney, Trump, and the Puzzling Pattern of Crime in 2015 and Beyond," University of Texas School of Law and Economics Seminar, April 24, 2017; Faculty Workshop, UC Davis School of Law, April 10, 2017; Law and Social Science Seminar, Texas A&M University School of Law, March 6, 2017; Quantlaw, University of Arizona Law School, February 17, 2017.

• Debate with Kent Scheidegger on Capital Punishment, Philosophy of Punishment Seminar, JFK University School of Law, March IS, 2017.

• "The Evidence on Guns and Gun Laws," Federal Bar Council Program on Guns and Gun Laws -- Rancho Mirage, California, February 23,2017.

• "Guns, Crime and Race in America," Stanford's Center for Population Health Sciences, Stanford Medical School, October 17, 2016.

• "Evaluating the Death Penalty," Forum on California Propositions 62 and 66, Stanford Law School, September 14, 2016.

• "Empirical Analysis and the Fate of Capital Punishment," Colloquium, Presley Center for Crime and Justice Studies; University of California, Riverside, October 24,2016.

• "Gun Violence and Mental Illness," Department of Psychiatry, Stanford University, August 25,2016.

• "The Battle Over Gun Policy In America," Physicians and Social Responsibility" seminar; Stanford Medical School, October 3,2016; Bioethics Committee ofthe San Mateo County Medical Association, April 27, 2016; The League of Women Voters of Palo Alto, April 19, 2016; Human Rights and Health Seminar, Stanford University, April 12, 2016; Bechtel International Center, Stanford University, February 23,2016; Stanford in Government Seminar, Haas Center, Stanford University, February 2,2016.

32

Exhibit 2 - 33

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• American Economic Association Continuing Education Course "The Economics of Crime" (with Jens Ludwig), AEA Annual Meeting, San Francisco, January 5-7,2016.

• "Race and Arbitrariness in the Connecticut Death Penalty," University of Connecticut School of Law, Nov. 20,2015.

• "Connecticut v. Santiago and the Demise ofthe Connecticut Death Penalty," Faculty Workshop, Stanford Law School, August 19, 2015.

• "Do Handguns Make Us Safer? A State-Level Synthetic Controls Analysis of Right-to­ Carry Laws," Second Amendment Conference, Covington and Burling, New York, May 14,2015; NBER Summer Institute, Cambridge, MA, July 23,2015; Faculty Workshop, Stanford Law School, November 11,2015.

• "U.S. Criminal Justice Under Siege: Will Becker or Beccaria Prevail?" Faculty Seminar, Bocconi University School of Law, Milan, Italy, June 18,2015. • "Can You Believe Econometric Evaluations of Law, Policy, and Medicine?," Stanford Law School, Legal Theory Workshop, March 1, 2007; Faculty Workshop, Tel Aviv University School of Law, May 14,2007; Faculty Workshop, University of Haifa Law School, May 16, 2007; Law and Economics Workshop, Georgetown Law School, September 19, 2007; Law and Economics Workshop, St. Gallen Law School, Switzerland, November 29, 2007; and Yale Law School, February 25, 2008; Law and Economics Workshop, Swiss Institute of Technology, Zurich, Switzerland, May 21, 2008; Faculty Workshop, University of Virginia Law School, October 24, 2008; Plenary Session, Latin American and Caribbean Law and Economics Association, Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona), June 15, 2009; Google, Milan, Italy, June 8, 2015. • Commentator: ""Throw Away the Jail or Throw Away The Key? The Effect of Punishment on Recidivism and Social Cost,"" by Miguel F. P. de Figueiredo, American Law and Economics Association Meetings, Columbia Law School, May 15,2015.

• "Broken Windows, Stop and Frisk, and Ferguson," 2015 Justice Collaboratory Conference: Policing Post-Ferguson, Yale Law School, April 17, 2015.

• "Assessing the Development and Future of Empirical Legal Studies," Stanford Law School course on Modem American Legal Thought, February 25,2015.

• Commentator: "Payday Lending Restrictions and Crimes in the Neighborhood," by Yilan Xu, 9th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, Boalt Hall, Berkeley, CA, November 7, 2014.

33

Exhibit 2 - 34

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• "An Empirical Evaluation of the Connecticut Death Penalty Since 1973: Are There Unconstitutional Race, Gender and Geographic Disparities? ," Faculty Workshop, Economics Department, Rice University, Houston, TX, Feb. 18,2014; Law and Economics Workshop, University of Virginia Law School, September 11,2014; Faculty Colloquium, University of San Diego School of Law, October 3,2014.

• "What's Happening to the Death Penalty? A Look at the Battle in Connecticut," Hamilton College, Clinton, New York, June 6, 2014.

• Panel Member, Research Methods Workshop, Conference for Junior Researchers on Law and Society, Stanford Law School, May 15, 2014.

• "Logit v. OLS: A Matter of Life and Death," Annual Meeting of the American Law and Economics Association, University of Chicago, May 9,2014.

• "Guns: Law, Policy, Econometrics," Second Amendment Litigation and Jurisprudence Conference, Jenner & Block, Chicago, May 8, 2014.

• "The Impact of Antidiscrimination Law: The View 50 Years after the Civil Rights Act of 1964," Renaissance Weekend, Liguna Niguel, CA, Feb. 15,2014.

• "Concealed Carry and Stand Your Ground Law," Renaissance Weekend, Liguna Niguel, CA, Feb. 15,2014.

• "Reducing Gun Violence," Forum on Gun Violence Reduction, Mountain View City Hall, Mountain View, CA, Feb. 8, 2014.

• "Gun Policy Debate," C-SPAN. National Cable Satellite Corporation, Jan. 16, 2014. .

• "Trial and Decision in the Connecticut Death Penalty Litigation," Faculty Workshop, Stanford Law School, November 20,2013.

• "Rethinking America's Illegal Drug Policy," Law and Economics Workshop, Harvard Law School, April 20, 2010; NBER Conference, "Economical Crime Control," Boalt Hall, Berkeley, CA, January 16, 2010; NBER Summer Institute Pre-Conference "Economical Crime Control," July 23,2009; Whitney Center Lecture Series, Hamden, CT, October 5, 2009; Law and Economics Workshop, University of Chicago Law School, October 13, 2009; Seminar for Spanish Law Professors, Harvard Law School, October 23,2009; The Criminal Law Society, Stanford Law School, March 31,2011, University of Denver Sturm College of Law, April 21, 2011; Law and Economics

34

Exhibit 2 - 35

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Workshop, Boalt Hall, Berkeley, CA, October 17, 2011; Shaking the Foundations Conference, Stanford Law School, November 2,2013. • "The Challenge to the Connecticut Death Penalty," Yale Law School, Death Penalty Clinic, November 5, 2007; Graduate Student Seminar, November 11,2009; Stanford Program in International Legal Studies Seminar, Stanford Law School, Nov. 11,2010; Faculty Workshop, Stanford Law School, June 8, 2011; Faculty workshop, Duke Law School, April 13, 2012; Program on Public Policy, Stanford University, May 2, 2012; Annual Meeting of the American Law and Economics Association, Vanderbilt Law School, Nashville, TN, May 18, 2013; Faculty Workshop, University of Arizona Law School, October 17, 2013; 8th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, University of Pennsylvania Law School, October 26,2013.

• Commentator: "How to Lie with Rape Statistics" by Corey Rayburn Yung, 8th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, University of Pennsylvania Law School, October 2013.

• "An Empirical Look at Gun Violence in the U.S.," University of Arizona Law School, October 17, 2013

• Discussant, "Sex Offender Registration and Plea Bargaining," NBER Labor Summer Institute, Cambridge, MA, July 25,2013.

• "What Works in the War Against Crime?" Renaissance Weekend, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, July 5,2013.

• Seminar Presentation, "Statistics and the Streets - Curbing Crime, Realities of the Death Penalty, and Successes in Public Safety," Renaissance Weekend, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, July 5,2013.

• Flashes of Genius (Glimpses of Extra-ordinarily Novel Thinking) -- "Stemming Gun Violence," Renaissance Weekend, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, July 5,2013.

• "Can Laws Reduce Crime? ," Safe Oakland Speakers Series, Holy Names University, Oakland, CA, May 1, 2013, http://www.ustream.tv/channe1/safe-oakland-speaker-series

• Presentation on "The Death Penalty in America" on a panel on "human rights and criminal justice systems in the world," Science for Peace conference at Bocconi University in Milan, Italy, November 15, 2012. http:// www.fondazioneveronesi.itlscienceforpeace20 121

35

Exhibit 2 - 36

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• Seminar Presentation, "America's Criminal Justice System," Renaissance Weekend, Santa Monica, CA., Feb. 19,2012. • "Statistical Inference, Regression Analysis and Common Mistakes in Empirical Research," SPILLS Fellow's Workshop, Stanford Law School, February 2,2012. • "New Evidence in the 'More Guns, Less Crime' Debate: A Synthetic Controls Approach," Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, Northwestern Law School, November 4,2011. • "Drug Legalization and its Alternatives," Lessons from the Economics of Crime: What Works in Reducing Offending? CESifo Venice Summer Institute Workshop, July 22, 2011. • "Incapacitating Addictions: Drug Policy and American Criminal Justice," in Rethinking the War on Drugs through the US-Mexico Prism," Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, May 12, 2011.

• Plenary Session: Flashes of Genius (Glimpses of Extra-ordin1rrily Novel Thinking) -­ "Has Legalized Abortion Reduced Crime,?" Renaissance Weekend, Liguna Niguel, CA., Feb. 18,2011.

• "An Evidence-Based Look at the More Guns, Less Crime Theory (after Tucson)" The American Constitution Society for Law and Policy (ACS), Stanford Law School, January 25,2011; Renaissance Weekend, Liguna Niguel, CA., Feb. 19,2011; "Faculty Forum" at the External Relations Office, Stanford Law School, AprilS, 2011.

• "Empirical Evaluation of Law: The Dream and the Nightmare," SPILS Fellows Lecture, Stanford Law School, January 15,2015; Legal Studies Workshop, Stanford Law School, Feb. 7,2011; Renaissance Weekend, Liguna Niguel, CA., Feb. 20, 2011;. University of Denver Sturm College of Law, April 22, 2011; Presidential Address, Annual Meeting of the American Law and Economics Association, Columbia University, May 20, 2011. • Death Sentencing in Connecticut," American Society of Criminology Annual Meeting, San Francisco, Nov. 17,2010.

• "The Impact of Right to Carry Laws and the NRC Report: Lessons for the Empirical Evaluation of Law and Policy," Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, Yale Law School, Nov. 6,2010. • Comment on Bushway and Gelbach, "Testing for Racial Discrimination in Bail Setting Using Nonparametric Estimation of a Parametric Model," Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, Yale Law School, Nov. 6,2010.

36

Exhibit 2 - 37

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• Commentator, "A Test of Racial Bias in Capital Sentencing," NBER Political Economy Program Meeting, April 23, 2010. • "The (Lack of a) Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment," Faculty Workshop, University of Chicago Economics Department, October 21, 2009. • Keynote Address, "The Evolution of Econometric Evaluation of Crime and Deterrence,"lst Paris& Bonn Workshop on Law and Economics: The Empirics of Crime and Deterrence, University of Paris Ouest Nanterre, September 24,2009. • Comment on Cook, Ludwig, and Samaha, "Gun Control after Heller: Litigating Against Regulation," NBER Regulation and Litigation Conference, The Boulders, Carefree, Arizona, September 11, 2009. • "Impact of the Death Penalty on Murder in the US," Faculty Workshop, Law School, Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona), June 18,2009. • Comment on Joanna Shepherd's "The Politics of Judicial Opposition," Joumal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics Conference, Kloster Eberbach, Germany, June 12,2009. • "The Great American Crime Drop of the '90s: Some Thoughts on Abortion Legalization, Guns, Prisons, and the Death Penalty," Hamilton College, Clinton, NY, June 5, 2009. • "The Impact of the ADA on the Employment and Earnings ofthe Disabled," American Law and Economics Association Meetings, University of San Diego, May 15, 2009. • "Crime and Punishment in the United States," Eastern State Penitentiary, Yale Alumni Event, philadelphia, PA, April 26, 2009. • "Measuring Culpability in Death Penalty Cases," Conference on Applications of Economic Analysis in Law, Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, April 18, 2009. • "Autopsy of a Financial Crisis," Workshop on New International Rules and Bodies for Regulating Financial Markets, State University of Milan, March 23,2009. • "Yet Another Refutation of the More Guns, Less Crime Hypothesis - With Some Help From Moody and Marvell, Law and Economics Workshop, NYU Law School, March 10, 2009. • Intelligence-Squared Debate: "Guns Reduce Crime," Rockefeller University, New York, October 28, 2008. • "The D.C. Handgun Controls: Did the Supreme Court's Decision Make the City Safer?" Debate, The Contemporary Club of Albemarle, Charlottesville, VA, October 23, 2008.

37

Exhibit 2 - 38

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• "Evaluating the Empirical Claims of the Woman-Protective Anti-Abortion Movement," Panel on The Facts of the Matter: Science, Public Health, and Counseling, Yale Conference on the Future of Sexual and Reproductive Rights, Yale Law School, October 11,2008. • "Empirical Evaluation of Gun Policy," Harvard Law School, October 9,2008. • "Assessing the Relative Benefits of Incarceration: The Overall Change Over the Previous Decades and the Benefits on the Margin," Russell Sage Foundation, New York, May 3,2007; Law and Economics Workshop, Tel Aviv University School of Law, May 28,2008. • Death Penalty Debate with Orin Kerr, Bloggingheads, April 11, 2008. • "Evaluating Connecticut's Death Penalty Regime," Faculty Public Interest Conversation, Yale Law School, April 9, 2008. • "The Death Penalty in Connecticut and the United States," The Whitney Center, Hamden, CT, November 5, 2007; Seminar on Advanced Criminal Law: Criminal Sentencing and the Death Penalty, Fordham Law School, April 8, 2008; Law and Economics Workshop, Swiss Institute of Technology, Zurich, Switzerland, May 20, 2008. • Radio Interview, "The Death of Capital Punishment?" Morning Edition: Where We Live. WNPR. Connecticut, March 10,2008. • Comment on Thomas Dee's "Born to Be Mild: Motorcycle Helmets and Traffic Safety," American Economics Association Meetings, New Orleans, Louisiana, January 4,2008. • "The Empirical Revolution in Law and Policy: Jubilation and Tribulation," Keynote Address, Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, NYU Law School, November 9, 2007. • "The Optimal Rate of Incarceration," Harvard Law School, October 26, 2007. • "Empirical Evaluation of Law: The Impact on U.S Crime Rates of Incarceration, the Death Penalty, Guns, and Abortion," Law and Economics Workshop, St. Gallen Law School, Switzerland, June 25,2007. • Comment on Eric Baumer's "A Comprehensive Assessment ofthe Contemporary Crime Trends Puzzle," Committee on Law and Justice Workshop on Understanding Crime Trends, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., April 25, 2007. • Comment on Bernard Harcourt, Third Annual Criminal Justice Roundtable Conferemce, Yale Law School, "Rethinking the Incarceration Revolution Part II: State Level Analysis," April 14,2006.

38

Exhibit 2 - 39

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• "Corporate Governance in America: The Disney Case," Catholic University Law School, Milan, Italy, March 19,2007. • "The U.S Tort System," (Latin American) Linkages Program, Yale Law School, February 13,2007. • Panel Member, "Guns and Violence in the U.S.," Yale University, International Center, January 24,2007. • "Economic Models of Crime and Punishment," Punishment: The U.S. Record: A Social Research Conference at The New School, New York City, Nov. 30, 2006 • Comment on Baldus et aI., "Equal Justice and the Death Penalty: The Experience ofthe United States Armed Forces, Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, University of Texas Law, School, Austin, Texas, October 27,2006. • "Empirical Evaluation of Law: The Promise and the Peril," Harvard Law School, October 26, 2006. • "Estimating the Impact of the Death Penalty on Murder," Law and Economics Workshop, Harvard Law School, September 12, 2006; Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, University of Texas Law School, October 28,2006; Joint Workshop, Maryland Population Research Center and School of Public Policy, University of Maryland, March 9,2007. • "Why Are Auto Fatalities Dropping so Sharply?," Faculty Workshop, Wharton, Philadelphia, PA, April 19, 2006. • "The Law of Racial Profiling," Law and Economic Perspectives on Profiling Workshop, Northwestern University Department of Economics, April 7, 2006. • "Landmines and Goldmines: Why It's Hard to Find Truth and Easy To Peddle Falsehood in Empirical Evaluation of Law and Policy," Rosenthal Lectures, Northwestern University School of Law, April 4-6, 2006. • "The Impact of Legalized Abortion on Crime," American Enterprise Institute, March 28,2006. • "The Impact of Damage Caps on Malpractice Claims: Randomization Inference with Difference-in-Differences," Conference on Medical Malpractice, The Rand Corporation, March 11, 2006. • "Powerful Evidence the Death Penalty Deters? ," Leighton Homer Surbeck Chair Lecture, Yale Law School, March 7, 2006. • "Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate," Faculty Workshop, University of Connecticut Law School, October 18, 2005; Faculty Workshop, UCLA Law School, February 3,2006; Law and Economics Workshop,

39

Exhibit 2 - 40

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Stanford Law School, February 16, 2006; ; Law Faculty, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, England, February 28, 2006; University of Illinois College of Law, Law and Economics Workshop, March 2,2006; Faculty Workshop, Florida State University Law School, March 30, 2006; ALEA, Berkeley, CA May 6, 2006; University of Chicago Law School, Law and Economics Workshop, May 9,2006.

• "Is Gun Control Illiberal?," Federalist Society Debate with Dan Kahan at Yale Law School, January 31,2006. • "Witness to Deception: An Insider's Look at the Disney Trial," 2005-2006 Distinguished Lecture, Boston University School of Law, November 10,2005; Center for the Study of Corporate Law, Yale Law School, November 3,2005; Law Offices of Herbert Smith, London, England, February 23,2006; Law Faculty, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, England, February 27,2006. • "Understanding the Surprising Fall in Crime in the 1990s," Rotary Club, Orange, CT, August 5,2005; Faculty Workshop, Yale School of Management, September 21,2005.

• Panel Member, "The Board's Role in Corporate Strategy," The Yale Global Governance Forum, Yale School of Management, September 8,2005.

• "Crime and Abortion," Museo de la Cuidad de Mexico, Mexico City, October 20,2003. • "Allocating Resources towards Social Problems and Away From Incarceration as a Means of Reducing Crime," MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, San Francisco, CA, February 28,2003.

• "Shooting Down the More Guns, Less Crime Hypothesis," Stanford Law School, Law and Economics Seminar, January 28,2003; Faculty Workshop, Center for the Study of Law and Society, Boalt Hall, University of California, Berkeley, Feb. 24, 2003; Development Workshop, Stanford Law School, April 25, 2003; Faculty Workshop, Stanford Law School, July 2,2003; Law and Public Affairs Program Workshop, Princeton University, September 29,2003; Stanford Alumni Weekend, Stanford University, October 17, 2003; Faculty Workshop, CIDE, Mexico City, October 20, 2003.

• "The Impact of Legalized Abortion on Teen Childbearing," NBER Labor Summer Institute, Cambridge, MA, July 30, 2002.

• "Do Concealed Handgun Laws Reduce Crime? ," Faculty Workshop, Stanford Law School, October 4,2000; First-Year Orientation, Stanford Law School, September 5, 2001; Faculty Workshop, Harvard Law School, April 26, 2002; Faculty Workshop, Columbia Law School, April 29, 2002.

• "The Evolution of Employment Discrimination Law in the 1990s: An Empirical Investigation," Fellows Workshop, American Bar Foundation, February 11,2002.

40

Exhibit 2 - 41

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• "The Role of Discounting in Evaluating Social Programs Impacting on Future Generations: Comment on Arrow and Revesz," Colloquium on Distributive Justice, Stanford Law School, Oct. 18,2001. • "The Impact of Wrongful Discharge Laws," NBER Labor Summer Institute, Cambridge, MA, July 30,2001; Labor and Employment Seminar, NYU Law School, October 16,2001; Faculty Workshop, Stanford Law School, September 18, 2002; Yale Law School, January, 2004. • "Racial Profiling: Defining the Problem, Understanding the Cause, Finding the Solution," American Society of Criminology Conference, San Francisco, CA, November 15, 2000. • "Institutional Architecture for Building Private Markets," Conference on "Latin America and The New Economy" at Diego Portales University in Santiago, Chile, October 26, 2000. • "The History and Current Status of Employment Discrimination Law in the United States," Unicapital School of Law, (Centro Universitario Capital), Sao Paulo, Brazil, March 10,2000. • "Corporate Governance in Developing Countries: Opportunities and Dangers," Conference on Neoliberal Policies for Development: Analysis and Criticism," University of Sao Paulo Law School, March 13,2000 • "Legalized Abortion and Crime," Law and Economics Workshop, University of Pennsylvania Law School, September 21, 1999; Faculty Workshop, Yale Law School, September 27, 1999; John Jay College of Criminal Justice, October 7, 1999; Faculty Workshop, Quinnipiac Law School, October 13, 1999; Faculty Workshop, University of Connecticut Law School, October 19, 1999; University of Virginia Law School, October 25, 1999; Faculty Workshop, Baruch College, November 9, 1999; MacArthur Foundation Social Interactions and Economic Inequality Network Meeting, Brookings Institution, December 4, 1999; Faculty Workshop, NYU Law School, January 21, 2000; Faculty Workshop, University of San Diego Law School, February 18,2000; Public Economics Workshop, Department of Economics, Stanford University, April 28, 2000; Law and Economics Workshop, University of California at Berkeley Law School, September 18, 2000; Faculty Workshop, Cornell Law School, September 26, 2000; OB­ GYN Grand Rounds, Stanford Medical School, October 2, 2000; Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences, October 11, 2000; Faculty Workshop, Graduate School of Business, February 5,2002. • Panel member, Session on Executive Compensation, Director's College, Stanford Law School, March 23, 1999. • "Exploring the Link Between Legalization of Abortion in the 1970s and Falling Crime in the 1990s," Law and Economics Workshop, Harvard Law School, March 16, 1999; Law

41

Exhibit 2 - 42

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and Economics Workshop, University of Chicago Law School, April 27, 1999; Faculty Workshop, Stanford Law School, June 30, 1999. • "Is the Increasing Reliance on Incarceration a Cost-Effective Strategy of Fighting Crime?" Faculty Workshop, University of Wisconsin School of Social Science, February 19, 1999. • "What Do We Know About Options Compensation?" Institutional Investors Forum, Stanford Law School, May 29, 1998. • Commentator on Orlando Patterson's presentation on "The Ordeal of Integration," Stanford Economics Department, May 20, 1998. • "Understanding The Time Path of Crime," Presentation at Conference on Why is Crime Decreasing?, Northwestern University School of Law, March 28, 1998; Faculty Workshop, Stanford Law School, September 16, 1998; Faculty Workshop, University of Michigan Law School, February 18, 1999. • Commentator, Conference on Public and Private Penalties, the University of Chicago Law School, Dec. 13-14, 1997. • "Some Thoughts on Affirmative Action," Presentation at a conference on Rethinking Equality in the Global Society, Washington University School of Law, November 10, 1997.

• Commentator on Chris Jencks' Presentation on Welfare Policy, Stanford Economics Department, October 8, 1997. • "The Impact of Race on Policing, Arrest Patterns, and Crime," Faculty Workshop, Stanford Law School, September 10, 1997; Law and Economics Workshop, University of Southern California Law School, October 23, 1997; Law and Economics Workshop, Columbia University Law School, November 24, 1997; Law and Economics Workshop, Haas School of Business, University of California at Berkeley, February 19, 1998; Annual Meeting of the American Law and Economics Association, University of California at Berkeley, May 8, 1998; Conference on the Economics of Law Enforcement, Harvard Law School, October 17, 1998. • "Crime in America: Understanding Trends, Evaluating Policy," Stanford Sierra Camp, August 1997. • "Executive Compensation: What Do We Know?" TIAA-CREF Committees on Corporate Governance and Social Responsibility, Center for Economic Policy Research, Stanford University, June 27, 1997; NASDAQ Director's Day, Stanford University, June 30, 1997.

42

Exhibit 2 - 43

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• Panel Chair, Criminal Law (Theory), Criminal Law (Empirical), and LaborlDiscriminationlFamily Law, American Law and Economics Association, University of Toronto Law School, May 9-10, 1997. • Commentator, "Diversity in Law School Hiring," Stanford Law School, February 25, 1997. • Keynote Speaker, "The Optimal Rate of Crime," 11 th Annual Conference, The Oklahoma Academy for State Goals, Tulsa, Oklahoma, May 7, 1996. • Panel member, Session on Executive Compensation, Director's College, Stanford Law School, March 28-29, 1996. • "The Power of Law: Can Law Make a Difference in Improving the Position of Women and Minorities in the Labor Market?" The Fellows of the American Bar Foundation, Baltimore, Maryland, February 3, 1996. • "Public Action, Private Choice and Philanthropy: Understanding the Sources of Improvement in Black Schooling Quality in Georgia, 1911-1960," Stanford Faculty Workshop, January 24, 1996; Faculty Workshop, University of Virginia Law School, January 22, 1997; National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Labor Studies Conference, April 3, 1998. • Commentator, "The Effect of Increased Incarceration on Crime," Meetings of the American Economics Association, San Francisco, January 6, 1996. • Commentator, Symposium on Labor Law, University of Texas Law School, November 10-11, 1995.

• Panel Member, Symposium on Criminal Justice, Stanford Law School, October 6-7, 1995. • Commentator, "The Litigious Plaintiff Hypothesis," Industrial and Labor Relations Conference, Cornell University, May 19, 1995. • Commentator on Keith Hylton's, "Fee Shifting and Predictability of Law," Faculty Workshop, Northwestern University School of Law, February 27, 1995. • "The Selection of Employment Discrimination Disputes for Litigation: Using Business Cycle Effects to Test the Priest/Klein Hypothesis," Stanford University, Law and Economics Seminars, October 31, 1994.

• "Is the United States at the Optimal Rate of Crime?" Faculty Workshop, Indiana University School of Law, Indianapolis, November 18,1993; Faculty Workshop, Northwestern University School of Law, April 18, 1994; Law and Economics Workshop, Stanford Law School, April 28, 1994; Meetings of the American Law and Economics Association, Stanford Law School, May 13, 1994; American Bar

43

Exhibit 2 - 44

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Foundation, September 7, 1994; Faculty Workshop, DePaul Law School, September 21,1994; Law and Economics Workshop, University of Chicago Law School, October 11, 1994; Faculty Seminar, Stanford Law School, October 31, 1994; Law and Economics Luncheon, Stanford Law School, November 1, 1994; Faculty Seminar Workshop, University of Illinois College of Law, Champaign, November 22, 1994; Law and Economics Workshop, Harvard Law School, November 29, 1994; School Alumni Luncheon, Chicago Club, December 13, 1994; Northwestern Law School; Law and Economics Workshop, Yale Law School, February 1, 1996; Faculty Workshop, Cornell Law School, April 10, 1996; Faculty Workshop, Tokyo University Law School, June 4, 1996; Panel on "The Economics of Crime," Western Economics Association Meeting, San Francisco, July 1, 1996. • "The Broad Path of Law and Economics," Chair Ceremony, Northwestern University School of Law, September 30, 1994. • Commentator on Paul Robinson's "A Failure of Moral Conviction," Northwestern University School of Law, September 20, 1994. • "The Do's of Diversity, The Don'ts of Discrimination," Kellogg School of Business, Northwestern University, May 17, 1994. • "Does Law Matter in the Realm of Discrimination?" Law and Society Summer Institute, Pala Mesa Lodge, Fallbrook, California, June 25, 1993. • Commentator, "The Double Minority: Race and Sex Interactions in the Job Market," Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics, New School for Social Research, March 28, 1993. • "The Effects of Joint and Several Liability on Settlement Rates: Mathematical Symmetries and Meta-Issues in the Analysis of Rational Litigant Behavior," Economic Analysis of Civil Procedure, University of Virginia School of Law, March 26, 1993. • Debate with Richard Epstein on Employment Discrimination Law, Chicago Federalist Society, February 23, 1993. • Panel Chair, "Optimal Sanctions and Legal Rules in Tort and Criminal Law," Meetings of Annual Association of Law and Economics, Yale Law School, May 15, 1992. • Panel Member, "The Law and Economics of Employment at Will," The Institute For Humane Studies, Fairfax, Virginia, March 27, 1992. • "The Efficacy of Title VII," Debate with Professor Richard Epstein, University of Chicago Law School, February 26, 1992. • Moderator, "Using Testers to Demonstrate Racial Discrimination," University of Chicago Law School, February 13, 1992.

44

Exhibit 2 - 45

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• "Law & Macroeconomics: The Effect of the Business Cycle on Employment Discrimination Litigation," Law and Society Workshop, Indiana University, November 6, 1991; Faculty Workshop, University of North Carolina Law School, Chapel Hill, November 8,1991; Faculty Workshop, Northwestern University School of Law, December 11, 1991; Law and Economics Conference, Duquesne Law School, March 14, 1992; University of Chicago Law School, April 2, 1992. • Panel Chair and Commentator, "New Perspectives on Law and Economics," Society for the Advancement of Socioeconomics, Stockholm, June 17, 1991; Law and Society Meetings, Amsterdam, June 29, 1991. • Panel Chair, "Regulation of International Capital Markets," Law and Society Meetings, Amsterdam, June 27, 1991. • Panel Chair, "The Law and Economics of Discrimination," American Association of Law and Economics, University of Illinois Law School, May 24, 1991. •. "The Economics of Employment Discrimination Law," Industrial Relations Research Association, Chicago, Illinois, March 4, 1991. • "Does Current Employment Discrimination Law Help or Hinder Minority Economic Empowerment?" Debate with Professor Richard Epstein, The Federalist Society, Northwestern Law School, February 26, 1991. • Panel Member, "The Law and Economics of Employment Discrimination," AALS Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C., January 6, 1991. • "Re-Evaluating Federal Civil Rights Policy," Conference on the Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in Employment, Georgetown University Law Center, November 30, 1990. • "Opting for the British Rule," Faculty Seminar, Northwestern Law School, September 11, 1990; Faculty Seminar, University of Virginia Law School, September 14, 1990; Law and Economics Seminar, University of Michigan Law School, October 18, 1990; Faculty Workshop, NYU Law School, November 14, 1990; Faculty Workshop, University of Florida Law School, March 18, 1991. • "The Effects of Fee Shifting on the Settlement Rate: Theoretical Observations on Costs, Conflicts, and Contingency Fees," at the Yale Law School Conference "Modem Civil Procedure: Issues in Controversy," June 16, 1990. • "Studying the Iceberg From Its Tip?: An Analysis ofthe Differences Between Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases," Law and Society Meetings, Berkeley, California, May 31, 1990. • Panel Discussion on Tort Reform, University of Pennsylvania Law School, April 27, 1990.

45

Exhibit 2 - 46

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• Panel Discussion of "The Role of Government in Closing the Socio-Economic Gap for Minorities," at the Federalist Society National Symposium on "The Future of Civil Rights Law," Stanford Law School, March 16, 1990.

• "Continuous versus Episodic Change: The Impact of Affirmative Action and Civil Rights Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks," University of Virginia Economics Department, February 15, 1990; Princeton University Department of Economics, February 21, 1990 (with James Heckman); Law & Economics Workshop, University of Toronto Law School, October 8, 1991. • "Sex Discrimination in the Workplace: An Economic Perspective," Fellows Seminar, American Bar Foundation, October 16, 1989.

• "The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation," Law and Economics Workshop, Columbia Law School, March 23, 1989; Faculty Seminar, University of Virginia Law School, March 24, 1989; Law and Economics Workshop, University of Chicago, April 25, 1989; Law & Society Meeting; Madison, Wisconsin, June 8, 1989; Labor Economics Workshop, University of Illinois, Chicago, November 1, 1989; Law & Economics Workshop, University of Pennsylvania Law School, November 9,1989; Law and Economics Seminar, University of California at Berkeley, October 4, 1990; Law and Social Science Workshop, Northwestern University, February 3, 1991; Law and Economics Seminar, Stanford Law School, March 21, 1991; Faculty Workshop, Cornell Law School, April 3, 1991; Visiting Committee, Northwestern Law School, April 5, 1991.

• "Law & Economics: The Third Phase," The Association of General Counsel, Northwestern University School of Law, October 14, 1988.

• "Employment Discrimination Litigation," Northwestern Law School Alumni Monthly Loop Luncheon. Chicago Bar Association, May 31, 1988.

• "The Morality of the Death Penalty." A debate with Ernest Van Den Haag. Northwestern University School of Law, April 19, 1988.

• "Models of Deregulation of International Capital Markets." A presentation with David Van Zandt, Faculty Seminar, Northwestern University School of Law, April 1, 1988; Visiting Committee, May 5, 1988.

• "ls Title VII Efficient?" A debate with Judge Richard Posner, Faculty Seminar, Northwestern University School of Law, November 20, 1987.

• "The Senate's Role in Confirming Supreme Court Nominees: The Historical Record," Northwestern University School of Law, September 22, 1987.

• "Diverting the Coasean River: Incentive Schemes to Reduce Unemployment Spells," Yale Law School Civil Liability Workshop, March 30, 1987; Faculty Seminar,

46

Exhibit 2 - 47

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Northwestern University School of Law, March 18, 1987; University of Southern California Law Center, May 1, 1987; and Seminar in Law and Politics, Department of Political Science, Northwestern University, May 8, 1987; Labor Workshop, Department of Economics, Northwestern University, October 27, 1987; AALS Annual Meeting, New Orleans, January 7, 1989. • "Women in the Labor Market--Are Things Getting Better or Worse?," Hamilton College, February 23, 1987. • "The Changing Relative Quit Rates of Young Ma1e and Female Workers," Hamilton­ Colgate Joint Faculty Economics Seminar, February 23, 1987. • "Living on Borrowed Money and Time -- u.S. Fiscal Policy and the Prospect of Explosive Public Debt," Orange Rotary Club, February 22, 1985. • "Capital Punishment in the Eighties," Hamilton College, April 6, 1981. • "Terms and Conditions of Sale Under the Uniform Commercial Code," Executive Sales Conference, National Machine Tool Builders' Association, May 12, 1980.

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

• Member, Committee on Law and Justice, National Research Council, October 2011 - present.

• Co-Editor (with Steven Shavell), American Law and Economics Review, May 2006- August 2012.

• President, American Law and Economics Association, May 2011 May 2012. • Co-President, Society for Empirical Legal Studies, November 2011 - August 2012. Member, Board of Directors from November 2011- November 2014.

• Testified before the Connecticut Legislature in Support of Senate Bill 1035 and House Bill 6425 (A Bill to Eliminate the Death Penalty), March 7,2011; Testified again before the Connecticut Judiciary Committee on March 14,2012.

• Member of the Special Committee on ALI Young Scholars Medal, October 2009 - February 2011.

• Vice-President/President Elect, American Law and Economics Association, June 2010- May 2011.

• Secretary-Treasurer, American Law and Economics Association, June 2009 - May 2010. • Board of Advisors, Yale Law School Center for the Study of Corporate Law, July 2004- August 2010.

47

Exhibit 2 - 48

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• Evaluated the Connecticut death penalty system: "Capital Punishment in Connecticut, 1973-2007: A Comprehensive Evaluation from 4600 murders to One Execution," http://works.bepress.com/john_ donohuel13 7/

• Member, Panel on Methods for Assessing Discrimination, National Academy of Sciences, September 2001 - June 2004. Resulting Publication: National Research Council, Measuring Racial Discrimination (2004), http://www.nap.edulcatalog/l 0887 .html • Member, National Science Foundation Review Panel, Law and Social Sciences, September, 1999 - April 2001. • Editorial Board, Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, July 2003 - present. • Editorial Board, International Review of Law and Economics, October 1999 - present. • Editorial Board, Law and Social Inquiry, February 2000 present. • Board of Editors, American Law and Economics Review, August 1998 April 2013. • Consultant, Planning Meeting on Measuring the Crime Control Effectiveness of Criminal Justice Sanctions, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., June 11,1998

• Member, Board of Directors, American Law and Economics Association, June 1994- May 1997. Member, ALEA Nominating Committee, July 1995-May 1996. Member, Program Committee, July 1996-May 1998 and July 2000 - May 2002. • Statistical Consultant, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Settlement Conference Project (December, 1994). • Testified before U.S. Senate Labor Committee on evaluating the Job Corps, October 4, 1994. • Assisted the American Bar Association Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary in evaluating the qualifications of Ruth Bader Ginsburg (June 1993) and David Souter (June, 1990).

• Chair, AALS Section on Law and Economics, January 1990 - January 1991. • Economic Consultant to Federal Courts Study Committee. Analyzing the role of the federal courts and projected caseload for Judge Richard Posner's subcommittee. February 1989 - March 1990. • Member, 1990 AALS Scholarly Papers Committee. • Member, Advisory Board, Corporate Counsel Center, Northwestern University School of Law. Since December 1987. • Associate Editor, Law and Social Inquiry. Summer 1987 - December 1989.

48

Exhibit 2 - 49

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• Interviewed Administrative Law Judge candidates for u.s. Office of Personnel Management. Chicago, Illinois. May 23, 1988.

• Member, Congressman Bruce Morrison's Military Academy Selection Committee. Fall 1983. • 1982 Candidate for Democratic Nomination, Connecticut State Senate, 14th District (Milford, Orange, West Haven).

PRO BONO LEGAL WORK

• Death Penalty case: Heath v. Alabama. Fall 1986-FaIl1989. • Wrote brief opposing death sentence in Navy spy case. Court ruled in favor of defendant on September 13, 1985. • Staff Attorney, Neighborhood Legal Services, January-July 1981. • Appealed sentence of death for Georgia defendant to the United States Supreme Court. Sentence vacated on May 27, 1980. Baker v. Georgia.

• Court-appointed representation of indigent criminal defendant in District of Columbia Superior Court, February-July 1980. RESEARCH GRANTS

• Stanford University Research Fund, January 1997 and January 1998. • The National Science Foundation (project with James Heckman), December 1992; (project with Steve Levitt), July 1997. • Fund for Labor Relations Studies, University of Michigan Law School, March 1988.

BAR ADMISSIONS

• Connecticut - October 1977; District of Columbia - March 1978 (Currently Inactive Status); United States Supreme Court - November 1980; U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut - February 14, 1978.

49

Exhibit 2 - 50

553 Case 2:16-cv-06164-JAK-ASCase: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, Document ID: 11033141, 59-2 Filed DktEntry: 10/02/17 17-3, Page Page 51 231 of 51 of 232 Page ID #:1714

PROFESSIONAL AND HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS

• American Academy of Arts and Sciences (since April 2009). • Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research (since October 1996)­ in Law and Economics and Labor Studies. • American Law Institute (since September 29, 2010). • American Bar Association • American Economic Association • American Law and Economics Association

PERSONAL

• Born: January 30,1953.

Exhibit 2 - 51 50

554 Case: 18-55717, 10/02/2018, ID: 11033141, DktEntry: 17-3, Page 232 of 232

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on October 2, 2018, an electronic PDF of APPELLANTS’

EXCERPTS OF RECORD, VOLUME III OF X was uploaded to the Court’s CM/ECF system, which will automatically generate and send by electronic mail a Notice of Docket Activity to all registered attorneys participating in the case. Such notice constitutes service on those registered attorneys. Date: October 2, 2018 MICHEL & ASSOCIATES, P.C.

/s/C.D. Michel C.D. Michel Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellants Michelle Flanagan, et al.