Outsider Presidents, Institutional Performance, and Governability in Latin America
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OUTSIDER PRESIDENTS, INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE, AND GOVERNABILITY IN LATIN AMERICA by Miguel Carreras BA, History, Université Paris-Sorbonne, 2005 MSc, Political Science, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne, 2006 MA, International Studies, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2008 Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Pittsburgh 2014 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH THE DIETRICH SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES This dissertation was presented by Miguel Carreras It was defended on December 1, 2014 and approved by B. Guy Peters, Professor, Political Science, University of Pittsburgh Scott Morgenstern, Associate Professor, Political Science, University of Pittsburgh Melanie Hughes, Associate Professor, Sociology, University of Pittsburgh Dissertation Advisor: Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, Political Science, University of Pittsburgh ii Copyright © by Miguel Carreras 2014 iii OUTSIDER PRESIDENTS, INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE, AND GOVERNABILITY IN LATIN AMERICA Miguel Carreras, PhD University of Pittsburgh, 2014 In the last 25 years, eight outsider candidates won presidential elections in Latin America. Outsiders are candidates with little political experience running with new parties. This reality presents a dual puzzle, which is the focus of this dissertation. First, what explains the sudden rise and election of political outsiders in presidential elections? Second, what are the consequences of the election of outsiders for democratic governability and institutional performance? I address these questions through a combination of quantitative analyses and an in-depth qualitative analysis of the case of Alberto Fujimori (outsider president of Peru who governed between 1990 and 2000). Against the conventional wisdom, the first part of my dissertation shows that the rise of outsiders is not a “peril of presidentialism.” When other important economic and political factors are controlled for, the political system (presidential vs. parliamentary) is not a good predictor of outsider success. The rise of outsiders in Latin America is associated with a combination of supply and demand factors. A series of institutional design characteristics (compulsory voting, reelection provisions, and non-concurrent elections) make it easier for outsiders to run. Once viable outsiders are in the race, their success is facilitated in contexts where a severe crisis of representation exists. Dealigned citizens and voters whose preferences are not reflected in the established party system are more likely to support outsiders on election day. iv The second main contribution of this dissertation is to show that outsiders are more likely to threaten democratic governability and to commit authoritarian excesses. There are three main factors that contribute to executive abuses when political outsiders reach the presidency: 1) the lack of democratic political socialization of outsiders, 2) the difficult socio-political context faced by outsiders –which creates a “window of opportunity” for executive excesses–, and 3) the lack of a strongly organized party monitoring the actions of outsider presidents. This work shows that executive-legislative relations tend to be more acrimonious when the president is an outsider. The in-depth analysis of the Fujimori case also suggests that outsiders tend to form very inexperienced cabinets, which generates serious governability problems. v TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................................... XIV 1.0 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 1 1.1 THE POLITICAL ARENA: NO PLACE FOR AMATEURS ........................ 2 1.2 THE PUZZLE ...................................................................................................... 6 1.3 WHY STUDY OUTSIDERS? ........................................................................... 11 1.4 MOVING BEYOND INSTITUTIONS ............................................................ 14 1.5 ROADMAP OF THE DISSERTATION ......................................................... 16 2.0 DEFINITION, RESEARCH DESIGN, AND THEORY ........................................ 22 2.1 POLITICAL OUTSIDERS: DEFINITION .................................................... 23 2.1.1 Secondary level: the constitutive dimensions of the concept “outsider” .. 25 2.1.2 Indicator level: operationalization of the concept of political outsider .... 30 2.2 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY ........................................... 38 2.3 THEORIZING “OUTSIDERSHIP” ................................................................ 44 2.3.1 The “perils of presidentialism” literature ................................................... 44 2.3.2 The rise of outsiders: a neglected peril of presidentialism?....................... 47 2.3.2.1 Individual characteristics of outsiders and lack of democratic socialization ........................................................................................................ 49 2.3.2.2 Socioeconomic and political context .................................................. 52 vi 2.3.2.3 Institutional factors and strategic constraints .................................. 57 2.4 SUMMARY ........................................................................................................ 60 3.0 OUTSIDERS: A PERIL OF PRESIDENTIALISM? ............................................. 61 3.1 THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS .......................................................... 62 3.1.1 Presidentialism and political inexperience .................................................. 63 3.1.2 Presidentialism and new parties ................................................................... 66 3.1.3 Alternative explanations of outsider rise ..................................................... 68 3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN ....................................................................................... 72 3.2.1 Data ................................................................................................................. 72 3.2.2 Model estimation............................................................................................ 75 3.3 OUTSIDERS AND PRESIDENTIALISM ...................................................... 76 3.3.1 Descriptive statistics ...................................................................................... 76 3.3.2 Results and analyses ...................................................................................... 78 3.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS ............................................................................ 84 4.0 INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND OUTSIDER RISE ........................................... 86 4.1 THEORY: INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF OUTSIDER SUCCESS ............................................................................................................................ 87 4.1.1 Institutional design and the rise of outsiders .............................................. 88 4.1.2 Alternative explanations of the rise of outsiders in Latin America .......... 92 4.2 RESEARCH DESIGN ....................................................................................... 93 4.2.1 Data ................................................................................................................. 93 4.2.2 Model estimation............................................................................................ 96 4.3 RESULTS ........................................................................................................... 98 vii 4.4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION ............................................................. 103 5.0 WHO VOTES FOR OUTSIDERS IN LATIN AMERICA? ................................ 105 5.1 CRISIS OF REPRESENTATION AND OUTSIDERS IN LATIN AMERICA ......................................................................................................................... 106 5.2 ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS OF THE VOTE FOR OUTSIDERS 113 5.3 DATA AND MODEL ESTIMATION ........................................................... 115 5.3.1 Data ............................................................................................................... 116 5.3.2 Model estimation.......................................................................................... 120 5.4 RESULTS ......................................................................................................... 121 5.5 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 128 6.0 OUTSIDERS AND EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE CONFLICT ....................... 131 6.1 THEORY: OUTSIDERS AND EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE CONFRONTATION ........................................................................................................ 133 6.1.1 Outsiders as minority presidents ................................................................ 134 6.1.2 Lack of political experience and democratic socialization....................... 135 6.1.3 Public tolerance for executive excesses ...................................................... 138 6.1.4 Outsiders are not constrained by organized parties................................. 139 6.2 ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS OF INTERBRANCH CONFLICTS 140 6.2.1 Presidential dissolution of congress ........................................................... 142 César Gaviria ...........................................................................................................