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Baltic Unity Within European Unity – Why Myth, Not Reality?

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Baltic Unity Within European Unity – Why Myth, Not Reality? 1 Baltic Unity within European Unity – why Myth, not Reality? In recent years a debate about development of the European Union (EU) has become hugely important. There are diverse views on the direction of federalism, which the President of the European Commission J. M. D. Barroso is passionately promoting: “Let’s not be afraid of the words: we will need to move towards a federation of nation states. This is what we need. This is our political horizon.”1 As a consequence of such ambitious plans, the question of national identity and independence has become crucial. However, less attention has been paid to the problem of regional cooperation and the effects of already existing European integration on it, which is exactly what this report aims at. In mass media one can often hear about an entity called ‘the Baltic States‘. This union of three states Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania has cooperated quite a lot in the two last decades of 20th century, however, now the importance of cooperation seems to be in decline. The Baltic unity in the European unity (i.e. EU) is a myth because of two reasons: passive effect of the integration in the EU, when the European unity indirectly and unintentionally influences the cooperation among the Baltic States, and active effect of the policies of the EU, when they have deliberate impact on the Baltic Unity. Baltic Unity before the EU In order to indicate why Baltic unity is impossible in the context of integrated Europe, it is necessary to recall the common aim of Baltic cooperation before the accession to the European Union. Back in the 1990, when the Baltic States still were republics of the Soviet Union, the chairmen of Supreme Council of each state signed Declaration on Unity and Cooperation, inter alia deciding that a Council of Baltic States has to be created “in order to assist in the full restoration of state independence of the three Republics”. 2 Being small states, they needed each other, first of all, for regaining independence and, secondly, for being recognized by international community. The goal was achieved in August of 1991, when the Soviet Union officially recognized the independence of the Baltic States, 3 and the recognition from other 1 Barroso, J. M. D. State of the Union 2012 Address. Available on: http://europa.eu/rapid/press- release_SPEECH-12-596_en.htm Last visited 26 April 2014. 2 Declaration on Unity and Cooperation by the Republic of Estonia, Republic of Latvia and Republic of Lithuania, 1990. 3 Dahlburg, J. T. and Marshall, T., Los Angeles Times (1991). Independence for Baltic States. Available on: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-09-07/news/mn-1530_1_baltic-states Last visited 26 April 2014. 2 states shortly afterwards followed.4 Admittedly, the Baltic cooperation before these events was quite symbolic, for instance the Baltic Way in 1989 5 and the agreement mentioned above, even though many politicians tend to overestimate it. 6 The Baltic States with their simultaneous demonstrations definitely attracted the attention of the world, which was necessary, but the largest contribution to their independence was the disastrous situation of the Soviet Union in terms of economics and politics, when, as History reports, the reforms of Mikhail Gorbachev appeared unsuccessful.7 It allowed the Baltic cooperation to happen. After regaining independence, the Baltic States were well aware of the fact that they quickly need to search allies and integrate them in the West, especially after experiment with neutrality before the Second World War. Therefore, the third goal and, according to Kirsten Biering, the primary objective of cooperation was to get a way into international politics. 8 In addition, “mistrust and fear towards Russia” did not disappear,9 and was a stimulus to search for security and economic independence. They found security in North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and economic independence in the European Union (EU). For the purposes of this report, the case of EU will be examined. Already in 1992 first steps were made, in order to become members of the EU (then European Community), namely, trade and cooperation agreements were signed with it, gaining the Most Favoured Nation Status.10 Attention should be paid to the fact that the Baltic States started their way to the EU together. On the way the main achievement was the creation of the Free Trade Agreement in 1994,11 which was extended further in 1996, including agricultural goods as well.12 There was also an idea about the Baltic Customs Union, and, again, as then the Prime Minister of Latvia 4 Charles, A., Baltic Review (2011). World Leaders Welcomed The Baltic States To The United Nations: Iceland Received Special Recognition For Its Support In 1991. Available on: http://baltic-review.com/2011/03/world- leaders-welcomed-the-baltic-states-to-the-united-nations-iceland-received-special-recognition-for-its-support-in- 1991/ Last visited 26 April 2014. 5 UNESCO. The Baltic Way – Human Chain Linking Three States in Their Drive for Freedom. Available on: http://www.balticway.net Last visited 26 April 2014 6 Kalniete, S. (2011). Baltijas valstu neatkarības atjaunošana. Kā tas viss notika? Available on: http://kalniete.lv/2011/10/18/baltijas-valstu-neatkaribas-atjaunosanas-20-gadadiena/ Last visited 26 April 2014. 7 History. Fall of the Soviet Union. Available on: http://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/fall-of-soviet-union Last visited 26 April 2014. 8 K. Biering, “The Baltic States on the International Scene: an epilogue”, in N. Petersen (ed.), The Baltic States in International Politics, Copenhagen, DJOFPublishing, 1993, pp. 175-178. 9 M. Haab, “Potentials and Vulnerabilities of the Baltic States”, in B. Hansen and B. Heurlin (eds.), The Baltic States in World Politics, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1998, p. 4. 10 A. Elson, “Baltic State Membership in the European Union: Developing a Common Asylum and Immigration Policy”, (1997) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 326. 11 Free Trade Agreement Between the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Latvia and the Republic of Lithuania, 1993. 12 OECD (2013). Baltic Free Trade Agreement. Available on: http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=174 Last visited 26 April 2014. 3 said, one of the goals of it was to facilitate the Baltic integration into EU. 13 It failed, and later the transformation from Baltic cooperation to Baltic competition was observed. What Did Go Wrong? The breaking point was the year of 1997 when the Commission presented its opinions on progress that the Baltic States have made, in order to get membership in the EU. It reported that “negotiations for accession should be opened with Estonia”,14 but in the case of Latvia and Lithuania the Commission added “as soon as it has made sufficient progress in satisfying the conditions of membership defined by the European Council in Copenhagen.”15,16 Probably it is too brave to say that this was the end of the Baltic unity and the start of the Baltic competition, nevertheless it was true, especially on political level. “Latvia and Lithuania were initially upset that they had been left behind,” 17 and they were forced to increase their capabilities, i.e. to compete, which succeeded in accession to the EU in 2004 together with Estonia. The inner competition of the Baltic States did not disappear till this day, and instead of cooperation, they are rivals. Before the accession, however, some experts, such as Edmunds Apsalons 18 predicted that the integration into EU would enhance the Baltic unity. On the contrary, others such as Mare Haab19 were sure that the Baltic States would try not to engage in cooperation among them, in order to advance the capabilities of each state separately. Nevertheless, it was clear that the cooperation is needed, in order to ensure better integration into Europe. Also now it is quite logical that it would be easier for three small states to ally and promote their regional interests, not to compete. Then, the question is: do the Baltic States have regional interests? 13 Šķēle, A. (1997). Report of the Prime Minister Andris Skele at the 3rd session of the Baltic Council. Available on: http://www.am.gov.lv/en/news/speeches/1997/3659/ Last visited 26 April 2014. 14 Commission of the European Communities, Commission Opinion on Estonia's Application for Membership of the European Union, Brussels, 1997, p. 109. 15 Agenda 2000 - Commission Opinion on Latvia’ s Application for Membership of the European Union, Brussels, 1997. 16 Agenda 2000 - Commission Opinion on Lithuania’ s Application for Membership of the European Union , Brussels, 1997. 17 A. Kasekamp, “Baltic States and the EU: A Rocky Road from “Outside” towards the “Core”, in The Baltic States in the EU: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, Studies & Reports No. 98, Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute, 2013, p.19. 18 E. Apsalons, “Baltic Unity – Illusion of Reality?”, in A. Lejiņš and D. Bleiere (eds.), The Baltic States: Search for Security, Riga, Latvian Institute of International Affairs, 1996, pp. 216-217. 19 M. Haab, “Potentials and Vulnerabilities of the Baltic States”, in B. Hansen and B. Heirlin (eds.), The Baltic States in World Politics, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1998, pp. 9-10. 4 Regional Goals Achieved Looking at the previously mentioned aims of the Baltic unity, it is clear that they are achieved. First, they regained independence, secondly, they were recognized by the international community, and then they became members of both EU and NATO. Along with their accession to the EU, the Free Trade Agreement of the Baltic States became invalid, because it was not relevant anymore, since there was already a free trade within the EU.
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