DOCSLIB.ORG

The Network Analysis of Co ‑Voting Strategies of the KDU ‑ČSL Deputies 1

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Network Analysis of Co ‑Voting Strategies of the KDU ‑ČSL Deputies 1 The disintegration of KDU ‑ČSL in 2009: The network analysis of co ‑voting strategies of the KDU ‑ČSL deputies 1 DUŠAN BRABEC Politics in Central Europe (ISSN: 1801-3422) Vol. 16, No. 2 DOI: 10.2478/pce-2020-0023 Abstract: The main objective of this study is to capture and analyse the dynamics of co ‑voting ties among the members of the KDU ‑ČSL political party group in the 5th parliamentary term between 2006 and 2010 when some members of KDU ‑ČSL left this party and founded new political party TOP 09. For the analysis of the data, network approach and methods were used, with emphasis on the detection of possible rivalling communities in the constructed network of co‑voting ties between deputies belonging to the KDU‑ČSL parliamentary party group in the analysed time period. The co‑voting was treated as a proxy indicator of a possible relationship indicating co ‑operation or rivalry between the deputies. The main outcome of the study was the identification of the co ‑voting strategies and dynamics of the co ‑voting between deputies who left KDU ‑ČSL in 2009 and formed a new political party with their former party colleagues. The study is of a quantitative nature, but the main findings are connected to qualita‑ tive insights as well. Keywords: political parties; unity, party discipline, party factionalism, co‑voting, legislative networks 1 This study was supported by the Charles University Research Programme ‘Progres’ Q18 – Social Sciences: From Multidisciplinarity to Interdisciplinarity. The author would like to thank Lukáš Hájek for the initial data preparation. POLITICS IN CENTRAL EUROPE 16 (2020) 2 547 Introduction It has been more than ten years since the new political party TOP 09 was estab‑ lished in 2009. That year was very turbulent as, from the political perspective, the government lost the vote of confidence, which negatively influenced the stability of the Czech political environment. One of the oldest Czech political parties KDU ‑ČSL suffered from a long ‑lasting internal crisis, which escalated in early 2009. Right after the party congress in May 2009, which was supposed to resolve the party instability, many of its core members left the KDU ‑ČSL and joined the new political party TOP 09. The main goal of the study is to uncover the voting strategies of those mem‑ bers of KDU‑ČSL who left their party in 2009 and joined the newly established political party TOP 09. To be more specific, I will focus on the co ‑voting of these MPs (renegades) with their former colleagues from KDU ‑ČSL, as I’m interested in what their co ‑voting looked like during the fifth parliamentary term between 2006 and 2010. Because of the relational nature of the co ‑voting, I will make use of network analysis tools when investigating the co‑voting strategies among the deputies of the KDU ‑ČSL parliamentary party group. It can be expected that the MPs who left KDU ‑ČSL and joined TOP 09 af‑ terwards voted differently than their former party colleagues. It would be in‑ teresting to investigate if the renegades voted differently even before they left KDU‑ČSL, or if they were disciplined members until they decided to form a new political party. This brings several possible outcomes of the analysis that I will try to confirm or reject in the study. Outcome 1: Deputies that left KDU‑ČSL and joined TOP 09 voted differently than their KDU ‑ČSL colleagues before the TOP 09 was founded (before Miroslav Ka‑ lousek, former leader of KDU ‑ČSL, declared his departure from the party). Outcome 2: MPs who left the KDU ‑ČSL started to vote differently than their former party colleagues after they left the party. Outcome 3: Deputies who left KDU ‑ČSL voted similarly to (or differently than) their former colleagues during whole fifth parliamentary term. The resulting outcome will be put together with qualitative insights to better understand the dynamics of the co‑voting between the two ‘rivalling’ blocks inside the KDU ‑ČSL parliamentary party group. The aim of the article is not to contribute to the theoretical framework of party factionalism but rather to investigate specific co‑voting strategies of the MPs who left their original political party group and founded a new political party with the formation of TOP 09 in 2009, and to capture the moment when and if the legislative (co ‑voting) behaviour of these MPs changed. Theoretical background: 548 The disintegration of KDU-ČSL in 2009: The network analysis … Dušan Brabec In the introduction section, I presented three outcomes that would be the most probable results of the final analysis of roll‑call data of KDU ‑ČSL deputies between 2006 – 2010. At this stage, I will explain the main logic and theoretical background behind these expectations. First, all of the possible outcomes could be divided into two general categories. The first category reflects the outcomes in which any community or sub‑ ‑community of deputies who would vote in a similar fashion could not be iden‑ tified. These outcomes would be possible if the deputies of the KDU‑ČSL voted randomly with no co ‑operation. This category would present the outcomes with no or very weak intraparty unity. The second category reflects these outcomes in which I will be able to identify cohesive groups of the deputies (and possible subcommunities in its parliamen‑ tary party group if the party is suffering from an internal crisis) thanks to the fact that the deputies of the specific political party should be voting unanimously to a large extent (or co ‑ordinating their political actions). The concept of party unity stems from two specific sources, namely from the ideological cohesion of a party and party discipline. Ideological cohesion is based on the shared opinions and views of the deputies, who consequently tend to vote together or sit in the same political party because of their shared preferences. Party discipline, on the other hand, could be understood as a pressure that the party imposes on its members to secure their obedience (Ozbundun 1970). According to the concept of party unity, political parties should consist of members that have similar preferences and opinions and the party management should endorse this cohesion so the political party can survive in the long run. I assume that the results of the analysis of KDU ‑ČSL members’ co ‑voting behaviour between 2006–2010 will fall into this (second) category. Apart from the theoretical perspective, this assumption could even be supported by empirical studies that investigated the internal unity and cohesion of Czech political parties (Linek – Lacina 2011). Specifically, Dvořák (2017: 113) identifies the rates of internal party cohesion of Czech parliamen‑ tary parties in 2006–2010. According to his study, KDU ‑ČSL was an internally cohesive parliamentary party, with an exception that occurred during the fifth parliamentary term, when KDU ‑ČSL suffered from an internal crisis. Based on this evidence, I will focus more specifically on the rationale behind the individual outcomes that fall into the second category (as the possible out‑ comes belonging to the first category could not be obtained, based on theoretical assumptions as well as empirical evidence) where the party unity affects the votes of deputies. As was already presented in the introductory part of the text, I expect that the final analysis should result in one of these outcomes: Outcome 1: Deputies that left KDU‑ČSL and joined TOP 09 voted differently than their KDU ‑ČSL colleagues before the TOP 09 was founded (before Miroslav Ka‑ lousek, former leader of KDU ‑ČSL, declared his departure from the party). POLITICS IN CENTRAL EUROPE 16 (2020) 2 549 Outcome 2: MPs who left the KDU ‑ČSL, started to vote differently than their former party colleagues after they left the party. Outcome 3: Deputies who left KDU ‑ČSL voted similarly to their former colleagues during whole fifth parliamentary term. The main difference between these outcomes is directly linked to the concepts of exit, voice and loyalty introduced by Albert O. Hirschman (1970). As related to the content of this study: exit could be labelled as a strategy where the mem‑ bers of the political party choose to leave when they are dissatisfied with the internal or external situation of the party. The voice, on the other hand, could be perceived as a strategy where the political party members attempt to improve the situation they are displeased with. Both exit and voice could be legitimate strategies taken by the members of a party which is on the decline (suffers from an internal or external crisis, etc.). The concept of loyalty has a decisive effect on whether the individual inclines more towards the strategy of exit or voice. Where there is present loyalty to the organisation (political party), the inclina‑ tion of its members to use the exit strategy should be mitigated, as they should most likely accept voice strategy first. It is therefore interesting to investigate what strategy the deputies who left KDU ‑ČSL and joined TOP 09 incorporated. It has to be stated here that “Since the TOP 09 formed practically in Parliament, before its official establishment it had its people in both chambers, from the ranks of independent, mayors (such as Jaromír Štětina), representatives of smaller parties and former members of the KDU ‑ČSL, which the KDU‑ČSL labelled for their affection for ODS as “bluish” (Mach 2010). We can assume that this group of new TOP 09 members would have a slightly different voting preference than their former party colleagues. The first introduced outcome (Outcome 1) of the analysis would indicate that the renegades did use the strategy of voice first and then they incorporated the strategy of exit.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Bus& 101 Introduction to Business Readings and Workbook Course Designer: Leslie Lum Academic Year 2010-2011 Funded by the Ga
    Bus& 101 Introduction to Business Readings and Workbook Course Designer: Leslie Lum Academic Year 2010-2011 Revised 5/11 Funded by the Gates Foundation/State Board Open Course Initiative 5/28/2011 TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 5 Thirty Second Commercial 22 Resume 6 COMPANY ANALYSIS 24 DOING THE COMPANY ANALYSIS 25 Writing Self Assessment (Courtesy Robin Jeffers) 42 Company Selection 26 Company Research 29 Company Analysis- Marketing 37 Company Financial Analysis 38 Company Management Paper 39 Company Presentation 41 Links to sample student paper 42 Team Writing Assignment 47 Team Research Scavenger Assignment 49 MODULE 1: THE CONTEXT OF BUSINESS 51 Module 1 Goals 51 The Economy 52 GDP: One of the Great Inventions of the 20th Century 52 Economic Growth 55 World’s Economies 56 GDP per capita 66 Inflation 69 Business Cycles 74 Government and Policy 77 Fiscal Policy 77 Monetary Policy 79 Currency Risk 80 Economic Indicators 81 Individual Assignment – Calculating growth rates 85 Team Assignment - Economic Indicators 86 Team Assignment – Costco Case 91 Commanding Heights A Case Study of Bubbles 147 Module 1 Questions for Timed Writes 148 2 MODULE 2 - ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND LEGAL FORMS OF BUSINESS 149 Businesses and Entrepreneurship 150 Forms of Ownership 155 Choosing the Business Structure 158 Starting a Business – The Business Plan 159 Breakeven Analysis 167 Team Assignment – Forms of Business 171 Team Assignment – Entrepreneurship and Business Plan 173 Team Assignment Optional - Breakeven analysis of your business plan 174 Module 2 Questions
    [Show full text]
  • November 2020
    EPP Party Barometer November 2020 The Situation of the European People’s Party in the EU (as of: 23 November 2020) Dr Olaf Wientzek (Graphic template: Janine www.kas.de Höhle, HA Kommunikation, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung) Summary & latest developments (I) • In national polls, the EPP family are the strongest political family in 12 countries (including Fidesz); the Socialist political family in 6, the Liberals/Renew in 4, far-right populists (ID) in 2, and the Eurosceptic/national conservative ECR in 1. Added together, independent parties lead in Latvia. No polls/elections have taken place in France since the EP elections. • The picture is similar if we look at the strongest single party and not the largest party family: then the EPP is ahead in 12 countries (if you include the suspended Fidesz), the Socialists in 7, the Liberals in 4, far-right populists (ID) in 2, and the ECR in one land. • 10 (9 without Orbán) of the 27 Heads of State and Government in the European Council currently belong to the EPP family, 7 to the Liberals/Renew, 6 to the Social Democrats / Socialists, 1 to the Eurosceptic conservatives, and 2 are formally independent. The party of the Slovak head of government belongs to the EPP group but not (yet) to the EPP party; if you include him in the EPP family, there would be 11 (without Orbán 10). • In many countries, the lead is extremely narrow, or, depending on the polls, another party family is ahead (including Italy, Sweden, Latvia, Belgium, Poland). Summary & latest developments (II) • In Romania, the PNL (EPP) has a good starting position for the elections (Dec.
    [Show full text]
  • Remembering Sudetenland: on the Legal Construction of Ethnic Cleansing Timothy W
    Maurer School of Law: Indiana University Digital Repository @ Maurer Law Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship 2006 Remembering Sudetenland: On the Legal Construction of Ethnic Cleansing Timothy W. Waters Indiana University Maurer School of Law, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, and the International Law Commons Recommended Citation Waters, Timothy W., "Remembering Sudetenland: On the Legal Construction of Ethnic Cleansing" (2006). Articles by Maurer Faculty. Paper 324. http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/324 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Remembering Sudetenland: On the Legal Construction of Ethnic Cleansing TIMOTHY WILLIAM WATERS* I. To Begin: Something Uninteresting, and Something New ......... 64 II. A im s of the A rticle ................................................................. 66 1II. An Attempt at an Uncontroversial Historical Primer .............. 69 A. Czechoslovakia and Munich .......................................... 69 B. The Bene§ D ecrees ........................................................ 70 C. The Expulsions or Transfers .......................................... 73 D. The Potsdam Agreement ..............................................
    [Show full text]
  • ESS9 Appendix A3 Political Parties Ed
    APPENDIX A3 POLITICAL PARTIES, ESS9 - 2018 ed. 3.0 Austria 2 Belgium 4 Bulgaria 7 Croatia 8 Cyprus 10 Czechia 12 Denmark 14 Estonia 15 Finland 17 France 19 Germany 20 Hungary 21 Iceland 23 Ireland 25 Italy 26 Latvia 28 Lithuania 31 Montenegro 34 Netherlands 36 Norway 38 Poland 40 Portugal 44 Serbia 47 Slovakia 52 Slovenia 53 Spain 54 Sweden 57 Switzerland 58 United Kingdom 61 Version Notes, ESS9 Appendix A3 POLITICAL PARTIES ESS9 edition 3.0 (published 10.12.20): Changes from previous edition: Additional countries: Denmark, Iceland. ESS9 edition 2.0 (published 15.06.20): Changes from previous edition: Additional countries: Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden. Austria 1. Political parties Language used in data file: German Year of last election: 2017 Official party names, English 1. Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (SPÖ) - Social Democratic Party of Austria - 26.9 % names/translation, and size in last 2. Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP) - Austrian People's Party - 31.5 % election: 3. Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) - Freedom Party of Austria - 26.0 % 4. Liste Peter Pilz (PILZ) - PILZ - 4.4 % 5. Die Grünen – Die Grüne Alternative (Grüne) - The Greens – The Green Alternative - 3.8 % 6. Kommunistische Partei Österreichs (KPÖ) - Communist Party of Austria - 0.8 % 7. NEOS – Das Neue Österreich und Liberales Forum (NEOS) - NEOS – The New Austria and Liberal Forum - 5.3 % 8. G!LT - Verein zur Förderung der Offenen Demokratie (GILT) - My Vote Counts! - 1.0 % Description of political parties listed 1. The Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs, or SPÖ) is a social above democratic/center-left political party that was founded in 1888 as the Social Democratic Worker's Party (Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei, or SDAP), when Victor Adler managed to unite the various opposing factions.
    [Show full text]
  • Download Article
    5 Comment & Analysis CE JISS 2008 Czech Presidential Elections: A Commentary Petr Just Again after fi ve years, the attention of the Czech public and politicians was focused on the Presidential elections, one of the most important milestones of 2008 in terms of Czech political developments. The outcome of the last elections in 2003 was a little surprising as the candidate of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), Václav Klaus, represented the opposition party without the necessary majority in both houses of Parliament. Instead, the ruling coalition of the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD), the Christian-Democratic Union – Czecho- slovak Peoples Party (KDU-ČSL), and the Union of Freedom – Democratic Union (US-DEU), accompanied by some independent and small party Senators was able – just mathematically – to elect its own candidate. However, a split in the major coalition party ČSSD, and support given to Klaus by the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM), brought the Honorary Chairman of the ODS, Václav Klaus, to the Presidential offi ce. In February 2007, on the day of the forth anniversary of his fi rst elec- tion, Klaus announced that he would seek reelection in 2008. His party, the ODS, later formally approved his nomination and fi led his candidacy later in 2007. Klaus succeeded in his reelection attempt, but the way to defending the Presidency was long and complicated. In 2003 members of both houses of Parliament, who – according to the Constitution of the Czech Republic – elect the President at the Joint Session, had to meet three times before they elected the President, and each attempt took three rounds.
    [Show full text]
  • List of Members
    Subcommittee on Security and Defence Members Anna FOTYGA Chair European Conservatives and Reformists Group Poland Prawo i Sprawiedliwość Christian EHLER Vice-Chair Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats) Germany Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands Jaromír ŠTĚTINA Vice-Chair Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats) Czechia TOP 09 a Starostové Clare MOODY Vice-Chair Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament United Kingdom Labour Party Sabine LÖSING Vice-Chair Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left Germany DIE LINKE. Laima Liucija ANDRIKIENĖ Member Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats) Lithuania Tėvynės sąjunga-Lietuvos krikščionys demokratai Johannes Cornelis VAN BAALEN Member Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe Netherlands Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie Brando BENIFEI Member Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament Italy Partito Democratico Klaus BUCHNER Member Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance Germany Ökologisch-Demokratische Partei Jerzy BUZEK Member Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats) Poland Platforma Obywatelska 30/09/2021 1 Aymeric CHAUPRADE Member Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy Group France Les Français Libres Javier COUSO PERMUY Member Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left Spain Independiente Arnaud DANJEAN Member Group of the European People's Party
    [Show full text]
  • The Monkey Cage "Democracy Is the Art of Running the Circus from the Monkey Cage." -- H.L
    11/5/13 The Czech paradox: Did the winner lose and the losers win? Sign In SUBSCRIBE: Home Delivery Digital Real Estate Rentals Cars Today's Paper Going Out Guide Find&Save Service Alley PostT V Politics Opinions Local Sports National World Business Tech Lifestyle Entertainment Jobs More The Monkey Cage "Democracy is the art of running the circus from the monkey cage." -- H.L. Mencken What's The Monkey Cage? Archives Follow : The Monkey Cage The Czech paradox: Did the winner lose and the losers win? BY TIM HAUGHTON, TEREZA NOVOTNA AND KEVIN DEEGAN-KRAUSE October 30 at 5:45 am More 3 Comments Also on The Monkey Cage Is the nonproliferation agenda stuck in the Cold War? Make-up artists prepare the Czech Social Democrat (CSSD) chairman Bohuslav Sobotka for his TV appearance after early parliamentary elections finished, in Prague, on Saturday, Oct. 26, 2013. (CTK, Michal Kamaryt/ Associated Press) [Joshua Tucker: Continuing our series of Election Reports, we are pleased to welcome the following post-election report on the Oct. 25-26 Czech parliamentary elections from political scientists Tim Haughton (University of Birmingham, UK), Tereza Novotna (Universite Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium) and Kevin Deegan-Krause, (Wayne State University), who blogs about East European politics at the excellent Pozorblog. Deegan-Krause's pre-election report is available here.] ***** Czech party politics used to be boring. The 2013 parliamentary election, however, highlights the transformation of the party system, the arrival of new entrants and the woes faced by the long-established parties. The Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD) won the election, but the margin of victory was slender.
    [Show full text]
  • Petr Nečas Zum Premierminister Ernannt
    LÄNDERBERICHT Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. TSCHECHIEN DR. HUBERT GEHRING TOMISLAV DELINIC Mitte-Rechts-Koalition steht - MAREN HACHMEISTER Petr Nečas zum Premierminister 30. Juni 2010 ernannt www.kas.de MITTE-RECHTS-PARTEIEN EINIGEN SICH www.kas.de/tschechien Vorbereitung des Staatshaushaltes be- nächsten Jahr auf Steuermehreinnahmen schleunigt Verhandlungen von weiteren 30 Mrd. CZK (1,2 Mrd. €). Die Europäische Kommission bezeichnet Die Koalitionsverhandlungen der drei Mit- die tschechischen Sparmaßnahmen der te-Rechts-Parteien ODS, TOP 09 und VV Regierung Fischer unterdessen schon als wurden nach den tschechischen Parla- „ausreichend“, um die Haushaltsziele mentswahlen Ende Mai mit Hochdruck 2010 zu erreichen. Die Neuverschuldung vorangetrieben. Staatspräsident Václav wird voraussichtlich mit 5,7% des BIP Klaus ernannte Petr Nečas am 28. Juni noch über den 3% der EU- zum Premierminister. Am 29 Juni wurde Konvergenzkriterien liegen. schließlich auch die Regierung zusam- mengestellt. Dem Premierminister und Zunächst überschattete die Wahl des Par- ODS-Vorsitzenden Nečas gelang es so- lamentsvorsitzenden die neue Dreieinig- mit, die Koalitionsverhandlungen noch keit der Mitte-Rechts-Koalition – dem vor Beginn der Haushaltsverhandlungen Gewohnheitsrecht folgend beanspruchte am 07. Juli erfolgreich zu einem Ende zu nämlich die nach den Wahlen stimmen- bringen. stärkste Partei, die Sozialdemokraten (ČSSD), diesen Posten für sich. Sie konn- Koalitionsvereinbarung mit härtestem ten mit ihrem Kandidaten Lubomír Zaorá- Sparpaket der tschechischen Geschich- lek schließlich nur den stellvertretenden te Parlamentsvorsitz ergattern, da die künf- tige Koalition Miroslava Němcová (ODS) Die Koalitionsvereinbarung der Mitte- durchsetzte. Rechts-Koalition enthält sieben Kapitel. Nach den anfänglichen Forderungen der Auch die Frage der Ministerienverteilung Partei VV zur Kürzung des Verteidigungs- brachte harte Verhandlungen mit sich.
    [Show full text]
  • Far from Stability: the Post-Election Landscape in Bulgaria Dariusz Kałan
    No. 50 (503), 15 May 2013 © PISM Editors: Marcin Zaborowski (Editor-in-Chief) . Katarzyna Staniewska (Managing Editor) Jarosław Ćwiek-Karpowicz . Artur Gradziuk . Piotr Kościński Roderick Parkes . Marcin Terlikowski . Beata Wojna Far from Stability: The Post-Election Landscape in Bulgaria Dariusz Kałan Early parliamentary elections not only will not help restore political stability in Bulgaria but also could further deepen the chaos because of the high dispersion of votes and the expected difficulties with creating a coalition. For a country immersed in crisis, maintaining the post-election stalemate is particularly not beneficial because of the deteriorating economic situation and growing public pressure. Regardless of which party will return to power, one should not expect a significant improvement in Bulgaria’s image in the EU or a positive settlement of the most important issues, including the country’s rapid accession to the Schengen area. Although the winner of the early parliamentary elections of 12 May was the centre-right Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB, 30% of votes), for all four parties that exceeded the 4% electoral threshold, the results can be seen as satisfactory. GERB, the ruling party in 2009–2013, won for the second time in a row during unfavourable economic and social situations. The similar support for the Bulgarian Socialist Party (27%), which received more than 600,000 additional votes than in 2009, is because of the mobilisation of its permanent electorate and generational changes in the party. Also, for the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (11%), which represents the Turkish minority, and the nationalist Attack party (7%), the results are a confirmation of their stable positions on the political scene.
    [Show full text]
  • WHY COMPETITION in the POLITICS INDUSTRY IS FAILING AMERICA a Strategy for Reinvigorating Our Democracy
    SEPTEMBER 2017 WHY COMPETITION IN THE POLITICS INDUSTRY IS FAILING AMERICA A strategy for reinvigorating our democracy Katherine M. Gehl and Michael E. Porter ABOUT THE AUTHORS Katherine M. Gehl, a business leader and former CEO with experience in government, began, in the last decade, to participate actively in politics—first in traditional partisan politics. As she deepened her understanding of how politics actually worked—and didn’t work—for the public interest, she realized that even the best candidates and elected officials were severely limited by a dysfunctional system, and that the political system was the single greatest challenge facing our country. She turned her focus to political system reform and innovation and has made this her mission. Michael E. Porter, an expert on competition and strategy in industries and nations, encountered politics in trying to advise governments and advocate sensible and proven reforms. As co-chair of the multiyear, non-partisan U.S. Competitiveness Project at Harvard Business School over the past five years, it became clear to him that the political system was actually the major constraint in America’s inability to restore economic prosperity and address many of the other problems our nation faces. Working with Katherine to understand the root causes of the failure of political competition, and what to do about it, has become an obsession. DISCLOSURE This work was funded by Harvard Business School, including the Institute for Strategy and Competitiveness and the Division of Research and Faculty Development. No external funding was received. Katherine and Michael are both involved in supporting the work they advocate in this report.
    [Show full text]
  • Political Conflict, Social Inequality and Electoral Cleavages in Central-Eastern Europe, 1990-2018
    World Inequality Lab – Working Paper N° 2020/25 Political conflict, social inequality and electoral cleavages in Central-Eastern Europe, 1990-2018 Attila Lindner Filip Novokmet Thomas Piketty Tomasz Zawisza November 2020 Political conflict, social inequality and electoral cleavages in Central-Eastern Europe, 1990-20181 Attila Lindner, Filip Novokmet, Thomas Piketty, Tomasz Zawisza Abstract This paper analyses the electoral cleavages in three Central European countries countries—the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland—since the fall of communism until today. In all three countries, the left has seen a prolonged decline in support. On the other hand, the “populist” parties increased their support and recently attained power in each country. We relate this to specific trajectories of post-communist transition. Former communist parties in Hungary and Poland transformed themselves into social- democratic parties. These parties' pro-market policies prevented them from establishing themselves predominantly among a lower-income electorate. Meanwhile, the liberal right in the Czech Republic and Poland became representative of both high-income and high-educated voters. This has opened up space for populist parties and influenced their character, assuming more ‘nativist’ outlook in Poland and Hungary and more ‘centrist’ in the Czech Republic. 1 We are grateful to Anna Becker for the outstanding research assistance, to Gábor Tóka for his help with obtaining survey data on Hungary and to Lukáš Linek for helping with obtaining the data of the 2017 Czech elections. We would also like to thank Ferenc Szűcs who provided invaluable insights. 1 1. Introduction The legacy of the communist regime and the rapid transition from a central planning economy to a market-based economy had a profound impact on the access to economic opportunities, challenged social identities and shaped party politics in all Central European countries.
    [Show full text]
  • Czech Debate on the EU Membership Perspectives of Turkey and Ukraine
    Czech debate on the EU membership perspectives of Turkey and Ukraine David Král EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy November 2005 Acknowledgement: This report was written as part of an international project, mapping the state of debate on the EU membership perspectives of Turkey and Ukraine in four Central European countries: Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovenia and undertaken jointly by EUROPEUM, Institute of Public Affairs (Warsaw), Centre for Policy Studies at CEU (Budapest) and Peace Institute (Ljubljana). Introduction The question of further EU enlargement is an issue that remained very much on the table even after the May 2004 “Big Bang” expansion of the Union. While in the ten countries that recently acceded all the efforts thus far have been focusing on the rules and conditions of entering the exclusive club, not much space in the public debate remained for discussing the issue as to what are the further steps in EU enlargement, which countries should be considered for joining and what are the stakes of the new member states, including the Czech Republic, in the whole process. This paper will look into examining the Czech attitudes towards the EU membership perspectives of two countries: Turkey and Ukraine. It will deal with the attitudes of the political representation, including the political parties, government and diplomatic service (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and other governmental stakeholders. Further, it will try to give an account of how the issue was treated in the media, especially in the major opinion shaping newspapers. Thirdly, it will try to assess what are the other stakeholders in the process, especially within the ranks of the civil society and how they are likely to shape the public debate.
    [Show full text]