A Framework for Consciousness Francis Crick and Christof Koch

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

A Framework for Consciousness Francis Crick and Christof Koch commentary A framework for consciousness Francis Crick and Christof Koch Here we summarize our present approach to the problem of consciousness. After an introduction outlining our general strategy, we describe what is meant by the term ‘framework’ and set it out under ten headings. This framework offers a coherent scheme for explaining the neural correlates of (visual) consciousness in terms of competing cellular assemblies. Most of the ideas we favor have been suggested before, but their combination is original. We also outline some general experimental approaches to the problem and, finally, acknowledge some relevant aspects of the brain that have been left out of the proposed framework. General strategy framework may well apply, however, to see, for example, either introns or RNA The most difficult aspect of consciousness is other sensory modalities. We have been editing. And who would have guessed the so-called ‘hard problem’ of qualia1,2— especially interested in the alert macaque that DNA replication usually starts with the redness of red, the painfulness of pain, monkey because to find the NCC, not the synthesis of a short stretch of RNA, and so on. No one has produced any plau- only widespread neural activities but also which is then removed and replaced by sible explanation as to how the experience the detailed behavior of single neurons (or DNA? The broad framework acted as a of the redness of red could arise from the small groups of neurons) must be inves- guide, but careful experimentation was http://www.nature.com/natureneuroscience actions of the brain. It appears fruitless to tigated on very fast time scales. This is dif- needed for the true details to be discov- approach this problem head-on. Instead, ficult to do systematically in humans. ered. This lesson is broadly applicable we are attempting to find the neural corre- Methods such as fMRI are too coarse in throughout biology. late(s) of consciousness (NCC), in the hope both space and time to be of much use for that when we can explain the NCC in causal our problem. On the other hand, experi- A preamble on the cerebral cortex terms, this will make the problem of qualia ments in visual psychology are much eas- By the ‘cortical system’, we mean the cere- clearer3. In round terms, the NCC is the ier to do on humans than on monkeys. bral cortex plus other regions closely asso- minimal set of neuronal events that gives Moreover, humans can report what they ciated with it, such as the thalamus and rise to a specific aspect of a conscious per- are conscious of and thus convey the ‘con- the claustrum, and probably the basal cept. We discuss elsewhere4 why we think tents’ of their consciousness. For these ganglia, the cerebellum and the many consciousness has to be largely private. By reasons, experiments on monkeys and widespread brainstem projection systems. ‘private’, we mean that it is accessible exclu- humans should be pursued in parallel. We shall refer to the ‘front’ of the cor- sively to the owner of the brain; it is impos- tex and the ‘back’ of the cortex because © Group 2003 Nature Publishing sible for me to convey to you the exact Framework the terms ‘frontal’ and ‘prefrontal’ can be nature of my conscious percept of the color A framework is not a detailed hypothesis ambiguous. For example, is the anterior red, though I can convey information about or set of hypotheses; rather, it is a sug- cingulate prefrontal? it, such as whether two shades of red appear gested point of view for an attack on a sci- The dividing line between front and to me to be the same or different. entific problem, often suggesting testable back is somewhat arbitrary. It roughly Our main interest is not the enabling hypotheses. Biological frameworks differ coincides with the central sulcus. It may factors needed for all forms of conscious- from frameworks in physics and chem- turn out that a good operational defini- ness, such as the activity of the ascending istry because of the nature of evolution. tion is that the front is all those parts that reticular systems in the brainstem. Rather, Biological systems do not have rigid laws, receive a significant input, via the thala- we are interested in the general nature of as physics has. Evolution produces mech- mus, from the basal ganglia. (This simple the neural activities that produce each anisms, and often sub-mechanisms, so division is probably not useful for olfac- particular aspect of consciousness, such that there are few ‘rules’ in biology which tion, however.) as perceiving the specific color, shape or do not have occasional exceptions. There is an absolutely astonishing vari- movement of an object. A good framework is one that sounds ety and specificity of actions performed As a matter of tactics, we have con- reasonably plausible relative to available by the cortical system. The visual system centrated on the visual system of primates, scientific data and that turns out to be of the higher mammals handles an almost leaving on one side some of the more dif- largely correct. It is unlikely to be correct infinite variety of visual inputs and reacts ficult aspects of consciousness, such as in all the details. A framework often con- to them in detail and with remarkable emotion and self-consciousness. Our tains unstated (and often unrecognized) accuracy. It is clear that the system is high- assumptions, but this is unavoidable. ly evolved, is likely to be specified epige- Francis Crick is at the Salk Institute for An example from molecular biology netically in considerable detail and can Biological Studies, 10010 N. Torrey Pines Road, might be helpful. The double-helical learn a large amount from experience. La Jolla, California 92037, USA. structure of DNA immediately suggest- The main function of the sensory cor- Christof Koch is at the California Institute of ed, in a novel way, the general nature of tex is to construct and use highly specific Technology, 1200 East California Boulevard, gene composition, gene replication and feature detectors, such as those for orien- Pasadena, California 91125, USA. gene action. This framework turned out tation, motion or faces. The features to e-mail: [email protected] to be broadly correct, but it did not fore- which any cortical neuron responds nature neuroscience • volume 6 no 2 • february 2003 119 commentary are usually highly specific but multi- rather than following just one method (Further discussion of this idea comes at dimensional. That is, one neuron does not very accurately. This appears to be how, the end of subhead #3 below.) respond to a single feature but to a family for example, people see in depth. We have discussed elsewhere17 whether of related features. Such features are some- Incoming visual information is often the neural activity in the front of the brain times called the ‘receptive field’ of that incomplete or ambiguous. If two similar is largely unconscious. One proposal18,19, neuron—the ‘non-classical receptive stimuli are presented in rapid succession, for example, is that humans are not direct- field’5 expresses the relevant context of the the brain blends them together into one ly conscious of their thoughts, but only of ‘classical receptive field’. The visual fields percept. If they are different but in con- sensory representations of them in their of neurons higher in the visual hierarchy tradiction, such as a face and a house, the imagination. At the moment, there is no are larger and respond to more complex brain selects one at a time (as in binocular consensus about this20. features than those that are lower down. rivalry) instead of blending them togeth- The hypothesis of the homunculus An important but neglected aspect of er. In cases where there is not enough is very much out of fashion these days, the firing of a neuron (or a small group of information to lead to an unambiguous but this is, after all, how everyone associated neurons) is its ‘projective interpretation of one’s environment9, the thinks of themselves. It would be sur- field’6. This term describes the perceptual cortical networks ‘fill in’—that is, they prising if this overwhelming illusion and behavioral consequences of stimulat- make their best guess, given the incom- did not reflect in some way the general ing such a neuron in an appropriate man- plete information. Such filling-in is like- organization of the brain. ner (for further discussion of motor and ly to happen in many places in the brain. premotor cortex, see ref. 7). Both the This general principle is an important 2. Zombie modes and consciousness receptive field and the projective field are guide to much of human behavior (as in Many actions in response to sensory dynamic, not merely static, and both can ‘jumping to conclusions’). inputs are rapid, transient, stereotyped be modified by experience. and unconscious14,21. They could be How are feature detectors formed? A Our present framework thought of as cortical reflexes. Con- http://www.nature.com/natureneuroscience broad answer is that neurons do this by Having outlined a few general points sciousness deals more slowly with broad- detecting common and significant corre- about the cortical system, let us now con- er, less stereotyped aspects of the sensory lations in their inputs and by altering their sider specifically the NCC and its atten- inputs (or a reflection of these in imagery) synapses (and perhaps other properties) dant properties. We are mainly interested and takes time to decide on appropriate so that they can more easily respond to in time periods on the order of a few hun- thoughts and responses.
Recommended publications
  • Koch AAAS Updated
    Consciousness and Intelligence Dr. Christof Koch Allen Institute for Brain Science Seattle, USA Cartesian Certainty As a radical skeptic, the only certainty Rene Descartes had Je pense, donc je suis translated later on as Cogito, ergo sum. or, in modern language, I am conscious, therefore I am Rene Descartes (1637) Intelligence and Consciousness • Intelligence - the ability to understand new ideas, to adapt to new environments, to learn from experience, to think abstractly, to plan and to reason • It can be decomposed into crystalline and fluid intelligence and can be measured (IQ, g-factor) • Consciousness - the ability to experience something, to see, hear, feel angry, or explicitly recall an event • Many animals besides humans experience the sights and sounds of the world Lilac Chaser What do we know about Consciousness? • Consciousness is associated with some complex, adaptive, biological networks (not immune system nor enteric nervous system) • Consciousness does not require behavior • Consciousness can be dissociated from emotion, selective attention, long-term memory and language • Self-consciousness is one of many aspects of consciousness, highly developed in adult neuro-typical humans, less so in infants, certain patients and non-human animals Many Zombie Behaviors Many - if not most - behaviors occur in the absence of conscious sensations, or consciousness occurs after the fact: • Over-trained routines - shaving, dressing, tennis, video games, keyboard typing, driving, rock-climbing, dancing • Reaching and grabbing, posture adjustments • Generating and understanding speech • Eye-movement control • High-level decision making (e.g. choice blindness, dissociations) Neuronal Correlates of Consciousness (NCC) Search for the minimal neuronal mechanisms jointly sufficient for any one conscious perception, the NCC.
    [Show full text]
  • © 2017 Luis H. Favela, Ph.D. 1 University of Central Florida PHI
    1 University of Central Florida PHI 3320: Philosophy of Mind Fall 2017, Syllabus, v. 08222017 Course Information ¨ Title: Philosophy of Mind ¨ Course number: PHI 3320 ¨ Credit hours: 3.0 ¨ Term: Fall semester 2017 ¨ Mode: Web Instructor Information ¨ Name: Luis Favela, Ph.D. (Please refer to me as “Dr. Favela” or “Professor Favela.”) ¨ Email: [email protected] ¨ Website: http://philosophy.cah.ucf.edu/staff.php?id=1017 ¨ Office location: PSY 0245 ¨ Office hours: Tuesday and Thursday 1:30 – 3:00 pm Course Description ¨ Catalogue description: Recent and contemporary attempts to understand the relation of mind to body, the relation of consciousness to personhood, and the relation of psychology to neurobiology. ¨ Detailed description: This course introduces some of the main arguments, concepts, and theories in the philosophy of mind. Some of the questions addressed in the philosophy of mind include: “What are minds made of,” “How does the mind relate to the brain,” and “what is consciousness?” Answers to these questions have consequences for a wide range of other disciplines, including computer science, ethics, neuroscience, and theology. The first part of the course covers the main philosophical views concerning mind, such as dualism, behaviorism, identity theory, functionalism, and eliminativism. The second part of the course focuses on consciousness, and questions such as: “Does ‘consciousness’ exist,” “Is consciousness physical,” and “Can there be a science of consciousness?” Student Learning Outcomes ¨ Students will be able to describe the main philosophical views concerning the mind. § Students will be able to reconstruct the arguments underlying the main philosophical views concerning the mind. § Students will be able to articulate their positions concerning whether or not they agree with the conclusions of the arguments behind the main philosophical views concerning the mind.
    [Show full text]
  • Is the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness Compatible with Russellian Panpsychism?
    Is the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness Compatible with Russellian Panpsychism? Hedda Hassel Mørch Erkenntnis (2018) Penultimate draft – please refer to published version for citation. Abstract: The Integrated Information Theory (IIT) is a leading scientific theory of consciousness, which implies a kind of panpsychism. In this paper, I consider whether IIT is compatible with a particular kind of panpsychism known as Russellian panpsychism, which purports to avoid the main problems of both physicalism and dualism. I will first show that if IIT were compatible with Russellian panpsychism, it would contribute to solving Russellian panpsychism’s combination problem, which threatens to show that the view does not avoid the main problems of physicalism and dualism after all. I then show that the theories are not compatible as they currently stand, in view of what I call the coarse-graining problem. After I explain the coarse-graining problem, I will offer two possible solutions, each involving a small modification of IIT. Given either of these modifications, IIT and Russellian panpsychism may be fully compatible after all, and jointly enable significant progress on the mind–body problem. 1 Introduction Panpsychism is the view that every physical thing is associated with consciousness. More precisely, it is the view that every physical thing is either (1) conscious as a whole, (2) made of parts which are all conscious, or (3) itself forms part of a greater conscious whole. Humans and animals (or certain areas of human and animal brains) are conscious in the first sense—our consciousness is unified, or has a single, subjective point of view.
    [Show full text]
  • Robot Rights Conscious Machines: Defining Questions
    Conscious robots may merit legal protections. Developing machine capacities such as artificial intelligence (AI) and robots for human-robot interaction is of extreme technological value, but it raises moral and ethical questions. For example, one of the major sectors in robotics is the develop- ment of sexual robots (1). Although some researchers consider this phenomenon a gateway to the future acceptance of human- robot interactions, others see a danger for human society as robots modify the social LETTERS representation of human behaviors (2, 3). The robotics field must wrestle with these questions: Is it ethical to create and con- tinue to use robots with consciousness in Edited by Jennifer Sills global projection of winning representa- the way we use robots that were originally tions and have metacognitive capacity, designed for our needs? Do robots deserve Downloaded from such as confidence estimates. If these types to be protected? This debate could challenge Conscious machines: of processes were strongly indicative of the limits of human morality and polarize consciousness, we would have to admit society’s views on whether conscious robots Defining questions that some machines are already conscious. are objects or living entities (4–6). In their Review “What is consciousness, We agree with Dehaene et al. that to As we approach an era when conscious and could machines have it?” (27 October address the question of machine conscious- robots become part of daily life, it is http://science.sciencemag.org/ 2017, p. 486), S. Dehaene et al. argue that ness, we must start with a theory of human important to start thinking about the cur- the science of consciousness indicates that consciousness.
    [Show full text]
  • FCMC Program Master DOC Final
    The Francis Crick Memorial Conference Consciousness in Human and Non‐Human Animals Wolfson Hall, Churchill College Cambridge, United Kingdom "It is essenƟal to understand our Crick Memorial Conference: num Sponsor of the Francis Ɵ brains in some detail if we are to assess correctly our place in this Proud Pla Proud vast and compli- cated universe we see all around us." - Francis Crick All Bordering Photos Courtesy Google Images The Francis Crick Memorial Conference Francis Crick (1916‐2004) Thank you to all of our sponsors for your support in making the Francis Crick Memorial Conference a success and for helping us to fuel this unprecedented discussion on data‐driven perspectives on the neural correlates of consciousness. Sponsored by: The Francis Crick Memorial Conference The Francis Crick Memorial Conference Schedule of Events Schedule of Events 7:45 Check‐in / Complimentary 13:00 Complimentary Lunch Breakfast 14:00 Diana Reiss, Ph.D. Mirror Self‐recognition: A Case of 8:30 Christof Koch, Ph.D. Studying the Murine Mind Hunter College and Cognitive Convergence in Humans Allen Institute for Brain Science, City University of New York and other Animals Caltech 14:30 Franz X. Vollenweider, MD Neuronal Correlates of Psychedelic 9:00 Invited Lecture: Consciousness: A Pharmacological University of Zü rich School of Drug‐Induced Imagery in Humans Baltazar Gomez‐Mancilla, Perspective Medicine, Heffter Research Centre MD Ph.D. Novartis Institute of 15:00 Naotsugu Tsuchiya, Ph.D. Visual Consciousness Tracked with Biomedical Research RIKEN, ATR, Japan, Caltech, Direct Intracranial Recording from 9:30 Ryan Remedios, Ph.D.* The Claustrum and the Orchestra of Monash University Early Visual Cortices in Humans CalTech Cognitive Control Nikos K.
    [Show full text]
  • Neuroscience Thinks Big Bring Them Together in a Unified View
    PERSPECTIVES VIEWPOINT new computing technologies. Neuroscience is like the infant brain — it is flooded with data and theories but lacks the ability to Neuroscience thinks big bring them together in a unified view. We pin our hopes on more and more data with- (and collaboratively) out realizing that experiments can only give us a small fraction of what we need. The Eric R. Kandel, Henry Markram, Paul M. Matthews, Rafael Yuste and attempt to reconstruct the human brain as a computer model can provide a new focus Christof Koch for neuroscience and for clinical and tech- Abstract | Despite cash-strapped times for research, several ambitious collaborative nological research. It will help us to ‘clean neuroscience projects have attracted large amounts of funding and media up’ conflicting reports and teach us how to apply knowledge from animal studies to attention. In Europe, the Human Brain Project aims to develop a large-scale understanding the human brain. Ultimately, computer simulation of the brain, whereas in the United States, the Brain Activity it will allow us to discover the fundamental Map is working towards establishing a functional connectome of the entire brain, principles governing brain structure and and the Allen Institute for Brain Science has embarked upon a 10‑year project to function and to predictively reconstruct understand the mouse visual cortex (the MindScope project). US President Barack the brain from fragments of experimental data. Without this kind of understanding, Obama’s announcement of the BRAIN Initiative (Brain Research through Advancing we will continue to struggle to develop new Innovative Neurotechnologies Initiative) in April 2013 highlights the political treatments and brain-inspired computing commitment to neuroscience and is expected to further foster interdisciplinary technologies.
    [Show full text]
  • Exploring the Mind What Our Brain Reveals About Our Thoughts
    11th Berlin Colloquium of the Gottlieb Daimler and Karl Benz Foundation in cooperation with the Bernstein Center for Computational Neuroscience Berlin and the Charité University Medicine Berlin on May 9th 2007 at the Academy of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Berlin Exploring the Mind What Our Brain Reveals about Our Thoughts Scientific Coordinators: Professor John-Dylan Haynes and Professor Gabriel Curio Statements of the Speakers Gisbert zu Putlitz Reading thoughts – Accessing our innermost lives 2 Cornelius Borck Making brains write: Electrical strategies in the 4 history of mind-reading Gabriel Curio Non-invasive brain-computer interfaces – 5 On thoughts that move Miguel A. L. Nicolelis Computing with neural ensembles 7 Rainer Goebel Real-time mind-reading and BOLD 8 brain interactions John-Dylan Haynes Decoding conscious and unconscious thoughts 10 from fMRI signals Daniel D. Langleben The study of deception: Functional MRI and lie 12 detection applications Adrian Owen Detecting residual cognitive function 14 in the vegetative state Henrik Walter From brain to bedside? Implications of brain 16 reading for psychiatry Thomas Metzinger Philosophical implications of brain-reading: 18 Ethical and anthropological consequences Christof Koch Decoding the contents of perception from single 20 neurons in the human brain Editing: Kristina Vaillant and Marlene Schoofs, Berlin 11th Berlin Colloquium “Exploring the Mind” 2 Professor Gisbert zu Putlitz President of the Board, Gottlieb Daimler and Karl Benz Foundation, Ladenburg Reading thoughts – Accessing our innermost lives Dr. Gisbert zu Putlitz is a physicist at the University of Heidelberg, specializing in elementary particle physics, nuclear physics and quantum fluids. When the Gottlieb Daimler and Karl Benz Foundation was founded in 1986, he was appointed Executive Director of the Board.
    [Show full text]
  • 2000 Annual Report
    2000 2000 BANBURY CENTER DIRECTOR'S REPORT In 2000, there were 25 meetings at Banbury Center, exceeding by two the 1999 record. Laboratory staff used Banbury Center for 11 meetings, and a notable addition to the Banbury schedule was the first of the Topics in Biology courses of the Watson School of Biological Sciences. There were the usual five Summer Courses, and we made the Center available to community groups on seven occasions. More than 700 visitors came to Banbury in 2000, and the geographical distribution of the partici­ pants was much the same as in previous years; 80% of participants came from the United States, and although New York, Califomia, and Massachusetts accounted for 44% of the participants, 39 U.S. states were represented. There were 95 participants from Europe, the majority coming from the United Kingdom. Eugenics on the Web This, a joint project between the DNA Learning Center and Banbury Center, completed its first stage in January, 2000. Our Advisory Board came to Banbury to review and approve the final version of the site before we went to the National Human Genome Research Institute for authority to release it to the public. The Advisory Board was, as always, constructively critical and made valuable suggestions. They approved the site, and we presented them with a certificate thanking them for their help. We have obtained a second round of funding to expand the site further, by increasing the number of images and by extending it to include European eugenics. Neuroscience A significant feature of the 2000 program was the large number of neuroscience meetings.
    [Show full text]
  • The Problem of Consciousness
    the problem of consciousness IT IS NOW BEING EXPLORED THROUGH THE VISUAL SYSTEM— REQUIRING A CLOSE COLLABORATION AMONG PSYCHOLOGISTS, NEUROSCIENTISTS AND THEORISTS BY FRANCIS CRICK AND CHRISTOF KOCH 10 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN COPYRIGHT 2002 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, INC. he overwhelming question in neurobiology today is We selected the mammalian visual system because humans are the relation between the mind and the brain. Everyone very visual animals and because so much experimental and the- agrees that what we know as mind is closely related to oretical work has already been done on it. certain aspects of the behavior of the brain, not to the It is not easy to grasp exactly what we need to explain, and heart, as Aristotle thought. Its most mysterious aspect it will take many careful experiments before visual conscious- Tis consciousness or awareness, which can take many forms, ness can be described scientifically. We did not attempt to de- from the experience of pain to self-consciousness. In the past fine consciousness itself because of the dangers of premature the mind (or soul) was often regarded, as it was by Descartes, definition. (If this seems like a copout, try defining the word as something immaterial, separate from the brain but interact- “gene”—you will not find it easy.) Yet the experimental evi- ing with it in some way. A few neuroscientists, such as the late dence that already exists provides enough of a glimpse of the Sir John Eccles, have asserted that the soul is distinct from the nature of visual consciousness to guide research. In this arti- body.
    [Show full text]
  • Arxiv:2002.07655V1 [Q-Bio.NC]
    THE MATHEMATICAL STRUCTURE OF INTEGRATED INFORMATION THEORY JOHANNES KLEINER AND SEAN TULL Abstract. Integrated Information Theory is one of the leading models of con- sciousness. It aims to describe both the quality and quantity of the conscious experience of a physical system, such as the brain, in a particular state. In this contribution, we propound the mathematical structure of the theory, sep- arating the essentials from auxiliary formal tools. We provide a definition of a generalized IIT which has IIT 3.0 of Tononi et. al., as well as the Quantum IIT introduced by Zanardi et. al. as special cases. This provides an axiomatic definition of the theory which may serve as the starting point for future formal investigations and as an introduction suitable for researchers with a formal background. 1. Introduction Integrated Information Theory (IIT), developed by Giulio Tononi and collabora- tors, has emerged as one of the leading scientific theories of consciousness [OAT14, MGRT16, TBMK16, MMA+18, KMBT16]. At the heart of the theory is an algo- rithm which, based on the level of integration of the internal functional relationships of a physical system in a given state, aims to determine both the quality and quan- tity (‘Φ value’) of its conscious experience. While promising in itself, the mathematical formulation of the theory is not sat- isfying to date. The presentation in terms of examples and concomitant explanation veils the essential mathematical structure of the theory and impedes philosophical and scientific analysis. In addition, the current definition of the theory can only be applied to quite simple classical physical systems [Bar14], which is problematic if the theory is taken to be a fundamental theory of consciousness, and should eventually be reconciled with our present theories of physics.
    [Show full text]
  • Integrated Information Theory: Consciousness
    PERSPECTIVES the brain, leads to testable predictions, and OPINION allows inferences and extrapolations about Integrated information theory: consciousness. From phenomenology to physics The axioms of IIT state that every experience from consciousness to its physical exists intrinsically and is structured, specific, unitary and definite. IIT then substrate postulates that, for each essential property of experience, there must be a corresponding Giulio Tononi, Melanie Boly, Marcello Massimini and Christof Koch causal property of the PSC. The postulates of IIT state that the PSC must have intrinsic Abstract | In this Opinion article, we discuss how integrated information theory cause–effect power; its parts must also have accounts for several aspects of the relationship between consciousness and the cause–effect power within the PSC and they brain. Integrated information theory starts from the essential properties of must specify a cause–effect structure that phenomenal experience, from which it derives the requirements for the physical is specific, unitary and definite. Below, we substrate of consciousness. It argues that the physical substrate of consciousness discuss the axioms and postulates of IIT (see Supplementary information S1,S2 (figure, must be a maximum of intrinsic cause–effect power and provides a means to box)) and describe the fundamental identity determine, in principle, the quality and quantity of experience. The theory leads — between an experience and a conceptual to some counterintuitive predictions and can be used to
    [Show full text]
  • Curriculum Vitae
    CURRICULUM VITAE Name: Constanze Hofstötter Date of birth: 12 April 1975 Nationality: German Contact address: Institute of Neuroinformatics Winterthurerstrasse 190 CH-8057 Zürich Switzerland Tel.: +41 1 635 30 65 Fax: +41 1 635 30 53 Email: [email protected] Web: www.ini.unizh.ch/~connie EDUCATION Oct. 2002 – present Ph.D. student at the Institute of Neuroinformatics, ETH and University of Zurich, Switzerland Supervisors: Daniel C. Kiper and Christof Koch Topic: Neural correlates of visual awareness Jun. 2001 – Sept. 2002 Ph.D. student at the Institute of Neuroinformatics, ETH and University of Zurich, Switzerland Supervisor: Paul F.M.J. Verschure Topic: Models of the neuronal substrate underlying classical conditioning Oct. 1997 – Feb. 2001 Diploma in Biology (with honors), University of Saarland, Germany Major: Technical Biology and Bionics Minor: Zoology, Computer Science Sept. 1996 – May 1997 Diploma of Arctic Studies (with honors), Artic Center, University of Lapland, Finland Oct. 1994 – Sept. 1996 Pre-diploma in Biology, University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany Aug. 1985 – Jun. 1994 High school, Anno-Gymnasium, Siegburg, Germany Jul. 1991 – Jul. 1992 Student Exchange, Woree High School, Cairns, Australia INTERNSHIPS AND PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Spring 2003 Reviewer for Christof Koch’s book “The Quest for Consciousness” (Roberts & Company Publishers) Mar. 2002 – May 2002 Visiting researcher at the Koch laboratory, Californian Institute of Technology, Pasadena, USA Topic: Studies on fear conditioning in human subjects Apr. 2000 – Sept. 2000 Internship at the Institute of Neuroinformatics, ETH and University of Zurich, Switzerland. Topic: Simulations and robotic studies on classical conditioning 1 Jul. 1998 – Jul. 1999 Research assistant for Werner Nachtigall, Zoological Institute, University of Saarland, Germany Topic: Aerodynamic measurements in wind tunnels Oct.
    [Show full text]