Simplicius, Syrianus and the Harmony of Ancient Philosophers*

Pantelis Golitsis

Introduction

Harmonizing philosophical discourse, that is, the discourse which sets out to prove the compatibility of philosophical texts considered to contain incom- patible ideas, was not generally or permanently accepted in the philosophical Schools of Late Antiquity – contrary to what is quite often assumed in scholarly literature.1 In late sixth century Alexandria, for instance, Iamblichus is referred to by Elias as a bad example of a commentator who sympathized too much with Plato: ‘Iamblichus was so much devoted to Plato’, he says,2 ‘that he contended that Aristotle did not disagree with Plato on the doctrine of Forms’, a disagreement which was apparently too obvious to Elias. Elias was of course not the first to see a disagreement between the two philosophers. To illustrate this, let us first take a look at the closing paragraph of Aristotle’s Metaphysics: (1) These then are the results and perhaps yet more might be adduced. At any rate, the fact that these men experience many great difficulties in explaining the generation of numbers and can in no way make a system of them is like a proof that the mathematicals are not separable from the perceptibles, as some say, and that they are not the principles.3

* I am grateful to Stephen Menn for helpful comments on a penultimate draft of this paper. 1 It is true that, to some extent and on some range of doctrines, all Neoplatonists harmonized Aristotle’s with Plato’s philosophy. But Neoplatonists do this without acknowledging it, thinking that many of Aristotle’s doctrines were already in Plato. Studying the way they do this, for what purpose and on what range of doctrines, belongs to a paper about Neoplaton- ic hermeneutics. What I am particularly interested in in this paper is not so much Neopla- tonic hermeneutics but the way they themselves account for Aristotle’s polemics and its consequences for their overall approach to Aristotle’s philosophy. 2 Elias, In Cat. 123, 2–3: οὗτος γὰρ προσπάσχων τῷ Πλάτωνι συνδίδωσι τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει ὅτι οὐκ ἀντιλέγει τῷ Πλάτωνι διὰ τὰς ἰδέας. 3 Met. N 6.1093 b 24–29: Tὰ μὲν οὖν συμβαίνοντα ταῦτά τε κἂν ἔτι πλείω συναχθείη· ἔοικε δὲ τεκμήριον εἶναι τὸ πολλὰ κακοπαθεῖν περὶ τὴν γένεσιν αὐτῶν καὶ μηδένα τρόπον δύνασθαι συν- 70 Pantelis Golitsis

Let us now take a look at how, four generations earlier than Elias, the Head of the Platonic School at Athens, Syrianus, reacted to that closing paragraph in his commentary on the Metaphysics: (2) Now, I would take as a proof of the fact that these divine men have done philosophy in the finest, best and most irrefutable way that you, , who are the most ingenious and productive of those on record, have experienced such great difficulties in your controversy with them, having said nothing that might even be persuasive, not to say con- clusive, or indeed anything relevant to them at all, since in most of what you say you employ alien hypotheses which are in no way appropriate to the doctrines of your elders, while in a number of instances, when proposing to make some point against their true doctrine, you fail to come to grips with them at all.4 Aristotle is here deemed a bad reader of Plato and the Pythagoreans, striving to refute the best philosophy but being eventually trapped in his own irrelevant or incompetent antilogies (shown to be so by Syrianus, of course). Earli- er in the commentary, Aristotle’s discourse is said by Syrianus to be φι- λεγκλήμων, ‘fond of fault-finding’: (3) However, before dealing with Aristotle’s arguments against this more authentic doctrine, it would be perhaps better to present the true meaning of the ancient philosophy with regard to those matters, so that we be able to understand whether it is the real theory of these divine men that Aristotle’s contentious discourse strives to battle with, or whether he takes what is said in the light of his own assumptions, and then dis- honestly sets out to overthrow them.5

εῖραι τοῦ μὴ χωριστὰ εἶναι τὰ μαθηματικὰ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ὡς ἔνιοι λέγουσι, μηδὲ ταύτας εἶναι τὰς ἀρχάς. 4 Syrian., In Met. 195, 2–9: Ἐγὼ δὲ τεκμήριον ἂν ποιησαίμην τοῦ κάλλιστα καὶ ἄριστα καὶ ἀνελεγκτότατα πεφιλοσοφηκέναι τοὺς θείους ἐκείνους ἄνδρας τὸ σὲ δεινότατον ὄντα καὶ γον- ιμώτατον τῶν ἱστορηθέντων [συγγραφέων] οὕτω μὲν κακοπαθῆσαι περὶ τὰς ἀντιλογίας τὰς πρὸς αὐτούς, μηδὲν δὲ οὐχ ὅτι νικητικὸν ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ πιθανὸν εἰρηκέναι, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ ὅλως τι πρὸς αὐτοὺς εἰρηκέναι, ἀλλὰ τὰ πλεῖστα μὲν ἑτέραις ὑποθέσεσι χρήσασθαι μηδὲν προσηκούσαις τῇ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων πραγματείᾳ, ἐνιαχοῦ δὲ λέγειν τι πρὸς τἀληθὲς αὐτῶν δόγμα προθέμενον παρὰ θύρας ἀπηντηκέναι. Translation by J. Dillon – D. O’Meara, Syrianus: On Aristotle Meta- physics 13–14 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2006, slightly modified. 5 Syrian., In Met. 81, 26–30: πρὶν δὲ αὐτῶν ἅψασθαι τῶν κατὰ τῆς ἀληθεστέρας αὐτοῦ δόξης ἐπιχειρήσεων βέλτιον ἴσως τὴν ἀληθῆ παραδοῦναι περὶ τούτων τῆς ἀρχαίας φιλοσοφίας διάνοιαν, ἵνα καὶ σχῶμεν συνιδεῖν, εἴτε πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν θεωρίαν τῶν θείων ἀνδρῶν ὁ φιλεγκλήμων διαμάχε- ται λόγος εἴτε πρὸς οἰκείας ὑποθέσεις ἱστάμενος τὰ λεχθέντα μοχθηρῶς ἀνατρέπειν ἐπιχειρεῖ. Translation by Dillon – O’Meara (see note 4), modified. Simplicius, Syrianus and the Harmony of Ancient Philosophers 71

Such a statement, of course, does not have to mean that Syrianus completely disregarded Aristotle. In text no. 2, he considers Aristotle to be δεινότατος and γονιμώτατος among other philosophers and the failure of his attack is tantamount to one more proof of the irrefutable philosophy of the venerable ancients. Besides, in the opening paragraph of his commentary,6 Syrianus makes plain that Aristotle’s logic, ethics and physics, as well as a part of his metaphysics, are to be highly esteemed: (4) I am not a natural controversialist, nor yet would I count myself as a disciple of Aristotle on merely a few or trivial topics; rather, I am one of those who admire his logical methodology overall and who would accept with enthusiasm both his ethical and physical treatises. And that I may not make a bore of myself by enumerating in detail all the excellent aspects of this man’s philosophy, let me just ask why every right-minded person might not justly marvel at the apt remarks to be found in this most excellent treatise on the subject of the enmattered forms and defini- tions, and at the teachings on the divine and unmoved separable causal principles of the whole cosmos, accompanied by suitable demonstrations – although indeed they are beyond the reach of all synthetic treatment or too detailed exposition –, and declare the author of such a philosophical enquiry a benefactor of the life of man. For all this he is owed the warmest thanks both from us and from all those who can appreciate his acuity of mind.7 Does the parallel reading of texts no. 2, 3 and 4 suggest that Syrianus was a somewhat inconsequent philosopher, say, a self-contradicting ‘concordist’? In a recent article about ancient commentary and harmonization, Rachel Barney

6 Syrianus’ more focused commentary on Metaphysics M-N has to be dissociated, in my view, from his more scholarly commentary on the Metaphysics, from which only parts seem to have survived, namely on books B and Γ. The qualification of the beginning of M as φροίμια (81, 6: φροιμίων μὲν οὖν ἅλις) as well as the εὐχή at the end of N point to a self- standing work, which is clearly addressed to readers (cf. 195, 18: τῆς τῶν ἐντυγχανόντων διανοίας). 7 Syrian., In Met. 80, 4–16: Οὔκ εἰμι τῶν φιλαπεχθημόνων, οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ τῶν ἐν ὀλίγοις ἢ τοῖς τυχοῦσι τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη διδάσκαλον ἐπιγραφομένων, ἀλλὰ τῶν τάς τε λογικὰς αὐτοῦ μεθόδους ὡς ἐπὶ πᾶν τεθαυμακότων καὶ τῶν τὰς ἠθικάς τε καὶ φυσικὰς πραγματείας ὑπερφυῶς ἀποδεχ- ομένων. καὶ ἵνα μὴ νῦν πάντα διαριθμούμενος, ὅσα κάλλιστα καὶ ἄριστα τῷ ἀνδρὶ τῷδε πεφιλ- οσόφηται, μακρὸς εἶναι δόξω, τί οὐ πᾶς τῶν εὖφρονούντων τὰ ἐν τῇ τελεωτάτῃ πραγματείᾳ ταύτῃ περί τε ἐνύλων εἰδῶν καὶ ὁρισμῶν εὐστόχως εἰρημένα περί τε τῶν θείων καὶ ἀκινήτων ἐξῃρημένων κόσμου τοῦ σύμπαντος αἰτίων σὺν ἀποδείξεσι ταῖς ἐγχωρούσαις παραδοθέντα, καίπερ ὄντα πάσης συνθέσεως καὶ διεξόδου πυκνοτέρας ὑπέρτερα, δικαίως ἂν ἀγασθείη καὶ τὸν ἡγεμόνα τῆς τοιαύτης θεωρίας εὐεργέτην τοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίου κατονομάσειε; τούτων μὲν οὖν αὐτῷ πολλὴ χάρις παρά τε ἡμῶν παρά τε πάντων τῶν συνῃσθημένων αὐτοῦ τῆς ἀγχινοίας ὀφείλε- ται. Translation by Dillon – O’Meara (see note 4), slightly modified. 72 Pantelis Golitsis notes indeed: ‘There is an irremediable tension between, on the one hand, Syrianus’ enormous respect for Aristotle and his general picture of Plato and Aristotle as in accord, and on the other hand the implication that Aristotle is, inexplicably, an incompetent or malicious reader of Plato’.8 This tension disappears, however, if we disambiguate the word ‘accord’. The texts of two philosophers can be in accord by being complementary in a unified system, which is quite different from their being in accord as to the very ideas they contain. Syrianus accepted parts of Aristotle’s philosophy, not the whole of it. He accepted the overall validity of his logic and commended the study of his ethics and physics; he accepted (some sections of) Metaphys- ics Z-I and Metaphysics Λ;9 but he did not accept any part of Metaphysics M-N. And similarly did the next Head of the Athenian Platonic School, Pro- clus, who is known to have taught Aristotle’s De interpretatione10 and who amply used Aristotle’s Physics in his Elementatio physica,11 but who also refuted, in his lost treatise An Examination of Aristotle’s Criticisms of Plato’s Timaeus,12 the arguments advanced against Plato in Aristotle’s De caelo. There is philosophically no problem with an otherwise esteemed Aristotle vainly contradicting Plato or incompetently disagreeing with Platonic ideas. Aristotle was a good philosopher but not just as good as Plato. Good parts of his philosophy could be read with great profit for aspiring philosophers, whereas bad parts of it had to be rejected. Such was, therefore, the ‘complementarist’ reading of Aristotle at the School of Athens and it was certainly not an innovation. It was Porphyry who established that certain parts of Aristotle’s philosophy were useful and could be profitably included in a philosophic curriculum.13 But this is quite different from claiming in proper harmonizing spirit, as Iamblichus did, that Aristotle shared precisely the same philosophical ideas as Plato, e.g. the doc-

8 R. Barney, Simplicius: Commentary, Harmony, and Authority, Antiquorum Philosophia 3, 2009, 112. 9 The content of these two parts of the Metaphysics fits to the description given by Syrianus in passage no. 4. 10 Cf. Ammon., In De int. 1, 6–11. 11 See J. Opsomer, The integration of Aristotelian Physics in a Neoplatonic Context: Proclus on Movers and Divisibility, in: R. Chiaradonna – F. Trabattoni (edd.), Physics and Philoso- phy of Nature in Greek Neoplatonism. Proceedings of the European Science Foundation Exploratory Workshop. Il Ciocco, Castelvecchio Pascoli, June 22–24, 2006 (Philosophia antiqua vol. 115), Leiden−Boston 2009, 193–203. 12 Cf. Phlp., De aet. mundi c. Proclum 31, 10–11; Simp., In De cael. 640, 24–26. 13 See G. E. Karamanolis, Porphyry: The First Platonist Commentator on Aristotle, in: P. Adamson – H. Baltussen – M. W. F. Stone (edd.), Philosophy, Science and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic and Latin Commentaries, vol. 1 (Supplement to the Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies vol. 83,1), London 2004, 97–120. Simplicius, Syrianus and the Harmony of Ancient Philosophers 73 trine of Forms. Are we, then, rightly accustomed to speak without qualification of the harmony between Plato and Aristotle in the philosophy of Late Antiquity? To be sure, Iamblichus was not the only ‘concordist’ among ancient commentators. From Proclus to Elias there have been other ‘concordists’, who tried to account positively for Aristotle’s criticisms and thus make him indi- rectly agree with Plato. And they tried to do this by altering the target of Aristotle’s criticisms. While discussing Aristotle in his De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum, John Philoponus notes indeed that: (5) From these passages we can most certainly see that Aristotle’s refutations of Plato are not directed at people who have wrongly understood Plato, which is a fiction created by some more recent commentators out of embarrassment at the disagreement between the philosophers, but rather constitute a rebuttal of the notions of Plato himself. For, if Aristotle had not been attacking Plato’s own doctrine on the Forms but, as these commentators claim, that of people who have misunderstood him, he would have specified precisely this at the outset and not have refuted the doctrine of the Forms generally and without qualification.14 According to these ‘more recent commentators’, Aristotle did not want to refute Plato but people who did not understand Plato correctly, say, not Pla- to’s true doctrine of Forms but a false understanding of Plato’s true doctrine of Forms. Philoponus could have in mind Iamblichus, whom we know to have precisely advocated Plato’s and Aristotle’s agreement as to the doctrine of Forms, but it is in Simplicius that we find a similar defence of a criticism addressed by Aristotle to Plato: (6) Why is it then, one might ask, that Aristotle claims that every , save one, has said that time is ungenerated, just making an allusion to this at the beginning of the passage but then saying it by name?

14 Phlp., De aet. mundi c. Proclum 29, 2–13: ἐξ ὧν ἔστιν μάλιστα συνιδεῖν, ὡς οἱ κατὰ Πλάτωνος Ἀριστοτέλους ἔλεγχοι οὐ πρὸς τοὺς κακῶς τὰ Πλάτωνος ἐξειληφότας ἐνίστανται, ὥς τινες τῶν νεωτέρων ἐμυθολόγησαν τὴν τῶν φιλοσόφων διαφωνίαν αἰδεσθέντες, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς Πλάτωνος αὐτοῦ ὑπονοίας τὴν ἀντιλογίαν πεποίηνται· εἰ γὰρ μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸ διεμάχετο τὸ περὶ τῶν ἰδεῶν Πλάτωνος Ἀριστοτέλης δόγμα, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς κακῶς τῶν Πλάτωνος, ὥς φασιν, παρακούσαντας, πρῶτον μὲν αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο προσδιορίζεσθαι ἤμελλεν καὶ οὐχ ἁπλῶς καὶ ἀδιορίστως τὴν περὶ τῶν ἰδεῶν ἀπελέγχειν δόξαν. Translation by M. Share, Philoponus: Against Proclus’ On the Eter- nity of the World 1–5 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2005, slightly modified. Cf. also Phlp., In Anal. post. 243, 9–13: ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς κακῶς, φασίν, ἐκλαμβάνοντας τὰς περὶ τῶν ἰδεῶν δόξας καὶ οἰομένους λευκότητα καθ’ αὑτὴν ὑφίστασθαι καὶ μὴ ἐν τῷ δημιουρ- γικῷ λόγῳ ἢ ἀνθρωπότητα ἀσώματον οἱονεὶ ῥῖνας ἔχουσαν καὶ πόδας καὶ χεῖρας καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα εἴωθεν ἀεὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἰδεῶν ἐπιρραπίζειν. 74 Pantelis Golitsis

For he adds that it is only Plato who claims that time has been generated and he also tells why: “, he says, claims that the time has been generated together with the heaven and that the heaven has been generated”. The reply is that it was an old custom to raise objections against the apparent meaning of a word out of concern for the views of the more superficial people (φειδοῖ τῶν ἐπιπολαιοτέρων). Therefore, since the word ‘generated’ was applied more usually to entities that come to be, it is for this reason that Aristotle seems to accuse Plato, as if the latter had said that time is generated. But, in reality, he does not accuse Plato but those who apply the word ‘generated’ to time and to cosmos according to this very meaning.15 Like Philoponus’ opponents, Simplicius points out that Aristotle considers in his criticism not what Plato really meant but just what can be falsely understood in Plato’s words, namely that Plato’s saying that time has been generated is tantamount to saying that time has come to be. A similar thesis is found in a teaching of Simplicius’ and Philoponus’ common master Ammonius, son of Hermeias, which is reported by his other pupil Asclepius of Tralles: (7) Aristotle says here16 that being and the one follow each other; for everything participates both in being and in one. Other philosophers, however, separate the two from each other and this is also what Aristotle does elsewhere, as our philosopher (i.e. Ammonius) explains. For if matter is both being and not-being, since it is grasped only by bastard reasoning, and participates in the one, it is clear that the one is above being. Now, since the one and being introduce the many (for we speak of the one as related to the many) and since it is the one and the same science that examines the opposites, and since the many are opposite to the one, it is clear that the first philosopher will also take into account the many, and not merely the one. For there is an intelligible manifold, in virtue of which being is present to the many, as there also is an intelligible henad, in virtue of which continuity is present to all sensible things. Therefore,

15 Simp., In Phys. 1155, 8–1156, 3: διὰ τί οὖν, φαίη τις ἄν, ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ἔξω ἑνὸς πάντας φησὶ τὸν χρόνον ἀγένητον λέγειν τὴν μὲν ἀρχὴν αἰνιξάμενος, ὕστερον δὲ καὶ ὀνομαστὶ προσθείς, ὅτι Πλάτων μόνος γεγονέναι φησὶ καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ γεγονέναι προσθείς·“ἅμα γὰρ αὐτὸν τῷ οὐρανῷ γεγονέναι, τὸν δὲ οὐρανὸν γεγονέναι φησίν”; ἢ ὅτι παλαιὸν ἔθος ἦν καὶ πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον ἀντιλέγειν φειδοῖ τῶν ἐπιπολαιοτέρων τὰς γνώμας. ἐπειδὴ οὖν τὸ γενητὸν συνηθέστερον ἐπὶ τῶν πρότερον μὴ ὄντων ὕστερον δὲ ὄντων ἐλέγετο, διὰ τοῦτο πρὸς ταύτην τὴν σημασίαν τοῦ ὀνόματος ἀντιλέγων ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης δοκεῖ μὲν εὐθύνειν τὸν Πλάτωνα ὡς γενητὸν εἰπόντα, εὐθύνει δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἀληθὲς οὐ τὸν Πλάτωνα, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐπὶ τούτου τοῦ σημαινομένου τὸ γενητὸν τῷ χρόνῳ καὶ τῷ κόσμῳ προσάψαντας. 16 Met. Γ 2.1003 b 22–24. Simplicius, Syrianus and the Harmony of Ancient Philosophers 75

Empedocles spoke well about love and strife, and the Pythagoreans about numbers, meaning by that the intelligibles, as did the Platonists speaking about forms. And we have shown that Aristotle openly repre- sents the same things. It is thus as to the appearance that Aristotle disput- ed with these philosophers, so that we do not accept the philosophers’ doctrines by trusting their appearance.17 Like Simplicius, Ammonius claimed that Aristotle did not really dispute with Plato or, for that matter, with any other philosopher. He seemed to refute other philosophers but in reality he refuted the apparent meaning (τὸ φαινόμενον) of other philosophers’ sayings, leaving thus intact, we may assert, the depth of their thought. And he did so in order to prevent that we accept their doctrines according to what these doctrines seem to say; he wanted, for instance, to prevent us understanding that Empedocles spoke of the love and strife in an ordinary sense; for, by that, Empedocles meant the intelligibles. We may provisionally name this rationale imputed to Aristotle by Ammonius and his school ‘the preventive function of philosophical criticism’. In the present contribution I intend to examine what this function is supposed to do and how exactly it serves harmonizing purposes. I think that this has not yet been properly understood, especially as to the pedagogical reasoning that it involves.18 I shall focus on Simplicius, since it is in his

17 Ascl. (Ammon.), In Met. 233, 25–40: καὶ ὁ μὲν Ἀριστοτέλης ἐνταῦθά φησιν ὅτι ἐπακολ- ουθοῦσιν ἀλλήλοις τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ἕν· πάντα γὰρ μετέχουσι καὶ τοῦ ὄντος καὶ τοῦ ἑνός· οἱ μέντοι γε ἄλλοι φιλόσοφοι διακρίνουσιν αὐτὰ ἐξ ἀλλήλων, καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς δέ, ὥς φησιν ὁ ἡμέτερος φιλόσο- φος, ἐν ἄλλοις. εἰ γὰρ ἡ ὕλη καὶ ὄν ἐστι καὶ οὐκ ὄν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ νόθῳ λογισμῷ ἐστι ληπτή, μετέχει δὲ τοῦ ἑνός, φανερὸν ὅτι ὑπερβέβηκε τὸ ἓν τὸ ὄν. ἐπεὶ οὖν τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ὂν πλῆθος εἰσάγουσι (τὸ γὰρ ἓν πρὸς πλῆθος λέγεται), μιᾶς δὲ καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστιν ἐπιστήμης τὸ θεωρῆσαι περὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων, ἀντίκειται δὲ τῷ ἑνὶ πλῆθος, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ περὶ πλήθους διαλέξεται ὁ πρῶτος φιλόσοφος, καὶ οὐ περὶ μόνου τοῦ ἑνός. ἔστι γὰρ νοητὸν πλῆθος, ἐξ οὗ τοῖς πολλοῖς τὸ εἶναι ὑπάρχει, ὥσπερ καὶ ἑνὰς νοητή, ἐξ ἧς ἡ συνέχεια πᾶσι τοῖς ἐνταῦθα. ὥστε καλῶς ἔλεγεν Ἐμπεδ- οκλῆς νεῖκος καὶ φιλίαν, καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι ἀριθμούς, τὰ νοητὰ διὰ τούτων αἰνιττόμενοι, καὶ οἱ περὶ Πλάτωνα τὰς ἰδέας. ἰδοῦ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐνταῦθα ἄντικρυς ταῦτα πρεσβεύει· ὥστε κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἐμάχετο πρὸς αὐτούς, ἵνα μὴ τῷ φαινομένῳ πεισθέντες αὐτὰ δεξώμεθα. Cf. also Phlp. (Ammon.), In De an. 116, 26–28: πλὴν ὡς εἴωθεν ἀεὶ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης κἀνταῦθα τὸ φαινόμενον ἐλέγχει, ἵνα μή τις τὰ δηλούμενα διὰ τῶν αἰνιγμάτων τούτων συνιδεῖν μὴ δυνάμενος μένῃ μέχρι τοῦ φαινομένου. 18 Simplicius’ harmonization of ancient philosophers has lately received considerable attention; see H. Baltussen, Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius. The Methodology of a Com- mentator, London 2008 passim; H. Baltussen, Simplicius and the Subversion of Authority, Antiquorum Philosophia 3, 2009, 121–136; Baltussen in this volume; Barney (see note 8); M.-A. Gavray, Archytas lu par Simplicius. Un art de la conciliation, The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 5, 2011, 85–158. I here develop further the analysis presented briefly in P. Golitsis, Les Commentaires de Simplicius et de Jean Philopon à la Phy- sique d’Aristote. Tradition et Innovation (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca et Byzantina Bd. 3), Berlin−New York 2008, 100. For helpful remarks see also the review of Baltussen’s 76 Pantelis Golitsis commentaries that this interpretive principle mainly survives and has been in all probability further developed.19 Once this is clarified, I will try to construe how this principle shaped Simplicius’ self-understanding as a ‘concordist’ commentator, especially with regard to his Athenian ‘complementarist’ predecessors, and what this allows us to say overall about the scope of his philosophical exegesis.

I. Aristotle and the Preventive Function of Philosophical Criticism

One good place to start with is a passage in Simplicius’ commentary on the De caelo, in which Simplicius tries to account for Aristotle’s severe criticism of the two philosophers who seem to have represented a confused monism, that is, Parmenides and Melissus: (8) But what Aristotle accuses them of in investigating the reason for their mistake would be really harsh, only if it were true. For Parmenides and Melissus, he says, on the one hand assumed that there is nothing else in reality apart from the substance of perceptible things and on the other hand they were the first to understand that it is necessary for there to be natures which do not come to be or change if there is to be scientific knowledge (for there is no knowledge of what is always in flux, and Plato’s Parmenides says that a person ‘will have no place to turn his mind’ if the eternal forms are not hypothesized to exist); so, having understood these things, they transferred the accounts which fit the intelligible and unchanging reality to the perceptible reality which comes to be, since they said things which are appropriate to the intelligibles while they proposed to speak about nature. Indeed, if Melissus entitled his work On nature or On being, it is clear that he considered nature to be being and natural things to be beings. But these are the perceptibles. It is per-

book by R. B. Todd, Review of H. Baltussen, Philosophy and Exegesis in Simplicius. The Methodology of a Commentator, Aestimatio. Critical Reviews in the History of Science 5, 2008, 210–224. 19 While it was, as it seems, Ammonius’ invention. A similar explanation of Aristotle’s criticisms is also found in Simplicius’ colleague Priscianus (pseudo-Simplicius); cf. In De an. 28, 12–13: Ὁ μὲν Ἀριστοτέλης τὸ φαινόμενον ἀεὶ εἰωθὼς ἱστορεῖν καὶ ἐλέγχειν καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα κατὰ τὴν τῶν πολλῶν συνήθειαν ἐκδέχεσθαι εἴωθεν. Note that in In Met. 171, 9–13 Syrianus says that Plato contradicts Parmenides only as to the φαινόμενον of the latter’s doctrine, whereas their doctrines are not opposed as to the very truth (κατά γε το ἀληθέστατον) they contain. Simplicius, Syrianus and the Harmony of Ancient Philosophers 77

haps for this reason that Aristotle said that they assumed that there is nothing else apart from the substance of the perceptibles when they said that being is one; for, if the perceptible reality is thought to evidently be and if being is one, there cannot be anything apart from what is perceptible. […] But, as is his custom, Aristotle here too raises objections against the apparent meaning of what is said, taking care in advance that more superficial people do not be misled by false reasoning (προνοῶν τοῦ μὴ τοὺς ἐπιπολαιοτέρους παραλογίζεσθαι); as to Parmenides and Melissus, they indeed hypothesized a double reality.20 Simplicius wants us to believe that Aristotle’s criticism against the two philosophers is not to be taken at face value. Parmenides and Melissus, he says next, believed in the reality of being as well as in the reality of the apparent being, which is to say the reality of becoming or generation; and he goes on to cite a few passages from Parmenides and Melissus, in which the two philosophers are presented to clearly distinguish between the two levels of reality.21 ‘It is clear’, he wittily says, ‘that, when Parmenides said that being is one, he was completely aware of the fact that he was himself generated and that he had two feet’.22 Why, then, are the two philosophers, especially Parmenides, so harshly criticized by Aristotle for confusing the intelligible with the sensible and for denying generation through their monism? A legitimate answer for Syrianus, we may assert, would be that here too Aristotle ‘employs alien hypotheses which are in no way appropriate to the doctrines of his elders’ (cf. text no. 2 above). But this is an answer that Simplicius would not endorse.

20 Simp., In De cael. 557, 1–21 (I have slightly modified the punctuation): ἀλλ’ ὅπερ Ἀρισ- τοτέλης αὐτοῖς ἐγκαλεῖ τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς διαμαρτίας ἐξελέγχων σκληρὸν ὄντως ἦν, εἴπερ ἀληθὲς ἦν· ἐκεῖνοι γάρ, φησίν, οὐδὲν μὲν ἄλλο παρὰ τὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὐσίαν ὑπολαμβάνοντες ἐν ὑποστάσει εἶναι, πρῶτοι δὲ ἐννοήσαντες, ὅτι ἀνάγκη τοιαύτας τινὰς ἀγενήτους καὶ ἀκινήτους εἶναι φύσεις, εἴπερ ἔστι γνῶσις ἐπιστημονική (τῶν γὰρ ἀεὶ ῥεόντων οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, καὶ λέγει καὶ ὁ παρὰ τῷ Πλάτωνι Παρμενίδης, ὅτι οὐδὲ ὅποι τρέψει τις τὴν διάνοιαν ἕξει μὴ τῶν ἀιδίων εἰδῶν ὑποτιθεμένων εἶναι), ταῦτα οὖν ἐννοήσαντες μετήνεγκαν ἐπὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ γενητὰ τοὺς τοῖς νοητοῖς καὶ ἀκινήτοις ἐφαρμόζοντας λόγους, εἴ γε περὶ φύσεως προτιθέμενοι λέγειν τὰ ἐκείνοις προσήκοντα λέγουσι. καὶ εἰ Περὶ φύσεως ἢ Περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ἐπέγραψε Μέλισσος, δῆλον, ὅτι τὴν φύσιν ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι τὸ ὂν καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ τὰ ὄντα, ταῦτα δέ ἐστι τὰ αἰσθητά. καὶ ταύτῃ δὲ ἴσως ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης εἶπεν αὐτοὺς μηδὲν ἄλλο παρὰ τὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὐσίαν ὑπολαμβάνειν τῷ ἓν λέγειν τὸ ὄν· τοῦ γὰρ αἰσθητοῦ ἐναργῶς εἶναι δοκοῦντος, εἰ ἓν τὸ ὄν ἐστιν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄλλο παρὰ τοῦτο. […] ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν Ἀριστοτέλης, ὡς ἔθος αὐτῷ, πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον καὶ νῦν τῶν λόγων ὑπήντησε προνοῶν τοῦ μὴ τοὺς ἐπιπολαιοτέρους παραλογίζεσθαι, οἱ δὲ ἄνδρες ἐκεῖνοι διττὴν ὑπόστασιν ὑπετίθεντο. Translation by I. Mueller, Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Heavens 3.1–7 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2009, modified. 21 Cf. Simp., In De cael. 557, 21–559, 27. 22 Simp., In De cael. 559, 27–560, 1: δῆλον δέ, ὅτι οὐκ ἠγνόει Παρμενίδης, ὅτι γενητὸς αὐτὸς ἦν, ὥσπερ οὐδέ, ὅτι δύο πόδας εἶχεν, ἓν λέγων τὸ ὄν. Cf. Resp. VII 522 D 6. 78 Pantelis Golitsis

According to him, the reason for Aristotle’s being critical of his predecessors has to be sought elsewhere, namely in his care for the superficial readers, the ἐπιπολαιότεροι, in other words readers who have just a basic understanding of complex notions and can only grasp the apparent meaning of what philosophers say. Simplicius elsewhere calls them ἁπλούστεροι,23 ‘unsophisticated’, and we finally get to see that the readers whom Aristotle cared about are simple common people with ordinary thinking: (9) Now, Aristotle philosophized in a way which is more suited to the majority of people and because he was beware of their misunderstandings, he took guard not to call motion the unchangeable activity of the intellect, which is, as he more grandly said, essence. For he who hears the word ’motion’ at once thinks of change and suspects that what changes is liable to affection and he immediately associates motion with time.24 Let me exemplify Aristotle’s concern for the majority of people on his earlier criticism against Parmenides and Melissus. Aristotle set out to criticize not Parmenides’ or Melissus’ true doctrine but an understanding of Parmenides’ and Melissus’ doctrine, namely the understanding that ordinary people were supposed to have.25 Now, ordinary people would take Parmenides’ and Mel- issus’ claim that being is one to mean, roughly, that there is just one nature in the world and that no plurality exists. Thus, in order to prevent such a disturbing reasoning to people who do experience a world of plurality, Aris- totle refuted providentially (προνοῶν) the two philosophers’ doctrine taken in its apparent meaning. Such refutations, Simplicius says, are customary of Aristotle: They are an ἔθος to him. Earlier in the commentary, when countering the criticisms of Philoponus, Simplicius adduces the same argument: (10) This man (i.e. Philoponus) next proposes to undermine confidence derived from the shared belief of humans and from perception. Let us

23 Cf. Simp., In De cael. 377, 26; In Phys. 74, 17–18. 24 Simp., In Phys. 821, 27–32: ὁ δέ γε Ἀριστοτέλης συμμετρότερα φιλοσοφῶν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τὰς παρακοὰς αὐτῶν φυλαττόμενος ηὐλαβήθη τὴν τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργειαν ἀμετάβλητον οὖσαν, ἢ ὡς αὐτὸς ἔτι σεμνότερον εἶπεν (cf. Met. Λ 7.1072 b 22), οὐσίαν οὖσαν τὴν ἐνέργειαν τοῦ νοῦ κίνησιν εἰπεῖν. ὁ γὰρ ἀκούων κίνησιν εὐθὺς μεταβολὴν ἐννοεῖ καὶ παθητὸν τὸ κινούμενον ὑποπτεύει καὶ χρόνον εὐθὺς τῇ κινήσει συναναφέρει. Translation by J. O. Urmson, Simplicius: On Aristotle Physics 5 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 1997, modified. 25 Mueller, Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Heavens 3.1–7 (see note 20) 124 n. 25 comments: ‘Aristotle gives arguments against a text based on a superficial reading of it, but his purpose is to prevent people from reasoning the way the superficial reading suggests is proper.’ It is more plausible to assume that, according to Simplicius, Aristotle argues not against a text but against a reading which is the reading of the collective mind of ‘superficial readers’. Simplicius, Syrianus and the Harmony of Ancient Philosophers 79

take a look at his armament against those arguments as well. Aristotle has said that all people, Hellenes as well as barbarians, assign the upper region to the divine because what is immortal is linked with what is immortal, and a little later, recounting the views of his predecessors on the construction of the cosmos, he says, ‘Everyone says that the heaven has come to be, but some say it is everlasting, others that it perishes, and others, for example Empedocles of Acragas and Heraclitus of Ephesus, that there is an alteration with it sometimes being one way and sometimes another, and this goes on forever’. Now, this man has thought that Aristotle’s using the witness of ordinary people and a little later bringing in those renowned in philosophy as providing evidence for the contrary view of heaven offered him a feast. However, if, in the case of the doctrine that being is one Aristotle cited as evidence the common belief according to which there are many things, and proposed to correct the view of Parmenides and Melissus, I think it would be possible for anyone, even late learners, to say that, thinking the common belief to be true, he raised objections against the apparent meaning of those men in order that those who attach themselves in a superficial way to the doctrine of those men and are not able to grasp their depth, not be disturbed with regard to views which are so evident.26 Philoponus’ ‘feast’ (θοίνη, alluding to the late-learners of the Sophist)27 is his alleged finding of contradiction between the common belief in the eternity of the world, shared by Aristotle, and Aristotle’s own account of the contrary belief in the generation of the world, held by all other philosophers. Simplici-

26 Simp., In De cael. 139, 25–140, 9: οὗτος ἐφεξῆς καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς κοινῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων δόξης καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως πίστιν προτίθεται σαλεύειν, ἴδωμεν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν πρὸς ἐκείνους τοὺς λόγους παρασκευήν. εἰπόντος τοίνυν τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους (cf. De cael. I 3.270 b 5–9), ὅτι πάντες ἄνθρωποι τὸν ἄνω τῷ θείῳ τόπον ἀποδιδόασιν καὶ Ἕλληνες καὶ βάρβαροι ὡς τῷ ἀθανάτῳ τὸ ἀθάνατον συνηρτημένον, μετ’ ὀλίγον δὲ τὰς τῶν προτέρων δόξας ἱστοροῦντος περὶ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου συστάσεως καὶ λέγοντος (cf. De cael. I 10.279 b 12–17), ὅτι γενόμενον ἅπαντες εἶναί φασιν, ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν ἀίδιον, οἱ δὲ φθαρτόν, οἱ δὲ ἐναλλὰξ ὁτὲ μὲν οὕτως ὁτὲ δὲ ἄλλως ἔχειν φθειρόμενον, καὶ τοῦτο ἀεὶ διατελεῖν οὕτως, ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ὁ Ἀκραγαντῖνος καὶ Ἡράκλειτος ὁ Ἐφέσιος, θοίνην οὗτος ἑαυτῷ παρεσκευάσθαι νενόμικεν τὸ ταῖς μαρτυρίαις χρώμενον αὐτὸν τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων μετ’ ὀλίγα τοὺς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ κλεινοὺς παράγειν τἀναντία μαρτυροῦντας περὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ. καίτοι γε, εἰ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἓν εἶναι τὸ ὂν τήν τε κοινὴν πρόληψιν ἐμαρτύρατο πολλὰ τὰ ὄντα νομίζουσαν καὶ τὴν Παρμενίδου καὶ Μελίσσου δόξαν εὐθύνειν προέθετο, παντὸς ἄν, οἶμαι, καὶ τῶν ὀψιμαθῶν ἦν λέγειν, ὅτι τὴν κοινὴν πρόληψιν ἀληθῆ νομίζων πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐκείνων ὑπήντησεν ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ τοὺς ἐπιπολαιοτέρως τῇ δόξῃ προσέχοντας τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ τὸ βάθος αὐτῶν ἑλεῖν μὴ δυναμένους πρὸς τὰ οὕτως ἐναργῆ τῶν δογμάτων ταράττεσθαι. Translation by I. Mueller, Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Heavens 1.3–4 (An- cient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2011, slightly modified. 27 Cf. Soph. 251 B 5–6. Cf. also Simp., In Phys. 640, 13. 80 Pantelis Golitsis us implies that this contradiction is taken by Philoponus to disprove the authority of Aristotle and, more importantly, to highlight the mutual refutation of Hellenic views. To resolve this apparent contradiction, Simplicius appeals to the parallel case of Aristotle’s criticism of Parmenidean and Melis- sean monism. Just as this criticism is brought about by Aristotle only to protect ordinary people, so that they continue to hold their right common belief in the plurality of the world, so here too Aristotle contradicts not the true doctrine of the other philosophers, who, as Simplicius explains later, by γενητόν mean ‘what receives a (timeless) existence from elsewhere’ (τὸ ἐτέρωθεν τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχον), but a version of this doctrine which is precisely adapted to the apparent meaning of γενητόν as ‘that which is generated in a part of time’ (γενητὸν ἀπὸ μέρους χρόνου).28 And he did so in order to prevent that ordinary people, who necessarily take the words of philosophers àla lettre and are unable to grasp the depth of their thought, be shaken up (ταράττεσθαι) by being invited to believe henceforth in the generation of the world in time. Now, it seems that this explanation of Aristotle’s criticisms is up to a certain degree an innovation of Simplicius. We saw in text no. 5 that Philopo- nus records the ‘more recent commentators’ who claimed that Aristotle’s criticisms are directed not to Plato but to those who misunderstood Plato; but Philoponus does not explain why these commentators claimed that to be so. An explanation is provided nevertheless by Asclepius, who reports in text no. 7 that his teacher Ammonius explained that Aristotle refuted a false understanding of Plato and of other philosophers, namely an understanding which is based on the apparent meaning of what they say; and he did so, Ammonius explained further, in order that we avoid to misleadingly accept their doctrines according to their fallacious appearance. Here is another relevant passage from Ammonius’ commentary on Aristotle’s De anima, pub- lished by Philoponus: (11) This is what Timaeus says, and Aristotle attempts to contradict this as if he were to contradict poetic myths for not corresponding to the nature of things. For, as Plato says, to those taking poetic myths at their face value nothing would appear more ridiculous, just as to those who seek the hidden meaning in them nothing would be more inspiring. But here, too, Aristotle, as he always does, refutes the apparent meaning, so that someone who is unable to understand what is being conveyed through these riddles does not stay at the level of the apparent. […]

28 Cf. Simp., In De cael. 140, 9–19. Simplicius, Syrianus and the Harmony of Ancient Philosophers 81

Indeed, what has been said symbolically is by its apparent absurdity an incentive for us to seek the truth hidden in it.29 For Ammonius, Aristotle’s criticisms are an incitement for philosophers to go into the hidden meaning of his predecessors’ sayings, to exceed their appearance and understand them correctly. But Simplicius goes further than this. He holds that Aristotle wanted with his criticisms to take care of the readers who were unable to properly understand the depth of Plato’s or other philosophers’ thought: (12) Those who philosophized about the first principles investigated them in as far as they are related to beings; some did this vaguely, without making any distinction between natural and supernatural beings, while others, like the Pythagoreans, Xenophanes, Parmenides, Empedo- cles and Anaxagoras, distinguished between the two, but because of their obscurity they escaped the notice of the multitude. And this is why Aris- totle raises objections as to the appearance , so that he helps those who understand them superficially (τοῖς ἐπιπολαίως ἐκλαμβάνουσι βοηθῶν).30 Aristotle’s criticisms were not meant to prevent the few from understanding the ancient doctrines in the way the many would do, as Ammonius implied; they were rather meant to help the many not to be misled by the difficult doctrines of the few. Here is another characteristic passage: (13) Generally, the whole thesis of those who say that being is one is paradoxical and absurd, if one reads it in such a superficial manner;

29 Phlp. (Ammon.), In De an. 116, 21–117, 10: ἃ μὲν οὖν φησιν ὁ Τίμαιος, ταῦτά ἐστι, καὶ τούτοις ἀντιλέγειν ἐπιχειρεῖ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ταὐτὸν ποιῶν ὡς εἴ τις καὶ τοῖς ποιητικοῖς μύθοις ἀντιλέγει ὡς οὐ συνᾴδουσι τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων. ὡς γὰρ ὁ Πλάτων φησί, τοῖς κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἐκλαμβάνουσι τοὺς ποιητικοὺς μύθους οὐδὲν ἂν φανείη καταγελαστότερον, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τοῖς τὴν κεκρυμμένην ἐν αὐτοῖς διάνοιαν ζητοῦσιν οὐδὲν ἐνθουσιαστικώτερον (cf. Pl., Epist. II 314 A 2–5). πλὴν ὡς εἴωθεν ἀεὶ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης κἀνταῦθα τὸ φαινόμενον ἐλέγχει, ἵνα μή τις τὰ δηλούμενα διὰ τῶν αἰνιγμάτων τούτων συνιδεῖν μὴ δυνάμενος μένῃ μέχρι τοῦ φαιν- ομένου. […] καὶ αὐτὰ δὲ τὰ συμβολικῶς εἰρημένα διὰ τῆς κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀτοπίας ἐνάγει ἡμᾶς εἰς τὸ ζητεῖν ἐν αὐτοῖς τὴν κεκρυμμένην ἀλήθειαν. Translation by P. J. van der Eijk, Philoponus: On Aristotle On the Soul 1.3–5 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2006, modified. This interpretation depends on a technical sense of σύμβολον, standardized with Iamblichus, in which σύμβολον is contrasted, for instance, with εἰκών; see P. T. Struck, Birth of the Symbol. Ancient Readers at the Limits of Their Texts, Princeton 2004, 204– 226. 30 Simp., In Phys. 21, 15–20: οἱ γὰρ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς φιλοσοφοῦντες ὡς ὄντων ἀρχὰς ἐζήτουν, καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀδιορίστως, οὐ διακρίνοντες τὰ φυσικὰ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπὲρ φύσιν, οἱ δὲ διακρίνοντες μέν, ὥσπερ οἵ τε Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ Ξενοφάνης καὶ Παρμενίδης καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας, τῇ δὲ ἀσαφείᾳ λανθάνοντες τοὺς πολλούς. διὸ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ὡς πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον ἀντιλέγει, τοῖς ἐπιπολαίως ἐκλαμβάνουσι βοηθῶν. 82 Pantelis Golitsis

however, such is Aristotle’s concern for the unsophisticated readers that he deems it worthy to refute it.31 In other words, Aristotle’s criticisms as well as Plato’s were not simply preventive but, more profoundly, they were providential. For Simplicius, both philosophers assumed the unseemly task to criticize their predecessors according to notions which were not theirs out of affection for common people. Let us hear it from Simplicius’ mouth: (14) Let no one blame Plato and Aristotle for making their criticisms against foreign notions. For it is out of humanity (φιλανθρώπως) that they forestall the misunderstandings which can come about.32 There is a philanthropic and pedagogical aspect in Simplicius’ reasoning which, I think, has to be rightly understood, if we are to do justice to his argument. It will help us to quote another passage from his commentary on the Physics, in which this very providential aspect is said to be an essential part of ancient philosophical criticism in general: (15) Since we are going to hear Aristotle criticize the doctrines of the previous philosophers and since, before Aristotle, Plato has manifestly done the same thing, as did Parmenides and Xenophanes before them, we must know that these philosophers refute what appears to be absurd in their accounts because they take care (κηδόμενοι) of those who understand the philosophic doctrines more superficially, since the ancients were accustomed to express their views in a riddling way. This is made clear by Plato, who admires to such extent Parmenides, whom he seems to refute, that he says that Parmenides’ thought needs a diver into the deep. And Aristotle manifestly alludes to the depth of Parmenides’ wis- dom, when he says that ‘Parmenides seems to speak by being more awake’. So these philosophers sometimes supply what has been left out, sometimes make clear what has been said unclearly, sometimes distinguish what has been said with regard to the intelligibles as being unable to apply to natural things (as in the case of those who said that Being is one and unmoved), sometimes forestall the unsophisticated understanding of more superficial people; and this is how they seem to be refuting.33

31 Simp., In Phys. 74, 15–18: ὅλως δὲ ἡ ὅλη θέσις τῶν ἓν τὸ ὂν λεγόντων εἴ τις οὕτως ἐπιπολαίως αὐτὴν ἐκδέχοιτο, παράδοξός ἐστι καὶ ἀπεμφαίνουσα, καὶ ὅμως φειδοῖ τῶν ἁπλουστέρων ἀντιλ- ογίας ἠξίωται παρὰ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους. 32 Simp., In Phys. 148, 11–13: μηδεὶς δὲ τῷ Πλάτωνι καὶ τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει μεμφέσθω πρὸς ἄλλας ἐννοίας ἀντιλεγόντοιν (scripsi : ἀντιλέγοντι D F Diels : ἀντιλέγοντο Ε)· φιλανθρώπως γὰρ τὰς γενησομένας παρακοὰς προαναστέλλουσιν. 33 Simp., In Phys. 36, 25–37, 7: ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλους ἐλέγχοντος ἀκουσόμεθα τὰς τῶν προτέρων φιλοσόφων δόξας καὶ πρὸ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ὁ Πλάτων τοῦτο φαίνεται ποιῶν καὶ πρὸ Simplicius, Syrianus and the Harmony of Ancient Philosophers 83

This account may seem naïve to a modern scholar but it ceases to seem so, as soon as its pedagogical grounds are realized. If one asked why Xenophanes, Parmenides, Plato or Aristotle were so worried about the misunderstandings of common people, no good answer could be given, as Rachel Barney has rightly pointed out.34 But if one asked why Xenophanes, Parmenides, Plato or Aristotle were so worried about common people that they cared to refute their understanding of philosophic doctrines, a good answer would be that they wished that common people did not lose their common sense by being taught by philosophers to accept ideas that contradict evidence. But why then, it might be objected, should such people have to bother with philosophy at all? Here is a better answer. Xenophanes, Parmenides, Plato or Aris- totle cared to refute the common people’s understanding of philosophical doctrines because they wished that such people did not get discouraged in the study of philosophy by being taught to accept ideas that contradict evidence and because they further wished these people to pursue their study of philosophy, so that they would later be able to properly understand not the apparent but the true meaning of philosophical doctrines. And this answer is a pertinent answer in light of the late Platonic conception according to which philosophy is not accessible at once but is progressively instilled into the soul of the novice philosopher.35

ἀμφοῖν ὅ τε Παρμενίδης καὶ Ξενοφάνης, ἰστέον ὅτι τῶν ἐπιπολαιότερον ἀκροωμένων οὗτοι κηδόμενοι τὸ φαινόμενον ἄτοπον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις αὐτῶν διελέγχουσιν, αἰνιγματωδῶς εἰωθότων τῶν παλαιῶν τὰς ἑαυτῶν ἀποφαίνεσθαι γνώμας. δηλοῖ δὲ ὁ Πλάτων θαυμάζων οὕτως τὸν Παρ- μενίδην, ὃν διελέγχειν δοκεῖ, καὶ βαθέος κολυμβητοῦ δεῖσθαι λέγων τὴν διάνοιαν αὐτοῦ. καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ τὸ βάθος αὐτοῦ τῆς σοφίας ὑπονοῶν φαίνεται, ὅταν λέγῃ “Παρμενίδης δὲ ἔοικέ που βλέπειν (Menn et Barney cum F : <μᾶλλον βλέπων> ἔοικέ που λέγειν Diels)”. καὶ οὗτοι οὖν ποτὲ μὲν τὸ παραλελειμμένον ἀναπληροῦντες, ποτὲ δὲ τὸ ἀσαφῶς εἰρημένον σαφηνίζοντες, ποτὲ δὲ τὸ ἐπὶ τῶν νοητῶν εἰρημένον ὡς μὴ δυνάμενον τοῖς φυσικοῖς ἐφαρμόττειν διακρίνοντες ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ἓν τὸ ὂν καὶ ἀκίνητον λεγόντων, ποτὲ δὲ τὰς εὐκόλους ἐκδοχὰς τῶν ἐπιπολαιοτέρων προαναστέλλοντες, οὕτως ἐλέγχειν δοκοῦσι. Translation by Barney (see note 8) 111, completed and modified. 34 Barney (see note 8) 113: ‘It has to be admitted that Simplicius’ solution is in the end unsatisfy- ing. There is, after all, every difference between criticising a certain position as false and warning that it risks being misunderstood as false, unless carefully rephrased and explained. And it is very hard to believe that Aristotle was unaware of the distinction, or to read him as always intending to do the latter. If Aristotle is so worried about misunderstandings by the vulgar, why would he frame his clarifications of his predecessors in such a deeply mislead- ing way? So far as I can see, Simplicius has no clear answer to this question.’ According to my interpretation, this is not a question that Simplicius should be concerned to answer. 35 See P. Hoffmann, La fonction des prologues exégétiques dans la pensée pédagogique néopla- tonicienne, in: J.-D. Dubois – B. Roussel (edd.), Entrer en matière: Les prologues (Patri- moines. Religions du livre), Paris 1998, 228, who speaks of the Neoplatonists’ concern ‘de ne délivrer aucun savoir qui ne fût strictement adéquat à la capacité de réception de[s] âmes, progressivement restituées à leur automotricité et conduites pas à pas vers des plans 84 Pantelis Golitsis

We need now to correct what has been said earlier, namely that for Sim- plicius Aristotle’s criticisms are not to be taken at face value. In as far as they are received as such, Aristotle’s criticisms are to be taken at face value, otherwise they would not be beneficial. To put it differently, in Simplicius’ view the criticisms that ancient philosophers seemed committed to were intended to be criticisms only for a class of readers, namely the unsophisticated ones. Accomplished philosophers could easily realize that what constitutes a criticism at one level is a providential discourse at another. Students who had not yet completed their philosophical studies, or who were just at the beginning of them, would only later recall what they once took to be, say, Aris- totle’s criticism against Plato’s theory of ideas and realize that such a criticism did not have to do with Plato but had to do with them. It can be legitimately objected that, in spite of this account, Simplicius insists on clarifying at once, by revealing the inner intention of ancient criticisms, what was meant to be understood only progressively, that he is committed to explain synchronically what was normally to be explained in the diachrony of the philosophic curriculum. Simplicius, I think, was convinced that the good student who was to go through the whole curriculum would finally realize that there is no real disagreement between ancient philosophers. However, by the time Simplicius composed his commentaries there was no curriculum. We shall have to return to this point later. For now, let it suffice to say that Simplicius completely shared the old Aristotle’s pedagogical concern. He can be seen himself taking care of his own unsophisticated readers, when he felt that they risked being misled by reading the De caelo with the help of Alexander of Aphrodisias’ commentary: (16) It is my opinion that Alexander of Aphrodisias obviously under- stands the words of Aristotle well on other occasions – and does so better than the other Peripatetics –, but, in the case of the things which Aristotle says concerning Plato, he does not seem to me to respect the purpose of Aristotle’s antilogies, which are directed at the appearance of Plato’s statements. But, contesting Plato mischievously in a way, he tries not only, as Aristotle certainly did, to refute the apparent meaning of what Plato says out of concern for the simpler people, but he also attacks the ideas of the divine Plato and tries to draw definite conclusions from what Plato says, frequently not even attending to that apparent meaning. Consequently I, putting forward the truth, which is dear to god and to Aristotle, will here add and try to do a careful investigation of the things which Alexander says are the opinions of Plato about the motion of the

toujours plus élevés de la réalité.’ For a clear instance of such a concern in Simplicius, see Golitsis (see note 18) 16–17. Simplicius, Syrianus and the Harmony of Ancient Philosophers 85

soul. I do this because of those who read Alexander’s words in a more superficial way and are at risk to be misleadingly set against Plato’s doctrines, which is the same as to say against Aristotle’s doctrines and against the divine truth.36 This passage is quite interesting in more than one respect. First, it offers at the end a clear illustration of what the ‘concordist’ conviction consists in: the interchangeability of truth, Platonic truth and Aristotelian truth. Secondly, it enables us to see that a ‘providential’ criticism, in Aristotle’s manner, was to be welcomed; had Alexander made a criticism of that sort, it would have sufficed for Simplicius to alert his readers correspondingly. Alexander’s criticism, however, is mischievous; it fails to meet even the appearance of Plato’s doctrine and can set the readers against Plato. This implies that the apparent criticism of Plato is not supposed to turn the readers against Plato; and this suggests in its turn that it is meant to prepare them for the study of Plato. Finally, Simplicius’ accusations against Alexander of being malicious and committed to a reading which is irrelevant to the true import of Plato’s doctrines, tellingly reminds us of Syrianus’ similar accusations against Aristotle.

II. Syrianus and the Access to the Doctrines of True Philosophy

By Simplicius’ own standards, as these are described in the prolegomena to his commentary on the Categories, the worthy exegete of Aristotle must master Aristotle’s custom.37 It was thus essential to his argument against Alexan- der to have previously noted that Aristotle’s criticism out of concern for

36 Simp., In De cael. 377, 20–34: Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁ ἐκ τῆς Ἀφροδισιάδος Ἀλέξανδρος ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις καλῶς, οἶμαι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Περιπατητικῶν καλλιόνως τοῖς Ἀριστοτέλους φαίνεται παρα- κολουθῶν λόγοις, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς Πλάτωνα τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει λεγομένοις οὐκέτι μοι δοκεῖ φυλάττειν τὸν σκοπὸν τῆς Ἀριστοτέλους ἀντιλογίας πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον τῶν Πλάτωνος λόγων ἀποτεινόμενον, ἀλλὰ κακοσχόλως πως ὑπαντῶν πρὸς αὐτὸν οὐ τὸ φαινόμενον μόνον ἐλέγχειν καὶ αὐτὸς πειρᾶται φειδοῖ τῶν ἁπλουστέρων, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐποίησεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ἐννοίας διαβάλλει τοῦ θείου Πλάτωνος καὶ πορίσματα συνάγειν ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἐπιχειρεῖ οὐδὲ τῷ φαινομένῳ πολλάκις ἀκολουθοῦντα, φέρε κἀνταῦθα τὴν τῷ θεῷ καὶ τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει φίλην ἀλήθειαν προστησάμενος τὰ τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου περὶ τῆς <τῆς> ψυχῆς κινήσεως ὡς τῷ Πλάτωνι δοκοῦντα προσθεὶς βασανίσαι πειράσομαι διὰ τοὺς ἐπιπολαιότερον αὐτοῦ τοῖς λόγοις ἐντυγχάνον- τας καὶ κινδυνεύοντας ἐξ αὐτῶν διαβεβλημένως ἴσχειν πρὸς τὰ τοῦ Πλάτωνος δόγματα, ταὐτὸν δὲ εἰπεῖν καὶ πρὸς τὰ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ πρὸς τὴν θείαν ἀλήθειαν. Translation by I. Mueller, Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Heavens 2.1–9 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), Lon- don 2004, modified. 37 Cf. Simp., In Cat. 7, 23–26: Τὸν δὲ ἄξιον τῶν Ἀριστοτελικῶν συγγραμμάτων ἐξηγητὴν δεῖ μὴ πάντῃ τῆς ἐκείνου μεγαλονοίας ἀπολείπεσθαι. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τῶν πανταχοῦ τῷ φιλοσόφῳ γε- γραμμένων ἔμπειρον εἶναι καὶ τῆς Ἀριστοτελικῆς συνηθείας ἐπιστήμονα. 86 Pantelis Golitsis unsophisticated readers was customary of him. And, for obvious reasons, it was even more essential to his general harmonizing project to note that this custom was in reality an older custom, shared by other philosophers too: (17) We must know that Aristotle, following an old custom, frequently objects to the apparent meaning , whenever this apparent meaning, taken rashly, does not agree with the truth. And he does this in order to help those who understand the old sayings in a more superficial way.38 Nonetheless, Simplicius’ claim can hardly find any explicit support in any ancient text. No ancient philosopher seems to have clarified his motives to that effect and it is telling that Simplicius does not cite any passage in support of his argument. It is true that Aristotle speaks in his De caelo of the ἁπλούστερον λέγοντες, meaning by that people who advance their arguments without any sophistication, while he nobly recognizes in his Metaphysics the import to the progress of philosophy of those who expressed their opinion in a more superficial way, the ἐπιπολαιότερον ἀποφηνάμενοι.39 But these passages merely suggest an Aristotelian origin of the vocabulary. If we follow Ammo- nius, we can actually see Porphyry addressing his Isagoge to the more superficial Chrysaorios: (18) Those who are disposed in a more intelligent way can fix their mind to these from what has been already said. However, since Porphyry writes this book for someone more superficial (πρός τινα τῶν ἐπιπολαιοτέρων) (this is clear from the fact that he addresses to him the superficial theorems), he says these things making a selection out of what has been said already.40

38 Simp., In De cael. 296, 6–9: ἰστέον δέ, ὅτι ὁ μὲν Ἀριστοτέλης κατὰ παλαιὰν συνήθειαν πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον ἐνίσταται πολλάκις, ὅταν τοῦτο προχειρότερον ἐκληφθὲν μὴ συμφωνῇ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ· ποιεῖ δὲ τοῦτο βοηθῶν τοῖς ἐπιπολαιότερον τῶν παλαιῶν λόγων ἀκροωμένοις. 39 Cf. De cael. III 5.304 a 9–13: Οἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν σχῆμα περιάπτουσι τῷ πυρί, καθάπερ οἱ τὴν πυραμίδα ποιοῦντες, καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν ἁπλουστέρως λέγοντες ὅτι τῶν μὲν σχημάτων τμητικώτα- τον ἡ πυραμίς, τῶν δὲ σωμάτων τὸ πῦρ, οἱ δὲ κομψοτέρως τῷ λόγῳ προσάγοντες ὅτι […]; Met. α 1.993 b 11–14: οὐ μόνον δὲ χάριν ἔχειν δίκαιον τούτοις ὧν ἄν τις κοινώσαιτο ταῖς δόξαις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἐπιπολαιότερον ἀποφηναμένοις· καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι συνεβάλοντό τι· τὴν γὰρ ἕξιν προήσκησαν ἡμῶν. 40 Ammon., In Porph. 115, 13–16: καὶ δύνανται μὲν οἱ εὐφυεστέρως διακείμενοι ἐκ τῶν ἤδη ῥηθέντων τούτοις ἐπιστῆσαι, ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ τὸ βιβλίον πρός τινα τῶν ἐπιπολαιοτέρων γράφει (τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τοῦ τὰ ἐπιπόλαια τῶν θεωρημάτων πρὸς αὐτὸν γράφειν), αὐτὸς ἐκ τῶν ῥηθέντων ἐκλεξάμενος ταῦτα λέγει. Simplicius, Syrianus and the Harmony of Ancient Philosophers 87

But Porphyry would hardly do as an ancient philosopher.41 It is thus even more surprising that a concern which is similar, not to say identical, to Sim- plicius’ is found in Syrianus: (19) However, since it is the fact that, for whatever reasons, both in other parts of his theological treatise and especially in the last two books, M and N, Aristotle has indulged in a good deal of criticism of the first principles of the Pythagoreans and the Platonists, while never presenting any adequate justification for his position, and in many instances, if one may state the truth quite frankly, not even meeting them on their own ground, but rather basing his objections on hypotheses propounded by himself, it seemed reasonable, out of concern for the more unsophisticated students (φειδοῖ τῶν ἁπλουστέρων ἀκροατῶν), lest, under the influence of the well-deserved reputation of the man, they be seduced into con- tempt for divine realities and the inspired philosophy of the ancients, to subject his remarks, to the best of our ability, to a judicious and impartial examination, and to demonstrate that the doctrines of Pythagoras and Plato about the first principles remain free of disproof or refutation.42 It is obvious that, in his criticism against Alexander that we saw in text no. 16, Simplicius tacitly adopts the motive that Syrianus gave himself in writing his commentary on Metaphysics M and N. But it is also obvious that he silently transposes Syrianus’ providential motive to Aristotle. While the first act is totally to be expected from someone who operates in the same Platonic tradition as Syrianus, the second act seems to undermine the credi- bility of Simplicius’ account of Aristotle as well as his own philosophical integrity. If Syrianus cared about unsophisticated readers and did so in order to protect them from being wrongly led by Aristotle against Plato and the Pythagoreans, then Simplicius’ claim that Aristotle criticized Plato and the Pythagoreans in order to protect the same unsophisticated readers is seriously contradicted.

41 Plotinus is clearly classified by Simplicius among the νεώτεροι; cf. In Phys. 790, 30–31: Ἐν δὲ τοῖς νεωτέροις Πλωτῖνος φαίνεται πρῶτος τὸν πρῶτον ἐκεῖνον ἐπιζητήσας χρόνον. 42 Syrian., In Met. 80, 16–27: ἐπειδὴ δὲ συμβέβηκε δι’ ἅς τινάς ποτ’ αἰτίας καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις μὲν μέρεσι τῆς θεολογικῆς πραγματείας, διαφερόντως δὲ ἐν τοῖς τελευταίοις δύο βιβλίοις, τῷ Μ καὶ τῷ Ν, πολλήν τινα καταδρομὴν αὐτὸν ποιήσασθαι κατὰ τῶν Πυθαγορείων καὶ Πλατωνικῶν ἀρχῶν οὐδὲν μὲν ἐχέγγυον οὐδὲ ἱκανὸν πρὸς αὐτὰς λέγοντα, τὰ πολλὰ δὲ οὐδὲ πρὸς αὐτάς, εἰ χρὴ τἀληθὲς ἀπροφασίστως εἰπεῖν, ἀπαντῶντα, ἰδίαις δὲ ὑποθέσεσι τὰς ἀντιλογίας προσάγοντα, εὔλο- γον ὤφθη φειδοῖ τῶν ἁπλουστέρων ἀκροατῶν, ὡς ἂν μὴ τῇ δόξῃ τῇ δικαίᾳ κατεχόμενοι τἀνδρὸς εἰς καταφρόνησιν ὑπενεχθῶσι τῶν θείων πραγμάτων καὶ τῆς ἐνθέου τῶν πρεσβυτέρων φιλοσ- οφίας, βασανίσαι τὰ ῥηθέντα κριτικῶς ἅμα καὶ ἀδεκάστως εἰς δύναμιν, καὶ ἐπιδεῖξαι τάς τε Πυθαγόρου καὶ Πλάτωνος περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν θεωρίας ἀνελέγκτους καὶ ἀπτώτους διαμεμενηκυίας. Translation by Dillon – O’Meara (see note 4), slightly modified. 88 Pantelis Golitsis

This may seem so to a modern reader but, again, I do not think that it does any justice to Simplicius’ self-understanding as a commentator. For it overlooks two things: Simplicius’ belief in the infallibility of ancient philosophy and Simplicius’ belief in the fallibility of recent exegesis. Let me clarify this by adducing the conclusion reached by Rachel Barney: ‘Simplicius’ project […] is to vindicate the unity of a certain dominant, broadly Platonic philosophical tradition which importantly includes Aristotle, the Presocrat- ics, and to a lesser extent the Stoics, the better to defend that tradition against Christian attack.’43 This is in a way quite right but it has one serious default. It anachronistically labels Platonic what for Simplicius was only ancient. And this would not have been serious, had it just been a question of naming differently the same set of doctrines, broadly Platonic from our point of view, ancient from Simplicius’ point of view. More than that, it is a question about how Simplicius’ unitary approach to the pluralism of ancient Greek philosophy is to be construed. According to Barney, Simplicius wished to defend the unity of a certain tradition on a doctrinal basis, in other words a tradition which was somehow attached to the doctrines of Plato and of which he was himself part, while he disregarded or was merely indifferent to other philosophical traditions, say, the philosophy of the Epicureans. But Simplici- us did not consider Plato to be a really dominant figure in the philosophy of the Hellenes. Here is just a sample passage: (20) It is indeed very likely that Plato said that the One and the Indefinite Dyad are the principles of all things. For this is a Pythagorean doctrine and Plato obviously follows the Pythagore- ans at many places.44 Moreover, and more importantly, Simplicius constantly refers throughout his concordist work to the παλαιοί, not to any Pythagoreans or Platonists broadly construed. His concern was clearly to defend not the unity of a transhistor- ical Platonic tradition, which would also include himself, but the unity of an epoch of philosophy, namely the philosophy of the persons whom he himself

43 Barney (see note 8) 117. 44 Simp., In Phys. 151, 12–14: καὶ τὸν μὲν Πλάτωνα ἀρχὰς πάντων λέγειν τὸ ἓν καὶ τὴν ἀόριστον δυάδα πάνυ εἰκός· Πυθαγορείων γὰρ ὁ λόγος, καὶ πολλαχοῦ φαίνεται Πυθαγορείοις ὁ Πλάτων ἀκολουθῶν. Cf. also his commitment to a similar account of the origin of Plato’s metaphysics given by the Neopythagorean Moderatus; Simp., In Phys. 230, 34–231, 2: Ταύτην δὲ περὶ τῆς ὕλης τὴν ὑπόνοιαν ἐοίκασιν ἐσχηκέναι πρῶτοι μὲν τῶν Ἑλλήνων οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι, μετὰ δ’ ἐκείνους ὁ Πλάτων, ὡς καὶ Μοδέρατος ἱστορεῖ. οὗτος (i.e. ὁ Πλάτων) γὰρ κατὰ τοὺς Πυθαγορ- είους τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἓν ὑπὲρ τὸ εἶναι καὶ πᾶσαν οὐσίαν ἀποφαίνεται, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ἕν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ ὄντως ὂν καὶ νοητὸν, τὰ εἴδη φησὶν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ τρίτον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ ψυχικόν, μετέχειν τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν. Simplicius, Syrianus and the Harmony of Ancient Philosophers 89 calls ‘the ancients’. Let it suffice to cite a characteristic passage from the so- called Corollarium de loco: (21) Why, then, should we say that so many great men were mistaken in their doctrines about place, putting forward our difficulties as an unfor- tunate feast for those who are accustomed to abuse at pleasure the apparent contradictions of the ancients? Shall we not rather follow up each of those who wrote about place and show that none of them missed the truth about it, but, since place has many aspects, each one of them has seen and revealed a different aspect of it?45 Thanks to another passage of the commentary on the Physics, in which the Stoics are described as νεώτεροι,46 we can define with sufficient certainty the class of philosophers whom Simplicius considered to be παλαιοί. It included his ‘canon’ of Preplatonic philosophers (that is, the Pythagoreans, Xeno- phanes, Parmenides, Empedocles and Anaxagoras, whom he constantly ad- vocates in his concordist accounts of the παλαιοί), Plato and Aristotle of course, and presumably ancient Platonists and Peripatetics who were person- ally acquainted with Plato and Aristotle, such as Speusippus and Xenocrates, Theophrastus and Eudemus.47 But how are these considerations linked to our initial question about Simplicius’ relation to Syrianus? Syrianus says in his preface to his commentary that Aristotle failed to compete with the philosophy of his elders, in other words the Pythagoreans and Plato, who have assimilated their accounts on the first principles to the reality itself.48 This is, in principle, the reason for which their philosophy remains irrefutable despite Aristotle’s claims to the contrary. This implies that the relevant part of Aristotle’s philosophy did not belong to the tradition

45 Simp., In Phys. 640, 12–18 (I have modified the punctuation): Τί οὖν ἄρα τοσούτους καὶ τηλικούτους ἄνδρας διαμαρτεῖν ἐν τῇ περὶ τόπου δόξῃ φήσαιμεν θοίνην οὐκ εὐτυχῆ προτιθέντες τὰς ἡμετέρας ἀπορίας τοῖς εἰωθόσιν ἐντρυφᾶν ταῖς δοκούσαις τῶν παλαιῶν ἐναντιολογίαις, ἢ μᾶλλον ἑκάστῳ τῶν περὶ τόπου τι γραψάντων παρακολουθοῦντες δείξωμεν μηδένα μὲν τῆς περὶ τόπου διαμαρτεῖν ἀληθείας, πολυειδοῦς δὲ ὄντος αὐτοῦ ἄλλον κατ’ ἄλλο τι τῶν εἰδῶν τοῦ τόπου θεάσασθαί τε καὶ ἐκφῆναι; Translation by J. O. Urmson, Simplicius: Corollaries on Place and Time (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 1992, modified. 46 See Simp., In Phys. 333, 2–5 and 356, 34; see Golitsis (see note 18) 109. It is with reference to Pericles of Lydia that the Stoics themselves are described as παλαιοί in In Phys. 227, 25. 47 For a defense of Xenocrates by Simplicius, see In Phys. 142, 19–27; on Speusippus and Xenocrates as authentic conveyers of Plato’s doctrine, see In Phys. 151, 8–11. Theophras- tus’ old doctrine on place is advocated in the Corollarium de loco; cf. In Phys. 639, 12– 14. For an account which makes Eudemus sympathetic to Parmenides, see below note 49. On how other Preplatonic philosophers, such as Thales, Anaximander and Heraclitus, fit into Simplicius’ concordist account, see In Phys. 36, 8–14. 48 Syrian., In Met. 81, 3–5: τοὺς περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν λόγους ἐξομοιοῦντες τοῖς πράγμασιν οἱ πατέρες αὐτῶν μονίμους καὶ ἀμεταπτώτους καθ᾽ ὅσον προσήκει λόγοις εἶναι κατεστήσαντο. 90 Pantelis Golitsis of the true philosophy and, consequently, had to be refuted for the benefit of those who could be misled by Aristotle’s arguments. But the very ability to refute Aristotle’s antilogies implies in its turn that Syrianus believed to have a better (that is, better than Aristotle’s) or, at least, an adequate understanding of the doctrines of true philosophy. ‘It would be better’, he says in text no. 3, ‘to present the true meaning of the ancient philosophy’, that is, contrary to Aristotle’s presentation (or understanding) of it. In other words, Syrianus felt to be able to defend Plato and the Pythagoreans against Aristotle because he thought it possible for him to be directly linked to their tradition. It is this belief in the possibility of directly accessing the true meaning of Plato’s doctrine which enabled the ‘complementarist’ reading of Aristotle. Direct knowledge of Platonic doctrines could determine which part of Aris- totle’s philosophy was to be retained in terms of its compatibility with Plato’s philosophy and which part of it had inversely to be rejected. Naturally enough, the ‘concordist’ Simplicius had a different approach. Simplicius makes a clear distinction between παλαιοί and νεώτεροι among philosophers and this allows us to say that for him there were two epochs in Greek philosophy. There was on the one hand the epoch of the direct knowledge of the truth about reality. But while this truth was directly known to philosophers, the preciseness of their philosophical discourse and method was still subject to evolution: (22) ‘This’, Aristotle says, ‘Parmenides did not yet see’, namely that it is possible for things that are one in hypostasis to have different accounts and for that reason to be many. And it should not surprise us that the standards of [using] accounts had not yet been sorted out, but were later decided upon from the things themselves, and so brought in to contribute to greater accuracy. And Eudemus bears witness to this when he says: ‘One should not wonder at Parmenides’ following untrustworthy accounts and being deceived by things that had not yet been clarified. For neither did anyone refer to ‘ in many ways’ but Plato was the first to introduce ‘ in two ways’, nor did anyone speak of the ‘in itself’ or ‘the accidental’; and Parmenides seems to have been deceived because of these points. But these, as well as the syllogisms, have been distinguished thanks to the prac- tice of arguments and counter arguments; for there was no agreement to be made, unless the necessity for it was obvious. Our predecessors, however, made claims without proof’.49

49 Simp., In Phys. 120, 1–12 (I have modified the punctuation): ‘τοῦτο δέ’, φησί,‘Παρμενίδης οὔπω ἑώρα’, ὅτι δυνατὸν τὰ τῇ ὑποστάσει ἓν ὄντα λόγους διαφόρους ἔχειν καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο πολλὰ εἶναι. καὶ οὐδὲν μὲν ἦν θαυμαστὸν τοὺς κανόνας τῶν λόγων μήπω τότε διακεκρίσθαι, ἀλλὰ ὕστερον φωραθέντας ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων οὕτως ἐξενεχθῆναι πρὸς πλείονα συντελοῦντας ἀκρίβειαν· Simplicius, Syrianus and the Harmony of Ancient Philosophers 91

It is indeed Plato who is explicitly called by Simplicius ὁ τῆς ἀληθείας ἐξηγητής,50 an allusion to the perfect capability of his philosophical language to describe reality. But we may surmise that this is a qualification which Simplicius would not be reluctant to apply also to Aristotle, who is said by him to have made in his Physics the compellingness of demonstrations clearer than Plato did,51 a development which also Eudemus seems to have alluded to in the passage above. Such was then the philosophy of the παλαιοί, those ‘who are superior to us and inhabit closer to gods’, as Socrates says in the Philebus.52 They had direct knowledge of the truth but they only gradually brought its formulation into completion. It is with reference to this that we can properly understand Simplicius’ point, when he says in text no. 16 that the ancient philosophers seem to be refuting, while in reality they were just making clear what has been said unclearly. On the other hand, there was the epoch of the νεώτεροι, who could access the truth primarily through the intermediary of the true philosophy of the ancients. They were meant to do philosophy not about directly knowing the truth or formulating it in an original way, but about understanding it by going through the different formulations of the ancients. In virtue of such a historical reconstruction, it is impossible for a νεώτερος, say, Syrianus, to have a better understanding of truth, or of Plato for that matter, than a παλαιός, say, Aristotle: (23) Indeed, it is not really likely that Aristotle was ignorant of either the meaning of Plato’s text or of Plato’s intention.53 Contrary to the knower of truth, who is immune to gradation in as far as he is directly acquainted with it, the person who strives to understand truth can have a better or a worse understanding of it. In spite of the appearances, Aristotle knew the one and same truth that Plato knew. Syrianus, on the other hand, could not have properly understood the true meaning of Aris- totle’s apparent criticisms against Plato. We can see what such an account

ὡς καὶ ὁ Εὔδημος μαρτυρεῖ λέγων ‘Παρμενίδου μὲν οὐκ <ἂν> ἀγασθείη τις ἀναξιοπίστοις ἀκολ- ουθήσαντος λόγοις καὶ ὑπὸ τοιούτων ἀπατηθέντος ἃ οὔπω τότε διεσαφεῖτο. οὔτε γὰρ τὸ πολλαχῶς ἔλεγεν οὐδείς, ἀλλὰ Πλάτων πρῶτος τὸ δισσὸν εἰσήγαγεν, οὔτε τὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ καὶ κατὰ συμ- βεβηκός· φαίνεται δὲ ὑπὸ τούτων διαψευσθῆναι. ταῦτα δὲ ἐκ τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν ἀντιλογιῶν ἐθεωρήθη καὶ τὸ συλλογιστικόν· οὐ γὰρ συνεχωρεῖτο, εἰ μὴ φαίνοιτο ἀναγκαῖον. οἱ δὲ πρότερον ἀναποδείκτως ἀπεφαίνοντο.’ Translation by P. Huby – C. C. W. Taylor, Simplicius: On Aris- totle Physics 1.3–4 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2011, modified. 50 Cf. Simp., In De cael. 131, 1. 51 Cf. Simp., In Phys. 8, 12–13: προφανεστέρας τίθησι τὰς τῶν ἀποδείξεων ἀνάγκας. 52 Phlb. 16 C 7–8: οἱ μὲν παλαιοί, κρείττονες ἡμῶν καὶ ἐγγυτέρω θεῶν οἰκοῦντες. 53 Simp., In De cael. 518, 20–21: τῷ γὰρ ὄντι οὔτε τὴν τῆς λέξεως σημασίαν εἰκὸς ἦν ἀγνοεῖν αὐτὸν οὔτε τὸν τοῦ Πλάτωνος νοῦν. 92 Pantelis Golitsis amounts to, if we compare the prayer that closes Simplicius’ commentary on the Categories with Syrianus’ final prayer in his commentary on Metaphysics M-N. Not surprisingly, Simplicius’ prayer is partially copied on Syrianus’ prayer. But it contains one significant addition: (24) These, then, are the criticisms that Aristotle brings in these books against the theories of Pythagoreans and the Platonists, criticisms con- tained also in what is said in Book A, as indeed the commentator Alexan- der has pointed out. For this reason, in dealing with the former, we consider that we have not neglected also the latter, nor even the criticisms levelled against these men in his two books On the Forms. For there also, Aristotle runs through almost the same arguments, so that we can take it that these also might be countered by the same means. We therefore will end our discourse by praying to the gods who are the guardians of philosophy. Of the many arguments that have been presented on either side, let there prevail in the readers’ mind those that are more true and more pleasing to the gods.54 (25) But since this is also as far as the divine Iamblichus reached, I too end here my discourse, praying to the guardians of reason both to put in me a more accurate understanding of these matters and to bestow this on me as a resource for contemplating the higher realities, and to grant me relief from the difficulties of life.55 Like Syrianus, and in genuine pagan spirit, Simplicius prays to the gods guardians of philosophy (or reason). But unlike Syrianus, who lets the Gods of philosophy decide the winner of his debate with Aristotle, Simplicius prays to the same Gods to provide him with a more accurate understanding (ἀκριβεστέρα κατανόησις) of ancient philosophy, represented here by Aris- totle’s Categories. He thus differentiates himself from his predecessor in that

54 Syrian., In Met. 195, 10–19: Ταῦτά ἐστιν ἃ ἐν τούτοις ἀντιλέγει ταῖς τῶν Πυθαγορείων καὶ Πλατωνικῶν ἀνδρῶν θεωρίαις ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης· ἃ δὴ περιέχει καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ μείζονι τῶν Α ῥηθέντα, ὡς καὶ ὁ ὑπομνηματιστὴς Ἀλέξανδρος ὑπεσημήνατο· διὸ καὶ ἡμεῖς τούτοις ἐπιστήσαντες οὐδ’ ἐκεῖνα παραλελοιπέναι νομίζομεν· οὐ μὴν οὐδ’ ὅσα ἐν τοῖς Περὶ εἰδῶν δύο βιβλίοις πρὸς αὐτοὺς εἴρηκε· σχεδὸν γὰρ κἀκεῖ τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἀνακυκλοῖ, ὥστε εἰκότως διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἂν εἴη καὶ ἡ πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ἀπάντησις. ἡμεῖς μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἐφόροις τῆς φιλοσοφίας θεοῖς εὐξάμενοι τὸν λόγον καταπαύσομεν· πολλῶν δὲ ῥηθέντων ἐφ’ ἑκάτερα λόγων κρατοίη τῆς τῶν ἐντυγχανόντων διανοίας τὰ ἀληθέστερα καὶ θεοφιλέστερα. Translation by Dillon – O’Meara (see note 4). 55 Simp., In Cat. 438, 33–36: Ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ μέχρι τοῦδε καὶ ὁ θεῖος προῆλθεν Ἰάμβλιχος, καὶ ἐγὼ καταπαύω τὸν λόγον, εὐχόμενος τοῖς τῶν λόγων ἐφόροις τούτων τε ἀκριβεστέραν ἐνδοῦναι κατανόησιν καὶ ταύτην ἐφόδιόν μοι πρὸς τὰς ὑψηλοτέρας θεωρίας χαρίσασθαι καὶ σχολὴν παρα- σχεῖν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ περιελκόντων. Translation by R. Gaskin, Simplicius: On Aristotle’s Categories 9–15 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2000, modified. Simplicius, Syrianus and the Harmony of Ancient Philosophers 93 he sees himself not as an accomplished philosopher but as an interpreter, who by the very epoch to which he belonged was a philosopher constantly in the making. For his epoch was not authoritative. Simplicius accepts the authority of the ancient philosophers but he does not accept any authority from commentators. He criticizes at times those who approach inadequately what the ancient philosophers say: (26) Consequently, Aristotle’s objections affect neither the theologians nor Plato, but rather those who understand the doctrines of the ancients in such a way as to suppose that, while the world was generated at a particu- lar time, it was nonetheless indestructible. This is really absurd and is justly refuted by Aristotle. Alexander of Aphrodisias, however, did not understand Plato’s views as Aristotle understood them, nor did he pay attention to the agreement of the two men as to what they mean, but having been from the outset, so it seems, suspicious towards Plato, just as shortly before our time some people have been with Aristotle (ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὡς ἔοικε, πρὸς τὰ τοῦ Πλάτωνος ὑπόπτως διατεθείς, ὥσπερ ὀλίγον πρὸ ἡμῶν τινες πρὸς τὰ Ἀριστοτέλους), he does not think it worthwhile to refute this very view, in the way that Aristotle, who does not mention Plato’s name at all apart from a handful of times, did, but drags Plato himself up for refutation. So it is necessary, and at all events only fair to Aristotle and to those who choose to understand and interpret Aristotle’s doctrines by using Alexander’s commentaries, to examine what Alexander says.56 A later reference helps us to possibly identify one of the philosophers who lived ‘shortly before’ Simplicius and were ‘suspiciously disposed’ towards Aristotle: (27) Different Platonists have responded to these objections brought against what is called the coming to be of bodies from planes,

56 Simp., In De cael. 296, 26–297, 9: ὥστε οὔτε πρὸς τοὺς θεολόγους οὔτε πρὸς Πλάτωνα τείνουσιν αἱ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ἐνστάσεις, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς οὕτως ἐκδεχομένους τὰ τῶν παλαιῶν, ὡς γενητὸν μὲν ἀπὸ χρόνου τινὸς νομίζειν τὸν κόσμον, ἄφθαρτον δέ· τοῦτο γὰρ ὄντως ἄτοπον καὶ καλῶς ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους διελεγχόμενον. Ὁ δὲ Ἀφροδισιεὺς Ἀλέξανδρος οὐχ οὕτως τὰ Πλάτωνος νοήσας, ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης ἐνόησεν, οὐδὲ παρακολουθήσας τῇ περὶ τὰς ἐννοίας αὐτῶν συμφωνίᾳ, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὡς ἔοικε, πρὸς τὰ τοῦ Πλάτωνος ὑπόπτως διατεθείς, ὥσπερ ὀλίγον πρὸ ἡμῶν τινες πρὸς τὰ Ἀριστοτέλους, οὐκ ἀξιοῖ τὴν δόξαν αὐτὴν εὐθύνειν, ὥσπερ Ἀριστοτέλης οὐδὲ μνημονεύων ὅλως τοῦ Πλάτωνος ὀνόματος πλὴν ὀλιγάκις, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸν εἰς τὰς εὐθύνας ἕλκει τὸν Πλάτωνα. ἀναγκαῖον οὖν καὶ τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει πάντως ἀρέσκον καὶ τοῖς διὰ τῶν ὑπομνημάτων αὐτοῦ τὰ Ἀριστοτέλους νοεῖν τε καὶ ἐξηγεῖσθαι προαιρουμένοις λυσιτελοῦν τὸ τὰ παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ λεγόμενα ἐπισκέψασθαι. Translation by R. J. Hankinson, Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Heavens 1.10–12 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2006, modified. 94 Pantelis Golitsis

and Proclus of Lycia, one of the successors of Plato, who lived shortly before me (ὀλίγον πρὸ ἐμοῦ), wrote a book which dissolves the objections made by Aristotle here. Accordingly, I thought it would be good to ap- pend Proclus’ resolutions of the objections as briefly as possible. But it is opportune to say again what I am accustomed to repeating. The disagreement between the philosophers is in any way not substan- tial, but Aristotle frequently raises objections against the appearance of what Plato says, which can be also understood in a worse way, and he seems to be refuting Plato for the benefit of those who understand Plato superficially.57 Although Simplicius does not spell it out (but how could he?), I think it is reasonable to assume that, through the τινές in text no. 26, also Syrianus is alluded to. Simplicius was well acquainted with his predecessor’s critical commentary on Metaphysics M-N, since it must have been Syrianus’ objec- tive, as is established in the prolegomena to his commentary, which suggested to Simplicius the providential function as real essence of Aristotle’s own criticisms. Against this background, Simplicius’ closing prayer in his commentary on the Categories can be read as discreetly correcting Syrianus’ inadequate one.

III. Simplicius and the Absence of Philosophical Curriculum

On last analysis, Simplicius’ account of ancient philosophy and recent exegesis puts the master on the same level with the disciple – not as to the amount of understanding of ancient philosophical doctrines that each one of them has but as to the very attitude they both ought to have when they come to grips with the texts of the ancients: They ought to strive to understand better. By the time Simplicius’ Aristotelian commentaries were composed there was no curriculum. As is well known, Simplicius constantly refers to his readers

57 Simp., In De cael. 640, 20–31: ἐπειδὴ δὲ πρὸς ταύτας τὰς ἐνστάσεις τὰς τῇ γενέσει τῶν σωμάτων τῇ ἐκ τῶν ἐπιπέδων λεγομένῃ προσενεχθείσας τινὲς μὲν καὶ ἄλλοι τῶν Πλατωνικῶν ἀντειρήκασι, Πρόκλος δὲ ὁ ἐκ Λυκίας ὀλίγον πρὸ ἐμοῦ γεγονὼς τοῦ Πλάτωνος διάδοχος βιβλίον ἔγραψε τὰς ἐνταῦθα τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ἐνστάσεις διαλύον, καλῶς ἔχειν ἔδοξέ μοι συντόμως ὡς δυνατὸν ταῖς ἐνστάσεσι τὰς λύσεις ἐκείνας ὑποτάξαι. ὅπερ δὲ πολλάκις εἴωθα, καὶ νῦν εἰπεῖν καιρός, ὅτι οὐ πραγματική τίς ἐστι τῶν φιλοσόφων ἡ διαφωνία, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον τοῦ λόγου καὶ δυνάμενον καὶ χειρόνως νοεῖσθαι πολλάκις ὑπαντῶν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης φειδοῖ τῶν ἐπιπο- λαίως ἀκουόντων τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἀντιλέγειν δοκεῖ πρὸς αὐτόν. Translation by I. Mueller, Simpli- cius: On Aristotle On the Heavens 3.7–4.6 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2009, slightly modified. Simplicius, Syrianus and the Harmony of Ancient Philosophers 95 and this is confirmed anew by the account given so far. It is, I think, in this deplorable absence of any philosophical school in which Hellenic doctrines could be properly taught that Simplicius’ biggest exegetical anxiety lies. Athens was history and Alexandria was getting obsessed with a νεαρὸς κόραξ, the counter-example of the φιλομαθεῖς, who insisted on the disagreement of ancient philosophers.58 Simplicius alerts his readers to that fact and he can be seen even calling to intellectual resistance, as in text no. 21. Highlighting the mutual contradiction of Hellenic doctrines, Plato’s or Aristotle’s criticisms against their predecessors, or even Syrianus’ or Proclus’ criticisms against Aristotle, was a means for breaking apart the innate unity of ancient Greek philosophy. The Hellenes should be able to dismiss such malicious criticisms and learn how to read the philanthropic criticisms of the ancients. But there was no place where they could be correspondingly trained. Simpli- cius invites them to learn by themselves or, if possible, in groups: The disciple must also be sufficiently good and virtuous, and above all he must carry out, both by himself and with other φιλομαθεῖς, the in-depth examination of Aristotelian concepts, while he must guard against dispu- tatious twaddle, into which many of those who frequent Aristotle fall.59 To help the Hellenes, Simplicius had no other choice but to offer an illustri- ous example of how to do such an in-depth examination.

58 Cf. e.g. Phlp., De aet. mundi c. Proclum 32, 8–13: οὕτω καὶ ὁ Πρόκλος λαμπρᾷ τῇ φωνῇ τὴν διαφωνίαν τῶν φιλοσόφων ὡμολόγηκεν, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους ἀποδέδειχεν· ἐξ ὧν θαυμάσειέ τις τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς ἀναιδείας τῶν συμφώνους κἀν τούτῳ δεικνύναι πειραθέντων Ἀριστοτέλη καὶ Πλάτωνα. ‘Thus even Proclus himself has explicitly conceded the disagreement between the two philosophers, or rather, demonstrated it from Aristotle’s own . This being so, one might well be amazed at the gross effrontery of those who have tried to show that Aristotle and Plato are in agreement even on this point.’ Translation by Share (see note 14). 59 Simp., In Cat. 7, 33–8, 2: Καὶ τὸν ἀκροατὴν δεῖν καλόν τε εἶναι καὶ σπουδαῖον ἱκανῶς καὶ προὔργου παντὸς ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπὶ πολὺ τῶν Ἀριστοτελικῶν νοημάτων ἐξέτασιν καθ᾽ αὑτόν τε καὶ μετὰ τῶν ὁμοίως φιλομαθῶν. φυλάττεσθαι δὲ χρὴ τὴν ἐριστικὴν φλυαρίαν, εἰς ἣν πολλοὶ τῶν Ἀριστοτέλει συγγινομένων ἀποπίπτουσιν. Translation by M. Chase, Simplicius: On Aristotle Categories 1–4 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2003, slightly modified. Compare Ammonius’ rather indifferent treatment of the same topic; In Cat. 6, 21–24: Ἕκτον ζητήσωμεν πῶς δεῖ παρασκευάσασθαι τὸν μέλλοντα ἀκροάσασθαι τῶν Ἀριστοτελικῶν συγγραμμάτων. καὶ λέγομεν ὅτι δεῖ πεπαιδευμένον τὰ ἤθη εἶναι καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν κεκαθαρμένον· ‘μὴ καθαρῷ γὰρ καθαροῦ ἐφάπτεσθαι οὐχὶ θεμιτόν’, ὁ Πλάτων ἔφησεν. ‘In the sixth place, let us ask how the person who is going to listen to Aristotle’s writings should prepare oneself. We reply that he must be educated in character and pure of soul. “For the impure is not allowed to attain the pure”, as Plato said (cf. Phd. 67 B 11).’ Translation by S. M. Cohen – G. B. Matthews, Ammonius: On Aristotle Categories (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 1991, modified. 96 Pantelis Golitsis

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