Simplicius, Syrianus and the Harmony of Ancient Philosophers*
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Simplicius, Syrianus and the Harmony of Ancient Philosophers* Pantelis Golitsis Introduction Harmonizing philosophical discourse, that is, the discourse which sets out to prove the compatibility of philosophical texts considered to contain incom- patible ideas, was not generally or permanently accepted in the philosophical Schools of Late Antiquity – contrary to what is quite often assumed in schol- arly literature.1 In late sixth century Alexandria, for instance, Iamblichus is referred to by Elias as a bad example of a commentator who sympathized too much with Plato: ‘Iamblichus was so much devoted to Plato’, he says,2 ‘that he contended that Aristotle did not disagree with Plato on the doctrine of Forms’, a disagreement which was apparently too obvious to Elias. Elias was of course not the first to see a disagreement between the two philoso- phers. To illustrate this, let us first take a look at the closing paragraph of Aristotle’s Metaphysics: (1) These then are the results <of the account of Pythagoreans and Plato- nists> and perhaps yet more might be adduced. At any rate, the fact that these men experience many great difficulties in explaining the generation of numbers and can in no way make a system of them is like a proof that the mathematicals are not separable from the perceptibles, as some say, and that they are not the <first> principles.3 * I am grateful to Stephen Menn for helpful comments on a penultimate draft of this paper. 1 It is true that, to some extent and on some range of doctrines, all Neoplatonists harmonized Aristotle’s with Plato’s philosophy. But Neoplatonists do this without acknowledging it, thinking that many of Aristotle’s doctrines were already in Plato. Studying the way they do this, for what purpose and on what range of doctrines, belongs to a paper about Neoplaton- ic hermeneutics. What I am particularly interested in in this paper is not so much Neopla- tonic hermeneutics but the way they themselves account for Aristotle’s polemics and its consequences for their overall approach to Aristotle’s philosophy. 2 Elias, In Cat. 123, 2–3: οὗτος γὰρ προσπάσχων τῷ Πλάτωνι συνδίδωσι τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει ὅτι οὐκ ἀντιλέγει τῷ Πλάτωνι διὰ τὰς ἰδέας. 3 Met. N 6.1093 b 24–29: Tὰ μὲν οὖν συμβαίνοντα ταῦτά τε κἂν ἔτι πλείω συναχθείη· ἔοικε δὲ τεκμήριον εἶναι τὸ πολλὰ κακοπαθεῖν περὶ τὴν γένεσιν αὐτῶν καὶ μηδένα τρόπον δύνασθαι συν- 70 Pantelis Golitsis Let us now take a look at how, four generations earlier than Elias, the Head of the Platonic School at Athens, Syrianus, reacted to that closing paragraph in his commentary on the Metaphysics: (2) Now, I would take as a proof of the fact that these divine men have done philosophy in the finest, best and most irrefutable way that you, <Aristotle>, who are the most ingenious and productive of those on record, have experienced such great difficulties in your controversy with them, having said nothing that might even be persuasive, not to say con- clusive, or indeed anything relevant to them at all, since in most of what you say you employ alien hypotheses which are in no way appropriate to the doctrines of your elders, while in a number of instances, when proposing to make some point against their true doctrine, you fail to come to grips with them at all.4 Aristotle is here deemed a bad reader of Plato and the Pythagoreans, striving to refute the best philosophy but being eventually trapped in his own irrele- vant or incompetent antilogies (shown to be so by Syrianus, of course). Earli- er in the commentary, Aristotle’s discourse is said by Syrianus to be φι- λεγκλήμων, ‘fond of fault-finding’: (3) However, before dealing with Aristotle’s arguments against this more authentic doctrine, it would be perhaps better to present the true mean- ing of the ancient philosophy with regard to those matters, so that we be able to understand whether it is the real theory of these divine men that Aristotle’s contentious discourse strives to battle with, or whether he takes what is said in the light of his own assumptions, and then dis- honestly sets out to overthrow them.5 εῖραι τοῦ μὴ χωριστὰ εἶναι τὰ μαθηματικὰ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ὡς ἔνιοι λέγουσι, μηδὲ ταύτας εἶναι τὰς ἀρχάς. 4 Syrian., In Met. 195, 2–9: Ἐγὼ δὲ τεκμήριον ἂν ποιησαίμην τοῦ κάλλιστα καὶ ἄριστα καὶ ἀνελεγκτότατα πεφιλοσοφηκέναι τοὺς θείους ἐκείνους ἄνδρας τὸ σὲ δεινότατον ὄντα καὶ γον- ιμώτατον τῶν ἱστορηθέντων [συγγραφέων] οὕτω μὲν κακοπαθῆσαι περὶ τὰς ἀντιλογίας τὰς πρὸς αὐτούς, μηδὲν δὲ οὐχ ὅτι νικητικὸν ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ πιθανὸν εἰρηκέναι, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ ὅλως τι πρὸς αὐτοὺς εἰρηκέναι, ἀλλὰ τὰ πλεῖστα μὲν ἑτέραις ὑποθέσεσι χρήσασθαι μηδὲν προσηκούσαις τῇ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων πραγματείᾳ, ἐνιαχοῦ δὲ λέγειν τι πρὸς τἀληθὲς αὐτῶν δόγμα προθέμενον παρὰ θύρας ἀπηντηκέναι. Translation by J. Dillon – D. O’Meara, Syrianus: On Aristotle Meta- physics 13–14 (Ancient Commentators on Aristotle), London 2006, slightly modified. 5 Syrian., In Met. 81, 26–30: πρὶν δὲ αὐτῶν ἅψασθαι τῶν κατὰ τῆς ἀληθεστέρας αὐτοῦ δόξης ἐπιχειρήσεων βέλτιον ἴσως τὴν ἀληθῆ παραδοῦναι περὶ τούτων τῆς ἀρχαίας φιλοσοφίας διάνοιαν, ἵνα καὶ σχῶμεν συνιδεῖν, εἴτε πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν θεωρίαν τῶν θείων ἀνδρῶν ὁ φιλεγκλήμων διαμάχε- ται λόγος εἴτε πρὸς οἰκείας ὑποθέσεις ἱστάμενος τὰ λεχθέντα μοχθηρῶς ἀνατρέπειν ἐπιχειρεῖ. Translation by Dillon – O’Meara (see note 4), modified. Simplicius, Syrianus and the Harmony of Ancient Philosophers 71 Such a statement, of course, does not have to mean that Syrianus completely disregarded Aristotle. In text no. 2, he considers Aristotle to be δεινότατος and γονιμώτατος among other philosophers and the failure of his attack is tantamount to one more proof of the irrefutable philosophy of the venerable ancients. Besides, in the opening paragraph of his commentary,6 Syrianus makes plain that Aristotle’s logic, ethics and physics, as well as a part of his metaphysics, are to be highly esteemed: (4) I am not a natural controversialist, nor yet would I count myself as a disciple of Aristotle on merely a few or trivial topics; rather, I am one of those who admire his logical methodology overall and who would accept with enthusiasm both his ethical and physical treatises. And that I may not make a bore of myself by enumerating in detail all the excellent aspects of this man’s philosophy, let me just ask why every right-minded person might not justly marvel at the apt remarks to be found in this most excellent treatise on the subject of the enmattered forms and defini- tions, and at the teachings on the divine and unmoved separable causal principles of the whole cosmos, accompanied by suitable demonstra- tions – although indeed they are beyond the reach of all synthetic treat- ment or too detailed exposition –, and declare the author of such a philo- sophical enquiry a benefactor of the life of man. For all this he is owed the warmest thanks both from us and from all those who can appreciate his acuity of mind.7 Does the parallel reading of texts no. 2, 3 and 4 suggest that Syrianus was a somewhat inconsequent philosopher, say, a self-contradicting ‘concordist’? In a recent article about ancient commentary and harmonization, Rachel Barney 6 Syrianus’ more focused commentary on Metaphysics M-N has to be dissociated, in my view, from his more scholarly commentary on the Metaphysics, from which only parts seem to have survived, namely on books B and Γ. The qualification of the beginning of M as φροίμια (81, 6: φροιμίων μὲν οὖν ἅλις) as well as the εὐχή at the end of N point to a self- standing work, which is clearly addressed to readers (cf. 195, 18: τῆς τῶν ἐντυγχανόντων διανοίας). 7 Syrian., In Met. 80, 4–16: Οὔκ εἰμι τῶν φιλαπεχθημόνων, οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ τῶν ἐν ὀλίγοις ἢ τοῖς τυχοῦσι τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη διδάσκαλον ἐπιγραφομένων, ἀλλὰ τῶν τάς τε λογικὰς αὐτοῦ μεθόδους ὡς ἐπὶ πᾶν τεθαυμακότων καὶ τῶν τὰς ἠθικάς τε καὶ φυσικὰς πραγματείας ὑπερφυῶς ἀποδεχ- ομένων. καὶ ἵνα μὴ νῦν πάντα διαριθμούμενος, ὅσα κάλλιστα καὶ ἄριστα τῷ ἀνδρὶ τῷδε πεφιλ- οσόφηται, μακρὸς εἶναι δόξω, τί οὐ πᾶς τῶν εὖφρονούντων τὰ ἐν τῇ τελεωτάτῃ πραγματείᾳ ταύτῃ περί τε ἐνύλων εἰδῶν καὶ ὁρισμῶν εὐστόχως εἰρημένα περί τε τῶν θείων καὶ ἀκινήτων ἐξῃρημένων κόσμου τοῦ σύμπαντος αἰτίων σὺν ἀποδείξεσι ταῖς ἐγχωρούσαις παραδοθέντα, καίπερ ὄντα πάσης συνθέσεως καὶ διεξόδου πυκνοτέρας ὑπέρτερα, δικαίως ἂν ἀγασθείη καὶ τὸν ἡγεμόνα τῆς τοιαύτης θεωρίας εὐεργέτην τοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίου κατονομάσειε; τούτων μὲν οὖν αὐτῷ πολλὴ χάρις παρά τε ἡμῶν παρά τε πάντων τῶν συνῃσθημένων αὐτοῦ τῆς ἀγχινοίας ὀφείλε- ται. Translation by Dillon – O’Meara (see note 4), slightly modified. 72 Pantelis Golitsis notes indeed: ‘There is an irremediable tension between, on the one hand, Syrianus’ enormous respect for Aristotle and his general picture of Plato and Aristotle as in accord, and on the other hand the implication that Aristotle is, inexplicably, an incompetent or malicious reader of Plato’.8 This tension disappears, however, if we disambiguate the word ‘accord’. The texts of two philosophers can be in accord by being complementary in a unified system, which is quite different from their being in accord as to the very ideas they contain. Syrianus accepted parts of Aristotle’s philosophy, not the whole of it. He accepted the overall validity of his logic and commended the study of his ethics and physics; he accepted (some sections of) Metaphys- ics Z-I and Metaphysics Λ;9 but he did not accept any part of Metaphysics M-N. And similarly did the next Head of the Athenian Platonic School, Pro- clus, who is known to have taught Aristotle’s De interpretatione10 and who amply used Aristotle’s Physics in his Elementatio physica,11 but who also refuted, in his lost treatise An Examination of Aristotle’s Criticisms of Plato’s Timaeus,12 the arguments advanced against Plato in Aristotle’s De caelo.