Free Will an Extensive Bibliography
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Nicholas Rescher Free Will An Extensive Bibliography Nicholas Rescher Free Will An Extensive Bibliography With the Collaboration of Estelle Burris Bibliographic information published by Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliographie; detailed bibliographic data is available in the Internet at http://dnb.ddb.de North and South America by Transaction Books Rutgers University Piscataway, NJ 08854-8042 [email protected] United Kingdom, Eire, Iceland, Turkey, Malta, Portugal by Gazelle Books Services Limited White Cross Mills Hightown LANCASTER, LA1 4XS [email protected] Livraison pour la France et la Belgique: Librairie Philosophique J.Vrin 6, place de la Sorbonne; F-75005 PARIS Tel. +33 (0)1 43 54 03 47; Fax +33 (0)1 43 54 48 18 www.vrin.fr 2010 ontos verlag P.O. Box 15 41, D-63133 Heusenstamm www.ontosverlag.com ISBN 978-3-86838-058-3 2010 No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in retrieval systems or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use of the purchaser of the work Printed on acid-free paper FSC-certified (Forest Stewardship Council) This hardcover binding meets the International Library standard Printed in Germany by buch bücher dd ag Free Will Bibliography Contents Introduction i Bibliography 1 FREE WILL BIBLIOGRAPHY INTRODUCTION “While the concept of free will is a favored theme of philosophical deliberation, there nevertheless here enters a one-sidedness, unclarity, and confusion as though a mass of a hundred speakers in a hundred languages were disputing simultaneously, each being absolutely convinced that he alone is altogether clear on the matter and that all the rest are uncomprehending ignoramuses.” —Eduard von Hartmann, The Phenomenology of Moral Consciousness (Berlin, C. Duncker, 1879), p. 399. It was said of Helen of Troy that she had a beauty that launched a thousand ships. And it can be said with understatement, that the problem of free will has a fascination which launched a thousand books. Rare indeed is the philosophical problem that has engendered a literature of comparable scope. Anyone who takes the present volume into hand cannot fail to be impressed by the amount of philosophical productivity on this topic. Nor is this all all due to the problem’s two and a half millennia of existence. For four-fifths of the writing ever done on the topic is the work of the past single generation. And even a casual look at such an extensive bibliography will suffice to show that a change of tectonic proportions has come over the subject during the past two generations. The ex- plosion of the literature has rendered it impossible to do “business as usual.” No longer cam even the most dedicated of scholars able to take the literature of the subject into adequate account—not even where one single particular problem- issue is concerned. The problem of free will was put on the agenda of philosophy in Plato’s dia- logue Phaedo, where it was posed in the following classic formulation, Socrates being the speaker: I felt very much as I should feel if someone said, ‘Socrates does by mind all he does’; and then, in telling the causes of what I am doing should say first that the reason why I sit here now is, that my body consists of bones and sinews, and the bones are hard and have joints between them, and the sinews can be tightened and slackened, surrounding the bones along with flesh and the skin which holds them together; so when the bones are uplifted in their sockets, the sinews slackening and tightening make me able to bend my limbs now, and for this cause I have bent to- gether and sit here; and if next he should give you other such causes of my con- versing with you, alleging as causes voices and airs and hearings and a thousand others like that, and neglecting to give the real causes . But by the Dog! these bones and sinews, I think, would have been some- where near Megara or Boeotia long ago, carried there by an opinion of what is best, if I had not believed it better and more just to submit to any sentence which my city gives than to take to my ii Nicholas Rescher • Free Will Biblography heels and run. To call all those things the causes is strange indeed. If one should say that unless I bad such things, bones and sinews and all the rest I have, I should not have been able to do what I thought best, that would indeed be true. But to say that these, and not my choice of the best, are the causes of my doing what I do (and when I act, by mind, too!), would be a very heedless way of speaking.1 The question at issue is effectively the following. Do people have the power to determine their actions through the choices they make on the basis of delibera- tions based on their own preferences and wishes, or is what we do always the re- sult of the operation of larger external forces beyond our control. The issue of the freedom of the will is of paramount importance in philoso- phy primarily for two reasons. The first is its bearing on the self-image of our- selves and our fellows as rational agents, beings whose actions are, or can be, autonomously determined by making thought-guided choices in a responsible way. The other is its bearing on the correlative issue of the moral—and subse- quently legal—responsibility for our actions. Without claiming free will for hu- mans, so it has generally been held, the prospect of viewing ourselves as respon- sible intelligent agents becomes hopelessly compromised. It is with some deliberation that this bibliography has been characterized as extensive rather than comprehensive. For even though it registers some 5,000 works dealing with freedom of the will, it must inevitably remain incomplete. Completeness is a state virtually unachievable here, since no matter how care- fully one does one’s inclusion-trawling in a venture of this sort, it is just about impossible to avoid having some fish slip by the net. Moreover, the boundaries of the topic are sufficiently indefinite that no exact line of demarcation can be drawn between “appropriately in” and “appropriately out.” Various errors of omission and commission are effectively unavoidable given the vast compass of relevant literature. The problem of free will vividly illustrates the dialectic of philosophical de- velopment in general. For philosophical deliberation is usually rooted with aporetic situations of individually plausible but collectively inconsistent theses, as per: (1) Whatever happens in the world is the product of the inexorable operation of nature’s causal laws. (The Principle of Causality) (2) The causality of nature’s processes proceeds independently of our thought-operated decisions and resolutions. (Naturalistic determinism) (3) Our thought processes—our deliberations and decisions—control our ac- tions in the world. (Free will) Given the incompatibility of these considerations as they stand, a limited num- ber of alternative approaches present themselves: (1)-abandonment: Some occurrences stand outside the domain of causality. (Causality-exemption) FREE WILL BIBLIOGRAPHY iii (2)-abandonment: Our thought can control the flow of natural causality. (Mental causation) (3)-abandonment: Our thought is itself the product of natural causality. (Causal determinism) Many of the issues that concern us here are spanned by the range of these three propositions. The history of the subject is such that every possible response to its questions has found an advocate. But as a given alternative was espoused, it immediately attracted objections and challenges that its proponents then seek to meet by means of due qualifications and refinement. Such a dialectal development pro- duced an ongoing elaboration—and complexification—of the theory in the wake of objections. The result has been an arms-race reminiscent escalation of ongo- ing sophistication and potency, where ever more elaborate refinements in the theory are in response to the challenges of its opponents. The fundamental posi- tions remain the same, but their articulation and exposition becomes ever more complex and its defenses ever more subtle and sophisticated. The present bibli- ography manifests how this process is clearly and strikingly at work in the litera- ture of the problem of free will. The English philosopher-historian R. G. Collingwood spoke for a plethora of theorists in maintaining that different eras and cultures cannot address the same question. This doctrine—generally called historicism—has it that even where a contention is formulated in the same words, the concepts at work in different culture-contexts are incommensurable. And if this is so, then there can be no perennial philosophical issues, because as the historico-cultural context changes, this change of setting induces a change of subject. Across the boundaries of eras and places there is bound to be conceptual discontinuity. The problem of free will is a perfect test-case for this position, seeing that to all appearances it has constantly been on the agenda of philosophical concern— alike in Mediterranean antiquity, in medieval Islam and Christian Europe in the modern world’s industrialized societies. Is it or is it not the same problems that have been addressed throughout by all those participants in the discussion? Are not those lawyers who wrangle about responsibility for action in its legal bearing throughout the years addressing the same issue? No doubt, saying that “the same question” is at issue is far from unproblem- atic.