Putin's Grand Strategy: Russia's Campaign Of
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PUTIN’S GRAND STRATEGY: RUSSIA’S CAMPAIGN OF CONTROLLED INSTABILITY IN UKRAINE AND BEYOND A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate Studies of Angelo State University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree MASTER OF SECURITY STUDIES by JOHN KOELLER December 2015 Major: Intelligence, Security Studies, and Analysis PUTIN’S GRAND STRATEGY: RUSSIA’S CAMPAIGN OF CONTROLLED INSTABILITY IN UKRAINE AND BEYOND by JOHN KOELLER APPROVED: Dr. Robert Ehlers Dr. Jeff Dailey Dr. Eduardo Martinez Dr. Roger Jackson 11/10/15 APPROVED: Dr. Susan E. Keith Dean, College of Graduate Studies ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS First I would like to thank the very friendly and approachable staff at Angelo State University. My initial accolades go to Dr. Robert Ehlers, who convinced me to stick with such a grueling program when I first thought it would have too overwhelming a pace completing this thesis and the degree program while working a full-time job. There is no doubt of the grueling course structure, but it is a manageable and rewarding experience. He also has given me the encouragement and confidence to proceed with a thesis attempt that I was initially unsure I could confront. The United States Air Force lost an important intellectual asset when Colonel Ehlers retired, but Angelo State has obtained a top-notch officer and professor in return—the most impressive I have had the pleasure of working with. I would also like to extend my thanks to Dr. Jeffrey Dailey for being my primary point of contact during this journey. He has always been quick and forthcoming with any questions that come up about coursework, and explains complex content in a way that is easier to understand. He is the type of man who, when he gives his insight, is bound to teach students something new and very useful. I honestly do not feel I would have proceeded as far in the program as I have without his guidance. Finally, I would like to thank my company, I-3 Corps, for funding the vast majority of the expenditures involved in my graduate school tuition. Never in my career have I found a more pleasant group of people to work for, and who put such a high priority on taking care of their employees. I know that the education I have received at Angelo State University will make me more adept and proficient in supporting I-3 Corps customers. iii ABSTRACT: This thesis addresses the great lengths to which Vladimir Putin and the Russian Federation have gone to foster “controlled instability” in the former Soviet Union. It is said that those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it, and with Western policy makers who appear unwilling to act on intelligence regarding Russian actions as well as incontrovertible evidence of Putin’s aggressive strategy, this Western failure to learn has contributed significantly to a repeat of various Russian behaviors during past conflicts. Russian actions pose a clear and present danger to the stability of the global community. Because many of the current events are not yet published in texts or are classified, the author has had to depend heavily upon open-source references from the internet to provide key events as they chronologically happened, particularly when analyzing the crisis in Ukraine. In writing the thesis, my observations have been validated by Russia’s recent incursion into Syria to fortify the Russian leadership’s interests as a result of the continued inaction of Western policy makers. As a result, we will see significant additional instances of controlled instability from Russia in the future. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS…………………………………………………………..………iii TABLE OF CONTENTS……………………….…………………………………………….iv ABSTRACT………………………………………………………………………………...…v CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………….……1 A Shared History of Russia and Ukraine……………………...………..…1 Ukraine and Russian History Post-Soviet Union……………………...…25 II. ELEMENTS OF CONTROLLED INSTABILITY..…………………..…….59 Key Players and Organizations…………………………………..………59 The Euromaiden…………………………………………………….……89 Maskirovka: Russian Intelligence and Military Doctrine………………123 Maskirovka Ukraine: Crimea and the Donbas…………………….……149 Maskirovka Flaws………………………………………………………160 III. ASSESSMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS……………….………...………179 What It All Means: Putting Everything Together………………………179 BIBLIOGRAPHY (Chicago Manuel of Style 16th Edition)…………………………..……258 BIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………………………………....278 v CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION RUSSIA AND UKRAINE: A SHARED BUT DIFFICULT HISTORY In any attempt to assess current Russian behavior toward Ukraine, we must understand the history and symptoms of the patient. Russians have had certain tendencies in the past that arguably could have been anticipated and utilized by Ukraine and Western leaders to calculate what to do next in Ukraine. While it is important to treat each individual strategic case as unique, history has shown us a multitude of cases in which certain patterns have repeated themselves in the realm of Russian strategy and geopolitics. The more thoroughly policy makers and strategists understand the history, rationalities, and reasoning behind a crisis, the more likely they will be to counter the adversary’s efforts and thus succeed in achieving their policy objectives. When dealing with a country like Russia, thinking a few moves ahead is vital to any strategic posture that has an opportunity to succeed. To summarize the whole of Russian and Ukrainian history in great detail would detract from the primary topic at hand, so this paper will address only the most important historical events of relevance to the present crisis. The Third Rome We must first address the “brotherly relationship” shared between Ukraine and Russia. Russia and Ukraine have been intimately involved historically long before the borders of both countries were drawn as they are at present. Like other areas of Europe, there were no nation-states before the modern period (roughly 1500 A.D.), and loyalty was focused around bands and tribes that quarreled with each other and occasionally allied themselves against Viking, Turk, and Arab invaders. The first Slavic nation-state emerged in 882 and was known as Kievan Rus, a historical event celebrated by both Ukraine and Russia. 1 This Slavic state covered a swath of territory that encompassed a sizable portion of modern Ukraine and European Russia and included present St. Petersburg, Moscow, and most importantly Kiev, which was the capital and was declared by Prince Oleg to be “The Mother of All Rus.”1 Because of this, the city of Kiev will always hold an element of prestige even in the hearts and minds of not just Ukrainians, but Russians as well. It was to be a short- lived period however, and upon the death of Yaroslav the Wise there was internal strife primarily related to who was the rightful successor to the throne.2 Combined with turmoil created in the region by the Fourth Crusade, this caused the empire to crumble even further. The conclusive demise of the Kievan Rus Empire was the result of Mongol invasions from the east. This period was critical in Russian psychology by developing the mindset that Ukraine’s fate should be tied to Russia’s for cultural and historical reasons, and also for the purposes of security from invasion, but it was also exactly the point at which some Ukrainians say their relationship with Russia ended. The Kievan Rus Empire is thus a focal point in the current crisis regarding questions of history and thus political legitimacy and sovereignty. Russia and Moscow emerged separately from Kiev, which was becoming less prestigious and influential as time wore on. Moscow was beginning to emerge as a trading hub in 1283. By the 14th century, a prominent regional duke named Ivan III (historically remembered as Ivan the Great) was able to establish the foundations of the Russian state through carefully calculated alliances and invasions of neighboring territories. Ivan III 1 “Prominent Russians: Oleg Veshchy”, Russia Today. Accessed October 24, 2015. http://russiapedia.rt.com/prominent-russians/the-ryurikovich-dynasty/oleg-veshchy-the-prophet/. 2 Marvin Kalb, Imperial Gamble: Putin, Ukraine, and the New Cold War (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2015), p. 34. 2 modelled his absolute rule to that of Western Europe, establishing a feudal system of lords and peasants. Mutual experiences in establishing identity were also shared at this time, with arguably the most important being the conversion to Christianity and its evolution toward Russian Orthodoxy. Russian Orthodoxy would be vital to the philosophy and decision- making process of Russia’s rulers up until the establishment of the Soviet Union. Moscow became the center of Russian Orthodoxy during this tumultuous period, and a prophet-monk named Filofei wrote a letter to Ivan the Great stating that he had a vision that Moscow would be the city that would be the “Third Rome.” This prophecy would be a rallying point for multiple eras of Russian rulers to the present day.3 Following the Ottoman Turk capture of Constantinople in 1453, Ivan III proclaimed that “two Romes have fallen, but one still stands, and a fourth there shall not be.”4 The driving notion for all of these leaders was that Russia was destined for greatness. Ivan the Great used this as a rallying cry to push back the crumbling Tartar Golden Horde and conquer much of its land given the threat it posed to Russia. By the end of Ivan the Great’s life, he established absolute power over most of his territory and began what would become the tsarist lineage and the foundations of a true Russian state. While the establishment of a state is of obvious importance, just as important was the establishment of the ideal of Moscow being a “Third Rome”, which plays a critical role in determining current Russian diplomatic and strategic behavior to this day.5 It was not until the period of Romanov expansion that the fates of Russia and Ukraine would be shared once again on a significant level.