Labor Exploitation on Pre-1952 Haciendas in the Lower Valley of Cochabamba, Bolivia

The Journai of Developing Areas 11 (Jan. 1977): 227-244

STEPHEN M. SMITH

In the latifundia-minifundia1 agrarian societies characterized by huge estates and tiny subsistence plots that predominate in much of Latin Amer- ica, the large majority of farmers are in the subsistence sector. A subgroup of these farmers is made up of the resident workers on the large farms (latifundos or haciendas). This institution somewhat resembles the Euro- pean manorial system with a landlord demesne, separate plots of land for the serfs, and labor obligations imposed on the serfs.2 This particular structure is most characteristic of the Andean and Central American highlands, with variations found throughout Latin America. Service has suggested the prevalence of three general types of agrarian institutions in Latin America, based on the differences in native cultures which the Spanish and Portu- guese colonists encountered. Outwardly, the economic, political, and reli- gious system* that existed in the highlands more closely resembled those of Spain than did the societies in the lowlands and plains areas. Thus, the Spanish colonists had their greatest success in establishing the feudal form of labor exploitation in these areas.3 The purpose of this paper is to examine

Assistant Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Idaho; has worked in Bolivia and Chile. Funding for field research was provided by the Land Tenure Center/Bolivia, directed by Ronald J. Clark. The author gratefully acknowledges the indispensable field assistance of Ricardo Luj&n as well as the comments and sugges- tions of William C. Thiesenhusen, Don Kanel, Hem&n Zeballos H., Joseph Dorsey, Marion Brown, and the referees of the JDA. 1 Spanish terms will be italicized only when they first appear. 3 For a discussion of the European manorial system and its Latin American counter- part, see Cristobal Kay, "Comparative Development of the European Manorial System and the Latin American Hacienda System," Journal of Peasant Studies 2 (October 1974): 69-98. 3 Elman R. Service, "Indian-European Relations in Colonial Latin America," American Anthropologist 57 (1955): 411-25. 238 Stephen 11. Smith this classic hacienda form of labor exploitation in an area where previous study has been limited. The system to be examined is that which existed in the Lower Cochabamba Valley in Bolivia before the revolution and agrarian reform of 1952-53.4 While latifundismo was essentially eliminated in Bolvia some 25 years ago, the system is still firmly entrenched in much of Latin America,6 and has even gained ground in recent years at the expense of the peasants.6 Those living under the system obtain access to land, consisting merely of usufruct rights, only by assuming a series of labor obligations on the hacienda. The obligations are so heavy that the peasant family perpetually lives on the margin of bare subsistence. These people are among those receiving the lowest average remuneration, including payments in land, of any significant sector of Latin American society.7 According to Feder, the latifundio system "seems to represent the most important single obstacle

4 There are very few studies of the overall agrarian system, either before or after the agrarian reform, and of the prereform hacienda system in the Cochabamba Valley. This lack of data exists in spite of the preeminent role of the Cochabamba Valley peasants in the 1952-53 agrarian reform. Dandier laments this fact in his important study of the origins of the peasant movement in Cochabamba. He points out that those studies which do exist for the region either emphasize certain size distinctions of the haciendas or different tenancy forms, without giving examples or descriptions of specific haciendas, and/or consider only one or two scattered cases. See Jorge Dandier H., El Sindicalismo Campesino en Bolivia (Mexico, D.F.: Institute Indigenista Interamericano, 1969), p. 40. As examples of the former type of study see: George McCutchen McBride, Agrarian Indian Communities of Highland Bolivia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1921); Octavio Salamanca, El Socialisms en Bolivia (Cochabamba, Bolivia: Imprenta Rejas, 1931); and David Weeks, "Land Tenure in Bolivia," Journal of Land and Public Utility Economics 23 (1947): 321-36. Examples of the scattered case study type are: Carlos Camacho Saa, "Minifundia, Productivity, and Land Reform in Cochabamba" (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1966); Evelyn Kiatipoff Clark, "Agrarian Reform and Developmental Change in Parotani, Bolivia" (Ph.D. diss. Indiana University, 1970); Olen E. Leonard, "Canton Chullpas: A Socioeconomic Study of the Cochabamba Valley of Bolivia," Foreign Agricultural Economics Report 27 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. De- partment of Agriculture, 1948); Joseph P. Dorsey, "A Case Study of the Lower Cocha- bamba Valley: Ex-Hacienda"! Parotani and Carrtmarra," T and Tenure Center Research Paper 64 (Madison: University of Wisconsin, June 1975); and also Dorsey s A Case Study of Ex-Hacienda Toralapa in the Tiraque Region of the Upper Cochabamba Val- ley," Land Tenure Center Research Paper 65 (Madison: University of Wisconsin, June 1975).

5 Ernest Feder, The Rape of the Peasantry (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1971), p. ix; and Peter Dorner and Don Kanel, 'The Economic Case for Land Reform" in Land Reform in Latin America, ed. Peter Domer, Land Economics Monographs 3 (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1971), p. 43. 6 An example of the system's gaining at the expense of the peasants is the increasing number of landless families. This is a consequence of workers leaving to escape onerous living conditions and to look for greater freedom and opportunity in the cities, plus workers being forced out of their jobs or having land rights taken away as landowners increasingly mechanize and convert from traditional in-kind payment to money wages in order to simplify labor problems and gain greater production control over their land. Not only are rural employment and poverty aggravated through this process, but much of Latin America's increasing urban unemployment, poverty, and spreading slum problems have their source in the agrarian structures. However, consideration of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper.

7 Ernest Feder, "La Mano de Obra Agricola en el Latifundismo," app. 5, Monografias sobre algunos aspectos de la Tenencia de la Tierra y el Desarrollo Rural en America Latina (Washington, D.C.: Comite Inter-Americano de Desarrollo Agricola [CIDA], 1970), p. 24. Labor Exploitation oil Pre-1952 Haciendas in Cochabamba, Bolivia 229 to rapid economic, social and political development" in Latin America today.8 However, the statistics which verify the extent and degree of this con- tinuing exploitation do not adequately reflect the economic, social, and psychological squalor under which the population tied to the large haciendas lives.9 Such data does, nevertheless, provide an aggregate indication of the skewed agricultural resource distribution in Latin America, and of the resulting control over economic, social, and political opportunities of the mass of rural residents by the landlords. But Feder concludes that complete comprehension of the totality of this control can only come from detailed, farm-level investigations of the employer-worker relationships, and the institutions which govern these relationships.10 Barraclough concurs with this assessment. He believes that those who study agrarian reform are in almost complete agreement that the relationships of greatest importance between agrarian reform and development cannot be solely determined by means of economic and socioeconomic indices. However, he points out that when these specialists are pressed to elaborate on those unquantifiable relationships, they are able to answer with only general references to individual freedom and dignity.11 The major purpose of this paper is to present a detailed farm-level investigation of hacienda labor exploitation, and thereby to provide the basis for understanding the landlords' "totality of control," and to give greater substance to the "individual freedom and dignity" arguments for

8 Feder, Rape of the Peasantry, p. ix. For a similar interpretation, see Jacques Lambert, Latin America, Social Structure and Political Institutions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967). 9 For example, in the mid-1960s after the extensive reforms in Mexico, Bolivia and Cuba, and midway through the decade when the United States and the Alliance for Progress were advocating agrarian reform, 60 to 65 percent of the land in Latin America was still in large estates. In 18 Latin American countries, 7.6 percent of the farms occupied 84 percent of the land. See: Lambert, Latin America, Social Structure, p. 62; Eric R. Wolf and Edward C. Hansen, The Human Condition in Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 148, citing data from the Statistical Abstract of Latin America 1967 (Los Angeles: University of California, Latin American Center, 1968), pp. 190-91; and Magnus Morner, "Tenant Labour in Andean South America Since the Eighteenth Century" (Moscow: Nauka Publishing House, Central Department of Oriental Literature, 1970), p. 1. Also in the mid-1960s, in the seven CIDA countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colom- bia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Peru) the large latifundia had at their service, directly or indirectly, 37 percent of the contracted agricultural work force. Considering the minifundia residents who depend on the latifundia for work, the latifundos controlled fully 45 percent of those contracted to work in agricultural pursuits. According to Feder ("La Mano de Obra Agricola," p. 9) if the medium-size, but still larger-than-family farms are included, this proportion rises to 76 percent. Since the mid-1960s, only two significant changes in this agrarian structure have occurred—in Peru and Chile. Thus, it can still be said that semifeudal conditions exist or predominate in the majority of Latin American countries, and that the social structure shaped by the latifundio system embraces a large part of the population, and in some places the majority. 10 Feder, Rape of the Peasantry, p. 119. 11 Solon Barraclough^ "Comentarios Generales sobre Tenecia de la Tierra y Desarrollo de la America Latina,' app. 1, Monografias sobre algunos aspectos de la Tenencia de la Tierra y el Desarrollo Rural en America Latina (Washington, D.C.: Comit6 Inter- Americano de Desarrollo Agricola [CIDA], 1970), pp. 21-22. 238 Stephen 11. Smith agrarian reform. In addition, the information presented here may provide the basis to examine more thoroughly why the agrarian reform in Cocha- bamba was more violent and complete, and followed a more spontaneous, "from-the-bottom-up" path, while in other areas the reform arrived months and years later and was essentially imposed from the top down.12 The study area is located in the provinces of Cercado, Quillacollo and Capinota in the Department of Cochabamba. The Lower Valley extends northwest from the city of Cochabamba, the department capital, for 15 to 20 kilometers, then turns south and runs through a narrow break in the mountains, shortly opening onto a smaller valley at Parotani, 40 kilometers from Cochabamba. This second valley continues south for approximately 20 kilometers to the town of Capinota. The region has reasonably homo- geneous agricultural characteristics of climate, land quality, and available irrigation water. These factors will thus have minimal influence on any differences in systems between haciendas. The data was gathered through group interviews with ex-resident workers (ex-colonos) from the pre-1952 haciendas. Interviews were held on 19 ex-haciendas during June and July, 1969. The primary interviewer had considerable experience in other parts of Bolivia. He was also a lifelong resident of the region. The author participated in all but one of the interviews. With respect to sampling procedure, the author (who had lived and worked in the region for two years) and the interviewer obtained as many interviews as time allowed while attempting to geographically represent the area.13 At the time of the Revolution of 1952, Bolivia was an overwhelmingly rural and agriculturally based country.14 Approximately 70 percent of the labor force was engaged in agriculture or agriculturally related occupa- tions.15 And considering only departmental capitals as urban areas, 87 percent of the population were rural residents in 1950. These general figures are also valid for the Department of Cochabamba and the area under study.16 The distribution of land where the population is so heavily dependent

12 According to Patch, the spontaneous agrarian reform began mainly in Cochabamba in 1952. Richard W. Patch, "Peasantry and National Revolution: Bolivia," in Expectant Peoples: Nationalism and Development (New York: Random House, 1963), p. iii. Pearse states that it was from Cochabamba that the strongest peasant impulses to rev- olutionary change emerged, and that the confrontation there was from the start more violent and the ousting of the landowners more rapid. Andrew Pearse, "Peasants and Revolution: The Case of Bolivia," pt. 2, Community and Society 1 (November 1972): 403, 409. 13 While some may feel that a sample size of nineteen is small, this is the largest, most representative study of the region to date. 14 Bolivia is still predominantly rural. In 1972, the rural population comprised approximately 68 to 70 percent of total population; see E. Boyd Winnergren and Morris D. Whitaker, The Status of Bolivian Agriculture (New York: Praeger, 1975), table 6.1, p. 163 and table 6.4, p. 166. 15 Cornelius H. Zondag, The Bolivian Economy, 1952-1965: The Revolution and Its Aftermath (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 18. 16 Result ados Generales de Censo de Poblucidn de la Republica de Bolivia (La Paz: Ministerio de Hacienda y Estadisticas, Direction de Estadisticas y Censos 1951) pp. 6, 131-32. Labor Exploitation oil Pre-1952 Haciendas in Cochabamba, Bolivia 281

upon agriculture is the major determinant of economic and social welfare. Before the agrarian reform, 91.9 percent of the land was owned by only 6.3 percent of the landowners, while 69.4 percent of the farmers controlled only 0.4 percent of the land.17 To the extent that there is a high correlation between land ownership and income, as Flores suggests, these figures indicate a similarly skewed income distribution.18 To further illustrate, it has been estimated that for the country as a whole, 70 to 80 percent of rural families were peasants. Some 25 to 30 percent of these peasant families—making up over Vz of the rural families in a country almost 90 percent rural—lived as obligated residents with their dependents on the large haciendas.19 The labor exploitation system under which these people lived was called colonato, and the obligated worker was the colono. As mentioned above, the colono earned the right to land by providing labor services to the hacienda owner. This was an opportunity to use a piece of land, but was not a claim over a specific parcel. However, law and tradition afforded the peasant some land rights. Weeks notes that eviction was permitted only if the colono refused to help with the planting and harvesting on the landlord's fields, or committed a criminal act.20 Flores also points out the strength of the colono's usufruct rights.21 In addition, Peinado states that the right was inherited by a member of the family who continued the labor obligation of the former colono.22 Still, the landlord had almost total control over the actions and lives of the colonos. A landowner would not hesitate to move the colonos if he wanted to reorganize his farm.23 And while there may have been minimal moral and legal obstacles to taking away land use rights, evictions were not unheard of. In Peinado's study, 35 families were ejected from one hacienda for refusing to exchange their old holdings for newer ones of lower quality.24 In the interviews for the present study, cases were cited where families were discharged from haciendas because of temporary inability to satisfy the colonato obligations.25

" U.S. Army Handbook jor Bolivia {W ashington, D.C.. American University, Foreign Areas Studies Division, Special Operations Office, August 1963), p. 463. 18 Edmundo Flores, "Un Aiio de Reforma Agraria en Bolivia," Trimestre Economico 23 (April-June 1956): 258. 19 Ronald J. Clark, "Land Reform in Bolivia," Spring Review of Land Reform: Country Papers, C-7 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Agency for International Development, 1970), pp. 7, 17. 20 David Weeks, "Land Tenure in Bolivia," p. 329. 21 Edmundo Flores, "Taraco: Monografia de un Latifundo del Altiplano Boliviano," Trimestre Economico 22 (April-June 1955): 212. 22 Marcelo Peinado Sotomayor, "Land Reform in Three Communities of Cochabamba, Bolivia" (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1971), p. 69. 23 Weeks, "Land Tenure in Bolivia," p. 328. 24 Peinado Sotomayor, "Land Reform," p. 69. 25 In the 1960s expulsion was still being practiced in Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru. Feder, Rape of the Peasantry, pp. 116-18; and Douglas E. Horton, "Haciendas and Cooperatives: A Preliminary Study of Latifundist Agriculture and Agrarian Reform in Northern Peru," Land Tenure Center Research Paper 53 (Madison: University of Wis- 238 Stephen 11. Smith

Constitutional provisions and presidential decrees provide further evidence of the oppressive nature of the colonato system. The 1939 Bolivian Constitution declared that slavery did not exist, and that no one was required to provide personal services without just compensation and complete consent. In 1945, President Gualberto Villarroel reiterated this position in decrees intended to abolish unremunerated labor, involuntary servitude, and tribute payments.26 While these decrees were generally conceded to have little or no effect, the present study indicates that they may have had a positive impact in the Lower Valley. The amount, and often the quality, of the land received by the colonos depended upon the size of the labor obligation undertaken. In all cases the plots were very small and of poor quality. Access to other inputs, such as water and fertilizer, was also severely limited. The only resource over which the colono had any significant control in attempting to increase the output from his land was his family's own labor. Since other means of supplementing income were also limited, the use of all available labor was the peasant family's only means of reaching even a subsistence production level. Consequently, any circumstances which reduced the time the peasant family could spend working its plot threatened its survival. But the colono's labor time had already been greatly reduced by his obligation to the hacienda, and duties required of his family reduced the available labor still further. Moreover, the colonato system placed other restrictions on the peasants' lives. The resulting social situation was essentially a lord-servant relationship between the landowner and the resident peasant families. From an economic standpoint, the system ensured that the peasants lived at a subsistence level.

The Colonato System in the Lower Valley The basis of the colonato system was the colono's year-round agricultural labor obligation. Several other labor services, however, were also required. A second major obligation was pongueaje, under which the colono or a member of his family periodically became the landlord's personal household servant. A third common service was miianaje. This was similar to pongueaje, but was usually required of the colono's wife and/or daughter. Other obligations were cacha—the transportation of hacienda produce to market; muqueo—making corn beer by women; hilado—spinning and weav- ing by women; and chaquereria— guarding ripening crops at night to prevent theft. The system of labor obligations found on the Lower Valley haciendas is summarized in table l.27

26 Weeks, "Land Tenure in Bolivia," p. 328. 27 The set of colono family labor and personal service obligations described here for Bolivia continues to be a common characteristic in most of Latin America. This is particularly true of the Andean countries. See Feder, Rape of the Peasantry, pp. 149-55; Charles Erasmus, "Upper Limits of Peasantry and Agrarian Reform: Bolivia, Venezuela and Mexico Compared," Ethnology 6 (October 1967): 369; Morner, "Tenant Labour," pp. 1-2. While the recent agrarian reforms in Peru and Chile have greatly reduced the incidence of traditional colonato, the system prevailed in those countries through the 1960s. Peru in the late 1960s appeared to differ little from Bolivia before 1952. See F. LaMond Tullis, Lord and Peasant in Peru: A Paradigm of Political and Social Change (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 4; Horton, "Haciendas TABLE 1 L. IJOR OBLIGATIONS ON PRE-1952 HACIENDAS IN I I IE LOWER VALLEY OF COCHABAMBA, BOLIVIA

o H a tc z 2 z to U Z W •< a CO OS C6 2 ESTIMATES OF 2 2 S a tF> 3 (5 E TOTAL NUMBER O 2 3 •< m H 5 < OS C O t= a H D os o « O H H Q 0. Q fc o H WORKED FOR ° ^ I 3 H n H 2 2 a § a I rt - 03 - aH. £Z s 2 < HACIENDA z •< 2 O a H& o « O " •< Si D J D OH a g- ? a w a a J M EH o s a a - » a M H g < p J tsi o < Pre- Post- S 5 a OS J ff.

MUQU E OTHE R r" < •J Se tJ f rD 3 s o 1946 1946 K h X H fan co o

K Viloma 5 5 2.0 X X 280 280 X X X n.d. Londo 3 3 3.0 X X X X 182 182 X 3 Montecillos 6 4 .3 X X 314 214 X X El Linde 6 4 1.0 X X X X 324 238 X n.d. Balconcillo 4 4 4.5 X X 217 217 X W Potrero 6 4 1.0 X X X 318 228 X X X X X S Bella Vista 6 6 1.0 X X X X 318 318 X X X X X Parotani 6 6 .5 X 310 310 X X X X Chojnacollo 6 5 .5 X X X 319 274 X X Playa Aneha 4 4 2.5 X X X 224 224 X X X a Ucuchi 3 3 1.3 X X 183 183 X X X o Chilimarca 6 4 .5 X 310 210 X X Sumumpaya 6 6 1.0 X X X 324 324 X X X X Capinota 3 3 .5 X X n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. Paucarpata 6 4 1.0 X X n.d. n.d. X X X X Cota 5 4 1.0 262 211 X X Filadelfia 6 4 1.0 X X X 337 233 X X X El Carmen 6 6 1.3 X X X 318 318 X X X X San Jorge 6 5 .9 X 316 268 X X X Mean 5.2 4.3 1.3 286 249 NOTE: This table follows the form used by Charles Erasmus in his study of southeastern Bolivia in "Upper Limits of Peasantry and Agrarian Reform," Ethnology 6 (October 1967): table 3, 353-54. n.d. - No data. 238 Stephen 11. Smith

Each hacienda had a fixed agricultural labor requirement for which use of a standard size plot of land, called a pegujal, was earned. For a full size pegujal, which averaged approximately 1.3 hectares (a range of .3 to 4.5 hectares), a colono prior to 1946 was required to work an average of 5.2 days per week (a range of 3 to 6 days) ,28 Subsequently the average weekly labor requirement decreased to 4.3 days.29 The requirement was lowered on 9 of the 19 haciendas in the sample. These findings are in conflict with observations by Dorsey that three or four days had been the required norm for agricultural work, and that "by 1950 the legally prescribed maximum of four days was generally observed throughout the Lower Valley, although there were instances of as few as two and as many as five still being required on many haciendas."30 As table 1 indicates, 37 percent of the haciendas sampled required more than four days, and none required less than three, for a full pegujal. The agricultural labor arrangements varied between haciendas and also within the same hacienda. On nine haciendas the ex-colonos indicated that they could choose the number of days they wished to work, depending on the size and often quality of pegujal they desired. For example, a half pegujal could be obtained for one-half the standard labor obligation. In four cases, a quarter pegujal was also available. Other variations were mentioned which permitted several combinations of work obligations and pegujal size and quality. The labor obligation also required the colonos to provide their own tools. If the colono owned a pair of oxen and a plow, he was required to make them available, even though the hacienda possessed its own. The structure of labor obligations that emerged in this study conforms closely to that described by Erasmus, Heath, R. Clark, and Pearse for southern Bolivia, the Altiplano and the Yungas, respectively.31 A major

and Cooperative," pp. 55-59; and Andrew Pearse, "Los Origenes de los Actuales Sistemas de Tenencia," app. 2, Monografias sobre algunos aspectos de la Tenencia de la Tierra y el Desarrollo Agricola (Washington, D.C.: Comite Inter-Americano de Desar- rollo Agricola [CIDA], 1970), p. 7. 28 lu reality, tins *vos an obligation which could be met by any adult member of the nuclear or extended family. Thus, it was to a colono's advantage to have enough able- bodied adults in his family to fulfill the labor and personal service obligations to the hacienda, as well as to work the family's personal parcel. In Peru and Ecuador the CIDA studies found that the colono was required to provide more than one worker at certain times of the year. Feder, "La Mano de Obra Agricola," pp. 48, 55. 29 This is the principal indication that the Villarroel decrees had a positive effect in this area. 30 Dorsey, "Case Study of the Lower Cochabamba Valley," pt. 2, p. 11. Dorsey cites no references for these statements, and the author knows of none. He may be generalizing from his two case studies, but if so, the conflict is sharper. One of his cases, Parotani, is also included in the present sample, and the ex-colonos indicated that they worked six days a week up to the agrarian reform. 31 Erasmus, "Upper Limits"; Heath et al., Land Reform and Social Revolution; Ronald J. Clark, "Land Reform"; Pearse, "Peasants and Revolution," pt. 1, p. 266. Similar labor requirements existed in Peru through the 1960s, with a range also of three to six days. See Pearse, "Origenes de Sistemas," p. 7; and Tullis, Lord and Peasant, p. 4. In Ecuador, five to six days appear to be normal according to Morner, "Tenant Labour," p. 1. As the author's unpublished field research demonstrated for Chile, this was true through the 1960s. Labor Exploitation oil Pre-1952 Haciendas in Cochabamba, Bolivia 235

difference is that on 14 of the 19 haciendas studied in the Lower Valley the colonos were paid regularly for their labor. On the Altiplano, Buechler found that "unpaid labor by resident peons was the rule."82 In only one of the Lower Valley cases was payment reported to have begun after 1946, and in another case the payment was increased after this date. This indicates that in the Lower Valley at least some remuneration was given for required agricultural labor before Villarroel's attempted reforms.33 In most cases, those interviewed readily remembered the rates at which they were paid. The average payment on 13 of the haciendas was about 31 centavos per day, where one boliviano (Bs. 1.00) equaled 100 centavos. For the 1940-51 period, one boliviano was worth an average of approximately US$.012. Thus, the average daily wage on these 13 haciendas was equal to less than .4 of one US cent ($.004). On the fourteenth hacienda that paid its colonos, Montecillos, the peasants indicated that they received Bs. 1.00 before 1946 and Bs. 5.00 after that date. An illustration of the purchasing power of these wages is provided in tables 2 and 3. The average prices of selected foods in the Lower Valley in the immediate pre-revolution years, and the number of labor days based on an average daily wage of .31 bolivianos required to purchase these foodstuffs are shown in table 2. The prices of men's hats and shirts, shown in table 3, are such that years of saving would have been necessary to purchase these goods.34 Data in tables 2 and 3 indicate that the colonos were only marginally a part of the market economy. Furthermore, even in the cases where colonos received a regular wage, it was insufficient to enable them to purchase a subsistence diet. The role of the pegujal in providing the family's food thus takes on added importance. Another difference between the colonato system in the Lower Cocha- bamba Valley and that in southeastern Bolivia was the number of required work days and the amount of land obtained in exchange. The annual average labor obligation in the latter area was 127 days versus 249 in the Lower Valley after 1946 (see table l).86 There was also a much wider variation on the southeastern haciendas, where % to ^ of a hacienda's cultivated land was in the hands of serfs.36 For the country as a whole Pearse states that 60 to 85 percent of the land in most estates was in the hands of the pea-

32 Heath, et al., Land Reform, p. 220. 33 This finding is also in conflict with Dorsey who states that "the practice of paying wages does not appear to have been generalized in the (Lower) Valley during the prereform period," in "Case Study of the Lower Cochabamba Valley," pt. 2, p. 12. No references are cited for this statement. 34 It should be mentioned that the colono families had other sources of cash income from various entrepreneurial activities which cannot be treated within the scope of this paper. Such activities included occasional sales of crop and animal produce in small amounts; the manufacture of baskets, brooms, and pottery; the raising of cattle or hogs in compama ("sharecropping") which were sold for a profit; and infrequent hiring out as day laborers. Feder, citing Julio Barbosa, refers to this phenomena as "polyvalency of employment" in Rape of the Peasantry, p. 134. 35 Erasmus, "Upper Limits," table 3, pp. 353-54. 36 Erasmus, "Upper Limits," p. 352. 238 Stephen 11. Smith

TABLE 2

1945-50 AVERAGE PRICES® OF SELECTED FOODS IN QUILLACOLLO

PRICE IN EQUIVALENT PRODUCT BOLIVIANOS*1 DATS OF LABOR"

Rice (imported) 13.20 42.5 Barley 4.20 13.5 Coca 61.30 197.7 Chufio (first class) 11.50 37.1 Corn 4.80 15.5 Chicken (each) 40.20 129.7 Cow's milk (liter) 3.60 11.6 Beef (with bone) 17.30 55.8 Mutton 19.10 61.6 Pork 18.50 59.7 Eggs (each) 1.80 5.8 Corn flour 4.60 14.8 Potatoes (first class) 3.60 11.6 SOURCE: Derived from 1945 base prices and price indexes for 1946- 50 in Estadisticas de Indiccs dc Precios de Produclos Agropecvarios de la Republica de Bolivia, anos 1946-50 (La Paz: Ministerio de Agri- culture, Ganaderia y Colonization, Direccio'n General de Economia Rural, Departamento de Muestros y Padrones, n.d.). a Price per kilogram unless otherwise indicated. b One boliviano (Bs. 1.00) = US$.012, on the average for 1940-51. c Based on the daily average wage of .31 bolivianos paid on 13 haciendas.

TABLE 3

1945-50 AVERAGE PRICES OF MEN'S SHIRTS AND HATS-LA PAZ (PRICE IN BOLIVIANOS'1 )

Imported hats 834 Imported shirts 431 Domestic shirts 289 SOURCE: Derived from 1945 base prices and general cost of living index (1931 = 100) in Memoria Anual (La Paz: Banco Central de Bolivia, 1946). * One boliviano (Bs. 1.00) = US$.012. santry 37 For the Lower Valley there is evidence that the extremes of these proportions were reversed.38 The explanation for these differences lies in a combination of land quality (including water availability), population density, market proximity, labor demand, absentee ownership, and perhaps the nature of the agricultural enterprise. R. Clark states that the pegujal size and colono family work obligation fluctuated in direct relation to the demand for labor, population pressure, and land quality.39 Feder and Erasmus also conclude that a high population density leads to the greatest labor exploitation.40

37 Pearse, "Peasants and Revolution," pt. 2, p. 409. 38 Dorsey, "Case Study of the Lower Cochabamba Valley," pt. 2, p. 8. 39 Ronald J. Clark, "Reforma Agraria e Integraci6n Campesina en la Economia Boliv- iana," Estudios Andinos 1 (1970): 12. 40 Feder, "La Mano de Obra Agricola," p. 25; and Erasmus, "Upper Limits," pp. 356, Labor Exploitation oil Pre-1952 Haciendas in Cochabamba, Bolivia 287

In southeastern Bolivia, as well as in much of the rest of the country, absentee ownership was high, land quality was low (due to its hilly, rocky nature and the lack of water), markets were distant, and workers were scarce. Under these conditions, the landowner tended to invest little of his own time, effort, or finances in the hacienda. In order to work the hacienda and to attract labor, much of the land, except that of best quality, would be turned over to the peasants either to grow crops or raise livestock, and the owner would receive a percentage of the output for his income. In such cases the labor obligations were minimal, except dining planting and harvesting.41 In the Lower Valley however, conditions were quite the opposite. The region contains some of the country's highest quality land and has a year- round water supply. Double-cropping was often practiced here and the area produced a high proportion of the country's vegetables. Also large urban markets existed nearby in the departmental and provincial capitals, and the only road and railroad to the mining areas and the Altiplano urban areas ran through the Lower Valley. Furthermore, the Cochabamba Valley as a whole was and is one of the most densely populated regions of Bolivia, and before the agrarian reform there was a large excess labor force, promoting the large migrations to the agricultural frontiers and the mining areas.42 Thus, the conditions in the Lower Valley were more conducive to extreme labor exploitation than in any other area of the country except Lake Titicaca.43 The second major labor obligation was that of pongueaje. This was a rotating duty under which a colono became the personal household servant (pongo) of the landlord (patn5n). Pongueaje was perhaps the most onerous and hated of all obligations, and was the specific target of the 1939 Con- stitution and of President Villarroel's 1945 decrees. Nevertheless, all but one of the haciendas studied required this service. The one that did not, Cota, had only five colonos, and brought its pongos from another property while the resident colonos served as occasional substitutes. On four of the haciendas (El Linde, Potrero, Montecillos, and Bella Vista) pongueaje was required at both the hacienda house and at the landlord's house in Cocha- bamba. At Sumumpaya, the colonos traveled to Bella Vista to comply with their pongueaje obligation. Pongueaje required the appointed person to leave his house, family, and lands when his turn came and spend a week in the hacienda house. He could not leave unless sent on an errand or until his week ended. The pongo was on call 24 hours a day to perform any service desired by the patr6n. In several cases the landlord did not feel obligated even to provide

41 Erasmus, "Upper Limits," p. 355. 41 R. J. Clark, "Reforma Agraria," p. 13. 43 Chile's Central Valley is a region similar to the Lower Valley in land quality (relative to the rest of the country), population density, market proximity, and agricultural enterprises. Up to the time of the agrarian reform in the late 1960s and early 1970s, labor exploitation in the Central Valley, measured in terms of required days of labor and the amount of land and cash payment received, was at least as great as that in the Lower Valley of Cochabamba 20 vears earlier. Pablo Ramirez, Cambio en las formas de pago en la mono de obra agricola (Santiago: Institute de Capacitaci6n e ITIVPCTIFMOI'An nrt Rpfnrmi 4irrnnn fTf^TR A1 lQfifi\. n .1 nrtrttiT0{c!iAr4 fiplH TPCMTOII Vl V 238 Stephen 11. Smith food for the pongo, necessitating its being brought from the latter's home. A pongo's wife would usually bring her husband's meals, thereby taking advantage of her only opportunity to see him during that week. In one case, the hacienda Potrero, the pongos were required to bring a new broom, made from a grass growing in the area, with them to perform their sweep- ing chores. The duties performed under the pongueaje obligation were divided into two general categories—household service and care of the hacienda's animals and animal quarters. As a household servant, the pongo cleaned the house and patio, washed dishes, helped prepare food, kept the house supplied with water, cut and hauled firewood, ran errands, did minor marketing, and cared for the household garden and orchard. Under the second category, the pongo was expected to feed and water both the farm and household animals, clean the quarters of these animals, and feed the oxen at 4:00 A.M. so that they would be ready to work by 6:00 or 8:00 A.M. Beyond these basic duties, the pongueaje at Montecillos regularly required travel to the landlord's chicharia (tavern) in a nearby town and making chicha (corn beer). Under a later landlord, these colonos operated a grinding mill. On the Bella Vista hacienda, when the Sumumpaya colonos finished their normal pongueaje duties, they joined the other colonos in the fields. Although the pongueaje obligation was usually carried out by one person at a time, 6 of the 19 haciendas studied employed 2 pongos per week. These 6 averaged 39.0 colonos per hacienda as opposed to the overall average of 24.6. They were Bella Vista, Parotani, Balconcillo, Ucuchi, Chili- marca, and El Carmen, with the first two also drawing pongos from other properties of the same landlord. In these six cases, one pongo was employed in the house and was called the ukhu or huasi pongo (Quechua for inside or house pongo). The second was called the jawa or huaca pongo (Quechua for outside or cow pongo). Each colono family served an average of 3.6 weeks of pongueaje per year before the decrees of Villarroel. The range of service was from approximately ten weeks at Filadelfia, seven at Capinota, and six at Ucuchi and K Viloma to one or two weeks at six other haciendas. After 1945-46, the average dropped to 3.2 weeks per year when the number of colonos at Filadelfia more than doubled (because of improved working conditions), and the previous ten-week pongueaje obligation declined to less than four weeks per year. One significant facet of the traditional pongueaje was absent on the majority of the haciendas studied in the Lower Valley. In 12 cases, the ex- colonos indicated that although the service was obligatory and burdensome, they did receive cash remuneration for the week's work.44 On the thirteenth hacienda, Cota, the colonos serving as substitute pongos received payment in potatoes, although payment was made by the missing pongo as a fine. The personal service obligation of mitana]e was required on the haciendas of El Linde, Bella Vista, Sumumpaya, Londo, and Chojnacollo. The last

44 Seven of the 12 haciendas paid an average of Bs. .31 per week (Bs. 1 — $.012, 1940-51 average) while the other three paid an average of Bs. 3.5 per week. 13 Labor Exploitation oil Pre-1952 Haciendas in Cochabamba, Bolivia required the service only up to 1948, when the new owner abolished the obligation. As usually defined, it was a rotating, gratuitous service, similar to pongueaje, and was performed in the hacienda house by the young daughters and/or wives of the colonos. The duties consisted of cooking, cleaning, washing clothes, doing minor marketing chores, and feeding the household animals such as dogs and chickens. Only Chojnacollo, Londo, and occasionally Bella Vista adhered to the traditional form of mitanaje. The ex-colonos at Londo remember the service as particularly severe, with the threat of punishment always present The marketing had to be done in either Parotani or Santivanez, eight or ten kilometers away. And each evening the mitani was required to rub the landlord's wife's feet until the latter went to bed. An example of the harsh conditions of mitanaje at Londo was related by one old woman. As a girl, she was taking a leg of lamb to market one day. Along the way a dog ran off with the meat which resulted in her serving a second consecutive week of mitanaje. At Bella Vista, on the other hand, household service by the women was required only occasionally, mainly when guests were present. On the other haciendas requiring mitanaje (El Linde, Sumumpaya, and generally Bella Vista), the colono himself was under the obligation. He was required to spend a week herding the hacienda's animals. However, it was indicated that his family usually helped with this service, thereby allowing the head of the family time to spend on his own land. Each family on the five haciendas served an average of 2 to 2.5 weeks of mitanaje per year. No pay was received for this service. The services of pongueaje and mitanaje were long considered by the reform-minded in Bolivia to be the most onerous facets of the pre-1952 agrarian system. They were obligatory and extremely burdensome in time served, work load, interruption of family relations, and in the distances that colonos often had to travel, by their own means, to arrive at the place of service. Also, some haciendas required a monetary or foodstuff payment to the landlord at the beginning of the week of service.45 Under the regime of President Villarroel, pongueaje and mitanaje were the primary subjects of the decrees previously discussed. But the effect of the decrees, and implicitly the strength of the landlords and their system, can be seen in the overthrow and death of Villarroel and the continuance of the services unabated until the 1952 Revolution. Another common manner of labor exploitation was cacha.4® Under this obligation, the colonos transported the hacienda's crop and animal produce to market. They often took firewood and produce to the landlord's house in Cochabamba. The mode of transportation was by foot or by donkey, with the exception of two haciendas that owned carts. The cacha service was also determined by a rotation scheme. As with the other obligations, immediate compliance was required, even if one's own crops needed tend- ing.

45 Other examples of this practice are found in R. J. Clark, "Land Reform," p. 155, and Dandier H., Sindicalismo Campesino, p. 50. 44 Cacha appeared to be common throughout Bolivia. See Erasmus, "Upper Limits," p. 355, and Pearse, "Peasants and Revolution," p. 268. 238 Stephen 11. Smith

Thirteen of the nineteen haciendas relied on cacha to some extent Two included it under already required services, but on the other haciendas it was an additional obligation. The haciendas located farthest from Cocha- bamba (Londo, Ucuchi, Balconcillo, and Playa Ancha) used the service mainly to supply their city houses with firewood and farm produce, or to take cheese or butter to sell in Cochabamba. Cacha was required less frequently on these haciendas but each turn necessarily lasted longer. This was especially true when firewood had to be delivered. The colono sched- uled to perform this service had to find, cut, load, and transport his quota, a process that could take several days. Other haciendas closer to the markets of Quillacollo and Cochabamba made use of cacha once or twice a week, and in two cases daily, to transport crops to market. No definite figures were obtained for the number of days per year required by cacha, but a reasonable estimate would be approximately 10 to 15 mandays per year. The colonos were paid for this service in only four cases, averaging Bs. .15 per day. Several other labor obligations were required, but were less common and less burdensome. Muqueo was the chewing of a certain quantity of com flour preparatory to making chicha. It was primarily a woman's chore and was required only a few times a year—at harvest, on an occasional holiday, or at times of common labor. The resulting chicha was for the benefit of all and was not sold. Two other women's duties were shearing sheep and spinning a required amount of wool (hilado) for the hacienda. Chaquereria was mentioned in only one interview but was probably a common duty. It entailed watching the corn crop at night to guard against theft during the final days of ripening. The practice of sending colonos to other properties to work, or renting them to other haciendas, is mentioned by R. Clark as being a common practice on the Altiplano.47 During the interviews for this study the former was found only four times (Sumumpaya, Cota, Parotani, and Chojiiacollo) and the latter once, at El Linde. Beyond the restrictions. caused by heavy labor obligations, small and low quality subsistence plots, and the various taxes (discussed below), the colono family was subject to additional direct controls on its life. The most widespread was the prohibition against cutting firewood on the hacienda lands, either to sell or use for cooking. This restriction was mentioned in 12 interviews and was probably present in other instances. As a result, the colonos were limited to fallen branches, cornstalks left in the ground after harvest, dried cattle dung, or what could be stolen. By not being allowed to sell firewood, the colonos were deprived of another potential source of cash income. They, however, continually tried to evade this restriction and in some areas were able to go to nearby hills and cut wood for both sale and use. Cutting broomgrass for sale and making chicha without the landlord's permission were also prohibited. Chicha was an important potential income source, as well as being an integral part of the peasants' social fives. Evelyn Clark explains the prohibition against brewing chicha as an attempt by

" R T ClarV "T.and Reform" o. 155 Labor Exploitation oil Pre-1952 Haciendas in Cochabamba, Bolivia 841 landlords to assure regular work attendance, although the major effect was to force the colonos to go outside the hacienda for their chicha.48

Tax and Tribute Payments to the Landlord The R. Clark and Dandier studies noted above, along with the Villarroel decrees, mention the tribute or tax payments exacted from the colonos in addition to labor obligations.49 Similar payments were made by the colonos in the Lower Valley. The two that were mentioned in the interviews were hierbaje—a tax on the colono's animals, and direct tribute payments. Hierbaje (also called pastoreo, diezmo, or vientena) was the most common form of payment. This was a tax on the colono's animals for the right to use hacienda pasture lands. For sheep, 6 haciendas charged 10 percent and 2 charged 20 percent of the flock per year, with the landlord taking his choice of the flock. For example, at Parotani the landlord made his yearly assessment in the company of a slaughterhouse buyer. At K Viloma the colonos paid 3 to 5 bolivianos per year for every 10 to 20 sheep. The hierbaje at Playa Ancha and Londo was half a year's accumulated manure from the sheep flock. On Londo this was charged in addition to 20 percent of the flock. Two haciendas also taxed cows and oxen. At Mon- tecillos, the charge was 3 bolivianos per cow or ox per year, and at Pau- carpata it was one extra day of work per animal. Tribute payments as described by R. Clark and Dandier occurred only at Bella Vista and Sumumpaya, both owned by the same person. The colonos from Sumumpaya maintained, however, that the practice was voluntary. Nevertheless, all colonos regularly took a few eggs to the landlord when they visited or worked at Bella Vista. Also at Bella Vista, the resident colonos presented the landlord with a dozen eggs and a chicken just before dividing the produce from a sharecropping arrangement. The Ucuchi and Potrero landlords exacted a tribute payment of one or two chickens a year. However, the colonos were paid—the full market price at Potrero and about half the market price at Ucuchi.

Other Dealings with the Landlord Frequently, the combination of pegujal production, wages, and other earnings was less than was needed to live. This situation resulted in either constant hunger or continual debt. When necessary, the colonos would purchase staples, such as corn and potatoes, from the landlord. Payment was usually made by mortgaging future earnings on those haciendas where wages were paid, or by working extra days at the going day-wage rate. Occasionally a colono would pay cash for the food or would repay in kind at the next harvest. The prices charged appeared to be equal to or less than the going market price. No interest was charged in such transactions. At Sumumpaya the need to supplement the yield from one's pegujal occurred so often that the colonos at times were deeply in debt to the land-

48 E. K. Clark, "Agrarian Reform," p. 53. "R. J. Clark, "Land Reform," p. 155; Dandier H. Sindinnllimn C/?»mi#*fnn » «sn STEPHEN M. OIIINU lord. When this happened, further credit was denied until the account was cleared. In other dealings with their landlords, the colonos would obtain an advance on wages, buy alfalfa, or rent a harvested cornfield or patch of alfalfa on which to graze their animals, and raise animals or crops in compania. At Parotani a "company store" (pulperta) was maintained. The store provided extra staples along with some luxury foods. To pay the bills that were continually run up, the colonos would work extra days for the hacienda.50

Sanctions Violation of the restrictions and labor obligations imposed by the landlord brought sanctions and sometimes physical punishment. If caught cutting firewood on the hacienda lands, a colono would have his ax con- fiscated and be forced to work an extra day to get it back. Sometimes he was also made to pay for the wood he cut. Failure to comply with the obligations of the colonato system always carried the threat of expulsion from the hacienda, which meant complete loss of livelihood. A missed day of work or tardiness resulted in extra days of labor or loss of pay for a week. Unfulfilled pongueaje or mitanaje obligations often brought a second consecutive week of service. Physical punishment was known but was not common on the haciendas studied.51 An exception was Londo. Here the mayordomo (overseer, usually a peasant himself) directed the work "en forma violenta y torpe" (violently and roughly), whipping the colonos and threatening them with expulsion from the hacienda. When such treatment was resisted, expulsion did result for three or four days at a time, until the colono humbly came back. If the colonos complained, the owner tended to favor the mayordomo. During the final days of the pre-revolution system, in the face of impending reform, the abuse by the mayordomo at Londo increased to the point where he threatened to shoot the colonos with a pistol if they disobeyed orders, say- ing to them, "Cuanto siempre valen ustedes? Solamente valen 100 bolivianos." (How much do you think you are worth? You are only worth 100 bolivianos.) Summary The colonato system of labor exploitation which existed in Bolivia before 1952 was socially, psychologically, and economically enslaving to approximately 40 percent of the country's population. The function of the system

60 Debt peonage and the presence of hacienda stores appears to have been much less prevalent in the Lower Valley than in the other parts of Bolivia and Latin America. The difference is directly related to population density. In areas where labor was scarce, such as southeastern Bolivia and northwestern Mexico, the hacienda store and debt peonage were used to keep and control a labor force. According to Erasmus, "Upper Limits," pp. 356, 367, in Mexico the obligated peasants were not even allowed to plant a subsistence plot until the debt was paid. In tne Lower Valley, however, the demand for employment and a subsistence plot was so high that a large, stable, and compliant work force was always available. Cl The opposite was true in the Yungas valleys region on the eastern slopes of the Andes northeast of La Paz. Pearse, "Peasants and Revolution," pp. 265, 268-69. Labor Exploitation oil Pre-1952 Haciendas in Cochabamba, Bolivia 848

was to define the status of the resident obligated workers and families as serfs; to keep them "beyond the pale of the urban, Spanish-speaking society, without hope of mobility"; and to keep them on the margin of subsistence.®2 The system accomplished this up to the revolution and agrarian reform of 1952-53. There was little hope of moving off a hacienda since the peasant's status on the hacienda all but precluded his entry into a non-agricultural occupation. In Pearse's words, "Freedom for the peasant to wander in this society with neither land rights nor a patr6n behind him was no better than the freedom of a cockroach to walk about the fowlyard."BS These people obtained a means of support only if they fulfilled agricultural labor and personal service obligations on the haciendas. In return they received usufruct rights to small, low-quality plots of land, and little or no monetary compensation. The obligated worker (colono) was expected to sustain himself and his family on this piece of land, an often impossible task, given the size and quality of the plots, the lack of other inputs, as well as the heavy labor obligations required of the colono and his family. In addition, at crucial times (planting, weeding, irrigation, harvest) the landlord's crops had priority, and thus the colono could not tend his crops when necessary to ensure a maximum yield. Moveover, since a significant portion of his production was taxed away by the landlord, the colono was frequently forced to borrow staple foods from the landlord. These loans, which were repaid either in land or with extra work, served only to exacerbate the colono's plight. The system of labor exploitation that emerged in this study conforms closely to that which has been documented for other areas of Bolivia by R. Clark, Erasmus, Heath, and Pearse. In the Lower Cochabamba Valley a combination of high population density, surplus labor, good land, and accessible and ready markets produced this labor exploitation situation in the extreme. The colono family had labor obligations which averaged almost five days a week year-round, including onerous personal services required of the entire family. Beyond supplementing previous work, the information presented here also has helped fill an important gap in our knowledge about the agrarian system in the region where Bolivia's militant peasant movement originated, and the spontaneous, peasant-instigated land reform began. While this exploitive labor system has been eliminated in Bolivia, in much of the rest of Latin America there has been little change in the agrarian structure in terms of increasing access to income and income pro- ducing resources, or in the peasants' involvement in the social and political activities of their countries.64

62 Richard W. Patch, "Bolivia: The Restrained Revolution," Land Tenure Center Re- print 33 (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1961), p. 124. 53 Pearse, "Peasants and Revolution," p. 270. 54 Feder, Rape of the Peasantry, p. 109.