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FSR FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW APRIL 2014 MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICIES IMPLEMENTATION AND INTERACTIONS 18 110–018 FSR18.indb 1 page 1 du fichier 240091 2014_03_25 24/03/2014 17:09:58 www.banque-france.fr “No part of this publication may be reproduced other than for the purposes stipulated in Article L122-5 2° and 3° a) of the Intellectual Property Code without the express authorisation of the Banque de France or, where applicable, without complying with the terms of Article L122-10. of the said Code.” © Banque de France - 2014 ISSN 1636-6964 FSR18.indb 2 page 2 du fichier 240091 2014_03_25 24/03/2014 17:09:58 CONTENTS ARTICLES Introduction Macroprudential policy: from theory to implementation CHRISTIAN NOYER, Banque de France 7 Macroprudential policies: rationale and objectives Five questions and six answers about macroprudential policy JAIME CARUANA AND BENJAMIN H. COHEN, Bank for International Settlements 15 Governance of macroprudential policy KLAAS KNOT, De Nederlandsche Bank 25 From tapering to preventive policy CHARLES GOODHART, London School of Economics, Financial Markets Group AND ENRICO PEROTTI, University of Amsterdam and Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Collective action problems in macroprudential policy and the need for international coordination JOSÉ VIÑALS AND ERLEND NIER, International Monetary Fund 39 A macroprudential perspective on regulating large financial institutions DANIEL K. TARULLO, Federal Reserve System 47 The impact of macroprudential policy on financial integration ANDREAS DOMBRET, Deutsche Bundesbank 61 Experiences regarding macroprudential policies European macroprudential policy from gestation to infancy IGNAZIO ANGELONI, European Central Bank 71 Macroprudential policy in France: requirements and implementation ANNE LE LORIER, Banque de France 85 Implementing macroprudential policies: the Swiss approach JEAN‑PIERRE DANTHINE, Swiss National Bank 97 The effects of macroprudential policies on housing market risks: evidence from Hong Kong DONG HE, Hong Kong Monetary Authority 105 Macroprudential policies in Korea – Key measures and experiences CHOONGSOO KIM, Bank of Korea 121 Framework for the conduct of macroprudential policy in India: experiences and perspectives KAMALESH C. CHAKRABARTY, Reserve Bank of India 131 Learning from the history of American macroprudential policy DOUGLAS J. ELLIOTT, The Brookings Institution 145 Macroprudential policy and quantitative instruments: a European historical perspective ANNA KELBER AND ÉRIC MONNET, Banque de France 151 Macroprudential policies: implementation and interactions Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 18 • April 2014 3 FSR18.indb 3 page 3 du fichier 240091 2014_03_25 24/03/2014 17:09:59 CONTENTS Macroprudential policy interactions and transmission channels Macroprudential policy beyond banking regulation OLIVIER JEANNE AND ANTON KORINEK, Johns Hopkins University, Department of Economics 163 Principles for macroprudential regulation ANIL K KASHYAP, University of Chicago Booth School of Business, DIMITRIOS P. TSOMOCOS, Said Business School, St Edmund Hall, University of Oxford AND ALEXANDROS VARDOULAKIS, Federal Reserve System 173 Macroprudential capital tools: assessing their rationale and effectiveness LAURENT CLERC, Banque de France, ALEXIS DERVIZ, Czech National Bank, CATERINA MENDICINO, Banco de Portugal, STÉPHANE MOYEN, Deutsche Bundesbank, KALIN NIKOLOV, LIVIO STRACCA, European Central Bank, JAVIER SUAREZ, CEMFI, AND ALEXANDROS VARDOULAKIS, Federal Reserve System 183 The housing market: the impact of macroprudential measures in France SANVI AVOUYi‑dOVI, RÉMY LECAT, Banque de France AND CLAIRE LABONNE, Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution 195 Three criticisms of prudential banking regulations VIVIEN LEVY‑GARBOUA, Sciences Po and BNP Paribas AND GÉRARD MAAREK, EDHEC 207 Macroprudential policy and credit supply cycles JOSÉ‑LUIS PEYDRÓ, Catalan Institution for Research and Advanced Studies, Universitat Pompeu Fabra 217 Interactions between monetary and macroprudential policies PAMFILI ANTIPA AND JULIEN MATHERON, Banque de France 225 PUBLISHED ARTICLES 241 Macroprudential policies: implementation and interactions 4 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 18 • April 2014 FSR18.indb 4 page 4 du fichier 240091 2014_03_25 24/03/2014 17:09:59 Introduction FSR18.indb 5 page 5 du fichier 240091 2014_03_25 24/03/2014 17:09:59 FSR18.indb 6 page 6 du fichier 240091 2014_03_25 24/03/2014 17:09:59 Macroprudential policy: from theory to implementation CHRISTIAN NOYER Governor Banque de France he crisis has demonstrated the need to countries have only just put in place the necessary renew our approach to financial system operational frameworks. In Europe, for instance, regulation and notably to complement it with the CRD IV/CRR3 banking regulation package only Ta macroprudential perspective. came into force on 1 January 2014, while the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) is due to become There is no single definition of what constitutes effective in November. The two texts, CRD IV and “macroprudential” policy. There is, however, some CRR, list the macroprudential tools that national consensus over its broad outlines. authorities can use. If deemed necessary, these tools can in turn be tightened by the European First, it involves adding a macroeconomic perspective Central Bank (ECB), which also has macroprudential to the supervision of the financial system, which responsibilities in addition to its microprudential role. up till now has only really been addressed from a “micro” standpoint. As the crisis has shown, financial Experience and analysis have shown that the stability does not depend solely on the soundness of successful implementation of macroprudential policy the individual components that make up the financial depends on three key factors: system; it also depends on complex interactions and interdependencies between these components. • the governance of that policy; Moreover, the term “macro” refers to the interactions between the real world and the financial world, to the • the identification of market failures and the extent that a risk only becomes “systemic” once the selection of tools to combat them; imbalances or shocks affecting the financial system pose a significant threat to economic activity. • a proper understanding of the channels of transmission and of the way these tools interact with The second characteristic of macroprudential policy other economic policies, notably monetary, fiscal is that it is preventive.1 Its aim is precisely to prevent and microprudential policies. the formation of financial imbalances, procyclical phenomena or systemic risks by limiting excessive growth in credit and in economic agents’ debt levels, 1| THE GOVERNANCE and increasing the shock‑absorbing capacity of financial institutions or structures ex ante.2 Therefore, OF MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY macroprudential policy is not designed to manage financial crises directly once they have erupted, but With regard to governance, there are a number rather to prevent them from happening in the first place. of points which need to be defined: the mandate assigned to the authorities in charge of defining The implementation of macroprudential policy poses and implementing the policy, their institutional a number of major challenges, particularly as many organisation and their rules of governance.4 1 See the contribution by Perotti and Goodhart in this publication. 2 On the macroprudential regulation of systemically important banks, see the article by Tarullo in this publication. 3 Capital Requirements Directive/Capital Requirements Regulation. 4 On the issue of governance, see the article by Caruana and Cohen in this publication. Macroprudential policies: implementation and interactions Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 18 • April 2014 7 FSR18.indb 7 page 7 du fichier 240091 2014_03_25 24/03/2014 17:10:00 Macroprudential policy: from theory to implementation Christian Noyer 1|1 The policy mandate Regardless of the type of organisation adopted, the main challenges are the same: how to avoid The mandate should set out in a clear and coherent undermining the independence of the central bank? manner all the objectives, functions and powers How to avoid or limit conflicts of interest between assigned to the macroprudential authorities. micro and macroprudential policies? 6 How to ensure The objectives must be precise, attainable and coordination with other economic policies, especially measurable. In the case of financial stability, this is monetary and fiscal policies? And how to avoid where we hit the first stumbling block: it is hard to an “inaction bias” on the part of macroprudential find a straightforward definition of financial stability, authorities due to the complexity of the financial and even harder to actually measure it using a single stability objective or of the decision‑making process? 7 metric. Financial stability is therefore a complex and multifaceted objective. 1|3 Governance of the macroprudential authority 1|2 Institutional organisation The rules of governance, established internally or by The organisation of macroprudential authorities law, specify how the macroprudential authority will differs from one country to another, in terms of function in order to meet these challenges. the degree of integration between the central bank and the prudential supervision authority, the actual First, for macroprudential policy to be effective, it institution in charge of macroprudential policy, and has