Risk and Regulation Monthly November 2020 Contents
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Payments and Market Infrastructure Two Decades After the Start of the European Central Bank Editor: Daniela Russo
Payments and market infrastructure two decades after the start of the European Central Bank Editor: Daniela Russo July 2021 Contents Foreword 6 Acknowledgements 8 Introduction 9 Prepared by Daniela Russo Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, a 21st century renaissance man 13 Prepared by Daniela Russo and Ignacio Terol Alberto Giovannini and the European Institutions 19 Prepared by John Berrigan, Mario Nava and Daniela Russo Global cooperation 22 Prepared by Daniela Russo and Takeshi Shirakami Part 1 The Eurosystem as operator: TARGET2, T2S and collateral management systems 31 Chapter 1 – TARGET 2 and the birth of the TARGET family 32 Prepared by Jochen Metzger Chapter 2 – TARGET 37 Prepared by Dieter Reichwein Chapter 3 – TARGET2 44 Prepared by Dieter Reichwein Chapter 4 – The Eurosystem collateral management 52 Prepared by Simone Maskens, Daniela Russo and Markus Mayers Chapter 5 – T2S: building the European securities market infrastructure 60 Prepared by Marc Bayle de Jessé Chapter 6 – The governance of TARGET2-Securities 63 Prepared by Cristina Mastropasqua and Flavia Perone Chapter 7 – Instant payments and TARGET Instant Payment Settlement (TIPS) 72 Prepared by Carlos Conesa Eurosystem-operated market infrastructure: key milestones 77 Part 2 The Eurosystem as a catalyst: retail payments 79 Chapter 1 – The Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) revolution: how the vision turned into reality 80 Prepared by Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell Contents 1 Chapter 2 – Legal and regulatory history of EU retail payments 87 Prepared by Maria Chiara Malaguti Chapter 3 – -
OECD, "Seminar on Capital Movements Agenda,"
PROGRAMME SEMINAR ON OPEN AND ORDERLY CAPITAL MOVEMENTS Does global co-operation matter? 25 October 2016, OECD, Paris Organised by the OECD in co-operation with Germany (Federal Ministry of Finance) as the upcoming G20 Presidency Open and orderly capital movements: does global co-operation matter? An open, transparent and orderly global system of capital flows underpins global growth and stability. In light of the increasingly interconnected global economy, faced with episodes of heightened capital flows volatility, significant value is attached to credible commitment mechanisms to rules-based and co-operative approaches to capital flows that send a positive signal of a predictable policy agenda. This type of framework will help countries maintain markets’ confidence and continue to attract the long-term, high-quality capital needed to support inclusive growth and sustainable development. The OECD Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements (the Code) provides such a framework. As an instrument that encourages co-operation, it has provided a tried and tested process for global dialogue for over 50 years. The Code is used by the 35 OECD countries, including emerging economies, as well as by non-OECD countries. Four non-OECD countries have applied for adherence since it was opened to all in 2012. It is a living instrument adaptable to countries at different levels of development, through built-in flexibility clauses that allow temporary suspension of liberalisation commitments in times of economic and financial disturbance. Over time, Adherents have developed a body of well-established jurisprudence on the implementation of the Code’s rights and obligations and the conformity of individual country measures. -
Four Essays on Capital Regulation of Banks
Four Essays on Capital Regulation of Banks Schriftliche Promotionsleistung zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades Doctor rerum politicarum vorgelegt und angenommen an der Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaft der Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg Verfasser: Eva Schliephake Geburtsdatum und -ort: 01.02.1983, Karl-Marx-Stadt (heute Chemnitz) Arbeit eingereicht am: 20. Juni 2013 Gutachter der schriftlichen Promotionsleistung: Professor Dr. Roland Kirstein Professor Dr. Abdolkarim Sadrieh Datum der Disputation: 24. September 2013 The Essays This collection of essays analyzes optimal capital requirement regulation and its effects on the incentives of stakeholders. The first essay, written together with my supervisor Roland Kirstein was recently published in the Journal of Money Credit and Banking. It analyzes under which conditions a binding capital requirement reduces the incentives of banks to undercut in prices. Based on the strategic capacity commitment model of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) we show that if the immediate recap- italization insufficiently costly, capital requirement regulation induces banks that compete in Bertrand competition to behave like Cournot competitors. Formally, the binding capital regulation changes the strategic price setting Bertrand game into a two stage game, where banks first have to commit to a loan supply capacity before they compete for loan interest rates. This de- creases the loan supply and increases loan interest rates, resulting in higher profits for banks compared to the unregulated case. In this thesis, I add the online appendix to the published version that provides all the proofs of the propositions. This appendix was not part of the publication due to capacity limits within the journal. The second essay builds on the results of the first essay and analyzes the impact of reduced competition on the efficiency of capital requirement regulation in establishing financial stability. -
Ignazio Visco: the fi Nancial Crisis and Economists’ Forecasts
Ignazio Visco: The fi nancial crisis and economists’ forecasts Commencement address by Mr Ignazio Visco, Deputy Director General of the Bank of Italy, to the students of the Master in Public Economics at the Faculty of Economics, La Sapienza University, Rome, 4 March 2009. While I alone am responsible for the views put forward in this paper, I wish to thank Fabio Busetti, Michele Caivano, Eugenio Gaiotti, Alberto Locarno, Sergio Nicoletti Altimari, Patrizio Pagano, Fabio Panetta and Stefano Siviero for discussions on its various parts and for their practical assistance. The original speech, which contains various links to the documents mentioned, can be found on the Bank of Italy’s website. 1. Introduction T IS PERHAPS early to draw lessons from the crisis that has hit the global economy. The crisis appears severe and widespread, its effects far-reaching and long-lasting. IMeasures of various kinds have been taken or are in the process of being taken regarding monetary policy, the use of public resources and the revision of rules and institutions on which the proper functioning of the markets and the operation of fi nancial intermediaries depend. The present is undoubtedly a period of maximum efforts on the part of economic policy and overall political action, efforts that are directly proportional to the seriousness of the crisis. But this is also a moment in which the interpretative models used in analyzing our economies start being reconsidered and attempts are being made at identifying the reasons underlying the failures of markets, economic policies and economists’ forecasts. Besides, this is also necessary in order to better defi ne interventions – global, substantial, focused and lasting – aimed at overcoming the crisis and, as far as possible, preventing, with the design of new rules, new institutions and new policies, such serious instability from occurring again. -
Isabel Schnabel, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the “VIII
Societal responsibility and central bank independence Keynote speech by Isabel Schnabel, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the “VIII. New Paradigm Workshop”, organised by the Forum New Economy Frankfurt am Main, 27 May 2021 Central banking in times of shifting societal concerns The best contribution that central banks can make to economic prosperity is to maintain stable prices: this was the broad consensus among academic scholars and policymakers emerging in the late 1970s when inflation in many advanced economies had surged to double-digit levels, thereby eroding purchasing power and hitting the poorest in society the hardest (Chart 1). Chart 1 Consumer price inflation (1960-1990) (year-on-year change, %) Source: IMF. The delegation of the task of maintaining price stability to an independent and accountable institution with a clear mandate has proven successful in solving the underlying time inconsistency problem while upholding democratic principles. This underpins the large degree of political independence that most central banks enjoy, including the ECB, which consistently ranks as one of the most independent central banks in the world (Chart 2). 2/17 Chart 2 Measures of central bank independence (index, 0-1) Source: Dall’Orto Mas et al. (2020), “The case for central bank independence”, Occasional Paper Series, No 248, October. Note: Indices calculated by Bodea and Hicks (2015) and Garriga (2016). Index values in Bodea and Hicks (2015) refer to 2014 (data for the ECB refers to 2010); index values in Garriga (2016) refer to 2012. The values correspond to the unweighted indices of central bank independence. Values closer to 1 indicate higher levels of independence. -
POLICY INSIGHT No.68 December 2013
abcd a POLICY INSIGHT No.68 December 2013 The aftermath of the crisis: Regulation, supervision and the role of central banks Ignazio Visco Governor, Bank of Italy Introduction trillion at the end of 2006, 700 at the end of 2007 and still 700 trillion in December 2012. The financial crisis has brought to the fore a number of issues. It has been severe and Financial deepening, by allowing greater widespread, and has affected many economies diversification of risk and making finance in different and long-lasting ways. Maintaining accessible to larger numbers of countries and firms, financial stability has once again become a major can be instrumental to broadening economic concern of policymakers and central banks are development. But there is a risk that finance turns heavily involved in this endeavour. A clear need into an end in itself, with consequences that can has emerged for a substantial overhaul in financial be more damaging as the system becomes more regulation and supervision, also considering that interconnected and the potential for externalities the financial system of tomorrow will most likely increases. be rather different from the one that has developed over the last two decades. Scepticism has grown At the same time, the interaction between about the role of finance in the economic system, monetary policy and financial stability becomes and especially its apparent separation from, if not more relevant as heightened financial complexity conflict with, the real economy. We should take amplifies the widespread non-linearities in the stock of what has gone wrong, and in so doing dynamics of financial and economic variables, and reflect on the way forward – as it is already taking the consequences of interconnections between the shape – as well as on how to better link our theories financial and the real side of the economy. -
Short Biography of Yves Mersch
Short biography of Yves Mersch Copyright: (c) CVCE.EU by UNI.LU All rights of reproduction, of public communication, of adaptation, of distribution or of dissemination via Internet, internal network or any other means are strictly reserved in all countries. Consult the legal notice and the terms and conditions of use regarding this site. URL: http://www.cvce.eu/obj/short_biography_of_yves_mersch-en-ad643658-c212- 4443-b1d7-0b8f6dbb014f.html Last updated: 07/07/2016 1/3 Yves Mersch President of the Banque Centrale du Luxembourg (since 1 June 1998) Born on 1 October 1949 in Luxembourg Education and training 1973: Master’s in Law, University of Paris I–Panthéon-Sorbonne 1974: Postgraduate studies in International Public Law and Master’s in Political Science, University of Paris I–Panthéon-Sorbonne 1975: Postgraduate studies in Political Science, University of Paris I–Panthéon- Sorbonne Career 1974: Admission to the Bar in Luxembourg and appointment as Assistant Professor in Public Law at the University of Paris–Sud 11 1975: Assistant in the Luxembourg Ministry of Finance 1976–1978: Assistant at the International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C. 1978–1979: Attaché in the Luxembourg Ministry of Finance 1980–1981: Financial adviser to the Permanent Representation of Luxembourg to the United Nations, New York 1981: Adviser in international financial and monetary relations at the Ministry of Finance 1983–1999: Member of the Council of the Luxembourg Monetary Institute 1985–1989: Government representative for the Luxembourg Stock Exchange 1989–1998: -
Two Proposals to Resurrect the Banking Union by Luis Garicano
Two proposals to resurrect the Banking Union: the Safe Portfolio Approach and SRB+1 Paper prepared for ECB Conference on “Fiscal Policy and EMU Governance”, Frankfurt, 19 December 2019 Luis Garicano2 Member of the European Parliament Professor of Economics and Strategy, IE Business School (on leave) Abstract Nearly eight years after its inception, the European Banking Union is crumbling. None of its two stated objectives—breaking future contagion between banks and sovereigns, and creating a true single market for banks—have been achieved. In fact, the banking market is more fragmented now than it was at the inception of the Banking Union, as home and host regulators for cross-border European banks fight to ensure sufficient capital and liquidity in each market that a bank might operate in. The reason for this state of affairs is that, of the planned “three pillar” structure of the Banking Union, only its “first pillar” (the Single Supervisory Mechanism), is working smoothly. The “second pillar”, the Single Resolution Mechanism, is being circumvented, along with the bank resolution framework, while Member States continue to spend taxpayer money to prevent investors from incurring losses. The “third pillar”, a European deposit insurance, has been paralyzed for four years. This paper aims to provide a politically and economically viable path to revive our Banking Union. This path rests on two legs. First, creating a model “Safe Portfolio” and incentivizing banks to move toward it. Such “Safe Portfolio” would be the basis for a market-provided European Safe Asset without joint liability. Second, empowering the Single Resolution Board by reforming the resolution framework and setting up a European deposit insurance. -
8-11 July 2021 Venice - Italy
3RD G20 FINANCE MINISTERS AND CENTRAL BANK GOVERNORS MEETING AND SIDE EVENTS 8-11 July 2021 Venice - Italy 1 CONTENTS 1 ABOUT THE G20 Pag. 3 2 ITALIAN G20 PRESIDENCY Pag. 4 3 2021 G20 FINANCE MINISTERS AND CENTRAL BANK GOVERNORS MEETINGS Pag. 4 4 3RD G20 FINANCE MINISTERS AND CENTRAL BANK GOVERNORS MEETING Pag. 6 Agenda Participants 5 MEDIA Pag. 13 Accreditation Media opportunities Media centre - Map - Operating hours - Facilities and services - Media liaison officers - Information technology - Interview rooms - Host broadcaster and photographer - Venue access Host city: Venice Reach and move in Venice - Airport - Trains - Public transports - Taxi Accomodation Climate & time zone Accessibility, special requirements and emergency phone numbers 6 COVID-19 PROCEDURE Pag. 26 7 CONTACTS Pag. 26 2 1 ABOUT THE G20 Population Economy Trade 60% of the world population 80 of global GDP 75% of global exports The G20 is the international forum How the G20 works that brings together the world’s major The G20 does not have a permanent economies. Its members account for more secretariat: its agenda and activities are than 80% of world GDP, 75% of global trade established by the rotating Presidencies, in and 60% of the population of the planet. cooperation with the membership. The forum has met every year since 1999 A “Troika”, represented by the country that and includes, since 2008, a yearly Summit, holds the Presidency, its predecessor and with the participation of the respective its successor, works to ensure continuity Heads of State and Government. within the G20. The Troika countries are currently Saudi Arabia, Italy and Indonesia. -
Invitation Lecture by President DNB Tokyo 31
INVITATION The Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Netherlands Chamber of Commerce in Japan have the pleasure to invite you to a lecture by the President of De Nederlandsche Bank, (the Central Bank of the Netherlands) Prof. Klaas Knot entitled: Economic Outlook for the Euro Area followed by Q&A on Thursday, 31 March 2016 from 16:00 to 18:00 hrs Ascot 1-room Okura Hotel Tokyo 2 Chome-10-4 Toranomon R.S.V.P. before Thursday 24 March 2016 Minato-Ku, Tokyo 105-0001 http://goo.gl/forms/EUFMVry3eI Program 16.00 Doors open 16.15 Introduction by Prof. Sahoko Kaji of Keio University 16.30 Lecture by Prof. Klaas Knot on the Economic Outlook for the Euro Area 17.00 Q&A session, moderated by Prof. Sahoko Kaji 17.30 Conclusion Prof. Klaas Knot Prof. Klaas Knot has been President of De Nederlandsche Bank since 1 July 2011. By virtue of his position, he holds seats on the Governing Council and General Council of the European Central Bank, as well as on the Financial Stability Board, besides being a Governor of the International Monetary Fund. Prof. Knot holds several secondary positions. Since 2005, he has been Professor of Economics of Central Banking at the University of Groningen and, with effect from 2015, he is Professor of Monetary Stability at the Faculty of Economics and Business of the University of Amsterdam. Mr Knot has published a variety of articles in prominent domestic and international journals in the fields of monetary and financial economics. Prof. -
The Question of Who Succeeds Jean-Claude Trichet
Gunfight at the ECB Corral The question of who succeeds Jean-Claude Trichet. urope’s eleven-year-old monetary union is still being tested by skeptical investors and markets. It was barely saved by a €750 ($955) billion rescue plan that European Union leaders B Y K LAUS C. ENGELEN put together in May of this year. Although the immediate danger of Greece—or other eurozone member countries like Portugal or Spain— defaulting seems to have been averted, the pressure from markets to cut public deficits, stabilize banks, and reform economies remains. A look at the interest rates and insurance premia that financially Eweak eurozone countries have to pay on their new sovereign debt issues makes it clear that the crisis is not over. A year of major challenges for the sixteen-member eurozone is in store, with an uncertain outcome. For Europe’s central bankers and policymakers, one of those challenges is to rebuild confidence in the euro and its guardian, the European Central Bank. Since the ECB joined the international rescue of Greece and other financially weak nations on Europe’s southern periphery and announced that it would indef- initely accept those countries’ debt as collateral regardless of credit rating, the ECB, its President Jean-Claude Trichet, and its governing council have been con- fronted with a credibility crisis. “Trust in the ECB, as measured by the standard Eurobarometer (and other) sur- veys, has fallen to an unprecedented low—especially in the larger euro area coun- THE MAGAZINE OF tries,” concludes a major empirical study by Daniel Gros and Felix Roth of the INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY Centre for European Policy Studies. -
Calendar of Klaas Knot
Calendar of Klaas Knot President of De Nederlandsche Bank N.V. Member of the ECB's Governing Council March 2020 Tuesday, 3 March Guest lecture for the Finance Master's programme at the Amsterdam University of Amsterdam (UvA) about the financial world crisis and the role of Europe Additional meeting of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) on the latest economic and financial developments – teleconference Lecture on monetary economics at the Amstel Club Wednesday, 4 March Meeting with a Unicredit representative Amsterdam Meeting with an Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum (OMFIF) representative Meeting with the media – teleconference Regular meeting with the Minister of Finance of the Netherlands The Hague Thursday, 5 March Meeting with the International Financial Reporting Standards Amsterdam (IFRS) working group – teleconference Meeting with the Financial Stability Board (FSB) – teleconference Monday, 9 March Meeting of the European Economic Comunity (EEC) on COVID-19 Amsterdam – teleconference Meeting of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) on COVID-19 – teleconference Tuesday, 10 March Regular meeting with the Prime Minister of the Netherlands The Hague Meeting with a Credit Suisse representative Amsterdam Wednesday, 11 and Meeting of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank Frankfurt Thursday, 12 March (ECB) Thursday, 12 March Additional meeting of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) – Frankfurt teleconference Meeting with the media – interview for Nieuwsuur news Hilversum programme