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Introduction Notes INTRODUCTION 1. D. C. Watt, 'The Historiography of Appeasement', A. Sked and C. Cook, eds, Essays in Honour of A. J. P. Taylor (London, 1976); P. Kennedy, •Appeasement', G. Martel, ed., The Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered (London, 1986). 2. The classic statement is Cato [M. Foot, F. Owen, and P. Howard], Guilty Men (London, 1940), 38-41; C. Bloch, 'Great Britain, German Rearmament and the Naval Agreement of 1935', in H. Gatzke, ed., European Diplomacy between the Two Wars, 1919-39 (Chicago, 1972); R. Best, 'The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935: An Aspect of Appeasement', Naval War College Review 34 (1981 ). Despite access to the British archives, E. H. Haraszti, Treaty-Breakers or "Realpolitiker"? The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of June 1935 (Boppard am Rhein, 1974), advances a 'Guilty Men' style hypothesis. But, as A. J. P. Taylor pointed out, her evidence is in conflict with her conclusion: see his 'The Anglo-German Naval Agreements', New Hungarian Quarterly 16 (1975), 161. 3. H. Hall, 'The Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process in Britain, 1934-1935, and the Origins of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement', Historical Journal 19 (1976); N. H. Gibbs, Grand Strategy Vol. I, (London, 1976), 155-70. In 'The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935: An Interim Judgement', Journal of Modern History 28 (1956), D. C. Watt anticipated the revisionist case before British documents became available. 4. S. Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars 2 vols (London, 1968-76), II, 321. 5. P. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London, 1983), 289. 6. W. Wark, The Ultimate Enemy: British Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933-1939 (Oxford, 1986), 124-54. 7. G. Post Jr, Dilemmas of Appeasement: British Deterrence and Defence, 1934-1937 (Ithaca, 1993), explores the temporal dimension to British defence and diplomacy more thoroughly than most accounts, and recognises that the Admiralty entertained a different timescale from other Whitehall departments. Yet Post wrongly assumes that this was a result of a Naval Staff preoccupation with the Japanese threat. 8. J. R. Ferris, '"It is our business in the Navy to command the Seas": The Last Decade of British Maritime Supremacy, 1919-1929', in K. Neilson and G. Kennedy, eds, Far Flung Lines: Studies in Imperial Defence in Honour of Donald Mackenzie Schurman (London, 1996). Also see G. Martel, K. Neilson, J. Ferris and B. McKercher in International History Review 13 (1991). 195 196 Notes 9. S. Aster, "'Guilty Men": The Case of Neville Chamberlain', in R. Boyce and E. M. Robertson, eds, Paths to War (London, 1989); R. A. C. Parker, Chamberlain and Appeasement (London, 1993). W. Murray argues that the appeasers failed as strategists in The Change in the European Balance of Power, 1938-1939 (Princeton, 1984). 10. Gibbs, Strategy, 767-92. 11. General W. Jackson and Lord Braman, The Chiefs (London, 1992). 12. J. R. Ferris, Men, Money. and Diplomacy (Ithaca, 1989), 1-14; B. McKercher, 'Old Diplomacy and New: The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1919-1939', in M. Dockrill and B. McKercher, eds, Diplomacy and World Power (Cambridge, I 996); G. Peden, British Rearmament and the Treasury. 1932-1939 (Edinburgh, 1979). 13. A. Duff Cooper, Old Men Forget (London, 1955), 195; S. Hoare, Nine Troubled Years (London, 1954), 204-5. 14. Ferris, Diplomacy, 6. 15. M. Murfett et al., The First Sea Lords (London, 1995), 157-71. 16. Sir Oswyn Murray, 'The Admiralty', The Mariner's Mirror 33 (1937). 17. J. Gooch, 'The Chiefs of Staff and the Higher Organisation for Defence in Britain, 1904-1984', in J. Hattendorf and R. Jordan, eds, Maritime Strategy and the Balance of Power (London, 1989); A. J. Marder, From Dreadnought to Scapa Flow Vol. IV (London, 1969); Murfett, First Sea Lords, 48; Command 1343 (1921), 'The Distribution of the Duties of the Naval Staff. 18. Murfett, First Sea Lords, 128. 19. D. C. Watt, Personalities and Appeasement (Austin, 1991), 9. 20. Instructions for Naval Staff June 1934, CE674/34, ADMI/8778/183. 21. 'The Work of Plans', 16 April 1935, PD04884/35, ADM116/3366. 22. C. M. Andrew, Secret Service (London, 1985), 139-94. 23. F. H. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War Vol. I (London, 1979), 3-43; E. Thomas, 'The Evolution of the JIC System Up to and During World War II', in C. Andrew and J. Noakes, eds, Intelligence and International Relations 1900-1945 (Exeter, 1987). Before 1939, the JIC acted more as a joint study group on specific issues (such as air warfare in Spain) than as a central cell for the appraisal of intelligence. 24. 'Organisation of Intelligence Division', February 1924, ADM 11611842. 25. R. Young, 'Spokesmen for Economic Warfare: The Industrial Intelligence Centre in the 1930s'. European Studies Review 6 (1976). 26. In the 1930s, the Admiralty employed about fifty men at its wireless inter­ ception stations at Scarborough and Flowerdown, which sent by teleprinter intercepted messages for decryption to the Naval Section at the Government Code and Cypher School. The Home, Mediterranean and the Reserve fleets at Portsmouth and Devonport made interceptions to decrypt foreign naval codes. On naval signals intelligence between the two world wars, see 'Before September 1939: NID Revives', n.d. [1947?], ADM223/469 and ADM116/6320, 6322-4. 27. Hinsley, Intelligence. 3-43; D. C. Watt, 'British Intelligence and the Coming of the Second World War in Europe', in E. May, ed.• Knowing One's Enemies (Princeton, 1984 ). Notes 197 CHAPTER 1 THE NAVAL STAFF AND THE ANGLO-GERMAN NAVAL AGREEMENT OF JUNE 1935 1. C. Hall, Britain, America, and Arms Control, 1921-1937 (London, 1987); S. Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbour (Boston, 1984); E. Goldstein and J. Maurer, eds, 'The Washington Conference, 1921-1922', Diplomacy and Statecraft 6 (1993); J. R. Ferris, 'The Symbol and the Substance of Seapower: Great Britain, the United States and the One-Power Standard', in B. McKercher ed., Anglo-American Relations in the 1920s (London, 1990). 2. B. McKercher, The Second Baldwin Government and the United States, 1924-1929 (Cambridge, 1984). 3. J. Ferris, 'Last Decade', 124-70; G. Gordon, British Seapower and Procurement between the Wars (London, 1988), passim. 4. Ferris, 'Last Decade', 159-61. 5. Gibbs, Strategy, Chp II; Roskill, Policy, II, Chs. III-VI. 6. Plans, 14 November 1932, Case 11431, ADM 116/3434. 7. Roskill, II, 70, 125-6, 150-1, 153-4. 8. Monsen to Chatfield, 26 June 1932, CH[a]T[field Papers NMM]2/l/55. 9. Roskill, II, 154-5; A. J. Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies (Oxford, 1981}, 30-1; Gordon, Procurement, 109-11. 10. His remarks to Sir Warren Fisher, Permanent Under-Secretary of the Treasury, 16 July 1934, CAB211434 and 4 June 1934, CHT3/1. 11. Gordon, Procurement, 109-12. 12. Ferris, 'Last Decade', 124-70. 13. DCNS, Controller (Chatfield), and ACNS,joint minute, 21 December 1926, M03056/26, ADMl/8699/118. 14. J. Sumida, In Defence of Naval Supremacy (London, 1989); Kennedy, Mastery, 267-98; Ferris 'Last Decade', 124-70. 15. Roskill, I, 499, II, 50; 'Proposed Classification and Limitations of Warships', Table W, M03056/26, December 1926, ADMl/8699/118; Plans, 'Capital Ships', December 1932, Templewood Papers, Vol. IX, folios 5-6, Cambridge University Library. 16. Ferris, 'Symbol and Substance', 55-80. 17. See 'Maritime Power' in DRC37, 21 November 1935, CAB16/112. 18. DCNS, Controller (Chatfield), ACNS, 21 December 1926, M03056/26, ADMl/8699/118; FO/Admiralty mtg., 20 March 1934, A2416/1938/45, F0371117596. 19. This account of the Naval Staff's proposals unless otherwise stated is based on the following: Sir Robert Craigie, Head of the American Department, FO, 9 January 1934, Al977/22/45, F0371/17596; 'Strategic Requirements', 14 March 1934, M0687/34, ADM116/2999; NCM(35)23, 30 October 1934, CAB291148; FO/Admiralty, '1935 Naval Conference', 23 March 1934, NCM(35)1, CAB29/148. 20. Admiral R. Bellairs, 7 September 1933, Wl0329/117/38, F0371/17382. 21. The opposite practice, 'global limitation'- whereby each power expended its assigned tonnage as it liked - was advanced by the French and later adopted by the Japanese. 198 Notes 22. The non-construction zone became paras three and four of Article IV of the Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armament, London, 25 March 1936, Command Paper 5136. 23. Sumida, Supremacy, 39; NCM(35)23, 30 October 1934, CAB29/148. 24. The committee papers and the records of talks are in CAB29/147-9. 25. 'Admiralty Paper No.I ',para. 6, Aprill934, PD04493/34, ADM 116/3373. 26. Hall, Anns Control, 144. 27. Craigie, 9 January 1934, A1977/22/45, F0371/17596. 28. For instance para. 18, Annex III, NCM(35)50, 5 June 1935, CAB29/l50. 29. Chatfield to Admiral W. Fisher, 2 August 1934, CHT4/5; 'New Standard', 25 September 1936, PD05892/36, ADMl/9729; Ferris, 'Last Decade', 124-70. 30. Chatfield to Admiral Charles Madden, former First Sea Lord, 1927-30, 4 October 1934, CHT/3/2. 31. The DRC papers are in CAB16/109~ Gibbs, Strategy, 93-131; Peden, Treasury, passim. 32. U. Bialer, The Shadow of the Bomber (London, 1980). 33. DRC14, 28 February 1934, CAB16/109. 34. NCM(35)3, 19 April 1934, CAB29/148; D. C. Watt, Personalities and Policies (London, 1965), 83-99; Hall, Anns Control, 149-60. 35. The DCM's records are in CAB16/110. It included the three service minis­ ters, the Chancellor, the FO Under-Secretary, the Lord Privy Seal, the President ofthe Board of Trade, the Colonial Secretary and Hankey. In July 1935, it became the Defence Policy and Requirements Committee, which vetted later DRC reports for the CID. 36. DCM(32), 55th mtg, 24 July 1934, CAB16/110; DCM(32)120, 20 June 1934, CAB 16/111; Chamberlain, diary, 6 and 31 July 1934, 9 and 25 October 1934, NC2123A, Birmingham University Library.
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