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IRAQ COUNTRY of ORIGIN INFORMATION (COI) REPORT COI Service

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IRAQ COUNTRY of ORIGIN INFORMATION (COI) REPORT COI Service IRAQ COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION (COI) REPORT COI Service 25 March 2011 IRAQ 25 MARCH 2011 Contents Preface Latest News EVENTS IN IRAQ FROM 2 FEBRUARY 2011 TO 24 MARCH 2011 Useful news sources for further information REPORTS ON IRAQ PUBLISHED OR ACCESSED BETWEEN 2 FEBRUARY 2011 AND 24 MARCH 2011 Paragraphs Background Information 1. GEOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................ 1.01 Size and population.............................................................................................. 1.01 Ethnicity and religion........................................................................................... 1.04 Language .............................................................................................................. 1.06 Measurements ...................................................................................................... 1.07 Public holidays ..................................................................................................... 1.08 Maps ...................................................................................................................... 1.09 2. ECONOMY ................................................................................................................ 2.01 Currency................................................................................................................ 2.05 Employment.......................................................................................................... 2.07 3. HISTORY .................................................................................................................. 3.01 The rise of the Baath Party and Saddam Hussein’s reign (1958-2003)............ 3.01 Security situation (2003 – 2009) .......................................................................... 3.05 Fall of Saddam Hussein and rise in sectarian violence (2003 – 2007)........... 3.05 Counter-insurgency operations (‘The Surge’ 2007 – 2009)............................ 3.08 US military drawdown under the US-Iraq ‘Security Agreement’ (1 Jan 2009)3.09 Political situation (2003 – 2009)........................................................................... 3.12 Creation of a new government (2003 – 2005)................................................ 3.12 De-baathification and political divide between Sunni and Shia groups (2003 – 2009) .......................................................................................... 3.14 Political reform and reconciliation (2008 – 2009) ........................................... 3.18 Provincial elections 2009 ............................................................................... 3.21 The Kurdistan Regional Government ................................................................. 3.25 Creation of an autonomous region and government (1992 – 2006)............... 3.25 Constitutional reform and 2005 elections................................................. 3.28 The ‘disputed territories’ (2003 – 2009).......................................................... 3.32 Kurdistan National Assembly elections 2009 ................................................. 3.34 4. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS (1 DECEMBER 2009 – 1 FEBRUARY 2011) ............................ 4.01 Security Developments........................................................................................ 4.01 Security related incidents............................................................................... 4.01 US combat mission ends – August 2010 ....................................................... 4.04 Wikileaks ‘war logs’ – October 2010 .............................................................. 4.05 Political developments......................................................................................... 4.06 Run-up to the 2010 parliamentary elections: Challenge to Maliki’s rule......... 4.06 Election law signed (6 December 2009)......................................................... 4.07 Disqualification of election candidates (January 2010) .................................. 4.09 March 2010 national elections ....................................................................... 4.11 ii The main text of this COI Report contains the most up to date publicly available information as at 1 February 2011. Further brief information on recent events and reports has been provided in the Latest News section to 24 March 2011. 25 MARCH 2011 IRAQ Coalition government established (21 December 2010) ................................ 4.14 5. CONSTITUTION.......................................................................................................... 5.01 6. POLITICAL SYSTEM ................................................................................................... 6.01 Executive............................................................................................................... 6.02 Legislature ............................................................................................................ 6.04 Political parties..................................................................................................... 6.05 Kurdistan Regional Government......................................................................... 6.06 Executive ....................................................................................................... 6.09 Legislature ..................................................................................................... 6.11 Political parties............................................................................................... 6.12 Human Rights 7. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... 7.01 8. SECURITY SITUATION ................................................................................................ 8.01 Overview ............................................................................................................... 8.01 Main actors involved in the violence .................................................................. 8.06 Trends in the number of security incidents and fatalities ................................ 8.12 Limitations in quantitative data....................................................................... 8.18 Types of violence ................................................................................................. 8.22 Sectarian targeting............................................................................................... 8.28 Security by regions .............................................................................................. 8.36 Southern Iraq ................................................................................................. 8.39 Basrah ..................................................................................................... 8.42 Central and Western Iraq ............................................................................... 8.44 Baghdad .................................................................................................. 8.44 Al-Anbar................................................................................................... 8.49 Salah-al-Din............................................................................................. 8.51 Northern Iraq.................................................................................................. 8.52 Diyala (Khanaqin) .................................................................................... 8.56 Ninewa (Mosul)........................................................................................ 8.59 Kirkuk....................................................................................................... 8.65 Kurdistan Regional Government area............................................................ 8.67 9. CRIME...................................................................................................................... 9.01 Kidnapping/hostage taking ................................................................................. 9.02 10. SECURITY FORCES .................................................................................................... 10.01 Effectiveness of the security forces ................................................................... 10.05 Sectarian influence and divisions within the security forces........................... 10.12 Targeting of security forces by insurgents...................................................... 10.15 Police..................................................................................................................... 10.16 Iraq Police Service (IPS) ................................................................................ 10.21 Iraq Federal Police (IFP) (previously National Police).................................... 10.25 Border enforcement ....................................................................................... 10.28 Facilities Protection Service (FPS)................................................................. 10.32 Oil Police........................................................................................................ 10.34 Armed forces ........................................................................................................ 10.37 Other government forces..................................................................................... 10.41 Intellience Organisations...............................................................................
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