POLICY BRIEF NO.16 MARCH 2012 - - - - MARCH 2012 MARCH . before time runs out. invest in a successful political tran sition in 2014, lest fraudulent elec tions lead to renewed civil conflict in the opportunity to exercise leader ship in spurring consideration of an exit strategy that will better promote the shared security of Afghanistan and the West. Afghanistan is based on faulty as sumptions and must be rethought • The international community must allies have • Canada and other NATO transition plan for • The NATO At a glance... or failure of the plan outlined, on a of kind automatic pilot, with to no change course opportunity or mitigate failure? The ebbing of energy and political will to cope Western many in evident is Afghanistan with imagine not did they crises by beset capitals Afghan intervention more at the time the of have the capacity to honestly reassess the adjust? and vulnerabilities, its identify plan, Or do politics, fiscal limits, and the sheer exhaustion of Western governments in with mean, problems intractable Afghanistan’s effect, that the choice is between success POLICY BRIEF NO. 16 BRIEF NO. POLICY Steve Coll generated risks that are being inadequately considered by the U.S. and its Does partners? NATO or the Obama Administration from around the world, the transition plan is necessarily bulky and difficult to move in new directions—it is the proverbial ocean pointed at the distant horizon of liner, 2014 and difficult to maneuver off its path. What if the Afghanistan NATO is unsound, transition however? What if plan it is based for upon faulty assumptions or has feature of the transition is a plan to reduce international combat forces drastically by 2014, perhaps to just a few thousand, and to transfer lead responsibility for security to the , police, and a patchwork of local militias. Because involves it military plans several that encompass dozen difficult logistic national andand governments, coordinated supplyaid and external financing challenges, The United States and its partners in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have embarked on a political and military will outcome whose Afghanistan in transition determine whether the country will begin to break free of the continuous warfare it has suffered since 1979 or will plunge into a new round of civil conflict. The principal Can NATO Rethink its Exit Rethink Can NATO Afghanistan? from Strategy 2 POLICY BRIEF NO.16 MARCH 2012 One concern for the Soviets was succeededtheyend, the forceInnorth. the to outpulled protectionthey as inextracting all of their formal military forces and left of force advisory undeclared mostly and small a behind several thousand military and political advisors. The government in that the Soviets left a presidential election with new and competing political competing and new with election presidential a personalities coming to the fore. As the United States fashioned its transition plan after counterinsurgency of examples two upon drew it 2009, strategylinkedwithdrawala to internationalof troops: the and 1989,Afghanistan in withdrawalfromSoviet the U.S. surge-and-withdrawal from which concluded last After year. the invasion of 1979, the Soviet 40th Army led violent and a bombardment aerial indiscriminate included brutal scorched-earth campaign sweep-and-destroy that operations around the country. In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev delivered a speech in which he acknowledged that Afghanistan was wound.” That a signaled “bleeding that he was prepared to anplan exit. He allowed his generals one failed,theywhenbutGorbachev militarily, warthe win more effort to entered into negotiations that produced the Accords Genevaandpreparedhe fullforamilitary withdrawal. to increase their investments in the country—military to increase their investments in the country—military and otherwise. For the the , surge presented a with responded has it which to rebellion, its to challenge asymmetric strategies that have allowed it to fashion a arms, under factions non-Taliban For stalemate. durable the incentives created by rising investments argued for patience, hedging, and rent-seeking while the money was good. Now the were situation actors Afghan for incentives the has general, in before, reversed. Whereas to wait out the West, now the incentives may tempt some of them to act—to try to control and political seize and the military spaces that has NATO announced it is abandoning. This may tip groups previously neutral only violence new to rise give may it side; Taliban the to peripherally related to insurgency; the and Taliban’s it will certainly create challenges for the 2014 political transition Afghanistan, in which is scheduled to include

” Does NATO or the Obama Administration Afghanistan today. In 2009, as the Obama ‘surge’ began, ‘surge’ Obama the as 2009, In today. Afghanistan it was apparent Afghan to actors all in the war that the intended community international the and States United incentives shaping the actions Afghan of factions under arms can shift rapidly. That is certainly happening in If there is a lesson for today from the 1842 example, it may be that when a foreign occupying or intervening army signals weakness or the intent to withdraw, the its perceptions of friends and enemies quickly. thinking about Afghanistan, but it reminder that is the Afghan nonethelessbody politic a is infused with nationalismandstreaks ofxenophobia, anditcan alter on its way to . That long-ago perhaps too often examplereared itself as a hascliché of Western about forty thousand soldiers, in 1842, did not go very well. The entire force, but one man, was destroyed under pressure, so one way to think about the exit strategy is toNATO compare it with historicalexamples. one Infamously, exit by a British expeditionary force of Afghanistan has a history of international armies leaving armies international of history a has Afghanistan be flawed. At a minimum, these assumptions require honest challenging and reassessment while it might still be possible to change them. difficult, and that number a may based is strategy exit American-designed the which of the assumptions on planning committees can alter the transition in reality Afghanistan is that going to the be, at best, very adjust? No number of international conferences or NATO have the the capacity plan, identify to its honestly vulnerabilities, reassess and goals in the country. “ for allowing the Taliban to operate from its territory, as to operate from its territory, for allowing Taliban the were if not NATO complicit in the failure to achieve its its There hangovers. is a tendency to blame in the West the Afghans for the problems that have accumulated during the intervention, to and blame equally, than than a decade ago, particularly the financial crisis and 3 POLICY BRIEF NO.16 MARCH 2012 ” Who will provide the narrative and the and often said, that Afghanistan was not Iraq. The truth is, however, that he emphasized quite of a the same approaches. lot A problem with this export of the Iraq model to Afghanistan has to do with the coherence of tribal authority in the vital areas of the south and east. In Iraq’s Anbar Province, the Sunni tribes were thoroughly intact. When they changed sides, they did so in a unitary way. In Afghanistan, international combat forces are reduced? influenceIraq’s on exit the strategy NATO is obvious. It is personified by the decisive leadershipboth wars role in played by General David commanded Petraeus, the surge Administration’s Bush of about who twenty thousand troops into Baghdad in 2007. That intervention stabilized Iraq’s violence, civil and war, reduced ultimately withdrawal set of conditions American for troops. those the Petraeus lessons carried with him was a to single element of Afghanistan. his learning from If Iraq that influenced there his decision-making about Afghanistan, it was the belief that local militia forces, local police, and the systematic conversion of opposing guerrillas into security forces allied with the state achieved. could be intellectually, knew he and man bright very a is Petraeus built a surprising number of Afghanistan allies around as Soviet forces departed, playing on the fear that many Afghans understandably Hekmatyar had and other Islamist of leaders of the Gulbuddin armed opposition. President Karzai has virtues, but strong, even ruthless, alliance-building internal critical a raises This them. leadership of one be to proved not has question about the American exit Najibullah, as strategy: formidable as leader proxy a of absence in the and given that Afghanistan is scheduled to itself into a plunge contested presidential election in 2014, who will provide the narrative and the leadership for forces combat international as unity political national are reduced? “ leadership for national political unity as not enjoy. Najibullah was a thug with blood on his hands, but he was a strong and adaptive He leader. The Soviets enjoyed some advantages that NATO does The Soviets enjoyed some advantages that NATO lot of pickets Other along similarities the to way. the Soviet approach include the use of local militias or police, sometimes connected to tribal authority. idea is unit that tries if to a Taliban come down from North Waziristan to attack Kabul, it will encounter a security forces intended to challenge more directly those guerrillas who use sanctuary in Pakistan. The and military planners have worked from this footprint this from worked have planners military and defense, active forward, more a emphasized have but with night raids on Taliban commanders and border The American-led plan has fairly explicitly embraced this design, with variations. American Special Forces withdrawal of Soviet troops and the handover of the Afghan troops. lead defense role to at least twenty-five kilometers outside the capital. All of this provided a solid security structure for the did control. They built layered ring defenses around the cities. In Kabul’s case, they pushed the defense other towns. They tried to control some of the roads and daytime, the during towns and cities these linking that was about it, but they reinforced the areas they Afghanistan’s major cities—Kabul, Jalalabad, , Kandahar, Jalalabad, cities—Kabul, major Afghanistan’s various and base air Shindand the , Mazar-i-Sharif, At the end of their war, the Soviets came to grips with grips to came Soviets the war, their of end the At the fact that they had lost control of the countryside and were never going to regain it. They controlled and equipping Afghan forces to take the combat lead. lead. combat the take to forces Afghan equipping and planned planned the surge-and-withdrawal strategy in 2009. planning—military military Soviet from borrowed They up building on emphasis Soviet the also geometry—and The The success of the Soviet exit in these respects did attract attention American from commanders as they longer existed and was in no position to maintain the air bridge of supplies on which Najibullah depended. notwithstanding notwithstanding many forecasts that survived it for three would. years, until It the spring when of it fell 1992, only because the Soviet Union itself no behind, did led not Najibullah, by collapse, President 4 POLICY BRIEF NO.16 MARCH 2012 of Pakistani sanctuary did not get any worse. of Pakistani How many of these six assumptions been firmly borne out look by events? There to are some on have which the jury is still out. There are others, such as the assumption about the surge and improved governance, that have already been proved wrong. Province in Iraq after 2007. Province A fifth assumption has been that a ‘civilian surge’, as the Obama Administration termed it—the dispatch of diplomats, aid workers, agricultural officers, and other specializing in and governance, the economy—would supplement and justice strengthen the shaky performance of the Afghan government to such a degree that ordinary Afghans would see that governance had improved, and that their future lay Taliban. with Kabul, not with the Finally, a sixth assumption has explicit held—and in the American-designed campaign this plan for was the war in 2009 and the 2010—that plan and the exit problem the if even designed as succeed could strategy The addressed. not was Pakistan in sanctuary Taliban of campaign the that was assumption this of form specific exploitation Taliban’s the as long as succeed could plan police state for many decades before the American invasion of 2003. In Afghanistan, the army had been for war civil in involved continually and pressure under the was assumption Yet and several decades. remains up quickly and effectively. that it could be scaled A third assumption has been that Afghanistan be stable enough particularly politically, will in Kabul, in terms of constitutional power-sharing arrangements at to the allow center, a transition of security forces as 2014. to occur as early A fourth assumption, as bottom-up, outlined earlier, coercive is that ‘reintegration’ Taliban forces, converting of them from enemy opposing forces to neutral or supportive of the state, one valley at a time, would work in Afghanistan as it did in Anbar The question is whether this is producing is this whether is question The Iraqi army and police had been intact and serving a the United States, did rapidly build up large military the course, Of time. short a in forces paramilitary and country began to crack up in 1975, could be successfully be could 1975, in up crack to began country arms, under men of thousands of hundreds to up built Iraq, In 2014. by officers, capable confident, by led and National Army, National an Army, institution with a long history and considerable coherence and even success before the the Pakistan sanctuary. the Pakistan A second important assumption was that the Afghan south, even though some of these areas were relatively were areas these of some though even south, isolated from Kabul, other population centers, and In the end, the however, assumption was that it was vital to break ‘center the of Taliban’s gravity’ in the Helmand. There were alternatives to this approach, such as concentrating on the Pakistan border in the Waziristan. North in Haqannis the after going and east was that the best way to break Taliban momentum was to attack their center of gravity in Kandahar and against the Taliban, because this Taliban had arisen was and where they where had the greatest the historical presence and credibility. The implication where Canadian forces had served in Kandahar, should Kandahar, in served had forces Canadian where be understood as the ‘center of gravity’ of the war Afghanistan since 2009. One was that the south of Afghanistan, including continue to provide the basis for the campaign plan for constructed have partners NATO and Petraeus that Let us turn, then, to the full list of assumptions that security and stability or its opposite. The early evidence, early The opposite. its or stability and security I believe, is not as encouraging as press NATO releases would suggest. militias, but to take a very localized, one-valley-at-a- localized, very a take to but militias, approach. time power, including warlords, commanders, and religious and commanders, warlords, including power, ideologists. The response to this problem been to change has assumptions about the value of not local making has been undermined and even decimated by to claimants new of rise the and war of decades three what coherence there ever was in tribal decision- 5 POLICY BRIEF NO.16 MARCH 2012 not a rock was thrown in anger. The incentives of rising of incentives The anger. in thrown was rock a not described as Afghanistan, in investments international argued for earlier, forbearance and patience. That is not likely to recur in 2014 if fraud on a similar scale is carried out. The time is now for the international community to give cause for worry and skepticism), there is little visibility on how his successor is going how to the emerge, patronage-driven Karzai palace is going to and how competitionplay, among various vote banks is going to be managed peacefully. There are cruel, violent strains in the recent history Afghan of politics. This is hardly a transition that can election Nations United to left or granted for taken be major influence to leverage the lack who technocrats, political actors. In the 2009 presidential documented election, fraud created a crisis. perspective, From the fraud was Karzai’s probably unnecessary; if there had been a clean vote, the president probably would But have it won was anyway. not a clean vote. The leader of the opposition, Abdullah, Dr. reacted very responsibly to the affront of stolen votes. stood in He his rose garden in Kabul and held a series of mobilized, was militia single a Not conferences. press Another question is who Karzai, and will how succeed will this President constitutionalbe constructed transition in 2014? You might think, following the public discourse in Washington, that the major only event anticipated in Afghanistan in 2014 is the reduction of international military the forces transition to anAfghan and lead in security matters. In political strategy, you might also be forgiven for thinking that the only strategy any that resources and attention is is that receiving associated with direct talks with In the Taliban. fact, Afghanistan is very a be tohere, fromlooks, what have scheduled to which in one 2014, in electionpresidentialchallenging President Karzai is constitutionally prohibited from running again. Karzai has said publicly and privately word his at him take we if Even go. to intends he that (and the history of such transitions worldwide would ” There is no shame in acting upon bad strategy has been weighted, will be doubtful. than the national interest, then the durability of the Afghan security forces, on which so much of Western security forces. If the army becomes a fief of corrupt and generals key appointments of use who individuals other officers to protect their own interests rather a subtler, less easily mapped but no less dangerous role dangerous less no but mapped easily less subtler, a in sapping the cohesion, morale and durability of the challenge. There are ethnic imbalances in its officer play corruption and known. Cronyism well is as corps, Karzai palace? The army’s unity and coherence is already under split apart by another fraudulent election or by some transparent power grab by the (putatively) outgoing in, and may be willing to fight and die to defend. How defend. to die and fight to willing be may and in, will the symbolic and practical power and credibility of that state be strengthened through 2014, and not The Afghan army and police services require a state to be loyal to—national leadership that they believe The first is how long Afghan the politics center can of hold in Kabul, and what can be done to reinforce it. considered in reassessing these assumptions and the plan on which they are based. There are a number of major questions that should be be should that questions major of number a are There assumptions. to Whatdo so and is thenterms unacceptablefail with to mistakes... come to honest is “ statements ratifying it, but on the ground it is plain not may running is plan this which down track the that hold its weight. now. now. The campaign plan is on a form of automatic pilot; a series of international conferences issue bad assumptions. What is unacceptable is to do so and so do to is unacceptable is What assumptions. bad then fail to come to honest terms with mistakes—and adjust as rapidly as possible. I fear that is happening assumptions assumptions being reevaluated honestly? It is human There is no shame in acting to upon get things wrong. There are others that look doubtful. Are these 6 POLICY BRIEF NO.16 MARCH 2012 at This Foundation delivered magazine. lecture America Yorker New public New of a The on cips.uottawa.ca at University of University [email protected] based president is is Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1N 6N5 Ontario, Ottawa, 55 Laurier Avenue East, Room 3170 Room East, 55 Laurier Avenue Centre for International Policy Studies International for Centre Brief Coll contributor a 1990’s, ignored 1990’s, the linkages Afghan between security and Western An security. exit of combat forces is a certainty, but there are reasons to keep working on how that exit occurs and what it leaves behind, hard and dispiriting as that work can sometimes be. The security of Afghans, Canadians and Americans what may. remain linked, come will Steve and Policy 27, 2012. CIPS on February ” in 2014. The time is now for the international n a successful political transition recognition that it had, during the dark period of shared. The failures of policy involve many complicit parties. Yet NATO arrived in Afghanistan in 2001 in plans and assumptions made five years before. The costs of the mistakes made in Afghanistan are insurgency impossible to imagine. But it will not come not will it But imagine. to impossible insurgency easily and it is in unlikely, 2014, to flow rigidly from Nor is the prospect of Afghan stability adequate to facilitate and population the of sections large protect Pakistan’s emergence from its own dark period of stability. stability. This is no longer a ‘forever war’; the end of international military involvement is within sight. other influentialNATO capitals whose governments invested blood and treasure in the project of Afghan now about alternatives, before it is well and truly too too truly and well is it before alternatives, about now late. This is a challenge of leadership—not only for the Obama Administration but also for Canada and adjustments—perhaps major ones—may be required. thinking start to opportunity an is there minimum, a At of either NATO of governments either or NATO regional governments to barrel bravely ahead drawn along without admitting the even lines the already possibility that is based are flawed, what timely adaptations might mitigate this problem? Surely it is not in the interests outside of governmental systems can have the temerity the have can systems governmental of outside to ask, is “What is Plan B?” If some or a majority of the assumptions on which the current exit strategy Another question, which perhaps only those of us community to begini planning and investing now, in anticipation of multiple challenges in 2014. in anticipation now, “ critical to the nascent election system Afghanistan in must be reinforced, emphasized and strengthened opposition not to challenge the vote violently. But that But violently. vote the challenge to not opposition cannot be the only serious investment in a successful transition. The and other institutions transition transition in 2014. Talks facilitate with such an election the by persuading the Taliban armed might begin planning and investing in a successful political