DOCSLIB.ORG

Ngo Insecurity in High-Risk Conflict Zones: the Politicization of Aid and Its Impact on “Humanitarian Space”

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Ngo Insecurity in High-Risk Conflict Zones: the Politicization of Aid and Its Impact on “Humanitarian Space” NGO INSECURITY IN HIGH-RISK CONFLICT ZONES: THE POLITICIZATION OF AID AND ITS IMPACT ON “HUMANITARIAN SPACE” by JOHN “DAVID” F. MITCHELL B.A., George Mason University, 2008 M.S., George Mason University, 2010 AN ABSTRACT OF A DISSERTATION submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Security Studies College of Arts and Sciences KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY Manhattan, Kansas 2016 Abstract Attacks against nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in high-risk conflict zones have increased exponentially over the last two decades. However, the few existing empirical studies on NGO insecurity have tended to focus on external factors influencing attacks, with little attention paid to the actions of aid workers themselves. To fill this gap, this dissertation theorizes that aid workers may have contributed to their own insecurity by engaging in greater political action. Both quantitative and qualitative methods are used to assess the impact of political activity by NGOs on the insecurity of aid workers. The quantitative analyses test the theory at two levels. The first is a large-N country-level analysis of 117 nations from 1999 to 2015 using panel corrected standard errors. The second is a subnational-level statistical analysis of four case studies: Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and Colombia from 2000 to 2014. Both the country- and provincial- level analyses show that the magnitude of aid tends to be a significant determinant of aid worker security. The qualitative methods of “structured-focused comparison” and “process tracing” are used to analyze the four cases. Results show that aid workers are most likely to be victims of politically-motivated attacks while in-transit. Consistent with the quantitative findings, it is speculated that if workers are engaged in a large-scale project over an extended period of time, attackers will be able to monitor their daily activities and routines closely, making it easier to orchestrate a successful ambush. Furthermore, the analysis reveals that political statements made by NGOs—regardless of their sectors of activity—have increased insecurity for the broader aid community. These results dispel the myth that humanitarian activity has historically been independent, impartial, and neutral. Several NGOs have relied on this false assumption for security, believing that adherence to core principles has contributed to “humanitarian space.” The results also dispel the popular NGO assumption that targeted attacks are not official tactics of organized militants, but rather the result of criminality or mistaken identity. In fact, the overwhelming majority of aid workers attacked in high-risk conflict zones have been targeted by political actors. NGO INSECURITY IN HIGH-RISK CONFLICT ZONES: THE POLITICIZATION OF AID AND ITS IMPACT ON “HUMANITARIAN SPACE” by JOHN “DAVID” F. MITCHELL B.A., George Mason University, 2008 M.S., George Mason University, 2010 A DISSERTATION submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Security Studies College of Arts and Sciences KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY Manhattan, Kansas 2016 Approved by: Major Professor Emizet F. Kisangani, Ph.D. Copyright DAVID F. MITCHELL 2016 Abstract Attacks against nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in high-risk conflict zones have increased exponentially over the last two decades. However, the few existing empirical studies on NGO insecurity have tended to focus on external factors influencing attacks, with little attention paid to the actions of aid workers themselves. To fill this gap, this dissertation theorizes that aid workers may have contributed to their own insecurity by engaging in greater political action. Both quantitative and qualitative methods are used to assess the impact of political activity by NGOs on the insecurity of aid workers. The quantitative analyses test the theory at two separate levels. The first is a large-N country-level analysis of 117 nations from 1999 to 2015 using panel corrected standard errors. The second is a subnational-level statistical analysis of four case studies: Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and Colombia from 2000 to 2014. Both the country- and provincial- level analyses show that the magnitude of aid tends to be a significant determinant of aid worker security. The qualitative methods of “structured-focused comparison” and “process tracing” are used to analyze the four cases. Results show that aid workers are most likely to be victims of politically-motivated attacks while in-transit. Consistent with the quantitative findings, it is speculated that if workers are engaged in a large-scale project over an extended period of time, attackers will be able to monitor their daily activities and routines closely, making it easier to orchestrate a successful ambush. Furthermore, the analysis reveals that political statements made by NGOs—regardless of their sectors of activity—have increased insecurity for the broader aid community. These results dispel the myth that humanitarian activity has historically been independent, impartial, and neutral. Several NGOs have relied on this false assumption for security, believing that adherence to core principles has contributed to “humanitarian space.” The results also dispel the popular NGO assumption that targeted attacks are not official tactics of organized militants, but rather the result of criminality or mistaken identity. In fact, the overwhelming majority of aid workers attacked in high-risk conflict zones have been targeted by political actors. Table of Contents List of Figures ................................................................................................................................ xi List of Tables ............................................................................................................................... xiii Chapter 1 - Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1 Chapter 2 - Literature Review and Theoretical Development ........................................................ 8 2.1 Theme One: Security Trends ............................................................................................ 8 2.2 Theme Two: Explanations for Attacks ........................................................................... 11 2.3 Theme Three: Organizational Activity and Approaches ................................................ 23 2.4 Limitations ...................................................................................................................... 30 2.5 Theoretical Argument ..................................................................................................... 32 Chapter 3 - Quantitative Analysis ................................................................................................. 36 3.1 Research Design .............................................................................................................. 36 3.2 Operational Definitions of Variables .............................................................................. 39 3.3 Country-Level Empirical Analysis ................................................................................. 48 3.4 Provincial-Level Empirical Analysis .............................................................................. 62 3.5 Summary and Discussion of Findings ............................................................................ 67 Chapter 4 - Qualitative Research Design ...................................................................................... 69 4.1 Qualitative Approach ...................................................................................................... 70 4.2 Structured-Focused Comparison ..................................................................................... 72 4.3 Process Tracing ............................................................................................................... 75 Chapter 5 - Afghanistan ................................................................................................................ 78 5.1 A Brief History of Afghanistan (1747-1978) .................................................................. 79 5.2 Modern Conflict (1978-Present) ..................................................................................... 84 5.3 Insecurity of NGOs in Afghanistan, 2000-2014 ............................................................. 94 5.3.1 Structured-Focused Comparison: Motivations and Locations ................................. 99 5.4 Process Tracing ............................................................................................................. 103 5.4.1 Critical Antecedents ............................................................................................... 104 5.4.2 Critical Junctures ................................................................................................... 111 5.4.2.1 Political Critical Juncture ................................................................................ 111 5.4.3.2 Criminal Critical Juncture ............................................................................... 120 viii 5.5 Summary and Discussion of Findings .......................................................................... 122 Chapter 6 - Iraq ........................................................................................................................... 125 6.1 A Brief History of Iraq (1638-1979) ............................................................................
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Haji Yusuf Iman Guled
    Haji Yusuf Iman Guled Justice and Welfare Party of Somaliland ( UCID ) ⢠Haji Yusuf Iman Guled , former Defense Minister of Somalia and a Business Magnate Premierzy Somalii. 14 lutego 2009 ) ⢠premier - elekt Mohamed Mohamud Guled ( 16 grudnia - 24 grudnia 2008 ) ⢠Omar Abdirashid Circonscription d'Est Gashamo. Zone Degehabur . Son représentant actuel est Abdulkerim Ahmed Guled . Voir aussi ⢠Circonscriptions législatives ( Éthiopie )⢠Conseil Hasan Guled Aptidon. Guled Aptidon Z Wikipedia Hasan Guled Aptidon , Hassan Hasan Guled Aptidon Z Wikipedia Hasan Guled Aptidon , Has Saida Ismail is the daughter of Haji Bashir Ismail Yusuf, the first President of the Somali National Assembly during Somalia's early civilian administration. Her brother, Abdullahi Haji Bashir Ismail, is a Deputy Director-General of Somali Immigration & Naturalization, One of the high rank Senior Somali Administration Officers, as well as a writer of Politics and History. Ismail later also entered politics, serving as Vice-Minister of Finance in the Transitional National Government (TNG) between 2000 and 2004. Haji Yusuf Iman Guled (Somali: Xaaji Yuusuf Imaan Guleed, Arabic: Øاجي يوس٠إيمان جوليد) was a Somali politician. Biography. Guled was raised in Somalia. He served as the newly independent country's Minister of Defence during the 1960s, and was a key figure in the nation's early civilian administration.[1] [2]. See also. Haji Bashir Ismail Yusuf. Osman Haji. References. Europa Publications Limited, The Middle East: a survey and directory of the countries of the Middle East, (Europa Publications., 1967). Haji Yusuf Iman Guled was a Somali politician.
    [Show full text]
  • 19 October 2020 "Generated on Refers to the Date on Which the User Accessed the List and Not the Last Date of Substantive Update to the List
    Res. 1988 (2011) List The List established and maintained pursuant to Security Council res. 1988 (2011) Generated on: 19 October 2020 "Generated on refers to the date on which the user accessed the list and not the last date of substantive update to the list. Information on the substantive list updates are provided on the Council / Committee’s website." Composition of the List The list consists of the two sections specified below: A. Individuals B. Entities and other groups Information about de-listing may be found at: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ombudsperson (for res. 1267) https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/delisting (for other Committees) https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/2231/list (for res. 2231) A. Individuals TAi.155 Name: 1: ABDUL AZIZ 2: ABBASIN 3: na 4: na ﻋﺒﺪ اﻟﻌﺰﻳﺰ ﻋﺒﺎﺳﯿﻦ :(Name (original script Title: na Designation: na DOB: 1969 POB: Sheykhan Village, Pirkowti Area, Orgun District, Paktika Province, Afghanistan Good quality a.k.a.: Abdul Aziz Mahsud Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: na Passport no: na National identification no: na Address: na Listed on: 4 Oct. 2011 (amended on 22 Apr. 2013) Other information: Key commander in the Haqqani Network (TAe.012) under Sirajuddin Jallaloudine Haqqani (TAi.144). Taliban Shadow Governor for Orgun District, Paktika Province as of early 2010. Operated a training camp for non- Afghan fighters in Paktika Province. Has been involved in the transport of weapons to Afghanistan. INTERPOL- UN Security Council Special Notice web link: https://www.interpol.int/en/How-we-work/Notices/View-UN-Notices- Individuals click here TAi.121 Name: 1: AZIZIRAHMAN 2: ABDUL AHAD 3: na 4: na ﻋﺰﯾﺰ اﻟﺮﺣﻤﺎن ﻋﺒﺪ اﻻﺣﺪ :(Name (original script Title: Mr Designation: Third Secretary, Taliban Embassy, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates DOB: 1972 POB: Shega District, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan Good quality a.k.a.: na Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: Afghanistan Passport no: na National identification no: Afghan national identification card (tazkira) number 44323 na Address: na Listed on: 25 Jan.
    [Show full text]
  • Read the Transcript
    A Deeper-Look: How military and development actors share the battlespace February 2020 Patrick Fine and Lieutenant General David Barno, USA, Retired Page 1 of 19 [Music] Patrick Fine: As we enter the 2020s, we see a world of growing great power competition where the effects of climate change are becoming more and more apparent and where non-state actors threaten sovereign states and national governments. We've seen more migration than ever before in history over the last few years, something we've explored in depth in previous podcasts, and we're seeing how these same factors fuel conflict and threaten longstanding international arrangements. Voiceover: A Deeper Look. Exploring what works and what doesn't in development, and the changes we can make together to turn ideas into action. Patrick Fine: Welcome, listeners. I'm Patrick Fine, CEO of FHI 360 and host of A Deeper Look. This season, we're taking a deeper look at the trends, ideas and forces that will shape the future of development. Today, I'm joined by Lieutenant General David Barno to explore how evolving security challenges will shape the way we think about and address human development needs. General, welcome to the podcast. Gen. David Barno: It's great to be here, Patrick. Patrick Fine: General, even as the world has grown more prosperous, we're seeing complex human development challenges, particularly in places affected by conflict. In our last episode, we had Masood Ahmed from the Center for Global Development, and he observed that a rising tide has lifted many boats, but there are places where the tide does not reach and those are characterized by fragility, instability, and conflict.
    [Show full text]
  • Gericht Entscheidungsdatum Geschäftszahl Spruch Text
    18.12.2017 Gericht BVwG Entscheidungsdatum 18.12.2017 Geschäftszahl W159 2123646-1 Spruch W159 2123646-1/15E IM NAMEN DER REPUBLIK! Das Bundesverwaltungsgericht hat durch den Richter Dr. Clemens KUZMINSKI über die Beschwerde von XXXX, geb. XXXX, StA. Somalia, gegen den Bescheid des Bundesamtes für Fremdenwesen und Asyl vom 22.02.2016, Zl. XXXX, nach Durchführung einer mündlichen Verhandlung am 10.11.2017 zu Recht erkannt: A) Die Beschwerde wird gemäß § 3 Abs. 1 AsylG 2005 idgF als unbegründet abgewiesen. B) Die Revision ist gemäß Art. 133 Abs. 4 B-VG nicht zulässig. Text ENTSCHEIDUNGSGRÜNDE: I. Verfahrensgang: Der Beschwerdeführer, ein damals unbegleiteter Minderjähriger somalischer Staatsangehöriger, gelangte am 09.11.2014 unter Umgehung der Grenzkontrolle nach Österreich und stellte am gleichen Tag einen Antrag auf internationalen Schutz. Bei der ebenfalls noch am 09.11.2014 stattgefundenen Erstbefragung nach dem Asylgesetz durch die Polizeiinspektion XXXX gab der Antragsteller zu seinen Fluchtgründen an, dass er in Somalia alleine, ohne Eltern und Geschwister gelebt habe, dass er obdachlos gewesen sei und als Schuhputzer gearbeitet habe. Er sei traurig und einsam gewesen, da sich niemand um ihn gekümmert habe und er habe vergebens seine Eltern gesucht. Nach Zulassung zum Asylverfahren wurde seitens des örtlich zuständigen Jugend- Wohlfahrtsträger konkret genannte Mitarbeiter der XXXX mit der Vertretung des Minderjährigen im Asylverfahren betraut. Am 13.08.2015 erfolgte eine Einvernahme des Antragstellers (im Beisein eines gesetzlichen Vertreters). Der Antragsteller bestätige, dass er bisher (in der polizeiliche Erstbefragung) der Wahrheit entsprechende Angaben gemacht habe und diese jeweils rückübersetzt und korrekt protokolliert worden seien, korrigierte jedoch seinen Geburtsort von XXXX auf XXXX.
    [Show full text]
  • Regional Interests Define the African Union Mission in Somalia
    DIIS POLICY BRIEF NOVEMBER 2015 Fragmented peacekeeping REGIONAL INTERESTS DEFINE THE AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SOMALIA The African Union Mission in Somalia RECOMMENDATIONS (AMISOM) achieved impressive results during 2014 and has demonstrated the potential to act ■ Understand in detail what motivates AMISOM’s as one mission rather than a collection of main troop contributors socially, politically and individual troop-contributing countries. historically. However, national interests of Ethiopia and ■ Accept and learn to work with national interests as Kenya lead to fragmentation of the results that a basic reality that shapes the strategic direction may be achieved through AMISOM. of AMISOM. ■ In early 2007 AMISOM was created as one of the Find ways to support and strengthen AMISOM headquarters, for instance, by gifting equipment African Union’s most expansive peace support for it to distribute from its headquarters. operations to date. It was first deployed to Mogadishu in March 2007 with some 1,650 Ugandan troops. ■ Provide greater support to the African Union (AU) AMISOM’s initial peacekeeping mandate was and AMISOM to ensure that after-action reviews expanded on 22 July 2010 to encompass a peace are produced and used in future planning. In the case of AMISOM, national interests and strategic objectives of the mission at times overlap, but are often contradictory. ‘To AMISOM we say we should not misunderstand you. We know how important you are to us. I was one of the top SNA leaders who in the past went to the troop contributing countries such as Uganda, Burundi and Ethiopia to help build your forces. So now it is your turn to help us rebuild our institutions’.
    [Show full text]
  • Here's the Best Thing the United States Has Done in Afghanistan
    CENTER FOR GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT ESSAY Here’s the Best Thing the United States Has Done in Afghanistan Justin Sandefur October 2013 www.cgdev.org/publication/here-best-thing-united-states-has-done-afghanistan ABSTRACT The 2010 Afghanistan Mortality Survey showed that, from 2004 to 2010, life expectancy had risen from just 42 years — the second-lowest rate in the world — to 62 years, driven by a sharp decline in child mortality. Doubts immediately crept in about the findings, particularly the child mortality decline, but a new survey in 2011 confirmed that child mortality was indeed declining rapidly, and the United Nations Children’s Fund’s September 2013 global report calculates an overall decline for Afghanistan of more than 25 percent from 2000 to 2012. Afghanistan’s progress against mortality reflects the success of providing health aid that differed radically from the bulk of American aid to Afghanistan during the war. The USAID program that contributed to the decline was a multilateral effort coordinated by Afghanistan’s own Ministry of Public Health. Results were verified by random sampling, and some funding was linked to measures of performance. This internal policy experiment, however, was destined to provoke resistance. More surprising is the source of resistance to an aid program that attempted to stop simply throwing money at a problem and focus on building sustainable systems: auditors. Thanks to Victoria Fan for help interpreting the child mortality numbers, to Charles Kenny and Bill Savedoff for comments on an earlier draft, and to Sarah Dykstra for help tabulating the numbers and sources. All opinions and errors are mine.
    [Show full text]
  • Piracy and Terrorism: How to Contain the Threat of Al-Shabaab and Maritime Piracy In
    Couchenour 1 Piracy and Terrorism: How to Contain the Threat of Al-Shabaab and Maritime Piracy in Somalia By Thomas Couchenour The United States must help effective African militaries contain the al-Shabaab terrorist group and refrain from instigating piratical strikes rather than resorting to “imperialist intervention” in Somalia. Somalia is located in Eastern Africa, bordering Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Kenya, and the Indian Ocean. Somalia achieved political relevance through terror organizations born under its people’s struggle for legitimate governance.i Somali maritime piracy presents a threat to an array of nations’ economic interests in the Gulf of Aden. Due to NATO and unilateral efforts from Russia, China, and India, Somali piracy damage has decreased substantially since 2011.ii The Somali terrorist organization, “al-Shabaab” is an Islamic extremist group allied with al-Qaeda and engages in similar attacks with assault weapons, dismemberings, and suicide bombings. Shabaab attacks haven’t exceeded the borders of Somalia, Kenya, and Uganda; though threats have recently been made against Washington and New York. The U.N. expects terrorist activity from al-Shabaab to increase following the US airstrike death of group Couchenour 2 leader, Ahmed Godane.iii Al-Shabaab currently presents a larger threat than maritime piracy despite issues with the Somali TFG and Kenyan and Ethiopian military forces. The U.S. government must acknowledge the relevance of AMISOM and unilateral African military efforts to combat al-Shabaab. The Somali
    [Show full text]
  • Rents, Patronage, and Defection: State-Building and Insurgency in Afghanistan
    Rents, Patronage, and Defection: State-building and Insurgency in Afghanistan Anand Gopal Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 2017 © 2017 Anand Gopal All rights reserved ABSTRACT Rents, Patronage, and Defection: State-building and Insurgency in Afghanistan Anand Gopal Afghanistan has been one of the most protracted conflicts modern era, but theories of civil war onset fail to explain the war’s causes or its patterns of violence. This thesis examines the origins of the post-2001 period of the conflict through the perspective of state formation; although many civil wars today unfold in newly-forming states, the processes of center-periphery relations and elite incorporation have been little studied in the context of political violence. The thesis first describes how Afghanistan’s embeddedness in the international state system and global markets undermined the nascent state’s efforts to centralize and bureaucratize, leading instead to warlordism and neopatrimonialism. Second, it demonstrates that the development of an insurgency after 2001 was due not to ethnic grievance or rebel opportunities for profit, but rather to the degree to which local elites were excluded from state patronage. Third, it examines the role of ideology and social position in the Afghan Taliban movement. The dissertation seeks to offer a theory of political violence in Afghanistan that can, mutatis mutandis, help explain key features of civil war
    [Show full text]
  • 3243 Tel.: (251-11) 5513 822 Fax: (251-11) 5519 321 Email: [email protected]
    AFRICAN UNION UNION AFRICAINE UNIÃO AFRICANA Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, P.O. Box: 3243 Tel.: (251-11) 5513 822 Fax: (251-11) 5519 321 Email: [email protected] PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL 462nd MEETING ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA 16 OCTOBER 2014 PSC/PR/2.(CDLXII) REPORT OF THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE COMMISSION ON THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA PSC/PR/2.(CDLXII) Page 1 REPORT OF THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE COMMISSION ON THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA I. INTRODUCTION 1. The present report is submitted pursuant to the relevant decisions of Council. It provides an update on the main developments that took place in Somalia during the period under review, the implementation of the mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and other related issues. The report concludes with observations on the way forward. II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 2. The overall political developments in Somalia remain encouraging, with evidence of progress in the State formation process, constitutional review and preparations for elections by 2016. a) State Formation Process 3. Since the signing of the August 2013 Addis Ababa Agreement establishing the Interim Jubba Administration, there has been some progress in the implementation of this Agreement. Furthermore, agreements have been reached regarding the establishment of two other States, namely the South-West and Central States. On 23 June 2014, the South West-6 Group and a delegation of South-West-3 Group signed a historic Agreement at Villa Somalia to set up an Interim South-West Administration that would include the regions of Bay, Bakol and Lower Shabelle. A Technical Committee was set up to prepare the roadmap for the creation of an interim South-West Administration.
    [Show full text]
  • Milestones in Humanitarian Action
    Milestones in Humanitarian Action Milestones in Humanitarian Action Edited by Kevin M. Cahill, M.D. The Center for International Humanitarian Cooperation Fordham University Press IHA Book Series, New York, 2017 Copyright © 2017 The Center for International Humanitarian Cooperation Distributed by Fordham University Press as part of the IHA Book Series All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval systems without permission in writing from the publishers. ISBN #978-0-8232-7905-0 All royalties from this book go to the training of humanitarian workers. Printed in the United States of America. IHA Book Series The International Humanitarian Affairs (IHA) Book Series, authored or edited by Kevin M. Cahill, M.D., is devoted to improving the effectiveness of humanitarian relief programs. With contributions by leading professionals, the books are practical guides to responding to the many different effects of civil strife, natural disasters, epidemics, and other crises. All books are available online at www.fordhampress.com. Books marked with an asterisk are available in French translation from Robert Laffont of Paris; books marked with a double asterisk are available in Spanish, German, Arabic, and French. Preventive Diplomacy: Stopping Wars Before They Start, 1996, 2000* Basics of International Humanitarian Missions, 2003* Emergency Relief Operations, 2003* Traditions, Values, and Humanitarian Action, 2003* Human Security for All: A Tribute to Sérgio Vieira de Mello, 200 Technology for Humanitarian Action, 200 To Bear Witness: A Journey of Healing and Solidarity, 2005* Tropical Medicine: A Clinical Text, 7th edition, 2006 The Pulse of Humanitarian Assistance, 2007 Even in Chaos: Education in Times of Emergency, 2010 Sudan at the Brink: Self-Determination and National Unity, F.D.
    [Show full text]
  • “Global Terrorism Index: 2015.” Institute for Economics and Peace
    MEASURING AND UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM Quantifying Peace and its Benefits The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) is an independent, non-partisan, non-profit think tank dedicated to shifting the world’s focus to peace as a positive, achievable, and tangible measure of human well-being and progress. IEP achieves its goals by developing new conceptual frameworks to define peacefulness; providing metrics for measuring peace; and uncovering the relationships between business, peace and prosperity as well as promoting a better understanding of the cultural, economic and political factors that create peace. IEP has offices in Sydney, New York and Mexico City. It works with a wide range of partners internationally and collaborates with intergovernmental organizations on measuring and communicating the economic value of peace. For more information visit www.economicsandpeace.org SPECIAL THANKS to the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) headquartered at the University of Maryland for their cooperation on this study and for providing the Institute for Economics and Peace with their Global Terrorism Database (GTD) datasets on terrorism. CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 ABOUT THE GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 6 1 RESULTS 9 Global Terrorism Index map 10 Terrorist incidents map 12 Ten countries most impacted by terrorism 20 Terrorism compared to other forms of violence 30 2 TRENDS 33 Changes in the patterns and characteristics of terrorist activity 34 Terrorist group trends 38 Foreign fighters in Iraq
    [Show full text]
  • UPDATE | Displacements Caused by Military Offensive in South-Central Somalia 700 ETHIOPIA KENYA 6,420
    UPDATE | Displacements caused by military offensive in South-Central Somalia 2-6 September 2014 UNHCR Somalia Overview New IDPs during the reporting period 700 Preliminary reports indiocate that around 6,420 civilians were reported as displaced since 'Operation Indian Ocean', an AMISOM/SNAF offensive launched on 25 August 2014 Total number of new IDPs since late August 2014 6,420 targeting Al Shabaab strongholds in South Central Somalia. Most recent displacements are seen with 700 displaced in Lower Shabelle and Middle Juba, in addition to the around 5,700 civilians displaced during August after the first week of the offensive. The majority are seeking refuge in Shabelle Hoose and Bakool regions. The newly displaced are reported to be in need of humanitarian assistance. ETHIOPIA Ceel Barde Belet Weyne Displacement inside Shabelle Hoose region Rab dhuure GALGADUUD Around 1,850 civilians were displaced in Shabelle Hoose region, mainly from Buulo Mareer BAKOOL in Marka district to Qoryooley town in Qoryooley district. From Kurtunwaarey, 1,200 civilians Buur dhuxunle Xudur HIRAAN were displaced to Qoryooley in Qoryooley district and another 570 civilians moved to Waajid Tayeeglow Shalaambood in Marka district. Luuq Bulo Barde Kurtow Displacement from Bakool to Hiraan region Baidoa GEDO Buurdhuubo Approximately 2,100 persons were displaced in Tayeeglow in Bakool region fleeing to Belet Buur Hakaba SHABELLE DHEXE Weyne in Hiraan region. BAY Diinsoor SHABELLE HOOSE Diplacements from Bay and Shabelle Hoose regions to Juba Dhexe region BANADIR Qoryooley Mogadishu Saakow and Salagle towns in Juba Dhexe have seen an influx of new IDPs arriving from Salagle Saakow Marka Shalaambood multiple locations in and around the region due to the military offensive.
    [Show full text]