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Dismissal of Military Commission Charges 5.12.2008.Pdf CHARGE SHEET I. pERSONAL DATA 1. NAME OF ACCUSED: Khalid Sheikh Mohammed Walid Muhammad Salih Mubarak Bin 'Attash Ramzi Binalshibh Ali Abdul Aziz Ali Mustafa Ahmed Adamal Hawsawi ~ ,,'.. ,~~ .... V.l " ~, !, , / 2. ALIASES OF ACCUSED: Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (aliases Mukhtar al Baluchi; Hafiz; Meer Akram; Abdul Rahman Abdullah AI Gha i) W.alid Muhammad Salih Mubarek Bin 'Attash (aliases Khallad; Salah Saeed Mohammed Bin Yousaf; Silve , Tawfiq) I Ramzi Binalshibh (aliases Abu Ubaydah; Ahad Abdollahi Sabet; Abu Ubaydah al Hadrami) Ali Abdul Aziz Ali (aliases Ammar al Baluchi; Isam Mansur; Isam Mansar; Isam Mansour; Ali; Hani) I Mustafa Ahmed Adam al Hawsawi (aliases Zahir; Hashem Abdollahi; Muhammad Ahanad; Abdera an Mustafa) Mohamed alKahtani (aliases Ahmed al Qahtani; Mohamed al Qahtani; Abdul Rahman al Janoo . 3. ISN NUMBER OF ACCUSED (LAST FOUR): Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (10024) Walid Muhammad Salih Mubarek Bin 'Attash (10014) Ramzi Binalshibh (10013) Ali Abdul Aziz Ali (10018) ~t/ ~dQ Mustafa Ahmed Adam al Hawsawi (10011) Mohamed al Kahtani (0063) S~ ~ II. CHARGES AND SPECIFICA}I'6NS 4. CHARGE, VlOLAllON OF SECllON AND llTLE OF CRI.E7F •.•.C. SPECIFICATION: See Attached Charges and Specifications. , , III. SWI;A"RING OF CHARGES ' 5a. NAME OF ACCUSER (LAST, FIRST, MI) 5b.GRADE 5c. ORGANIZATION OF ACCUSER Dejong, Laura, S / 0-3 Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF) 5d. S~URE OF ACCUSER JH~ 5e. DATE (YYYYMMDD) ttu/liX r. -0 Y- ' 20080415 AFFIDAVIT: Before me, the underSigne~horit'ed by law to administer oath in cases of this character, personally appeared the above named accuser the 15th day of April . 2008. and signed the foregoing charges and specifications under oath that he/she is a person "bJ,a '" th' "o'''m J~';" "d 'ho' h,/'h, ho' ".0"" '0"""'" of ~ h" ;~"tI,,',d 'ho =.,,, "t tooth 'h,..,o ,,' that the same are true toCOL the best 0 is/her knowledge and belief. K In M. Chenail Office of Military Commissions LdN.m.ofO- Organization of Officer LieL nant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps judge Advocate. Grade Official Capacity to Administer Oath (See R.M. C. 307(b) must be commissioned officer) ~ ~ ~ / Sianature / MC FORM 458 JAN 2007 IV. NOTICE TO THE .ACCUSED . ...r.. ' 'L -. , "I'""n if", DUro "lnA\ Clayton G. Trivett, Jr. GS-14 Office of Military Commissions / Typed Name aM Grade ofPerson Who Caused organlrarJon or rne I"'erson wno (;ausea Accused to Be Notified of Charges Accused to B,e Notified ofCharges Signature V. RECEIPT OF CHARGES BY CONVENING AUTHORITY / 1. The sworn charges were received at 1151 hours, on 15 April 2008 ,at Arl i L Virnini.::l / Location For the Convening Authority: Donna L. wiL ./Typed Name of Officer GS-15 Grade Af~ / Signature \'fl~~RRAL 8a. DESIGNATION OF CONVENING AUTHORITY LACE 80. DATE (YYYVMMDD) .~ ~:tt -".10, ''''' ~",. ("'")00""" m"'~ ","""""'r,"!d:»m,..~ """".."'" "'''''''''''' "dO, ''''7'''' ~""g ,,,,,,,,,,,,,.' By / of Command. Oreler, or70n Type7e end GraCIe of ufficer OmCiet CepactrY of Om.cer ::itgmng /: ;:iJgnatul'e / ,,' VII. SERvICt: uF CI"\ARGES ·S.On / , I (caused to be) served a copy these'charges on the above named accused. / .. V Typed Name ofTr/sl Counsel .Grade of rri.l Counsel Slgn.tUre oftiM Counsel FOOTNOTES lSee R.M.C. 601 con99rning instructlons. If none, so state. Me FORM 458 JAN 2007 Specification: In that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Walid Muhammad Salih Mubar Bin 'Attash, Ramzi Binalshibh, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, Mustafa Ahmed Adam al Hawsawi and Mohamed al Kahtani, persons subject to trial by military commiss' n as alien unlawful enemy combatants, did, at various locations, from in or about 199 to in or about May 2003, conspire and agree with Usama bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahi , Mohammed Atef(a/k/a Abu Hafs al Masri), 19 individuals who hijacked fo commercial airliners on September 11, 2001: (American Airlines Flight 11, hereinafter A #11) Mohamed Atta, Satam al Suqami, Waleed al Shehri, Wail al Shehri, Ab I Aziz al Omari; (United Airlines Flight 175, hereinafter UA #175) Marwan al Shehhi, amza al Ghamdi, Ahmed al Ghamdi, Mohand al Shehri, Fayez Rashid Ahmed Hassan . I Qadi Banihammad (hereinafter Fayez Banihammad); (United Airlines Flight 93, here.' after UA #93) Ziad Samir Jarrah, Ahmad Ibrahim A. al Haznawi, Ahmed al Nami, eed al Ghamdi; (American Airlines Flight 77, hereinafter AA #77) Hani Hanj r, Khalid al Mihdhar, Nawaf al Hazmi, Majed Moqed, Salem al Hazmi; and vario s other members and associates of the al Qaeda organization, known and unkn n, and willfully join an enterprise ofpersons with the intent to further the unla ul purpose ofthe enterprise; to commit the following offenses triable by milit c ion: attacking civilians, attacking civilian objects, intentionally causi~ ~ ily injury, murder in violation of the law of war, destruction of property in ViOl~ q:i~ e law of war, and terrorism, said agreement and enterprise sharing a common cr .n~l ~ rpose, known to the six accused, to attack the United States, its people, and their ro , said conspiracy resulting in the deaths of2,973 persons. (See Charge She Appendix A for a list of victims killed in the attacks). nt and enterprise, and in order to accomplish some objective or purpose of the agree nt and enterprise, the above six accused and their co­ conspirators knowingly commit d an overt act or acts, including, but not limited to, the following: 1. In August 1996, sarna bin Laden issued a public "Declaration of Jihad Against the Americans," in whi he called for the murder of U.S. military personnel serving on the Arabian Peninsula. 2. In 1996 balid Sheikh Mohammed met with Usarna bin Laden in Afghanistan and discussed t e operational concept of hijacking commercial airliners and crashing them into building III the United States and elsewhere. This plan was ultimately approved by Usarna bin aden. 3. Between 1996 and 2001, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Usama bin Laden, and Mo mmed Atef (a/k/a Abu Hafs al Masri, the military commander of al Qaeda), proposed a discussed potential targets for attack by hijacked commercial airliners and decided to Page 1 of90 4. In Febl nary 1998, Usama bin Laden, A:yman al Zawahiti, and others, mtdel the banner of "International Islamic Front for Fighting Jews and Crusaders," issued a fatwa (purported religious ruling) requiring all Muslims able to do so to kill Americans - whe civilian or military - anywhere they can be found and to "plunder their money." 5. On or about May 29, 1998, Usama bin Laden issued a statement entitle 'The Nuclear Bomb of Islam," under the banner of the "International Islamic Front Dr Fighting Jews and Crusaders," in which he stated that "it is the duty ofthe Muslims to repare as much force as possible to terrorize the enemies of God." 6. In early 1999, Usama bin Laden directed Walid Muhamm Salih Mubarak Bin 'Attash (a/k/a Khallad, hereinafter Khallad Bin 'Attash) to 0 tain a United States visa so that he could travel to the United States and obtain pilot tra' ing in order to participate in what Bin 'Attash termed the "Planes Operation." 7. On or about April 3, 1999, Khallad Bin 'Attash aveled to San'a, Yemen and applied for a visa to travel to the United States using the a . s "Salah Saeed Mohammed Bin Yousaf." This application was denied. ~ 8. On or about April 3, 1999, and April ~ ,~~pectively, Nawaf al Hazmi (AA #77) and Khalid al Mihdhar (AA #77) recei~i ~\eddah, Saudia Arabia, in order to travel to the United States. ?::>~) S 9. In or about September 1999, Khal d Bin 'Attash administered a forty-five day special course in hand-to-hand combat tra' ing at an al Qaeda camp in Logar, Afghanistan, in order to help select trainees for the" anes Operation." Khalid al Mihdhar (AA #77) and Nawaf al Hazmi (AA #77) attend athis course. Following their participation in the course, al Mihdhar (AA #77) and a azmi (AA #77) were selected to be part of the "Planes Operation." 10. In or about Novemb r 1999, Khallad Bin 'Attash and Nawafal Hazmi (AA #77) traveled from Qandahar, A hanistan, to Karachi, Pakistan, where they moved in with Khalid Sheikh Moham ed. With the assistance of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Khallad Bin 'Attash d Nawafal Hazmi (AA #77) began using CDs, books, and other materials to learn ab t flying airplanes. 11. While y ing in Karachi, Khallad Bin'Attash, and Nawafal Hazmi (AA #77) used compute~lmulators to learn how to fly planes, and studied and researched flight timetables fo United States air carriers with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, in order to coordinate e simultaneous hijacking ofmultiple aircraft. 12. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who was educated in the United States, taught Kha ad Bin 'Attash and Nawaf al Hazmi (AA #77) various English phrases needed for hi' cking planes, including "get down," "don't move," "stay in your seat," and "if~yone , . Page 2 of 90 , his idea of hijacking planes and crashing them into buildings from Usama bin Laden (hereinafter the "Planes Operation"). ;, .c, 14. In or about November 1999, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed provided Nawaf Hazmi (AA #77) and Khalid al Mihdhar (AA #77) with funds in order to travel to e United States to train and prepare for the "Planes Operation." 15. In or about December 1999, Khallad Bin 'Attash traveled to Ku a Lumpur, Malaysia, in order to assess airline security,collect information regardin air carriers for flights in Southeast Asia, and facilitate onward travel for Nawaf al Ha i (AA #77) and Khalid al Mihdhar (AA #77) from Kuala Lumpur to the United State . 16. In or about December 1999, before Khallad Bin 'Atta departed from Pakistan on his casing trip to Kuala Lumpur, Khalid Sheikh Moham d gave him a razor knife to st:;crete on his person while traveling in order to assess airli security measures.
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