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Remarks Following a Meeting with Prime Minister Ehud Olmert of Israel in Jerusalem May 14, 2008

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Remarks Following a Meeting with Prime Minister Ehud Olmert of Israel in Jerusalem May 14, 2008 May 14 / Administration of George W. Bush, 2008 be at that time, it would be hard to be honor to represent my country for your able to project such a prosperous, hopeful 60th birthday. land. No question, people would have said, In the meantime, we will continue to ‘‘Well, we’d be surrounded by hostile work toward a vision of—where the— forces.’’ But I doubt people would have where people who are just reasonable and been able to see the modern Israel, which want a chance to live at peace with Israel is one reason I bring so much optimism have that opportunity, and at the same to the Middle East, because what happened time, speak clearly about those forces of here is possible everywhere. terror who murder innocent people to And the objective of the United States achieve their political objectives and how must be to, one, support our strongest ally the world must stand against them. and friend in the Middle East that won’t— And so I want to thank you for giving me a chance to come by and see you again. only true democracy against the forces of And you’re looking good. [Laughter] I hope terror that you just described—and at the you’re feeling well. same time, talk about a hopeful future. Thank you, sir. So I’m really looking forward to my time President Peres. Thank you very much. here. I want to thank you for giving me a chance to speak to the Knesset. I hear NOTE: The President spoke at 2:29 p.m. at it’s quite an experience. It’ll be a huge the President’s residence. Remarks Following a Meeting With Prime Minister Ehud Olmert of Israel in Jerusalem May 14, 2008 Prime Minister Olmert. I am delighted international effort, led by the United to honor President George W. Bush on his States of America, to try and stop Iran from second visit. This time, President came to acquiring nuclear power. And the discus- celebrate with Israel the 60th anniversary sions between our two countries will con- of the State of Israel. tinue on this issue. And of course, Israel We are particularly excited by the fact will try to join the main forces, led by that the President chose to come this week, the United States of America and the Presi- which is a very meaningful and very excit- dent, to try and stop the Iranians from ing week in his private life. And I congratu- continuing their efforts, which are going on late you again, President—— and which are clearly dangerous and threat- President Bush. Thank you. ening for the stability of the world. Prime Minister Olmert. ——for the mar- We also discussed the situation in Leb- riage of your daughter Jenna this last week- anon. We observed the events in Lebanon, end. We are very happy to host you here. and we are very much concerned that there We had a long discussion about a variety will be an attempt to upset the democratic of issues. The first of the issues was the process, which has to take place properly attempts made by Iran to acquire nuclear in Lebanon. And we will continue to ob- capabilities. This is a danger of the highest serve the situation, and hopefully, the situa- order to the safety of the region—of tion will stabilize in Lebanon and the Gov- course, Israel is part of it—and many other ernment of Prime Minister Siniora will pre- HEARING countries in the world. And there is an vail against the provocations and the efforts with 680 DSK5TPTVN1PROD on VerDate Mar 15 2010 13:23 Apr 17, 2012 Jkt 217557 PO 00000 Frm 00680 Fmt 1240 Sfmt 1240 E:\HR\OC\217557A.019 217557A wreier-aviles Administration of George W. Bush, 2008 / May 14 made by Hizballah and the Iranians, which We will continue this discussion. And I’m are obviously heavily involved in the at- sure that America will continue the extraor- tempts to upset the situation over there. dinary efforts made by Secretary Rice and We also discussed the situation in Gaza. President Bush to try and influence the A couple of days ago, I had a visit of Gen- process so that it will end up in a positive eral Omar Suleiman, the head of the Egyp- way. tian military intelligence, and we discussed Again, this is not just a ceremonial visit. possible terms for what may emerge as a I thank you, Mr. President, for your friend- cease-fire in the Gaza district. The fact is ship, for your dedication to the basic prin- that while General Suleiman was visiting ciples which are shared by our two coun- here, Qassam rockets were still shot at in- tries, and for your great friendship. You nocent people in the south of Israel, and are a great person, you are a great leader, two people were killed. And this is a very and you are a great friend. And it’s a great threatening signal. An organization which honor for me to have the opportunity to pretends to want to stop terror can’t con- host you in the home of the Prime Minister tinue to shoot at innocent people. We will of the State of Israel on the 60th anniver- make exceptional efforts that we will not sary of the State of Israel. Thank you very explain. But Israel naturally will not be able much. to tolerate continuous attacks on innocent President Bush. Mr. Prime Minister, civilians. thank you for your friendship, and thank We hope that we will not have to act you for your hospitality. Laura and I are against Hamas in other ways, with the mili- looking forward to having dinner with you tary power that Israel hasn’t yet started to and Mrs. Olmert tomorrow night, as well use in a serious manner in order to stop as the celebrations tonight and tomorrow. it. But it entirely depends on responding I’m honored to be representing our positively to the principles set forth by me country here for the 60th anniversary of and by the Israeli Cabinet in order to stop the existence of the State of Israel. It’s these operations. just a great honor, and it’s a chance for We also briefed the President on the ne- me to express the enduring friendship of gotiations between us and the Palestinians. the American people with the Israeli peo- We are genuinely interested in meeting the ple. It’s also an interesting time to come time framework that we talked about in because, you know, here we are in the Annapolis. I still remember the very elo- heart of a thriving democracy, and yet that quent presentation of President Bush prior democracy, as are other democracies, are to the public meeting in Annapolis, in being challenged by extremists and terror- which he described the difficulties, the sen- ists, people who use violence to try to ad- sitivities, the complexities, and also the op- vance their dark vision of the world. portunities that the Annapolis process pro- I happen to believe it’s an important role poses for both sides. The Israeli side is of the United States to stand with democ- making an exceptional effort on all fronts. racies and to stand strong against terrorists, We need to reach an understanding that whether it be to stand with Israel against will define accurately the parameters for the existential threat of a nuclear weapon the realization of the vision of you, Mr. with Iran or whether it be to stand with President, of a two-state solution that will the Siniora Government. relate to the issue of borders, to the issue What’s interesting—what took place in of refugees, to the issue of the security Lebanon—is that Hizballah, the so-called arrangements, and will set forth also, at protector of the Lebanese against Israel, the end of the day, the framework for how has now turned on its own people. And HEARING to deal later with the issue of Jerusalem. as you mentioned, Hizballah is supported with 681 DSK5TPTVN1PROD on VerDate Mar 15 2010 13:23 Apr 17, 2012 Jkt 217557 PO 00000 Frm 00681 Fmt 1240 Sfmt 1240 E:\HR\OC\217557A.019 217557A wreier-aviles May 14 / Administration of George W. Bush, 2008 by Iran. This is an Iranian effort to desta- We’ve had an—extensive discussions on a bilize that young democracy. And the variety of issues, and there’s no better per- United States stands strongly with the son to discuss those issues with than you. Siniora Government. You clearly see the threats; you clearly see You brought up Hamas. Hamas’s objec- the opportunities. And I want to thank you tive—stated objective is the destruction of for your strong leadership, and thank you the State of Israel. And therefore, the for your friendship. United States will stand strongly with Israel, as well as stand strongly with the Palestinians who don’t share that vision. NOTE: The President spoke at 5:35 p.m. at And so I thank you very much for your the Prime Minister’s Residence. In his re- efforts to describe what’s possible for the marks, he referred to Aliza Olmert, wife of millions of Palestinians who simply want Prime Minister Olmert; and Prime Minister to live side by side with Israel in peace. Fuad Siniora of Lebanon. Remarks in Jerusalem May 14, 2008 Thank you all. President Peres, thank lost sight of Jerusalem.
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