Selected Background Research a Primer on the Changing Role of Law Enforcement and Intelligence in the War on Terrorism

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Selected Background Research a Primer on the Changing Role of Law Enforcement and Intelligence in the War on Terrorism PART THREE: SELECTED BACKGROUND RESEARCH A PRIMER ON THE CHANGING ROLE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM BY ROBERT M. MCNAMARA,JR. Partner, Manatt, Phelps and Phillips, LLP INTRODUCTION AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY While the “War on Terrorism” has taken on a new urgency since September 11, 2001, it is not a new phenomenon nor is it a reinvented focus of either the U.S. intelligence community, or the federal law enforcement agencies. What is relatively recent, however, is the scope of effort by both groups in terms of human resources committed to the task, the level of sophisticated technology focused against the target(s) and the unparalleled, albeit evolving, nature of cooperation and coordination between the two communities. For the past few years, there have been repeated calls for closer cooperation, better sharing of infor- mation and less friction. While to the outside objective observer, these suggestions seemed both reasonable and doable, there were practical, cultural and legal impediments, which prevented what should have been a seamless continuum from becoming so. The two drive wheels for change in the status quo were George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence and of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Louis Freeh, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). By all accounts, they accomplished more in the past half-decade toward this goal, than had been done in all of the history of their respective agencies. There were a number of critical factors in this equation of change: necessity, maturity and urgency, to name a few. But the overriding single most important ingredient was the shared belief that things had to change and the unequivocal commitment of both Directors that things were going to change. Each may have had his own reasons for pulling hard on their respective oars, but both were convinced that the alternative—the status quo—was not an option. In fact, the status quo would, in the end, fail the country and its citizens in time of greatest need. This is not to say that everyone in both agencies was immediately converted or that a residuum of insularity did not exist, and that total transparency was achieved. In fact, that was not the case— and as a recent preliminary report of the House Intelligence Committee investigating the tragedies of September 11 indicates, it is still not the case. But the situation is so much beyond where it was before. The momentum for change is not merely being maintained, but actually it is being acceler- ated by Director Tenet and the new head of the FBI, Director Robert Mueller. Before the Task Force can begin to think about the new cooperative law enforcement and intelli- gence environment, especially when focused on terrorism, it is important to understand where both came from. Each had a totally different mission, was grounded by a different culture, was cir- cumscribed by different laws and authorities and was constrained by different limitations. Within the past quarter-century, both communities have been the subjects of scathing congressional inves- tigations, which had uncovered numerous abuses of the rights and freedoms of Americans. As a result, laws were passed, guidelines were issued and policies were established, which defined the Markle Foundation 81 focus of the respective communities and may have inadvertently contributed to an environment in which each looked out for itself, and neither saw either a value or a need to develop a coordination mechanism in order to accomplish their respective work. THE LAW ENFORCEMENT ENVIRONMENT Jurisdiction When we think of “law enforcement” as a concept, we generally think of it in terms of the cop on the street, but obviously it is much broader than that. It not only includes the dozens of federal law enforcement agencies, but also the nearly 700,000 state and local police and peace officers through- out the country. Each of these entities is defined, in the first instance, by the scope of their respec- tive authority. In some cases, there may be an overlap; for instance, nearly all may have arrest authority for various types of illegal drug activity. In other cases, the FBI and the local police may have concurrent authority, such as in a bank robbery case, but the rule of thumb is “the FBI gets it unless they decline it.” Federal law enforcement authority is also defined by jurisdiction, which in turn is circumscribed by its mission, and in most cases arises out of it. For instance, the U.S. Customs Service is responsible for collecting tariffs and duties on goods entering the United States and for ensuring that illegal or prohibited products are excluded or seized. The normal day-to-day responsibility for carrying out this mission falls to the Customs Inspectors, but when illegality is uncovered or suspected, the sit- uation shifts from being a trade matter to becoming a criminal investigation, and Customs Special Agents assume responsibility for handling the case. The law enforcement investigative authority of that Customs Special Agent, however, is limited by the scope of the mission of the U.S. Customs Service. The Customs Special Agent, for instance, would have no authority to investigate a murder in a national park. Investigative authority for that crime would fall to the U.S. Park Police, which is the law enforcement component of the U.S. Park Service, wherein the same duality exists, as it does in most federal departments, which have regula- tory and enforcement components. The FBI has the broadest law enforcement jurisdiction of any federal law enforcement agency. Its 11,500 Special Agents have nationwide jurisdiction and authority to investigate any federal crime, which is not otherwise within the exclusive jurisdiction of another federal agency, e.g. the U.S. Customs Service (for importation crimes), or the U.S. Secret Service (for counterfeiting crimes). As a matter of reality, however, federal jurisdiction may lie with multiple agencies because the crimi- nal activity may involve the violations of multiple criminal laws. In those instances, one agency becomes the “lead agency” for the case, and the others provide assistance as needed for a successful investigation and subsequent prosecution.1 Because of the FBI’s predominance in federal criminal investigations, it will be the focus of this paper. Mission The basic criminal investigative mission of the FBI is to detect and investigate criminal activity, which violates one or more of the hundreds of federal criminal laws found in the United States 82 Markle Foundation Code, primarily in Title 18.2 The focus can be a specific crime, like a bank robbery, or a pattern of activity, such as an interstate car theft ring, or a criminal enterprise such as an organized crime group or a terrorist organization. The common thread is the underlying criminal activity that has been, is being or is about to be committed. Methodology The FBI’s focus is to investigate the criminal activity, to identify those involved, to collect evidence sufficient to prove the criminal activity beyond a reasonable doubt, and to assist the Department of Justice attorneys in the prosecution of those charged. The collection of evidence is the single most important function in this sequence for two reasons; it must be collected lawfully and its integrity (the so-called “chain of custody”) must be maintained. If either of these criteria is faulty, the evi- dence may be excluded from trial and the suspect may go free as a result.3 The nature of the evidence collected and the manner in which it is collected can be subject to a spectrum of legal requirements and constraints. Physical evidence in a public place is generally sub- ject only to chain of custody requirements so that it can be introduced into evidence. Physical evi- dence in a private place, such as a home, is protected by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. The FBI usually must get a search warrant from a federal magistrate to search the premises and seize the specific property, although over the years the Supreme Court has carved out a number of exceptions to the warrant requirement, e.g., for items “in plain view” and for “exigent circumstances.”4 Nor is the FBI allowed to search persons, whose privacy is also protected by the Fourth Amendment. However, the Supreme Court has held that a reasonable articulation of crim- inal activity would justify government action when the intrusion on individual privacy is minimal and outweighed by an important governmental interest.5 As with searches of property, the Supreme Court has also defined instances in which a warrantless search of a person is permitted, such as searches incident to arrest and searches at fixed checkpoints. Separate rules apply to interviews conducted by the FBI. If the person is merely a witness to a crime, the law does not require any specific procedure, but if the person is a material witness in an inves- tigation and there is a concern the person may flee the jurisdiction, the FBI can obtain a material witness warrant from a federal judge, and the individual can be detained. Similarly, the FBI is not required to give a person, who is merely fact witness or an eyewitness, any specific warnings. However, if the person is a suspect, he is entitled under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution to the so-called Miranda warnings, and he cannot be forced to incriminate himself or to speak without a lawyer being present to advise him, if he so wishes. These rights, however, can be waived. Lastly, the FBI must respect privileged relationships, such as husband-wife, psychotherapist- patient, and attorney-client, and not attempt to interfere with them.
Recommended publications
  • A Review of the FBI's Handling of Intelligence Information Related To
    U. S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General A Review of the FBI's 1Uantlli.ng of Intelligence Information Re1ade:d to the September 11 Attacks (Novennl~er2004) Released Piublicly June 2006 Office (ofAthe Inspector General NOTE This report is an unclassified version of the full report that the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) completed in 2004 and provided to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of Justice, the Congress, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. The OIG’s full report is classified at the Top Secret/SCI level. At the request of members of Congress, after issuing the full report the OIG created an unclassified version of the report. However, because the unclassified version included information about the FBI’s investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui, and because of Moussaoui’s trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia and the rules of that Court, the OIG could not release the unclassified version of the report without the Court’s permission until the trial was completed. In June 2005, the Court gave the OIG permission to release the sections of the unclassified report that did not discuss Moussaoui. Therefore, at that time the OIG released publicly a version of the unclassified report that did not contain Chapter 4 (the OIG’s review of the Mousssaoui matter), as well as other references to Moussaoui throughout the report. The Moussaoui case concluded on May 4, 2006, when the Court sentenced Moussaoui to life in prison.
    [Show full text]
  • Exhibit a Case 3:16-Cr-00051-BR Document 545-2 Filed 05/11/16 Page 2 of 86
    Case 3:16-cr-00051-BR Document 545-2 Filed 05/11/16 Page 1 of 86 Exhibit A Case 3:16-cr-00051-BR Document 545-2 Filed 05/11/16 Page 2 of 86 Executive Order 12333 United States Intelligence Activities (As amended by Executive Orders 13284 (2003), 13355 (2004) and 134 70 (2008)) PREAMBLE Timely, accurate, and insightful information about the activities, capabilities, plans, and intentions of foreign powers , organizations, and persons, and their agents, is essential to the national security of the United States. All reasonable and lawful means must be used to ensure that the United States will receive the best intelligence possible. For that purpose, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, (Act) and as President of the United States of America, in order to provide for the effective conduct of United States intelligence activities and the protection of constitutional rights, it is hereby ordered as follows: PART 1 Goals, Directions, Duties, and Responsibilities with Respect to United States Intelligence Efforts 1.1 Goals. The United States intelligence effort shall provide the President, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council with the necessary information on which to base decisions concerning the development and conduct of foreign, defense, and economic policies, and the protection of United States national interests from foreign security threats. All departments and agencies shall cooperate fully to fulfill this goal. (a} All means, consistent with applicable Federal law and this order, and with full consideration of the rights of United States persons, shall be used to obtain reliable intelligence information to protect the United States and its interests.
    [Show full text]
  • Calendar No. 32
    Calendar No. 32 108TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! 1st Session SENATE 108–40 AMENDMENT OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978 TO ALLOW SURVEILLANCE OF NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS WHO ENGAGE IN OR PREPARE FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM WITHOUT AFFILIATION WITH A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OR INTERNATIONAL TER- RORIST GROUP APRIL 29, 2003.—Ordered to be printed Mr. HATCH, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the following R E P O R T together with ADDITIONAL VIEWS [To accompany S. 113] [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] The Committee on the Judiciary, to which was referred the bill (S. 113) to exclude United States persons from the definition of ‘‘foreign power’’ under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 relating to international terrorism, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with amendment, and recommends that the bill as amended do pass. CONTENTS Page I. Purpose ........................................................................................................... 2 II. Background on the Legislation ..................................................................... 2 III. Need for the Legislation ................................................................................ 2 IV. Hearings ......................................................................................................... 6 V. Committee Consideration .............................................................................. 6 VI. Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion ...............................................
    [Show full text]
  • The Proposed Authorities of a National Intelligence Director: Issues for Congress and Side-By-Side Comparison of S
    Order Code RL32506 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web The Proposed Authorities of a National Intelligence Director: Issues for Congress and Side-by-Side Comparison of S. 2845, H.R. 10, and Current Law Updated October 5, 2004 -name redacted- Specialist in Intelligence and National Security Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress The Proposed Authorities of a Director of National Intelligence: Issues for Congress, and Side-by-Side Comparison of S. 2845, H.R. 10, and Current Law Summary The 9/11 Commission, in its recent report on the attacks of September 11, 2001, criticized the U.S. Intelligence Community’s (IC) fragmented management structure and questioned whether the U.S. government, and the IC, in particular, is organized adequately to direct resources and build the intelligence capabilities that the United States will need to counter terrorism, and to address the broader range of national security challenges in the decades ahead. The Commission made a number of recommendations, one of which was to replace the current position of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) with a National Intelligence Director (NID) who would oversee national intelligence centers on specific subjects of interest — including a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) — across the U.S. government, manage the national intelligence program; oversee the agencies that contribute to it; and have hiring, firing, and budgetary authority over the IC’s 15 agencies. Although the Commission recommended that the director be located in the Executive Office of the President, the Commission Vice Chairman in testimony before Congress on September 7, 2004, withdrew that portion of the recommendation in light of concerns that the NID would be subject to undue influence.
    [Show full text]
  • Suspect Until Proven Guilty, a Problematization of State Dossier Systems Via Two Case Studies: the United States and China
    University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations Fall 2009 Suspect Until Proven Guilty, a Problematization of State Dossier Systems via Two Case Studies: The United States and China Kenneth N. Farrall University of Pennsylvania, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations Part of the Asian Studies Commons, Communication Technology and New Media Commons, International and Intercultural Communication Commons, and the Social Influence and oliticalP Communication Commons Recommended Citation Farrall, Kenneth N., "Suspect Until Proven Guilty, a Problematization of State Dossier Systems via Two Case Studies: The United States and China" (2009). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 51. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/51 This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/51 For more information, please contact [email protected]. Suspect Until Proven Guilty, a Problematization of State Dossier Systems via Two Case Studies: The United States and China Abstract This dissertation problematizes the "state dossier system" (SDS): the production and accumulation of personal information on citizen subjects exceeding the reasonable bounds of risk management. SDS - comprising interconnecting subsystems of records and identification - damage individual autonomy and self-determination, impacting not only human rights, but also the viability of the social system. The research, a hybrid of case-study and cross-national comparison, was guided in part by a theoretical model of four primary SDS driving forces: technology, political economy, law and public sentiment. Data sources included government documents, academic texts, investigative journalism, NGO reports and industry white papers. The primary analytical instrument was the juxtaposition of two individual cases: the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Federal Bureau of Investigation Hearing
    FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION JULY 26, 2007 Serial No. 110–86 Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary ( Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 37–010 PDF WASHINGTON : 2007 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001 VerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:11 Jul 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5011 Sfmt 5011 H:\WORK\FULL\072607\37010.000 HJUD1 PsN: DOUGA COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan, Chairman HOWARD L. BERMAN, California LAMAR SMITH, Texas RICK BOUCHER, Virginia F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., JERROLD NADLER, New York Wisconsin ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina ELTON GALLEGLY, California ZOE LOFGREN, California BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas STEVE CHABOT, Ohio MAXINE WATERS, California DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts CHRIS CANNON, Utah ROBERT WEXLER, Florida RIC KELLER, Florida LINDA T. SA´ NCHEZ, California DARRELL ISSA, California STEVE COHEN, Tennessee MIKE PENCE, Indiana HANK JOHNSON, Georgia J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia BETTY SUTTON, Ohio STEVE KING, Iowa LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois TOM FEENEY, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
    [Show full text]
  • 9-11 Commission Hrng 4 13 04 2
    PANEL ONE OF THE TENTH HEARING OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES RE: "LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY" THOMAS H. KEAN, CHAIR; LEE H. HAMILTON, VICE CHAIR PHILIP D. ZELIKOW PRESENTS STAFF STATEMENT: "LAW ENFORCEMENT, COUNTERTERRORISM, AND INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION IN THE UNITED STATES PRIOR TO 9/11" WITNESS: LOUIS J. FREEH, FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE FBI 9:01 A.M. EDT, TUESDAY, APRIL 13, 2004 MR. KEAN: (Sounds gavel.) Good morning. As chair of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, I hereby convene this commission's 10th public hearing. The hearing will run all today and tomorrow. Our focus for the next two days will be "Law Enforcement and the Intelligence Community." As we did with our two prior sets of hearings this calendar year, we precede each series of witnesses with a statement from the Commission staff. These statements are informed by the work of the Commissioners, as well as the staff, and they represent the staff's best efforts to reconstruct the factual record of what happened. Judgments and recommendations are for commissioners and the Commission to make, and of course we'll do that in the course of our work, and most definitively and finally in our final report. Viewers, by the way, who are watching at home can obtain staff statements at www.9-11commission.gov. Before we begin, let me make just a brief request to members of the audience who have taken the time to be with us today. We're going to be hearing from a lot of witnesses in the course of the next two days.
    [Show full text]
  • Summary of U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, Practice, Remedies, and Oversight
    ___________________________ SUMMARY OF U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE LAW, PRACTICE, REMEDIES, AND OVERSIGHT ASHLEY GORSKI AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION AUGUST 30, 2018 _________________________________ TABLE OF CONTENTS QUALIFICATIONS AS AN EXPERT ............................................................................................. iii INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 1 I. U.S. Surveillance Law and Practice ................................................................................... 2 A. Legal Framework ......................................................................................................... 3 1. Presidential Power to Conduct Foreign Intelligence Surveillance ....................... 3 2. The Expansion of U.S. Government Surveillance .................................................. 4 B. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 ..................................................... 5 1. Traditional FISA: Individual Orders ..................................................................... 6 2. Bulk Searches Under Traditional FISA ................................................................. 7 C. Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ........................................... 8 D. How The U.S. Government Uses Section 702 in Practice ......................................... 12 1. Data Collection: PRISM and Upstream Surveillance ........................................
    [Show full text]
  • Drug Enforcement Administration
    350 Fifth Avenue, 34th Floor New York, NY 10118-3299 Tel: +1-212-290-4700 Fax: +1-212-736-1300; 917-591-3452 Kenneth Roth, Executive Director Freedom of Information & Privacy Act Unit (SARF) Deputy Executive D i r e c t o r s Michele Alexander, Development and Global Initiatives Drug Enforcement Administration Nicholas Dawes, Media Iain Levine, Program 8701 Morrissette Drive Chuck Lustig, Operations Springfield, VA 22152 Bruno Stagno Ugarte, Advocacy Emma Daly, Communications Director Dinah PoKempner, General Counsel January 18, 2017 James Ross, Legal and Policy Director Division and Program Directors Brad Adams, Asia To Whom It May Concern: Daniel Bekele, Africa Maria McFarland Sánchez-Moreno, United States Alison Parker, United States Through this letter, Human Rights Watch (“HRW”) requests copies of José Miguel Vivanco, Americas Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East and North Africa documents pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552. Hugh Williamson, Europe and Central Asia Shantha Rau Barriga, Disability Rights Peter Bouckaert, Emergencies We request these documents on an expedited basis; we also seek a public Zama Coursen-Neff, Children’s Rights Richard Dicker, International Justice interest fee waiver and news media fee status. Bill Frelick, Refugees’ Rights Arvind Ganesan, Business and Human Rights Liesl Gerntholtz, Women’s Rights As explained below, our request concerns final or working policy and Steve Goose, Arms Diederik Lohman, acting, Health and Human Rights other documents that relate to the ability of the Drug Enforcement Graeme Reid, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Rights Administration (“DEA”) to obtain access to communications and related Advocacy Directors Maria Laura Canineu, Brazil data that the US government has acquired under 50 U.S.C.
    [Show full text]
  • 9/11 Report”), July 2, 2004, Pp
    Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:25 PM Page i THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:25 PM Page v CONTENTS List of Illustrations and Tables ix Member List xi Staff List xiii–xiv Preface xv 1. “WE HAVE SOME PLANES” 1 1.1 Inside the Four Flights 1 1.2 Improvising a Homeland Defense 14 1.3 National Crisis Management 35 2. THE FOUNDATION OF THE NEW TERRORISM 47 2.1 A Declaration of War 47 2.2 Bin Ladin’s Appeal in the Islamic World 48 2.3 The Rise of Bin Ladin and al Qaeda (1988–1992) 55 2.4 Building an Organization, Declaring War on the United States (1992–1996) 59 2.5 Al Qaeda’s Renewal in Afghanistan (1996–1998) 63 3. COUNTERTERRORISM EVOLVES 71 3.1 From the Old Terrorism to the New: The First World Trade Center Bombing 71 3.2 Adaptation—and Nonadaptation— ...in the Law Enforcement Community 73 3.3 . and in the Federal Aviation Administration 82 3.4 . and in the Intelligence Community 86 v Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:25 PM Page vi 3.5 . and in the State Department and the Defense Department 93 3.6 . and in the White House 98 3.7 . and in the Congress 102 4. RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA’S INITIAL ASSAULTS 108 4.1 Before the Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania 108 4.2 Crisis:August 1998 115 4.3 Diplomacy 121 4.4 Covert Action 126 4.5 Searching for Fresh Options 134 5.
    [Show full text]
  • Introduction the Intelligence Community (IC) – General Information
    Guide to Posted Documents Regarding Use of National Security Authorities – Updated as of January, 2020 Contents Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 1 The Intelligence Community (IC) – General Information .............................................................................. 1 IC Framework for Protecting Civil Liberties and Privacy and Enhancing Transparency ................................ 3 Reports on Use of National Security Authorities. ......................................................................................... 5 Section 702: - Overviews............................................................................................................................... 6 Section 702: Targeting and Minimization ..................................................................................................... 7 Section 702: Compliance, Oversight, and Other Documents ....................................................................... 8 FISA: Other Provisions ................................................................................................................................... 9 FISA: FISC and FISCR Opinions..................................................................................................................... 10 Executive Order 12333 ................................................................................................................................ 11 Presidential
    [Show full text]
  • The Internal Effects of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
    REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED The Internal Effects of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Reprioritization U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General Audit Division Audit Report 04-39 September 2004 REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED THE INTERNAL EFFECTS OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S REPRIORITIZATION EXECUTIVE SUMMARY * In direct response to the September 11, 2001 (9/11), terrorist attacks, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) initiated a transformation that, among other things, established a new ranking of priorities and formally shifted a significant number of agents from traditional criminal investigative work to counterterrorism and counterintelligence matters. According to the Director, each of the changes was designed to reshape the FBI into an organization better able to combat the imminent threat of terrorism and to prevent another large-scale terrorist attack against the United States. Prior to 9/11, the FBI utilized more of its field agent resources to investigate traditional criminal activity than to investigate matters related to terrorism. According to the FBI, since the reprioritization it is striving to incorporate more proactive, intelligence-based tactics and operations into its procedures, particularly in terrorism-related matters. Non-terrorism related crime, however, still occurs, and because the FBI has the broadest jurisdiction of any federal law enforcement agency, it is expected to maintain a response capability for violations of federal criminal law. However, other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies may be capable of taking on increased responsibilities for certain investigative areas in light of the FBI’s reprioritization. In order for this transition to occur effectively, the specific areas from which the FBI has reduced its involvement must be identified.
    [Show full text]