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China and the Sino‑Indian Border Dispute This document is downloaded from DR‑NTU (https://dr.ntu.edu.sg) Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Wars, fought and unfought : China and the Sino‑Indian border dispute Balazs, Daniel 2021 Balazs, D. (2021). Wars, fought and unfought : China and the Sino‑Indian border dispute. Doctoral thesis, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. https://hdl.handle.net/10356/150314 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/150314 https://doi.org/10.32657/10356/150314 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution‑NonCommercial 4.0 International License (CC BY‑NC 4.0). Downloaded on 23 Sep 2021 18:11:51 SGT WARS, FOUGHT AND UNFOUGHT: CHINA AND THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE DANIEL BALAZS S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 2021 1 WARS, FOUGHT AND UNFOUGHT: CHINA AND THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE DANIEL BALAZS MAIN SUPERVISOR: ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR ANIT MUKHERJEE CO-SUPERVISOR: ASSISTANT PROFESSOR HOO TIANG BOON CO-SUPERVISOR: PROFESSOR HARSH V. PANT S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES A thesis submitted to the Nanyang Technological University in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 2021 2 3 4 5 Acknowledgments Writing a PhD dissertation is much like walking through a dark forest. There is no clear road ahead and everybody has to find their own way of getting through. However, it is not completely dark all the time. On numerous occasions, people appear with flashlights on the other end and for a brief period of time, we get a sense of direction to move forward. As the years pass by, we make incremental progress every day and find the way out before we know it. This section is dedicated to those people with flashlights. First and foremost, my advisors Anit Mukherjee and Hoo Tiang Boon. I can hardly think of anyone more patient than them. Listening to all my ideas as well as reading my writing, they demonstrated relentless patience, persistence and perseverance. This dissertation could have never happened without their guidance. Professor Mukherjee moved mountains to secure me a Visiting Fellowship at MP-IDSA and bought me enough time to collect more than a thousand pages of archival materials before the pandemic kicked in and sabotaged all research trips. Professor Hoo was always ready to give me advice on China research, filling me in with the latest developments of the People’s Republic and connecting me to the right kind of people. Naturally, all of the mistakes found are mine and mine alone. I will hardly ever be able to thank them enough for their help. The second group that cannot go unmentioned is the quartet of Rajesh Basrur, Li Mingjiang, Pascal Vennesson and Professor T.V. Paul. Although these individuals had no obligation toward or stakes in my dissertation, they offered help in various ways. Professor Li was indispensable in helping me out in my fieldwork and connecting me to Chinese scholars. Professor Basrur offered great help in my theoretical framework, neoclassical realism. Professor Vennesson was there to guide me at every crucial part of my research: proposal, fieldwork and writing. The first class I took as a PhD student was T.V. Paul’s Selected Topics in IR: Conflict, Cooperation and Change in World Politics. It was the perfect introductory class to IR theory and taught me how to think, something that most of us take for granted. Thank you all. I also raise my hat to Farish Noor, the PhD Coordinator of the school who—with the indispensable help of Roxane Domingo Ordonez—guided me through the byzantine system of NTU Administration. Their ability to stay on top of the bureaucracy game amid a pandemic is truly admirable. 6 In the non-NTU setting, I am deeply indebted to Dr Patrick Mendis. It was his lecture at Tongji University that sparked the flame of my desire for academic knowledge. Before meeting him, I thought of our discipline as a convenient device to improve my Mandarin skills and nothing more. In and of itself, a master’s degree in international relations is not going to take any of us far. Or so I thought. Dr Mendis showed me that discerning patterns of international relations and reading between the headlines can go a long way. Fuelled by the desire to acquire such arcane knowledge, I made the crucial decision to embark on the path to academia. I also owe thanks to Professor Walter Andersen, a retired Professor from SAIS Johns Hopkins University. He was the one who encouraged me to pursue a research on China-India relations. During times of weakness, he was there to ensure me that my intellect was not as catastrophic as I thought it to be. Without his encouragement, I would have never believed that I have what it takes to get a PhD. I also thank Nicole Choo Jen Quinn for her help with the maps. For someone like me, it would have been difficult to conjure up anything remotely similar to those illustrations that you provided me with. With this move, we added to the existing knowledge on the China-India border dispute, because the maps I found were inaccessible to non-Chinese speakers. Gratitude. Many others helped with simple gestures such as listening to my rambling, telling me that I was not a disaster and that I had what it takes. These individuals include Gong Xue, Gong Lina, Sarah Teo, Shawn Ho, Ben Ho, Joel Ng, Li Xirui, Kim Soyoung, Xu Chengrui and Wu Siyu. Of course, the list is not exhaustive. The TEDxNTU team also deserves mentioning. How could I forget that dark night when four of those magnificent individuals gathered to salvage my terrible first two chapters that I prepared for the qualification examination. Harsha Turlapati, Ezequiel Santillan, Aswin Haridas and Akhilesh Koul all gave me great help in passing the examination. They are from the hard sciences, so it was a pleasure to see that my ideas found their way to their minds. I was even more pleased to see that I received one of the most crushing and rigorous feedback from them. As we have been friends for a while, they knew that I do not look well upon mollycoddling and appreciate honest punishment for logical fallacies. Aswin stayed behind an extra hour to improve my slides, a template I use since then. Harsha and Akhilesh also listened to my revised first chapter after my fieldwork in China and India. It is fantastic to have such a team to fall back on during hard times. Finally, in the non-academic setting, I owe infinite thanks to my family back in Hungary. As the first born child, I feel like it was supposed to be my task to find employment at an early age 7 and start giving back all the care that my family gave me. Nevertheless, I ruthlessly ignored this duty and left home to chase dreams in China, India and Singapore. Never have my family criticized me for this decision. On the contrary, they gave me their unqualified support. My little brother, Attila, wrapped up an undergrad in computer science and became the sibling I should have become, just so that I can pursue my dreams. I wish one day I would become half as selfless as you are. My sister, Natasa, grew up without her eldest brother being present and she never felt the need to point that out to me. Just as my parents have never demanded me to fly back home, even when they could have used an extra pair of hands around the house. With a good team behind my back, the challenge and loneliness of the PhD was less severe. 8 Table of Contents Summary ....................................................................................................................................... 12 Tables, Figures and Maps ............................................................................................................. 13 Chapter 1. Introduction: China’s Use of Force and the Sino-Indian Border Dispute .............. 14 1.1. The puzzle: China’s use of force ................................................................................ 14 1.2. The argument: a neoclassical realist probe ................................................................. 18 1.3. Hypotheses.................................................................................................................. 21 1.4. Relevance—rising powers, nuclear heavyweights ..................................................... 25 1.5. Contribution ................................................................................................................ 26 1.6. Research design .......................................................................................................... 28 1.6.1. Assumptions, variables and indicators .................................................................... 29 1.6.2. Definitions............................................................................................................... 35 1.6.3. Scope ....................................................................................................................... 37 1.6.4. Null hypothesis and alternative explanations ......................................................... 39 1.6.5. Falsifiability and testing .......................................................................................... 41 1.6.6. Limitations .............................................................................................................. 44 1.6.7. Sourcing .................................................................................................................. 44 1.6.8. Dissertation outline ................................................................................................. 49 Chapter 2. Chinese conflict behaviour and the Sino-Indian border
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