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The Transcendental Path. Assumptions and Arguments in Kant’S Transcendental Deduction

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The Transcendental Path. Assumptions and Arguments in Kant’S Transcendental Deduction The Transcendental Path. Assumptions and Arguments in Kant’s Transcendental Deduction D I S S E R T A T I O N zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades Doctor philosophiae (Dr. phil.) eingereicht an der Philosophischen Fakultät der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin von Bo Song Die Präsidentin der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin: Prof. Dr. Sabine Kunst Die Dekanin der Philosophischen Fakultät: Prof. Dr. Gabriele Metzler Gutachter: Erstgutachter: Tobias Rosefeldt Zweitgutachter: Bernhard Thöle Datum der Einreichung: 25.10.2018 Datum der Promotion: 20.12.2018 Abstract This present work addresses Kant’s project of transcendental deduction of the pure concepts of understanding with regard to its question, assumptions, and arguments. Unlike many interpreters, I propose that Kant’s question in transcendental deduction is meta-semantic in the metaphysical sense. By rejecting all the possible rival theories, Kant convincingly shows the necessity of his Copernican solution and the plausibility of the view of “no necessary connection without necessary instantiation”. I argue that Kant develops different lines of arguments in transcendental deduction: the argument from cognition, the argument from self-consciousness, the argument from judgment and the argument from perception, and that all of them are primarily not anti-skeptical, but explanatory in character. This interpretation of Kant’s transcendental deduction reveals how seriously Kant takes his transcendental path to be necessary and why Kant’s approach should be viewed as problem- oriented, rather than foundation-motivated. Die vorliegende Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit Kants Projekt der transzendentalen Deduktion der reinen Verstandesbegriffe hinsichtlich ihrer Fragen, Annahmen, und Argumente. Anders als viele Interpreten schlage ich vor, dass Kants Fragestellung in der transzendentalen Deduktion im metaphysischen Sinne meta-semantisch ist. Indem er alle möglichen konkurrierenden Theorien ablehnt, zeigt Kant überzeugend die Notwendigkeit seiner kopernikanischen Lösung und die Plausibilität der Auffassung von „keiner notwendigen Verknüpfung ohne notwendige Instanziierung“. Ich werde argumentiert, dass Kant verschiedene Argumentationsansätze in der transzendentalen Deduktion entwickelt: das Argument aus der Erkenntnis, das Argument aus dem Selbstbewusstsein, das Argument aus dem Urteil und das Argument aus der Wahrnehmung, und dass sie alle in erster Linie nicht im Wesen anti-skeptisch, sondern erklärend sind. Diese von mir vorgeschlagene Interpretation von Kants transzendentaler Deduktion zeigt, wie ernst Kant seinen transzendentalen Weg für notwendig hält und warum Kants Ansatz vor allem als problemorientiert, nicht aber als gründungsmotiviert angesehen werden sollte. i Acknowledgments I owe a debt of gratitude to a number of people and institutions for their support during this project. I am grateful for Tobias Rosefeldt’s willingness to be my supervisor and all his help. I am indebted to Rosefeldt’s various lectures, seminars (especially the one on transcendental deduction), and colloquiums, to his valuable advice on reading and philosophizing in our talks, and to his encouragement on my explanatory reading on Kant. I am also grateful to Bernhard Thöle, who was willing to be the second referee of my dissertation, to Lucy Allais, who recommended Rosefeldt to me, and to Robert Stern, who helped me a lot when I was in Sheffield. In addition, I benefitted a lot from the speakers of the Berliner Kant Course, from the feedbacks to my presentations in Rosefeldt’s colloquiums, and from Xi Luo, Jiuxing Mao, Yi Zheng, and many other members of our reading circle on Kant. My everyday talk with Xi Luo helps me a lot in thinking about Kant. My special thanks should be delivered to my wife, Livi. Without Livi, to study in Germany seems not a serious option. Her encouragement to me and enthusiasm about life constitute an important motivation for my progress. The last but not the least, I would like to express my gratitude to the financial support by the China Scholarship Council and to the persistent Chinese economic reform, without which my study in Germany would be entirely impossible. ii Table of Contents Abstract ........................................................................................................................................................... i Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................................................ ii Table of Contents ........................................................................................................................................ iii Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 1 Chapter 1 The Problems of the Transcendental Deduction .............................................................. 19 1.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 19 1.2 The Secret of Metaphysics ............................................................................................................. 21 1.3 The Mystery of Metaphysics .......................................................................................................... 26 1.4 Reconstruction of the Philosophical Spectrum .......................................................................... 33 1.5 Paths and Assumptions .................................................................................................................. 38 Chapter 2 Against the Empirical Path.................................................................................................... 45 2.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 45 2.2 The Radical Empiricist Epistemology .......................................................................................... 48 2.3 The Argument from Sciences ........................................................................................................ 50 2.4 The Argument from Experience ................................................................................................... 55 2.5 The Modal Indeterminacy, Occult Quality, and Explanatory Rationalism ............................. 60 Chapter 3 Against the Mystical Fanatical Path ..................................................................................... 63 3.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 63 3.2 The Platonic Epistemology and Metaphysics ............................................................................. 66 3.3 Against the Naïve Argument for Intellection Intuition ............................................................. 68 3.4 Against the Sophisticated Argument by Mystical Intuition ...................................................... 77 Chapter 4 Against the Logical Fanatical Path ....................................................................................... 86 4.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 86 4.2 The Crusian Epistemology and Metaphysics .............................................................................. 87 4.3 Against the C-Criterion of Truth .................................................................................................. 91 4.4 Against the Pre-established Harmony ........................................................................................ 103 Chapter 5 Toward the Transcendental Path ....................................................................................... 119 5.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 119 5.2 The Transcendental Path and A Priori Determination ............................................................ 120 5.3 The Implications of the Transcendental Path ........................................................................... 128 5.4 The Idealism Implication ............................................................................................................. 131 5.5 The Schematism Implication ....................................................................................................... 144 5.6 The Psychologism Implication .................................................................................................... 154 Chapter 6 The Argument from Cognition .......................................................................................... 165 iii 6.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 165 6.2 Kant’s Notion of Cognition ......................................................................................................... 166 6.3 The Argument for Apprehension ............................................................................................... 171 6.4 The Argument for Reproduction ................................................................................................ 176 6.5 The Argument for Association ...................................................................................................
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