THE KEY TO ONE-PARTY DOMINANCE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF

SELECTED STATES.

By

PHILLIP FREDERICK GAUTA MTIMKULU

Submitted in accordance with the requirements

for the degree of

DOCTOR OF LITERATURE AND PHILOSOPHY

In the subject

POLITICAL SCIENCE

at the

UNIVERSITY OF JOHANNESBURG

PROMOTER: PROF. A J VENTER

July 2006 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To the following people:

My daughter, Hloni who asked me if I would ever finish my doctorate.

My colleague John G Yoh who constantly asked me how the Ared thing@

(gown), was coming.

Obakeng Setsile and John Yoh for keeping me sane when the numbering of pages was driving me round the bend.

My son, Puso for assisting me with the technicalities of the computer.

Alexa Barnby for meticulously editing the thesis.

My promoter, Prof A J Venter for his expertise and patience in guiding me. DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis titled, “the key to one-party dominance: a comparative analysis of selected states,” which I completed in July 2006 is my own work and that all the sources that I have used have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

PFG Mtimkulu iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Pages CHAPTER 1 1 1. INTRODUCTION 1 1.1 Motivation for study 1 1.2 One-party dominance debate in South Africa 2 1.3 Conceptualisation of the problem 6 1.4 The purpose of the study 10 1.5 Research method 14 1.6 Delimitation of the study 17 1.7 Structure of the study 18 CHAPTER 2 21 ASCENSION TO POWER: THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS DOMINANCE 21 Introduction 21 2.1 Sir Seretse Khama and the ascension to power of the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) 22 2.1.2 Introduction 22 2.1.3 Evolution of Botswana=s political system and formation of the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) 23 2.1.4 Sir Seretse Khama and the rise to power of the BDP 24 2.1.5 Sir Seretse Khama and Botswana=s road to independence 26 2.1.6 Benefit of Sir Seretse Khama=s stature to the BDP 28 2.1.7 Summary 30 2.2 The Indian National Congress (Congress) and the independence of India 31 2.2.1 Introduction 31 2.2.2 Formation of Congress 32 2.2.3 Acquiescent Congress 32 2.2.4 Gandhi and the nationalist movement 33 2.2.5 Nehru and the independence of India 36 2.2.6 Congress and the partitioning of India 38 2.2.7 Summary 40 v

2.3 Mapai and the formation of the State of Israel 41 2.3.1 Introduction 41 2.3.2 Formation of Mapai 41 2.3.3 Emergence of conflict between Arabs and Jews 42 2.3.4 Mapai and the leadership of Israel 43 2.3.5 Histadrut and Mapai 44 2.3.6 Ben-Gurion and the founding of the state of Israel 44 2.3.7 Summary 45 2.4 Catholicism and the rise to power of the Christian Democratic Party (DC) 46 2.4.1 Introduction 46 2.4.2 Formation of the DC 46 2.4.3 Fascism and World War II 47 2.4.4 Demise of Fascist rule 49 2.4.5 Emergence of the Resistance Movement 50 2.4.6 The Catholic Church, communism and the DC=s ascension to power 50 2.4.7 De Gasperi and the birth of a new political order in Italy 58 2.4.8 Summary 54 2.5 The Social Democratic Party (SDP) and Sweden=s political and economic problems 55 2.5.1.Introduction 55 2.5.2 Formation of the SDP 55 2.5.3 The SDP and the labour movement 55 2.5.4 Sweden=s economic crisis and the SDP=s election victory in 1932 56 2..5.5 Summary 58 2.6. The African National Congress (ANC) ņ from a nationalist movement to a ruling party 59 2.6.1 Introduction 59 2.6.2 Formation of the ANC 60 2.6.3 The banning of the ANC 61 2.6.4 Soweto unrest and resuscitation of the ANC 62 2.6.5 The unbanning of the ANC and the beginning of negotiations 64 2.6.6 South Africa=s 1994 nonracial and democratic elections 64 vi

2.6.7 Contribution of Mandela=s leadership to the ANC=s ascension to power 65 2.6.8 Summary 67 2.7 Conclusion 68

CHAPTER 3 73 FACTORS THAT FACILITATE THE RISE TO ONE-PARTY DOMINANCE 73 Introduction 73 3.1. The BDP and the consolidation of power: 1965 ņ 1990 74 3.1.1 Introduction 74 3.1.2 Organisational strength 74 3.1.3 Support of a strong socioeconomic bloc 75 3.1.4 Penetration of society 77 3.1.5 Pragmatism 78 3.1.6 Patronage 79 3.1.7 Symbolism ņ the legacy of Sir Seretse Khama and the role of the BDP in the independence of Botswana 81 3.1.8 Electoral performance 82 3.1.9 Summary 83 3.2. Congress and the consolidation of power in India: 1952 - 1977 84 3.2.1 Introduction 84 3.2.2 Different views advanced for the dominance of Congress 84 3.2.3 Organisational strength 86 3.2.4.1 Support of a strong socioeconomic bloc ņ Indian masses 87 3.2.4.2 Support of a strong socioeconomic bloc ņ labour and commercial organisations 87 3.2.5 Penetration of society 87 3.2.6 Pragmatism 88 3.2.7 Patronage 90 3.2.8 Symbolism ņ Nehru, Congress and the nationalist movement 91 3.2.9 Electoral performance 92 3.2.10 Summary 92 vii

3.3 The Histadrut ņ vehicle behind Mapai=s dominance: 1949 ņ 1977 93 3.3.1 Introduction 93 3.3.2 Organisational strength 93 3.3.3 Support of a strong socioeconomic bloc 94 3.3.4 Penetration of society 96 3.3.5 Pragmatism 97 3.3.6 Patronage 98 3.3.7 Symbolism S role of Ben-Gurion and Mapai in the founding of the state of Israel 98 3.3.8 Electoral performance 99 3..3.9 Summary 100 3.4 Fascism, World War II and the rise to dominance of the DC: 1948 - 1973 101 3.4.1 Introduction 101 3.4.2 Organisational strength 101 3.4.3 Support of a strong socioeconomic bloc 102 3.4.4 The DC and anti-communism 103 3.4.5 Penetration of society 104 3.4.6 Pragmatism 105 3.4.7 Patronage 105 3.4.8 Symbolism of De Gasperi=s role in reorganising the DC and leading Italy to political stability 106 3.4.9 Electoral performance 107 3.4.10. Summary 107 3.5 The SDP=s shaky start to dominance in Sweden: 1932 - 1957 108 3.5.1 Introduction 108 3.5.2 Organisational strength 109 3.5.3 Support of a strong socioeconomic bloc 109 3.5.4 Penetration of society 110 3.5.5 Pragmatism 111 3.5.6 Patronage 112 3.5.7 Symbolism 113 3.5.8 Electoral performance of the SDP 113 viii

3.5.9 Summary 114 3.6 South Africa and the incipient rise to dominance by the African National Congress (ANC):1994 - 114 3.6.1 Introduction 114 3.6.2 Organisational strength 115 3.6.3 Support of a strong socioeconomic bloc 116 3.6.3.1 African masses 116 3.6.3.2 Labour federation 117 3.6.4 Penetration of society 118 3.6.5 Pragmatism 119 3.6.6 Patronage 121 3.6.7 Symbolism B legacy of Mandela and the ANC=s role in the liberation struggle 122 3.6.8 Electoral performance 123 3.6.9 Summary 124 3.7 Conclusion 125 3.7.1 Organisational strength 126 3.7.2 Support from a strong socioeconomic bloc 127 3.7.3 Penetration of society 129 3.7.4 Pragmatism 129 3.7.5 Patronage 131 3.7.6 Symbolism 132

CHAPTER 4 135 THE EFFECT OF GOVERNMENTAL PERFORMANCE ON ELECTORAL SUPPORT Introduction 135 4.1 BDP: Botswana: from poverty to prosperity 137 4.1.1 Introduction 137 4.1.2 Sources of economic success 139 4.1.3 Capable leadership and good management 140 4.1.4 Negotiation skills 141 ix

4.1.5 Government performance 142 4.1.5.1 Economic growth 142 4.1.5.2 Employment 143 4.1.5.3 Education 143 4.1.5.4 Social welfare and health 144 4.1.5.5 Infrastructure S roads 145 4.1.5.6 Inequalities 145 4.1.6 Summary 146 4.2 Congress: The protracted struggle to overcome poverty 148 4.2.1 Introduction 148 4.2.2 Congress confronting the challenges 149 4.2.3 Government performance 151 4.2.3.1 Economic growth 151 4.2.3.2 Employment 152 4.2.3.3 Education 153 4.2.3.4 Social welfare and health 153 4.2.3.5 Population growth 154 4.2.3.6 Inequality 155 4.2.4 Summary 156 4.3 Mapai: building a self-sufficient nation 157 4.3.1 Introduction 157 4.3.2 Problems confronting the new state of Israel 158 4.3.3 Government performance 158 4.3.3.1 Economic growth 158 4.3.3.2 Employment 159 4.3.3.3 Education 160 4.3.3.4 Social welfare and health 161 4.3.4. Summary 162 4.4 Christian Democratic Party (DC): from a devastated country to an economic miracle 163 4.4.1 Introduction 163 4.4.2 First steps towards reconstruction 164 x

4.4.3 Government performance 165 4.4.3.1 Economic growth 165 4.4.3.2 Employment 166 4.4.3.3 Education 167 4.4.3.4 Social welfare and health 167 4.4.3.5 Housing 169 4.4.4 Summary 169 4.5 SDP: the formation of a unique social welfare system 170 4.5.1 Introduction 170 4.5.2 Unemployment and the formation of an ideology 171 4.5.3 Implementation of a socialist ideology 172 4.5.4 Government performance 174 4.5.4.1 Economic growth 174 4.5.4.2 Employment 174 4.5.4.3 Education 175 4.5.4.4 Social welfare and health 176 4.5.4.5 Housing 177 4.5.5. Summary 178 4.6. ANC: correcting an unequal distributive system 179 4.6.1 Introduction 179 4.6.2 Confronting the challenges 180 4.6 3 Government performance 181 4.6.3.1 Economic growth 181 4.6.3.2 Employment 182 4.6.3.3 Education 182 4.6.3.4 Social welfare and health 182 4.6.3.5 General development 184 4.6.4 Summary 186 4.7 Conclusion 187

CHAPTER 5 192 ADVERSE CONDITIONS AFFECTING THE PERFORMANCE OF OPPOSITION xi

PARTIES 192 Introduction 192 5.1 Botswana 193 5.1.1 Introduction 193 5.1.2 Botswana People=s Party (BPP) 194 5.1.2.1 Electoral performance 195 5.1.3 Botswana Independence Party (BIP) 196 5.1.3.1 Electoral performance 197 5.1.4 Botswana National Front (BNF) 197 5.1.4.1 Electoral Performance 198 5.1.5 Factors responsible for the weakness of the opposition in Botswana 200 5.1.6 Summary 205 5.2 India 206 5.2.1 Introduction 206 5.2.2 Leftist parties 208 5.2.3 Rightist parties 208 5.2.4 Communist Party of India (CPI) 208 5.2.4.1 Electoral performance 210 5.2.5 Socialist Party 210 5.2.5.1 Electoral performance 211 5.2.6 Samyukta Socialist Party (SPP) 211 5.2.6.1 Electoral performance 212 5.2.7 Jana Sangh 212 5.2.7.1 Electoral performance 214 5.2.8 Swatantra Party 214 5.2.8.1 Electoral performance 215 5.2.9 Factors responsible for the weakness of the opposition in India 216 5.2.10 Summary 222 5.3 Israel 224 5.3.1 Introduction 224 5.3.2 Mapam 224 5.3.2.1 Electoral performance 225 xii

5.3.3 Herut 226 5.3.3.1 Electoral performance 227 5.3.4 General Zionist 228 5.3.4.1 Electoral performance 229 5.3.5 Factors responsible for the weakness of the opposition in Israel 230 5.3.6 Summary 235 5.4 Italy 235 5.4.1 Introduction 235 5.4.2 Communist Party of Italy (PCI) 236 5.4.2.1 Electoral performance 238 5.4.3 Socialist Party of Italy (PSI) 238 5.4.3.1 Electoral performance 239 5.4.4 Factors responsible for the weakness of the opposition in Italy 239 5.4.5 Summary 243 5.5 Sweden 244 5.5.1 Introduction 244 5.5.2 Liberal Party 245 5.5.2.1 Electoral performance 246 5.5.3 Center Party 246 5.5.3.1 Electoral performance 247 5.5.4 Conservative Party 247 5.5.4.1 Electoral performance 248 5.5.5 Communist Party 249 5.5.5.1 Electoral performance 250 5.5.6 Factors responsible for the weakness of the opposition in Sweden 251 5.5.7 Summary 255 5.6 South Africa 255 5.6.1 Introduction 255 5.6.2 National Party (NP) 256 5.6.2.1 Electoral performance 257 5.6.3 Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) 258 5.6.3.1 Electoral performance 260 xiii

5.6.4 Democratic Alliance (DA) 260 5.6.4.1 Electoral performance 261 5.6.5 Factors responsible for the weakness of the opposition in South Africa 262 5.6.6 Summary 267 5.7 Conclusion 268

CHAPTER 6 273 DECLINE AND LOSS OF DOMINANCE 273 Introduction 273 6.1 Indira Gandhi and the crisis within Congress 274 6.1.1 Introduction 274 6.1.2 First leadership battle and appearance of schisms within Congress 275 6.1.3 Second leadership battle and Congress split 277 6.1.4 Emergence of authoritarian and oligarchical tendencies 278 6.1.5 Corruption 281 6.1.6 Failure to resolve socioeconomic problems 281 6.1.7 Consequences of war 282 6.1.8 Emergence of an organised opposition and the end of Congress dominance 283 6.1.9 Summary 284 6.2 Loss of dominance by Mapai/Labour Alignment 285 6.2.1 Introduction 285 6.2.2 Leadership battles and appearance of schisms within the Alignment 286 6.2.3 Emergence of authoritarian and oligarchical tendencies 288 6.2.4 Corruption 288 6.2.5 Failure to resolve socioeconomic problems 289 6.2.6 Loss of support from strong socioeconomic bloc 289 6.2.7 Consequences of war with the Arabs 290 6.2.8 Herut and the formation of an opposition alliance 292 6.2.9 Summary 293 6.3 Italy: the Christian Democratic Party (DC), the Mafia and corruption 294 6.3.1 Introduction 294 6.3.2 Appearance of schisms within the DC 295 6.3.3 Corruption and the DC=s link to organised crime 296 6.3.4 Failure to resolve socioeconomic problems 299 6.3.5 Loss of support from a strong socioeconomic bloc 300 6.3.6 Consequences of the end of the Cold War 300 6.3.7 Summary 301 6.4 The Social Democratic Party=s welfare success and the 1976 electoral defeat 302 6.4.1 Introduction 302 6.4.2 Labour union=s ambition to wrest control of the proceeds of the economy 304 6.4.3 Success of social welfare programme and the nuclear power crisis 305 6.4.4 Summary 309 6.5 Conclusion 310

CHAPTER 7 314 CONCLUSION 314 BIBLIOGRAPHY 321

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Motivation for study

The focus of this study is one-party dominance, which is explained in the paragraphs below. When the book by the American political scientist, TJ Pempel, titled Uncommon democracies: the one-party dominant regimes, was published in 1990, South Africa was a one-party dominant state, albeit of a different kind, as the ruling National Party (NP) had been in power for more than four decades. However, the elections that constantly returned this party to power were only contested by the country¶s white population to the exclusion of its black citizens who were in the majority.

The year 1990 heralded the first tentative steps towards the transformation of South Africa¶s political system to make it inclusive and representative of all its citizens, regardless of colour. On 2 February of the same year, Mr FW de Klerk, the then president of South Africa, announced the unbanning of political organisations in parliament. Among these organisations was the African National Congress (ANC) (which had been banned in 1960). This was followed a week later by the release of the ANC leader, Nelson Mandela, from 27 years of imprisonment. This bold move by Mr De Klerk set South Africa on the road towards establishing a new political system (Buntman 1998:248).

After protracted and often acrimonious negotiations by various political organisations, which lasted three years, a draft constitution was accepted and on 27 ņ28 April 1994, South Africa¶s historic first nonracial, democratic elections were held. The elections were won by the ANC with a large majority. The party received 62,65 per cent of the votes, giving it 252 of the 400 seats in the House of Assembly. Two years after the ANC¶s victory a number of academics and scholars started

speculating about the possibility of the ANC becoming a dominant party. As a result, one-party dominance started to become a topical and contentious issue in South African politics.

Welsh (1996:91) argues that the magnitude of the ANC¶s victory and the fragmented character of the opposition forces raises the question whether South Africa was not destined for one-party hegemony. After the country¶s second elections held in 1999, which were won by the ANC with an increased margin, Lanegran (2001:81) expressed the view that a dominant party state was being consolidated. At this early stage it was becoming evident that a one-party dominant state was beginning to crystallise in South Africa.

1.2 One-party dominance debate in South Africa

Throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s, one-party dominance dominated the writings of academics, spawning theorists on this theme. Among the academics who have written on this theme are Lodge (1999), Southall (1998), Giliomee (1998), Giliomee and Simkins (1999), Welsh (2003), Butler (2000), Brooks (2004), Schlemmer (2005) and Myburgh (2004). In addition, many other people have commented on this issue in newspaper articles. Southall (2005:61) expresses the view that the one-party debate in South Africa just will not go away, becoming a major focus of academic and public attention in the lead up to the 2004 general elections.

South Africa¶s one-party dominance theorists are ranged into two groups ņ opponents of one-party dominance and those who are not unduly worried by it. Giliomee, Simkins, Myburgh, Schlemmer and Welsh fall into the first group, while Lodge, Butler, Brooks and Southall represent the second group. In their writings, the opponents of one-party dominance express their concern about its compatibility with democracy. They are uneasy about its implications for South Africa¶s nascent democracy, fearing that the ANC, because of its majority, will not rule according to

the letter and spirit of the Constitution. On the other hand, Lodge (1999), Southall (1998), Butler (2000) and Brooks (2004) do not share the apprehension of the opponents of one-party dominance.

The scholars who are apprehensive about one-party dominance argue that the continued return to power of the same political party in successive elections does not augur well for democracy. They argue that democracy is better served when there is an alternation of power. According to proponents of this view, the existence of political opposition within a competitive party system presents alternatives to the governing party and, therefore, stimulates debate within society over ideas and policies, and allows society to question the actions and choices of government (Brooks 2004:2).

At the forefront of the academics¶ unease about the ANC¶s impending dominance is Giliomee and Simkins (1999). Their concern finds expression in a book they co- edited. The book is aptly titled, The awkward embrace: one party domination and democracy. Giliomee (1998) also expresses his views on the issue in an article titled: ³South Africa¶s emerging dominant party regime´. In this article, Giliomee (1998:129) puts forward the argument that it is the fear of losing elections, ³more than institutionalised or legal safeguards that keep officials honest and forces them to act as agents of the electorate´.

Giliomee points out that in industrialised states dominant party rule is compatible with free electoral competition, while in semi-industrialised areas this is not the case. In such states, dominant parties encroach on civil liberties and barely tolerate opposition formations (Giliomee 1998:132). Drawing from African states, Giliomee and Simkins (1999:314) argue that dominant parties in semi-industrialised states such as South Africa are more likely to abuse power than those in industrialised countries.

The two authors further argue that the dominant party¶s sheer preponderance of political power increasingly leads to unilateral and even arbitrary decision-making that undermines the integrity of democratic institutions, particularly that of the legislature and its ability to check the executive (Giliomee & Simkins 1999:340). On the other hand, Welsh (2003:5) maintains that South Africa is staring down a slippery slope to a Zimbabwean-style one-party dominant state. Although conceding that Zimbabwe is an extreme case, he points out that it is not hard to discern tendencies in the ANC that reflect its essentially liberation character: a strong tendency to equate itself with the nation, a quest for hegemonic control, and the divine righteousness of its cause.

Schlemmer (2005:7) argues that the increase in the ANC¶s winning margin in three consecutive elections is a threat to government accountability. He also points out that it is ANC people sympathetic to it serving in institutions such as the Constitutional Court who rule in favour of the government. Myburgh (2004:4) asserts that under the ANC democracy is inseparable from the concentration of power in the hands of the ruling party to allow it to give effect to the interests and aspirations of the black majority. Southall (1998; 2005), Lodge (1999), Butler (2000) and Brooks (2004) express optimism about the prospects of democracy in South Africa under the ANC. Southall (1998:654) asks the question that if the ANC is about to dominate national and provincial government, are we about to witness the re-emergence of an authoritarian political system? He answers his own question by saying it is premature to hold this view as South Africa may prove able to combine the ANC¶s assumption of dominant party status with a retention of democracy.

Southall (2005:77) believes that the one-party dominance thesis is too important and too insightful to dismiss out of hand as it addresses major issues concerning democratic consolidation, notably the tendency for dominant parties to become more illiberal the more they became entrenched. He states that, regarding the ANC, the argument about one-party democracy is essentially wrong. He puts forward the view that the defenders of one-party democracy are correct to respond that the ANC has been the harbinger of democracy in South Africa, primarily responsible for the human rights-based nature of the Constitution.

Lodge (1999:72), on the other hand, points out that there are institutions of government which are meant to safeguard the abuse of power by the ANC. Among them he mentions parliament and chapter nine of the Constitution. Butler (2000:189) includes the following safeguards: the Public Protector, the Human Rights Commission, the Auditor-General and the Constitutional Court. In addition, Brooks (2004:31) argues that the existence of an active civil society, a well-organised and historically and politically charged society, unions and civil-based organisations act as countervailing forces against any abuse of power by the ANC.

The motivation for the study arises from the concern expressed by the scholars referred to above about the threat posed by the ANC¶s impending dominance on the country¶s nascent democracy. The ANC came to power after transforming itself from a nationalist movement which led the resistance against the oppressive and discriminatory legislation of various National Party governments. Nationalist movements in Africa that took over the leadership of their countries after independence have a poor track record of democratic rule. The consolidation of their power did not follow the democratic path. South Africa¶s democracy, while not under serious threat, is faced with various challenges which could impact negatively on its consolidation.

The above fears have made it necessary for a study on one-party dominance to be embarked upon to determine factors that facilitate it and whether it takes place within a democratic framework. The study is important and necessary as South Africa is headed for a dominant party system, headed by the ANC. There is a need to assess the possibility of the ANC achieving dominant status, whether this would occur in a

manner similar to that of other dominant parties and whether this would jeopardise the country¶s democratic political system.

1.3 Conceptualisation of the problem In a Western liberal political system, where political parties compete for power, the regular replacement of an incumbent government is not unusual. However, it is rare for a party to win four or more consecutive elections. Pempel (1990:1) states that the changeable nature of voters and the ability to switch governing parties, rewarding appealing promises or ³throwing the rascals out´, has long been a keystone of electoral democracy. According to him, the continued stay in power by the same party over a lengthy period of more than 20 years gave rise to the phenomenon referred to as one-party dominance.

One-party dominance is a rare feat, which has been achieved by only a few political parties in the past century. Among these parties are Sweden¶s Social Democratic Party (SDP), Italy¶s Christian Democratic Party (DC) and Japan¶s Labour Democratic Party (LDP). One-party dominance is considered an anomaly, an aberration and a deviation from the norm (Pempel 1990:5). The best-known cases of one-party dominance are the SDP and the DC, both of which ruled their countries continuously for 44 years. The dominance of these parties was achieved within the democratic framework of their states¶ political systems.

Sartori (1979:193) puts forward the view that the criteria by which a party is declared dominant are seldom operationalised, but the general idea (of what is meant by the concept) is clear enough. Much as this could be the case, it has not stopped disagreements over this concept. Aronoff (1990:269) points out that since the term ³dominant party system´ was first coined by Duverger in 1951, it has been the subject of much debate among scholars. Sartori (1979) and Duverger (1964) are among the few scholars who have given the concept attention, albeit very

superficially. Arian and Barnes (1974), who also wrote on this concept, described it as a neglected model of democratic stability.

Pempel (1990) was later to add to the view of these scholars with his seminal book, which is a comparative analysis of four parties that attained dominance. However, scholars such as Kochanek (1968), Medding (1972), Castles (1975), and Leonardi and Wertman (1989) also wrote on one-party dominance, but did so from the perspective of particular political parties, without concerning themselves with theoretical arguments of what dominance is or is not. They concentrated on the empirical manifestations of dominance. Kochanek¶s book is titled, The Congress Party of India: the dynamics of one-party democracy, while that of Leonardi and Wertman is titled, Italian Christian democracy: the politics of dominance.

One-party dominance is often confused with the one-party political systems found in the Soviet Union and other communist states before 1990. Here, according to Blondel (1972:99), only one party was allowed by law to exist. The citizens of these states did not have a choice, but were supposed to belong to this party, which purportedly represented the will of the entire nation. Elections in these countries were more like referendums. Blondel (1972:99) adds that in other countries a single party is the result of authoritarianism on the part of the ruling party. Although the opposition exists, conditions are made difficult for it to contest for power, as it is harassed to ensure that it does not defeat the ruling party.

Much as there is debate about one-party dominance, there is broad agreement of what constitutes this concept. Sartori (1979:194) maintains that it is a party that outdistances the others over consecutive elections. Duverger (1964:308) puts forward the view that it is a party that is larger than the others. Like Sartori, he also argues that this party should outdistance its rivals over a certain period of time. Both Sartori (1979) and Duverger (1964) express the view that the party must win a majority of votes.

According to Shalev (1990:83), ³simplistically defined, dominant parties are those that head governments over long periods (on the scale of the number of decades rather than of cabinets) continuously or with only ephemeral interruptions´. He adds that dominant parties are not necessarily majority parties, but that they always enjoy a plurality of the popular vote. If there are interruptions of any kind to a party¶s rule, then one-party dominance comes to an end.

Another scholar that summarises one-party dominance is Heywood (1997). He starts by warning that the dominant party system should not be confused with one-party systems, although they may at times exhibit similar characteristics (1997:243). He explains that a dominant party system is competitive in the sense that a number of parties compete for power in regular and popular elections, but that these elections are dominated by a single major party that consequently enjoys prolonged periods of power. However, he does not indicate how long the prolonged period of time should be for a party to be regarded as dominant, pointing out that Japan¶s LDP was in power for 38 years. Although Pempel (1990:12) holds the view that ³the literature on one-party dominance among industrialised democracies is marked by vagueness in definition and disagreements´, he does not sufficiently elaborate on this statement. On Duverger, Pempel avers that his discussion of dominance is vague, resting heavily on unspecified assessments by the mass public. He argues that Sartori¶s discussion on the theme is no less unsatisfactory than the others. However, he agrees with Duverger and Sartori on two of the most important requirements for dominance: that the party must be dominant in numbers and that it must win elections chronologically over a period of time. He adds two other requirements for dominance: the party must enjoy a dominant bargaining position and it must be dominant in government.

Pempel (1990:6) argues that in industrialised societies where the citizens have a developed participatory political culture, a high literacy rate and an affluent standard of living, and where demographic changes occur, such as when voters grow old or young people are enfranchised, dominance is not supposed to happen. This is because it would be expected of them to transfer their votes to other parties if they are not satisfied with the ruling party.

While Duverger (1964) and Sartori (1979) do not concern themselves too much about why and how dominance occurs, scholars writing on one-party dominance in particular states made an effort to explain the puzzle of dominance and how it came about. Writing on the dominance of the Italian Christian Democratic Party (DC), Leonardi and Wertman (1989) pose the question as to what made possible the occupation of power by the DC for such a long time in a state that has undergone so much socioeconomic change.

Pempel (1990: 6) is equally puzzled by the occurrence of dominance. This is how he expresses it: ³Therefore, a central puzzle for single-party dominance within the industrialised democracies is how or why it occurs under situations of social dynamics and political openness.´ He goes on to ask the following questions:

How does a single party come to retain a plurality or a majority of a relatively free vote by a dynamic and fluid citizenry decade after decade? Why don¶t at least some of its supporters desert it? Why, with demographic changes, don¶t other voting blocs become numerous, thereby reducing it to minority status? Why don¶t other parties or coalitions find it sufficiently desirable and possible at least once or twice to organise an alternative government?

Arian and Barnes (1974:594) point out that many dominant parties have been closely identified with the creation of the constitutional and political order that they were to dominate. On the other hand, Thackrah (2000:4) holds the view that fortuitous idiosyncrasies give one party a head start over the rest. In his comparative study involving four parties, Sweden¶s SDP, Japan¶s Liberal Democratic Party, Israel¶s Mifleget Poalie Yisrael (Mapai) and Italy¶s DC, Pempel (1990:343) notes that unusual circumstances prevailed in these states before the parties ascended to power. The role these parties played in resolving these unusual circumstances gave them an advantage over the other parties.

Arian and Barnes (1974:595) express the view that the identification in the public mind with an heroic or eventful period and a leadership cadre with an unusual wealth of experience are all important consequences of the party¶s early arrival on the scene. For Duverger (1964:307) the party must be identified with an era ņ a distinctive period in the history of a country, such as the rise of socialism in Scandinavian countries.

In their explanations of one-party dominance, Duverger (1964) and Sartori (1979) do not concern themselves with the circumstances that made possible the ascension to power of a particular party. The nearest that Duverger (1964) comes to this is when he expresses the view that the party must be identified with an epoch. Duverger and Sartori do not explain the factors that may be responsible for the party¶s continued electoral success, in spite of the presence of other parties also contesting elections. The two scholars also do not explain how long a party should be in power before it is recognised as being dominant. Pempel (1990:5) believes that a party should be in power for more than 20 years.

1.4 The purpose of the study

The focus of this study is on five political parties that achieved dominant status. These parties are the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), the Indian National Congress (Congress), the Mifleget Poalie Yisrael (Mapai), the Christian Democratic Party (DC) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP). These parties are from Botswana, India, Israel, Italy and Sweden respectively.

The main argument of the study is that apart from Pempel¶s theory that unusual circumstances give a party a head start over its rivals, a number of factors contribute to the maintenance of dominance. The study will focus on a comparative analysis of the rise to dominance of the parties in the aforementioned states. Unusual circumstances prevailed in these states prior to the parties¶ ascension to power, and they were at the forefront of seeking a resolution to these unusual circumstances. They were successful in their endeavours and they reaped the fruits of this when, in the founding elections held soon afterwards, they were elected to power. However, this tells only part of the issue of dominance. The important question to be answered in the study is how did these parties, from their advantageous start, entrench themselves in power by winning elections consecutively over 25 years? What did these parties do to continue to retain the confidence of the voters over two decades, regardless of the changing circumstances discussed by Pempel (1990) and Leonardi and Wertman (1989) above?

The argument that is put forward in this study is that the ascension to power of the parties being studied was preceded by unusual circumstances prevailing within their states. It was the successful involvement of these parties in these unusual circumstances that was responsible for their victory in the elections held afterwards. This gave the parties an advantage over others. A political party that comes into power during a crisis has an advantage over its rivals because the voting public will remember its role in extricating the nation from the crisis. A party that is perceived as a national saviour is difficult to defeat (Thackrah 2000:5).

However, an advantageous start is not an adequate explanation for the domination of these parties. Over and above this, other factors also contributed to the electoral success of the parties. The study will focus on identifying the factors that consolidated the dominance of the parties and determining whether they are common to all the parties. These factors will be helpful in unravelling the occurrence of this phenomenon.

The factors associated with a party¶s electoral success were identified after researching the literature on democratic parties that achieved dominance. These factors are identified in the breakdown of the chapters below, and are helpful in explaining one-party dominance. A completely favourable configuration of factors to one-party dominance greatly facilitates the possibility of its achievement. These factors are important in the sense that it was through their presence that the parties consolidated their support among the voters. The contribution of this thesis moves the body of knowledge on one-party dominance further by identifying, through a thorough and systematic analysis of the literature, both empirical and theoretical, a considerable number of conditions that are associated with the rise and fall of one- party dominant democracies.

The scholars who have written on one-party dominance from the perspective of particular parties have laid the foundation for the study of this phenomenon. While their contributions are helpful to political scientists in understanding the intricacies of party dominance, the literature could be further enhanced if a comparative study of the factors contributing to this phenomenon could be embarked upon and compiled. Although Pempel (1990:337) alludes to the fact that several conditions giving rise to dominance are common to the four cases in his study, he does not discuss them in any detail. Another omission in his study is a comparison of the factors that render the opposition weak and ineffectual in its quest to challenge the ruling party.

Pempel¶s focus in his study is not so much on the factors that were responsible for the dominance of the parties, but according to him, rather on ³matters related to the dominant party and its relationship to the socioeconomic support groups, interest associations and the state apparatus´ (Pempel 1990:30). However, he does compare the common beginnings of these parties. The contention here is that there are a number of factors that are crucial to the attainment of dominance, which are common to all the parties. The potential of a party to become dominant can only be identified after it (the party) has successfully won the first few elections and exhibits common characteristics with parties that have already achieved this feat.

The starting point of the study is with the unusual circumstances that prevailed in the five states where one-party dominance occurred. In Botswana, the Botswana Democratic Party played a pivotal role in events leading up to the country¶s independence in 1966. Botswana did not have developed political parties as was the case with other African countries. It was a rural peasant society which was not unduly concerned about agitating for the independence of the country. Its association with South Africa was largely due to the fact that it was landlocked and relied on the ports of its powerful neighbour for it exports and imports. It got unwittingly involved in South Africa¶s politics as members of the ANC and Pan Africanist Congress(PAC) who were running away from the police sought refuge in that country.

The Indian National Congress was at the forefront of the struggle for liberation from Britain ņ India gained its independence in 1952. Mapai was at the centre of the battle for the formation of the state of Israel, which was realised in 1948. This came after strong opposition from the Palestinians who felt that they were encroaching on their territory. In Italy, the Christian Democratic Party rebuilt the country after it collapsed, following authoritarian rule by Mussolini¶s Fascist government and the destruction it suffered as a result of World War II. The Social Democratic Party in Sweden crafted an economic policy that rescued the country from the grip of unemployment and led it to prosperity. This occurred after the country was severely affected by the Great Depression and suffered from high unemployment levels. . The ANC also traces its ascension to power from the unusual circumstances that prevailed in South Africa and that the party assisted in resolving. These unusual circumstances related to the country¶s authoritarian political system based on racial discrimination, with the ANC being at the forefront of the struggle against it. In this study an assessment is made of the possibility of the ANC maintaining dominance in the South African body politic in the same way as the parties mentioned above. The possibility of South Africa becoming a one--party dominant state has been alluded to by the political science scholars mentioned in the preceding paragraphs.

The ascension to power of these parties would not have been possible without the support of strong socioeconomic blocs. These socioeconomic groups continued to support these parties in successive elections. For a party to institutionalise its initial support and also to make inroads into other constituencies, it has to be seen to be satisfying the needs of the community as a whole. A party¶s performance, as government, may also be a factor in its continued electoral success. All of the above will lead to the identification of factors that result in the establishment of dominance.

1.5 Research method

In this study three research methods would be utilised to collect, interpret and analyse data. The methods are the following; secondary sources, case study and comparative research methods. Research would be undertaken through secondary sources comprising books, journals, magazines and government records obtained through internet and e-mail. According to Neuman (2000:397), social research use secondary sources, which include books and articles written by specialist historians as evidence of past conditions.

Before embarking on this research, an exploratory study of the phenomenon of one-party dominance was undertaken. The focus was on political parties which achieved dominance. The literature revealed the existence of common factors among the parties. The existence of these common factors indicated that their dominance was achieved in more or less the same manner. This made the employment of both the case study and comparative research method imperative in order to analyse the contribution of these factors to the attainment of dominance by the parties.

Neuman (2000:32) points out that in case study research, researchers examine in depth many features of a few cases over a duration of time. These cases could be individuals, organisations, movements, events or geographic units. The data is usually more detailed, varied and extensive involving qualitative research. Neuman (2000) argues that although qualitative and case study research are not identitical, almost all qualitative research seeks to construct representations based on in-depth detailed knowledge of cases. In a case study, a researcher may intensively invetigate one or two cases or compare a limited set of cases, focusing on several factors. A researcher carefully selects a few cases to illustrate an issue and analytically study it in detail.

Yin (2003:9) puts forward the view that selecting the case or cases to be studied is one of the most difficult steps in case study research. He sounds a word of warning by stating that selecting cases for a case study should not simply be a matter of finding the most convenient or accessible site from which you can collect data. The selection process should incorporate the specific reasons why you need a particular group of cases. Candidate cases should be screened before hand to determine their suitability.

The focus of the study under investigation is on one-party dominance. What was discovered through the exploratory research is that the parties to be studied operated within western liberal democratic political systems in their states. Here elections which are held regularly were contested by various political parties and accepted as being free and fair. There are no restrictions imposed upon the citizens of the state and their civil liberties are protected. A political party from an authoritarian system would thus not qualify as a candidate for inclusion in the study, as elections held here cannot be regarded as democratic.

Case study research could be embarked upon either using single or multiple cases. Multiple case study includes the use of two or more cases within the same study. Yin (2003: 5) argues that multiple case studies should be selected so that they replicate each other, either predicting similar results or contrasting results for predictable reasons.

Having selected six cases for the study, it is only logical that the comparative research method should be utilised. Van Dyke (1960: 184) points out that the comparative method consists of identifying similarities and differences. He adds that finding that the various phenomena are similar enough, we may group them together and give them a label, which means that the comparative method enters into the realm of concept formulation. Via conceptualisation and classification the comparative method is basic to thought expression. Faure (1979: 82) puts forward the view that ³the prevailing method in comparative politics is the most similar systems design (MSSD) in terms of which systems as similar as possible with respect to as many features as possible constitute the optimal samples for comparative inquiry.´

Neuman (2000: 401) avers that the focus of comparative research is on similarities and differences between units, and comparison is central to the very act of knowing and perceiving. According to him, the strength of comparative research lies in the fact that it raises new questions and stimulates theory building. In this study the comparative method would be useful in anticipating one-party dominance. Complementing the use of the three methods discussed above is the process of induction which is also employed in the study. In the study we progress from what we know to be the case, one-party dominance, to what might be the case in other similar situations, if they display the same characteristics. In induction we make a logical leap from what we have seen to a prediction about what we have not seen based on the assumptions that there is some constant patterns to events in politics.

The comparative method of research is not without its problems. Neuman (2000: 402) identifies the following three weakness with this method; firstly, he points out that it is more difficult, more costly and more time comsuming than research that is not comparative; secondly, this research method cannot use random sampling, and, lastly comparative research can apply, but not test, theory and can make only limited generalisations.

1.6 Delimitation of the study

There is no agreement among scholars about the period of time that a party should be in power for it to be regarded as dominant. For the purpose of this study, 25 years is considered sufficient for a party to achieve this status. In this study, the DC and the SDP were in power for over 40 years. However, only the first 25 years of their rule is considered in this study. The parties operated within a nominally Western liberal democratic political system. One-party dominance in authoritarian systems does not feature in this study.

1.7 Structure of the study Chapter 2 This chapter discusses the unusual circumstances that prevailed in the states before the ascension to power of the parties and discusses the involvement of the parties in efforts to resolve these circumstances. The chapter also brings to the fore the leaders of the parties and the roles they played in this regard. Over and above the advantage that the parties derived from the initial unusual circumstances, they also owed their success to the strong socioeconomic blocs that supported them. The role of the leaders of the parties in resolving the unusual circumstances gave them an advantage over the other parties.

Chapter 3 In this chapter the factors that added to the advantageous start of the parties are identified and analysed. Having won the all-important founding elections these parties could not just rely on the factors that brought them victory to win subsequent elections, but had to devise other means in order to stay ahead of the other parties. The focus of this chapter is on the factors that contributed to the continued success of these parties. The following factors are identified: organisational strength, the support of a strong socioeconomic bloc, penetration into society, pragmatism, patronage, symbolism of the role of the party and leaders in resolving the unusual circumstances.

Chapter 4 This chapter measures the performance of the ruling parties against the electoral support that they received. The author asks the question as to whether this was a factor in these parties¶ continued stay in power. It is generally believed that a party that satisfies the socioeconomic needs of a population has a better chance of being re-elected to power than if it fails to do so. The performance of the parties is measured by macroeconomic indicators such as the growth of the economy, provision of employment, allocation of resources for social welfare, health and education, life expectancy, infant mortality and to a lesser extent economic infrastructure, such as housing and construction of a communication network such as roads.

Chapter 5 In this chapter it will be argued that the weakness of opposition parties was also a contributory factor to the dominance of the parties. The opposition parties in this study were weak and incapable of unseating the ruling parties. The weakness of the opposition resulted from a number of factors, such as inappropriate ideology, policies similar to those of the ruling party, factionalism, a particularistic support base, lack of resources, the proliferation of opposition parties and a failure to form alliances. It is important to note that these factors are not common to all the parties. Those not found or absent in particular parties are explained in the text.

Chapter 6 Apart from the Botswana Democratic Party, the four other parties eventually lost their dominance and this chapter focuses on the factors that led to their demise. Three of the parties experienced similar problems , while the factors that led to the defeat of the fourth are unique to that party. The factors that have been identified include factionalism leading to schisms within the parties, the appearance of oligarchical and authoritarian tendencies and corruption, failure to attend to socioeconomic problems, loss of support from a strong socioeconomic bloc, and the consequences of war. These factors enabled the opposition to organise and end the dominance of the ruling parties.

Chapter 7 The study shows that the parties that ultimately became dominant had common beginnings. Unusual circumstances prevailed in their states and their interventions gave them an advantage over other parties. However, these factors alone do not explain their rise to dominance, nor were they able to rest on their laurels and rely on their advantageous start. They had to devise other means to remain undefeated for over 20 years. These circumstances, as the study shows, were common to all the parties, even though in some cases not to the same degree. The five parties in the study eventually relinquished their domination of their political systems when they were defeated and some of the reasons for their defeat are analysed in this chapter.

Lastly, this chapter will determine whether the ANC has the potential to become a dominant party, based on the factors leading to the ascension to power of the parties examined in this study and the similarity of the factors that were responsible for consolidaitng their positions. Most importantly, it will assess whether the ANC has resorted to undemocratic means in its quest to achieve dominant status. The chapter will show that the research has laid a foundation for the development of further studies of the theory of one-party dominance.

CHAPTER 2 ASCENSION TO POWER: THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS DOMINANCE

Introduction

Various factors account for the electoral success of a political party. Among these factors are a well-structured programme outlining a party¶s plans for the development of the country and its people; if the party is incumbent its performance as government; and as an opposition an attractive alternative programme to that of the ruling party. These factors presuppose a situation of normality in a country. This chapter will argue that unusual circumstances prevailing in a country have the effect of determining the outcome of founding elections as a first step towards one-party dominance in a state.

The purpose of this chapter is to identify and analyse the factors that led to the ascension to power of the parties to be discussed below. The intention is to demonstrate that the presence of unusual circumstances played a role in their ascension to power. The elections which catapulted these parties into power were held following unusual circumstances in their countries. After ascending to power, these parties won five or more elections consecutively and ruled for a period of 25 or more years, thus establishing a dominant party political system in their countries. The unusual circumstances that will be discussed are the following: obtaining independence, liberation struggle as a means of obtaining independence, formation of a new state, formation of a new political system after the overthrow of authoritarian rule and radical reform of the political economy of a state.

The parties concerned in our study are the following: Botswana: Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) India: Indian Congress Party (Congress) Israel: Mifliget Poalie Yisrael Party (Mapai) Italy: Christian Democratic Party (DC) Sweden: Social Democratic Party (SDP) South Africa: African National Congress (ANC)

2.1 Sir Seretse Khama and the ascension to power of the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP)

2.1.2 Introduction

Botswana, a landlocked country neighbouring South Africa, was a British protectorate that was not colonised in the same way as the other former African colonies through conquest, deceit or coercion. British control over the area was established after much hesitation and reluctance. In March 1885, Botswana was declared a British Protectorate by Royal Decree at the request of some of the territory¶s chiefs. However, there were other chiefs who were not in favour of the idea as they were suspicious of the motives of the British authorities. Britain was reluctant to exercise direct control over this country as evidenced by the fact that the capital, Mafeking, was for many years situated in South Africa (Holm 1988:183)

The only reason why Britain decided to extend its authority over this territory was to keep other settler interests in the region at bay; it was not on account of its economic resources or its strategic position. The British did not want the territory to fall under German rule as was the case with the neighbouring country of Namibia, which was then known as German West Africa (Ramsey 1998:62). Subsequently, when Namibia was administered by South Africa, it was known as South West Africa. In the case of Bechuanaland, British actions were more of a preventive measure than a desire to actually colonise the area. Because of this reality, Botswana suffered from neglect as Britain made no effort to develop the country. According to Colclough and McCarthy (1985:12), Britain aimed to keep the financial costs of its involvement to the barest minimum; thus when Botswana gained its independence from Britain, it was among the poorest countries in the world (Lewis 1993:13).

2.1.3 Evolution of Botswana¶s political system and formation of the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP)

Botswana¶s political system was slow in developing. The country had a traditional system based on chieftaincy and the administrative structure of Botswana society revolved around the chief, his councillors, headmen and subjects. The kgotla was the traditional assembly in which national issues were discussed and decisions were made (Mgadla 1998:3). Botswana¶s political parties did not evolve from nationalist movements as was the case in other parts of Africa. Rule (1995:21) argues that democratic rule evolved peacefully in Botswana without blood being shed. Political parties in Botswana were only formed a few years before the country was granted independence. The first political party, the Bechuanaland Protectorate Federal Party (BPFP), was formed in 1959 by Leetile Raditladi. This party was opposed to the rapid move towards democracy, preferring the retention of the traditional system (Rule 1995:21).

The second party to be formed was the Bechuanaland People¶s Party (BPP), the objectives of which were in opposition to those of the BPFP. The party was nontraditionalist and wanted quick independence for the country. It could be said to have been radical as it called for the Africanisation of the civil service and for the nationalisation of some parts of the land (Rule 1995:21). It also made an aggressive call for national self-determination and an end to white racism (Ramsey & Parsons 1998:135). The formation of the Bechuanaland Democratic Party (BDP) was the brainchild of Sir Seretse Khama, who called upon African members of the Legislative Council to consider the idea of forming a political party. These members reacted positively to the suggestion, and in 1962 the inaugural meeting of the BDP was held under a tree, according to Ramsey and Parsons (1998:138). Among the founder members of this party were Sir Seretse Khama and Sir Ketumile Masire, who both later became presidents of the country (Henderson 1990:34). On its formation, the party enjoyed widespread support from the chiefs, the moderate, the wealthy and the educated Batswana (Rule 1995:22). The BDP called for a nonracial and democratic society which recognised and gave a role to traditional chiefs and courts.

2.1.4. Sir Seretse Khama and the rise to power of the BDP

The BDP owes its rise to power largely to Sir Seretse Khama and, to some extent, to South Africa¶s ambitions and interference in Botswana. Botswana shares a common border with South Africa, and its colonial past was dominated by the prospect of being annexed, first by the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR), and secondly by the South African government which came into being in 1910. The 1908 Act of Union, which created the Union of South Africa, contained a provision that the Union should grow by incorporating other territories like Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (Picard 1985:11). However, this could only be done with the consent of the people of these territories.

Sir Seretse Khama was born into the chieftaincy of the Bamangwato, which is the largest tribe in Botswana. His family sent him to the then Fort Hare College in South Africa to study for his degree and, on completion, he went to the United Kingdom to study law. While studying in that country, Khama fell in love with Ruth Williams, a white woman whom he subsequently married in 1948 (Henderson 1990:29). Wiseman (1996:249) points out that the marriage was approved by the Bamangwato at a huge public meeting. However, it was not well received in South Africa. Subsequently, the South African authorities put pressure on Britain not to allow Sir Seretse Khama to return to Bechuanaland to claim his chieftaincy (Henderson 1990:29).

Britain requested Sir Seretse Khama to renounce his chieftaincy which he refused to do. The British authorities then banned him from returning to his country. However, in 1956 the urge to return home forced Sir Seretse Khama to renounce his chieftaincy, agreeing to go home as a private citizen (Henderson 1990:30). The Bamangwato tribe warmly welcomed Sir Seretse Khama back to his country after an absence of six years ņ from 1950 to 1956.

It is important to understand why the South African authorities were against Khama¶s marriage to a white woman. When the National Party (NP) came into power in 1948, it implemented legislation that was designed to separate the races. Among this legislation was the Mixed Marriages Act which prevented marriages between black and white people. Hence in South Africa Sir Seretse Khama¶s marriage was a contravention of this legislation. Holm (1988:186) argues that the Bamangwato tribe was left bitter at the decision to exile their chief. He adds that the 1965 elections gave them an opportunity to express their anger at the manner in which their traditional leader had been treated. They voted overwhelmingly for the BDP in order to restore him to his rightful position. It is important to add here that when Sir Seretse Khama died, Lady Khama did not return to Britain but remained in Botswana until her death in May 2002.

2.1.5 Sir Seretse Khama and Botswana¶s road to independence Botswana¶s independence is closely associated with Sir Seretse Khama, even though he was not at the head of a nationalist movement that pressured the colonial authorities for independence. Wiseman (1977:77) postulates the view that independence was attained without any anti-colonial struggle; it was a fait accompli, as the principle of decolonisation was basically accepted by the British before the growth of political parties.

When Sir Seretse Khama returned to his homeland, he did not show any proclivity towards politics. According to Parsons, Henderson and Tlou (1995:159), he was aloof from politics and had no ambitions of being at the forefront of nationalist politics, concerning himself instead with matters pertaining to his Bamangwato tribe. Not even coaxing by Peter Fawcus, the British Resident Commissioner, that he should play the role of a leading nationalist could influence him. And because of his indifference to politics, Matante, the leader of the rising, mass-based Botswana People¶s Party (BPP), thought that Sir Seretse Khama would be suitable to occupy the position of titular head of the country (Ramsay & Parsons 1998:135).

Sir Seretse Khama¶s foray into politics started in 1957 when he supported a call for the formation of a Legislative Council (Legco) for Botswana. He called for democratic leadership based on ability and not race (Parsons, Henderson & Tlou 1995:168). After the Legco was formed, Sir Seretse Khama served on it and it was in the Legco that he started making statements with clear political overtones. In one of his speeches, he advocated the removal of racial discrimination from the civil service. He also proposed the formation of a select committee to examine the laws and practices of racial discrimination. Parsons, Henderson and Tlou (1995:169) state that Sir Seretse Khama had now made his mark on the territorial or national politics of the Bechuanaland Protectorate ņ demarcating the main points of the political programme that he would eventually pursue as a party politician.

Much as he was becoming involved in politics through his debates in the Legco, Sir Seretse Khama was still removed from nationalist politics. Although the formation of the BDP was his brainchild, it was not done with the intention of entering the domain of nationalist politics. The party was formed to counter the BPP, which Sir Seretse Khama accused of confusing the people and attempting to cause dissension between the tribes, government and white settlers. He called for the formation of a party which would advise the government on what should be done to further the interests of the territory (Ramsay & Parsons 1998:137).

Sir Seretse Khama¶s active engagement in nationalist politics only started with the constitutional talks initiated by Britain in 1963. The colonial government invited the public to make submissions on constitutional talks that would result in the country being granted self-government (Parsons, Henderson & Tlou 1995:208). In June 1963, the government invited the leaders of the country¶s three political parties to attend constitutional talks. It was here that Sir Seretse Khama made his mark as a politician, as he led the BDP in the talks with the colonial authorities. The BDP, which was far better prepared for the talks than the other parties, outwitted them as it reached consensus with the colonial authorities on a number of important issues. This made a lasting impression on the colonial authorities who were well disposed towards the party. At the conclusion of the talks, a date was set for the country¶s first elections and campaigning by the parties started, with Sir Seretse Khama leading the efforts of the BDP and undertaking a nationwide speaking tour (Parsons, Henderson & Tlou 1995:219).

Although assured of the large Bamangwato constituency, the BDP, under the leadership of Sir Seretse Khama, recruited all Batswana members of the Bechuanaland Legislative Council to join the party. The party also recruited the traditional and modern elites in the country and educated and propertied figures in the rural communities (Wiseman 1998:248). The BDP was a moderate party in contrast to the radicalism of the BPP. According to Stevens and Speed (1977:384), the BDP was conservative and more moderately anti-colonialist with its roots in the Bamangwato, but it also appealed more broadly across tribal boundaries. This won it the support of the colonial administration and the country¶s white and Indian community who gave financial support to the party (Rule 1995:21). Breytenbach (1977:24) points out that the BDP received the unqualified support of the colonial administration, including helping it to present its policies most favourably to the voters. The colonial authorities regarded it as a government in waiting even before the 1965 elections.

It came as no surprise when the BDP won the 1965 elections capturing 80,4 per cent of the votes and 31 seats. It controlled 90 per cent of the parliamentary seats. The other parties that contested the elections were the BPP and the BIP. Sir Seretse Khama became the Prime Minister of an independent Botswana when the country gained independence in 1966, with Masire as his deputy. The BDP has subsequently won all the elections held in the country since then and has retained its dominant position in parliament.

2.1.6 Benefit of Sir Seretse Khama¶s stature to the BDP

The trials and tribulations that Sir Seretse Khama endured were later to prove beneficial to the BDP. Makgala (2005:304) attributes the BDP¶s success to Sir Seretse Khama. He asserts that it was Sir Seretse Khama¶s ³pervasive chiefly mystique that helped greatly in wooing voters to the BDP in the 1965 general elections´. This magnetism continued beyond his death in 1980. Wiseman (1998:248) points out that as much as he had renounced his position, Sir Seretse Khama¶s traditional prestige remained unaffected as the ordinary Motswana still regarded him as their chief. However, the loss of his position was advantageous to him as he was no longer encumbered with the daily duties associated with the office of a chief. Also, this improved his profile outside his Bamangwato tribe as he was now accepted nationwide. Sir Seretse Khama was able to make common cause with the ordinary people after losing his chieftaincy. Like all other party members, Sir Seretse Khama was prepared to work hard when the party was formed by traversing large parts of the country, driving on its dirt roads to open new branches of the party and recruit support (Parsons, Henderson & Tlou 1995:217). He was in demand throughout the country with villagers asking that he should come and address them. His appearance at a village was enough to turn the whole village to Domkrag, as the BDP was called (Parsons, Henderson & Tlou 1995:217). Much as he obliged, it was almost impossible for him to reach all corners of the country. The villagers he met were surprised by his humility. He was prepared to shake hands, make jokes and dispute a point with them (Parsons, Henderson & Tlou 1995:217).

Khama possessed various qualities. He was both a chief and an intellectual who made common cause with the ordinary people. According to Wiseman (1998:248), Khama was a man of high intelligence, integrity and political skill, who was also humble. He was revered by the people of Botswana across tribal affiliations. Rule (1995:21) postulates the view that his royal lineage and prestige appealed widely to the traditionalist majority of the electorate. Parsons, Henderson and Tlou (1995:224) point out that through his traditional position of bogosi he was already invested with presidential qualities. It was a mere formality that he should become the president of the country.

Henderson (1990:37) lists the following points as Khama¶s contribution to the BDP¶s ascendancy to power:

‡ He was one of the few people in the country who was known across the territory. ‡ He had the commitment and the personal capacity to campaign in every region and the courage to go to places even where he was not welcome. ‡ He could appeal to the chiefs as an equal and although he did not campaign hard for their support, he did not go out to alienate them. ‡ Sir Seretse Khama had, apart from his appeal to traditionalists, a delightful personality that could inspire loyalty to him and his ideas.

2.1.7 Summary

The unusual circumstances and events that occurred in Botswana were not of a traumatic nature if compared to those that occurred in other African countries where political parties struggled to free their countries from colonial rule. However, unusual circumstances were also present in this arid territory. The placid Batswana people were traumatised by the events that resulted in Sir Seretse Khama giving up his traditional position: a marriage between a white and a black person was something unheard of in these parts of Africa. Moreover, in neighbouring South Africa this type of relationship was prohibited by legislation. That Sir Seretse Khama lost his position for this reason traumatised and embittered the Batswana people since they had approved of the marriage.

They demonstrated their disdain for this interference by voting for the BDP in order to return Khama to his rightful position as their chief. Sir Seretse Khama was highly respected and a rarity in Botswana in that he was a chief who had acquired a university education. In addition, he identified with the rural masses and his appearance in a village was enough to turn the whole population to the BDP. 30 The role of the colonial authorities in promoting the BDP should not be overlooked as they favoured the BDP over the other parties. During the constitutional talks prior to independence it was able to outwit the other two feuding parties. The BDP presented itself as a coherent and united party and was also ad idem with the colonial authorities on a number of issues. 2.2 The Indian National Congress (Congress) and the independence of India

2.2.1 Introduction

According to Robinson (1982:33), the Indian National Congress is one of the oldest political parties in the world. This organisation, which was founded in 1885, is closely linked to the birth of an independent India. In 1953, Jawaharlal Nehru, India¶s first Prime Minister, summed this up when he said, Congress is the Country, and the Country is Congress (Robinson 1982:33). The two were inextricably intertwined. Unlike other political parties, which are referred to by their acronyms, the Indian National Congress is simply called Congress. This is how the party will be referred to throughout this study.

India attained its independence from Britain in 1947, after a long and bitter struggle under the leadership of Congress, a mass-based strong nationalist movement. The victory of Congress was born from the party¶s leadership of the nationalist movement. At the forefront of the struggle for independence were two men who came to dominate the country¶s politics, Mahatma Gandhi and Nehru. They symbolised the struggle for the independence of the country. Congress dominated Indian politics from its formation through the period of independence (Candland 1997:21). 2.2.2 Formation of Congress

Congress was formed by the elites of Indian society. During the period of its formation there were an estimated 55 000 English-educated elites in India (Kochanek 1968:322). Vatsal (1982:155) points out that during the 19th century there was an increase in a Western-educated class in India. Congress membership consisted mainly of three groups: men from the business and commercial sectors, government servants and professionals such as lawyers, doctors and teachers (Kochanek 1968:322). This new elite was predominantly Hindu.

2.2.3 Acquiescent Congress

Congress was not formed with the intention of fighting for the independence of the country, indeed this was far from the minds of the people responsible for its formation. The party made no demands for independence, or even self- government. Candland (1997:19) points out that Congress was founded to petition the British government in India for administrative and political reform. Vatsal (1982:155) states that Congress did not make any radical demands on the colonial authorities, it simply made a moderate demand for the reform of government policy. Deol (1980:185) expresses the opinion that Congress was a pressure group, rather than a party.

The people who formed Congress had no quarrel with His Majesty as evidenced by the fact that the organisation invited officials from the colonial administration to its meetings. At these meetings, a banner reading ³God save the Queen- Empress´ was usually draped on the walls of the hall and a Union Jack was placed next to the podium (Robinson 1982:34). Congress was an organisation that held the British in high regard, as can be seen by this comment made by one of the Congress delegates (Kochanek 1968: 323): Gentlemen, had it not been for English education and Western civilisation, persons inhabiting different parts of this vast country, ... would not have this day met together in this Hall to interchange thoughts, give expression to their common grievances and aspirations, and discuss in a most constitutional manner the means for redressing those grievances and aspirations.

At this stage Congress could not be said to have been a revolutionary organisation, which it later became. It made very modest demands on the British rulers. According to Robinson (1982:33), Congress was formed to discuss matters of national interest which impacted on the Indian community and appealed for the following:

‡ greater representation on the legislative council that the British were developing ‡ an opportunity to win top jobs in the bureaucracy ‡ to reduce the subordination of the Indian economy to that of the British ‡ for the Indians to be treated with respect

2.2.4 Gandhi and the nationalist movement

Congress continued to be an acquiescent organisation up until 1908 when it shifted its emphasis slightly. The 1908 constitution declared its aim to be the attainment by the people of India of a system of government similar to that enjoyed by the self-governing members of the British Empire (Robinson 1982:33). From being an acquiescent organisation, Congress subsequently became more assertive, as well as becoming a mass organisation after a successful recruitment campaign. From being an organisation of the elite, it opened its membership to every person who was prepared to pay its minimal membership fee (Robinson 1982:34). Owing to its extensive recruitment drive, the organisation received support from the rural areas and people from the lower income groups. Along with this recruitment drive there was a shift in the organisation¶s emphasis. The focus of the organisation changed as it started talking about the possibility of the country attaining independence (Robinson 1982:36). According to Kochanek (1968:330), the force behind this recruitment drive and the new boldness displayed by Congress was Gandhi. Gandhi was a trained lawyer who had returned to India from South Africa where he had participated in passive resistance movements against the government¶s legislation which discriminated against the Indian people (Vatsal 1982:177). On his arrival from South Africa, Gandhi joined the struggle to attain independence for India. He later proved to be a thorn in the flesh of the British because of the methods he used to drive his message across. He took the fight to the British colonial administration which reacted with force in order to quell it. This resulted in the nationalist movement suffering many casualties.

Gandhi added a new dimension to Congress in 1919 with the introduction of nonviolent, noncooperative action which was used to challenge British dominance. This method of resistance was called Satyagraha, which called upon those involved in civil disobedience not to retaliate against the brutality of the police and to be prepared to go to jail with pride and without offering any resistance. Gandhi said if their opponents resorted to violence it had to be borne cheerfully as a form of purification (Robinson 1982:34).

Gandhi used various methods to defy the British and mobilise the Indian people. He organised demonstrations and marches throughout the country, went on hunger strikes and exhorted the Indian people to defy the unjust laws of the British even if they had to go to jail. Gandhi himself was jailed on numerous occasions for organising protest action against the British. This, according to Hardgrave Jr (1980:33), gained him honour among his people. This strategy of nonviolence and noncooperation was used to mobilise the masses to join the organisation. Civil disobedience and passive resistance campaigns attracted thousands of Indians: a large and diverse membership that changed the composition of the organisation (Kochanek 1968:330). Congress adopted a resolution on noncooperation, which was to include the renunciation of government titles and the boycotting of elections under the 1919 Act, the law courts and government schools and colleges (Vatsal 1982:182). It also called for a boycott and withdrawal from colonial institutions, with the result that many lawyers and teachers resigned (Kochanek 1968:331). Gandhi toured parts of India to give encouragement to those taking part in the campaigns and when he was arrested in 1930 during one of the campaigns, demonstrations broke out in every major city in the country (Kochanek 1968:332).

The demonstrations organised by Gandhi took a heavy toll on those who took part in them, as the authorities acted with brutality in order to put them down, which resulted in a high number of casualties. In one such protest demonstration, 100 people were killed and 60 000 imprisoned. When Gandhi launched the Quit India protest in 1942, threatening to launch a massive civil disobedience campaign if the British did not heed his demand, violence erupted, and police fire resulted in the deaths of 1000 people. At the same time the authorities arrested 100 000 people, including the leadership of Congress who were later banned (Hardgrave Jr 1980:39).

Gandhi played a major role in the struggle for Indian independence. He was revered in the country as evidenced by this tribute to him by an unidentified member of the party who said: ³no man did more than Gandhi to achieve the freedom of India and the end of British rule.´ But Gandhi did more than that. He restored India¶s hope and self-confidence. For years, the British had been telling Indians that they were cowards and a weak and ineffectual race, destined to be ruled by more superior people (Vatsal 1982:190). Gandhi did not live to see the independence of his country that he had worked tirelessly to free as he was killed in 1947. Hardgrave Jr (1980:42) writes the following about Gandhi¶s contribution to India¶s struggle for independence:

Gandhi had served to mobilise widespread support for the Congress struggle for independence, and if he did not hasten its arrival, he nevertheless imbued the movement with moral concern and stirred the conscience of the world. By making the Congress a more representative organisation, Gandhi fundamentally changed the character of the nationalist struggle for independence.

2.2.5 Nehru and the independence of India

Nehru, a lawyer by training from a wealthy background, was a disciple of Gandhi. Under Gandhi¶s tutelage, Nehru played an important role in organising Congress as well as in leading it in the fight against British colonialism. Nehru gave up a life of comfort and luxury to fulfil the mission of his life, which was gaining independence for his people. This greatly inspired the Indian masses (Hardgrave Jr 1980: 43)

Candland (1997:3) avers that under the leadership of Nehru, Congress commanded tremendous organisational capacity, relying on local, state and national level Congress committees. It established vast networks stretching across the country. Nehru served as Secretary-General of Congress, and it was through his efforts that it became a mass movement since he organised branches throughout the country. During his long tenure in this position, he organised the party¶s infrastructure. During the 1937 and 1946 provincial elections, he galvanised the masses to join and vote for Congress, with the result that Congress emerged victorious from both these elections (Candland 1997:22). Edwardes (1971:27) points out that during the 1936 elections, he covered more than 50 000 miles carrying the message of Congress to literally millions of voters and nonvoters alike. He states that by the end of the campaign there was no doubt that Nehru was the true and unenviable heir of Gandhi.

Patil (1977:270) concurs, stating that Nehru was the most important personality in India during the period of the struggle for independence. He was at the centre of every important issue, giving direction and guidance. Patil (1977:272) points out that Nehru was influenced by Gandhian thought. He argues that Nehru found in Gandhi not only a man of action, but also one who practised with passion what he preached with conviction. As a true disciple, Nehru took part in the campaigns initiated by Gandhi. Nehru was one of the lawyers who abandoned their legal practices during the 1920-1922 noncooperation movement. Nehru played a leading role in Congress activities. Between 1923 and 1939, he held the office of President three times. Nehru was dedicated to his mission of winning independence for India (Patil 1977:272). Vatsal (1982:208) postulates the view that by 1945 his popularity as a leader in Indian politics could only be surpassed by that of Gandhi. Under his leadership, Congress flourished and became a strong organisation.

In 1947, India was partitioned into India and Pakistan. In India, Congress was in charge of the colonial parliament and on independence automatically became the government of the new state, with Nehru as Prime Minister and Lord Mountbatten as the Governor-General. Congress took over the leadership of the new state in 1947 without elections having been held. Weiner (1957:13) attributes this to the fact that the parties that existed during this period were largely political groupings within Congress functioning in a common cause as part of the nationalist movement. The first parliamentary elections were only held in 1952 and were won by Congress with 45,0 per cent of the votes and 357 of the 489 parliamentary seats, that is, 74 per cent of the parliamentary seats (Weiner 1957:20). Congress continued to rule the centre and in most Indian states from this election until the sixth general election in March 1977 (Candland 1997:21). 2.2.6 Congress and the partitioning of India

India¶s independence exacted a high price for the country owing to the rivalry between Congress and the Muslim League. The antagonism between the two organisations resulted in the country being partitioned, giving rise to the new state of Pakistan. Thousands of people were killed and injured, while an equal number was left homeless, becoming refugees in their own country.

The Muslim League was formed in 1906. As the name suggests, it had a predominantly Muslim membership while Congress had a diverse membership. However, the Muslim League perceived Congress as a Hindu organisation. From the outset, the Muslim League harboured suspicions against Congress. It resented claims by Congress that it was representative of all the population groups in India (Vatsal 1982:197) and was afraid of what it saw as Hindu domination of India, as it wanted to protect the rights of Muslims.

In 1946, the suspicions that the Muslim League harboured against Congress were aggravated when Nehru said there were only two forces in India ņ British imperialism and Congress (Hardgrave Jr 1980:37). This did not go down well with the leader of the Muslim League, Jinnah, who stated that there was a third force representing the Muslims. Congress refused to recognise the League as the sole representative of the Muslim community. Jinnah argued further that there were two nations in India ņ the Muslims and the Hindus.

Under the leadership of Jinnah, who according to Park and de Mesquita (1979:32) made a meteoric rise, the League agitated for the partitioning of India into two states. Jinnah was embittered against Congress and said he was praying for the day of deliverance from the tyranny, oppression and injustice of Congress rule (Hardgrave Jr 1980:38). It is worth noting that Gandhi and Congress were opposed to the partitioning of India. According to Hardgrave Jr (1980:40), Gandhi was prepared to see India burn rather than concede to partitioning.

Relations between the two remained strained as they both fought for the independence of their country. The decision by Britain in 1946 to grant the country independence fanned the flames between the two organisations. An interim government was formed in 1946 and the two organisations were invited to be part of this government. The Muslim League initially refused to be part of it, but later realised that this would give the advantage to Congress. It then changed its decision and accepted the invitation to serve on it. However, this was only to prove the point that Muslims and Hindus could not work in harmony and the solution was for the two to go their separate ways. The Muslim League was an obstructionist force in the interim government (Hardgrave Jr 1980:40).

The violence that erupted in India started in 1946 when the Muslim League demanded the partitioning of India. This resulted in widespread carnage marked by rioting and the massacre of thousands of Hindus and Muslims. According to Park and de Mesquita (1979:32), from 1946 to 1950 12 million people from both groups left their ancestral homes migrating to the newly independent states. Patil (1977:175) observes that in a fit of religious frenzy and hatred people were slaying one another on a scale unmatched and unequalled in the annals of fratricidal clash. It was nothing short of armed warfare.

Amidst the tension and fighting, Congress reluctantly conceded to the separation of India leading to the birth of Pakistan. Britain granted independence to both states with Pakistan also attaining its independence in 1947. The partition of India into two states did not resolve the enmity between the two groups. Since then they have been at loggerheads and war has broken out on a number of occasions.

2.2.7 Summary

The independence of India followed a long, bitter and tragic struggle led by Congress. Independence was won with serious consequences for the country, as it resulted in the separation of India and the birth of Pakistan after fratricidal violence which resulted in thousands of people losing their lives. The independence of India cannot be seen in isolation from the leadership of Congress by Gandhi and Nehru. The country¶s independence was born out of a struggle which was led by the two lawyers, who were at the helm of the nationalist movement.

Gandhi initiated campaigns against British colonial rule such as civil disobedience, noncooperation with the authorities, protest marches and demonstrations. These campaigns served to mobilise the Indian masses to join Congress, resulting in it becoming a mass movement and not just a mere elitist organisation of the educated middle-class. While Gandhi was responsible for turning Congress into a mass organisation, Nehru improved its organisational structures making its operations run smoothly. However, much as Nehru was a disciple of Gandhi, he was also an astute and respected leader in his own right. These two leaders are remembered in India long after their deaths for the role they played in liberating the country from foreign rule.

2.3 Mapai and the formation of the State of Israel

2.3.1 Introduction

The formation of the state of Israel in 1949 was preceded by tumultuous and violent events which left Jews uncertain of their future. From 1904 to 1914 between 35 000 and 40 000 Jews left Russia to seek a better life in what they referred to as the promised land (Medding 1972:7). According to Shalev (1990:89), these newcomers were ³self-styled pioneers who saw their move both as a means of personal redemption and as part of a political project to defend and normalise the Jews as a nation by resettling them on their own historic territory, ultimately as a politically autonomous entity´.

2.3.2 Formation of Mapai

The formation of Mapai in 1930 is closely associated with the struggle to establish the state of Israel in 1948. It was preceded by the immigration of thousands of Jews to Palestine at the turn of the 20th century and continued well into the 1940s. The persecution of Jews by Hitler and the growing anti-Semitism in Europe caused a rush of immigration between 1945 and 1948. The immigrants moved to Palestine in a quest to build a nation state of their own (Shalev 1990:89).

While involved in the struggle to establish their own state, the Jews formed structures and organised society in the disputed territory. This was the forerunner to the establishment of a fully-fledged political system. Political parties and various organisations were formed in order to cater for the interests of the new arrivals. Medding (1972:9) points out that the parties competed strenuously for converts and for the soul of unaffiliated immigrants. Mapai was established in 1930 as a Zionist socialist party and served as the dominant political party in the pre-statehood years.

2.3.3 Emergence of conflict between Arabs and Jews

The Jews did not receive a warm welcome at the area where they intended to settle as a politically autonomous entity. They encountered problems as Palestine, the area where they settled, was already inhabited by Arabs who did not take kindly to their intention to form a state on their land. The Arabs regarded Palestine as their own territory, which resulted in frequent clashes between the two groups throughout the 1920s and 1930s (Katz 1980:7). Despite this, the number of Jews in Palestine increased in the 1940s as more fled from Europe.

The Arabs had a strong ally in Britain, which was also not in favour of a Jewish settlement in Palestine. After World War I, when Palestine was made a British mandate, the immigration of Jews to this area became problematic because Britain blocked and intercepted shiploads of Jews fleeing from Europe. In response, the Jews formed organisations which assisted in the smuggling of immigrants into Palestine (Arian 1985:17). This was done at great risk as the ships loaded with their human cargo were frequently intercepted by Britain. David Ben-Gurion, who was to be the first Prime Minister of an independent Israel, was involved in the operation of assisting immigrants fleeing to Palestine. He was later arrested by the British for his efforts.

During this period the hostility of the Arabs towards the Jews continued and there was sporadic fighting in the area. The Arabs were steadfast in their resolve not to allow the establishment of a Jewish state in their territory. Concerned by this dispute, the United Nations intervened by setting up a commission to try and resolve it. The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine 181 (UNSCP), which was established in 1947, made a recommendation that the area should be separated into independent Arab and Jewish territories (Katz 1980:15). While the Jews accepted the recommendation of the Committee, the Arabs rejected it and threatened military action. The United Nations resolution which declared Israel an independent state was passed on 31 August 1947.

Soon after the rejection of the recommendation, Arab nations launched an offensive against the Jews who repulsed the threat and emerged victorious. This served to give the Jews a moral boost in forming their own state. According to Katz (1980:15), Israel¶s victory surprised the whole world as the Jews were a small nation, poorly equipped and with limited resources. The Jewish state was subsequently declared on 14 May 1948. It needs to be mentioned here that the fighting between the Jews and the Arabs has continued unabated even up to the present century, increasing in its ferocity. Numerous peace efforts have failed to end the hostilities between the two groups.

2.3.4 Mapai and the leadership of Israel

Mapai was one of the biggest parties formed during the pre-statehood period, and assumed the leadership of the immigrant Jews. It became a political force to be reckoned with, as it gained experience in how to wield and exercise power in administrative and political situations (Medding 1972:9). One of the first leaders of the party was Ben-Gurion whose name is associated with the founding of the state of Israel. He fought in battles against the British and the Arabs, becoming a legend in Israel. Mapai was for a long time credited with being instrumental in the founding of the state of Israel. Medding (1972:10) reveals that by 1935 Mapai was leading all the main bodies of Palestinian Jews. It welded the Jews together and elicited an important degree of coordination and unity. The party regarded itself as the vanguard of the Jewish renaissance in Palestine.

2.3.5 Histadrut and Mapai

Histadrut, the central labour organisation formed in the late 1920s, played a vital role in the rise to power of Mapai. Through Histadrut, Mapai was able to dispense patronage to new arrivals by offering wage earners access to employment and vital services. Mapai used Histadrut to attract the growing number of politically uncommitted workers by offering them social provisions (Shalev 1990:91). This gave Mapai an advantage over the other parties, and it came as no surprise when the party won the country¶s first elections in 1949. Mapai won 38 per cent of the vote, acquiring 46 of the 120 seats in the new parliament known as the Knesset. This amounted to 38 per cent of the parliamentary seats (Zohar 1974:20). Since it did not have a plurality of the votes, it was forced to invite other parties to join it in forming a government. While Herut, the right-wing party led by Menachem Begin, refused to join Mapai, the Separatists, Religious Front and Progressive Party joined to form a coalition government. As the leader of Mapai, Ben-Gurion became the first Prime Minister of Israel.

2.3.6 Ben-Gurion and the founding of the state of Israel

David Ben-Gurion is among the welll-known Israelis, being credited with having played a pivotal role in the establishment of the Jewish state. Ben-Gurion, who arrived in Palestine in 1906, played a leading role in the establishment of various organisations during the pre-statehood era. He was involved in the formation of the first agricultural workers¶ commune as well as the economic development of Israel. He was a founder member of the labour federation, Histadrut, becoming its first General Secretary in 1920.

When Britain blocked the immigration of Jews to Israel, Ben-Gurion was part of the organisation that smuggled them into Palestine. He was also part of a group that organised resistance to the British during the mandate and was at the helm of the pioneering Jews and the forefront of the battles against the British and the Arabs. He procured weapons in preparation for war. Arian (1985:18) postulates the view that Ben-Gurion¶s political wisdom in navigating these difficult times raised him to a peak of popularity and acceptance both in Israel and abroad. It was Ben-Gurion who declared the state of Israel and became its first Prime Minister in 1949. He served as Prime Minister from 1948 to 1953 and again from 1955 to 1963.

2.3.7 Summary

The state of Israel was born amidst violent conflict between the Arabs and the Jews. The Arabs, who were opposed to the establishment of a Jewish state in an area that they considered to be their home, committed themselves to fighting the Jewish people in order to prevent them from forming their own state. The Jewish people had to contend with an unsympathetic Britain which was favourably disposed towards the Arabs, forcing the Jews to fight on two fronts. The intervention of the United Nations made it possible for the Jewish people to establish their own state in the disputed territory. However, this did not end the hostilities between the two groups. In the forefront of these battles was Ben- Gurion who, according to Medding (1990:211), had a decisive impact on the establishment and functioning of the political structures.

2.4 Catholicism and the rise to power of the Christian Democratic Party (DC)

2.4.1 Introduction

The Christian Democratic Party, which is referred to in Italian as Democrazia Cristiana (DC), was among various organisations that formed the Resistance Movement which fought against Fascism during World War II. At the end of the war, Italy was a devastated, tired and leaderless country. The DC together with the Communist Party and the Socialist Party were the only organisations that survived the war, even though they were all weak and could not form a government on their own (Sassoon 1986:4).

These three parties formed a coalition government that ruled the country from 1943 until 1948, when the first parliamentary elections were held. These elections, which were won by the DC, marked the beginning of the party¶s dominance of Italian politics (Spotts & Wieser 1986:17). The DC maintained its dominance of Italian politics through a coalition of parties and never ruled on its own for over four decades (Spotts & Wieser 1986:20). The rise to power of the DC can be ascribed to the defeat of Fascism, World War II, the support it received from the Catholic Church and the backing of the United States. These issues are treated in detail in the sections that follow.

2.4.2 Formation of the DC

The DC was a successor to the Italian Popular Party (PPI) which was formed in 1919. During the last years of the Fascist regime, many former PPI leaders came forward to resurrect the party under a new name ņ Christian Democratic Party. The DC was formed by veterans from the pre-Fascist era, Catholic trade unionists and young leaders of Catholic professional organisations (Spotts & Wieser 1986:21).

Leonardi and Wertman (1989:21) state that « at its origin, Christian Democracy was a hybrid mix of old and new forms of Catholic political thinking, and from an organisational point of view it was a mosaic of the different Catholic groups which had developed a political outlook prior to and immediately after the fall of Benito Mussolini¶s government in 1943.

2.4.3 Fascism and World War II

The rise to power of the DC is due to two events, which are closely related. These are the rise of Fascism and the outbreak of World War II, which gave rise to the emergence of the Cold War. The alliance of Mussolini with Nazi Germany dragged Italy into the war, which at its conclusion left Italy in ruins. Fascism, which is associated with Mussolini, who is among the world¶s best known dictators, shaped the future political events of Italy. Italy¶s political system after the war rose from the ashes of Fascism which had been a traumatic experience for the country. It is therefore imperative to discuss the rise of Fascism and its effects on the politics of postwar Italy.

The Fascists¶ rise to power in 1922 plunged the country into a crisis. Their rise was due to the state of paralysis that the ruling Liberty Party found itself in. This party was experiencing a legitimacy crisis as it was unable to govern the country (Sassoon 1986:2): chaos and confusion reigned supreme. The country was also faced with serious economic problems. The population was restless and there were incidences of labour unrest (Sassoon 1986:2). The National Fascist Party, which was involved in extraparliamentary right-wing violence, took advantage of this situation to urge for power to be ceded to it. This was done in 1922 and Mussolini became the leader of Italy (Sassoon 1986:3).

Mussolini¶s ascendancy to power marked the end of the country¶s democratic political system. Italy became an authoritarian state with parliament being reduced to the role of a consultative assembly (Salvadori 1965:135). Government was concentrated in the hands of the duce, the leader of Fascism and head of government who was only responsible to the king (Salvadori 1965:134). Political parties ceased to operate with the Communist Party going underground. Civil liberties were eroded as the Fascist government placed a ban on newspapers, political parties and the holding of meetings. Those people who voiced opposition to Fascist rule were either arrested or killed (De Grand 1995:28).

The Italians developed a love-hate relationship with the Fascists. From initially being hostile to them, they gave them their grudging support and later changed and mounted resistance against Fascist rule. Sassoon (1986:3) argues that Fascism was able to obtain the passive consent of large sections of the Italian people. It did this through a mixture of repression, coercion, indoctrination and bribery. By 1938, Fascism had achieved popularity among the intellectuals, with even the Catholic Church supporting it (De Grand 1995:30).

The Fascists cultivated the support of society not only by using coercion, but also through their achievements in the economic sphere. Under Fascist rule, the country was stabilised and the economy started performing better. The Fascists prided themselves on their economic achievements, which they attributed to the superiority of corporatism over capitalism and collectivism (Salvadori 1965:137).

2.4.4 Demise of Fascist rule

The demise of Fascism was precipitated by the alliance which Mussolini entered into with another dictator, Hitler of Nazi Germany, at the start of World War II. Italy was dragged into the war when it followed Germany¶s expansionist desires and also invaded a number of European countries. While Germany was strong and encountered no problems in its expansionist designs, the Italian army was not equal to the task. It had to be rescued on a number of occasions by Germany when it could not extricate itself from difficult situations (Salvadori 1965:144). As the war progressed, the Italian army suffered several losses which, when reported back home after an initial news blackout, inspired the masses to resist Fascism (Salvadori 1965:144). The younger members of the intelligentsia, who had previously given Fascism their support, turned against it. This led to the birth of a Resistance Movement which pitted itself against the fascists (Sassoon 1986:4). The Resistance Movement aligned itself with the Allied Forces which were fighting both the Germans and the Fascists. With the Allied Forces gaining the upper hand in 1944, with spectacular victories over the Germans and the Italian Fascists, Fascism became weakened and eventually disintegrated. Salvadori (1965:150) tells us that officials holding senior positions in the Fascist government went into hiding, while public services stopped functioning. Soldiers and officials deserted their positions and the country descended into chaos and confusion with no government. In 1943, Mussolini was arrested and deposed as the leader of the country (Mignone 1995:7).

The successor government to Mussolini declared war on Germany leading to confusion among its soldiers. The army became divided as some soldiers joined forces with the Germans, while others joined the Allied Forces (Mignone 1995:7). Instead of peace reigning in Italy, the country became a scene of two wars between various forces. The first war was between the Allies and the Germans, and the second between Italians who were against Fascism, and the Germans and Fascist supporters (Salvadori 1965:150). Both the civil war and the war between the Allies and the Germans and Fascists ended in 1945. Italy paid dearly for the civil war as thousands of its citizens were killed. Between a quarter of the nation¶s wealth had been destroyed. Salvadori (1965:151) points out that out of this crisis emerged a new political system, which was fashioned after the defeat of Fascism.

2.4.5 Emergence of the Resistance Movement The Resistance Movement started spontaneously in 1943 at the height of Fascism and World War II. Mignone (1995:7) states that the Resistance Movement involved all sectors of the Italian community. It included the poor and wealthy, young and old, men, women and children, professionals and labourers, communists, socialists and Christians. However, at the forefront of the Resistance Movement were three political parties, the Christian Democrats, the Socialists and the Communists. This movement was not led by any particular leader, but engaged both the Italian army and the Nazis. It also proved helpful to the Allies as it provided them with important information about Mussolini¶s army. The resistance to Fascism and Nazism was costly to the Italians as 55 000 of them lost their lives and 20 000 were badly wounded (Mignone 1995:8).

2.4.6 The Catholic Church, communism and the DC¶s ascension to power

In 1946, a coalition of the three parties ņ the Christian Democratic Party (DC), the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) ņ which had fought Fascism was formed to govern Italy until free elections were held (Sassoon 1986:4). On 2 June 1946, a referendum was held and the Italians voted for a republican form of government. The DC continued to rule with the coalition until 1947 when it expelled the Communist and Socialist Parties from the government with the encouragement of the United States, as it was wary that communism would gain a foothold in Western Europe.

The DC¶s victory in the 1946 referendum and the 1948 elections was made possible by the support it received from the Catholic Church (Spotts & Wieser 1986:22). The Catholics form the biggest and most influential socioeconomic bloc in Italy. Since the communists were still a strong force in Italian politics, the Catholic Church was apprehensive about a drift towards the left, hence its support for the DC. In both elections, the Vatican, the clergy and Catholic laymen¶s associations conducted a political crusade on behalf of the DC (Spotts & Wieser 1986:22). The DC fully exploited the fear of communism, portraying itself as the champion of liberty, fighting for the preservation of Western civilisation (Clark 1996:324).

The 1948 elections were held soon after the start of the Cold War, with Europe divided into East and West. The West was aligned to democracy and capitalism while the East espoused communism and one-party rule. The West, led by the United States, was wary of the Soviet Union gaining a foothold in Western Europe after it had installed communist regimes in Eastern Europe. Italy was seen as being in danger of falling into the ambit of the Soviet Union since it had a strong Communist Party, which had emerged with credibility after its pivotal role during the Resistance. Italy was seen as a buffer state between the West and East. To get Italy into the ambit of the West, the United States initiated the Marshall Plan, whereby countries whose economies were destroyed during the war were given financial and military aid.

The US, which was wary of Soviet intentions in Europe after the war, also gave its support to the DC. It assisted devastated Italy financially and materially in exchange for a guarantee from the DC that Italy would remain a loyal and devoted ally of the West and that it would not pursue an independent foreign policy (Sassoon 1986:226). Although the DC obtained 48,5 per cent of the vote and 305 seats in the 1948 elections, it elected to rule with other parties. The DC controlled 48 per cent of the parliamentary seats. Following these elections the DC ruled Italy for four decades with the assistance of a coalition of smaller partners drawn from the Centre, Liberal, Republican and Social Democratic parties (Sassoon 1986:8). It was reluctant to invite the communists and socialists to join it in forming a coalition government. When the war ended the DC had an advantage over the other parties as it was supported by the powerful Catholic Church. The church had a strong influence over the party when it surfaced after the war. Most of the catholic congregants found a political home in the DC. According to Tannenbaum & Noether (1974: 89) the credo of the party found ready acceptance among the Italian people as the war came to a close because of its appealing blend of tradition and modernity. The two authors point out that ³once again Italy had a mass party that was interclass in composition as peasants, trade unionists, industrialists, large and small landowners, fervent Catholics, and nominal Catholics flocked to the standard of Christian Democracy.´

Sassoon (1986:7) points out the following five factors as having aided the DC¶s ascent to power:

‡ Firstly, it was the heir to the tradition of the Popular Party, the largest peasant-based party which was created in 1919. ‡ Secondly, it could use the vast machine of Catholic societies and organisations that had been allowed to operate under Fascism.

‡ Thirdly, it was able to rely on the support of the Church from the Pope and bishops to the village priests and mass lay organisations.

‡ Fourthly, the weakness of the old Liberal Party, the nearest equivalent to a clearly procapitalist party, meant that the DC soon became the obvious choice of industrialists.

‡ Fifthly , the DC was the only party on which the United States could rely to take Italy into the North Atlantic Alliance and to anchor it definitively in the Western Camp.

2.4.7 De Gasperi and the birth of a new political order in Italy

De Gasperi is recognised as the moving force behind the birth of the DC. When Fascism ended open political activity in 1922, De Gasperi was fortunate not to suffer the fate that befell some of Italy¶s politicians. Politicians who were not lucky enough to escape when Mussolini ascended to power were either killed, jailed or forced to flee into exile. De Gasperi escaped the attention of Mussolini and throughout the Fascist period worked as a librarian in the Vatican (Leonardi & Wertman 1989:24). From the sanctuary of the Vatican, De Gasperi was able to communicate with the remnants of the PPI towards the end of the war. He wrote many documents in which he outlined his thoughts about the future political party and political system for Italy. His writings were distributed among his former colleagues and other Catholic political leaders (Leonardi & Wertman 1989:24). De Gasperi¶s writings set out his basic ideas on the ideology, organisation and goals that were to enlighten party activity during the Resistance and in the postwar period. When he surfaced at the end of Fascism, De Gasperi was accepted as the unchallenged leader of the DC. He recruited to the party former members of the PPI. De Gasperi showed his genius when he steered the party through the difficult period when the Catholic church wanted to control it. He insisted on the independence of the party resisting the incursion of the church (Sassoon 1986:22). He was responsible for fusing together Catholicism and liberal democracy. It was De Gasperi who brought together into the party diverse organisations and individuals. De Gasperi also focused his attention on the future state of Italy. He foresaw the creation of a new political system based on universal suffrage, equal rights and freedom for the organisation of social and religious institutions (Leornadi & Wertman 1989:26).

2.4.8 Summary

Italy¶s post-World War I fragile democratic political system was brought to an end by the ascendancy to power of Mussolini, when open political activity was prohibited. The Italians had to bear the brunt of Mussolini¶s authoritarianism. However, Fascist rule brought some improvements to the lives of Italians, hence opposition to it was not widespread. Mussolini¶s decision to join forces with Hitler¶s Nazi regime plunged Italy into a catastrophe, however. The involvement of Italy in World War II all but destroyed the country which was pounded by the Nazis and the Allied forces. From the ruins of the country and the disastrous effects of World War II, a new political system was born and the DC formed the first postwar government.

However, the DC cannot claim that it played a more important role than the other parties in the fight to oust Mussolini and his Fascist government as, in reality, the party played a far lesser role than the Communist Party. It was the support that the party received from the Catholic Church and the anti-communist emotions which manifested themselves at the end of the war that resulted in the party¶s victory in 1948. De Gasperi was instrumental in resuscitating the PPI as the DC and fashioning its ideology and that of the Italian state. 2.5 The Social Democratic Party (SDP) and Sweden¶s political and economic problems

2.5.1 Introduction

Sweden¶s parliamentary democracy, which developed during the first decade of the 20th century, was preceded by a struggle to extend universal suffrage to all the people of the country. In 1907, a voting reform was signed and the universal right to vote gained legal force. However, the right to vote was reserved for men only on the basis of personal qualifications. Women were only allowed to vote in 1921. The formation of political parties took place during this period of struggle to obtain universal franchise. The three principal parties that were formed were the Social Democrats, the Liberals and the Conservatives.

2.5.2 Formation of the SDP

The SDP is Sweden¶s oldest party and was founded in 1889. Hancock (1972:112) points out that from its inception it was a mass-based collectivist movement dedicated to the radical transformation of Sweden¶s socioeconomic and political system. Most of the founder members of the party were steeped in socialist ideology. Hancock (1966:32) maintains that the socialist rise to power was due to the economic depression which affected Sweden and most parts of the world at the end of World War I and the support it received from the labour movement.

2.5.3 The SDP and the labour movement

A strong labour movement emerged in Sweden towards the end of the 19th century (Board 1970:45). The relationship between the SDP and the labour movement was forged soon after the party was formed in 1889. This came about when the party encouraged workers and other labourers to form trade unions and local social democratic organisations. The outcome of this was the formation of trade unions which later formed a central labour organisation, the Swedish Trade Union Confederation known by its Swedish abbreviation, LO which stands for Landsorginasationen (Hadenius 1999:18).

On its formation the LO required its members to join the SDP. However, some unions were uncomfortable with the instruction which was referred to as force rule and resulted in them not joining the party. Because of this strong opposition, this instruction was later dropped (Scott 1977:434). Scott (1977) points out that the relationship between the labour movement and the SDP has been intimate from their beginnings.

The relationship between the LO and the SDP was made stronger by the fact that they shared the same goals. Board (1970:44) points out that in its constitution the LO said it aimed to move towards the development of a social order based on political, social and economic democracy. These sentiments were also espoused by the SDP. The Swedish socialists claimed they wanted a new society, a new system and a new organisation of economic life (Hancock 1966:17). During the 1920s, the number of affiliated LO unions rapidly increased. This was because of an increase in the number of working class people as a result of industrialisation and commerce. This situation created a favourable climate for the development of a mass political movement supported by labour.

2.5.4 Sweden¶s economic crisis and the SDP¶s election victory in 1932

The problems that Sweden experienced at the end of World War I were an important factor in the party¶s 1932 election victory. Before the elections, the country was faced with a political crisis as the government was weak and unable to make decisions. There was parliamentary instability and decisions were made in select committees. These decisions were compromises between different parties (Hadenius 1999:40), which resulted in the formation of nine different governments between 1920 and 1933. Like all countries throughout the world, Sweden suffered greatly as a result of the Great Depression, which exacerbated the country¶s economic problems and led to a rise in unemployment. To compound this economic crisis, employers effected wage cuts, which gave rise to protests by those people who were fortunate enough to have jobs. The labour unrest that broke out necessitated the intervention of the police as there was confrontation between striking and nonstriking workers. The SDP and the communists took part in the strikes in support of the workers (Hadenius 1999:43). This led to a confrontation with the soldiers who were called in to restore order.

During a confrontation between the striking workers and the troops in 1931, ten people were shot, five of whom died. The SDP criticised the action of the troops, whom they called the long arm of the ruling class. The party took advantage of this tragic incident to launch its campaign against the capitalist system, calling for its abolishment (Scott 1977:489). The violence and loss of life alarmed the Swedish people who were not used to violence during labour disputes. This incident served to polarise labour and the general population , which was to the advantage of the SDP and its ally, the LO (Scott 1977:489).

Faced with an economic and unemployment problem, there was a need for a brave solution and for leadership to halt the deteriorating situation in the country. In order to address the unemployment problems, the SDP formulated a new policy, the New Unemployment Policy (NUP). This new policy was inclined towards socialism which was the dominant issue during this period. Hadenius (1999:40) avers that the SDP was ambivalent about how it intended to rescue the country from its economic problems, despite having published a socialist-oriented policy document. It was vague on how it would implement socialism if elected to power. However, it took its policy to the electorate during its campaign for the 1932 election.

The SDP policy did not clearly spell out its programme of action. It nevertheless criticised the government¶s economic policy adding that what was needed to be done was to provide the unemployed with meaningful jobs and to pay them market-related wages. This had nothing to do with socialism. The SDP won the election by capturing 41 per cent of the vote and 104 seats, while the combined percentage of the bourgeoisie parties, comprising the Centre, the Liberal and the Moderate Unity Parties, was 49 per cent. However, the SDP failed to gain a parliamentary majority, even though it controlled 45 per cent of the parliamentary seats.

The domination of Swedish politics by the SDP started in 1932 when it was asked by the king to form a government even though it had not won the elections with a clear majority of votes (Andren 1961:249). After consultation with the Speaker and party leaders, the king invited the SDP to form a government. This was after he realised that it was impossible for the bourgeoisie parties to form a coalition government (Andren 1961:249). After forming a government, the SDP encountered problems in parliament as it did not have a majority to enable it to implement its programmes for restoring employment and introducing long-delayed welfare state reforms. To make this possible, it reached an agreement with the Farmers Party in 1933 (Esping- Andersen 1990:41). The Farmers Party was an unlikely ally as it was opposed to the SDP¶s socialist inclinations. In order to obtain the support of the Farmers Party, the SDP agreed to a comprehensive reform package, including extensive state support for the crisis-ridden agricultural sector, to fight the crisis.

2.5.5 Summary

Faced with a weak government at the turn of the 20th century, Sweden¶s problems were further exacerbated by the Great Depression which affected the entire world. This period was marked by political instability. However, the most serious problem that faced the country was unemployment and an economic crisis, which was a result of the Great Depression. Various suggestions were made for solving the problems facing the country, but no effective solution could be found.

While a solution was being sought to bring order and stability to the country, industrial unrest broke out when workers, who were dissatisfied with their salaries, staged demonstrations. Troops were called in with tragic consequences when ten people were shot, five of whom died. This tragic event played into the hands of the SDP, who used it to denounce the country¶s capitalist system and call for its replacement. Simultaneously, the SDP prepared a New Unemployment Policy (UP) which it hoped would solve the country¶s unemployment problem. The SDP presented the UP to the voters when campaigning for the 1932 elections which it subsequently won. However, it is important to note that the SDP¶s victory could not have been possible had it not been for the support of the labour federation, LO, one of its strongest allies. For the SDP to be able to rule the country, it had to solicit the assistance of the Farmers Party to obtain a clear majority of seats in parliament, the Riksdagen.

2.6 The African National Congress (ANC) ņ from a nationalist movement to a ruling party

2.6.1 Introduction

The African National Congress (ANC), one of the oldest nationalist parties on the African continent, owes its ascendancy to power to the leading role that it played in the liberation struggle. Much as there were other nationalist movements which also took up arms against the South African government, the ANC¶s contribution surpassed those of other organisations. The ANC was one of the major parties during the negotiations to transform South Africa¶s political system.

After having managed to contain the nationalist movements through coercive measures in the 1960s, the South African government faced a new internal revolt during the 1970s. The impetus of this revolt was the 1976 student uprisings which started in Soweto. From the middle of the 1980s, political unrest intensified in the country with the security police fighting against both rural and township youths. The ANC infiltrated its cadres into the country and carried out acts of sabotage and the country was plunged into a mini civil war. In addition to this, South Africa was isolated by the world which had imposed sanctions on it, which made life difficult for many South African citizens.

2.6.2 Formation of the ANC

The formation of the ANC in 1912 was as a result of the exclusion of Africans from the newly formed Union of South Africa two years earlier and the promulgation of several discriminatory laws, including the Native Land Act which was meant to deprive Africans of their land. This, according to Walshe (1987:31), alarmed African leaders, spurring them into action. In 1912, four lawyers who had recently returned to South Africa took the initiative and convened a conference to address the concerns of the Africans about the legislation that was being proposed by the new government. They were Alfred Mangena, Richard Msimang, George Montshioa and Pixley ka Izaka Seme (Walshe 1987:32). In attendance at this conference were leading African personalities including chiefs, lawyers, doctors and teachers. Out of this meeting, the South African Native National Congress was formed. The name was changed to the ANC in 1923.

The reason behind the formation of this organisation was explained as a desire to have a single voice representing the African people (Walshe 1987:37). Congress, as the ANC came to be known, wanted to ascertain views and openly submit grievances to the government for discussion and redress. To this end, the ANC was going to use the medium of petitions and pleas to both the British and the South African governments (Walshe 1987:37). The methods used by the ANC to have the grievances of the African people addressed over the years made little impression on these two governments.

With the passing of time and no results being achieved, the younger members of the organisation became disillusioned with these methods. This resulted in the formation of the Congress Youth League (CYL) in 1943. The methods of this movement deviated from those used by the older members of the organisation, as they opted for nonviolent protest in order to have the government attend to the grievances of the African people. The CYL coerced the organisation into adopting a Programme of Action in 1949 (Gerhart 1978:83).

2.6.3 The banning of the ANC

Through this programme, the ANC with the youths at the forefront embarked on defying the government¶s discriminatory legislation in 1952. The programme called for civil disobedience, strikes, boycotts and stay away action. This committed the ANC to a new strategy based on extralegal tactics of mass action (Gerhart 1978:83). The mass action earned the ANC the wrath of the government which retaliated by arresting and imposing banning orders on its members. The ANC was eventually banned together with the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) in 1960.

After its banning, the ANC was left in disarray as some of its members were arrested, while others fled into exile where they hoped to continue the activities of the organisation. The organisation¶s problems were compounded by the arrest and conviction of its senior leaders, including Nelson Mandela, at what became known as the Rivonia Trial in 1964 where they were sentenced to life imprisonment. It was during this period that the organisation gave up nonviolent protest and opted for violence. At the trial Mandela explained that the reason for this decision was because they had been left with no alternative. He pointed out that the hard facts were that 50 years of nonviolence had brought the African people nothing but more and more repressive legislation (Meer 1989: 177)

The banning of the ANC and the arrest of its members led to the formation of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) which became the military wing of the organisation. Through the MK, the ANC embarked on a carefully controlled campaign of violence between 1960 and 1963. There were isolated incidents of bombings in Durban, Johannesburg and Port Elizabeth (Lodge 1983:231). The South African government cracked down on the insurgency and nipped it in the bud before it could gain momentum. The ANC¶s armed struggle then petered out. 2.6.4 Soweto unrest and the resuscitation of the ANC

The 1976 Soweto uprisings resuscitated the ANC as thousands of youths who were involved in the uprisings fled the country and were received by the organisation¶s branches in the countries neighbouring South Africa (Buntman 1998:243). The ANC recruited them and sent them for military training in Eastern European countries. The ANC¶s armed struggle started afresh as these youths were infiltrated back into the country to carry out sabotage attacks on selected targets. Lodge (1983:339) points out that during this period the ANC became popular within the country as low key guerrilla warfare intensified. However the South African government managed to bring a halt to this unrest in 1980.

Unrest broke out again in the country in 1984. This latest unrest gave the ANC leverage to stake a bigger claim in the resistance against the South African government. It fuelled the unrest through the statements it issued in exile. Internal organisations such as the United Democratic Front (UDF) were at the forefront of the resistance and pledged their support to the ANC through the adoption of its symbols and the Freedom Charter (Marx 1992:176). As the unrest intensified internally, the profile of the ANC increased. While the unrest was spreading, the ANC leaders in exile went on a campaign to have the country isolated by the international community and made ungovernable internally.

The events discussed above coincided with a crisis playing itself out within the ruling party which culminated in the resignation of PW Botha as the State President of South Africa. Events leading to the crisis within the NP may be traced back to the political unrest which started in the Vaal area in 1984 and engulfed the entire country. In the hopes of quelling the unrest, the government imposed a state of emergency on 20 July 1985. However, this did not have the effect of ending the conflict taking place in the country. Giliomee (2003:613) points out that the demands of the leaders of the uprising were much more radical than the reforms which were made by the government, hence it continued unabated. According to Giliomee (2003:614), Botha spurned an opportunity to introduce reforms when he addressed the country on 15 August 1985. It was expected that he would announce reforms and intimate the possible release of Mandela. Instead, according to Giliomee (2003:614), Botha used the occasion to ³display all the defiance of an old style white supremacist´ (Giliomee 2003:614). His speech disappointed sympathetic leaders such as Ronald Reagan of America and Britain¶s, Margaret Thatcher who responded to it by imposing limited sanctions. It was argued that in his speech Botha had failed to cross the Rubicon.

The continuing unrest caused tensions within the ruling party and the country¶s white population. There was concern about the continuing state of emergency and the brutal methods which were used by the security forces in an effort to crush the uprising (Giliomee 2003:624). A number of white academics, journalists and business people met with the ANC in Senegal in 1987. During this period the ANC asserted itself as a leading force within the country. Most of the acts of violence taking place within the country were attributed to the ANC by the South African government. This included the resignation of councillors belonging to the black local authorities.

Although outwardly opposed to negotiating with the ANC, Botha was secretly exploring avenues to do so. Led by the Director of the National Intelligence Service (NIS), Dr Neil Barnard, talks were initiated between the government and the ANC from the beginning of 1988. While these developments were taking place, PW Botha suffered a stroke and temporarily vacated his position. He returned to resume his position as State President but voluntarily relinquished his position as leader of the party. He later resigned as the State President of South Africa in 1989 under extreme pressure from his cabinet. He was succeeded by FW de Klerk. 2.6.5 The unbanning of the ANC and the beginning of negotiations

On succeeding PW Botha, FW de Klerk unbanned the ANC together with other organisations in 1990 and initiated talks about the possibility of holding negotiations for a new political dispensation. This eventually culminated in formal negotiations being held first with the ANC and later with an array of political organisations at what became known as CODESA ņ an acronym for the Congress for a Democratic South Africa (Rantete 1998:174). The talks started in 1991.

The talks at CODESA, which involved a multiplicity of organisations, were difficult and acrimonious at times. They were drawn out and reached a stalemate situation a number of times as the delegates could not agree on a number of issues (Buntman 1998:249). After almost two years of negotiations, an agreement was eventually reached to transform the country¶s discriminatory political system and to replace it with one acceptable to the majority of the people and which conformed to the norms of other democratic political systems. This paved the way for South Africa¶s first nonracial democratic elections in April 1994.

Existing and newly formed political organisations reorganised and positioned themselves to contest the elections. The ANC had to transform itself from an underground nationalist movement to a political party. Election campaigning started in earnest after 27 April 1994 was announced as the date on which people would go to the polls. For most of the voters it would be their first time to cast a vote.

2.6.6 South Africa¶s 1994 nonracial and democratic elections

The ANC organised rallies which were attended by thousands of their newfound supporters. Schrire (1994:8) points out that the ANC ran a highly effective and well- organised campaign which was very visible. The ANC used Mandela as the drawcard for its rallies and he addressed more rallies than anyone else within the organisation. The ANC unveiled its manifesto during the election campaigning. From the manifesto it was evident that the ANC wanted to eradicate the inequalities that had been created in South African society by the NP government. The party¶s major objective was to improve the lives of the black masses, its major constituency, and the party¶s campaign slogan was ³a better life for all´. (ANC 1994: 5) The ANC¶s election manifesto covered a variety of socioeconomic and political issues. In the manifesto the ANC committed itself to the following:

‡ creating a South Africa in which people would live in peace and with equal opportunities ‡ improving the quality of life, achieving peace and security for all ‡ providing jobs and better incomes through a growing economy ‡ establishing a single education system ‡ providing water, clinics, schools, toilet facilities, electricity, housing ‡ improving infrastructure ‡ instituting a healthcare programme aimed at improving the lives of those previously neglected by the past government

Of the organisations that took part in the CODESA negotiations, 19 contested the elections. The ANC, which was a firm favourite to win, secured 62,7 per cent of the votes which earned it 252 seats, that is, 63 per cent of the 400-seat Legislative Assembly. Mandela became South Africa¶s first black State President and headed a constitutionally mandated Government of National Unity (GNU) which included the National Party (NP) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP).

2.6.7 Contribution of Mandela¶s leadership to the ANC¶S elections victory

The name Nelson Mandela was synonymous with the ANC and the liberation struggle that this organisation embarked upon after it was banned in 1960. However, very few people knew much about the man himself. This was because there was a government-imposed blackout on information about Mandela and the activities of the ANC, which made him an enigmatic and mysterious figure. Despite not being known, his name grew in stature as he refused efforts to have him released from Robben Island (Rantete 1998:150). When he was eventually released from prison, he was a revered person, particularly among black people.

Upon his release, Mandela adopted both a conciliatory and a hard-line position. He pointed out that his organisation would not abandon the armed struggle. It was, however, for his conciliatory attitude that he became respected. After having been imprisoned for 27 years, he did not bear hatred in his heart and was prepared to forgive. He extended a hand of friendship to the white population of the country urging them to assist in building a new South Africa. In a foreword to a book written by Charlene Smith (1999:8-9), Archbishop Desmond Tutu described Mandela in these terms:

He is loved by virtually all South Africans, even the most virulent critics of his ANC led government. He is the most popular leader in the land, almost beyond criticism. He has bowled South Africans, and indeed the world with his extraordinary magnanimity, his readiness and eagerness to forgive.

Mandela is credited with having been instrumental in bringing a new political dispensation to South Africa. His priority upon his release from prison was reorganising the ANC which had had a difficult time in exile. He went abroad to meet the exiled leadership, including Oliver Tambo, who had acted as president of the organisation during Mandela¶s incarceration. He then took over the leadership of the ANC from the ailing Tambo (Rantete 1998:159). Mandela pressured the government into allowing the exiled members to return home and granting them immunity from prosecution. When this was granted, Mandela led the ANC to the first pre- negotiations. These negotiations became known as the Groote Schuur and Pretoria Minutes, and these were later followed by the CODESA negotiations which started in 1991 (Rantete 1998:161).

When the date for the country¶s first nonracial democratic elections was announced, Mandela joined the ANC¶s campaign trail. The organisation took advantage of his popularity and delegated him to areas where voters still had misgivings about the ANC. One such area was the Cape Province where it was feared that the coloured people would cast their votes for the National Party. Mandela went to the province accompanied by two senior coloured ANC members, Trevor Manuel and Cheryl Carolus, in February 1994. Mandela visited a church service in a coloured township where he took holy communion. He also addressed a select gathering of Muslim leaders, school principals and business leaders. These meetings were followed by rallies in the township (Southscan 1994:116)

Mandela also visited Natal which was the stronghold of the IFP. His visit came at a time when the province was gripped by violence which involved supporters of both parties. The ANC wanted to make inroads into the province, and who better to dispatch to this area than Mandela? He spoke at 13 venues in the first three days of his tour of the province and also addressed apprehensive members of the minority groups. Mandela received an overwhelming response from all races in Pietermaritzburg (Southscan 1993:331)

2.6.8 Summary

The ANC¶s overwhelming victory in the 1994 elections is attributed to the role the party played in the fight against the apartheid system. Much as there were other movements which took up arms against the South African government, the ANC is credited with having been far more effective. It was the ANC that resurrected the armed struggle after 1976, when it took advantage of an exodus of youths from South Africa to the neighbouring African countries. It intensified the fight against the government from the early 1980s until it was unbanned in 1990. After being declared a legal organisation it returned to the country where it was accepted by the black masses as the organisation that was fighting for them. It played a pivotal role at the CODESA negotiations under the leadership of Mandela. Mandela, who is regarded as an icon, enjoying cult-like status, was effectively used by the party to rally not only black voters, but also those from minority groups such as Indians, whites and coloureds. 2.7 Conclusion

Various factors account for a political party¶s victory during an election. The most important among them are a clearly enunciated policy programme and a well- planned election campaign. This presupposes the existence of a ³normal´ situation in a state. Depending on their magnitude, unusual circumstances prevailing within a state before an election may also have an impact on its outcome. When the five parties discussed above took part in the elections which initially brought them to power, unusual circumstances prevailed within their countries. These parties became involved in the unusual circumstances and their successful involvement had a positive effect on them as they won the elections that were held subsequently. The main argument of this chapter is that the unusual circumstances were instrumental in the ascension to power of these parties, and were a first step leading up to one-party dominance.

Obtaining independence Although unusual circumstances prevailed in Botswana, they were not of a catastrophic nature. Botswana was a colony which was ignored by the British colonisers and was also under threat from its powerful white neighbours, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. With most British colonies attaining independence, Botswana also became a sovereign country. However, what was unusual about Botswana¶s independence is that it was achieved without a struggle led by a nationalist movement.

Prior to Botswana being granted independence, unusual circumstances prevailed within the country. The marriage of Sir Seretse Khama to a white woman, leading to him being forced to relinquish his traditional position as heir apparent of the Bamangwato tribe, and later being exiled, could in a way be regarded as unusual circumstances for the peaceful Batswana, who were upset by this action which threw the country into turmoil. However, this later benefited the BDP, as the Batswana people voted for the BDP in order to show their solidarity with Sir Seretse Khama .

The BDP was the most prominent political party during the negotiations with the colonial authorities, eclipsing the other two parties which were feuding. Sir Seretse Khama played a leading role in these negotiations. The victory of the BDP in the 1965 elections is ascribed to the role the party played in bringing about the independence of the country. Sir Seretse Khama was revered throughout Botswana and the he and the BDP are acknowledged as having brought independence to Botswana.

Liberation struggle and independence The contribution of Congress to the liberation of India was a strong factor in the party winning the country¶s first elections in 1952. The Indian masses were led by Congress in the fight for the country¶s independence. Gandhi led the Indian masses on defiance campaigns against the colonial authorities, which paid dividends for Congress as its support increased, turning it into a mass-based party. The pressure which the nationalist movement applied resulted in Britain granting independence to India. It should also be remembered that Britain ceded power to the party in 1947 without elections being held, giving it an incumbency advantage over the other parties in the 1952 elections. Congress also benefited from the Great Man thesis with the imposing presence of Gandhi and Nehru. It was through the influence and dedication of these two leaders that Congress was able to become a mass-based organisation, challenging the British authorities. The two leaders were associated with the success of the liberation struggle.

Formation of a new state The formation of the state of Israel was preceded by conflict between the Jews and the Arabs. The Arabs were opposed to a Jewish settlement in what they regarded as their territory. Mapai is credited with having played a leading role in the creation of the Jewish state, even though other parties such as Herut also took part in the battle against the British and the Arabs. However, their contribution was not as prominent as that of Mapai, which was at the helm of the struggle to establish a Jewish state. Mapai was led by Ben-Gurion, a charismatic leader who took part in some of the battles against the Arabs. The 1948 elections were held amidst a tense period in Israel with emotions still running high as fighting between the Jews and Arabs had just ended. Mapai benefited from the leadership of Ben-Gurion who became the country¶s first Prime Minister.

Formation of a new political system following the overthrow of authoritarianism The ascension to power of Mussolini¶s Fascist Party in 1922 brought an end to Italy¶s fragile democratic political system. This was replaced by Mussolini¶s dictatorship. Mussolini dragged Italy into World War II which proved to be disastrous as the country emerged from it devastated. During the war resistance was launched to Mussolini¶s authoritarianism by a number of organisations and the general Italian public. The three political organisations were also part of the Resistance Movement.

At the end of the war, these three parties ruled Italy jointly. However, the DC later expelled the other two and ruled on its own. The beginning of the Cold War and the emergence of the West and East dichotomy helped the DC to gain power in 1948. The fear of the spread of communism at the end of the war benefited the DC, as it received the support of the United States and the church threw its support behind the party as well. The 1948 elections were held amidst outpourings of communist denouncements. De Gasperi, who took over the leadership of the DC, was credited with having led Italy from the crisis of an authoritarian system and the destruction of World War II to a stable political system.

Reforming the political economy of a country The 1932 elections in Sweden were held amidst an economic crisis and in the presence of an unstable and weak government. The parties contesting the election were equally positioned and none had an advantage over the others, hence the economic crisis could have been exploited by any of them. None of the parties contesting the elections had any firm ideas of how to resolve the crisis facing the country and the SDP was ambiguous about what it would do if elected to power. However, by bringing socialism into the debate, it improved its chances of success. To the unemployed people and those earning poor salaries socialism resonated well. The SDP was opportunistic and this paid off as it won the elections. All that was left for the party was to implement its programme.

Like Congress, the ANCs victory could be attributed to two factors, first the role it played in the liberation struggle and, secondly, the Great Man thesis. The ANC started the resistance against discriminatory legislation which was promulgated by the first South African government. The party continued with its resistance throughout its legal existence until it was banned in 1960. It then embarked on the armed struggle which intensified after 1976. The party was blessed with the leadership of a man of the stature of Mandela, who was the embodiment of the party. It was through his charisma and leadership that the ANC gained not only national, but also international acceptability. Even before the elections were held, it was a foregone conclusion that most black people would vote for the ANC. Mandela was a revered figure and was much respected throughout the country ņ even by his former enemies and gaolers. After 27 years in jail, he harboured no hatred and instead appealed for reconciliation among the people of South Africa.

It is clear from the above that as much as these parties had sound policies and programmes to persuade the citizens of their countries to vote for them, other factors also contributed to their election victory and eventual ascension to power. Pempel (1990:343) points out that war and economic crisis cannot be regarded as normal conditions. In Botswana, India, Israel, Italy and South Africa the establishment of new political systems played a role in the election success of the BDP, Congress, Mapai, DC and the ANC respectively. In Sweden the economic crisis helped the SDP to victory while the war and the fear of communism could be credited for the DC¶s victory.

After these initial elections, the parties continued to be voted into power by the electorate. The question that now arises is how these parties, in the face of opposition parties, managed to repeatedly win elections. What did they do that the other parties could not do? Were the factors that facilitated their rise to power always present throughout all the elections that they won? While ascending to power was important to these parties, consolidating their position was even more important. The next chapter discusses the methods that these parties used in order to consolidate their positions and remain in power after winning successive elections. Chapter 3

FACTORS THAT FACILITATE THE RISE TO ONE-PARTY DOMINANCE

Introduction

The previous chapter discussed the abnormal circumstances which prevailed in the countries of the political parties in our study. The parties became involved in these abnormal circumstances as they sought to find a way of resolving them and bringing normalcy to their societies. The involvement of these parties brought about a successful resolution to these unusual circumstances which won them the support of their constituencies. From these elections the parties went on to win successive elections over 25 years or more, resulting in them becoming dominant parties.

Although having been given an advantage by the role they played in the successful resolution of these abnormal circumstances, the continued victory of these parties cannot be solely ascribed to this factor. These parties could not rest on their laurels and continue to rely on the factors responsible for the victory that first brought them to power. In order for them to ensure that they continued winning elections these parties had to devise other means to maintain and increase their electoral support. The purpose of this chapter is to identify and discuss the factors responsible for their continued electoral support. The factors identified are the following: organisational strength; continued support of a strong socioeconomic bloc; penetration into society; pragmatism, patronage and the symbolism of the party; and of a charismatic leader being associated with the resolution of the unusual circumstances. The period under review is the first 25 years in which the parties were in power, even though some of them continued winning elections thereafter. The factors identified are common to all the parties. 3.1 The BDP and the consolidation of power: 1965 ņ 1990 3.1.1 Introduction

After winning Botswana¶s first elections in 1965, held under the auspices of the colonial power, the BDP was regarded as the de facto government of the country during the last months leading to independence. According to Wiseman (1998:248), the BDP appeared the natural party of government. During this period the party had the blessing of the colonial authorities, the white residents of the country and the traditional leaders. The BDP formally became the ruling party when Britain granted the country independence in 1966. It has remained in power up until the time of writing (2005). After winning the 1965 elections, the BDP strengthened its hold on power by winning all of the country¶s succeeding elections.

3.1.2 Organisational strength

Compared with the other political parties in the country, the BDP was better organised and had a head start when, as mentioned in the previous chapter, it was endorsed by the British colonial authorities who had bestowed on it the status of a government in waiting. The colonial authorities also gave the party material and human resources. Right from its formation the BDP leadership consisted of the wealthy and influential sector of the Tswana community. This sector includes the cattle and land owners as well as traditional leaders. Molutsi (1991:70) points out that since independence the party has been supported by leading farmers, teachers and businesspeople who are relatively better off than the rest of the community. These people contributed handsomely to the party¶s coffers during elections and Danevad (1995:398) points out that the party has a membership that provides financial and organisational assistance which is responsible for its electoral success.

Among Botswana¶s political parties, the BDP is the only party which is organised nationally, having branches throughout the country. The BDP has its own building in Gaborone, the capital of the country (Osei-Hwedie 2001:60). It also has a full-time organiser, a luxury which the other parties cannot afford. The party derives funds by renting out office space to the government. Offices in the building are also hired out for functions and other activities by community organisations (Polhemus 1983:414). The BDP has thus been able to generate sufficient resources from rent derived from these premises. This enables the party to launch effective election campaigns through the production of pamphlets of a high quality detailing its programmes, policies and successes (Polhemus 1983:416). The availability of funds also enables the party to field candidates in all the constituencies in the country. During election campaigning, the party is able to reach voters in remote areas as it has access to four-wheel drive vehicles owned by some of its wealthy members (Polhemus 1983:416). The party makes use of loudhailers mounted on the back of trucks moving around the urban and rural areas to inform the communities of its programmes.

3.1.3 Support of a strong socioeconomic bloc

The BDP obtained a large percentage of its votes from the rural voters during the five elections in question. On independence about 90 per cent of Botswana¶s population lived in the rural areas. Molutsi (1998:370) points out that after independence, Botswana¶s predominantly peasant society, which is conservative and based in the rural areas, voted overwhelmingly for the BDP because of Sir Seretse Khama whom most recognised as their chief even though he had been deposed. At the time, Botswana¶s peasant society lived in the rural areas under traditional leadership, and the BDP used these traditional leaders to mobilise support for the party as they wield enormous powers in their areas. They have always been at the centre of the traditional system and the communities in their specific areas owe allegiance to them (Somolekae & Lekorwe 1998:196).

The chiefs preside over the traditional assembly known as the kgotla where matters affecting the tribe are discussed (Mgadla 1998:5). The involvement of chiefs and headmen has assisted in retaining the loyalty of the rural masses to the ruling party, although chiefly authority and influence are still pervasive in rural Botswana. Much as it has curtailed the powers of the traditional leaders, the BDP recognises their influence among the rural people and has always sought their allegiance in all elections since independence (Rule 1995:29). At its formation the BDP enlisted the support of leading chief¶s uncles and other royalties in each reserve (Molutsi 1998:360) to gain acceptance and legitimacy among the rural people, as they arrange meetings where the party informs the communities of government projects (Holm 1988:199).

Although the BDP is strongly supported by the rural masses across the country, Holm (1988:191) points out that its mainstay are the Bamangwato and Bakwena tribes, who together constitute more than 50 per cent of the population. In the country¶s first four elections the BDP never lost a parliamentary seat in the Bamangwato area (Holm 1988:191). Danevad (1995:396) states that the party continued to receive this support in the country¶s post-independence elections. The same applies in the Kweneng area where it has won with at least 73 per cent of the vote. The Bamangwato and Bakwena tribes perceive the BDP as representing them.

The opposition parties have not succeeded in penetrating the areas inhabited by these two groups. Here it needs to be pointed out that Botswana is a homogeneous country with eight tribes identifying themselves as part of the larger Tswana ethnic group. These are the Bamangwato, Bakwena, Bamangwaketse, Batawana, Bakgatla, Bamalete, Barolong and Batlokwa tribes. Also resident in the country are the following six non-Batswana tribes for whose support the parties compete: Kalanga, San, Kgalagadi, Damara, Herero and Batswapong (Picard 1985:6). These groups constitute about 20 per cent of Botswana¶s population.

Holm (1988:191) points out that even though the BDP received its largest support from the Bamangwato and Bakwena tribes, when it campaigns in other areas, it plays down its tribal base. The internal migration of people in search of employment in later years as the country industrialised has served to spread the support of the BDP further outside its original two strongholds. The people from the rural areas did not change their political loyalties when they settled in the urban areas, but continued voting for the party. During the 1965 elections Chief Linchwe gave tacit support to a candidate of the Botswana People¶s Party (BPP) who defeated his BDP counterpart. The BDP realised that their hold on power depended on the passive acceptance of chiefs. Chief Linchwe, who was always at loggerheads with the BDP, was offered an ambassadorial position in the United States, which he accepted (Picard 1985:189). By so doing, the BDP bought Chief Linchwe¶s influence.

Chief Bathoen II, the second most powerful chief after Sir Seretse Khama, resigned his traditional position soon after the country gained independence and joined the Botswana National Front (BNF) after its formation in 1965 (Polhemus 1983:407). He did this because he was dissatisfied with the curtailing of the powers of the chiefs. The party made him its presidential candidate. Through his membership, the BNF won three parliamentary seats in the 1969 elections in his Ngwaketse area. This was worrying to the BDP who realised the influence of traditional leaders. The BDP was concerned that disaffected chiefs could give their support to the opposition parties, drawing away voters away from the party. It realised how vulnerable it was (Picard 1985:192). Since Bathoen was a powerful chief in his own right, the BDP could not neutralise him like Linchwe.

3.1.4 Penetration of society

On coming to power, the BDP reduced the powers of the traditional leaders. Much as it did this, the BDP, mindful of their influence in the rural areas where most of Botswana¶s population resides, established cordial relations with the traditional leaders as it wanted to use them to garner the support of the rural peasants. The rural constituency proved to the lifeblood of the BDP. The traditional leaders convene meetings referred to as the kgotla where representatives of the party inform the rural peasants of developmental programmes. The traditional leaders have the right to refuse permission for a meeting to be held in their territory. The BDP infiltrated the rural areas through the chiefs and headmen (Wiseman 1973:183). According to Gillett (1972:287), the party is characterised by a conservative electoral strength. The BDP is wary of the influence the chiefs wield over the rural people. Although the traditional leaders are not allowed to contest for political office, their support was much sought after by political parties. The endorsement of a particular political party by a chief has on occasion influenced the outcome of an election in his area. Thus it is important for a party to be in good standing with the chiefs and not to alienate them. The BDP discovered this to their chagrin when one of the chiefs gave tacit support to an opposition candidate while another went a step further by joining an opposition party (Picard 1985:192). Hereafter the BDP treated the traditional leaders with respect, not wanting to antagonise them.

Picard (1985:203) points out that the BDP also used cooption as another method of penetrating society. It targeted senior members and sympathisers of the opposition as well as former civil servants. It encouraged retired civil servants who previously were not allowed to take part in politics to contest for elections at both local and national level under the banner of the party, in an attempt to prevent them from joining the opposition. In 1979, the BDP government appointed Daniel Kwela, a senior opposition member, as a special member of parliament.

3.1.5 Pragmatism

From its formation the BDP was a moderate party. Unlike nationalist movements involved in the liberation struggle in other parts of Africa, it did not adopt radical socioeconomic policies such as socialism. According to Beaulier (2005:7), the BDP did not discard everything that it associated with colonialism. She points out that there were no statues of Marx or Lenin in Botswana. Rather than run from institutions left behind by colonialism, the new government embraced them: it campaigned on the basis of the retention of a multiracial society and a free market economy. It did not unsettle the expatriates forcing them to leave the country; instead it retained them in the civil service. Although it reduced the powers of the chiefs, it nevertheless retained the traditional system (Molutsi 1998:368). Aware of the influence the chiefs commanded in their territories, the BDP did not want to antagonise them, but it instead won them over to the side of the party.

3.1.6 Patronage

Scholars such as Picard (1985), Tsie (1996), Legum (1981/1982), Charlton (1993) and Danevad (1995) have identified patronage as a strong factor in the BDP¶s electoral success. Charlton (1993:340) boldly states that instances of partisan patronage distribution in Botswana are present in form and intent. He however distinguishes between partisan and uneven patronage. According to him Botswana has avoided the highly partisan patronage taking place in other African countries. But he sounds a warning saying that this does not mean that partisan patronage is not present in Botswana (Charlton 1993:342).

Patronage is used by the BDP to win the support of primarily rural voters because of their impoverished position. The party uses the benefits of development programmes to win votes. Danevad (1995:391) points out that the BDP¶s strategy for rural constituencies and distributionist policies have been applied as a means of nurturing political loyalties. The use of patronage by the BDP is made easy by the fact that the party has presided over a fast growing economy, while wealthy land and cattle owners occupy leadership positions within the party. The wealthy members also use patronage to attract support for the party.

Picard (1985:175) refers to the 1974 elections to argue his point about the use of patronage by the BDP. In those elections, the BDP used the Accelerated Rural Development Programme (ARDP) to win the support of rural voters. This was after the BNF won three seats in the 1969 elections, taking the BDP by surprise at its performance. Subsequently the BDP realised that this was made possible by the support the party received from the rural areas. It then decided to use patronage to neutralise the BNF in the 1974 elections.

The ARDP was a developmental programme projected in government plans for the rural areas. This programme was to be implemented within a specific time frame. However, with the 1974 elections pending the government gave instructions that its implementation should be speeded up. The programme was hurriedly implemented six weeks prior to the elections in order to show visible progress by the government and deflect opposition criticism of rural neglect (Picard 1985:179). Tsie (1996:605) argues that the ARDP was explicitly political and was designed to garner support from the peasants by demonstrating the benefits of development.

Tsie (1998:604) points out that since 1962 the BDP has been enjoying enormous support from the peasants. He however dismisses the notion that this is due to the organisational strength of the party and the influence of Sir Seretse Khama, because he was a paramount chief by birth. He maintains that this does not adequately explain the electoral support the party has been receiving in all the elections since independence. Tsie (1996:604-605) instead identifies three methods of patronage used by the wealthy elite to win the votes of the rural dwellers for the party. The first occurs when wealthy cattle owners farm out their cattle to poor peasants in what is known in Tswana as mafia. Under mafia the wealthy cattle owners allow the peasants to use their cattle for ploughing their small pieces of land. The second occurs when the land owners who have boreholes on their properties allow the peasants to use them to water their cattle, and, thirdly, the cattle owners sit on Land Boards which are responsible for the allocation of tribal lands to the tribal people. As a result of these three factors the peasants invariably follow the political choice of the wealthy members of the party.

Charlton (1993:342) states that the BDP uses patronage in order to influence voters in areas in which it is weak to vote for the party. This it does by promising members of a numerically dominant group in the area that they will benefit personally from their support of the BDP. When Botswana was gripped by drought in the 1980s the BDP took advantage of this situation to win the support of the rural masses. The Drought Relief Programme (DRP), according to Charlton (1993:342), significantly influenced the BDP¶s electoral success as the people were fed, clothed and offered employment. This made it difficult for the opposition to make inroads into the rural areas. Other incidences of patronage by the BDP were the decrease in the price of petrol prior to the 1979 elections and a 7.5 per cent salary increase for civil servants in 1981, despite the state of the economy (Legum 1981/1982:B603).

3.1.7 Symbolism ņ the legacy of Sir Seretse Khama and the role of the BDP in the independence of Botswana

Sir Seretse Khama¶s role in the independence of Botswana cannot be equated with that of other African leaders who were at the forefront of the struggle against colonialism, as Botswana¶s independence was not born of a confrontation with the colonial authorities. However, this is not to detract from the role that he played as the leader of the BDP when the country¶s political parties attended constitutional talks with Britain. Through his able leadership, the BDP outmanoeuvred the other parties, winning the favour of the colonial authorities. The BDP is thus generally regarded as the party which brought Botswana independence.

Sir Seretse Khama was revered in Botswana in life and even long after his death. This was because of his able leadership which saw Botswana becoming a stable country not wrecked with internecine warfare as was the case with other African countries. Under his leadership Botswana rose from an obscure to a recognised country and played an important role in the affairs of the Southern African region. He remained at the helm of the party until his untimely death in 1980. Wiseman (1998:248) attributes the party¶s victory in the 1969, 1974 and 1979 elections to his leadership. He led the party during election campaigns, travelling to constituencies throughout the inhospitable interior of the country despite his failing health (Parsons, Tsie & Henderson 1995:280). Concern was expressed about his health, but he assured people that he was well enough to campaign for his party. However it was clear that campaigning left him exhausted (Legum 1979/1980:B689). Polhemus (1983:414) expresses these sentiments about Sir Seretse Khama:

Beyond his claim to traditional authority, Sir Seretse Khama was an extremely able and appealing leader in his own right. He was well-educated, a good speaker with a sense of humour, and approached voters on the basis of reason rather than tradition or emotion.

During his leadership the country moved from being one of the poorest in the world to prosperity with a fast-growing economy. Botswana experienced political stability and economic prosperity. Sir Seretse Khama was a man of stature who has revered in his country and not only among the Bamangwato people. He laid a foundation on which those who succeeded him were able to build (Polhemus 1983:418).

A person who built on the legacy of Sir Seretse Khama was his successor, Sir Ketumile Masire, his long time confidante. Having been close to him and also being a founder member of the party, it was only natural that Sir Ketumile Masire should succeed him, and the decision that he should take over the leadership of the BDP was unanimous. Sir Ketumile Masire was taciturn and not endowed with the same qualities as Sir Seretse Khama. As the first general secretary of the party he was one of the few people close to Sir Seretse Khama and held the party together after taking over its leadership. He continued promoting the same policies of Sir Seretse Khama and did not make many changes relying on the trusted ³old guard´ of the party (Legum 1984/1985:B636) .

3.1.8 Electoral performance

The factors discussed above were responsible for the BDP¶s overwhelming victory in the elections held between 1965 and 1984. In all these elections its share of the votes exceeded 60 per cent. It suffered a slight setback in the 1969 elections when the BNF won three seats. This unnerved the BDP and it devised means to counter the BNF. To this end it accelerated the ARDP and offered civil servants a pay increase. The following table shows how the party performed in the country¶s elections, expressed as its share of the popular vote, number and percentage of seats in parliament.

Year 1965 1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 % of votes 80 69 77 75 68 64

No. of seats 28 24 27 29 28 31

% of seats 90 77 84 91 82 91

3.1.9 Summary

The BDP has been associated with the attaining of independence by Botswana in the same vein as other nationalist movements in Africa. After assuming power, the BDP continued to receive the support of the Bamangwato and Bakwena tribes, who constituted the majority of the population. In comparison with the other parties, the BDP was better organised having both human, physical and financial resources. This enabled it to reach voters in remote parts of the country. The BDP also owed its electoral success to the traditional leaders who allowed the party access to the rural peasants.

In addition to the funding which the party generated from its own resources, the BDP as the incumbent also made use of patronage in order to win support. The ADP which was aimed at the rural population benefited the party during the 1974 elections. The discovery of diamonds saw the country becoming prosperous and the BDP was able to dispense both evenhanded and partisan patronage to win support. The continued association of the party with Sir Seretse Khama, even after his death was also a boon to the BDP. His protege, Sir Ketumile Masire was able to continue to build on the foundation laid by his predecessor.

3.2 Congress and the consolidation of power in India: 1952 ņ 1977 3.2.1 Introduction

When Congress won India¶s first democratic parliamentary elections in 1952, it was, to all intents and purposes, already a dominant party. The party had been in existence for 62 years and had established itself as a political force through its involvement in the struggle for the independence of the country. Through its ability to win consecutive elections, Congress established itself as a dominant party in India. Congress is the only party that has regularly won more than 40 per cent of the popular vote in all the elections since independence and was thus capable at the time of forming a national government on its own in the face of a weak opposition.

3.2.2 Different views advanced for the dominance of Congress

Scholars such as Weiner (1967), Vatsal (1982), Patil (1977), Kochanek (1968), Robinson (1982) and Morris-Jones (1964) attribute various factors for the durability and electoral success of Congress. Morris-Jones (1964:290) postulates the view that there is no single factor which explains Congress¶s dominance: he attributes it to various factors such as history, social structure and political style.

Patil (1977:299) on the other hand argues that one of the factors that benefited Congress and propelled it into dominant party status was its identification with the independence struggle and the leadership of Nehru. However, Weiner (1967:12) is not convinced about the influence of these two factors on the voters. Although he concedes that the presence of Nehru at an election campaign inspired party cadres to work harder, he contends this was not sufficient to assure the party of victory. He points out that Congress had lost to opposition parties at places where Nehru attended election rallies.

Dismissing the role of the party in the struggle for independence, Weiner (1967:13) points out that other nationalist movements had fared poorly as political parties after squandering their legacies. He argues that these two explanations are inadequate to explain the success of Congress. However on the next page he contradicts himself when he states:

Nonetheless, the legacy does play a role in the present position of the party. Much of the esteem Congress has among its supporters results from its role in the nationalist struggle. Congress still contains many party workers who joined when it was a nationalist movement and who continue to contribute their skills and reputations to support the party.

Weiner (1967:14) puts forward the view that Congress relied on its own resources to gain support and win elections. He argues that in order to succeed politically, the party leaders were concerned, first and foremost, with doing whatever was necessary to adapt the party to its new environment after independence.

Writing earlier than Weiner, Kochanek (1968:xx) had this to say about the durability of Congress:

Congress durability is attributable to its well-exercised ability to adapt pragmatically to change, its highly developed skill in managing internal conflict, and its evolution of a decision-making process designed to aggregate the demands of a highly differentiated following.

When it started ruling the country, Congress faced what appeared to be insurmountable problems. One of the problems Congress faced was the effects of the partitioning of the country which left many people displaced. The new government had to feed them and provide them with accommodation.

India is a big country with a large population divided across religious, regional, ethnic, class, caste, linguistic, social and cultural differences. These diversities, if not properly handled, are a recipe for conflict. Faced with a myriad of problems, Congress had to soldier on and bear the burden of consolidating its position and ruling the country. Morris-Jones (1964:291) points out that ³to have held Congress together over a period of changing political climates in a country of deep diversity required prodigious political ability´. This Congress achieved, ruling India from 1952 until it was defeated in the elections of 1977.

3.2.3 Organisational strength

As a first step towards consolidating its power, Congress transformed itself from an all-embracing nationalist movement to a political party that would seek votes, win elections and rule the country (Weiner 1957:16). In pursuance of this goal, Congress eliminated from its ranks individuals and organisations which formed part of the nationalist movement but were not amenable to working with its leadership. It ruled that nobody should owe allegiance to two parties ņ only to Congress (Weiner 1957:17).

Weiner (1967:461) argues that Congress owes much of its success to its internal cohesiveness and its relations with its members and the larger Indian community. The party, which was run from New Delhi, was represented in states, cities, towns, dwellings and villages (Park & de Mesquita 1979:129). Congress was present throughout the country and communicated with its members through the use of the party¶s structures. This enabled it to be in constant communication with the grassroots supporters. Weiner (1967:461) states that by so doing the party kept members informed of its activities.

The party also informed members of its activities through publications produced in both English and local dialects. Senior party members availed themselves to the grassroots supporters and paid visits to branches in the rural areas to listen to their problems (Weiner 1967:462). This gave them a feeling of belonging. At the local level party cadres offered assistance to their members, most of whom were poor and illiterate, when dealing with authorities. Congress arbitrated in factional, caste and linguistic disputes involving the community as their neutrality in arbitrating disputes was trusted rather than that of someone from their own area. Congress had members who devoted themselves to settling disputes wherever they occurred, be it in rural or urban areas (Kochanek 1968:323). 3.2.4.1 Support of a strong socioeconomic bloc ņ Indian masses

While still operating as a nationalist movement, Congress attracted to its ranks diverse groups of Indian society irrespective of caste, language, religion, ethnicity, occupation and political ideology. These groups all came together with the single purpose of supporting Congress in its fight against British colonialism. After independence was attained some of these groups left Congress to contest the elections on their own. However, the majority of them continued supporting Congress, resulting in its electoral success in successive elections.

3.2.4.2 Support of strong socioeconomic bloc ņ labour and commercial organisations

Although Congress draws its support from diverse sectors of Indian society, it also has the backing of strong socioeconomic blocs. These include the Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC), the Farmers¶ Forum and the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI). INTUC was formed in 1947 with the blessing of Congress whose policies it has supported (Hardgrave Jr 1980:107). INTUC organised manpower and finances that benefited the party during election campaigns. The union also provided leadership for the party. No less a leader than Nehru served his apprenticeship in the labour field (Park & de Mesquita 1979:134).

Park and de Mesquita (1979) point out that the party expanded its organisation and thereby access to manpower and other resources, to include workers, peasants, students and other groups. This enabled Congress to mobilise support, win elections, and implement programmes that in turn contributed to its great popularity (Park & de Mesquita 1979:134). FICCI draws its membership from representatives of major industrial and trading enterprises and represents 100 000 firms which employ over 5 million workers. Hardgrave Jr (1980:135) argues that the members of this organisation took their cue from its president and voted for Congress. By voting for Congress they hoped to be given preference in the awarding of government contracts.

3.2.5 Penetration of society

In the preceding chapter we discussed how Congress built up a massive following through its campaigns to force the British to grant the country self-government. Robinson (1982:36) however points out that during this period of struggle, Congress had not penetrated all parts of the country. Robinson states that in the 1950s and 1960s with many people being drawn to politics after independence it was only then that it started attracting more people, particularly from the rural areas. According to Suri (1974:202), it was only at the beginning of the 1950s that Congress became a nationwide party in India, not confined to any one particular caste or religious group. Suri (1974:203) points out that the support of Congress came from poorer classes and lower castes. Rural people became the backbone of the organisation.

3.2.6 Pragmatism

Hardgrave Jr (1980:149) expresses the view that Congress was not rigid but was prepared to adapt its policies when the need arose in order to win support from different groups. During the first two decades after independence it incorporated individuals with different political ideologies and constituents. In the rural areas it sought and won the support of landowners, villagers and local cooperatives. Congress was a pragmatic organisation where people with different backgrounds coexisted, as Suri (1974: 203) attests:

Indeed, a striking feature of the Congress party¶s position is that it straddled the past and the present, tradition and modernisation, conservatism and progress; it brings together high castes and low castes, big business and landless labourers.

Candland (1997:22) argues that Congress did not have any difficulty in recruiting to its ranks a large number of caste and community leaders, landlords, businessmen and many former opponents as it was not a revolutionary ideological party. Park and de Mesquita (1979:130) point out that Congress was a centrist party leaning ³somewhat to the left´. It had a rhetorical commitment to socialism while the economy was still in the hands of the private sector (Park & de Mesquita 1979: 29), which, they state, allowed it to accommodate people of differing persuasions from large industrialists, to Indian peasants and pragmatic socialists. Congress had been able to take the wind out of the sails of the socialists when it declared itself in favour of socialism. This ideological flexibility divided the opposition and allowed Congress to attract support during the first five elections.

Robinson (1982:36) explains the number of occasions that Congress adapted its policies to attract a particular constituency by saying if elements in a state raised the spectre of political separatism, Congress would become the voice of regionalism; when a socialist party planned a major thrust, Congress resolved to support the development of a socialist pattern of society. In the rural areas it would speak the language of both caste and traditionalism even though it was opposed to both. It adopted whatever position was best in the rural areas in order to win support. Robinson (1982:37) expresses the view that this adaptive strategy was responsible for the party¶s victory in the 1952, 1957 and 1962 elections.

According to Hardgrave Jr (1980:149), for three decades Congress was the only genuinely all-India party capable of appealing to virtually all sections of society. He adds that in consolidating its power after independence Congress sought to achieve a national consensus through the accommodation and absorption of dominant social elements that had kept aloof from the nationalist movement (Hardgrave Jr 1980:150).

3.2.7 Patronage Being in control of the country¶s limited resources when coming to power, Congress was able to dispense patronage. Morris-Jones (1964:216) argues that patronage was the oil that lubricated the Congress party machine and was an important factor in its dominance. As Congress tightened its rule over India, the state expanded its developmental role and in the process accumulating more resources that could be distributed to party members. He points out that Congress enjoyed the benefits of a ³virtuous cycle´ in which its electoral success gave it access to economic and political resources that enabled the party to attract new supporters.

Morris-Jones (1964:216) states that Congress was everywhere in India and as an influential organisation it was much sought after. Everybody either wanted to belong to it, or to know an influential member of the party. People were only too ready to show their gratitude to Congress for what it could do for them or what it had done for them. Business people were in the forefront of those who were ingratiated to Congress. However, this did not come free, as the business people were expected to contribute to the coffers of Congress in exchange for favours. Congress established a network of links with business people throughout the country.

The wealthy members of Indian society derived prestige from being associated with Congress. Powerful individuals were proud to be seen with the senior leadership of the organisation, particularly during visits to their areas. This enhanced their status among their communities. Individuals seeking political power and favours were more inclined to join Congress than other parties which had nothing to offer (Morris-Jones 1964:216 ).

Membership of Congress opened previously closed doors such as being admitted to university or being granted a trading licence (Weiner 1967:450). Hardgrave Jr (1980:135) adds that ³contributions to the Congress by business also served to facilitate political access, and the Congress, as the party in power, frequently extracted contributions from businesses dependent upon Government favour, a process all too familiar in the American context´. In addition, Gupta (1990:236) expresses the view that Indira Gandhi, as Prime Minister of the federal government, which controlled the strategic points of the economy, and as leader of the larger Congress party, could command larger resources to buy support than her opponents.

3.2.8 Symbolism ņ Nehru, Congress and the nationalist movement

Gandhi and Nehru played an important role in events that resulted in the country eventually being granted independence. These two leaders were immortalised in India as they symbolised the struggle for independence. Gandhi died in 1948 and Nehru in 1964, but their names remained etched on the minds of many Indian people, particularly those who were present when the struggle for independence was being fought. During election campaigning, the role of the party in the struggle for independence was a constant refrain and was reiterated by no less a person than Nehru in his election campaigns. Congress enjoyed prestige from its association with both Gandhi and Nehru and its role in leading the country to independence. It based its appeal to the electorate on the basis of its claim that it fulfilled its pledge to liberate the Indian people under the leadership of Gandhi and Nehru.

Congress did not only benefit from the legacy of Nehru through his involvement in the fight for independence, but he also led by example. After the party came to power, Nehru continued to exercise a firm command over Congress. He was at the helm of the party settling disputes in order to avoid factionalism. He motivated Congress workers and turned Congress into a well organised institution. Candland (1997:22) postulates the view that under the leadership of Nehru, Congress commanded tremendous organisational capacity, relying on local, state and national level committees, and members and vast networks reaching across more than a dozen European-sized states. Nehru was at the helm of the party in the 1952, 1957 and 1962 elections which were won by the party. Like other senior party leaders, Nehru addressed party rallies throughout the country during elections. According to Edwardes (1971:26), for the 1952 elections, the organisation¶s national campaign centred on Nehru to the exclusion of practically everything else. He adds that, for Nehru, the elections seemed to be a special form of catharsis, an emotional release after the drama of independence.

3.2.9 Electoral performance

Congress was the only all-India party that won a plurality of the votes during the country¶s elections. However its share of the votes never reached the 50 per cent mark in all the elections that it won. The party was favoured by the country¶s plurality system of voting. The following table shows how it performed before it was defeated in 1977:

Year 1952 1957 1962 1967 1971

% of votes 45 48 48 41 44

No. of seats 364 371 361 283 352

% of seats 74 75 73 54 68

3.2.10 Summary

After independence was attained, Congress converted itself from a nationalist movement to a political party with well-organised structures throughout the country. On assuming power, Congress did not take the support it had built during the nationalist struggle for granted, but continued to mobilise countrywide. The party was aided in this task by the fact that it was well organised and reached communities in far-flung areas. It communicated with the people in these areas through publications written in the local languages. Nehru played an important role in ensuring that the party was well organised and that disciplinary problems were dealt with timeously. Even though it was well supported, Congress went on a recruitment drive throughout the country, becoming in the process a nationwide party. It also received the support of influential organisations such as the labour unions and the commercial and industrial organisations. Congress adapted its policies to suite a constituency whose support it was trying to win. It was flexible in becoming all things to all people. Having control of the country¶s limited resources it could afford to dispense patronage in order to win support. This was made easier by the contributions of influential people who wanted favours from Congress. The party also continued to receive support because of Nehru, and the role it played in the nationalist struggle.

3.3 The Histadrut ņ vehicle behind Mapai¶s dominance: 1949- 1977

3.3.1 Introduction

Mapai emerged victorious from a multiplicity of parties which contested the 1949 elections to lead Israel until it merged with other labour-oriented parties to form the Labour Alignment in 1965. During this period Mapai was the largest single party, entrusted with forming the country¶s government. However, much as this was the case, Mapai was forced to invite other parties to form a coalition government as it did not achieve an absolute majority. Mapai was a leading political force in Israel providing most of the country¶s prime ministers and holding important positions in the cabinet in the period under discussion. (Katz 1980:29). points out that during the founding period, Mapai was the party of administration and government

3.3.2 Organisational strength

When the state of Israel was formed, Mapai was already a well-established political party, attracting newly arriving immigrants to the organisation. Medding (1972:89) points out that after statehood, the party experienced tremendous growth in the number of branches and membership. The party recruited the arriving immigrants and facilitated their participation in its affairs. The rank and file members were divided geographically and connected to the party through the local branch and regional structures which permeated throughout the country. The biggest branches were in the towns of Tel Aviv and Haifa. By the middle of the 1950s the party was organised into over 400 branches. The membership of Mapai grew from 40 000 in 1948 to 196 000 in 1964 (Medding 1990:44).

3.3.3 Support of a strong socioeconomic bloc

Mapai, which ruled Israel from 1949 until 1965 when parties aligned to labour merged, owes its success and dominant position to Histadrut, the labour federation which was discussed in the previous chapter. Medding (1972:46) puts forward the view that no Israeli government could succeed without the steady cooperation of Histadrut. According to Johnston (1962:315), Mapai maintained majority control of the powerful labour federation which was its major source of strength.

At this point it is opportune to trace the origins of the relationship between Mapai and Histadrut, and the source of the labour federation¶s strength which makes it such an enormous, influential and much sought-after player in the politics of Israel. Histadrut was formed in 1920 during the period of the British mandate in Israel. Rolef (1987:145) describes Histadrut as ³a trade union, a mutual aid society, a productive economic system and a centre of cultural activities, sports and learning´. Mapai was formed ten years later. The close association between the two was forged at the height of the struggle to establish the state of Israel, in which both participated.

As Israel did not have a strong working class, Histadrut was established specifically to create it. This was done through the encouragement of the immigration of Jews from Europe into the disputed area. When this was restricted, Histadrut brought them into the country illegally (Samuel 1960:176). These new arrivals, who were offered employment, automatically became members of Histadrut. Bernstein (1957:61) argues that Mapai was better organised than other parties to absorb these new arrivals as it had the tradition of the party that led Zionism to statehood. Histadrut was an institution in its own right in Israel. It was more like a hydra, spreading its tentacles all over society and having a massive membership. According to Medding (1972:48), by 1963, almost 13 years after the new state was created, 90 per cent of the nation¶s employees were members of Histadrut. The wives of members of Histadrut also automatically became members of this organisation (Medding 1972:50). Histadrut, one of Israel¶s largest employers controlled two-thirds of the country¶s economic activities by 1962, operating manufacturing, contracting and marketing corporations, clinics, and hospitals, rest homes, buses and theatres (Kraines 1961:66).

The membership of Histadrut is drawn from all sectors of the community, be it rural or urban. It is only a small proportion of society such as large employers and shopkeepers that do not qualify for Histadrut membership. In their daily lives most Israelis were in contact with Histadrut. It had an overwhelming presence in Israeli society. As Luft puts it (Bernstein 1957: 30):

It was once pointed out that a member of the Histadrut could spend his whole life within the framework of the organisation. He wakes up in a house built by a Histadrut society, goes to work in a bus operated by a cooperative, spends his day in a factory owned by the Histadrut, sends his children to what used to be labour movement schools, goes to Kaput Holim (the Histadrut health service) for medical treatment, spends his vacation at a Histadrut rest home, and finds entertainment in workers¶ clubs and theatres. It needs no big stretch of imagination to say the same of the Mapai member who can, if he wishes, move exclusively within this huge, largely self-contained organisation.

All political parties in Israel fight for influence within Histadrut where they are all be represented. Political parties contest for representation to the Histadrut Convention whose elections are held every five years. The posts for this body have to be filled on a proportionate number of votes the parties received. Mapai¶s influence and control of Histadrut is derived from the fact that it has over half of the votes in this organisation (Medding 1972:237). About 80 per cent of the members of the Histadrut belonged to the three major left-wing parties.

3.3.4 Penetration of society

Medding (1972:45) expresses the view that another factor which contributed to Mapai¶s success was its ability to penetrate organisations, performing an interest aggregation function. He states that:

« competitive organisational penetration was a major mechanism of political recruitment and socialisation, facilitating Mapai¶s efforts to integrate and incorporate diverse social forces into its structure and to aggregate their interests. Its main feature was the way in which it sought control of functional and occupational organisations in order to gain secure political support and to impose a degree of political direction over their activities.

Mapai did not rely on individual membership but on large or corporate membership. It infiltrated organisations, took over their leadership and brought their policies in line with its own. It penetrated most structures of Israeli society including agricultural settlements, industrial workers, artisans and professionals (Medding 1972:19).

Mapai¶s most successful penetration was that of the Workers Committee. The Workers Committee is the basic cell of Histadrut and exists in every workplace. The Committee is elected every two years and has a secretary. Because Workers Committees are in constant contact with workers through the functions that they perform, Mapai took control of them as they perform an important function at the workplace (Medding: 1972:49).

During the election of the Workers Committee, Mapai aimed at taking control of them and appoint the secretary, who would invariably be a member of the party. This would allow the Workers Committee to canvass support for Mapai. Eventually, Mapai controlled over 100 000 Workers Committees in Israel. Medding (1972:50) points out that access to a Workers Committee ³was particularly valuable at election time when Mapai members on the workers committees actively sought support for the party, on a direct, informal and personal basis, either at the plant or by visiting workers¶ homes´.

3.3.5 Pragmatism

Mapai also put flexibility to good effect in recruiting and retaining members. This occurred when there was an increase in the number of new arrivals in the country. Mapai socialised them into the party and adapted its policies to suite both the old and new members. The party displayed flexibility in incorporating a diversity of viewpoints as it coopted more groups. Initially a large percentage of the party¶s membership consisted of agriculturalists, but when there was increasing urbanisation, it directed its focus to this new group (Medding 1972:16). The party then assumed the status of a workers¶ party.

The party incorporated diverse elements within its structures. Medding (1990:44) points out that immigration introduced ethnic diversification and heightened consciousness giving added weight to groups based on sex, age and religion. Mapai, not only sought to incorporate members of these groups, but adopted separate organisational approaches in each case to facilitate their incorporation.

Medding (1990:47) states that Mapai was flexible, and much as it was committed to defending the sovereignty of Israel, it was also prepared to explore other avenues to bring peace to the territory. On economic issues the party adopted a ³middle-of- the-road´ economic policy which embraced elements of socialism and capitalism. It shunned the nationalisation of property as it was wary of frightening away private investors.

3.3.6 Patronage Histadrut was not the only source of patronage: the civil service constituted another source. Israel had to establish a civil service at the formation of statehood. While this was being undertaken, recruitment was conducted directly by the ministries and not by the Civil Service Commission which was only established in 1951 (Medding 1990:157). This resulted in a situation where employment in the civil service was made on the basis of political and personal acquaintance. Medding (1990:157) points out that ³a significant proportion of the early appointees were placed there by their political parties´. As Mapai was in control of government it stands to reason that most of the people in the civil service were its appointees.

Histadrut owned construction companies which were by far the largest in the country providing employment to a large number of workers who invariably would vote for Mapai (Shalev 1990:102). Through Histadrut, Mapai controlled labour exchanges which exerted substantial control over the distribution of employment (Medding 1990:60).

3.3.7 Symbolism ಥ role of Ben-Gurion and Mapai in the founding of the state of Israel

The heroic role that Ben-Gurion played in the formation of the state of Israel was discussed in the previous chapter. Medding (1972:50) dismisses the notion that the party¶s success was solely due to the influence of Ben Gurion. This is in contrast to the view held by Johnston (1962:315) that ³the presence of Ben Gurion alone has been an asset of great importance, and in the 1959 campaign the party¶s strongest theme was µSay yes to the old man¶´.

Bernstein (1957:61) points out that new immigrants arriving and not being able to distinguish between the parties recognised the figure of Ben-Gurion who won independence for the country. For years Ben-Gurion remained a hero to the Israelis, particularly those who remembered his involvement in the struggle for nationhood for which he was imprisoned. He served as Prime Minister of the country on numerous occasions. Mapai considered it had a divine right to rule Israel because of the role it played in establishing the state of Israel.

The role of Ben-Gurion as the power behind Mapai¶s electoral victories in the post- statehood period play second fiddle to his role as an international statesman whose stature benefited Israel as a whole. As Prime Minister and Minister of Defence he devoted himself to policy and high matters of state and society (Medding 1990:180). Medding (1990:211) argues that it was Ben-Gurion who benefited from his association with Mapai rather than the converse. He states that although Ben- Gurion¶s acknowledged leadership of the state strengthened Mapai as a party, both internally and externally, in many important ways his leadership (of Israel) was dependent upon Mapai¶s institutional and organisational strength.

Medding (1990:222) however later gives Ben-Gurion credit for his leadership role in Mapai when he asserts that he was able to set the political agenda, determine national priorities, make the major policy decisions and mobilise public support for the party. This, after he had initially quoted Ben-Gurion as saying that he did not control the inner workings of the party, as he was distant from what went on inside. He admits that he was not particularly well informed on what had been happening inside the party except what he read in newspapers (Medding 1990:179).

3.3.8 Electoral performance

Medding (1990:44) points out that between 1949 and 1965 Mapai consistently gained between 32,2 and 38,2 per cent of the popular vote, giving it between 40 and 47 seats. Mapai never won enough seats on its own to form a government, but invited other parties to join it in forming a government. It contested elections on its own until 1965, after which it became part of the Labour Alignment which contested the 1969 and 1973 elections. The following table shows how Mapai performed in elections between 1949 and 1965 on its own and the 1969 and 1973 as part of the labour alignment:

Year 1949 1951 1955 1959 1961 1965 1969 1973

% of votes 36 38 32 39 35 37 46 38

No. of seats 46 45 40 47 42 55 56 51

% of seats 38 41 33 39 35 46 38 42

3.3.9 Summary

The establishment of the state of Israel was a struggle for Mapai and the pioneering Jews who arrived in Palestine at the beginning of the 20th century. They were faced with numerous obstacles, the most serious being the opposition of the Arabs to a Jewish settlement in what they considered to be their territory. This frequently led to the outbreak of hostilities between the two communities. However, the persistence and resolve of the Jews resulted in a state of Israel being declared in 1948.

A year after the state was declared, elections were held which were won by Mapai. As the first government of the fledgling state, Mapai had to cater for a flood of immigrants arriving from Eastern Europe. Having been formed in the pre-statehood period, Mapai restructured itself to meet the post-statehood challenges facing the new state. Mapai was able to organise itself into a strong organisation with a presence throughout the country. It also retained and strengthened its relationship with the labour federation. It increased its support by penetrating and taking over other existing organisations in addition to creating new ones.

Mapai was pragmatic in that it was always prepared to adapt its policies in order to recruit more new members. As a government, Mapai adopted a mixture of socialism and capitalism and avoided nationalisation of property. With the assistance of Histadrut it increased its presence in the country¶s industrial and commercial sectors as the immigrants were offered employment upon their arrival. Through their membership of Histadrut, the immigrants and the other workers invariably voted for Mapai. The continued presence of Ben-Gurion also ensured that the people associated with the founding of the new state would continue to vote for the party.

3.4 Fascism, World War II and the rise to dominance of the Christian Democratic Party (DC): 1948 ņ 1973

3.4.1 Introduction

After expelling the communists and socialists from the coalition government which was formed after the 1946 Constituent Assembly elections, the Christian Democratic Party (DC) won the 1948 elections and went on to rule Italy uninterruptedly until 1992. During this period, the party formed every cabinet and provided the country¶s prime ministers (Pasquino 1980:88) However, what should be taken into consideration is that, as it did not win an absolute majority of votes, it was forced to form coalitions with other smaller parties in order to rule the country. Sassoon (1986:179) points out that in the entire history of the Italian Republic there has never been a case of a government made up of a single party relying exclusively on its own votes in parliament.

3.4.2 Organisational strength

After the war and the fall of Fascism, the DC and the country¶s other political parties reorganised themselves in order to contest for power. The DC¶s support was bolstered when the remnants of the PPI joined the party. From this beginning the DC grew into of one Italy¶s strongest parties with massive support. The person behind the reorganisation of the party was De Gasperi, who stepped into the leadership role.

On its launch the DC went on a strong recruitment drive which yielded positive results as its membership increased. In 1945 it established 7 000 local offices and recruited half a million members. The party published nine daily newspapers and eight weeklies in order to communicate with its members. By 1953 its membership had reached 1 million and in 1973 this went up to 1.8 million (Spotts & Wieser 1986:22). The DC drew its membership from an array of societal organisations with housewives being the single largest group. The DC became a mass party organised on a national, regional, provincial and communal basis with membership being open to people over 18 years. The basic unit of the DC was the section to which its members belonged at the grassroots level (Zuckerman 1979:85).

3.4.3 Support of a strong socioeconomic bloc

Hughes (1979:159) characterises the DC as a catchall party. He states that its supporters includes a rainbow of social classes and tendencies. According to him, the DC was ³a political movement of great landowners, poor peasants, industrialists, Catholic workers and different types of the middle-class´. However, diverse as these people were, they were held together by their belief in Catholicism. Catholic support, a pre-existing bloc, is seen by scholars such as Sassoon (1986), Zuckerman (1979), Hughes (1979), Pasquino (1980) and Leonardi and Wertman (1989) as being the major factor behind the DC¶s electoral victories throughout the period of its dominance.

Pasquino (1980:89) points out that from the beginning of its rule, the party was dependent on outside support, particularly that coming from and produced by Catholic organisations. Pasquino (1980:90) further expresses the view that the major compound of DC strength has ³always been and still is the large, stable support of Catholics who constitute about 98 percent of the Italian population´. Catholics have always been considered the single most important component of the party¶s strength. The DC relied on Catholic organisations for access to the voters.

Although not a Catholic party, the DC has been essentially a party of Catholics. Actually, Sassoon (1986:143) points out that the DC was seen as the long arm of the church. Most civil society organisations found in Italy are aligned to the church. These include trade unions, and organisations for professionals, women, landowners, farmers, youths and students. In order to strengthen its support, the DC also formed organisations that invariably were dominated by Catholics (Sassoon 1986:229). Among the organisations were those of youths, workers, school teachers, women and lawyers.

3.4.4 The DC and anti-communism

As a party closely aligned to the church, the DC was anti-communist. The church played a pivotal role in the DC¶s victory in the 1946 and 1948 elections as discussed in the preceding chapter. In 1949 the church issued a decree prohibiting any of its members from joining the Communist Party and distributing any of its literature. Those disobeying the decree with threatened with excommunication from the church (Sassoon 1986:145).

The DC was a party comprised of a disparate group of people with diverse interests. De Gasperi had to bring them together into a coherent unit and to this end he used their common loathing of communism. Spotts and Wieser (1986:23) point out that the deep fear of communism during the Cold War years was an important catalyst in transforming these disparate people into a solid political force.

Fearful of communist influence spreading to Western Europe, the United States actively campaigned for the DC during the 1946 and 1948 elections. The pervasive influence of the US after the war led the DC to mortgage its independence to the US. Another factor that has to be taken into account here was that Italy was a devastated country after the war and on its own it would have taken a lengthy period of time to recover. It thus had no hesitation in accepting the offer of assistance from the US (Mignone 1995:25).

The party was strongly supported by the US whose interest was to see to it that communism did not get a foothold in Italy. The DC made much of it being the bulwark against communism and the upholders of Western democracy and a free market system. Tarrow (1990:315) expresses the view that ³American influence assured that in economics as in politics, reconstruction would follow liberal- capitalist lines and that the working class would learn who was boss in the factory´. Italy was perceived as the buffer against communism in Europe. Pasquino (1990:19) states that from 1945 to 1989, Italy¶s status was as a ³front-line´ country in the West¶s strategy to contain the Soviet bloc. Tarrow (1990:319) attributes DC hegemony to ³its affiliation with the US, the requisites of its centrist strategy, and the distributional policies that followed from those that created the foundation for the party¶s hegemony´.

3.4.5 Penetration of society

Sassoon (1986:8) argues that the DC realised that for it to maintain its dominant position it would not be able to rely forever on the church. It then went out of its way to form its own support base, independent of the church. This resulted in it developing a presence in all sectors of society through the creation of nonparty organisations, which it controlled. Spotts and Wieser (1986:15) express the view that ³so broad and effective was the DC¶s control of society that it eventually developed into a veritable symbiosis of party, government, and the state´. The party¶s influence permeated throughout society. According to Leonardi and Wertman (1989:46), the DC had a large network of structures which gave the party organisational presence in every community or city quarters in the country. The party also effectively used its control of broadcasting to relay its messages to the larger Italian community.

3.4.6 Pragmatism

After the fall of Mussolini¶s Fascist regime, Italy had to establish a new political system. This was the task that De Gasperi mulled over from the sanctuary of the Vatican. Creating a new system for Italy was made difficult by the presence of Catholicism in Italy. De Gasperi adopted a middle position for DC when he fused Catholicism and liberal democracy (Spotts & Wieser 1986:23). He integrated the mass of Catholics for the first time into democratic parliamentarism. Leonardi and Wertman (1989:46) put forward the view that the DC was a centrist party. It was forced to adopt this position as it was operating in a system that was fragmented among various classes, ideologies and socioeconomic organisations. This enabled it not to be identified with any class or groupings within society, which made it easy for the party to act as arbiter among different groups in society. In the economic sphere, the DC adopted a middle position, which embraced both socialism and capitalism. Leonardi and Wertman (1989:45) state that the socioeconomic system lay between the alternative of a completely free enterprise system and a socialised economy.

3.4.7 Patronage

The DC used patronage to perpetuate its stay in power and to withstand the challenge of the opposition, particularly of the Communist Party. This it did by developing a network of clienteles through its possession of funds and creation of jobs. It used its control over public money to support specific social groups and interests. Italy experienced an economic boom which made jobs in the public sector available. The DC offered these jobs to people who were aligned to the party (Sassoon 1986:8). By placing its loyal members in the state apparatus, the party transformed them into an array of clients. The DC took advantage of its control over the bureaucracy to place many of its supporters on the public payroll.

Zuckerman (1979:82) posits the view that the DC¶s control of the bureaucracy permitted those interest groups and individuals associated with the party to get what they wanted from the government as they had easy access to the ministers. He adds that political considerations coloured appointments to senior positions in government. The DC was also in control of public corporations which were an important source of employment, investment credit and DC patronage. The DC did not use patronage only to induce support for its members. It also used it to neutralise the opposition. Levite and Tarrow (1983:311) assert that the DC allowed other parties a share of patronage ņ if not power ņ if only because any other strategy would have increased polarisation and undermined its position at the centre of the political spectrum. Opposition political parties were not beyond succumbing to offers of patronage from the DC.

Pasquino (1980:94) is in two minds about the influence of patronage on the DC¶s success. In one instance he expresses the view ³that nowhere is clientelism alone the basis of the strength of the party´. However, he later contradicts himself when he points out that clientelism constituted later on one of the pillars of DC support. He argues that the creation of a clientelistic system was made with the establishment and subsequent enlargement of the public sector of the economy. Pasquino (1980:94) expresses the view that this ³produced the prerequisites for the inauguration of a modern, managerial system of clientelism´.

3.4.8 Symbolism of De Gasperi¶s role in reorganising the DC and leading Italy to political stability

The defeat of Mussolini¶s authoritarian Fascist Party and the end of World War II, gave the Italians an opportunity of adopting a new political order. De Gasperi, who survived the excesses of Fascism as he was neither arrested, killed or forced into exile, applied his mind to this problem from the safety of the Vatican. He laid ideas for the foundation of Italy¶s new democratic political system. De Gasperi led Italy from the crisis and chaos which were the result of Fascist rule to stability. During his leadership of the country from 1948 to 1953 he was able to bring respectability to the DC and the country (Leonardi & Wertman 1989:27).

3.4.9 Electoral performance

De Gasperi, who was the Prime Minister of Italy from June 1945 to July 1953, is credited with having fashioned the DC into a dynamic force through his astute leadership. Spotts and Wieser (1986:23) point out that he succeeded in laying the foundation of a viable, long-term governing system by insisting that his party should forge alliances with other democratic forces. The party emerged as the strongest in the popular poll. It put together governing coalitions and ruled Italy, for over 25 years. The following table shows how the party performed in the elections:

Year 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1972

% of votes 49 40 42 38 39 39

No. of seats 304 262 273 260 265 266

% of seats 53 44 46 41 42 44

3.4.10 Summary

The DC took sole control of Italy when it expelled the Communist and Socialist Parties from the coalition government formed at the end of the war. It then established itself as a force within Italian politics ruling for well over 25 years. Under the leadership of De Gasperi, the DC became a mass party with its membership gradually increasing. The party was represented in every community in the country. The beginning of the Cold War and the fear of communist encroachment in Western Europe, resulted in Western countries, led by the United States favouring the DC over the Communist and Socialist parties. The DC positioned itself as the upholder of democracy against communism. As a Christian party at variance with communism, it received the blessing of the Catholic Church.

The party penetrated society and controlled most organisations associated with the church. It also formed its own organisations. As it controlled the bureaucracy and state resources it was able to dispense patronage, not only to its members but even to the opposition, thus compromising it. The party was responsible for the creation of a pragmatic political system which fused liberal democracy and Catholicism. The party benefited from being at the helm of the transition from authoritarianism to a democratic political system under the leadership of De Gasperi.

3.5 The SDP¶s shaky start to dominance in Sweden: 1932 ņ 1957

3.5.1 Introduction

Having ascended to power in 1932 without a working majority, the idea that the SDP would consolidate its position and stay in power for over four decades could not have been foreseen. The SDP¶s ascension to power was aided by the Swedish king who invited it to form a government after a stalemate which was brought about by the fact that none of the parties had attained an absolute majority in the Riksdag, the Swedish parliament. The party in turn invited the Agrarian Party to join it in forming a coalition government.

The SDP proceeded from this shaky start to dominate Swedish politics for a period of 44 years, as its share of the votes increased ranging between 40 and 50 per cent during this period (Board 1970:91). Castles (1975:79) puts forward the view that the SDP became the natural party of government, ³since it was the only party which could conceivably form a government of its own, the only party which could form a minority government, where the non-socialist vote is less than 50 percent, and the party in the best tactical position to take a leading role in a coalition where the vote exceeded 50 percent´.

3.5.2 Organisational strength

Board (1970:91) states that, at the time, the SDP was the most highly organised party in Sweden, with its support being evenly spread throughout the country. According to Andren (1961:27), the SDP had local organisations and workers communes based on both individual membership and block affiliation through trade unions. The structures of the party included youth and women¶s organisations. The SDP had its own publications which were distributed throughout the country. The party boasted a stable leadership, not having a high leadership turnover during its period of dominance which ended in 1976 (Hancock 1972:115) . Between 1932 and 1957 it only had two leaders - Per Albin Hansson who was the leader from 1932 until 1946 and Tage Erlander who took over in 1946 until 1969 (Hancock 1972:115).

3.5.3 Support of a strong socioeconomic bloc

There is unanimity among scholars writing on the dominance of the Swedish politics by the SDP that this was made possible by the relationship between the party and the labour movement. This relationship was strengthened after the party ascended to power. Throughout all succeeding elections, the SDP was assured of the unwavering support of the labour movement. Sweden¶s labour movement grew in strength when the country experienced rapid industrialisation during the first three decades of the 20th century (Tomasson 1970:33). This, according to Castles (1975:177), created a large working class which became the main feature of the SDP¶s social recruitment and mobilisation..

Organised labour was the major pillar of socialist electoral support. The labour movement experienced a phenomenal growth after the ascension to power of the SDP. From initially attracting 39 per cent of the industrial worker¶s vote in the 1932 elections, Lewin (1972:281) points out that there was a correlation between the increase in the number of workers and the votes received by the party (from slightly under 740 000 voters in 1932 to about 870 000 in 1944). The majority of workers in Sweden were unionised and they accounted for about 70 per cent of the party¶s support (Board 1970:92).

A large percentage of the party¶s membership was collectively affiliated to the SDP, through the trade union membership. This ensured funding, membership and voter mobilisation for the party (Esping-Andersen 1990:43). The trade union not only supplied the votes to the SDP, but it also put its shoulder behind the wheel and supplied manpower. It provided financial support to the party¶s press and publications and actively campaigned for and financially supported the election of the SDP (Tomasson 1970:35).

Castles (1975:177-178) identifies three factors which he argues facilitated the mobilisation of the working class by the SDP:

‡ The absence of religious, ethnic or linguistic cleavages which would have served to draw strength away from socialist grouping.

‡ Unlike Britain and other Western European countries, Sweden did not seem to manifest the same pattern of differential working class voting behaviour. Only a small number of the working class voted for the nonsocialist parties.

‡ The SDP had only one rival on the left, the Communist Party, and at no time did it present any serious electoral challenge to the SDP hegemony.

3.5.4 Penetration of society

The SDP had a foothold in major organisations in the country. It penetrated most of Swedish society, such as cooperative movements, tenant and pensioner organisations, education and leisure societies (Esping-Andersen 1990:43). Castles (1975:176) points out that the SDP consulted organised groups throughout the country seeking their views on various issues. This was in an effort to reach consensus on contentious issues. By the 1950s, regular meetings were held between the Prime Minister, union leaders and business people. Explaining the purpose of these meetings, Castles (1975:176) states that they ³clearly contributed to the enduring success of the SDP´. Although the SDP was initially opposed to the flourishing of the temperance movement, it changed its attitude when it realised that they had a strong following. While it was initially against its members forming cooperative movements it softened its attitude towards them when workers continued forming them (Castles 1975:177).

3.5.5 Pragmatism

Although the SDP initially espoused Marxist socialism, on assuming power it did not follow the tenets of this economic system. It introduced a new variant of socialism, one that did not include the nationalisation of property, but recognised the importance of the free market system. Board (1970:92) argues that from being a Marxist party, the SDP evolved towards gradualism, abandoning the earlier nationalisation policy which it advocated.

The SDP adapted its policies in order to attract the support of other sectors of the Swedish community. It won over the support of the agrarian sector when it paid attention to their interests (Hancock 1972:115). It also made inroads into the middle- class constituency by advocating comprehensive measures to sustain economic growth and insure social justice and welfare (Hancock 1972:117). By so doing, the SDP became a party with broad-based appeal. When the population of farmers decreased, resulting in a large number of people moving from the rural to the urban areas, the SDP shifted its attention to the growing number of white collar workers who though unionised did not owe allegiance to any party (Esping-Andersen 1990:47).

Board (1970:96) expresses the view that the coalition between the SDP and the Agrarian Party, which became known as the Red-Green alliance, also benefited the SDP. This was an unusual alliance between a party which had a strong labour constituency and one whose support was derived from farmers. The two groups were an odd pair as the farmers who were pro-capital saw their socialist inclined allies as a major cause of their deteriorating profitability. The workers on the other hand blamed the farmers for the rise in food prices and their concomitant problems (Esping-Andersen 1990:41). The reason for this unusual alliance, according to Hadenius (1999:46), was that the farmers had suffered greatly during the Great Depression. They and the workers thus shared an interest in an active government policy to combat an economic crisis. In order to entice the Farmers Party, the SDP promised that it would implement agricultural subsidies to alleviate their economic problems (Hancock 1969:22). Esping-Andersen (1991:41) states that once established, the coalition with the farmers permitted the SDP to build its dominant political force for the long-range future. The first alliance between the two lasted from 1932 to 1936 and the second from 1951 to 1957.

3.5.6 Patronage

The use of patronage by the SDP and the benefit it derived from it is clouded by ambiguity. Patronage was underplayed, to the extent of almost being denied. Nobody wanted to openly admit that it existed. Regardless of its existence being qualified, what is at issue is the extent to which it manifested itself and its benefit to the SDP. Sweden has a very large public service consisting of dozens of state boards which employ thousands of people. The key positions of the boards are the director-generalships which are filled at the discretion of the government (Elder 1970:63).

Writing on the same theme of patronage, Board (1970:164) is ambiguous about its existence, first saying that very few jobs could be regarded as ³political´, and then continuing by stating ³but during the past decades, in some departments, party affiliation seems to have played a part in recruitment for some lower positions as well´. He qualifies this by adding that Sweden cannot be regarded as having a highly developed system of political patronage. His assertion is supported by Elder (1970:78) who submits that the number of persons appointed to headships of politically sensitive boards having an obvious political affiliation remained quite small.

On the other hand, Hancock (1972:96) unambiguously reveals the existence of patronage when he points out that from 1945 to 1965 the governing executive appointed 49 provincial governors. There were more governors from the SDP than members of any other single party. Elder (1970:78) avers that although civil servants were apolitical career officials some were known to be members of the SDP or open sympathisers with its policies. The political involvement at the top level of under- secretaryship was a source of complaint in the opposition press (Elder 1970:85). However, he qualifies this by stating that unlike in Britain, in Sweden it is regarded as nothing out of the ordinary if the under-secretary is an active sympathiser with the government, as he does not have to divorce himself from politics. Swedish ambassadors, according to Elder (1970: 85), included a sprinkling of men and women aligned to the SDP.

3.5.7 Symbolism

Before the SDP ascended to power in 1932, Sweden was faced with economic problems and high unemployment. Efforts to resolve the country¶s high unemployment rate were not successful. When the SDP revealed its plan to resolve this problem, it was taking a calculated gamble, as failure would have been disastrous for the party. However the SDP¶s plan was successful as it tackled unemployment resolutely and was able to reduce it during the period under review. This endeared the party to the Swedish people.

3.5.8 Electoral performance of the SDP

With the exception of the elections that brought it to power, the SDP¶s share of the votes has always been above the 45 per cent mark. The following table illustrates this performance:

Year 1932 1936 1940 1944 1948 1952 1957

% of votes 42 46 54 47 46 46 45

no of seats 104 112 134 115 112 110 106 % of seats 45 48 58 50 49 48 44,6

3.5.9 Summary

The SDP was a cohesive party which was well organised. During its long tenure in office it did not have a high turnover of leadership and support for the party was spread throughout the country. The SDP commanded reliable and unwavering support from the labour federation with its massive membership over the years in which it successively won Swedish elections. However the party did not only rely on this support but penetrated society, establishing itself throughout the country. It also adapted itself and its policies to attract support from other organisations. The issue of patronage much as it is downplayed was also a factor in the SDP¶s mobilisation of support. The SDP¶s rise to power was due to the economic and unemployment crisis the country was facing and the SDP was seen as the saviour of the Swedish people when it resolved these two problems. The SDP¶s economic success is discussed in a later chapter.

3.6 South Africa and the incipient rise to dominance by the African National Congress (ANC): 1994 -

3.6.1 Introduction

Given its overwhelming victory in South Africa¶s first democratic elections held in 1994, the possibility of the African National Congress (ANC) becoming a dominant party was already being predicted by scholars and political analysts such as Giliomee (1998), Lodge (1996), and Southall (1996). The ANC confirmed the prediction when it won the country¶s next two elections held in 1999 and 2004 with even bigger majorities. Not only did it win the national elections but it also took control of the country¶s nine provinces after the 2004 elections. It also won handsomely in the 1995 and 2000 municipal elections. In an article aptly titled, ³South Africa¶s emerging dominant-party regime´, Giliomee (1998), a political scientist, traces the rise to power of the ANC which he argues is steeped in its role as a party that fought against the white government and apartheid. Giliomee (1998:130) points out that after languishing for decades following its ban in 1960, the ANC made a comeback during the 1980s, ³capitalising on its 80 year history of championing black rights, its standing in world opinion, the immense prestige of Nelson Mandela and other imprisoned leaders, its selective use of violence, and its alliance with the independent trade union movement´.

3.6.2 Organisational strength

The first task facing the ANC when it was unbanned was converting itself from a nationalist movement to a political party. According to Lodge (1992:44), it had to turn followers into members. The ANC had throughout the years gained followers through the nationalist struggle it waged against the South African government. By the time it was unbanned in 1990, it was already a household name within the country. A number of internal organisations such as the UDF and COSATU increased its popularity as they were associated with it.

Upon its unbanning, a decision was taken that the UDF should dissolve and its structures be absorbed into the ANC (Lodge 1992:43). The UDF structures consisted of civic associations, youth, women and student organisations. Lodge (1992:44) states that within two years of its legal existence, the ANC made good progress in consolidating its support. He argues that during this period the ANC acquired 900 branches, 500 000 signed members, a 20 storey office block in central Johannesburg, a fresh leadership, a democratic constitution, an elaborate administration and an annual income which topped R90 million.

With its support spread throughout the country, the ANC had to form structures to accommodate this uncoordinated support in formal party structures. Both the Women¶s and Youth Leagues were resuscitated. The Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (CONTRALESA) also associated itself with the ANC (Rantete 1998:16). The organisation went on a drive to launch regions and branches and established nine provincial and 52 regional offices throughout the country. It also formed branches in white, coloured and Indian areas (Rantete 1998:20). Rantete (1998) points out that the profile which the ANC enjoyed and the euphoria surrounding Mandela¶s release from prison paved the way for easy recruitment, particularly within the black community. The ANC developed into a mass-based political party, but although it had huge support, the majority of this support did not consist of card-carrying members. According to Lodge (2004:191), many people may consider themselves to be ANC members, even if they do not hold membership cards or pay regular R12 annual subscriptions.

3.6.3 Support of strong socioeconomic bloc

3.6.3.1 African masses

There is unanimity among scholars who wrote on the election success of the ANC that this was due largely to the preponderance of Africans who voted for the party in all three elections. For instance, in the 1994 elections the ANC polled 94 per cent of the African vote. However, much as this is the case, Lodge (1995:475) adds that the ANC also received a substantial backing from Indian and coloured voters. A negligible number of whites cast their vote for the ANC.

Owing to the high number of Africans who voted for the ANC, South Africa¶s elections were dubbed a racial census by scholars such as Lodge (1995), Brooks (2004), Southall (1996) and Welsh (1996). Those holding this view argue that elections follow racial lines, with whites voting for white parties such as the New National Party (NNP) and the Democratic Alliance and Africans for the ANC. Brooks (2004: 2) points out that in the absence of a credible opposition, South Africans continue to vote largely according to racial identity. However, scholars such as Lanegran (2001) and Habib and Taylor (2001) disagree with this categorisation of South Africa¶s elections. Lanegran (2001:87) points out that surveys that have been conducted reveal that voter identity was not a primary determinant of party preferences, even if the electorate aligned itself into party constituencies that largely reflected racial divisions. Much as the ANC portrays itself as a party for all South Africans, there is no doubt that it receives the majority of its support from African voters. The ANC is seen by Africans as a guardian of their interests and aspirations. According to a survey conducted by Schlemmer (2004:6), they (Africans) were even prepared to vote for the ANC while not satisfied with key aspects of the party. Booysen (1999:253) also points out that Africans were not perturbed about the party¶s performance record, as they compared the first five years of ANC rule with 55 years of NP rule. They contend that the ANC must be given more time to make good on its promise of a ³better life for all´. Africans have placed their faith in the ANC to offer them a better life and the ANC is strongly supported in the impoverished rural areas. In the 1994 elections the ANC¶s share of the votes in the then Orange Free State, Northern and Eastern Transvaal and the North West roughly equalled the African proportion of the population (Lodge 1995:474).

The documents of the ANC placed a strong emphasis on improving the lives of those people who were disadvantaged during the apartheid era. It promised to address the inequalities and injustices which were a product of discriminatory legislation that was passed by the previous white South African government. According to Schrire (1994:8), the ANC focused on issues that are of major concern to its historical constituency, such as land reform, job creation and redistribution.

3.6.3.2 Labour federation

The labour federation, COSATU, has been a strong ally of the ANC since its unbanning. It forms part of the Tripartite Alliance with the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the ANC. COSATU endorsed the ANC during preparations for the 1994 elections. After these elections it committed itself to further supporting the ANC. It said this was necessary as the ANC needed support in order to succeed in implementing its plans (Buhlungu 1994:9). COSATU provided the ANC with personnel during election campaigning. In 1994 the labour federation¶s membership stood at 1.2 million. However this figure has been decreasing over the years due to job losses. A month prior to the 2004 elections, COSATU¶s shop stewards from Gauteng met in Johannesburg to put plans in place to ensure that the ANC would win the elections because it was the only party, among those contesting the elections, which was close to the workers. They declared that there was no party that could assist and listen to the problems of the workers apart from the ANC. The ANC has been the only party to be supported by a mass-based labour organisation in all the three elections.

3.6.4 Penetration of society

Much as it already had a large constituency courtesy of the UDF, the ANC did not rest on its laurels but expanded its support. It infiltrated informal settlements which were mushrooming in the urban areas. These areas were named after prominent members of the ANC such as Mandela, Chris Hani, Winnie Mandela, Walter Sisulu and Oliver Tambo. The ANC established branches in these informal settlements.

After the draft constitution was accepted and political parties prepared themselves for the 1994 elections, the ANC canvassed prominent black people in order to include them in the parliamentary list. These prominent people were from the following sectors: business, sports, entertainment, education and the media. These were people who were popular in their communities and commanded respect. Using this strategy, the ANC was aiming to draw their supporters into the party. Among the celebrities who were invited to accept nominations were singers such Mirriam Makeba, who is internationally acclaimed, and Jennifer Ferguson (Rantete 1998:237). Using the Freedom Charter, which recognises a multiracial South Africa, it also made overtures to members of the white population.

During the period following its unbanning the ANC embarked on a number of protest activities. These protest activities which included what came to be known as rolling mass-action were attended by thousands of people. The ANC used these protest gatherings to mobilise support. The ANC also organised marches to demand the release of prisoners, return of exiles (Lodge 1992: 69). The ANC also used the violence which broke out in the Witwatersrand to win over the township residents. The violence resulted in scores of residents losing their lives. The ANC claimed the township constituency for itself and it got involved in assisting bereaved families in organising funerals. Its officials maintained a high profile at places where attacks on residents occurred. The colours of the organisation were prominently displayed at these funerals (Mtimkulu 1993: 221).

3.6.5 Pragmatism

When the ANC was banned and operating in exile it criticised the institutions which had been established by the then South African government to accommodate the aspirations of black people in accordance with the policy of separate development. These areas were known either as bantustans or homelands and incorporated their own political institutions and organisations. Indians and coloureds also had their own separate institutions. The ANC extended its criticism to people who had accepted these separate institutions and were serving within them. However, when the party was unbanned it did a volte face, inviting the leaders of these institutions and people living in these areas to join the ANC (Rantete 1998:237).

The party¶s call received a positive response as a majority of the leaders participating in these institutions abandoned them and joined the ANC. Prominent among them was General Bantu Holomisa and Stella Sigcau, both of whom had served as the president of the Transkei. From Venda came Brigadier Gabriel Ramashwana who had served as the president of the homeland after it was granted ³independence´ by South Africa (Rantete 1998:237). Leaders of the Transkei, Venda, political parties from various homelands and Indians and coloureds from the Tricameral Parliament aligned themselves with the ANC at the CODESA talks (Welsh 1992:19). Jan van Eck, Dave Dalling and Jannie Momberg, who were members of the Democratic Party joined the ANC and were included in the ANC¶s parliamentary list.

The ANC also appointed individuals from opposition parties to serve as the country¶s ambassadors. It successfully neutralised the Inkatha Freedom Party when in 2003 it appointed Ben Ngubane, a senior party member, who once served as the Premier of KwaZulu-Natal as ambassador to Tokyo. The ANCµs most successful pragmatic move was its invitation in 2004 to the New National Party (NNP) to join the party. The leader of the NNP, Martinus van Schalkwyk, accepted the invitation and encouraged members of his party to follow suite. This led to the demise of the party, as in 2005 during the floor-crossing period most of the remaining MPs of the NNP joined the ANC.

While in exile the ANC was perceived by the South African government and some people in the white community as being close to the Soviet Union, and as such, a proponent of a Marxist variant of socialism. It was feared that an ANC government, in accordance with this system, would be in favour of nationalisation and ownership of property by the state. After it was unbanned the leaders of the ANC were constantly asked to clarify the position of the party regarding nationalisation. Most were at pains to give clear and unambiguous answers.

The ANC dispelled the notion that it was wedded to nationalisation with Mandela explaining that the party was flexible on the economy. He said the party had no ideological commitment to the policy of nationalisation and would be prepared to consider other alternatives. During the first five years of its rule the ANC adopted a neoliberal economic policy known as Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR). This was the antithesis of the socialist-based economy favoured by the ANC¶s alliance partners who were opposed to it (Habib and Taylor 2001: 59). By adopting GEAR, the ANC was seen as abandoning the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) which was its cornerstone.

Through the RDP, the ANC aimed to improve the quality of life of the previously disadvantaged people by creating jobs, building cheap houses and providing them with electricity and water (Lodge 1999:4). The adoption of GEAR alarmed the SACP and COSATU and resulted in tensions within the Tripartite Alliance (Habib and Taylor 2001: 59). The allies saw GEAR as a deviation from the good intentions of the RDP. To them GEAR favoured white business as it advocated for privatisation, deficit reduction, government rightsizing, tariff reduction and wage cuts (Lodge 1999:5).

3.6.6 Patronage

In all its documents, the ANC¶s major concern was the inequalities which existed in South Africa and were a creation of the previous white governments. It made known its intention of addressing the imbalances of the past which had created the inequalities. With the control of state resources and institutions falling into its hands, the ANC was able to dispense patronage not only to its members and sympathisers but to the black community as well.

It is important to add here that there is a blurred distinction between patronage and a sincere intention to redress imbalances of the past through redistributive policies. Patronage refers to the practice whereby persons in high government office hand out material gains to trusted followers such as ambassadorships, government grants to constituents and state contracts to donors. The ANC¶s quest for egalitarianism has been interpreted as another method of patronage. The allocation of the budget for education, social welfare, health and other social services has been skewed in favour of poor communities.

During the CODESA negotiations, the NP received guarantees that there would not be wholesale replacement of white civil servants from the public sector. Mandela accepted the need for continuity in the civil service (Humphries 1994:33), but during the second term of its rule the ANC nevertheless gradually replaced white civil servants with the public service at national, provincial and local level being taken over by ANC appointees.

On the economic front, in order to let blacks have a stake in the economy of the country, the ANC pursued a policy of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE). In pursuance of this policy, it favoured blacks in the purchasing of former state enterprises. Members of the black community were also invited to buy shares in these enterprises. Blacks were also appointed to senior managerial positions in these enterprises as well as in parastatals. The tendering process was designed to favour black people. With the policy of affirmative action, which was enshrined in the Constitution, blacks were given preference in employment as well as being promoted to senior positions where they were employed. Schlemmer (2004:9) points out that the ANC has African voters captive simply by virtue of the fact that its employment equity and empowerment policies make it unthinkable for middle-class Africans to join opposition parties.

3.6.7 Symbolism ± legacy of Mandela and ANC¶s role in the liberation struggle

The ANC prides itself on being the party that made it possible for South Africa to have a new political system. Its members were not modest about this, making it known at every opportunity that presented itself. This fact has been generally accepted by the majority of South Africa¶s black population. Most of the ANC members who were in exile and took part in the liberation struggle, came to back to South Africa to a hero¶s welcome after 1990. These people symbolised the liberation struggle.

The ascendancy of Mandela to the presidency of South Africa was generally welcomed by most of South Africans, including those people who harboured reservations about the ANC. This was because he spoke of reconciliation and urged all South African to work together in building a new South Africa. Not only did Mandela talk of reconciliation but he went out of his way to meet even with Afrikaner right-wingers, who were opposed to an ANC takeover of power. He even went to the extent of conceding the idea of a separate area (homeland) for those Afrikaners who were clamouring for such a territory.

Mandela became an international statesman who was much sought after both nationally and internationally. Much as he was still involved in the affairs of the ANC, devoting time to go to Shell House every so often, he expanded his energy for the cause of South Africa. He was seen as a unique leader, possessing rare qualities. He was admired for his courageousness and his kind heartedness, evidenced by his constant refrain of reconciliation.

Mandela did his fair share of work for the ANC, particularly in preparation for the 1999 elections. During his tours abroad, he raised funds for the ANC¶s election campaign (Lodge 2001:82). He also attended numerous campaign rallies in different parts of the country. He attended a rally addressed by Mbeki in the populous Soweto where he received a rousing welcome on being introduced (Lodge 2001:105). Mandela addressed rallies in most provinces exhorting the people to vote for the ANC. One such rally was in Harrismith in the Free State which was attended by 60 000 people (Lodge 2001:118). Mandela urged the crowd to vote for the ANC as it was the only party that could give them a better future. The ANC used him to urge coloureds and whites to vote for the party. He went to the former Transkei where he allayed the fears of traditional leaders who were apprehensive that their powers would be curtailed. Mandela ensured that there would be no leadership battles when he retired by gradually letting Mbeki assume some of his duties prior to his stepping down.

3.6.8 Electoral performance

The ANC was tipped to win the country¶s first elections when campaigning started in early 1994. What was in doubt was the number of votes it would garner. Predictions were that it would get a two-thirds majority that would enable it to change the Constitution. However, in these elections the ANC narrowly missed the magical figure, gaining 62,65 percent of the votes, giving it 252 parliamentary seats. It improved on this performance in the 1999 elections increasing its percentage to 66,36 percent which earned it 266 seats. In the 2004 elections it received 69,68 percent of the votes which translated into 279 seats. With the exception of the 1994 elections which were marred by violence and intimidation, the succeeding elections were trouble free. Much as there is an uneasiness about the ANC because of the abrasiveness of some of its members and its intolerance towards the opposition, there has been no undue interference with the constitution and the people¶s civil liberties that could have influenced the results of the elections in favour of the party. Brooks (2004: 3) articulates the view that a number of states in Africa have witnessed the manipulation of electoral laws and regulations by the incumbent party with the intention of ensuring that it retains power. She quotes Zimbabwe as a case in point.

Year 1994 1999 2004

% of votes 63 66 70

No. of seats 252 266 279

% of seats 63 66 70

3.6.9 Summary

After winning South Africa¶s first democratic elections in 1994, the ANC was returned to power in 1999 and 2004, setting it on course to becoming a dominant party. On returning to South Africa after years in exile the ANC reorganised itself from a nationalist movement into a political party. The ANC turned the thousands of African people who supported it into members who belonged to the party¶s branches and regions, which were established throughout the country.

In the three elections the party won, its support came predominantly from two large socioeconomic blocs ± the African constituency and the labour movement, COSATU. The ANC penetrated society when it took over the already existing civil society structures which previously belonged to the UDF. It also established branches in the mushrooming informal settlements.

The ANC was pragmatic as it abandoned its socialist rhetoric and adopted a free market economic system. It invited all and sundry including its erstwhile enemies to join the party. It offered ambassadorial positions to people belonging to opposition parties. Being committed to transforming society and the eradicating inequalities of the past regime, the ANC was in a strong position to dispense patronage to its supporters. However the party benefited from its role in the liberation struggle and its association with the icon, Nelson Mandela.

3.7 Conclusion

When the parties that are the subject of our study ascended to power, none of them had any notion that they would become dominant. What was important to them was winning the next election they were faced with. Dominance, according to Pempel (1990:341), ³is more easily recognised in the cycle of its continuance than in the seeds of its regeneration´.

The purpose of this chapter was to identify the factors that facilitated the rise to dominance of these parties. For the parties to achieve dominance, they needed to rely on much more than the factors that were responsible for their initial ascension to power.

The parties had to come up with other strategies to supplement the legacy associated with their role in the unusual circumstances they found themselves in. The discussion above elicited the following factors: organisational strength, continued existence of strong socioeconomic blocs; penetration of society, pragmatism, patronage and the symbolism of a party and its leader being associated with the successful resolution of the unusual circumstances.

3.7.1 Organisational strength

A well-organised and run organisation is more likely to be successful than one which is disorderly. The BDP, Congress, Mapai, DC, SDP and the ANC were well-organised parties which established structures in the form of regional offices and branches throughout their countries. They canvassed support from various organs of society and socialised them into their parties. The BDP managed to attract the support of the elite of Botswana¶s society who made human and financial contributions to the party. The party has an efficient administration with its offices based in Gaborone and full- time workers seeing to the everyday administration of the party. The party also has structures spread throughout the country. During election time it receives funding from its wealthy members and this enables it to initiate successful election campaigns.

Congress was a cohesive organisation even while still a nationalist movement. It went on an extensive nationwide recruitment drive after assuming power. It has put in place structures throughout the country which facilitate communication between officials and ordinary members of the party. These members are able to communicate their grievances to their senior party members who in turn either attend to them personally or refer them to headquarters if unable to do so.

Mapai, which was founded in 1930, grew in strength after the formation of the state of Israel. It continued recruiting to the party people newly arrived in Israel. Its membership and branches grew throughout the country.

Under the leadership of De Gasperi, the DC went on a membership drive establishing local offices throughout the country. It also had publications which it disseminated to its members.

The SDP is a cohesive organisation which has structures throughout the country with its support evenly spread. It communicates with its membership through party newspapers.

The ANC acquired an already existing support base when it took over the structures of the UDF. All it did was to establish branches in order to turn these supporters into members. The party¶s membership is spread throughout the country.

3.7.2 Support from a strong socioeconomic bloc The existence of strong socioeconomic blocs played an important role in the ascendancy to power of the parties in our study. The BDP, Congress, Mapai, DC, SDP and the ANC all continued to benefit from influential socioeconomic blocs which continued supporting them after their coming to power. The relations between the socioeconomic blocs and the parties remained strong throughout their dominance. In Botswana and South Africa, the BDP and the ANC¶s electoral success was made possible by the support they received from large ethnic groups aligned to them.

In Botswana the ethnic factor (Bamangwato and Bakwena tribes) and the assured support of the traditional leaders were the vehicle for the BDP¶s continued electoral success. The ANC continued to be supported by an overwhelming majority of the African masses in the three elections they have contested and won. The support for Congress was nationwide and was across all of India¶s diversities. However, it also received the support of the trade union federation and commerce and trade associations. The DC continued to derive its strongest support from Catholic Church membership, as most of the social and economic institutions in Italy were dominated by Catholics.

In Israel, Sweden and South Africa the labour movement was closely aligned to Mapai, SDP and the ANC respectively. Histadrut, LO and COSATU which had a large membership were part and parcel of these political parties± endorsing them during elections and assisting them in their campaigns. In Israel the majority of working people belonged to Histadrut, which was at the organisational heart of Mapai. The relationship between the two organisations was forged during the struggle to establish a state of Israel. The relationship between the SDP and LO dates back to almost four decades before the ascension to power of the party, with the SDP being seen by members of the labour movement as their party. COSATU aligned itself to the ANC while it (ANC) was banned in South Africa. The three parties had established a close relationship with the labour movement in their countries. As seen from the discussion above, Histadrut played a crucial role in recruiting support for Mapai from before and after the state of Israel was established. This is did through patronage. It offered employment to the newly arrived immigrants some of whom were destitute after fleeing persecution and anti-Semiticism in Eastern Europe. These immigrants through force of circumstances had no choice but to align themselves with Mapai. This made Histadrut into the single largest labour federation in Israel. Some of the senior officials of Histadrut also held office in Mapai.

After its formation the LO made it compulsory that its members should also belong to the SDP. This however did not do down well with a certain section of its membership and this was llater made to be optional. But by this time the SDP had gained advantage over the other political parties as had already acquired the support of large numbers of the labour federation members. The SDP had branches in a large number of industrial concerns where it had a substantial membership.

Although after its formation COSATU portrayed itself as neutral and not aligned to the ANC, with the passing of time it moved closer to the liberation movement which was still operating from outside the country. Some of the COSATU¶s officials were at one time closely associated with the ANC and had been incarcerated on Robben Island for furthering the aims of the organisation. Thus would have made it difficult for them to become neutral because they were members of COSATU. After the unbanning of the ANC, the labour federation ended all pretences of neutrality and openly sided with the organisation. During campaigning for the 1994 elections it called upon the workers to vote for the ANC.

3.7.3. Penetration of society

It is not sufficient for a political party to rely on its existing support; it has to go out and seek new support. In every society there exists a number of institutions which are not aligned to any political party. Political parties fight for the support of these institutions with the aim of taking them over, as they would guarantee these parties bloc support. The BDP, Congress, Mapai, DC, SDP and ANC used different methods to infiltrate and eventually take over these institutions and penetrate societal organisations, in addition to forming other structures. The BDP penetrated rural Botswana society by seeking the goodwill of traditional leaders.

Although Congress had built up a large support during the struggle for independence, it did not take this for granted but continued to recruit support throughout the country. It attracted business people to the party who were not part of the Congress movement. It expanded the party to include diverse sectors of the Indian society, including workers, peasants, students and professional people. Mapai infiltrated the Workers Committees and placed its own members in leadership positions. The DC went further than just penetrating existing institutions by forming its own organisations which were parallel to the party. This resulted in party influence pervading society. The ANC took over organisations that were were in existence during the apartheid era and which were not affiliated to it. It also took over informal structures which mushroomed in the urban areas after 1994 and established its own branches. These informal settlements were named after prominent ANC leaders.

3.7.4 Pragmatism

Political society is never static but dynamic and changes all the time as new variables impact on it. For a party to retain and also expand its electoral support it needs to adapt to the environment. Parties should be able to adapt their policies to the changing circumstances. The parties under discussion used pragmatism to good effect in order to attract new support. They tempered their policies in order to suit the constituency that they wanted to attract.

The BDP did not follow the example of other African political parties which adopted radical policies on coming to power, but committed itself to retaining both a multiracial system and a free market economic system. It encouraged white expatriates not to leave Botswana.

When Congress became a political party it adapted its methods of recruiting support, canvassing people of different hues to its ranks through its flexible approach. It was prepared to temper its policies in order to recruit the support of a particular sector. The party ended up with a diverse group of supporters, as Suri (1974) attested above. It was home to groups of people from different backgrounds whose ideologies were opposed to those of Congress. It recruited support across language, caste and religious barriers.

With an increase in the working class in Israel in the early years of independence, Mapai had to adapt its policies in order to incorporate this group. Mapai started off as a party of the agriculturalists, but when the number of workers increased it shifted its focus and ended up as a party for the workers. Mapai was prepared to seek a peaceful solution to end the enmity with the neighbouring Arab states. The party had a pragmatic economic policy which embraced both capitalism and socialism.

The DC introduced a new political order in Italy which fused both Catholicism and parliamentary democracy. It was a centrist party which accommodated the interests of diverse groups of society. Its economic policy was a mixture of both socialism and capitalism.

The SDP adapted Marxist socialism fusing it with capitalism. It also changed its policies to suit the changing demographics of Swedish society. When there was a decrease in the number of farmers, it abandoned them in favour of the middle-class workers whose numbers were increasing.

Under pressure the ANC was forced to adopt a free market economic policy. It also welcomed to its ranks its former enemies such as homeland leaders and people serving within apartheid structures such as the Tricameral Parliament. The party invited influential people as well as whites to take out its membership.

3.7.5 Patronage

The BDP, Congress, Mapai, DC , SDP and the ANC all used patronage to varying degrees to buy support. This was made possible by the fact that they were in control of state resources and they also had their own resources with which they enticed the electorate in their countries.

In Botswana, the rural peasants were compromised by their wealthy cattle and land- owning employers who were prominent members of the BDP. The BDP used the ARDP to good effect as the rural peasants appreciated the concern it showed for their welfare. As was discussed above the hurried implementation of the ARDP was seen to be a politically motivated vote-buying exercise.

In India, Congress gained the support of the wealthy by making them feel indebted to the party. It was a privilege to be seen rubbing shoulders with senior members of the party and these businesspeople contributed to the funds of Congress.

Through its association with Histadrut, Mapai offered employment to new immigrants. These immigrants were beholden to the party and this left them with no choice but to vote for Mapai. Histadrut was more like an employment agency offering jobs to scores of Israelis as it controlled the country¶s industry. The new arrivals who were offered employment were in most cases destitute. The DC used its control of state institutions to provide employment. Its patronage was pervasive and affected large sectors of the community from business to ordinary people. The DC presided over a booming economy after the hardship experienced during the war and offered people employment in the bureaucracy. Party members were offered jobs in state organisations. It also ³bought off´ opposition parties with patronage.

In Sweden the use of patronage has been accepted with qualification. However it did exist, as the public service was politicised with recruits largely from the SDP. Even senior positions such as the under-secretary generalships were drawn from the ruling party.

The ANC was well positioned to use patronage extensively as it was determined to transform society and eradicate the inequalities of the past. It accelerated the employment of blacks in the public service and introduced policies of affirmative action and black economic empowerment.

3.7.6 Symbolism

Prior to their ascension to power unusual circumstances of a serious nature prevailed in the countries of the parties in our study. The role played by the parties and their leaders in the resolution of these unusual circumstances continued to be of benefit to them, assisting them to acquired dominant status, as the brave efforts made by the parties to resolve the unusual circumstances were such that they would not be easily forgotten. These parties presided over the institution of a new political order in their countries.

In Botswana, the BDP was recognised as the party that brought the country to independence, even though this occurred after a peaceful transfer of power. In India, Israel, Italy and South Africa, the new order was established after a struggle which was marked by violence. Congress, Mapai, DC and the ANC participated in those struggles. In Italy, the DC¶s contribution in the fight against Fascism was equal to that of the Socialist and Communist Parties. However, it was the DC under the leadership of De Gasperi that took the lead in the formulation of a new political system. In Sweden when the SDP came to power the country was faced with political instability and unemployment. The SDP had ³turned the country around´, so to say, and brought it political stability and economic prosperity. It presided over the institution of a new economic system. Although Sweden already had an established political system, it had unstable governments, but this came to an end with the ascendancy to power of the SDP..

Certain individuals associated with these parties were in the forefront of the struggle to bring normalcy to their countries. The success of their endeavours earned them cult-like status. Their continued association with these parties gave them (parties) an advantage over the others. These leaders are Sir Seretse Khama, Nehru, Ben-Gurion, De Gasperi and Mandela. The contention here is that the heroic deeds of an individual and a party are not easily forgotten. The contributions of Sir Seretse Khama, Nehru, Ben-Gurion, De Gasperi and Mandela to the formation of a new political order in their countries is not something that is easily forgotten, particularly by those people who were part of these events or were present when they occurred. These linger on for as long as these individuals live and even beyond their death.

The heroic deeds of these individuals gave their parties an advantage over the other parties for a long period of time. These leaders did not simply fade from the scene, but continued to shape the destinies of their countries. De Gasperi emerged from the war to lead the DC without having played any outstanding role as an individual. He was, however, responsible for the resurrection of the DC after the war and the formulation of a new political system. The success of the SDP in turning the party around was a collective effort of the party leaders. The next chapter will focus on the performance of the parties as governments of the day during their period of dominance. This is to determine whether their performance influenced electoral support in favour of the party.

CHAPTER 4 THE EFFECT OF GOVERNMENTAL PERFORMANCE ON ELECTORAL SUPPORT

Introduction

After being elected to power, a party has to deliver on the promises that it made when entreating people to vote for it. In succeeding elections voters will cast their votes on the basis of the government¶s performance in fulfilling its promises. This method of voting is referred to as retrospective voting. Voters ask their government what it has done for them or the country. If they are not satisfied with its performance, they will most likely not return it to power.

The purpose of this chapter is to assess the performance of the parties in our study in their capacity as government in order to determine if this could have been responsible for their continued electoral success. The chapter seeks to determine if there is a correlation between governmental performance and electoral support. A defensible role for government in society is that it should strive for, and demonstrate that it is improving the quality of life of society. This is assessed by the use of socioeconomic indicators. These consists of the following indices: growth of the economy, expenditure on social services such as health, education, and social welfare grants, which include old age pensions and various government grants. Human development indicators such as infant mortality rates, life expectancy and literacy are also considered. The ability of a government to create employment for its citizens is also a handy yardstick to assess its performance. The government can create employment through jobs in the civil service and patronage and by facilitating employment in the formal sector through thoughtful macroeconomic policies. The provision of housing, clean water, sanitation, electrification and infrastructure where these were not available is also an important yardstick for assessing a government¶s performance.

It is important to note here that one of the yardsticks used to gauge a government¶s performance is the amount of funds it allocates for social services, which include, education, health and welfare. For this to be measured, it is imperative that use should be made of statistics provided by the government, as they are the most reliable. In this study, scholars writing on the performance of the dominant parties, tend to be rather general and not specific about the funds made available by the government. They detail the increase in government spending on social services without indicating what percentage of the total government budget it constitutes. This made it necessary for an approach to be made to the present governments of the parties in the study in order to be provided with accurate statistics. The embassies in Pretoria were consulted in order to secure the addresses of the relevant government departments. Although the embassies were helpful, problems were encountered when getting through to the e-mail addresses and telephone numbers they provided. India was the only exception. The following paragraphs give the responses of some of the governments.

The response from Botswana was that the information being sought would take a long time to access as it was not readily available. Also, permission had to be obtained from the government before a search could be undertaken for the information.

India referred me to an Internet address where the information could be obtained. This document provided details on government spending on health and education since 1952. However, it did not state what it amounted to as a percentage of total government spending.

The following response was received from Israel: ³There are a lot of files in our Archives that contain relevant material on the history of Mapai. You are truly welcome to visit our Archives that will be open to the public again after renovation works since December 11th. However the most important source might be found in the Labour Party Archives in Beit Beri.´ (Saft: 2005: 1)

As regards Italy, e-mail addresses that were provided were returned as they were not correct. On making further inquiries, I was told they were the only addresses they had. With Sweden, the first response on the telephone was ³you¶ll have to go to Stockholm to get that information´. However, I was provided with e-mail addresses from which I received the following response: ³ the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs are not able to provide you with the requested information´ (Feldt 2005:1).

4.1 BDP: Botswana , from poverty to prosperity

4.1.1 Introduction

Writing on Botswana, Colclough and McCarthy (1985:55) advance the view that economic growth is necessary if a government is to improve the quality of life of its citizens. In a preceding chapter it was pointed out that Botswana was a poor country when it started its journey to nationhood being left almost destitute when the British left in 1966 after 80 years of rule. Botswana displayed all the characteristics of an underdeveloped country having a rudimentary economy. Harvey and Lewis (1990:15) point out that this was as a result of benign neglect by Britain due to the uncertainty of the future of the country. According to Oden (1981:5) Botswana was considered to be one of the poorest countries in Africa when it gained independence.

As a colony without a strong economy, Botswana was dependent on British aid. Since it had no industrial base it could not offer employment to its citizens, who were forced to work on South Africa¶s mines as migrant workers (Wiseman 1998:243). Besides the poverty it faced, Botswana also had other problems such as drought, foot-and-mouth disease and two hostile neighbours, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia (Lewis 1993:13). The drought that afflicted the country in 1965/1966 led to crop failure while the foot-and-mouth disease decimated the cattle herd which was the lifeblood of the Batswana people. With all these problems it seemed likely that the citizens of this new state would have a long wait ahead of them before realising any economic growth which would improve their standard of living. Given the above situation it would not have made any sense for Botswana to have opted for independence as Masire points out that ³when we asked for independence, people thought we were either very brave or very foolish´ (Lewis 1993:4). However the country confounded sceptics when from its impoverished and humble beginnings it became much respected and admired in Africa. From being one of the poorest countries in the world, Botswana was transformed into one of the most prosperous on the continent within a period of twenty years, as it experienced rapid growth (Holm 1988:197). Beaulier (2005:2) points out that without much foreign aid and in the absence of a large state, Botswana went from the third poorest nation in the world in 1965 to an upper income nation.

This new found wealth led to major changes being made in the economic and social structures of the country. This change of fortune resulted in an improvement in the standard of living of some of the people, with development projects taking place throughout the country. Owing to these developments Botswana experienced the fastest growth of urban population in sub-Saharan Africa. From being a rural country it experienced rapid urbanisation with more than a fifth of the population living in towns within 20 years (Harvey & Lewis 1990:34). By 1971 urbanisation had grown by 9.3 percent, in 1981 it increased to 17. 7 percent and by 1989 it stood at 45.7 percent (Campbell 1998:263). Besides the capital Gaborone, which was a small town at independence, three other towns were established, Selebi-Pikwe, Orapa and Jwaneng (Harvey & Lewis 1990:34).

4.1.2 Sources of economic success A number of factors account for Botswana¶s economic prosperity. The factors which changed the status of the country from poverty to wealth were the discovery of diamonds and the ending of the major drought of the mid-1960s. These two events occurred at almost the same time. Diamonds were first discovered in Orapa in 1967 and in Jwaneng in 1976. Diamonds were the major driving force behind Botswana¶s economic growth as they contributed 96 per cent of the country¶s mineral revenue (Picard 1985:22). Apart from the discovery of diamonds and the ending of the drought Botswana¶s economy also benefited from the following factors:

‡ The gaining of access to the European Economic Community (EEC) for beef exports, at prices above world prices

‡ renegotiation of the South African Custom¶s Union agreement

‡ increasing flows of aid from a wide range of donors

Britain was Botswana¶s only donor before independence, but within a few years the country was a recipient of aid from a majority of Western countries (Harvey & Lewis 1990:41-42). According to Molutsi (1991:52), the assistance involved grants and low- interest loans, volunteers and bilateral technical assistance personnel.

The end of the drought was followed by a 15-year wet phase which benefited agriculture and the cattle industry. This resulted in growth in the cattle herd and an increase in agricultural output. The cattle industry accounted for 20 per cent of the nation¶s gross domestic product (Picard 1985:23). Having previously experienced a devastating drought, the Botswana government was apprehensive of a repeat of a similar natural disaster and initiated a drought relief scheme. This drought relief project was highly successful in that no lives were lost due to drought in later years. 4.1.3 Capable leadership and good management Scholars such as Harvey and Lewis (1990), Henderson (1990), Good (1992) and Wiseman (1998) express the opinion that the leadership of the country contributed immensely to Botswana¶s economic prosperity. Botswana was blessed with a level- headed, modest and pragmatic leadership which was responsible for choosing appropriate priorities for the country (Good 1992:169). At the head of this leadership were the first two presidents of the country, Sir Seretse Khama and Sir Ketumile Masire. The wise leadership of Sir Seretse Khama was alluded to in the last two chapters.

Sir Ketumile Masire was distinguished for his ³prior detailed knowledge of the economy over the first 15 years of independence and provided a key link between the technicians in the civil service and the cabinet and parliament´ (Harvey & Lewis 1990:7). Festus Mogae who succeeded Sir Ketumile Masire as president supports the view that the country owes its success to the political leadership at the time of independence. He argues that the leadership was genuinely committed to development and was responsive to the needs of the people through an inclusive political process (Mogae 2005:3).

Careful planning and good management characterised Botswana¶s economic policies. The leadership took carefully considered decisions which were to prove beneficial to their country and its citizens. According to Good (1992:170) generally conservative fiscal and monetary policies have been pursued by the BDP government. Holm (1988:197) also commended the Botswana government for its tight control over the economy.

Three examples will suffice to show some of the good decisions taken by the Botswana government and which were beneficial to the country: Firstly, the BDP government, on assuming the leadership of the country, decided to retain the white civil servants who had previously served the colonial administration. This was because Botswana had no experienced personnel to man the civil service. It was a wise decision by the government to retain the expatriate officials while training its own people in preparation for a smooth take over. Secondly, unlike in a majority of African states, Botswana did not embrace the one-party political system. Molomo (2000:76) points out that the constitution caters for free political activity. Botswana retained multiparty democracy with elections being held every five years. Thirdly, Botswana retained the capitalist form of economy and did not embrace socialism as was the case with some African states. It did not engage in the nationalisation of property and there was minimal state intervention in economic activity. It should be noted however that some African states also continued with the capitalist economic system inherited from the departing colonisers.

4.1.4 Negotiation skills

The leadership of Botswana also had outstanding negotiation skills which resulted in the country entering into profitable agreements (Jefferis 1998: 305). Together with Swaziland, Lesotho and South Africa, Botswana belonged to the South African Customs Union (SACU). As landlocked countries, the three former British colonies used South Africa¶s ports for their exports and imports. South Africa paid them for goods coming through its ports. These payments were subject to regular negotiations. After its independence Botswana was able to negotiate more profitable terms with South Africa adding to its source of revenue (Good 1992:170).

The government ensured that the country received maximum remuneration from its mineral resources through its negotiations with the mining company, De Beers, which discovered diamonds in the country. This was done firstly by ensuring that the agreement reached with De Beers Consolidated Mining Company, which was allowed to prospect for diamonds, was favourable for the country. Secondly, it also negotiated with De Beers Central Marketing Organisation for the worldwide marketing and selling of the diamonds. The government was concerned that the country¶s major product should be properly marketed and also that its share of resulting revenue should reflect successful development of the resource. As a result of this, Botswana obtained the best possible prices for its diamonds (Harvey & Lewis 1990:131). The Botswana government gained a 50/50 shareholding agreement from De Beers over diamond exploitation (Good 1992:170).

4.1.5 Government performance

4.1.5.1 Economic growth

When Botswana attained independence it was dependent on Britain for financial assistance. This dependence soon became unnecessary, however, as the country became self-sufficient (Hartland-Thunberg 1978:7). This was made possible by the rapid economic growth the country experienced, the reasons for which have been discussed above. Within the first ten years of independence, the economy of Botswana grew at more than 15 per cent per annum (Hartland-Thunberg 1978:1). This growth remained constant at 12 per cent per annum throughout the second decade of independence which ended in 1986.

Botswana¶s economic success impacted on the country and community as a whole as it fuelled a dramatic expansion in government programmes (Wiseman 1998:220). Holm (1988:199) points out that ³virtually all sectors of society ņ politicians, civil servants, businessmen, large cattle holders, and well off peasants ņ received some of the benefits allocated by a bureaucratic planning process´. A high proportion of the government¶s budget was allocated to developmental projects, particularly the country¶s rudimentary infrastructure. The developmental expenditure averaged between 43 and 45 per cent of total governmental expenditure (Holm 1988:197). Below it will be shown that the benefits of the country¶s new-found wealth did not reach all of its citizens to the same extent. Botswana¶s rural population still lived in poverty while the elite enjoyed the wealth of the country. Among the Botswana population living in poverty are the Basarwa who have not been treated as citizens of the country by the government. In an effort to move them from thei area they had occupied for decades to make way for a game reserve, the government terminated water supplies and other social services (Taylor 2003: 224-226).

4.1.5.2 Employment

Lacking a strong economy, Botswana¶s citizens were forced to look for employment in South Africa where they were absorbed by the mining sector and farms. Harvey and Lewis (1990:27) point out that during this period, two to three Batswana were employed outside the country to one person who was employed inside. However, the discovery of diamonds and the growth of the economy altered this situation as there was an increase in employment opportunities within the country. Employment increased from 24 750 in 1968 to 62 1000 in 1977 (Harvey & Lewis 1990:28). This resulted in more people being employed in Botswana and spending time with their families, unlike when they were working as migrants in South Africa, when they could only visit home occasionally (Harvey & Lewis 1990:37). Employment in the formal sector grew by 9,6 per cent yearly. However, the employment boom did not last and towards the beginning of the 1980s unemployment became a problem again. This was fuelled by a drought which gripped the country and resulted in people moving from the rural areas to towns in search of employment (Legum 1982/1983:618).

4.1.5.3 Education

At independence Botswana had a rudimentary education system. The schooling system was characterised by a shortage of qualified teachers and poor facilities, and very few people had secondary education (Harvey & Lewis 1990:280). During the first decade of independence the government made education one of its developmental priorities. This led to an unprecedented expansion of education facilities and training (Colclough & MacCarthy 1985: 212 ) This was made possible by the increasing amount which the government allocated to education. A year after the attainment of independence, the government allocated P0,95 million to education. This increased to P1,31 in 1972 and by 1977 it had escalated to P5,47 million. (See table. 4.1.)

Legum (1970/1971:470) points out that the numbers of children in primary schools rose from 66 000 in 1965 to 82 000 in 1970, while that of teachers in training doubled to 560 during the same period. In 1978, 80 per cent of the children of school-going age started primary school compared to 44 per cent in 1965 (Oden 1981:21) The number of children in secondary schools trebled to 3900. In 1981 the enrolment rate at secondary schools was around 98,5 per cent. Untrained teachers were receiving training and by 1983 this problem had been eradicated (Harvey & Lewis 1990:286). Wiseman (1998:244) points out that by 1990 enrolment at primary schools was 95 per cent and stood at 85 per cent at junior secondary schools.

4.1.5.4 Social welfare and health

Most literature on Botswana¶s meteoric rise to success does not mention the provision of social grants to the poor and disabled. However, the government provided social welfare grants to the aged only in 1996. The people who were eligible to receive the grant were those who were aged 65 and over. Owing to a scarcity of health facilities before independence, Botswana¶s citizens were forced to walk long distances in order to receive medical attention. The government embarked on the building of health centres such as clinics and basic health posts. The budget allocated for this purpose increased from P0,11million in 1967 to P1,37 in 1977 (table 4.1). Basic health facilities were established throughout the country nearer to people in rural areas. By 1985 over 80 per cent of rural people lived within 15 kilometres of a health facility (Harvey & Lewis 1990:283). The availability of these health facilities impacted positively on the lives of the Botswana people and this resulted in an improved infant mortality and life expectancy rate. Infant mortality improved from 100 per 1000 live births in 1965 to 55 per 1000 live births in 1977, while life expectancy improved from 48 years in 1965 to 65 years in 1977 (Mogae 2005:3). (See table 4.1.)

4.1.5.5 Infrastructure ņ roads

Hartland-Thunberg (1978:5) points out that at independence, Botswana had only 54 kilometres of tarred roads. The discovery of diamonds and the growing economy necessitated better roads to be able to transport goods in and out of the country. Being a landlocked country an efficient road transport network was essential for the development of the country as it was the country¶s only link to the outside world. The government paid attention to this problem and by 1985 most of the roads leading to the towns and major villages were tarred. Only the sparsely populated areas continued to use sand and earth roads (Hartland-Thunberg 1978:5). Tarmacked roads increased from fewer than 10 kms in 1966 to over 10000 kms in 1990 (Mogae 2005:3).

4.1.5.6 Inequalities

The impression is given that all sectors of Botswana¶s society were beneficiaries of the country¶s new-found wealth. This, according to Colclough and McCarthy (1985) and Molutsi (1998), is not an entirely true picture of the situation. Colclough and McCarthy (1985:247) point out that the benefits of growth were not widely distributed to all sectors of the community. Molutsi (1998:373) argues that Botswana¶s wealth did not filter through to all sectors of the community. According to Molutsi (1988:373) glaring inequalities in the provision of, and accessibility to, social services and amenities were observable in Botswana. Poverty in rural areas was driving young people to urban areas where they hoped they would find employment. Relative success in economic growth and development of infrastructure have not been able to radically reduce poverty in Botswana with many people still living below the poverty datum line.

Table 4.1: Increase in expenditure on education and health by the Botswana government and an improvement in life expectancy and infant mortality (Colclough & McCarthy 1985; Mogae 2005)

1967/1968 1972/73 1976/1977

Year

Education P0,95m P1,31m P5,47m

Health P0,11m P0,25 P1,37m

Life expectancy 48 years 65 years

Infant mortality 100 per 1 000 live 55 per 1 000 live births births

Source: Colclough & McCarthy 1985; Mogae 2005

4.1.6 Summary

As can be deduced from the above discussion, Botswana had a difficult start to statehood. Odds were stacked against this semi-arid, landlocked country. However it experienced a change in its fortunes and within five years of being an independent, sovereign state became a prosperous country. This was due to the factors mentioned above. The country experienced a rapid increase in the growth of its economy. The government wisely used the proceeds accruing from the sale of diamonds for the benefit of the citizens of the country. The government increased on an annual basis money allocated for the education and health sectors. This was ascribed to the good leadership of the country.

The government introduced developmental programmes and improved the infrastructure of the country. It made education and health facilities accessible to all the people, particularly those in the rural areas. The Batswana people were able to find employment in their own country, allowing them to spend more time with their families. The improvement in health care impacted on infant mortality which decreased and the life expectancy of the citizens also increased.

It is generally assumed that all the citizens of Botswana benefited from the country¶s prosperity under the BDP¶s good leadership. However, this is not an entirely true picture of the situation as inequalities exist in Botswana. A large number of people living in rural areas are still poor as wealth has not filtered through to all sectors of the community as explained by Colclough and McCarthy (1985) and Molutsi (1998) above. After initially succeeding in creating employment during the economic boom, Botswana was to experience unemployment in the late 1980s.

However, all of the above has not affected the BDP¶s electoral support. It has claimed a large percentage of the votes from the country¶s first election in 1965 and all the others held thereafter. However the performance of the party in the 1965 and 1969 elections could not be attributed to government performance as the country was still poor, diamonds not having been discovered. fter the discovery of diamonds, the government got to work improving the country and the standard of living of its people. In the third elections held in 1974, aided by patronage, the party¶s share of the votes increased to 76,6 per cent. It remained in the 70s for the next elections until this decreased to the 60s in the 1984 and 1989 elections.

Since the BDP¶s receives 60 per cent of its votes from the rural areas where disparities are prevalent, its electoral success cannot be solely attributed to its performance in providing for all the citizens of the country. The role of traditional leaders in influencing rural people to vote for the party is a stronger factor behind the party¶s electoral success than governmental performance. Also, the BDP continued to be recognised as the party of Sir Seretse Khama. The above argument indicates that the correlation between party support and governmental performance is weak. 4.2 Congress: the protracted struggle to overcome poverty 4.2.1 Introduction

On assuming the leadership of the country after the hasty departure of the British, Congress was faced with a myriad of socioeconomic problems, with the most serious being poverty, which, Robson (1954: 119) points out, was not relative, but absolute and had to be seen to be believed. Commenting on India¶s poverty another Indian scholar, Chaudhuri (1971:38) avers that the ³average´ Indian is among the poorest in the world. He points out that the poverty ³is all too real and one hardly needs any statistics to show that after twenty years of planning, the Indian poor have little to be thankful about´. According to Suri (1974:281), Congress identified economic development as one of its major objectives even before independence in order to eliminate the poverty that was pervasive throughout the country. This suggests that there was no correlation between government performance and electoral success in India in the period under review.

Apart from poverty Congress was also faced with the difficult task of bringing together the diverse castes that dominated Indian society into one nation, and bring an end to factionalism. Deol (1980:179) points out that caste was for years the dominant feature of Indian society. The country¶s linguistic, religious, ethnic and cultural diversities are well recorded. These differences which frequently resulted in antagonism and conflict had to be harnessed and a new nationalism forged. It was Congress¶s express wish that all the inhabitants of the country should owe their loyalty to one indivisible state rather than to their caste. The caste system was seen as an impediment to the socioeconomic development of a new society and the evolution of a genuine community of democracy (Robson 1954:117).

4.2.2 Congress confronting the challenges The immediate challenge which confronted the new government was in providing food and shelter for the millions of people who were displaced by the partitioning of the country. When the partition of the country occurred Hindus who were living in areas which later became Pakistan moved across to India and vice versa for Muslims. The partitioning worsened the critical food situation in the country. The country¶s meagre resources which might have been used to fight poverty were diverted for the relief and rehabilitation of these people (Deol 1980: 180). To its credit, according to Morris-Jones (1952:242), the rehabilitation of nearly 5 million refugees represented a great achievement for the government.

Congress was faced with an urgent need for economic development. Morris-Jones (1974:281) explains the urgent need for economic development in these words:

Of all the aspirations which dominated the makers of the Constitution, none was more important than that which centred on economic development. There might be very different ideas on the pace and methods of development, but there was unanimity on the priority to be given to raising the shockingly low living standards of the people. Everyone felt not only the suffering but also the shame attached to India¶s poverty.

Much as the government had identified the elimination of poverty as a priority, it did not have the means to achieve this. Of all the problems which faced the government, the most serious and pressing was the absence of an industrial base on which to commence the establishment of a sound economy. This was a legacy of British rule in India. Deol (1980:180) puts forward the view that the British were not interested in the industrialisation of the country as they wanted it to remain backwards. India was a predominantly agrarian country with the villagers using antiquated equipment to work on their farms.

There was thus a recognition by the leaders of the country that India had to modernise if it was to provide a better life for its citizens, and this could only be done through industrialisation (Park & de Mesquita 1979:172). This became the major goal of the government of India. Deol (1980:57) argues that it was hoped that the switch from an economy based on agriculture to an industrialised economy would lead to an increase in the income of the nation as a whole. A rise in the national income would lead to an improvement in the standard of living of the people by eradicating the poverty mentioned in the above paragraphs.

For India to fulfil its goals it needed an economic plan. According to Suri (1974:281) planning became an urgent matter after the attainment of independence. In 1950 the government formed a Planning Commission whose task was to devote continuous attention to India¶s economic development. Between 1951 and 1974, India had four Five-Year Plans (Deol 1980:240). According to the First Five-Year Plan, ³the central objective of planning in India is to raise the standard of living of the people and to open out to them opportunities for a richer and more varied life (Hardgrave Jr 1980:80)´. It aimed to fight poverty and inequality, and increase production and redistribute wealth.

Planning was to be done in pursuance of India¶s objective of establishing a welfare state. According to Robson (1954:117), the basic aims of the welfare state are the attainment of a substantial degree of social, economic and political equality; freedom and opportunity for the individual to realise his potential and to achieve self-expression in his work and leisure as a citizen; and social justice. Robson (1954:117) states that this was the ³most complete and explicit statement to be found in any state document in any country of the fundamental aims and aspirations of the welfare state´.

During the country¶s first elections of 1952, in its manifesto Congress committed itself to the following:

‡ economic progress through planning ‡ neglected rural areas to be given priority in the planning ‡ cooperative farming should be encouraged in order to overcome the disadvantages of small uneconomic holdings and to increase production ‡ the condition of the agricultural labourer should be improved and employment opportunities should be increased ‡ basic industries should be owned and controlled by the state (Morris-Jones 1952:243).

4.2.3 Government performance

4.2.3.1 Economic growth

The problems which confronted India before and after independence have elicited sympathy from most scholars who assessed the growth of the economy and the performance of the government. Robson (1960), Suri (1974), Bhagwati and Desai (1970) and Deol (1980) were less critical of the government¶s efforts to alleviate the pervasive poverty which was a hallmark of Indian society. Less sympathetic was Chaudhuri (1971:39) who expressed the opinion that over the first 25 years India¶s economy made only limited progress towards self-sustained economic growth. He added that the industrial growth on which the government had placed its faith did not produce the expected results.

Suri (1974:285) argues that India¶s economic progress, though not spectacular, was not inconsiderate. He points out that the three economic plans initiated between 1952 and 1966, even though not impressive had some measure of success. He states that India¶s net national income increased by about 69 per cent between 1951 and 1966, the period covered by India¶s first three five-year economic plans. There was also a 47 per cent increase in industry and agricultural output. Deol (1980:251) supports Suri (1974) pointing out that the country¶s growth performance during the two decades of planning was successful. The overall growth rate of India¶s economy as a whole between 1950 and 1972 was approximately 3,5 per cent per annum (Brass 1990:256). Brass (1990) argues that this compared favourably with the pre-independence estimate of no less than one per cent per annum. Jalan (1991:24) expresses the opinion that this was good progress on the part on the government.

4.2.3.2 Employment

A growing economy is supposed to be the vehicle for the creation of jobs. However, regardless of the sentiments referred to above, India¶s economic growth was simply not high enough to solve the country¶s myriad problems which among others included unemployment. Unemployment was a perennial problem in India and was identified by the government as one of the country¶s most serious challenges (Singh 1974:93). In the first plan the government committed itself to creating employment. This it hoped to achieve through rapid industrialisation which would result in the growth of the economy. However industrialisation was not achieved at the rate Congress had envisaged. The problem of unemployment assumed a new urgency as very few jobs were created (Singh 1974:95). India¶s unemployment increased throughout all the five- year Plans. At the beginning of the first plan, unemployment stood at 3,3 million. At the end of the third plan it was at 7,5 million and between 1967 and 1969 it rose to 20 million (Fernando & Kambli 1970-1971:107).

4.2.3.3 Education

Bhagwati and Desai (1970:75) express the opinion that the government acquitted itself well in terms of providing social services. They point out that the educational system expanded considerably with technical colleges multiplying their capacity nearly eightfold during the three plans as they took in over 70 000 students. This was accompanied by a marked improvement in educational facilities. Enrolment in schools and universities increased and the literacy rate rose from 16.7 per cent to 29,4 per annum Chaudhuri (1979:42). All this was made possible by increased expenditure on education. At independence in 1952, government expenditure on education was 7,92 per cent of GDP. This figure increased to 9,82 per cent in 1966, and reached 10,32 per cent in 1976 (Ministry of Education: 2005: 2-3). (table 4.2).

4.2.3.4 Social welfare and health

Singh (1974:127) argues that in the third five-year plan the government identified welfare as meaning education, health and social services and committed itself to providing basic necessities in particular, food, work, opportunity for education, reasonable conditions of health and sanitation. He puts forward the view that nothing came of this commitment. On the other hand, Brass (1990:257) states that it was a deliberate policy of the government not to focus on providing welfare for the people in order to establish the country as an increasingly self-reliant modern industrial economy. Singh (1974:129) blames the failure of the government to provide social services on prolonged poverty, low incomes and low levels of productivity and the inability to withstand strains of every kind. However, the government did allocate money for health services, little, as it may have been. In 1952 it allocated 2,69 per cent, which was increased to 3,28 per cent in 1966 and reached 3,49 per cent in 1976 (Ministry of Health 2005: 1-2). (table 4.2).

The provision of health care by a government is figuratively a matter of life and death. Given its vast rural population, the Indian government¶s efforts to provide health care was not going to be an easy task. Chaudhuri (1979:139) points out that while the urban people had access to medical facilities, the rural people had to do with indigenous medicine. The government did not have the means to develop health facilities in rural areas. Despite all these problems, however, Bhagwati and Desai (1970:75) announced that medical facilities had expanded.

India did reasonably well in terms of preserving life. In 1952, life expectancy was 39,4 years. This figure had risen to 48 years by 1976. This was encouraging for the overpopulous nation, though it was lagging behind other developing nations. Given the problem of providing adequate health facilities India¶s infant mortality rate also showed a decline. At independence it stood at 146 per 1000 live births, declining to 72 per 1 000 live births in 1976 (table 4.2).

4.2.3.5 Population growth

Population growth impacted negatively on the developmental plans of the Indian government. One of the major problems that constrained the post-independent government from improving the living conditions of the country¶s citizens was the increasing population. India has always had a fast-increasing population rate even during the colonial era. The population continued to escalate under the rule of Congress, reaching extraordinary proportions. When a census was taken in 1951, India¶s population was 361 million. It increased by 78 million to 439 million in 1961. In 1971 the total population was 547 million and this growth impacted negatively on the growth of the economy (Chaudhuri 1979:42). Brass (1990:256) points out that the 2,2 per cent per annum growth of the population reduced the growth of the economy to 1,3 per cent per annum. It also led to a high consumption of food resulting in constant food shortages.

4.2.3.6 Inequality

As stated above the purpose of increased economic growth and output is to benefit the citizens, particularly those who are poor, as stated in the constitution of the welfare state. One of the objectives of the second economic plan was the reduction of inequalities in income and wealth and a more even distribution of economic power (Suri 1974:288). The growth which India realised had the opposite effect to that which was intended. Instead of reducing the inequalities found in Indian society it instead increased them. The economic growth benefited those who were already better off, while the majority of the people continued to live in abject poverty (Suri 1974:287). This led Nehru to admit that the ³hard fact of economic development in India has been carried forward at the cost of the increase in social and economic inequality´.

The verdict on India¶s economic planning was that it had failed to deliver the goods (Suri 1974:289). Singh (1974:123) shares the same sentiment adding that ³the pursuit of welfare, the search for equality and the desire for more even distribution of economic power were objectives which the government found most difficult to attain´. Table 4.2: Increase in expenditure by the Indian government on education and health and an improvement in life expectancy and infant mortality

Year 1951/1952 1965/1966 1976/1977

Education 7,92 % 9,82% 10,32% % of GDP

Health 2,69 3,28 3,49 % of GDP

Life expectancy 39 years 48 years

Infant mortality 146 per 1000 72 per 1000 live births live births

Sources:India Ministry of Education and Health, United Nations common database 2005.

4.2.4 Summary

On independence India was faced with a host of problems. Poverty characterised the new state and , to add to the government¶s woes, it did not have a sound economy on which to plan for the development of the country. To solve this problem, Congress embarked on a number of five-year economic plans. India was an agrarian country relying on agriculture as a means of eking out a living for its people. The government made industrialisation a priority in order to be able to improve the lives of the people. The country¶s economy managed to grow by 3,7 per cent per annum, which, given the country¶s problems, was reasonable. The government increased expenditure on the education and health sectors, which resulted in the expansion of health and education facilities. While life expectancy and infant mortality improved, it did not however do so significantly.

The government could not, however, provide its ever rising population with employment. It was simply unable to do enough for the citizens of this populous country. This was not because of a lack of trying, but because of the constraints mentioned above. The problems the country faced were almost insurmountable and the little improvements that the Indian government made were alluded to by scholars above. However, whatever efforts were made to improve the living conditions of the people were not felt by everyone, particularly those who were impoverished.

Even though Congress did not succeed in improving the living conditions of the majority of the Indian people, it was repeatedly voted into power with its share of the votes ranging between 40 and 47 per cent in all elections between 1952 and 1972. Much as the people of India remained poor they continued voting for Congress. From the above it cannot be said that government performance, based on macroeconomic indicators, was responsible for the continuous electoral success of Congress. This could be attributed to party identification as a result of its leading role in the struggle to free the country from British rule. There is therefore no correlation between government performance and electoral success. This goes against the retrospective vote that is being tested in this chapter.

4.3 Mapai: building a welfare state

4.3.1 Introduction

Although a nascent political society existed in Israel during the pre-statehood period and there was a semblance of normality, owing to the uncertainty and tension that prevailed Jews could not embark on any forward planning and development. The first leaders of the newly declared state of Israel were thus confronted with the formidable task of developing an economic system for the survival and upliftment of the small population at the end of the war in 1948. From this difficult and uncertain beginning, Israel prospered and became a welfare state with one of the highest rates of growth in the world by the mid-1960s. 4.3.2 Problems confronting the new state of Israel

The new Israeli government, which was a coalition led by Mapai, had no resources on which to plan the development of the country. According to Horowitz (1967:5) the economy of Israel showed signs of underdevelopment and the country had meagre mineral resources. In addition to this, the war had depleted whatever economic resources the small Jewish community had and this affected the economic activities that they were undertaking (Lerner & Ben-Sharar 1975:68). The country¶s problems were further exacerbated by the arrival of thousands of immigrants. Between 1948 and 1952 about 700 000 immigrants arrived in the country (Lerner & Ben-Sharar 1975:67).

Arian (1985:18) points out that the large number of these immigrants doubled the Jewish population of the country between 1948 and 1954, highlighting the already difficult economic conditions faced by the new country. These immigrants had to be integrated into the emerging society and be provided with accommodation and employment. Horowitz (1967:40) expresses the opinion that the singular achievement of the new Israeli government was the successful integration of the immigrants into the new political system. The Histadrut which encouraged the immigration of Jews to Israel played a major role in their integration as it offered them employment (Shalev 1990:101).

4.3.3 Government performance

4.3.3.1 Economic growth

Israel was a state born in penury. The country suffered from a lack of natural resources. Arian (1985:37) expresses the view that because of this the country was forced to import capital. Israel received funds from Jews in the diaspora, the governments of the United States and Germany (Bernstein 1957; Arian 1985; Sharaby 2002). According to Arian (1985:38), between 1949 and 1977 Israel received $5.7 billion from Jews in the diaspora. Aid from the United States totalled $23 billion during the same period. Sharaby (2005:29) however states that far more significant was the reparations agreement that the government of Israel signed with that of Germany on 10 September 1952, which provided a massive infusion of much needed foreign currency into the country. The agreement provided for a payment of $850 million dollars directly into the coffers of the state of Israel. This was a small amount as compared to the two other amounts it received. Israel¶s economy benefited from this external aid and resulted in it growing impressively In the 1950s the rate of growth was 11,1 per cent per annum and by the 1960s it was nine per cent. This placed it second in the world only to Japan¶s 9,7 percent (Sharaby 2002:29).

4.3.3.2 Employment

When Israel began its journey to statehood it had a rudimentary economy. Unemployment at this juncture was a problem the new government had to deal with as the unemployment rate increased from seven per cent in 1950 to a high of 11,3 per cent in 1953. The government was under pressure to initiate economic planning and provide the immigrants with jobs (Aharoni 1986:74). Intensive development and growth of the economy was necessary if the country was to provide employment for the new arrivals. The government managed to deal with this problem and by 1964 unemployment had reached a low of 3,3 per cent.

Israel¶s success in providing the arriving immigrants with employment owed a great deal to Histadrut. The immigrants were offered employment by Histadrut, which owned Solel Boneh, the largest construction company in the country. In Solel Boneh, Histadrut controlled an enterprise that was a large-scale employer (Shalev 1990:102). This is where thousands of immigrants found their footing on their arrival in Israel. Since housing was at a premium, building became the point of entry for the workers until they could be absorbed in other economic activities. In accordance with the dictates of welfarism, the government provided unemployed people with jobs on public projects which were financed by the state¶s development budget (Bernstein 1957:342). Some of the job creation schemes included planting grass and trees along the highways. As the state was committed to full employment and job security, unemployment in Israel was drastically reduced, never exceeding 15 000 (Frankel 1980:228). From initially being a burden on the economy of the country the immigrants were later to prove an asset. They contributed to the economy¶s impressive performance as they brought necessary skills to their adoptive country.

4.3.3.3 Education

The rapidly rising standard of living which the Israelis experienced during the impressive economic growth pushed up the demand for education. There was an increase in the enrolment rates from the mid-1950s. This was accompanied by a large expansion of secondary and post-secondary education (Ben-Porath 1986 :158). Medding (1990:153) points out that the benefits of secondary education were made available to more children whose parents could not afford to pay for it as the state granted them free or subsidised schooling. At the end of the 1960s the government was offering free education. The impressive gains were made possible by an increase in the funds allocated to education.

The education budget rose from 17 percent of GNP in 1968/69 to 20 percent in 1974/75 (table 4.3). However, it should be noted that the government was not the only provider of funds for education. Other agencies also contributed funds for education (Ben-Porath 1986:203). This minimised the government¶s budget allocation on education. 4.3.3.4 Social welfare and health

As a welfare state, Israel was supposed to offer free health care to its citizens. This however was not the case. This task was undertaken by Histadrut through one of its institutions known as Kaput Holim, dating back to the formation of the state of Israel (Frankel 1980:223). Kaput Holim was the largest health fund in Israel with an extensive systems of clinics and hospitals to which 83 per cent of Israelis belonged. Kaput Holim provided health services for the majority of Israelis and ran the largest health care programmes in the country (Razin & Sadka 1993:8). Because it undertook functions that should have been performed by the state a section of the population who were not members of Histadrut and who could not receive health care was disadvantaged. Membership of Kaput Holim depended on that of Histadrut.

The government of Israel was comfortable with the role of Kaput Holim in providing health care as it would have been costly if it had to provide it. The government gave Kaput Holim a subsidy which it justified by arguing that 75 per cent of Israelis belonged to Kaput Holim (Medding 1990:169). In essence what this meant is that it saved the government the cost of providing health care to all its citizens. Since the formation of the state of Israeli it has been recommended on various occasions that the functions performed by Kaput Holim should be transferred to the state. But there has been prevarication by various governments, and there has been no urgency or firm commitment to do so. Histadrut and some members of Mapai voiced their opposition to this suggestion (Aharoni 1986:238), however the government of Israel also contributed a certain percentage towards health and social welfare. Government¶s expenditure on health rose from 17 per cent of GNP in 1968/69 to 20 percent in 1974/75 (table 4.3). The citizens of Israel benefited from the government¶s concern about their health with life expectancy increasing from 60 years two decades after independence to 70 years during 1976/77. Infant mortality went down from 51,7 per 1000 live births in 1968/1969 to 18,5 per 1 000 live babies in 1975/75 (table 4.3). Table 4.3: Increase in expenditure on education and health by the government of Israel and an improvement in life expectancy and infant mortality.

Year 1968/69 1974/75

Education 17 percent of GNP 20 percent of GNP

Health 17 percent of GNP 20 percent of GNP

Life expectancy 60 years 70 years

Infant mortality 51,7 per 1000 live births 18,5 per 1000 live births

Sources: Ben-Porath 1986. United Nations common database 2005

4.3.4 Summary

The hostility the Israelis faced from the Arabs on their arrival in Palestine made it difficult for them to settle and plan for economic development. This impacted negatively on the newly formed state. The constant arrival of new immigrants who had to be fed and provided with housing and jobs did not improve matters either, as the country suffered from a shortage of resources. The government was forced to rely on external capital in order to develop the country. However, after suffering adversity, within the first decade of independence the country started to prosper, registering an impressive economic growth. The government of Israel, through its commitment to welfarism, managed to improve the living standards of the citizens of the country by providing them with employment and a generous allocation of funds for education and health. It also distributed social welfare benefits to the community and managed to drastically reduce unemployment. Education was expanded and made available free of charge. There was an annual increase in public expenditure. Although having led Israel to prosperity, Mapai has always relied on other parties to form a government. Its share of the votes was always under 40 per cent, with the lowest being the 32,2 per cent in received in the 1955 elections and the highest 38,2 per cent it polled in 1959. The party did not receive good support from the electorate commensurate with its good performance and the party¶s failure to attract a large share of the votes could be attributed to the preponderance of parties in Israel. These parties managed to get representation in parliament because of the country¶s list proportional representation electoral system. Therefore the correlation between governmental performance and electoral support is not that conclusive, even though Mapai ruled Israel for over 25 years.

4.4 Christian Democratic Party (DC): from a devastated nation to an economic miracle

4.4.1 Introduction

Second only to Germany in Europe, Italy emerged from the World War II the most devastated country. The war exacted a heavy toll on the country which was pounded by the Allied Forces. The country¶s infrastructure of buildings, roads, bridges, port facilities and railway lines was severely damaged. It was not only the infrastructure that suffered damage; the country¶s wealth was also affected. Zariski (1972:216) points out that the war resulted in the destruction of about a third of Italy¶s wealth. The country was left bankrupt with no foreign currency to purchase essentials such as food and fuel (Grindrod 1955:38 ).

Hughes (1979:174) states that the period 1943 to 1946 was the hardest that any Italian had ever endured as they were left homeless, undernourished and anxious about their future. The country did not have the means to rescue the citizens from this desperate situation and the disruption of communications aggravated the local shortages of food. As there was no fuel and electricity, which are essential for the working of industry, the economy of the country could not be immediately revived. Given this situation, the first priority of the government was to feed the country and to repair the damage caused to the infrastructure in order to get the means of production moving. To be able to do this the government had to restore electricity, import coal, repair the communication infrastructure such as roads, bridges, harbours and railway lines (Grindrod 1955:42).

4.4.2 First steps towards reconstruction

For the first two years after the end of the war little progress was made in rebuilding the industrial base of the country. This was because of differences between the three parties which formed the first postwar government. These parties were the DC, the PCI and the PSI. These differences were ideological, with the PCI and PSI advocating a recovery plan based on socialism while the DC advocated one based on a free enterprise system. It was only after the DC had expelled the other two parties from government that progress was made in confronting the economic problems facing the country (Hughes 1979:176). This, according to Sassoon (1986:10), gave the government a free hand in taking important decisions.

The end of the war had given rise to a new world order which resulted in nations searching for allies. The world became divided into east and west and between countries with a capitalist and socialist economic system. Fearful of communist influence spreading in Europe after the war, the United States went out of its way to also for search for allies. It was prepared to make funds available to political parties favourably disposed to capitalism and who were anti-Communist. One such party was the DC in Italy.

Italy was helped out of its predicament by the United States through the European Recovery Plan, known as the Marshall Plan. According to Hughes (1979:176), the basic concept of the plan was that the US would furnish raw materials and capital equipment that would enable Italian industry to expand production to above prewar levels. This was attained within a relatively short period of four years of the war ending. Italy also succeeded in importing coal from the United Kingdom, Poland, South Africa, Germany and the United States. This greatly assisted in the revival of certain branches of the economy (Grindrod 1955:156). The rebuilding of Italy occurred at a faster rate than was anticipated and within four years the economy was back to its prewar levels. This resulted in an improvement in the standard of living of the Italian people and an increase in the per capita income (Clark 1996:349) .

4.4.3 Government performance

4.4.3.1 Economic growth

Between 1951 and 1961 the national income of Italy grew by 78,3 per cent. Industrial production grew by an average of 8,1 per cent per annum (Sassoon 1986:37). Italy¶s economic recovery was so rapid that in the mid 1960s it was a modern industrial country with millions of people having moved to the towns (Clark 1996:349). Both Sassoon (1986) and Clark (1996) attribute the economic miracle to the state. Sassoon (1986:38) points out that state intervention was to be found in every aspect of the economy such as agriculture, industry, housing, transport and communications. Clark (1996:350) cites wise planning and decision making by the leaders as an important factor in the economic recovery of Italy.

Italy¶s economic recovery was variously described as a ³miracle´ and a ³boom´. This was because it was phenomenal given the problems the country faced after the war. Between 1950 and 1958 the country¶s economy grew by 5,3 per cent per annum. But this growth was surpassed by that which occurred between 1958 and 1963 when it grew by 6,6 per cent per annum. The country experienced a setback in 1964 and 1965 when the economy slumped and grew by only 2,9 and 3,5 per cent per annum respectively. But there was a recovery in the years 1966 and 1968 when it grew by 5,8 and 6,8 percent per annum respectively (Allen & Stevenson 1974:64). 4.4.3.2 Employment

Unemployment was another problem confronting Italy after the war. Prior to the war unemployment was not an issue as most men served in the army during the Balkan war and World War I, while others were deployed to the country¶s colonies. The end of the war, according to Grindrod (1955:216), revealed the true picture of Italy¶s unemployment. In 1950 the figure of unemployed Italians stood at over 2 million (Clark 1996:349). The war impacted heavily on employment as not only did industry collapse but thousands of men were conscripted into the army. When the war ended there was a high rate of unemployment and underemployment which was a cause of concern for the government (Tannenbaum & Noether 1974:186). Alleviating unemployment became the objective of all postwar governments.

Italy¶s governments devised various ways for alleviating unemployment. The first effort was made in 1949 when the Ministry of Labour issued an edict prohibiting the dismissal of labour (Dell¶more & Zerilli-Marimo 1961:27 ). With employment hard to come by as the country¶s economy was still being reconstructed, the government embarked on job creation programmes consisting of work yards and reafforestation. This comprised working on public projects such as construction of roads, prevention of rock falls, and the control and directing of streams. Through these programmes the government provided employment for 70 000 people. The government¶s efforts to reduce unemployment resulted in the number of full-time employees as opposed to full-time, self-employed and marginal workers rising from 43,9 per cent in 1951 to 64,5 per cent by 1968. During the same period unemployment declined from 8,0 per cent to 2,9 per cent (Allan & Stevenson 1974:75 ). 4.4.3.3 Education

Like everything else, Italy¶s education system was also affected by the war. School buildings were destroyed and needed to be reconstructed. The war also affected attendance at schools. The quest for the expansion of schools was supported by all three leading parties at the end of the fascist era as a priority. The government made great strides in this respect as by 1961 over 90 per cent of all children from age six to ten were in elementary school. By 1968 over 68 per cent of children between the ages 11 and 14 attended junior high school (Tannenbaum & Noether 1974:246).

According to Tannebaum and Noether (1974:246) the success in the expansion of education was made possible by rapid modernisation which in turn was made possible by a performing economy. During the reconstruction period starting in 1950, the government allocated 9,5 per cent to education. This amount was increased to 14 ,2 per cent in 1961 and reached 22 per cent in 1971 (table 4.4). Expenditure on education constituted 13 per cent of state expenditure as against five per cent in the prewar era. Increases in parents¶ salaries allowed more of them to keep their children at school longer. However this led to unemployment, as youths who graduated from tertiary institutions could not be absorbed by the labour market. This became known as the unemployed youth problem.

4.4.3.4 Social welfare and health

The Italian government instituted a comprehensive social welfare system which caters for all segments of society. The Italian constitution recognises the responsibility of the state for the protection of mothers, children, young people, families and the aged through the provision of institutions, medical assistance, general assistance and funding. It has an efficient system of compulsory social insurance which was has been in place since 1952 (Zerilli-Marimo & Dell¶amore 1961:15 ). Italian social insurance provides for invalids and old people and covers life insurance, illness, disability, unemployment and accidents at work. Poor families receive money, food parcels, clothing and work tools. They also receive free hospital service and medicine. The disabled, blind, deaf and dumb and the aged receive a monthly allowance for life. The system is financed by contributions made by employers and the state (Tannenbaum & Noether 1974:188). The Italian government¶s allocation for health was 6,3 per cent in 1950, 11,2 per cent in 1961 and 20 per cent in 1971 (table 4.4).

The provision of better and proper health facilities was made possible by a growing economy. This improved the life span of the Italian people: the rate of premature death in babies was reduced, while adults lived longer dying of affluence and old age. Life expectancy increased from 60.3 years 1950 to 68,2 years in 1970. Infant mortality decreased from 35 per 1000 live births in 1950 to 20 per 1000 live births in 1971 (table 4.4).

4.4.3.5 Housing

As described above, Italy suffered serious damage to buildings which included dwellings for its people. About 1.8 million rooms were destroyed, 1 million heavily damaged, and 2,7 severely damaged. Because of this damage thousands of people were left homeless (Grindrod 1955:212). There was an urgent need for the government to provide shelter for its people, consequently it embarked on a housing programme, which between 1946 and 1954 succeeded in building 50 000 new rooms and repairing 310 000 damaged rooms (Grindrod 1955:212- 213.). This building boom also aided the economic recovery of the country.

Table 4.4: Increase in expenditure on education and health by the Italian government, and improvement in life expectancy and infant mortality

Year 1950 1961 1971

Education 9,5% 14,1% 22%

Health 6,3% 11,2% 20%

Life expectancy 60.3 years 68.2 years .

Infant mortality 35 per 1000 live 20 per 1000 live births births (Tannenbaum & Noether 1974 and United Nations common database 2005.

4.4.4 Summary

At the end of World War II Italy was a devastated country . Its economy was wrecked by the bombing carried out by the allied forces towards the close of the war. With no resources, the DC government had to start from scratch in order to rebuild the country. With the material and financial assistance it received from the United States, the government was able to plan for the development of the country. Within three years of the DC taking power, the economy of the country started growing at a rapid pace. This enabled the government to launch programmes to rebuild the country and to provide for the citizens by creating employment and making education and health amenities accessible to all. The infrastructure which was destroyed during the war was also rebuilt. The government provided employment for the majority of its citizens and took care of the aged, the frail, the disabled and the young. Italy became one of Europe¶s prosperous countries with its people enjoying a high standard of living.

Although the DC was responsible for the economic ³miracle´ that occurred in Italy, this was not reflected in the number of votes it received. The DC¶s best electoral performance was in the 1948 elections when it attained 48,5 per cent of the votes. This high percentage was attributed to the beginning of the Cold War and the fear of communism. In the 1953 elections when it was succeeding in eradicating poverty, its share of the votes dropped to 40,6 per cent. The success of the DC should have been reflected in the percentage of votes it received in this election. Instead its share of the votes decreased. Apart from the 1958 elections, when it received 42,2 per cent of the votes, the party¶s share of the votes was constantly in the 30s. This shows that the performance of the government was not a factor in the DC¶s long stay in power. The list PR system compounded by the multiplicity of parties resulted in the party winning just enough votes for it to rule with the assistance of other parties.

4.5 SDP: the establishment of a unique social welfare system

4.5.1 Introduction uring the second decade of the last century (20th), Sweden experienced political instability and high levels of unemployment which were exacerbated by the Great Depression. The political instability was a result of the absence of a lasting majority government in the country. How to resolve the unemployment problem became a major issue within the country with political parties making different proposals.

Like the other political parties in Sweden, the SDP was also concerned about the unemployment being experienced by the country and explored ways in which this acute problem could be resolved. Prior to the 1932 elections, the SDP unveiled a plan with which it hoped to bring to a halt the unemployment afflicting the country. It went to the polls with confidence, certain that its plan would be well received by the electorate and emerged victorious. When it ascended to power it successfully tackled the unemployment problem and introduced a unique socialist democratic ideology and welfare system equal to none and immensely benefited the Swedish people. The country¶s success was attributed to the socialist democratic ideology which was introduced by the SDP after 1932 (Tilton 1958:iii). Sweden captured the attention of the world in the 1930s through the effectiveness of its political system in general and in particular with its remarkable success in improving the standard of living of its citizens through its unique ideology which blended Marxist socialism and capitalism. Olsson (1990: 113) expresses the view that it was the social reforms and the ambitious employment policy of the 1930s which created Sweden¶s reputation as a model for social welfare. Sweden became one of the most admired countries in the world with scholars from foreign countries visiting it in order to observe the workings of its new political system. In England, New Fabian Research sent a delegation to Sweden in 1937 to learn about Swedish politics and institutions of which little was known in the English-speaking world (Tomasson 1976:776).

4.5.2 Unemployment and the formation of an ideology

The Swedish socialist ideology emerged as a response to economic pressures and, according to Milner (1990 :62), ³not as the logical applications of an all- knowing programme´. It evolved gradually over a period of time after debates and differences among members of the SDP. The SDP were initially proponents of Marxist socialism believing in the class struggle. In the party¶s programme adopted in 1897, the SDP¶s policy was stated as to remould the economic organisation of capitalist society and to abolish private ownership of production (Korpi 1978:77; Tilton 1958: 514). The party ascribed the suffering of the masses and increasing unemployment to capitalism and, having no faith in this system, predicted that the workers would rise against it and through a violent revolution the means of production would be transferred to the people and a classless society would be created. This was in tandem with Marxist thinking, but it did not occur and unemployment continued being a problem in the country.

At the beginning of the 1920s, debates started taking place within the party on how best to address the continuing unemployment problem. Two schools of thought emerged within the party on this issue. The first was in line with Marxism, which favoured the nationalisation of the economy. Those who adhered to this line of thinking believed that the Depression would show the folly of capitalism. The second school of thought was opposed to the idea of nationalisation arguing that, in the past, the party¶s policy of nationalisation had failed as the electorate was not yet ready for socialism. This, they pointed out, cost the party the 1920 and 1928 election as talk of nationalisation strengthened the opposition (Milner 1960 :60). The party was deadlocked without a strategy to resolve the unemployment problem until Ernest Wigforss, a party stalwart and economist entered the scene. It was Wigforss who grappled successfully with Sweden¶s unemployment problem (Lewin 1988:134).

Wigforss took up a position between Marxism and capitalism, advocating economic planning rather than nationalisation. Economic planning, he argued, entailed greater public intervention in the economy without necessarily nationalising (Lewin 1988:137). Greater state intervention would result in the creation of jobs, which would be done by expanding state expenditure and providing productive public employment at normal wages that would increase the buying power, thereby increasing demand in the economy. After much debate the party eventually accepted his plan and faced the electorate for the 1932 election. According to Korpi (1978:181) the party¶s unemployment policy became the main issue in that election. The Social Democrats looked forward to the election with great expectation. As it was, the socialists won that election, albeit narrowly.

4.5.3 Implementation of a socialist ideology

For the party to be able to introduce its vision of a new Sweden it needed to have a majority in parliament, which on account of its slender victory it did not have. It was thus forced to strike a deal with the Farmer¶s Party in what amounted to a quid pro quo. The Farmer¶s party agreed to support bills introducing a welfare programme in return for the introduction of state subsidies for agriculture. This unusual alliance enabled the SDP to pass legislation in parliament to put into effect a welfare state (Esping-Andersen 1990:41). One of the bills passed focused on plans to end unemployment. The passing of this bill signalled a gradual assault on the laissez faire market economy by the SDP. This, according to Lewin (1988:143), marked the introduction of socialist democratic ideology in Sweden.

The decision to abandon the notion of nationalisation signalled the first move away from doctrinaire socialism by the SDP. When the SDP went to the electorate it was already having second thoughts about the acceptance of an unadulterated observance to Marxist socialism. Following on this, on assuming power the SDP did not nationalise the economy as the nonsocialist parties had feared. It rejected dogma in favour of pragmatism watering down doctrinaire Marxism (Board 1970 :92). From initially being a party wedded to Marxism, the party underwent an evolutionary change in the 1930s (Esping-Andersen 1980:119).

The transformation of the economic system was carried out gradually. Nationalisation was abandoned in favour of full employment, better income distribution and more economic efficiency (Esping-Andersen 1980:118). Castles (1975:173) expresses the view that the party became reformist ready to administer the state on behalf of all sections of the population. By so doing, the SDP fashioned a successful socialist ideology which was placed somewhere between capitalism and Marxist socialism. Because of this innovation, the country earned itself the appellation, ³Sweden, the middle way´.

4.5.4 Government performance 4.5.4.1 Economic growth

When the SDP ascended to power, Mr Gustav Moller, who took over the position of Minister of Social Affairs stated that the party was committed to raising the standard of living, achieving universal benefits and providing security for the Swedish people (Olsson 1990: 94). The major concern of the party was to overcome the Depression by introducing welfare measures. Within three years of the SDP coming to power, Sweden¶s economy started showing a steady growth and this assisted the country to recover from the effects of the Depression.

Throughout the 1930s the economy grew by a modest two to three per cent per annum (de Vylder 2004:9). This was however interrupted by the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939. When the war ended Sweden¶s economy growth continued . It grew by 4,5 per cent annually between 1945 and 1950 (Olsson 1990: 25). What should however be mentioned is the fact that Sweden¶s economy was not adversely affected by the war as the country opted to remain neutral. This assisted the economy of the country as its infrastructure was intact at the end of the war as it did not suffer any damage. The economy also benefited from the postwar international recovery (de Vylder 2004:10). Tomasson (1970:33) attributes Sweden¶s impressive economic growth to the high degree of industrialisation that came about in the first three decades of the 20th century.

4.5.4.2 Employment

Unemployment as explained above was a serious concern to Sweden¶s political parties. Much as the SDP had won the 1932 election ostensibly because of its unemployment it was not in a position to immediately bring a solution to this problem. Steinmo (1988:417) points out that unemployment was high among labour union members and reached 30 per cent by 1933. As this was a problem of profound significance to the SDP it turned its attention to addressing it. It now had an opportunity to turn theory into reality by providing employment as outlined in its plans. The party proved itself equal to the task as it achieved success in this Herculean task it had set itself. In July 1933 unemployment figures stood at 139 000. This declined to 21 000 in August 1936 and to 9 360 in August 1937 (Tomasson 1969: 777). This was a decline of more than 80 per cent within a short period of four years. The party was successful in its quest to end unemployment and by 1950 this was no longer an issue, as it was almost non-existent (Olsson 1990:132). Whoever wanted to work had an opportunity to do so and people did not endure long spells of unemployment. Unemployment remained insignificant through the 1940s and 1950s and never exceeded three per cent even during the worst of times (de Vylder 2004:9). In its quest to provide employment, the SDP was aided by a favourable economic climate that obtained in the country after the party came to power. According to de Vylder 2004: 9), in 1935 the volume of Swedish exports exceeded its pre-depression level, and by 1936, both real wages and the level of production had done the same.

4.5.4.3 Education

Board (1970:73) contends that Sweden has always been an education-conscious country having had a compulsory public school system dating back to 1842. Under the SDP Sweden provided a free and decent public education at all levels for all its citizens. All barriers to attaining an education were removed when the SDP came into power through reforms instituted in the 1930s. Students at tertiary institutions were given stipends and free loans to finance their studies. The government also embarked on heavy investment in adult education (Milner 1990: 157). Since 1946 all primary and elementary school children have been given free lunches, school books and writing material (Rosenthal 1967:82). Sweden has an obligatory, free primary education system which guarantees a decent education level for all.

4.5.4.4 Social welfare and health Sweden is best known for its welfare programme which for a long period of time was second to none and was much admired by other countries. With a stable and performing economy the country became wealthy and this allowed the SDP to introduce measures aimed at making improvements in the lives of Swedish citizens, as envisaged by Moller. The reforms that the SDP introduced were aimed at reducing the power of capital and improving the conditions of the poor lower strata. In order to be able to do so, the government increased the allocation for social expenditure. Social expenditure includes funds allocated to health, welfare, education and social services. Social expenditure as a percentage of total public expenditure rose from 30 to 40 per cent after the SDP came to power (Olsson 1990:10). The increase in social expenditure remained constant, not exceeding 10 per cent, reaching 60 per cent by the mid-1950s (table 4.5).

The country committed itself to instituting a welfare state and it introduced legislation to give effect to this. The SDP introduced the following measures between 1933 and 1938 (Olsson 1990:110):

‡ new state employment creation programmes ‡ state subsidies to voluntary unemployment benefit societies ‡ a housing programme for families with many children ‡ maternity benefits to around 90 per cent of all mothers ‡ free maternity and childbirth services ‡ state loans to newly married couples

The outbreak of World War II interrupted the progress being made by the SDP towards instituting a welfare programme. However, when hostilities ended the party resumed its programmes. The second wave of welfare reforms were introduced in the second half of the 1940s (Olsson 1990:116). As in the period before the war these welfare reforms focused on housing, employment, health, education and pensions. During the period under discussion Sweden had a low birth rate. In order to encourage parents to have more children the government offered them a monetary incentive and extended benefits to families with children.

Because of the provision of welfare benefits Sweden did not experience premature deaths among its infants and its citizens lived longer. Between 1931 and 1940, life expectancy was 64 years. This improved to 68 years between 1941 and 1950. There was also a decline in infant mortality during the same period. Infant deaths between 1931 and 1940 were 46 per 1000 live births, but they dropped to 28 per 1000 live births between 1941 and 1950 (de Vylder 2004:5) (table 4.5).

4.5.4.5 Housing

At the end of the war Sweden was faced with a huge demand for housing. This was caused by the immigration of people from the rural to the urban areas because of improved secondary and tertiary education and better work opportunities. The government had to provide these people with housing. In the period between 1945 and 1960 a total of 900 000 new dwellings were constructed (Board 1970:256). Board (1970:257) points out that there were no slums in Sweden and that the government built proper houses which were affordable. The government provided housing allowances for low-income earners as well as for large families and pensioners in the late 1940s and early 1950s (Olsson 1990:140).

Table 4.5: Increase in Swedish government expenditure on social welfare including education, health and social welfare and an improvement in life expectancy and the infant mortality rate. Year 1931-1940 1941-1950

Social service 45% 60%

Life expectancy 64 years 68 years

Infant mortality 46 per 1000 live births 28 per 1000 live births

Source: Olsson 1990; de Vylder 2004

4.5.5 Summary

Sweden experienced problems during the first three decades of the 20th century. Among these problems were unemployment, the effects of the Depression on the economy of the country and political instability. When the SDP ascended to power it was confronted with these problems and for it to stay in power it had to find a solution to them. The SDP was successful in confronting the challenges that faced the country. High on its lists of successes was the provision of employment to a majority of Swedish citizens. The SDP instituted a social welfare programme which was second to none and which brought prosperity to the Swedish people. This was due largely to the implementation of a unique economic system which combined elements of social democracy and capitalism.

The SDP government improved the lives of Swedish citizens through these welfare programmes, which were the best in Europe and much admired by the rest of Europe. Sweden became a prosperous country with its citizens in want of nothing, enjoying the benefits of the social welfare programmes and little, or no poverty to speak of. This was beneficial to the SDP in the 1936 and 1940 elections where it increased its percentage to 45,9 and 53 per cent respectively. However, its percentage of the vote dropped to 46 per cent in the 1944, 1948 and 1952 elections. This was a reasonable percentage which showed confidence in the party by the electorate, proving a correlation between government performance and electoral support. 4.6 ANC: correcting an unequal distributive system

4.6.1 Introduction

The South Africa that the ANC inherited in 1994 was a country of great contrasts. It had elements of a developed First World country and an underdeveloped Third World country. Poverty and wealth survived alongside one another within the same country. Tarp and Brixen (1996:8) express the view that South Africa has the most unequal distribution of income with widespread poverty among blacks. According to Southall (2000:165), a World Bank survey conducted in 1993 indicated that 47 per cent of black households were living in officially defined poverty and the per capita income of whites remained almost 12 times higher than that of blacks.

When the ANC took over power it was faced with a myriad of socioeconomic problems which it had to address. These problems were as a result of the policy of separate development which led to the neglect of the black population. Wilson (2001/02:102) points out that ³there were five fundamental issues which the young democratic government had to grapple with in the economic sphere´. He identifies them as poverty, inequality, racism, unemployment and economic stagnation. During the rule of the previous governments there was discriminatory spending on health, education, pensions, housing, infrastructure and other social services (Tarp & Brixen 1996:10).

4.6.2 Confronting the challenges

The first challenge which confronted the ANC before it even came to power, and which it had to solve as a matter of urgency, was to convince the apprehensive white community that no harm would befall them or their property under a predominantly black government. ANC leaders led by Nelson Mandela went out of their way to assure whites that they had nothing to fear in a new nonracial democratic South Africa led by the ANC.

Reconciliation and national unity became a recurring theme in speeches of ANC leaders before and after the election. The plea for national unity was encapsulated in Mandela¶s inauguration speech when he said: ³We know it well that none of us acting alone can achieve success. We must therefore act together as a united people, for national reconciliation, for nation-building, for the birth of a new world³ (Mandela 1994: 1)

Over and above the unease of the white population over a black-led ANC government was the fear that conflict would break out amongst the black ethnic groups which would result in civil war. This was fuelled by the violence which engulfed the country involving black groups between the unbanning of organisations in 1990 and the holding of the election in 1994. This violence was seen as a forerunner to what was going to happen in post-apartheid South Africa (Mtimkulu 1993:209). Fears were expressed that South Africa would not avoid going the ³Africa way´, meaning being wrecked by internecine ethnic violence.

In various documents that it published, the ANC identified the problems which it said were caused by the policies of South Africa¶s previous white governments. In these document the ANC stated that in every sphere of society ņ economic, social, political, moral, cultural, environmental ņ South Africa was confronted by serious problems. Segregation in education, health, welfare, transport and employment had left deep scars of inequality and economic inefficiency (Lodge 1999:28). After identifying the problems, the ANC gave an insight into how it would attempt to address these inequalities.

The ANC stated that its major aim was to overcome the problems of inequality and injustice caused by apartheid and colonialism. It set itself the task of improving the lives of the black people and singled out those from the rural areas who it said were living in dire poverty. Its aim, it said, was to create a better life for all. While committing itself to eradicating the legacies of apartheid, the ANC said it was aware of the difficult task that lay ahead and admitted that ³it will be difficult for the first democratic government to deal with all these problems straight away´ (ANC 1992:4).

4.6.3 Government performance

4.6.3.1 Economic growth

Prior to 1994, South Africa was a beleaguered country with very little contact with the international world. It was reeling under all types of sanctions and boycotts, which had affected the economy of the country. Added to this was the recession which the country experienced from 1989. During the period 1980 to 1990 the country¶s economy grew by only one per cent per annum. When the ANC ascended to power and the country regained international recognition, the economy of the country showed a slight improvement. Between 1995 and 2003 it grew by 2,7 per cent per annum (Race Relations Survey 2002/2003: 378). This increased to around 3,5 per cent in 2004/2005.

With a slightly improving economy the government set out to address the imbalances that were created by four decades of white rule where the black citizens of the country received a disproportionate allocation of resources. The share spending on education, health and welfare accruing to the lowest quintile has been increasing since the ANC took over the government (table 4). On the other hand spending on the wealthy white communities was reduced. This conforms with the government¶s decision to redistribute resources to the poor in accordance with the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). The budget of the South African government became redistributive after 1994. Seekings and Nattrass (2002: 8) point out that redistribution happened because the top quintile received much fewer transfers or in kind benefits than they paid tax, whilst everyone else received more benefits than they paid taxes. While spending on the wealthy was reduced, it was increased for the poor.

4.6.3.2 Employment

South Africa suffers from a chronic unemployment problem which dates back to the previous regimes. Employment has always been hard to come by in South Africa particularly for blacks most of whom are unskilled. This problem worsened in the post-apartheid period largely due to retrenchments and the failure by both government and the private sector to create jobs. After completing tertiary education youths could not be absorbed into the job market. By late 1999 and early 2000, unemployed figures stood at about 32 per cent of the labour force (Race Relations Survey 2002/2003:139). This figure increased to 42 per cent in 2003. The South African government has applied its mind to the problem and come up with various solutions. One of these was to invite individuals, businesspeople, organisations and parliamentarians to contribute towards a job creation fund. However, this has not had the desired effect of easing the pervasive unemployment that the country experiences. The government has not been able to find a solution to the unemployment problem, which increases on an annual basis.

4.6.3.3 Education

On coming to power the ANC-led government integrated the different education departments which were previously constituted along racial lines. The government focused its attention on the former black education system which, according to Tarp and Brixen (1996:8), had been grossly neglected. This involved building and repairing schools, adding more classrooms, training and upgrading teachers. The education budget has been increased annually by the government since 1995. Expenditure on education remains the largest budgetary item in South Africa as it is allocated about 20 per cent of the total budget (Garson 2004:1). For the 1995/96 year, the government allocated education R32,21bn which was 6,5 per cent of the total budget (Race Relations Survey 1995/1999:95). The education budget was increased annually eventually amounting to R48,5bn during the 1999/2000 year which was 22,1 per cent of the total budget (table 4.6). This was an increase of 16 per cent over the previous year (Race Relations Survey 1999/2000:125).

Under the new government there was an increase in the enrolment of pupils from primary to high school level. Between 1995 and 2001 primary school enrolment remained steady at around 95,5 per cent. Secondary school enrolment was at approximately 85 per cent indicating an increase of 15 per cent from 1992. There was also an increase of about 10 percent in the number of people who were receiving adult literacy education. Primary pupils particularly from rural schools are receiving a free meal on a daily basis (Garson 2004: 3).

4.6.3.4 Social welfare and health

The government¶s allocation for health and welfare has been increasing since the ANC came to power. Many more people have been beneficiaries of the government¶s increased spending on health and social welfare. In the past social grants were only received by pensioners and disabled people, but when the ANC government came to power it extended them to include teenage mothers, people suffering from HIV/Aids and large families without an income. The pension and disability grant which is no longer based on race has been increased annually (Government Communication Information Systems 2003:15). The government distributed R34,8 billion in social grants to more than 7,7 million people in 2003 (Race Relations Survey 2003/2004:271) .

For the 1995/1996 year, R1,2bn was allocated for health (Race Relations Survey 95/96:195). This amounted to four per cent of the total budget. The health budget reached R24,8bn in 1999/2000. This allocation was 11 per cent of the total budget ņ an increase of seven per cent over the previous year (Race Relations Survey 1999/2000:225). Welfare received R13,4bn in 1995/1996, which was three per cent of the total budget. The amount for welfare continued increasing, reaching R20bn in 1999/2000, which was nine percent of the total budget (table 4.6). This was an increase of 6 per cent over four years (Race Relations Survey 1999/2000:238). Since 1994 the health sector has been transformed to make it more accessible to poor people. This was done by building more clinics particularly in the rural areas. Over 7000 have been built and 2298 upgraded and 125 mobile clinics have been upgraded. Public health consumes 11 per cent of the government¶s total budget. The poor and the young received free health care. The government¶s expenditure on health care proved beneficial as there was an improvement in life expectancy and infant mortality (table 4.6).

4.6.3.5 General development

Approaching the 2004 elections, the ANC government released new statistics reflecting its performance over a 10-year period. They were the following: economic growth of 2,8 per cent in the years 2003/2004; 1.6 million houses built; more than 70 per cent of households electrified, 63 per cent of houses having access to sanitation; secondary school enrolment reaching 85 per cent by 2003; inflation declining to 4 per cent; 2 million jobs being created (The Star 2004:8-9):

Table 4.6: Increase in South African government spending on education, health and social welfare, and an improvement in life expectancy and the infant mortality rate

Education Year 95/96 96/97 97/98 98/99 99/2000

Amount R32,21bn R35,2 bn R40,3bn R46,8bn R48,5bn

% of budget 6,5 20 21 23 22,1

Health

Year 95/96 96/97 97/98 98/99 99/2000

Amount R1,2bn R17,1bn R20,2bn R25,1bn R24,8bn

% of budget 4 8 12 13 11

Welfare

Year 95/96 96/97 97/98 98/99 99/2000 amount R13,4bn R18,43bn R19bn R19,8bn R20bn

% of budget 3 7 9 9 9

Life expectancy 64.4 years 66.9 years

Infant mortality 56.1 per 44.9 per 1000 live 1 000 live births births.

Sources: Race Relations Survey 95/96; 96/97; 97/98; 98/99 & 99/2000.

4.6.4 Summary

The ANC was faced with seemingly insurmountable problems when it took over power in 1994. More than four decades of white rule had left the majority of the black citizens of the country impoverished. The ANC was well aware of the challenges that faced it and right from the beginning conceded that it would be difficult to solve the problems facing the black people who constituted a large majority of its constituency. Just as it had cautioned against high expectations of quick delivery, the ANC conceded that what it had achieved was not enough as ³many people were still jobless, many people still live in poverty, communities are still plagued by crime. We are not complacent about what has been achieved thus far. We are as impatient as you are to overcome these problems and speed up delivery¶ (ANC 1999:2)

The determination of the ANC government to improve the living conditions of the poor is reflected in the amount of money it allocates to education, health and welfare from the budget. There has been an annual increase in the amount allocated to the three sectors, with education always getting the proverbial lion¶s share. The increased expenditure of health impacted on the lives of both young and old as life expectancy and infant mortality improved.

Given the brief period that it has been in power and the formidable problems it faced it is still too early to judge the performance of the ANC. The ANC has made some tentative strides towards improving the living conditions of South Africa¶s black masses, but has hardly scraped the surface. High economic growth has been elusive as the economy grew by only 3,0 per cent in 2003. However, its largely black constituency was not complaining as seen by the increasing votes it received after the 62 per cent of the 1994 founding elections. This was followed by 66 per cent in 1999 and 69 per cent in the 2004 elections. Thus far the popularity of the ANC may be sought in the role it played in the liberation struggle, and not in its performance. Therefore the retrospective thesis does not apply to the ANC. 4.7 Conclusion

This chapter set out to determine the effect of government performance on the electoral success of the parties in our study, as they were elected to power time and again. When these parties ascended to power their countries were confronted with serious problems as unfavourable conditions prevailed within them. The parties made it their priority to address these problems once elected to office. While success in addressing them would improve their chances of re- election, failure would have meant an early exit from power. The parties stayed in power for 25 or more years, however. It is useful to ask at this point if this extended stay in power was due to their performance in addressing the problems which they found in their societies and, by so doing, improving the living conditions of their communities. As the government of their countries, these parties all increased spending on the education and health sectors, with social welfare not receiving as much. This does not, however, mean that it was therefore neglected.

In Botswana, the BDP¶s victory in the 1965 and 1969 elections cannot be said to be the result of government performance as the country was still battling with poverty during those years. However, after diamonds were discovered in the country, the BDP was able to make major improvements in the country and to the lives of the citizens of Botswana. To this end the government increased its spending on health and education and intensified its efforts to bring education and health facilities closer to the people by building more schools and clinics. The country¶s infrastructure was improved as reflected in the tarring of the country¶s major roads.

The party¶s share of the votes has been consistently high. This might not however be attributed to government performance in improving the living conditions of the masses, as most rural communities are still poor and unemployment reappeared in the late 1980s. It is safe to say that the BDP owes its electoral success more to the influence the chiefs exert on their subjects as to who to vote for. This does not, however, rule out the possibility that some segments of Botswana¶s population have been influenced to vote for the BDP because of the government¶s success in improving the quality of life. The beneficiaries in this case would be the wealthy segment of Botswana¶s society who are close to the party. When Congress took over power in India, it was aware of the magnitude of the problem facing the country. The most serious of these problems was the poverty of the country which was described by Robson (1954) and Morris-Jones (1964) above. Congress identified the eradication of poverty as one of its major aims. With no industrial base from which to build on, the odds were heavily stacked against the party.

Through the implementation of Five Year Economic Plans, Congress hoped to improve the economic position of the country. The government also increased its budget on education and health. Although the government¶s economic plans had a measure of success, they could not alleviate the poverty from which the people were suffering and Congress was faced with a perpetual struggle to address the problems facing the country. Whatever success accrued from the Economic Plans was enjoyed by people who were already better off than the rest. The government could not curb the increasing population rate which resulted in large consumption of food leading to an increase in food prices. Despite this, Congress was returned to power time and again with its share of the votes always being on or above 40 per cent. This was because of identification with the party, which was a result of its leading role in the struggle for the country¶s independence.

Mapai brought prosperity to Israel after the difficult early years experienced during the establishment of the state. The Israeli citizens enjoyed a high standard of living which included free education, improved social welfare and health facilities. Given all this it would have been expected that the party should average more than 40 per cent of the votes. This was, however, not the case as its percentage hovered around the 30 per cent mark. Mapai was never able to form a government on its own. It would seem that the Israeli voters were not unduly impressed with the performance of Mapai and elected to vote for other parties, which proliferated in the country. The small parties were able to gather enough votes to gain representation in parliament as Israel used the proportional representation system. The 1948 elections which brought the DC to power in Italy were held amidst tumultuous events in the world. This was the end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War which brought the democratic and capitalist west into conflict with the communist east. The fear of communism was exploited by the DC which garnered a high percentage poll of 48,5 per cent. The DC took over a devastated country which had to be reconstructed as the country¶s infrastructure which included bridges, buildings and roads had been destroyed. Italy had not industry to speak off. However the DC was able to bring about prosperity to Italy as the country later experienced what is referred to as an economic miracle in the early 1950s. However the efforts of the DC were not rewarded at the polls as its share of the votes during the successful period of reconstruction never went beyond 40 per cent, instead hovering at the mid-30 per cent. This means the government¶s performance failed to influence the majority of the people to vote for the DC. However there were mitigating circumstances such as the proliferation of parties and the country¶s electoral system.

The SDP which came to power in Sweden earlier than the other parties in the study did not inherit a country that was poverty stricken, but with a long established and functioning political system. Sweden also had a viable economy which was nevertheless affected by the Depression. Unemployment added to the country¶s problems. When the SDP assumed power, Sweden¶s economy recovered and recorded impressive growth. Through its cleverly crafted hybrid ideology, which combined both social democracy and capitalism, the SDP was able to rescue the country from the unemployment predicament it was facing.

After introducing its employment and economic plan the SDP worked aggressively to ensure its success. The party¶s 1936 election victory was attributed to its success in reducing the unemployment statistics. The SDP also started implementing its welfare policy which greatly benefited the Swedish community. This, more than reducing the unemployment statistics, endeared the Swedish voters to the SDP. This was reflected in the high 53,8 per cent of the vote that the party achieved in the 1940 elections. The SDP established a welfare state which was much admired throughout the Western world and that allowed the Swedes to live comfortable lives with a wide range of welfare benefits. The SDP¶s share of the votes was an impressive 46 per cent in three subsequent elections, which demonstrated the Swedish voters¶ satisfaction with the performance of the SDP. .

The ANC¶s victory in the 1994 election was made possible by an overwhelming vote from the black community who were impoverished by the policy of separate development. On assuming power, the ANC set itself the task of transforming society and eradicating the inequalities and disparities which existed in the country. The ANC was well aware of the magnitude of the problem, hence it cautioned against over-optimism.

In the first five years of its rule the ANC government devoted funds and energy towards improving the living conditions of the black people. As seen from the discussion above it had a measure of success, although problems were encountered in a number of areas where delivery of service was not satisfactory. This was understandable given the short period of time it had been in power and the problems that confronted it. Because of this, the ANC was given a chance and no judgment was passed on its performance at that early stage. Like Congress, its re-election in the first three elections could be ascribed to its role in the fight against apartheid. However, some impressive material gains were made.

From the above it is difficult to conclusively argue that government performance was a major factor in the electoral success of all the parties in our study. Other factors should be taken into consideration when ascribing the long stay in power by these parties. These factors were discussed in preceding chapters.

With opposition parties present in the states that are discussed above, it is important to find out what made it possible for the parties in our study to win elections for more than four consecutive elections. What constrained the opposition from defeating the ruling party? This will be discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 5

ADVERSE CONDITIONS AFFECTING THE PERFORMANCE OF OPPOSITION PARTIES

Introduction While Chapter 3 focused on the methods used by dominant parties in our study to entrench their stay in power, the purpose here will be to identify conditions that have adversely affected the performance of opposition parties, resulting in them being defeated by the ruling parties over a period of 25 years. The argument in this chapter is that much as dominant parties won elections through their own efforts, the weakness of the opposition was also a contributory factor to their unusually lengthy stay in power.

Once a political party has been elected to power and assumes the position of government, it is left to the defeated parties to pick up the pieces, go back to the drawing boards and plan for the next election in order to take over power. Political parties, by their nature, seek to capture state power and form governments. Macridis (1973:51) argues that opposition is an organised and structured attempt to replace a government according to certain constitutional rules.

The following have been identified as factors responsible for the weakness of the opposition: an inappropriate ideology, similar policies to those of the ruling party, factionalism, particularistic support base, lack of resources, proliferation of opposition parties, and a failure to form alliances. (It is important to note that these factors are not common to all the opposition parties and the reason for their absence will be discussed under the heading, ³factors not discussed´).

5.1 Botswana

5.1.1 Introduction

Political parties in Botswana were formed towards the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s and were not involved in a protracted struggle for the independence of the state. On the contrary, they were invited by the colonial authorities to take part in constitutional negotiations to pave the way for the independence of the country. The first party formed in 1959 was the Bechuanaland Protectorate Federal Party (BPFP). According to Ramsay and Parsons (1998:134), its formation was the first attempt at launching a protectorate-wide political party. This party had a short lifespan, however, as it ceased to exist in 1962 without having made any impact in the nascent politics of the country.

The formation of other parties followed in quick succession at the beginning of the 1960s. These parties were the Botswana People¶s Party (BPP), Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), Botswana Independence Party (BIP) and the Botswana National Front (BNF). The first three parties contested the country¶s first elections for self-government, which was a prelude to the granting of independence. The elections held in 1965 were won by the BDP, which captured 80,4 per cent of the votes, giving it 28 seats. The BPP became the official opposition party by virtue of winning 14,2 per cent of the votes, which gave it three seats, while the BIP won 4,2 per cent of the votes, a figure which was not enough to give it a seat in parliament. The BNF was formed in the same year that the elections were held, but did not contest them. The BPP, BIP and the BNF went on to contest Botswana¶s post-independence elections during the period under review. By virtue of this, they became the country¶s significant opposition parties, irrespective of the number of seats they won. The most seats ever won by the opposition were five. This was achieved by the BNF in the 1984 elections.

5.1.2 Botswana People¶s Party (BPP)

The BPP, which is commonly but erroneously regarded as the country¶s first political party, was formed in 1960. Picard (1985:18) points out that two factors partly accounted for the formation of the BPP. The first factor was the formation of the Legislative Council (Legco) comprising colonial administration officials and chiefs. Picard (1985) does not substantiate this assertion. The second factor was the nationalist movement in South Africa. The founder members of the BPP were closely associated with both the African National Congress and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) while living and working in South Africa. Some of the founder members of the BPP even belonged to these organisations. The influence of South African political events on the formation of political parties in Botswana is also shared by Polhemus (1983:399) and Holm (1988:185).

Although not attributing the formation of the BPP to the establishment of the Legco, Maundeni (1998:125) points out that the BPP was opposed to this institution, arguing that it was unrepresentative as it comprised the colonial government and white residents of the country.

The first leadership of the party, according to Picard (1985:18), consisted of educated people who dissociated themselves from tyrannical chiefs whom they claimed mistreated their subjects. This resulted in the party barring traditional leaders from its membership (Maundeni 1998:125). Picard (1985: 8) credits the BPP with having had an effect on Botswana¶s political development as it stimulated the rapid spread of a political consciousness in a traditionalist polity. On the other hand, Maundeni (1998:124) points out that the BPP was the first mass-based political party in Botswana. According to Wiseman (1977:384), the BPP was the first true nationalist party in Botswana as it agitated for the independence of the country.

Polhemus (1983:399) identifies the following as the aims of the party which it said it would pursue through ³the weapons of constitutional means and non-violence´: ‡ to mobilise and organise the political consciousness of the people of Bechuanaland ‡ to canalise and make it articulate ‡ to inculcate a sense of national unity and solidarity among the diverse and tribally divided inhabitants of Bechuanaland ‡ to endeavour diligently to raise the country to an internationally recognised status of viable, autonomous and independent statehood, unitary or federal

From its formation the party adopted a radical position calling for the early independence of Botswana, the Africanisation of the civil service and the nationalisation of some land (Picard 1985:18). It also adopted a very strong anti- white position, arguing that they were a privileged minority. To this end it called for an end to the following (Maundeni 1998:125): white racism and separate communal representation; the awarding of business licences biased in favour of whites; and the recruitment of white South Africans into the civil service. The party also opposed racially determined salaries for equal work within the civil service.

Maundeni (1998:125) points out that the anti-colonial and anti-white rhetoric was beneficial to the party as it increased its popularity. From initially being supported by villages situated along the railway line and eastern towns, it went on to gain a wide constituency throughout the country, particularly from the people who paid no allegiance to the chieftaincy.

5.1.2.1 Electoral performance

After its participation in the pre-independence elections the BPP went on to contest all Botswana¶s elections. In the 1965 elections it won three seats to the BDP¶s 28, earning itself the mantle of the official opposition party. It retained these seats in the first post-independence elections in 1969. However the number of seats it won in subsequent elections decreased. This is how the party performed in the elections: 1965 ņ 14,2 per cent, 3 seats; 1969 ņ 12,1 per cent, 3 seats; 1974 ņ 6,4 per cent, 2 seats; 1979 ņ 7,4 per cent, 1 seat; 1984 ņ 6,6 per cent, 1 seat, and 1989 ņ 4,4 per cent, no seat.

5.1.3 Botswana Independence Party (BIP) The formation of the BIP was due to factionalism within the BPP. This occurred when, according to Maundeni (1998:126), ³alienated, disgruntled, discredited and expelled members of the BPP left to form their own party in 1964´. The founder member of the party was Motsamai Mpho. On the other hand, Ramsay and Parsons (1998:135) attribute the emergence of factionalism within the BPP to a leadership struggle among the three founder members of the party.

In contrast to the BPP, the BIP was a moderate party which was in favour of multiracialism and multiparty democracy. According to its documents, the basic aim of the party is ³to unite all the peoples of Botswana into a cohesive national political organisation and establish a free democratic government founded upon the will and participation of all the inhabitants who are Batswana nationals, irrespective of colour, creed or race and to fully co-operate with other African countries to rid our continent of all forms of foreign domination´ (Polhemus 1983:404).

According to Picard (1985:235), led by Mpho, the BIP articulated the following aims: ³To rid our continent of all forms of foreign domination; to fight for the immediate economic independence of Botswana, so that Botswana shall be free from economic pressure of neighbouring white states, and to achieve these aims and objectives by non-violent positive action as far as possible.´

5.1.3.1 Electoral performance

The BIP did not have an impressive record in the country¶s elections and was the weakest of the three major opposition parties. It took part in the 1965 elections, winning no seats. In both the 1969 and 1974 elections it won one seat each. This is how the BIP performed in the country¶s elections: 1965 ņ 4,6 per cent, 0 seat; 1969 ņ 6,0 per cent, 1 seat; 1974 ņ 4,8 per cent, 1 seat; 1979 ņ 4,8 per cent, 0 seat, 1984 ņ 3,0 per cent , 0 seat and 1989 ņ 2,4 per cent, 0 seat.

5.1.4 Botswana National Front (BNF)

The initiative behind the formation of the BNF came from Dr Kenneth Koma upon his return to Botswana from Russia where he had obtained a doctorate in political science. He arrived while the country was preparing for the 1965 elections. According to Colglough and McCarthy (1985:432), the idea behind the formation of the party was to unite all opposition parties within the country in order to stop what it termed the BDP¶s neocolonial tendencies. The party was formed in 1965 and was initially largely urban based. Ramsay and Parsons (1998:147) point out that on his arrival, Koma immediately set about the task of building a united front between the opposition parties and other disaffected elements, including such veterans as Motsatse and Raditladi and younger traditional leaders who were upset at their loss of power.

From being an urban party, the BNF broadened its support base and went out of to win the support of the chiefs. Polhemus (1983 406) states that chiefs were easy to recruit as they were dissatisfied at having their powers curtailed when the new BDP government created a House of Chiefs which was only an advisory body. One of the influential chiefs who joined the BNF was Bathoen II of the Bamangwaketse tribe, after resigning his chieftaincy (Picard 1985:184). He was tactically elected as leader of the party in order to attract the support of other traditional leaders. Because of the support that Bathoen would bring to the party, Koma had no objections to him becoming the leader, while he became his deputy. The BNF was well aware of the criticism it would encounter by recruiting chiefs. Polhemus (1983:408) refers to this as a ³schizoid alliance´ since the radical elements decided to live with the traditional. As this was an alliance of convenience, the chiefs¶ stay in the party did not last as they later left as they were not sure of their future in the party. They also wanted to safeguard their chiefly positions which guaranteed them a salary (Polhemus 1983:409). The BNF had a radical programme espousing scientific socialism as compared with African socialism, which Koma dismissed as buffoonery. The party made a class analysis of the situation in Botswana and referred to the BDP government as ³neo-colonialists which was far worse than the classical colonial administration that preceded it´. The party said it would chart a strategy for bringing Botswana into the mainstream of the African revolution (Polhemus (1983:406).

The BNF are regarded by Polhemus (1983:406) as the most ideological of Botswana¶s parties. It propagated an unadulterated scientific socialism as opposed to African socialism which was being implemented on the continent by luminaries such as Tanzania¶s Julius Nyerere and Zambia¶s Kenneth Kaunda . However, much as this was the case, it was more socialist rhetoric than adherence to a firm belief system (Polhemus 1983:407).

5.1.4.1. Electoral performance

The BNF first participation in the elections of the country was in 1969, where it won three seats after taking 13,5 per cent of the votes. For this election it was boosted by the presence of Bathoen who became the party¶s drawcard. Bathoen was nominated as the party¶s presidential candidate. The BNF replaced the BPP as the country¶s official opposition party. The party won its seats in the Bamangwaketse area, where Bathoen had his stronghold (Polhemus 1983:407). Its performance improved in 1984 when it won 20,5 per cent of the votes giving it five seats. This is how the party performed in the elections: 1969 ņ 13,5 per cent, 3 seats; 1974 ņ 11,5 per cent, 2 seats; 1979 ņ 12,9 per cent, 2 seats; 1984 ņ 20,5 per cent, 5 seats and 1989 ņ 26,9 per cent, 3 seats.

5.1.5 Factors responsible for the weakness of the opposition in Botswana

Picard (1985:235) points out that Botswana¶s opposition parties are weak, disorganised and not a serious threat to the BDP. He continues his criticism of the opposition parties by saying ³they lack coherent strategies for acquiring power and remain fragmented, underfinanced and poorly organised and led´. Botswana¶s opposition parties have made little impact in the political system of the country. Similarly, Breytenbach (1977:24) attributes the opposition¶s weakness to a lack of organisation. The opposition has never been a serious threat to the BDP, being inactive in between elections. The following factors account for the weakness of the opposition in Botswana: inappropriate ideology, similar policies to those of the ruling party, factionalism, lack of resources and failure to form alliances.

Inappropriate ideology On its formation, the BDP recruited what could be said to be conservative members of the Botswana society such as chiefs, teachers, farmers and clerks. The BDP was a moderate party which did not espouse radical nationalism, nor socialism as was the case with nationalists movements in other parts of Africa. When it campaigned for the 1965 elections, it upheld multiracialism, democracy and a free market economic system (Molutsi 1998:368). It welcomed the continued presence of the British expatriates in Botswana.

On the other hand, both the BPP and the BNF adopted radical policies which were to the left of the BDP. Both parties expressed a preference for a socialist economic system. Polhemus (1983:402) states that the BPP seemed to offer a spectrum to the left of the BDP. While the BPP¶s radical ideology and anti- traditionalism won it support, the BNF paid a price for its ideology. Molomo (2000:71) points out that during the three decades of Botswana¶s independence, the BDP used the BNF¶s ideology to its own advantage. It explained the dangers of Communism under the BNF to the voters, pointing out that this included sharing property, including cattle, which was the livelihood of the rural peasants. According to Molomo (2000:71), this had the effect of starving the BNF of the support it could have received from the rural areas. Similar policies to those of the ruling party An interesting point mentioned by Holm (1988), Polhemus (1983) and Molomo (2000) is that much as the BPP and BNF had radical policies, they were merely posturing and were no different from the BDP. Polhemus (1983:402) states that the BPP and BNF had no commitment to socialism as they never went beyond posturing. All three of Botswana¶s opposition parties were not opposed to the BDP¶s multiracialism and the free market economy. Molomo (2000: 4) point out that there is an absence of acute ideological differences among the parties. The campaigns of the three parties are more about personalities than substantive policy differences. The parties are in agreement on the need to improve the living conditions of the Batswana people and the creation of jobs.

Holm (1988:190) argues that there is very little to distinguish between the policies of the opposition and those of the BDP. He points out that both the BPP and the BIP make less of a distinction between themselves and the BDP. While the BNF started off as a radical party which was contemptuous of the BDP, with the passing of time it had watered down that image in favour of pragmatism.

Of the three opposition parties the BIP is closest to the BDP. It has the same vision as the BDP for the well-being of the country¶s citizens. It confined its criticism of the BDP only to its delivery record and not its policies. Mpho saw the role of his party not so much as providing alternative policy choices, but as keeping the BDP honest, ensuring that Botswana did not become a one-party state. There was no animosity between the two parties who enjoyed cordial relations (Polhemus 1983:404). Up until the last election in 1989, the BIP maintained this position. To show the closeness between the two parties a photograph of Sir Seretse Khama occupied pride of place in Mpho¶s living room.

Factionalism Factionalism within Botswana¶s politics was not acute, and could not be said to have been detrimental to the fortunes of the opposition. However, it needs to be discussed, weak as it was. Factionalism reared its head in Botswana¶s politics as the country was preparing for the 1965 pre-independence elections. The BPP experienced factionalism within a year of its formation which resulted in a split and the existence of three parties, all laying claim to the name BPP. The three founder members of the party were feuding with each other and the leader of one of the factions, Motsamai Mpho adopted the new name, Bechuanaland Independence Party (BIP). Two BPPs contested the 1965 elections together with the newly formed BIP. One of the BPPs later faded away after its poor performance in those elections (Polhemus 1983:401).

The BNF which did not contest the 1965 elections also experienced internal problems which did not, however, lead to a split within the party. The BNF was an ambitious party which set out to challenge the BDP and was taken far more seriously by the ruling party than the other two opposition parties. Factionalism appeared within the party in 1969 when a radical group within the party, dissatisfied with the accommodation of traditional leaders, withdrew while others were expelled. The party experienced problems again after the 1984 elections due to in-fighting. This resulted in the party¶s MP for Kanye district, Daniel Kwele, leaving to form his own party, Botswana Freedom Party. This hurt the party¶s chances in the Kanye district in the 1989 elections as it split the vote resulting in it losing this seat (Legum 1989/1990: B500).

Lack of resources One of the most important reasons for the weak performance of the opposition in Botswana is a lack of resources. Unlike the ruling party, these parties do not have access to the resources of the central government. Molomo (2000:78) also points out that Botswana does not have a system of funding for political parties. He adds, however, that the opposition parties were suspicious that the BDP was receiving funding secretly, a claim the party denied. Charlton (1993:344) dismisses the opposition parties as having no patronage which they could use to attract voters. The parties also do not have alternative sources of income as the wealthy elite of Botswana support the BDP. Because of a lack of resources, opposition parties are unable to field candidates in all constituencies (Osei- Hwedie 2001:61). Legum (1982/1983: B614) argues that the lack of funds in the opposition renders them ineffective between elections, to the extent of being almost moribund.

Because of their parlous financial state, opposition parties have been unable to afford permanent headquarters in Gaborone, the country¶s capital. The only visible sign of the opposition in Gaborone was a table set up by the BNF at the central shopping mall with pamphlets written by Koma and old copies of the Communist Manifesto during the 1969 and 1974 elections (Polhemus 1983:419). This did not last long, however, as in later elections they were not on display. With opposition parties not having resources some of their election candidates have complained that they were expected to use their own money in their campaigns (Danevad 1995:399). Lack of funds prevents the opposition parties from executing the following functions necessary for an effective election campaign: nominating candidates in all of the constituencies; hiring halls for meetings; travelling to remote parts of the country as this would need four-wheel drive vehicles; and printing fresh and innovative election pamphlets. Overall the election campaigns of the opposition have been unimpressive (Danevad 1995:390).

Failure to form alliances Since Botswana¶s opposition parties do not have a large following, their salvation would lie in the formation of an alliance. Danevad (1995:399) points out that since 1969 the opposition parties have competed among themselves for seats in several constituencies. However, the idea of forming an alliance was not appealing to them and was not seriously entertained. The reason behind the formation of the BNF was to unite the opposition parties against the BDP. The vision of Koma was however never realised as the BPP and the BIF spurned his suggestions that they should unite (Polhemus 1983:421). However, Koma was not discouraged by this rebuff from trying to reach out to the leaders of the other two opposition parties and continued with his efforts up until the 1984 elections when he called for a united front of opposition parties ³to stop the BDP¶s widely vaunted one-party state´.

The BPP and BIF met to discuss the proposal Koma made before the 1984 elections, but failed to reach an agreement about forming an election alliance. Danevad (1995:399) points out that had the opposition combined they could have won ten instead of six seats in the 1984 elections. He adds that they could have been effective in their criticism of the BDP and played an important role in influencing public policy. Buoyed by winning five seats in the 1984 elections, which made it the official opposition party, the BNF felt confident to go it alone and abandoned the idea of an alliance with the other two parties (Legum 1984/1985:B628).

Factors not discussed Particularism Even though they may be strong in certain areas, Botswana¶s opposition parties draw their support from various areas throughout the country. However, the support they receive from these specific areas is not as strong as that which the BDP receives from the Bamangwato and Bakwena tribal areas.

Proliferation of parties Given the small size of the country (220 000 sq. miles) and the population (650 000 at independence), Botswana cannot be said to be overpopulated with political parties. Four parties are a reasonable number for the country.

5.1.6 Summary

Since the BDP ascended to power in 1965, it has never faced a serious challenge from the country¶s opposition. This is due to the factors that were discussed in the preceding paragraphs. Even among literate societies, the ideology of communism is rather difficult to comprehend. At independence and the years immediately following it, Botswana¶s population consisted primarily of rural people with a low level of education. Koma was the only Motswana who was able to embrace this ideology when he was furthering his studies in the Soviet Union. The BNF¶s communist ideology did not make much impact on the placid Batswana people. On the contrary it benefited the BDP, who used it against the BNF by characterising it as something evil. It explained that communism advocated the nationalisation of property including cattle, which was the livelihood of the ordinary Motswana.

It is anybody¶s guess what would have happened in Botswana had the BPP not experienced factionalism in 1965, which resulted in the formation of the BIP. Although the BPP may not have defeated the BDP, it could have put up an impressive performance giving it a respectable number of seats. The split before the crucial first elections affected the fortunes of the opposition. On the whole, factionalism was not a major issue in the politics of Botswana, as it never destabilised the opposition during the first decades of independence.

Botswana¶s opposition parties do not have enough physical and financial resources to enable them to launch effective election campaigns. The poverty of the parties is such that they cannot even afford to hire office premises or halls for public meetings or to print election pamphlets. This also prevents them from fielding candidates in all the constituencies. Because of their impoverished state, the opposition parties cannot reach supporters in the remote areas of the country, which are only accessible with four-wheel drive vehicles.

The formation of the BNF was the result of a desire by Koma to form a party strong enough to challenge the BDP. Suggestions from Koma for the opposition to unite did not receive a positive response from the other two parties. If they had formed an alliance, they could perhaps have put up a better performance that could have threatened the hegemony of the BDP.

5.2 India 5.2.1 Introduction

Three major political parties existed in India during the country¶s occupation by Britain. The parties were the Indian National Congress, the Communist Party of India and the Congress Socialist Party. Congress was the most prominent of these parties as it was at the forefront of the fight for the independence of the country. After independence, several parties emerged at both national and regional level (Innaiah 1981:i). According to Weiner (1957:17), 14 parties contested India¶s first post-independence elections held in 1952. After Congress¶ victory in these elections, they became the country¶s first opposition parties.

Weiner (1957:20) posits the view that parties entered the elections believing that Congress would perform poorly and they positioned themselves to become the official opposition. He argues that there was a general lack of certainty among the opposition as to what the elections might bring. However, the parties were proved wrong as Congress put up a good performance while they performed poorly. Out of 489 Lok Sabha seats, these parties including independents won only 125 seats (Weiner 1957:20). The rest of the seats were won by Congress in its first election, which was a test of its strength as power was bequeathed to it by the departing British colonial government. The share of the votes of Congress was 45 per cent. The elections legitimised Congress¶ rule over India.

From this and subsequent elections spanning a period of 20 years, the combined number of seats won by the opposition has not come any closer to those secured by Congress or to threaten its stranglehold on the country¶s politics. The only exception was in the 1967 elections where the opposition won a combined total of 237 seats to Congress¶s 283.

Political parties in India contest the elections at both national and state level. The parties which contest elections at national level are referred to as all-India parties, a status conferred by the government. The political programmes of all-India parties cover a wide range of national socioeconomic and political issues compared with state parties which focus on particularistic issues (Park & de Mesquita 1979:109). For a party to be recognised as a national party (all-India party) it should have earned four per cent of the votes or four per cent of the seats in elections to the Lok Sabha from at least four states in a previous election (Park & de Mesquita 1979:109).

Only four parties qualified to be referred to as all-India parties following the 1952 elections. They were Jana Sangh, the Communist Party, Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party (KMPP) and the Socialist Party(SP). The number of all-India parties increased when other parties were later formed, namely the Praja Socialist Party (PSP), the Samyukta Socialist Party, the Swatantra Party and the Communist Party of India (Marxist). The PSP was formed from a merger between the SP and the KMPP.

The all-India parties are classified into two categories. In the one category are parties regarded as belonging to the left. The other category accommodates parties belonging to the right. The Communist and Socialist Parties are identified with the left, while those regarded as being on the right are the Swatantra and Jana Sangh.

5.2.2 Leftists parties

The Communist and Socialist Parties are the oldest opposition parties in India and were involved in the country¶s fight for independence. They were among the parties which contested India¶s first parliamentary elections in 1952. During their post-independence existence both parties experienced factionalism which eventually led to them splitting, resulting in the formation of other left-inclined parties (Suri 1974:213). 5.2.3 Rightist parties

India¶s rightist or conservative parties are Jana Sangh and Swatantra. These parties were formed after the country gained independence in 1952. The formation of these parties was the result of anger and bitterness with Congress. The Hindus who formed Jana Sangh accused Congress of abandoning them during the violence which broke out in 1948 when the country was partitioned (Suri 1974:213). On the other hand, the people who formed Swatantra were opposed to the move to the left by Congress. The members of this party comprised India¶s wealthy merchants, traders and land owners in the urban areas. They were worried about the adoption of socialism and the effects it could have on their businesses (Chatterji 1971:71). Jana Sangh was also opposed to the socialist direction the government was taking, as its supporters consisted of small traders.

5.2.4 Communist Party of India (CPI)

The Communist Party was first formed in Russia in 1920 after some of its founder members were inspired by the 1917 Russian Revolution. It was inaugurated in India in 1924, starting with only 78 members (Innaiah 1981:10). The Communist Party has the longest record of opposition to Congress. Gupta (1972:8) points out that the party has always functioned on the periphery of Congress.

During the early 1930s, the Communist Party not only regarded the British as its opponents, but was also hostile towards Congress. It did not join the broader movement led by Congress, but preferred to go it alone in the fight for the independence of the country (Park & de Mesquita 1979:153). This was because it disagreed with the tactics employed by Congress. The Communist Party waged the independence struggle in accordance with the Soviet Union¶s ³left´ strategy of communist revolution as opposed to Congress¶s nationalist struggle. This strategy called for the communists to fight not only the British but Congress as well (Park & de Mesquita 1979:154). The communists advocated the use of revolutionary tactics including terrorism and sabotage to defeat the British between 1930 and 1940. The party viewed Congress¶s mass movement and civil disobedience with disdain, as it claimed it was not revolutionary enough. It frequently criticised Congress leaders, including Gandhi and Nehru who were highly regarded for their role in the fight against the British occupation of India. This made it unpopular among the people in India (Innaiah 1981:13). The Communist Party was alienated from the general independence movement which was led by Congress between 1919 and 1946.

The party¶s preference for violence continued even after independence was attained in 1947. This earned it the wrath of the new government of India, which banned it in several states (Suri 1974:217). After discussions between the leaders of the party, it abjured violence and agreed to abide by the country¶s new democratic order which it previously did not recognise (Suri 1974:217). When the party offered to work within the system of parliamentary politics (Gupta 1972: 19), the government allowed it to contest the 1952 elections.

Park and de Mesquita (1979:156) contend that the party gave the greatest emphasis to the economic situation in the country. It advocated extensive government control of the economy, including much more extensive planning, collectivisation of ownership of property and nationalisation of resources in the hands of foreign corporations.

5.2.4.1 Electoral performance

From being a revolutionary party without a base or support, once the Communist Party decided to operate within the newly established political system its started developing a constituency. The party contested all of India¶s post-independence elections, becoming India¶s official opposition party. This is how the party performed from 1952 until 1971: 1952 ņ 3,3 per cent, 16 seats; 1957 ņ 8,9 per cent, 27 seats; 1962 ņ 9,9 per cent, 29 seats and 1971 ņ 4,7 per cent, 23 seats. 5.2.5 Socialist Party

Although formed in 1934, the Socialist Party operated within Congress during the struggle for the independence of India. The socialists were forced to go their separate way after independence was attained when Congress stipulated that none of its members should belong to another political party. The socialists then reconstituted themselves as a separate party taking the name, Socialist Party (Weiner 1957:17). The Socialist Party experienced splits within its ranks which gave rise to other socialist-inclined parties.

The Socialist Party was among the parties which took part in the 1952 elections. It fared poorly in that election securing only 5,8 per cent of the votes. This however was enough to earn it the status of an all-India party. Owing to its poor performance the party merged with the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party (KMPP) which had also performed badly to form the Praja Socialist Party in 1952 (Chatterji 1971:48). This new party became the home of all the socialists in the country.

The party¶s programme consisted of a moderate socialist platform that advocated uplifting India¶s economy through the use of a Gandhian programme of small- scale and cottage industries within the villages to achieve economic self- sufficiency (Park & de Mesquita 1979:147). This adoption of a Gandhian programme in 1954 brought the Socialist Party closer to Congress which created tensions within the party. This was the party¶s undoing as it could not mobilise or capture support away from Congress.

The PSP was a party committed to working within the country¶s parliamentary system to achieve its aims, one of whom was democratic socialism. However, it expressed the view that this could not be achieved through the blessing of parliament, but that an extra-parliamentary struggle should also be pursued (Chatterji 1971:44). Regarding the economy, it did not believe in the nationalisation of all means of property and made allowances for the existence of private enterprise. 5.2.5.1 Electoral performance

The split within the socialist grouping weakened the PSP and affected its performance in subsequent elections it contested, with its support base diminishing with each election. In the four elections of 1957, 1962, 1967 and 1971 its share of the vote fell from 10 per cent to one per cent. This is how the party performed in those elections: 1952 ņ 5,8 per cent, 9 seats; 1957 ņ 10,4 per cent, 19 seats; 1962 ņ 6,8 per cent, 12 seats; 1967 ņ 3,1 per cent, 13 seats; and 1971 ņ 1 per cent, 2 seats.

5.2.6 Samyukta Socialist Party (SSP)

The party was formed in 1964 after some members of the PSP who were against any cooperation with Congress walked out. The people who formed the new party were militantly anti-Congress (Park & de Mesquita 1979: 48). The major aim of this new party was to oust Congress from power, and towards this end they were prepared to enter into electoral alliances with other parties without regard for ideological differences.

According to Suri (1974:224), the SSP pursued heroic policies. In place of a classless society it stood for a casteless society and the elimination of English as the language of administration, courts and higher education in India. The SSP gave greatest emphasis to policies intended to uplift small landowners and sharecroppers. Chatterji (1971:28) points out that the SSP aimed at a total change of society and humanity through the seven revolutions: imperialism, economic exploitation; sex inequality; white and coloured inequality based on caste and birth; encroachment of privacy and individual rightly and lastly the use of arms.

The SSP was opposed to Congress, and its main objective was its unseating. To this end it invited other parties, organisations and individuals to join forces and fight for one purpose, the removal of Congress from power. Park and de Mesquita (1979) argue that the aggressive championing of non-Congressism proved beneficial to the SSP in the early stages of its life as it managed to attract a diverse group of individuals and organisations. The support of the party doubled during the period when the non-Congressism strategy was introduced and propounded.

5.2.6.1 Electoral performance

The SSP contested only two elections before Congress was voted out of office in 1977. These elections were in 1967 and 1971. In 1967 it attained 4,9 per cent of the votes which gave it 23 seats. In 1971 it garnered only 2,4 per cent of the votes earning it three seats. It lost almost half of its votes and 20 seats.

5.2.7 Jana Sangh

The impetus for the formation of this party in 1951 was the violence which occurred in the northern region of India immediately before and soon after independence. The Hindus in this region of the country were bitter at the suffering they experienced as a result of the violence that accompanied the partitioning of the country (Suri 1974:210). These people bore the brunt of the violence that had displaced them resulting in them ending up as refugees. This bitterness was directed not only at the Muslims who perpetrated the violence, but also at the Congress leadership of Nehru and Gandhi whom they accused of having been conciliatory on the question of partition.

As a result they accused Congress of having abandoned them, leaving them to the mercy of the Muslims (Suri 1974:210). From the outset of its formation Jana Sangh was perceived as an anti-Muslim party, a claim which they strenuously refuted (Brass 1990:77). Jana Sangh drew its support from the north of the country which had a large Hindi population who were refugees from the violence which occurred during the partitioning of India. It also derived its support from the Hindi-speaking states of Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan and Medhya Pradesh (Suri 1974:212).

Jana Sangh was formed to protect and promote the culture, tradition and language of the Hindus during that turbulent period and the party championed the advancement of the Hindi-speaking people. Brass (1990:77) posits the view that it drew from Hindu tradition and culture. Party manifestos emphasised the maintenance of family, caste structure and law.

The party made common cause with the Rashtriya Swayomswak Sangh (RSS), the National Volunteer, a fiercely anti-Muslim paramilitary organisation dedicated to the preservation and renaissance of the Hindu way of life (Park & de Mesquita 1979:144). When the riots broke out before and after the partitioning in 1947, the RSS sought to protect the Hindus against the Muslims. This gained the RSS many adherents among the Hindu refugees (Suri 1974:211). Park and Mesquita (1979:144) argue that if one were to consider that the reason for its formation was its concern for the advancement of India¶s Hindi-speaking people, it did not have a coherent economic policy.

5.2.7.1 Electoral performance

Innaiah (1982:31) puts forward the view that, because it was formed in haste, Jana Sangh did not have sufficient time to prepare for the 1952 elections and this is the reason it performed poorly. It received only 3,06 per cent of the Lok Sabha votes, securing three seats (Innaiah 1982:31). It did not do any better in the second elections held in 1957, winning only one additional seat. However, its fortunes changed for the better in the 1962 general elections when it increased its seats to 14. Its best performance was however in 1967 when it won 35 seats to the Lok Sabha (Park & de Mesquita 1979:145). This made it the largest party after Congress. However, hereafter its performance declined as its major support base, the refugees became settled and started voting for Congress. It still performed relatively well however in the 1971 elections where it garnered 22 seats. This is how the party performed in the elections between 1952 and 1971: 1952 ņ 3,06 per cent, 3 seats; 1957 ņ 5,9 per cent, 4 seats; 1962 ņ 6,4 per cent, 14 seats; 1967 ņ 9,4 per cent, 35 seats and 1971 ņ 7,4 per cent, 22 seats.

5.2.8 Swatantra Party

Swatantra party was formed in 1959 as a reaction to what was perceived by some sections of the Indian population as a move towards the left by Congress in response to criticism of its policies by the leftist parties. Among the people who harboured this fear were big business owners, industrial capitalists, wealthy landlords and merchants. These people were afraid that a move to the left by Congress would jeopardise their economic interests (Suri 1974:213).

The birth of Swatantra was facilitated by organisations with an economic interest. Two of these organisations were the Forum for Free Enterprise and the All India Agriculturalists¶ Federation (Chatterji 1971:76). Park and de Mesquita (1979) contend that Swatantra¶s primary concern was with economic rather than social or political issues. It was opposed to the socialist policies of Congress. In its foundation document it said ´« the party holds that progress, welfare, and happiness of the people depend on individual initiative, enterprise and energy. The party stands for the principle of maximum freedom for the individual and minimum interference by the State´ (Chatterji 1971:77).

The diverse stream of people who formed the party was opposed to the government¶s economic policy of centralised planning, nationalisation of industries, agrarian reform and price controls. They preferred a free enterprise system and wanted very little government interference in the country¶s economic activity. They maintained that ³government is best which governs the least´. The party wanted to guard society against government¶s interference in their social and economic activities. Swatantra was committed to the conviction that the free enterprise system would promote economic development and social justice in India (Park & de Mesquita 1979:142).

The economic policy of Swatantra was based on its opposition to socialism. The leaders of the party argued that socialism gives enormous power to a political party, kills individual initiative and enterprise and is not conducive for efficiency in economic production (Chatterji 1971:78). The party rejected centralised planning of the economy, nationalisation of large or small industries and government regulation of prices and wages (Park & de Mesquita 1979:142)

5.2.8.1 Electoral performance

Having been formed after two elections had already been held, Swatantra¶s first participation was the election of 1962, in which it managed to secure 18 parliamentary seats. For the next elections in 1967 Swatantra was able to form electoral pacts with other parties in several states. This boosted its performance resulting in it winning 44 seats. Park and de Mesquita (1979:143) point out that in states where it did not form electoral pacts it performed poorly in the 1969 and 1971 elections. This is how the party performed: 1962 ņ 7,9 per cent, 18 seats, 44 seats; 1967 ņ 8,7 per cent, 44 seats and 1971 ņ 3,1 per cent, 8 seats.

5.2.9 Factors responsible for the weakness of the opposition in India

With the exception of the 1967 elections where it performed well, India¶s opposition parties did not impact seriously enough on the power held by Congress. The following factors have been identified as being responsible for the weakness of the opposition: inappropriate ideology, similar policies to those of the ruling party, factionalism, particularistic support base and reluctance to form alliances.

Inappropriate ideology As a left-leaning party in favour of socialism, Congress was seen as a party representing the aspirations of India¶s poor masses. Swatantra and Jana Sangh were uneasy with the socialist direction of Congress, as they saw it as a threat to the wealthy Indian people. The two parties were in favour of a capitalist economy which invariably alienated them from the poverty-stricken Indian masses. Because of this, Swatantra could not broaden its support to include the ordinary masses (Chatterji 1976:78).

Similar policies to those of the ruling party Within their ranks, both the Communist Party and the PSP had members who were well disposed towards Congress. While the Communist Party espoused Marxism, the socialism of the PSP was the same as that of Congress. This placed the PSP closer to Congress. The ideology of the socialists was close to that of Congress and because of this it could not develop a mass organisation from which it could build its strength, hence its poor performance (Park & de Mesquita 1979:147). The PSP was also compromised by the fact that it was prepared to cooperate with socialist-inclined elements within Congress. Therefore there would be no need for voters to leave Congress and vote for the two parties as they did not offer an alternative programme.

Factionalism The two leftist parties experienced factionalism within the first decade of India¶s independence. The worst affected was the Socialist Party which splintered into various new formations. The Communist Party¶s major and only split was in 1964 which gave rise to a new party, the Communist Party of India (Marxist). Two reasons accounted for the problems which manifested themselves within the party. The first was a lack of unanimity on how to relate to Congress, while the second was differences on how to identify with the international communist movement (Suri 1974:220).

One faction within the Communist Party was in favour of cooperating with those elements within Congress who were well disposed towards socialism. The other faction was opposed to any cooperation with Congress, regardless of whether there were individuals within it who were disposed towards socialism. Those in favour of cooperating with Congress argued that this would enable the party to exert influence at the highest levels of policy making (Suri 1974:220). The tensions within the party came out into the open as war broke out between China and India in 1962,as the party had to take a stand on the war by either condemning or supporting China. This posed a dilemma for the Communist Party, as among its members there were those who were pro-China while another group supported their country (India) in the war.

The national executive committee of the party issued a statement in 1962 condemning China for what it regarded as its aggression against India (Suri 1974:221). This angered the pro-China members within the party who argued that this was a violation of the proletarian internationalism which decreed that the Communist Party in one country irrespective of the national interests involved must stand by the Communist Party of another country (Suri 1974:221). The two factions could not reconcile their differences and the party split, resulting in the formation of the Communist Party of India (Marxists) in 1964. The consequence of the split was enmity between the two parties who expended much energy fighting one another, particularly in states with strong communist support such as West Bengal and Kerala (Innaiah 1981:19).

From the outset of its formation tensions existed within the ranks of the PSP which eventually culminated in a split. The split was caused by a disagreement on how to relate to Congress, which had accepted the ³socialist pattern of society´. This was after Nehru had realised that the challenge to Congress would come from the left and not the right as anticipated. Chatterji (1971:48) points out that this had taken the wind out of the sails of the socialists. Besides, there was also very little to distinguish between the ideology of the PSP and that of Congress. This was to increase tensions within the organisation on the relations it should cultivate with Congress.

Two groups emerged from within the PSP over this issue. One group was in favour of cooperation with Congress, while another wanted to distance itself from it. The group which was in favour of cooperation with Congress argued that the duty of the opposition was not to oppose the government, but to support its goals of achieving socialism (Park & de Mesquita 1979:147). It said it was prepared to support a parliamentary way to socialism. The differences between the two groups could not be reconciled resulting in the one hostile to Congress leaving and forming the Samyukta Socialist Party (SSP) in 1964.

The SSP also experienced factionalism which resulted in a split which ironically was also caused by a disagreement on how to relate to Congress. The split within the SSP was as a result of a split within Congress in 1969. Congress split into two factions which came to be known as Congress (O) and Congress (R). Congress (R) was led by Mrs Gandhi. One faction within the SSP party was in favour of collaborating with Mrs Gandhi¶s Congress (R). However, they argued that this would only be on condition that she showed a genuine commitment to socialism. On the other hand another group was in favour of establishing relations with Congress (O) even though its commitment to socialism was in doubt (Park & de Mesquita 1979:148). This group argued that non-Congressism applied only to Mrs Gandhi¶s Congress. This latter group was in favour of promoting a strong non- Congressism with other political groupings in India.

Particularistic support base Both Jana Sangh and Swatantra were formed out of anger at Congress. These parties were not broad based, but appealed to factions within Indian society who were also upset with Congress. They did not cast their net wide in their search of support, which was rather particularistic and narrow. Suri (1974:217) argues that Swatantra was influenced by its leaders and had no support beyond them. It failed to develop a mass following outside its individual members and its votes came largely from states where it had landed interests as well as big landowners, while in other areas its support was weak. It made little progress in winning support for its policies and programmes. Park and de Mesquita (1979:143) aver that the party had a weak, unstable and unpredictable base of support. Chatterji (1971:86-87) points out that the party was projected as belonging to feudal princes, landed aristocracy and big business. Jana Sangh unsuccessfully tried to play down the fact that it was formed to cater for the Hindu-speaking people who it felt were abandoned by Congress. But in 1977 it joined with the other opposition parties to challenge the dominance of Congress.

Failure to form alliances Most of India¶s opposition parties were not against forming alliances in order to unseat Congress. However, their only problem was that with the exception of the SSP they were selective when it came to the choice of an alliance partner. Ideology was an important factor to the Communist Party in forming alliances. It was in favour of forming alliances with leftist parties which included Marxists and socialists. This, according to Park and de Mesquita (1979:156), was because it was principled and used ideology as a determinant to forming electoral alliances. The formation of alliances did not, however, materialise as the party contested most elections on its own. Instead the party ironically entered into an alliance with its arch enemy, Congress. This occurred after the Congress split of 1969. At that time Congress relied on the communists to gain a majority in parliament. The alliance continued even during the emergency.

The PSP was in favour of forming pre- and post election alliances. But it was very selective about which parties it was prepared to form alliances with. It was not in favour of forming alliances with communists, right-wingers or ethnic-based parties, but preferred socialist parties. Its poor performance in the 1967 elections is attributed to its failure to form alliances (Park & de Mesquita 1979:148) . An attempt to merge the SP with the SSP was rejected by the latter. Another reason given for the poor performance of the PSP, according to Chatterji (1971:49), was its reluctance to form electoral alliances with other parties because it never believed in the combination of disparate groups with contradictory ideological orientations. The party has always believed in the consolidation of like-minded parties, as it maintained that parliamentary democracy can function effectively only through big parties and not through innumerable splits.

The SSP was at the forefront of a strong non-Congressism movement which was ³based on the shared antagonism of the opposition parties for the Congress, rather than any set of commonly held goals´ (Park & de Mesquita 1979:148). In its effort to unseat Congress it was prepared to enter into alliances with parties ranging from the right to the left (Suri 1974:225). This was because of its loathing of Congress. Although it was a socialist leaning party, it was prepared to enter into an alliance with both Jana Sangh and Swatantra which were right-wing parties. The pre-election alliances based on non-Congressism were beneficial to the party as it performed well in the 1967 election. The support of the party doubled between 1962 and 1967 during the period when the non-Congressism strategy was introduced and propounded.

Jana Sangh was reluctant to enter into pre-election alliances with other parties. The leaders of the party, according to Park and Mesquita (1979:146), reasoned that this could harm the eventual development of the party¶s grassroots support. However, in 1976 it agreed to join a coalition of opposition parties that formed the Janata Party coalition which defeated Congress in 1977, ending its dominant role in India¶s politics. Swatantra entered Indian politics not only opposed to Congress, but the left generally. It hoped to steer a middle path and attract to its ranks people who were opposed to Congress¶s move to the left. Towards this end, it was prepared to enter into alliances with other parties to form a coalition of all anti-Congress and non-Congress elements and weld them into a strong opposition to Congress (Chatterji 1971:81). Factors not discussed Lack of resources India¶s opposition parties, although not having the same resources as the ruling party, had various means of raising funds for elections. According to Hardgrave Jr (1980:218), they received funds from anonymous donors as well as their members. Hardgrave Jr (1980) points out that the CIA was also alleged to have given individuals belonging to different opposition parties funds. The Communist Party was alleged to be receiving money from the Soviet Union. Swatantra and Jana Sangh were supported by wealthy members of the Indian community who were opposed to the government¶s socialist policies.

Proliferation of parties Given the large size of the country and an equally big population, India¶s opposition parties could not be said to be many. Since 1952 the elections have constantly been contested by the country¶s all-India parties which are six in number. However, a plethora of parties contested the state elections.

5.2.10 Summary

In a poverty-stricken country such as India, people are more likely to vote for a party that promises to improve the plight of the poor majority. The policies of the party should emphasise a concern for the poor. This could not be said to have been the intention of the Swatantra Party. The party was formed to counter the decision by Congress to adopt socialism, which gave some hope, rightly or wrongly, to the people of India. Swatantra¶s free-market policies were not aimed at alleviating the plight of the masses, but to safeguard the interests of wealthy members of Indian society. The policies of Swatantra were thus inappropriate for India. The weakness of the leftist parties could be attributed to the similarity of their policies to those of Congress. Of the two leftist parties, the socialists are closer to Congress as they espouse a moderate form of socialism. The Communist Party on the other hand is slightly to the left of Congress. However, the party agrees with Congress on a number of issues pertaining to the economy. The similarity in ideology created problems for the socialist parties as some of their supporters argued for greater cooperation with Congress, while others were opposed to this suggestion. Morris-Jones (1964:158) contends that the Socialist Party could not flourish as expected because the distance between its Gandhians and the rest was not easily bridged.

Factionalism which resulted in schisms also weakened the opposition. The socialists were the worst affected by factionalism arising from their closeness to Congress. Congress was a common denominator in the splits experienced by the socialists . After splitting from the PSP over the issue of cooperation with Congress, the SSP experienced a split over the same issue. When Congress itself split into two factions, the SSP split into two factions as well, with one favouring cooperation with Congress while the other was opposed to it. The split which the Communist Party experienced was a result of India¶s war with China, as some members of the party were against it condemning China for waging war against India.

The two rightist parties were formed in reaction to Congress, albeit for different reasons. These parties appealed to a particular constituency and had a narrow support base. Swatantra was a party of the wealthy, formed to act as a ³watch- dog´ over Congress¶s move to the left. The party failed to develop a mass following outside of its influential leaders. Jana Sangh could be regarded as a cultural movement representing the interests of the Hindi-speaking people. Its agenda focused more on cultural and traditional affairs of the Hindus whose cause it championed. While it was initially strong in the northern regions of the country, it never became a force in other parts of India. This changed when it formed an alliance with other opposition parties to form the Janata coalition for the 1977 elections.

The leftist parties were not overly enthusiastic about forging alliances to contest the elections. Instead of being conciliatory to one another and fighting Congress, the common enemy, they competed against each other. An alliance of the leftist parties might have produced better results for them. Although the parties expressed the desire to form an alliance with like-minded parties, this did not get off the ground. The right-wing parties never hinted at forming an alliance, however they all buried their differences and formed the Janata coalition for the 1977 elections.

5.3 Israel

5.3.1 Introduction

With the exception of Mapai, the majority of Israel¶s political parties were formed on the eve of the country attaining statehood. Since the formation of the Israeli state, the country has had a multiplicity of political parties which have been variously classified. Kraines (1961) uses left, centre and right as his classification while Zohar (1974) classifies the parties as labour, nationalist and religious.

The country¶s first elections for the Constituent Assembly held in 1949 were contested by 21 parties. This election was won by Mapai, which later established itself as the dominant party. Mapai garnered 35,7 per cent of the votes. Mapam became the second largest party after winning 14,7 per cent of the votes (Medding 1990:49). Although having won the elections that ushered Israel into statehood, Mapai did not have an absolute majority to form a government on its own, hence it invited other parties to form a coalition government.

While other parties accepted the invitation, Mapam and the General Zionists declined, opting to become the official opposition (Medding 1990:52). Herut was not invited to join the coalition. The country¶s elections have been contested by a plethora of parties, most of whom are small. Small as they might be, however, they have played an important role in the formation of governments, and they are much sought after by the major parties. Israel¶s major opposition parties comprised of Mapam, Herut and the General Zionists.

5.3.2 Mapam

Mapam Party which stands for the United Workers Party was formed in 1948 following a merger between the Hashomer Hatzair and Achdut Ha¶Avodah parties (Rolef 1987:213). On its formation it had 24 000 members (Medding 1990:49). The party shared the same constituency with Mapai, as both were labour- based parties. Its support base was largely from the Jewish collective and agricultural settlers (Kraines 1961:69).

Mapam combined a revolutionary Marxist socialism with Zionism. As a party of the left, its programme called for the establishment of a classless society (Kraines 1961:69). According to Medding (1990:48), the goals of the party were the political and social rise of the masses and their capture of key economic and political positions and the defence of the new state. The party was opposed to capitalism which it said endangered world peace. However, it did advocate socialist policies such as the nationalisation of basic natural resources, land, transport and communications (Medding 1990:51). It also advocated the taxation of the rich. Mapam was in favour of the formation of cooperative and collective settlements to accommodate and accelerate an unrestricted immigration of Jews.

According to Rolef (1987:213), in its early years the party followed a pro-Moscow policy, which it however disavowed after the excesses of Stalin became known. Mapam, which was anti-United States, was against foreign investment in key resources and industry (Kraines 1961:69). The party also followed a conciliatory policy towards the Arabs. It did not take a tough stance towards the land dispute and was very restrained regarding military action against the Arabs. It advocated Jewish-Arab unity based on the collective leadership of the farmers. The party also welcomed Arabs to the membership of the party for whom it advocated equal rights with Jews. Mapam favoured the territorial concentration of the Jewish people in Palestine without dispossessing the Arabs of their land. After the 1967 Arab -Israeli War, it was in favour of Israel¶s withdrawal from the Arab territories it had conquered (Rolef 1987:213).

5.3.2.1 Electoral performance

Mapam contested the country¶s elections of 1949 and 1951 as part of an alliance with Achdut Haavoda. It was placed second in 1949 after obtaining 14,7 per cent of the votes and 19 seats. Mapam slipped from second to third in 1951 (12,5 %), sixth in 1955 (7,3%), back to fourth in 1959 (7,2 %). In 1961 its share of the votes was 7,6 per cent and in 1965 was 6,6 per cent. This was the last election it contested on its own as it joined Mapai and Achdut Haavodah in forming the Labour Alliance in 1965. This is how the party performed in opposition: 1949 ņ 14,7 per cent, 19 seats; 1951 ņ 12,5 per cent, 15 seats; 1955 ņ 7,3 per cent, 9 seats; 1961 ņ 7,6 per cent, 9 seats and 1965 ņ 6,6 per cent, 8 seats. It contested the 1969 and 1973 elections as part of the Labour Alignment which included Mapai.

5.3.3 Herut This party is closely associated with its founder, Menachem Begin, who is described by Rolef (1987:143) as its undisputed leader. The party which is variously described as nationalist by Zohar (1974) and rightist by Kraines (1961) and Bernstein (1957), was formed in 1948. Herut evolved from an underground movement, Irgun, which fought both the British and Arabs, becoming a political party after the state of Israel was declared. During the period of the mandate, some of its future leaders fought underground for the realisation of a Jewish homeland. This included Begin, who was regarded as a conservative, hawkish right-winger who was given to fierce rhetoric (Frankel 1980:11).

While both Mapai and Mapam are labour-oriented parties advocating socialism, Herut was in favour of private enterprise with as few restrictions as possible. Medding (1990:64) points out that its socioeconomic policies aimed at social security and improvement of the living conditions of the worker population. The economy was to be directed, regulated and coordinated, with the major role given to national-public capital, with ample opportunity for private initiative. The party saw itself as representing the underprivileged.

Herut espoused a radical Jewish nationalism advocating use of force against Israel¶s neighbours. It argued that the only way to achieve a stable peace was to use force to drive out the Arabs from the land they occupied. It wanted this land to be restored to the state of Israel (Medding 1990:64) and accused the government of being soft on the Arabs. As it was always expecting an attack from the Arabs after independence, it urged the government to take up preventive measures by going on the offensive and attacking the Arab states (Kraines 1961:80).

Viewed as a radical, right-wing organisation, Herut had a difficult existence during the first decade of statehood. The party did not win itself friends when it engaged in undemocratic actions and did not embrace the new political system. Suspicions were raised that Herut wanted to destroy the newly established political order. Credence was given to these suspicions in 1952 when members of the party threw stones at the Knesset while Begin was haranguing the members inside. Begin had invited his supporters to protest outside parliament in support of his opposition to Israel¶s acceptance of reparations from Germany for the role of the Nazis in the Holocaust. To Begin, according to Medding (1990:68), this was tantamount to reaching an agreement with Nazi murderers. Begin expressed the view that Israel was a totalitarian police state, which resulted in Begin and Herut being delegitimated. Herut was never invited by Mapai to become part of a coalition government and Begin was seen by Ben-Gurion as a threat to the country¶s nascent democracy. Frankel (1980:55) posits the view that Begin was close to leading an insurrection against the government by violence because of the bitterness of his opposition to the reparations.

5.3.3.1 Electoral performance

Herut drew most of its support from Israel¶s two big cities, Tel Aviv and Jerusalem (Kraines 1961:80). When it eschewed violence in 1949 and opted to operate within the newly created political system, Herut¶s main objective was to get rid of the Mapai government (Medding 1990:65). It saw itself as the alternative government and was confident that it would do well in the country¶s first elections held in 1949. It received 11,5 per cent of the votes and 14 seats, placing it fourth. Its performance declined in the 1951 elections, when it managed to win eight seats after winning only 6,6 per cent of the votes. However, thereafter its performance improved as it garnered 12,6 per cent of the votes in 1955, 13,6 per cent in 1959, 13,7 per cent in 1961 and 21,3 per cent in 1965.

In 1969, it contested the elections as part of an alliance known as Gahal and obtained 21,67 per cent of the votes. In 1973, it was the major component of the Likud right-wing alliance which obtained 30,2 per cent of the votes (alliance formation is explained below). The party¶s improved performance came after it reformed itself as it sought peace and quiet, housing and satisfactory food and income for the Israeli people (Medding 1990:67). This is the party¶s electoral performance; 1949 ņ 11,5 per cent, 14 seats; 1951 ņ 6,6 per cent, 8 seats; 1955 ņ 12,6 per cent, 15 seats; 1959 ņ 13,6, 17 seats, 1961 ņ 13,7 per cent, 17 seats; 1965 ņ 21,3 per cent, 26 seats; 1969 ņ 21,67 per cent, 26 seats. In the 1973 elections it received 30,2 per cent which gave it 39 seats.

5.3.4 General Zionist

This party, which Kraines (1961) regards as a centre party and Bernstein (1957) as a nationalist party, was formed in 1948. Before its formation it consisted of two groups, Zionist A and Zionist B. General Zionist A comprised the left-wing of the party which had a leaning towards the labour movement, while Zionist B comprised the wealthy sector of the Israeli population such as industrialists, merchants, landowners and agricultural producers (Kraines 1961:75). A split occurred in the party and the General Zionist became the General Zionist Party.

The party canvassed support from people who were not committed to a religious or a socialist party (Bernstein 1957:76). Being a conservative party, it was opposed to socialism and championed the cause of private enterprise. Medding (1990:57) refers to the General Zionist as the party of property. It advocated for minimum freedom from governmental restrictions that hamper private enterprise (Bernstein 1957:76). The General Zionist Party argued that productivity should be increased by granting greater financial rewards to skilled labour (Kraines 1961:75). The party promoted the interests of private property and capital.

Rolef (1987:123) identifies the following as the party¶s platform: ‡ the development of a welfare state and the construction of a society based on personal freedom and social justice ‡ the right of every person to an appropriate standard of living ‡ the ensuring of the liberal-democratic character of the regime ‡ the enactment of the constitution and increasing civic control over election campaigns

The General Zionist was pro-Western and anti-Soviet Union. The party wanted Jews in countries where they were not fairly treated to be allowed to immigrate to Israel. It advocated for the freedom of immigration. The General Zionist¶s major plank was its criticism of the government¶s economic policies. It gained respect when Israel¶s economy faltered in the mid-1960s (Medding 1990:60). However, it suffered a setback when the issue of the economy was relegated to the backseat as war seemed imminent with the Arabs and security became a major concern in Israel. In tandem with this, the government¶s handling of the economic situation improved, thus removing the party¶s strong rallying point. Its electoral performance declined as the country¶s economic problems improved because its message became less convincing (Medding 1990:61).

5.3.4.1 Electoral performance

In the country¶s first elections in 1949 the party did poorly finishing fifth after receiving only 5,2 per cent of the votes. This was enough to give it seven seats (Medding 1990:58). Like Mapam above, it refused to become part of a coalition government. In the second elections in 1951 its performance improved as it became the second largest party after receiving 16,2 per cent of the votes which gave it 12 seats. Its performance declined in the 1955 elections when it won 10,2 per cent of the votes and only 13 seats.

In the 1959 elections its share of the votes continued to decline as it received only 6,2 per cent and eight seats. In 1961 it merged with the Progressive Party and contested the elections as the Liberal Party. The new party gained 13,6 per cent of the votes and 17 seats. The Liberal Party joined Begin¶s Herut to produce the parliamentary bloc, Gahal, for the 1965 elections.

5.3.5 Factors responsible for the weakness of the opposition in Israel

Although a plethora of parties takes part in Israel¶s general elections, only a few are worth taking seriously. Kraines (1961:50) points out that Israel¶s opposition, which comprises of three major parties, is neither united nor cohesive and appears unable to replace the government. The following are the factors that are responsible for the poor performance of the opposition: an inappropriate ideology, factionalism, proliferation of parties and a failure to form alliances.

Inappropriate ideology Mapam¶s preferred ideology was behind the problems the party encountered. Its adherence to communism and by extension pro-Soviet orientation were problematic in Israel, more so since the United States, which was not very friendly towards the Soviet Union, was favourably disposed towards Israel. The US had given generous financial assistance towards Israel after the state was declared and the Israeli people were wary of the Soviet Union, as it was seen as one of the countries that had persecuted the Jews in Europe and was also on the side of the Arabs (Kraines 1961:70). Mapam was treading a dangerous path with its pro- Soviet policy. Even though initially the Soviet Union had been friendly towards Israel and was one of the countries which supported the existence of the Jewish state, relations soured after nationhood was attained when it supported the Arabs. Medding (1990:83) puts forward the view that doubts were expressed about Mapam¶s ultimate patriotism and loyalty to the state.

As the majority of the people who were to become part of the state of Israel were Zionist immigrants who fled from poverty and persecution in Eastern Europe, they were not attracted to Mapam¶s socialist state based on agricultural and collectivist leadership. All they were interested in was making a fresh start in Israel by getting themselves jobs and improving their living standards. The ideology of Marxist-Zionism was too revolutionary and did not appeal to them (Kraines 1961:71).

Medding (1990:67) avers that Herut¶s poor performance during Israel¶s first two elections was due to its militant nationalism. Even after it had reformed itself, Herut was still haunted by its initial revolutionary nationalist ideology and Begin¶s profile. According to Arian (1985:81), Begin was not good for the party as he was a right-winger, cold, hawkish, conservative, old fashioned and uncompromising. He adds that because of Begin the party did not make inroads into the support of Mapai. He was seen as a stumbling bloc by many moderate and younger members of the party.

Medding (1990:189) characterises Herut as an anti-system party whose desire was not only to replace the government, but to change major features of the political regime and social system. It advocated a radical institutional change to dismantle the existing structures of Israeli society. Herut¶s right-wing tendencies made it an easy target for Mapai¶s criticism, that is, what it saw as Herut¶s irresponsibility, its inability to distinguish rhetoric from acceptable political responses, and its emphasis on armed force to solve Israel¶s problems with its neighbours (Medding 1990:190).

Medding (1990:58) argues that the General Zionist policies did not impress the general public as they were based on promoting the interests of private property and capital. The party appealed to the well-off sector of the Israel community. This therefore excluded the arriving immigrants. With Mapai¶s policy leaning more towards the assistance of the general populace, through its socialist policies such as the expansion of state services in health and education, it was always going to be difficult for a party such as the General Zionist, which championed free enterprise and capitalism, to attract voters. Mapam was another party which also appealed to the masses through its Marxist socialism which placed an emphasis on assistance to the poor people, but it was unsuccessful at the polls.

Factionalism Mapam¶s support of the Soviet Union and communism gave rise to factionalism in the party which resulted in the formation of other parties. The party was caught between two groups, one of which was fervently pro-Soviet Union and another that was opposed to this relationship. Ironically, fissures first appeared in Mapam as a reaction to action being taken against Jewish citizens by Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. In 1951, Czechoslovakia arrested and imprisoned a leading member of Mapam for Zionist activities. This was followed in 1952 by the trials of 14 Czechoslovakian Communist Party members on charges of anti-state activity and supporting Zionism and Israel. A year later the Soviet Union arrested and tried a number of Jewish doctors in Moscow on charges of conspiracy. This resulted in a number of the party¶s members leaving and joining Mapai (Kraines 1961:71).

Owing to its association with the Soviet Union, Mapam experienced a decline in its support. In order to correct this situation, it changed its stance towards the Soviet Union. This did not go down well with other members of the party who accused it of revisionism. This pro-Moscow group left the party over growing criticism of Moscow policy in 1954 within the party and formed the Left Socialist Party (Rolef 1987:213). Achdut Haavodah which contested two elections with Mapam went its separate way in 1954 as it did not share the party¶s Marxist orientation. This party was also opposed to Mapam¶s decision to accept Arabs as members. In 1968 another leftist group left to form the Socialist Zionist Union of the Left. In 1969 the party became part of the Labour Alignment with Mapai.

Proliferation of parties Israel has a plethora of political parties as seen by the number of parties which have taken part in its elections. They consist of Jewish community parties, religious parties and Arab parties. The Jewish community parties represent the special interests of certain sections of the population. The National Religious Party (NRP) is the largest of the religious parties and has been prepared to serve in the coalition government of either Mapai or Likud (Kraines 1961:63). The 1949 elections which marked the entry of Israel into statehood were contested by 21 parties. The 1951 elections were contested by 17 parties, in 1955 there were 18 parties which took part and in 1959 the number increased to 26. Because of Israel¶s electoral system of proportional representation, these parties gained representation in parliament. Failure to form alliances Israel¶s major opposition parties never broached the subject of forming an alliance against Mapai. This was because Mapam and Herut were ideologically incompatible. Mapam was a proponent of Marxist socialism, while Herut was against nationalisation and preferred a free enterprise economic system. Mapam favoured a coalition of labour parties, hence it did not find it difficult to join Mapai and form the labour alliance in 1965. As an ideologically based party, Mapam was against the forming of a coalition government with parties with divergent views. It favoured a narrow coalition of labour parties (Kraines 1961:69). However, both parties later formed alliances, Mapam with Mapai while Herut pioneered a right- wing alliance which give birth to Gahal and later to Likud just prior to the 1977 elections. These elections were won by Likud, ending Mapai¶s dominance of Israel¶s political system.

Factors not discussed Similar policies to those of the ruling party The policies of the ruling party and the opposition in Israel were at variance. While both Mapai and Mapam wanted to improve the standard of living of the people of Israel, they adopted different policies in order to achieve this goal. Mapai adopted a modest form of socialism, while Mapam espoused a revolutionary Marxist socialism which advocated a class struggle and the nationalisation of property. On the other hand, Herut was a radical, right-wing organisation which was perceived as being a threat to the country¶s newly established state. It was not favourably disposed towards the socialist policies of Mapai, preferring a market economy. The General Zionist aligned itself with Herut.

Particularistic support base Even though the policies of the opposition parties differed, they received support from the same sectors ņ business people, workers in urban areas, professionals, middle-class population and people in the agricultural settlements. No party had an exclusive support base. Herut competed for supporters with Mapai in the urban areas. On the other hand Mapam also competed with Mapai for the support of the workers.

Lack of resources Up until 1969 the parties in Israel were responsible for their own fund raising for the elections. According to Arian (1985:106), much of the parties¶ budgets came from their political organisations abroad or from groups and corporations affiliated to them or anxious to support them. However, from 1969 , an alternative solution to funding the parties was implemented by the government. The parties were now to be funded from the government treasury. Legislation mandated payments to be made to the parties in proportion to their representation in the Knesset.

5.3.6 Summary

For Mapam to have remained faithful to the ideology of Marxism and be associated with the Soviet Union was not a good idea in a country whose citizens fled persecution from Eastern Europe. This ideology was radical and unsettling to them after what they experienced in their home countries. With the Soviet Union sympathetic to the cause of the Arabs, a party associated with this country would find it difficult to attract support. Mapam¶s association with the Soviet Union led to factionalism within the party, resulting in four splits. On the other hand, the radical nationalism of Herut and its undemocratic methods did not serve to endear it to the electorate.

Outside the four major parties, Israel has a multiplicity of parties. These parties were not overly keen on forging alliances, being content with taking part in elections on their own. They won enough votes under the list system of proportional representation and were invited by Mapai to join a coalition government.

5.4 Italy

5.4.1 Introduction

Although Italy has many political parties, the most prominent of them have been the Christian Democratic Party (DC), Italian Communist Party (PCI) and the Italian Socialist Party (PSI). Germino and Passigli (1968:89) point out that these three parties, which dominated the country¶s politics between 1948 and 1973, mostly polled between 75 and 80 per cent of the votes during elections. The DC, PCI and PSI took part in the resistance against Mussolini¶s Fascist dictatorship (Sassoon 1986:4). At the end of the war in 1946 they formed a coalition government, but the DC later expelled the PCI and PSI who later became the country¶s opposition parties in the reconstructed Italian state. 5.4.2 Communist Party of Italy (PCI)

This party was formed in 1921 after breaking away from the PSI. According to Germino and Passigli (1968:179), the early leadership of the party revolved around the triumvirate of Amadeo Bordiga, Antonio Gramsci and Palmiro Togliatti, who were the intellectuals and ideologues of the party. The party was banned shortly after its formation. While Gramsci was jailed by the Fascist government, Togliatti went into exile in Russia (Sassoon 1986:5). This emerged publicly only after the end of World War II. However, it played a sterling role in the resistance to fascism.

When it was formed, the party advocated the overthrow of the political system by revolutionary means led by the proletariat. However, after the war Togliatti surprised party members when he argued that they should abandon this strategy and work within the democratic structures and institutions to achieve socialism (Spotts & Wieser 1986:42). This strategy became known as the parliamentary way to socialism.

In the country¶s first post-war elections for the Constituent Assembly in 1946, it came third behind the DC and the PSI after receiving 19 per cent of the votes and became part of Italy¶s first coalition government formed after Mussolini¶s fall from power. The participation of the PCI in this government was shortlived as it was expelled by the DC (Sassoon 1986:7).

The PCI was regarded as fiercely anti-Fascist and its heroic role during the resistance such as organising strikes in industrial areas was beneficial to the party (Germino & Passigli 1968: 186). McHale (1983:567) points out that it was the only political party in Italy with the organisational skills required to launch a successful resistance against the Fascist regime. It emerged from the resistance as a mass party with a membership of nearly 2 million which consisted of workers, peasants and intellectuals (Sassoon 1986:6).

The party had also taken over control of the country¶s biggest labour federation, National Confederation of Italian Labour (McHale 1983:567). Spotts and Wieser (1986:60) concur with Germino and Passigli (1968) that this phenomenal growth had to do with the party¶s prestige as leader of the resistance to the Fascists and the German army. Much as the PCI was strong and had a stable support base, it found it difficult to dislodge the DC from its dominant position.

5.4.2.1 Electoral performance

McHale (1983:569) contends that the PCI¶s electoral support was impressive. Its share of the votes rose from 19 per cent in 1946 to 30,4 per cent in 1979. From being third behind the DC and PSI, the PCI¶s support grew steadily resulting in it becoming the second strongest party in Italy. According to Adams and Barile (1966:156), the party¶s electoral performance showed remarkable consistency at the rate of two per cent per annum in 1953 (6 000 000), 1958 (6 700 000) and in 1963 (7 700 000). Communist support remained constant in the 50s and 60s. The party¶s support was spread throughout Italy with most coming from industrial workers who constituted 40 per cent of its membership (Spotts & Wieser 1986:60).

After its poor showing in the 1948 elections where it received 19 per cent of the votes, it performed consistently well in the general elections of 1953, 1955 and 1963 receiving 22,6, 22,7 and 25,3 per cent of the votes respectively (Germino & Passigli 1968:187). Its share of the votes also increased in the1968 and 1972 elections where it recorded 26,9 per cent and 27,2 per cent respectively. The party¶s electoral performance was not affected by factionalism, splits, defections and expulsion even though these occurred. The number of defectors was small and after sometime they returned to the major party.

Much as its performance was creditable, given the odds against it, in the early 1970s the PCI was realistic enough to realise that it would not remove the DC from power as it had powerful backers such as the United States and the Church. As such, the party had to reassess its position. It decided that ³the only practical course lay in governing in alliance with its traditional enemy, the DC´ (Spotts & Wieser (1986:45). This was the first time since it was removed from government in 1947 that it worked with the DC. This is how the party performed: 1948 ņ 19 per cent; 1953 ņ 22,6 per cent, 143 seats; 1958 ņ 22,7 per cent, 140 seats; 1963 ņ 25,3 per cent, 166 seats; 1968 ņ 26,9 per cent, 177 seats and 1972 ņ 27,2 per cent, 179 seats.

5.4.3 Socialist Party of Italy (PSI)

Formed in 1892, the PSI was Italy¶s oldest party. Although having being part of the organisations which fought against fascism, Sassoon (1986:4) points out that its role was minor. During the elections for the Constituent Assembly in 1946, the PSI received the second highest vote after the DC with 20 per cent of the votes. The PSI joined the DC and PCI in Italy¶s first postwar government. However, it was also expelled together with the PCI in 1947. Thereafter it moved closer to the PSI and proclaimed itself a party based on Marxist-Leninism.

The PSI was a perpetual junior partner of the PCI and DC. Sassoon (1986:4) points out that the PSI could never call the tune, but only choose which piper to follow. And that was either the DC or PCI. Spotts and Wieser (1986:69) argue that the party¶s main problem was that it always had difficulty deciding what it was and what it wanted. This confused its members. From being the second strongest party in 1946, the PSI lost this position to the PCI (Germino & Passagli 1968:44). McHale (1983:578) states that the PSI became one of the largest of the small parties.

On the other hand Hine (1980:133) points out that in whatever relationship the party has engaged, it has proved to be the subordinate partner. When in the 1940s and early 1950s it associated with the PCI, it was seen as little more than an appendage of the communists. In reaction to this categorisation it joined up with the DC, but was seen as nothing more than a puppet of the ruling party.

5.4.3.1 Electoral performance

From having a 20 per cent support of the electorate in 1946, the PSI suffered an uninterrupted record of electoral decline (Hine 1980:134). As pointed out above the poor performance of the party was attributed to its failure to have a clear policy regarding its relationship with the DC and PCI. This resulted in factionalism within the party. The party was also seen as an appendage of both the DC and PSI, and it played second fiddle to the PCI. This is how the party performed: 1948 ņ 20 per cent, 1953 ņ 12,8 per cent, 75 seats; 1958 ņ14,2 per cent , 84 seats; 1963 - 13,8 per cent, 87 seats; 1968 ņ14,5 per cent, 91 seats and 1972 ņ 9,6 per cent, 61 seats. 5.4.4 Factors responsible for the weakness of the opposition in Italy

The PCI and PSI were the two major parties which unsuccessfully challenged the dominancy of the DC. Although having strong support, the PCI could not dislodge the DC, while the PSI was a weak and indecisive party. The following are the factors responsible for the weak performance of the opposition parties: inappropriate ideology, factionalism, proliferation of parties and failure to form alliances.

Inappropriate ideology Before the rise of fascism, the PCI was an adherent of Soviet communism. It was also a party which was intent on using revolution to take over and change Italy¶s political system. However, when the party surfaced from underground after the fall of Fascism, it had undergone a change in thinking. The party moderated its revolutionary path to socialism opting to work for the achievement of this ideal within the country¶s democratic institutions and rules.

On his return to Italy from exile in Russia, Togliatti, who resumed the leadership of the party, extended a hand of friendship to the church. He made positive statements about the church and its role in Italian society. He also declared that party membership was independent of religious faith and philosophical contradictions (Spotts & Wieser 1986:64). In a further attempt to win support from members of the church, the PCI included Catholics in its election list. The church was unimpressed by this and kept its distance from the party. To show its rejection of the party, the church declared that anyone who joined the party or voted for it would be excommunicated (Spotts & Wieser 1986:65).

Much as the PCI toned down its adherence to revolutionary change to socialism, it was still seen as a disciple of the Soviet Union. It could not shake off this image, which was like an albatross around its neck. This was to haunt the party in its future dealings with the Italian community. At the root of the PCI¶s problems was its allegiance with the Soviet Union and its membership of Communist International which did not go down well with the Italians. The PCI¶s relations with the Soviet Union meant that it was perceived as anti-Christian by the Italian voters.

The PCI¶s problems were compounded by the excesses committed by Stalin and the invasion of Hungary and Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union in 1956 and 1968 respectively. These excesses were revealed by Khrushchev when he succeeded Stalin and this revelation sealed the fate of the party as the excesses had always been denied. Amidst growing opposition in Italy to the invasion of Hungary, the PCI saw fit to defend it (the invasion) and this impacted negatively on the party (Sassoon 1986:234). In 1968 the party was again put in an unenviable position when the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia. This time, however, the PCI condemned the invasion (Spotts & Weiser 1986:48). These two events saw the party¶s membership being reduced and falling to a low of 1.5 million.

The PCI was a prisoner of the Soviet Union. It was tarred with the same brush as the Communist Party of that country and was caught between maintaining its relationship with the Soviet Union and operating within a democratic political system. The Soviet Union was not in favour of the PCI¶s participation within Italy¶s political system and ordered it to pull out. The Italians were reluctant to vote for the PCI as they feared that this would be tantamount to being ruled by a foreign power.

While being associated with an inappropriate ideology was an albatross around the neck of the PCI, the PSI lacked an ideology. Both Sassoon (1986) and Spotts and Wieser (1986), are not very complimentary about the PSI. Spotts and Wieser (1986:69) contend that the PSI was a party which could not define itself. It did not know what it was or what it wanted to be. In short, the PSI had an identity crisis. It oscillated between the DC and the PCI. It moved backwards and forth between these two parties on a number of occasions. It would align itself with the DC, leave it to join the PCI, and then go back to the alliance with the DC and vice versa (Spotts & Wieser 1986:75). The PSI changed its identity each time it joined up with one of the parties and is perceived as a party without a ³backbone´. Spotts and Wieser (1986:77) aver that it left the impression of a party that was irresolute and stood for nothing, and as such nobody took it seriously. By making itself little more than an appendage of the communists, the party squandered its socialist heritage, obfuscated its liberal character and destroyed its individuality (Spotts & Wieser 1986:71).

Factionalism Factionalism plagued the PSI leading to its haemorrhaging rendering it ineffective in challenging the DC. Going into the Constituent Assembly elections of 1946, the PSI was still outwardly a united party, but soon thereafter it experienced numerous internal problems. The PSI suffered its first split in 1947 when it aligned itself with the PCI. Some of its members were uncomfortable with its new anti- American and pro-Soviet rhetoric (Sassoon 1986:72). With the financial encouragement of the USA, some members left the party and formed the Socialist Democratic Party (Sassoon 1986:72). Between 1947 and 1950 it lost 400 000 members ņ half its total membership. McHale (1983:579) points out that factionalism and splits continuously weakened the party¶s credibility as a leftist alternative to the PCI. An announcement by Fanfani, the party leader, to join the government led to a split in 1963 (Adams & Barile 1966:157). Another split occurred in 1964 as some of its leftist-inclined members called for renewed ties with the PCI. According to Adams and Barile (1966:157), the splits the party suffered showed the dilemma of socialist movements as to whether they should be democratic and revolutionary and collaborate with existing liberal forces or be a proletarian and revolutionary party.

Proliferation of parties Apart from the two major opposition parties discussed above, Italy hosts five other parties. They consist of three lay parties, the Republicans, Liberals and Social Democrats who between them average 10 per cent of the vote (Spotts & Wieser 1986:87). The Radical party was formed in 1955 as a breakaway from the Liberals. Placed on the far right is the Italian Socialist Movement. There also exist a number of leftist parties which initially rejected the country¶s political institutions, refusing to take part in elections. They later changed their attitude and accepted the country¶s political system.

Failure to form alliances Being leftist-inclined parties, it would have made sense for the PCI and the PSI to form an alliance against the DC. However this was only tried once when the parties presented a joint list for the 1948 elections. After the collapse of fascism, the PSI joined up with the PCI. The PSI proclaimed its policy to be Marxist- Leninism (Spotts & Wieser 1986:71). However, thereafter the parties went their separate ways with the PCI performing better than the PSI in subsequent elections. The alliance with the PCI caused problems for the PSI as communists infiltrated the party introducing their own policies. The Socialist Party could take major decisions only with the agreement of the Communist Party.

Factors not discussed Similar policies to those of the ruling party Italy¶s major opposition parties, the PCI and PSI, were socialist inclined albeit with a variance in their policies. While the DC accommodated the PSI, it did not countenance any deal with the PCI whose socialism was that of the Soviet variant.

Particularistic support base Both the PCI and the PSI drew their support from different sectors of the Italian community. Sassoon (1986:172) points out that they were well represented throughout the country. Lack of resources On the whole, Italy¶s parties did not seem to suffer from a shortage of financial resources. The parties use various ways to raise funds. Adams and Barille (1966:162) mention the following as the sources from which the parties receive funds: party sponsored entertainment; a tax of about 50 per cent on the salaries of deputies; the profits from party-controlled cooperatives; and subsidies from interested groups. Adams and Barille (1966:162) point out that the Communist Party is the major exploiter of party-sponsored entertainment as a source of revenue. Interested groups seeking to influence government policy make substantial contributions to the various parties.

5.4.5 Summary

In four decades, Italy¶s two major opposition parties could not make inroads into the support of the DC. Although the PCI had consistent support, it was unsuccessful in breaking the dominance of the DC. Among the reasons for this failure was that the Italian people, the majority of whom are Catholic congregants, were wary of the party¶s association with the Soviet Union. The disclosure by Khrushchev of the excesses committed by Stalin, his predecessor, further alienated the people from the party. Communism was also regarded as a threat to the country¶s democratic political system. Much as it tried, even moderating its Marxist variant of socialism and agreeing to operate within the country¶s democratic framework, the PCI failed to reach out to Italy¶s voters.

After the PSI was expelled from government together with the PCI it never made a mark in Italian politics. This was due to the fact that it vacillated between the two other parties. It did not known where to place its mast. This vacillation proved costly to the party as some of its supporters left it for either being close to the DC or the PCI. When the party moved away from both parties, some of its members left it.

The proliferation of small parties also weakened the opposition while the ruling party relied on them to perpetuate its dominance as it used them to form coalition governments. The only occasion when the opposition worked together was during the 1948 elections when they presented a joint list, before going their separate way. With the PSI content with joining in a coalition with the DC, the chances of the leftist parties forming an alliance was never entertained. 5.5 Sweden

5.5.1 Introduction

With the exception of the SDP, Sweden¶s political parties were formed within the first two decades of the 20th century. The parties formed during this period were the Liberal Party, the Conservative Party and the Farmers Party. The last party to be formed was the Left Radical Socialist Party. A number of small parties were later formed but the parties mentioned above, together with the SDP, were at the centre of Sweden¶s political system. These parties took part in the 1932 elections which were won by the SDP and became the country¶s opposition parties during the 44-year rule of the SDP. With the exception of the Communist Party, these parties are alternatively referred to as the nonsocialist or bourgeoisie parties.

5.5.2 Liberal Party

The Liberal Party which was formed in 1900 is Sweden¶s second oldest party after the (SDP). The formation of the party was preceded by the existence of two liberal factions operating within and without the Swedish parliament during the latter part of the 19th century advocating the extension of suffrage rights. These factions merged to form the Liberal Party (Hancock 1972:120).

The Liberal Party derives its support from diverse groups within Swedish society leading to it being referred to as a heterogenous party by Board (1970:98). Among the people supporting the party are civil servants, businessmen, workers, intellectuals and the lower middle class. The party, according to Tomasson (1970:42), is predominantly middle class. The strongholds of the party are the country¶s two largest cities, Stockholm and Gothenburg. The party proclaims its programme as social-liberalism as it embraces both ideologies. McHale (1983:898) points out that the adoption of social-liberalism was an attempt by the party to find a position somewhere between social democracy and conservatism. However the party is strongly committed to liberal principles such as individual freedom, tolerance, popular democracy, social reform and individualism (Tomasson 1970:38).

The starting point of liberalism, according to its manifesto, is respect for the individual which has to be defended. The party states that its political proposals are based on the principle that each has the freedom and opportunity to try and make their dreams of good life come true. It believes in people¶s ability to think rationally and follow their conscience. Policies should eliminate barriers and create opportunities ņ not dictate how we should live our lives. Political decisions should never replace personal responsibility (Tomasson 1970:39).

5.5.2.1 Electoral performance

The Liberal Party¶s electoral fortunes have been fluctuating. The party was for a long time the strongest of the nonsocialist parties. Tomasson (1970:41) posits the view that the diversity of its support encourages it to appeal to the entire electorate. During the 1932 elections, which brought the SDP to power, the Liberal Party¶s share of the votes was 11,7 per cent placing it third behind the Conservative Party. The party¶s performance improved after the World War II as it captured 22,8 per cent of the vote in the 1948 elections (Tomasson 1970:41). This is how the party performed: 1932 ņ 11,7 per cent, 24 seats; 1936 ņ 12,9 per cent, 27 seats; 1940 ņ 12,0 per cent, 23 seats; 1944 ņ 12,9 per cent, 26 seats; 1948 ņ 22,8 per cent, 57 seats; 1952 ņ 24,4 per cent, 59 seats and 1956 ņ 23,8 per cent, 58 seats.

5.5.3 Center Party Previously known as the Agrarian and Farmers Party, this party was formed in 1913 as an interest group representing farmers against other organised groups. It did not set itself up as a political party from the outset. According to Andren (1961:29), the party was founded ³on the conviction that the fast declining agricultural population, in order to hold its own, must follow the example of industrial workers and form a solid front against other organised groups´. Its membership was restricted to farmers at this stage. Unlike the other parties it had a short programme which emphasised the concerns of its constituency consisting of farmers and small entrepreneurs. This made it easy for the Center Party to enter into alliances with the other parties.

Through force of circumstances the party had to undergo a change in name as well as its focus. This was caused by the decline in the population of the farmers. The name was changed to the Center Party in order to broaden its appeal to non- agricultural sector and small enterprises. From an interest group representing the interest of farmers, the party expanded its programme to focus on other issues and sectors of society (Tomasson 1970:46). Board (1970:100) points out that the party was successful in its attempts to gather support in the urban areas.

The party¶s ideology when it changed its name stressed the need to improve the economic status of small businessmen, strengthen the home environment through taxation and social policies favourable to families with children and raise the general level of education. This in a sense brought it closer to the SDP. Tomasson (1970:46) posits the view that this made it possible for it to cooperate with the Conservative, Social Democratic and the Liberal Parties. McHale (1983:893) points out that the party moved closer to the Liberal Party in an attempt to express a middle-party position in parliament and election campaigns.

5.5.3.1 Electoral performance

The Center Party was the smallest of the nonsocialist opposition parties, getting very few votes. In the 1932 elections the party¶s share of the votes was 14,1 per cent. Thereafter, except in 1936 where its share of the votes was 14,3 per cent, its support fluctuated between 9,4 and 13 per cent. Because of its declining support, it was forced to withdraw from the alliance with the SDP (Hancock 1972:124). This is how the party performed: 1932 ņ 14,1 per cent, 36 seats; 1936 ņ 14,3 per cent, 36 seats; 1940 ņ 12 per cent, 28 seats; 1944 ņ 13,6 per cent, 35 seats;1948 ņ 12,4 per cent, 30 seats;1952 ņ 10,7 per cent, 25 seats and 1956 ņ 9,4 per cent, 19 seats.

5.5.4 Conservative Party

At the turn of the 20th century there existed in Sweden groups representing conservative urban and rural interests. In 1904 these groups came together and formed the General Electoral Council which was later transformed into the Conservative Party (Andren 1961:30). On its formation the party was associated with the wealthy segment of Swedish society and was regarded as an upper class party representing the interest of land owners and the more prosperous farmers.

The party later changed its focus and started appealing to white collar workers, businessmen, higher level civil servants and small merchants (Board 1970:101). This was necessitated by the depopulation of the rural areas, as was the case with the Center Party. The party¶s programme makes strong appeals to Christian and traditional values. It defends the interests of the state and church and is in favour of a strong defence force and the monarchy (Tomasson 1970:45).

The party is also committed to a free enterprise system and was opposed to the SDP¶s social welfare programme (Hancock 1970:124). The role of the party, according to McHale (1983:900), has been one of principled opposition to socialism and the welfare state. However, some of its members later moderated their stance towards the SDP and cautiously accepted some of its welfare programmes. This change of heart was brought about by the success and popularity of these programmes when they were implemented by the SDP. The party was, however, opposed to raising child allowances and educational allowances for students over 21 years (Tomasson 1970:45).

5.5.4.1 Electoral performance

In the 1932 elections the Conservative Party¶s share of the votes was 23,5 per cent, which was the highest scored by any of the nonsocialist parties. However, thereafter its share of the votes went into a decline and was always less than 20 per cent. According to Hancock (1972:126) this was due to its opposition to the government¶s social welfare programme. From being the largest, it ended up as the smallest of the nonsocialist parties. Its fortunes changed in the 1950s when it also accepted some of the SDP¶s welfare principles. This is how the party performed: 1932 ņ 23,5 per cent, 58 seats; 1936 ņ 17,6 per cent, 44 seats; 1940 ņ 18 per cent, 42 seats; 1944 ņ 15,9 per cent, 39 seats; 1948 ņ 12,3 per cent, 23 seats;1952 ņ 14,4 per cent, 31 seats and 1956 ņ 17,1 per cent, 42 seats.

5.5.5 Communist Party

The Communist Party, the smallest party in the Swedish parliament, was established in 1917 as the Left Radical Socialist Party. This name was changed to the Swedish Communist Party in 1921 after which it finally became known as the Left Party Communists from 1967. With 23 000 members in the late 1960s, it was the smallest of Sweden¶s political parties and has not exerted much influence in the country¶s politics.

According to Tomasson (1970:50), Swedish Communism is primarily made up of urban workers. The party draws its support from industrial workers in the urban areas of Stockholm and Gothenburg, intellectuals, and timber and mining workers in the northern provinces (Hancock 1972:129). McHale (1983:897) adds that the groups to which the party appeals are the blue and white collar workers and students The party adheres to the ideology of Marxist-Leninism with which it intended to transform Swedish society (Tomasson 1970:50). However, much as it is committed to this ideology the party subscribes to the country¶s democratic political culture, which is a contraddiction. Swedish communists recognised the uniqueness of Swedish society in the process admitting that the Soviet variant of communism was not appropriate for their country. Hancock (1972:129) points out that the Swedish communists pursue a course of moderation instead of promoting rigid policies based on Marxist-Leninism. The party has accepted the existence of a free press and the plurality of the country¶s political system and has pledged to respect the outcome of elections (Board 1970:105). The Communist Party is pragmatic and not doctrinaire in its policy approach and did not slavishly follow Soviet Union.

Board (1970:104) contends that there is not much that distinguishes the Communist Party from the Social Democrats, as they have more or less the same programmes. The Communist Party according to him is just slightly to the left of the SDP. McHale (1983:896) concurs with this view describing the party as being to the left of the SDP, ³but not so far as to appear unacceptable to prevailing Swedish values´.

The Communist Party never really made an impact on Swedish politics as Board (1970:106) argues that the position of a Communist Party in an affluent welfare state cannot be easy, particularly if the nation has been governed for a long time by a party which calls itself socialist and has the overwhelming allegiance of the workers¶ organisations. In Sweden the party cannot use poverty and unemployment to build up a support base as these were almost unheard off during the early period of the SDP¶s rule.

5.5.5.1 Electoral performance

As already alluded to above, the Communist Party was the smallest opposition party in the Swedish parliament. The Party¶s share of the votes since the ascendancy to power of the SDP has been the lowest of the opposition parties. Its best performance was in 1944 due to the fact that the Soviet Union was part of the victorious Allied forces which fought against Nazi Germany (Hancock 1970:129). Thereafter it recorded a decrease in the number of votes it received.

Although the Communist Party is not a major factor in the politics of Sweden, it has from time to time played the role of a power broker. This occurred when it either voted with the Social Democrats in parliament, abstained from voting or did not put up a candidate which would have split the ³leftist´ vote (Board 1972:106). This it did in order to deny the nonsocialist opposition parties victory. This is how the party performed: 1932 ņ 8,3 per cent, 2 seats; 1936 ņ 7,7 per cent, 5 seats; 1940 ņ 4,2 per cent, 3 seats; 1944 ņ 10,3 per cent, 15 seats;1948 ņ 6,3 per cent, 8 seats; 1952 ņ 4,3 per cent, 5 seats and 1956 ņ 5 per cent, 6 seats.

5.5.6 Factors responsible for the weakness of the opposition in Sweden

Sweden was ruled by one party, the SDP, for a record 44 years. This was due, among others, to the weakness of the opposition. The following factors have been identified as being the cause of the weakness of Sweden¶s opposition: inappropriate ideology, similar policies to those of the ruling party leading to cordial relations and a failure to form alliances.

Inappropriate ideology The Swedish Communist Party, although not being at the beck and call of the Soviet Union, could not make any impact in the politics of the country. This was because it was seen to be aligned to the Soviet Union¶s variant of socialism as opposed to that of the SDP, which was moderate and operated within a liberal democratic framework. This was despite the fact that it did not slavishly follow the Soviet Union, and was quite independent. The Communist Party was also compromised by the fact that it accepted the country¶s democratic political system. The mere fact that the party advocated the same type of socialist policies as the Soviet Union was not going to win it friends in Sweden, whose economic success was made possible by the acceptance of capitalism.

Similar policies to those of the ruling party There are supposed to be major differences between the policies of the socialist SDP and the three nonsocialists opposition parties. However, the differences were only in theory as the opposition parties supported the country¶s social welfare system of which they were initially not enamoured. Although this was the situation when the SDP ascended to power in 1932, the nonsocialist parties moved closer to the ruling party with the passing of time, accepting its social welfare programme (Board 1970:99-102). After initially being hostile to the SDP¶s social welfare programme, the Conservative Party moderated its stance and accepted it because of its success and popularity. The Farmer Party¶s had no problems with the SDP as it assisted it to launch its dominance in 1933 when it forged an alliance with it as explained in Chapter 3. This enabled the Social Democrats to obtain a majority in parliament and to form a government.

Of all the opposition parties, the closest to the ruling party is the Liberal Party. Apart from the fact that it was believed in the free enterprise system and is opposed to long-range economic planning and state control over investment policy, the Liberal Party has much more in common with the SDP than the other nonsocialist parties. Board (1970:92) points out that the positions of the two are for all practical purposes indistinguishable. Hancock (1972:119) concurs with Board (1970) when he states that the social-liberal principles of the Liberal Party differ from those of the SDP more in nuance than in content.

The Liberal Party agrees with the SDP on the necessity of government intervention in economic matters, albeit on a limited scale; it recognises the need to increase expenditure to finance an extension of existing welfare services (Hancock 1972:119). The party favours strong free trade with a strong socialist reformist bent. The party supports the welfare state but rejects nationalisation (McHale 1983:898).

The politics of Sweden are not adversarial but are that of compromise as attested to by Rustow (1955) in his book titled, The politics of compromise: a study of parties and cabinet government in Sweden. Rustow (1955:233) points out that throughout the recent history of Swedish parties, compromise and consensus have laid the foundation for further compromise and closer coincidence of views among the parties. The opposition parties can be said to have been coopted indirectly into government. There is interaction between them and the government and they make recommendations regarding policy issues. Leaders of the parties meet behind closed doors to reach consensus and compromise on larger issues (Board 1972:106). Board (1972) points out that there is a ³great deal of face-to- face contact between members of different parties´.

Opposition parties have been compromised by their closeness to the government. Rustow (1955:230) argues that Swedish politics has consistently faced situations where positive decisions could result only from compromise. The opposition parties are comfortable with this arrangement which offers them an opportunity to make a contribution on policy issues affecting the country. Apart from this close working relationship, the opposition parties as we saw above accept some aspects of the SDP¶s social welfare programme. Swedish politics on the whole was consensual.

Failure to form alliances The failure by the opposition parties to form an alliance has been a puzzle to Swedish politicians and academics alike. This, more so since the policies of the opposition parties are very close to one another. Board (1970:107) states that it is difficult to comprehend why the nonsocialist parties in Sweden have not bothered to come together since their differences seem minor. Writing a year earlier than Board (1970), Hancock (1969:2) expressed the following view: ³Despite the origin of the Centre Party as an agrarian interest organisation and the mutually hostile historical tradition of the Liberals and Conservatives, the three parties presently share broadly similar concepts of how society and the economy should be organised. ³

Board (1970:108) argues that the reason why these parties have not formed a merger is because they are content with the political status quo which provides them with an opportunity of participating in the making of governmental decisions without being held strictly accountable for these policies once they have been enacted. The opposition parties enjoy cordial relations with the ruling party which confers with them on important policy issues. During World War II the opposition parties formed a coalition government with the SDP. Only the Communist Party was excluded from the coalition government.

Factors not discussed Factionalism Since their formation, none of Sweden¶s opposition parties have experienced feuding which resulted in schisms. Swedish parties have a low leadership turnover. Board (1970:89) attributes this to the coherence of the parties. Board (1970:90) points out that the relationship between the leadership and the rank and file is not one of command and unquestioned obedience, but one of cooperation and constructive interplay within a hierarchical structure. Party discipline is maintained not so much by drastic sanction as by long-formed habit stemming from a recognition of its value for every member.

Particularistic support base Even though they were initially formed to cater for a particular constituency, Sweden¶s opposition parties received support from across a broad spectrum of society as they evolved. They adapted to the changing conditions within the country. The Liberal Party is the most homogeneous of the opposition parties with its support including some civil servants, business people, workers and the lower middle class. The Centre and Conservative Parties also receive support from the same sources as the Liberal Party.

Lack of resources As their collective name, bourgeoisie parties, would suggest, Sweden¶s opposition parties did not suffer from a lack of resources. The membership of these parties comprises the wealthy sector of Swedish society which included farmers, business people, middle-class white collar workers and traders. Board (1970:117) also expresses the view that by agreement the parties limited their expenditure for the elections. Election campaigns were kept to a minimum period of time. Proliferation of parties For the period covered by the study, Sweden had only four parties. For a country as huge as Sweden, this number was sufficient.

5.5.7 Summary

Although the Communist Party accepted Sweden¶s democratic political system, the fact that it subscribed to the Soviet variant of socialism did not endear it to the country¶s voters. Much as Sweden¶s opposition parties regularly contested elections, they were content with their position of being second best. With the passing of time, the opposition and the SDP moved closer to one another. The opposition parties supported the SDP¶s social welfare programmes, because of the prosperity that they brought the country.

Cordial relations existed between the ruling party and the opposition parties. The government consulted the opposition when decisions were to be taken on important policy issues. Although the opposition parties had much in common, they were reluctant to form an alliance to oppose the SDP.

5.6 South Africa

5.6.1 Introduction

South Africa¶s opposition parties emerged from the 1994 elections following the victory of the ANC. Kotze (2001:116) avers that the opposition was legitimised by the country¶s first democratic constitution. Out of a total of 19 parties which contested the elections only six received the required number of votes under the list system, proportional representation, to be represented in parliament and thus be recognised as part of the opposition. The representation of these parties ranged from between two and 82 seats. The combined seats of these parties numbered 148 to the ANC¶s 252.

With the seats they won indicated in brackets, the parties were the National Party (82), Inkatha Freedom Party (43), Freedom Front (9), Democratic Party (7), Pan Africanist Congress (5) and African Christian Democratic Party (2). The NP became the first official opposition party in the country¶s new political system. By virtue of the number of seats they had secured, the NP and the IFP earned themselves the title of the major opposition parties. However, the DP¶s performance improved in the 1999 elections when it gained 9,55 per cent of the votes. This was more than a 100 per cent gain from the 1,73 per cent of the 1994 elections. This enabled it to displace the NP as the official opposition party. In the 2004 elections it received 12 per cent of the votes and retained its position as the official opposition.

5.6.2 National Party (NP)

Having been formed in 1914, this party is better known for having introduced the policy of separate development or apartheid after coming to power in 1948. The NP came to power after winning this election and ruled uninterrupted until 1994, thus becoming a dominant party, albeit of a different kind because elections were contested only by whites. Kotze (2001:119) points out that the NP was an all-white party which acted as the architect of apartheid and Afrikaner Nationalism. On ascending to power, the NP proceeded to set up legal frameworks to discriminate against blacks. Throughout its rule it resisted nonviolent and violent challenges from organisations such as the ANC and the international world to change its discriminatory political system (Buntman 1998:243). However, in the late 1980s the party had a change of heart and cautiously started engaging in talks with the leaders of the ANC with the view of seeking a solution to the country¶s political impasse.

Whereas previously it was a party which was exclusively for whites, the NP reconstituted itself as the country prepared for the 1994 elections and opened its membership to blacks in accordance with the country¶s transition to a nonracial democratic society. It canvassed blacks to join it and went even further by including some of them on its parliamentary election lists (Lodge 1995:484). The party campaigned in black townships, albeit under difficult circumstances, as these were made no-go areas for the previously white parties. The road shows of the leader of the party, FW de Klerk, were disrupted by youths in the black townships.

In its campaign documents the NP emphasised issues such as constitutionally entrenched power sharing and federalism, market-oriented economics, lighter taxation and the protection of private property. It also promised to provide jobs, education, housing and health care (Lodge 1995:484). It argued that it should be trusted as it had experience of ruling a country. The party embraced the country¶s nonracialism after eschewing separate development.

5.6.2.1 Electoral performance

The decision by the NP to initiate negotiations with the ANC in 1990 did not go down well with a section of its traditional supporters who felt betrayed. They did however vote for the party in the 1994 elections. Faced with a party backed by an overwhelming majority of black people, the NP could only manage to garner 20,7 per cent of the votes in those elections, giving it 82 seats in the 400 seat National Assembly (Southall 2000:154). This was however enough to acquire it the position of the official opposition party. The NP became part of the Government of National Unity (GNU) together with the ANC and the IFP. De Klerk was appointed as one of the two executive deputy-presidents to President Nelson Mandela, the other being Thabo Mbeki.

Between the first and second elections events which took place within the party such as the departure of De Klerk and Roelf Meyer, and these defections left it demoralised. These events are discussed below under the section on factionalism. This impacted negatively on the party resulting in its poor performance in the 1999 elections. In these elections the share of the votes of the NP decreased. The party received 6,87 per cent which translates into 28 seats ņ down from the 82 it received in 1994. According to Friedman (1999:110), the party lost 70 per cent of its support to the DP. While it could not attract black voters, the NP¶s former white supporters deserted it. The party, according to Kotze (2001:120), lost its appeal to many of its supporters. Its poor performance continued in the 2004 elections when it could only muster 1,6 per cent of the votes which secured it seven seats.

5.6.3 Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)

This party, which is closely identified with Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, its long serving president, originated as a Zulu cultural movement founded in 1928 by King Solomon ka Dinizulu. It was revived in 1975 by Chief Buthelezi and became known as Inkatha Ya KwaZulu, a cultural movement which was initially only for Zulus (Mare & Hamilton 1987:45). It reconstituted itself as the IFP when the country embraced a new political system following the unbanning of political organisations in 1990. The IFP was one of the major parties that took part in the negotiations to implement a new political system.

Before the beginning of negotiations, the IFP operated within South Africa¶s homeland system and was the ruling party in the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (Southall 2000:150). The party¶s stronghold was in the then Zululand where it was based. The party had a close relationship with the Zulu monarchy from where its leader, Chief Buthelezi, traced his roots. The IFP derived its support from the rural areas where traditional leaders still hold sway. These traditional leaders regard themselves as subjects of the king.

Although he operated within the South African political system, Chief Buthelezi was a strong critic of the NP¶s policies. This brought him into regular conflict with the South African government. While working within the apartheid system, Chief Buthelezi refused to accept independence for Zululand much to the chagrin of the South African government (Lanegran 1998:245). While not a favourite of the South African government, Chief Buthelezi also did not have friends among the liberation movements or the internally based extraparliamentary movements.

The IFP had an ambivalent relationship with the ANC ņ cordial one minute and acrimonious the next. In 1979 Chief Buthelezi led a delegation of his organisation to London where they held talks with the ANC leadership (Mare & Hamilton 1987:144). The meeting was portrayed by Chief Buthelezi as an affirmation of the close relations between the two organisations. However, according to Mare & Hamilton (1987:146), the ANC did not attach much significance to the meeting with some of its members dismissive of Chief Buthelezi.

With the progression of time and political developments unfolding fast in South Africa, the relations between the two moved from being strained to hostile. This was largely caused by the formation of two organisations, the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) which associated themselves with the aims and objectives of the ANC (Southall 2000:151). The period prior to the unbanning of the ANC saw unprecedented violence between supporters of both organisations and the IFP. Over the period of the negotiations and leading up to the elections 14 807 people were killed in political violence (Race Relations Survey 1998:230).

During the negotiations the IFP was involved in acrimonious exchanges with both the NP and the ANC. When the date for South Africa¶s first nonracial and democratic elections was announced, the IFP declared its intentions of boycotting them. However with a few days left before the elections the party had agreed to contest them, after receiving a promise that there would be international mediation to attend to its grievances (Buntman 1998:245). Thus, the party did not have sufficient time in which to campaign for the elections.

5.6.3.1 Electoral performance The IFP did not devote much time to election campaigning like other parties. In the rallies it held it did not unveil its policies but concentrated on condemning the ANC. Lodge (1995:492) argues that Inkatha did not seek to educate a new following about its policies; north of the Tugela River there was no need for door to door canvassing or leadership road shows. Inkatha activism instead took the form of stadium occupations in anticipation of ANC, attacks on ANC voter education classes, and the organisation of warlike marches through town centres. At its rallies, the IFP espoused itself as a militant Zulu ethnic organisation. It invoked the name of the Zulu monarchy demanding that the Zulu kingdom should be restored (Lodge 1995:491- 492). It appealed to people who believed in the sanctity of the monarchy. Southall (2000:150) argues that the party mobilised around an appeal to Zulu ethnicity.

Given the fact that it only had a week in which to campaign for the elections, the IFP¶s performance was commendable. It gained 10,5 per cent of the vote which translated into 43 seats, placing it third behind the ANC and NP. Its largest share of the votes came from KwaZulu-Natal where it registered 50,3 per cent of the votes. According to Lodge (1995:475), this confirmed the party as a mainly regional organisation. The IFP became part of the GNU with the ANC and NP.

5.6.4 Democratic Alliance (DA)

Before it participated in the 1994 elections as the Democratic Party, the party had undergone several name changes. It was founded as the Progressive Party in 1959. This name was then changed to the Progressive Reform Party and then it became known as the Progressive Federal Party. It became the DP in 1989 and then underwent another name change becoming the Democratic Alliance after forging an alliance with the NP. The party derived its support from the white middle class and stood for strong liberal values in South Africa (Kotze 2001:120). During the previous political order, the DA served in parliament as one of the opposition parties to the NP. It later became the official opposition party after the demise of the United Party. For years its sole representative in parliament was Mrs Helen Suzman who did not endear herself to the NP, the dominant party in parliament, through her criticism of its policies. During the last year¶s of South Africa¶s old political system it had a sizeable representative in parliament. The party reconstituted itself just before the 1994 elections and also opened its membership to blacks.

In preparation for the elections the DP campaigned to win the black vote. Like the NP it also took its road shows to the black townships. It suffered the same fate as the NP as these road shows were disrupted by township youths (Lodge 1995:490). Lodge (1995:488) points out that the DP believed that the black voters could be won over by a message that stressed the quality of the democrats as a parliamentary opposition. Its electioneering included policies such as respect for liberal freedoms, social welfare obligations and export growth oriented free market economics.

5.6.4.1 Electoral performance

The 1994 elections saw the DP obtaining 1,73 per cent of the votes, securing it seven seats. This placed it far below the other two opposition parties, the NNP and the IFP. Much as it had a small representation in parliament, its performance was impressive (Southall 2000:157). The party¶s parliamentary representatives were experienced and proved to be a ³thorn in the flesh´ of the ANC. The ANC was rankled by constant criticism and questions in parliament from the DP.

For the second elections held in 1999, the DP embarked on a very aggressive election campaign strategy which was headed ³fight back´. Its posters showed the leader of the party, Tony Leon with a clenched fist. It was prepared to take the fight to the ANC. For this election, the party targeted Afrikaner voters who were disillusioned with the NP. The DP¶s performance improved resulting in it becoming the official opposition party after winning 9,55 per cent of the vote which secured it 38 seats. In the third elections held in 2004 the DP which was now campaigning as the DA won 12 per cent of the votes which amounted to 50 seats. 5.6.5 Factors responsible for the weakness of the opposition in South Africa

South Africa¶s first nonracial democratic elections started with 18 parties taking part. Some of the parties fell by the wayside and did not take part in the 1999 and 2004 elections. South Africa¶s opposition has not been a serious threat to the ANC¶s monopoly of power. The reasons for the weakness of South Africa¶s opposition are identified as the following: being associated with an inappropriate ideology; similar policies to those of the ruling party; factionalism; particularistic support base; proliferation of opposition parties; and failure to form alliances.

Inappropriate ideology When the CODESA negotiations started in 1992, the ideology of apartheid was already history in South Africa after being renounced even by some members of the NP. However, although the NP had renounced apartheid and transformed itself into a party adhering to a western liberal democratic system, it could not easily shake off its association with this ideology. It was seen as the party which reformulated and intensified this ideology when it came to power in 1948. Apartheid affected mostly black people and it was thus a futile exercise for the party to venture into their areas in order to convince them to vote for it, as they were the ones who had suffered neglect at the hands of their discriminatory policies. Black youths showed their anger at the NP by disrupting its election campaigns in 1994. Thus the NP¶s crime was being associated with a discredited ideology, even if it had renounced it.

The NP not only suffered because of its association with the apartheid policy, but also due to its disassociation from it. Disassociation with apartheid had also proved to be costly for the NP, as it had taken its supporters by surprise when it announced that it was abandoning apartheid. Schrire (1994:9) points out that prior to the 1994 election the NP supporters were confused and demoralised resulting in doubts and dissatisfaction among its traditional supporters about their future. This was caused by what was seen as capitulation to the ANC, the traditional enemy of the party and country. Giliomee (1998:151) points out that in the mid-1980s the Afrikaner state far from showing signs of capitulation was as strong as ever having resisted international sanctions and dealing with the ANC¶s external insurgency.

The IFP was initially a Zulu-oriented cultural organisation. However, it later transformed itself into a political organisation and participated in the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, a structure which was instituted in accordance with the NP¶s policy of separate development. It was the ruling party in this structure. Because of this, it was seen as embracing the apartheid system, much as Chief Buthelezi frequently criticised the NP¶s policy of separate development. The party¶s image was further damaged by revelations that it had clandestinely received funding from security forces who were alleged to be behind the violence that erupted between 1990 and 1994 aimed at sabotaging the political transition. .

There is no unanimity among blacks about the association of the DP with the policy of separate development. Some blacks praised the role which the party played in parliament during the apartheid era. Its lone representative in parliament, Mrs Helen Suzman, did not endear herself to the ruling party through the questions that she asked or the comments she made about separate development and the government¶s discriminatory policies. On a number of occasions she visited Robben Island where members of the nationalist movements were incarcerated. She made appeals that their conditions of imprisonment should be improved. However, all this did not impress some blacks who associated the party with apartheid as it had served in parliament where discriminatory legislation was passed. However, no less a person than President Mandela praised her efforts in speaking out against injustice and discrimination. The party has however failed to attract black voters. Similar policies to those of the ruling party The ANC was seen as a party which was leaning towards the left when it was operating in exile. Its internal allies such as COSATU made no bones about the preferences of their economic system which was based on the tenets of Marxist socialism. However, the ANC later eschewed socialism and opted for a free market economic system. This took the wind out of the sails of opposition parties such as the NP and DA who used the association of the ANC with communism to warn the country to be aware of the party¶s economic policies and not to vote for it. Booysen (1999:252) argues that the ANC and the major opposition parties share many broad ideological beliefs and political objectives. The opposition parties, she adds, could do little more than battle with the ANC over policy implementation, as opposed to proposing drastic alternatives. During elections the opposition parties and the ANC were offering the voters more or less the same things ņ jobs, education, a health system, basic services and attending to crime. The opposition and the ANC agreed on the need to eradicate crime and the adoption of a macroeconomic policy.

Factionalism Two years into the country¶s new political system major developments occurred within the NP which were later to impact negatively on it. The first occurred when it pulled out of the GNU. The party withdrew from the GNU in 1996 because of what it perceived to be the ANC¶s dominance in the government (Spence 1997:234). This was followed by the resignation of two senior party leaders. The party¶s chief negotiator during the CODESA negotiations and member of parliament, Roelf Meyer fell out of favour with the party hierarchy and was demoted (Booysen 1998:45). Meyer resigned in 1997 and together with Bantu Holomisa who had been expelled from the ANC formed the United Democratic Movement (UDM) (Spence 1997:535). The NP¶s problems intensified in 1998 when De Klerk resigned from the party and later from politics (Booysen 1998: 45). The party suffered a further setback when some of its members defected and joined either the DP or the ANC, while others retired from politics. After its withdrawal from the GNU and the departure of De Klerk, the NP elected a new leader, Martinus Van Schalkwyk. The party was renamed the New National Party (NNP) in order to make a break with the apartheid past (Southall 2000:156).

Particularistic support base The NP derived the majority of its support from the Afrikaner ethnic group. It was through this support that the party managed to win all the elections following its rise to power in 1948. The DP drew its support initially from English-speaking whites. Habib and Taylor (2001:56) contend that both the NNP¶s and the DP¶s electoral strategy was aimed at serving the interests of Afrikaner and English whites. However, a number of Afrikaners later also switched their support to the party after being disillusioned with the NP. The two parties also turned their focus to Indian and coloured voters and had a measure of success, particularly in the Western Cape.

When it was formed as a cultural movement, the IFP¶s predecessor was meant only for Zulu-speaking people. However, after it converted itself to a political party, the IFP opened up its membership to all South Africans. However, because of its origins it was still perceived as a party for Zulus. Habib and Taylor (2001:56) point out that the IFP projected itself as a defender and representative of the Zulu people, reducing its appeal for non-Zulu people. Although it attracted large numbers of people at rallies it held on the Reef most of those attending them were migrant workers from KwaZulu-Natal. Much as the Zulu ethnic group forms the single largest group, it was not sufficient when compared with the massive support that the ANC had across the combined African ethnic groups.

Mare (2001:95) contends that both the DP and the NNP faced the double burden of whiteness in terms of support and participation in the previous system. These two parties failed to make inroads into the black constituency while the IFP failed to broaden its support to blacks, including even Zulus outside Zululand. The IFP emerged as an ethnically and regionally based organisation.

Proliferation of opposition parties South Africa¶s three elections have been contested by a wide variety of parties. The 1994 elections were contested by 19 parties, the 1999 elections by 16 parties and the 2004 elections by 21 parties. However, only a few of these parties managed to gain representation in parliament. This was largely due to the country¶s list system of proportional representation. The number of seats that they gained was minimal and did not pose a threat to the ANC.

Failure to form alliances Booysen (1999:250) argues that prior to 1999 the opposition faced a daunting task in challenging the ANC. The only salvation of the opposition was to form alliances. The idea of forming a common opposition has been mooted, but has never been seriously pursued. It was started by the NP and was joined by the Freedom Alliance and later promoted by the DA. Spence (1997:533) points out that the task of the opposition parties was never going to be easy as ³they have little, if anything, in common ideologically and a united front on many issues of importance has been difficult to establish´.

Booysen (1999:252) puts forward the view that there was no seriousness from the opposition about forming an alliance. It all boiled down to gamesmanship. There was also a lack of trust among the leadership of the parties. She adds that opposition parties generally favoured the option of keeping their distance from each other and from the ANC-led government.

However, after the 1999 elections the NP entered into an alliance with the DP forming the Democratic Alliance. According to Southall (2000:155), this alliance was formed at the behest of the DP which profited from it. The NNP later pulled out of the DA in favour of an alliance with the ANC. This caused consternation among some of the NP members. For the 2004 elections the IFP and DA reached an understanding regarding voting in the KwaZulu-Natal province. The contents of the agreement were never made known. Factors not discussed Lack of resources For the 1994 elections the government made money available to the political parties that contested them. However, legislation was passed in parliament to regulate funding for political parties. In accordance with the Public Funding Act of 1997, the allocation of funds was proportional to the number of representatives each party had in parliament (Southall 2000:153). Big parties such as the ANC received the lion¶s share of the funding. Up until the third elections in 2004, there was no indication that the major opposition parties lacked financial resources. Some parties received funds clandestinely and were opposed to suggestions that they should disclose the source of their funding. Lodge (2001:82) reveals that for the 1999 elections the NNP and the DP were the big spenders. The NNP used R60 million to the DP¶s R30 million.

5.6.6 Summary

South Africa¶s new political system resulted in a multiplicity of political parties contesting the country¶s first elections held in 1994. Out of this emerged South Africa¶s opposition parties. The opposition parties were not able to penetrate the predominantly African support base of the ANC and remained weak. They were hamstrung by the fact that they were associated with the discredited ideology of apartheid, even though they had embraced the country¶s new political system.

The policies of the opposition parties did not differ from those of the ANC after it had moderated some of its perceived leftist policies such as nationalisation in favour of a free market economic system. The opposition presented similar programmes to the voters as the ANC.

Although present within the NNP and IFP, factionalism did not necessarily lead to the formation of other opposition parties. However, both the NNP and the IFP lost some of their senior members who defected to other parties. The nearest that opposition parties came to factionalism occurred when Roelf Meyer left the NP to form a new party with Bantu Holomisa, who had been expelled from the ANC. South Africa¶s major opposition parties appealed to particular constituencies and thus could not broaden their support base. The formation of alliances was mooted but was never pursued by any of the opposition parties.

5.7 Conclusion

The above discussion focused on the problems that confronted opposition parties and which weakened them in their quest to unseat the ruling parties. These problems impacted negatively on the performance of the opposition parties, benefiting the ruling parties and resulting in them perpetuating their domination. The following were identified as the factors responsible for the weakness of the opposition: inappropriate ideology, similar policies to the ruling party, factionalism, particularistic support base, lack of resources, proliferation of opposition parties and a failure to form alliances. The factors were not common to all the parties.

Inappropriate ideology Leftist and radical ideologies proved to be an impediment to some of the opposition parties. The BPP, BNF, Mapam, Herut and the PCI all had what could be regarded as inappropriate ideologies for the voters of their countries. In Botswana, the BNF¶s adherence to communism and the BPP¶s radical nationalism did not impress the acquiescent Batswana people who preferred the moderate policies of the BDP.

Mapam¶s flirtation with the Soviet Union was the single major reason for the splits it experienced in the early 1950s. Communist ideology in Israel was not going to be acceptable following the experiences of the early immigrants who came from Eastern Europe where they had been persecuted. The Soviet Union was also well disposed towards the Arab nations who were opposed to a Jewish settlement on what they considered their territory. Although Herut took part in the struggle for the independence of Israel, the radical nationalism it advocated did not endear it to the country¶s electorate. It was seen as posing a threat to the new state. Begin, its hawkish leader, did not improve matters for the party with his fiery and right-wing rhetoric. In South Africa the opposition parties were not favoured, not because of their ideology, but because of being associated directly and indirectly with the apartheid system.

Much as the Communist Party in Italy had a reasonable support base and performed well in elections it was hamstrung by its ideology and its association with the Soviet Union. The Communist Party was viewed as anti-Christian in Italy, where the majority of the population are Christians belonging the Catholic Church. Efforts by the PCI to reach out to the church were spurned. With the Italian population wary of communism, the Soviet Union did not improve matters for the PCI by its invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. On the other hand the PSI lacked a coherent ideology as it vacillated between the PSI and the DC. From embracing Marxist-Leninism, it moved over to the form an alliance with the DC. It was a party which failed to give direction to its supporters.

Similar policies to those of the ruling party Writing on Sweden¶s opposition, Hancock (1966:2) argues that ³for an opposition party to gain credence for all its claims as the government of tomorrow, it must seek at all times to present a coherent alternative program appealing to as many voters as possible and to integrate the demands of a broad spectrum of organised interests´.

Political parties campaigning to be elected to power put forward policies with which they intend to entice the electorate to vote for them. These policies are supposed to differ from those of the ruling party. If their policies are similar to those of the ruling party there would be no point in people transferring their votes from the ruling party.

In three countries in our study some of the opposition parties had the same vision for society as the ruling party. In Botswana, although the BNF and BPP espoused radical ideologies, they aspired to the same benefits for society as the BDP. In India the leftist parties and Congress hold the same views on how to develop Indian society. They agree on the necessity of nationalising property albeit with some different nuances. In Sweden, the opposition parties to a varying degree share some aspects of the SDP¶s social welfare programme. In South Africa, when the ANC rejected socialism and accepted a free market economy it compromised the opposition parties who could no longer accuse it of intending to introduce a foreign and discredited economic system. The opposition parties were in favour of a free market system, a nonracial South Africa, the upliftment of the standard of living of the poor and ending unemployment, which were the same ideals propagated by the ANC.

Factionalism

Some of the opposition parties in our study experienced factionalism which resulted in the formation of other parties. Factionalism first reared its head among Botswana¶s opposition parties soon after they had been formed, just as they were preparing for the country¶s first elections. The BPP split into three factions which all contested the elections. However, once the country gained independence no further splits occurred. In India, the Communist and Socialist Parties experienced splits which led to the formation of other parties. Of the two, the socialists were the worst affected by splits which gave rise to three parties. On the other hand, Mapam in Israel split into three factions following factionalism within the party. These splits occurred within a period of three years from 1951 to 1954. The splits were a result of an inappropriate ideology.

In Italy, the PSI haemorrhaged as a result of factionalism which saw the party unable to take over from the PCI as the official opposition party. South Africa¶s opposition parties also experienced factionalism, but on a minor scale, and it did not result in the formation of other parties. The exception was the decision by Roelf Meyer to leave the NP and together with Bantu Holomisa to form the UDM. Other members of the NP also left it to join other parties. Particularistic support base The appeal to particularistic support bases occurred in India and South Africa. The performance of Jana Sangh and Swatantra parties in India was affected by the fact that they appealed to a particular constituency. Swatantra appealed to the wealthy segment of the Indian society while Jana Sangh¶s support came from the Hindi- speaking people based in the north of the country. These parties were not mass based. In Sweden the Farmers¶ Party initially represented the interests of farmers. But when this support base declined in numbers it changed its name and broadened its appeal to other members of society. In South Africa the three parties which emerged as the opposition had a narrow support base. The NP¶s support was from the Afrikaners, the DP from the English middle class and the IFP from Zulus based in KwaZulu-Natal. Although the parties attempted to broaden their support base, they achieved little success.

Lack of resources For political parties to launch successive election campaigns they need to have sufficient financial resources. Botswana¶s opposition parties lived in penury and could not compete with the well-resourced ruling party which was supported by the wealthy segment of the country¶s society. This made it difficult for them to launch effective election campaigns.

Proliferation of opposition parties An interesting question to ask here is what constitutes a proliferation of parties? This depends on the size and population of the country. For a small country such as Botswana, five parties would constitute a proliferation, while for a populous country such as India, this number would be small. However, bearing this in mind, Israel, Italy and South Africa were overpopulated with political parties dividing the electorate. Failure to form alliances Another weakness of the opposition parties was their failure to form alliances in order to improve their chances in the elections. In Botswana, the BIP and BPP never warmed to the suggestion of the BNF that they should form an alliance against the BDP. In India the leftist parties could have put up a better performance if they had formed an alliance, but they prevaricated. In Israel the idea of an alliance of opposition parties was never considered. The PCI and PSI whose ideologies did not differ that much could have forged an alliance against the dominant DC. The same goes for the nonsocialist parties in Sweden, whose policies were similar. In South Africa the opposition parties mooted the idea of forming an alliance against the ANC, but nothing came of it.

Not all the parties in our study were able to maintain their dominant positions. Some eventually lost the elections to the opposition. The focus of the next chapter will be on the decline and eventual end of dominance where it occurred.

CHAPTER 6 DECLINE AND LOSS OF DOMINANCE

Introduction

As it is unusual for a political party in a democracy to stay in power for more than two decades, the previous chapters sought to find answers to the continued electoral success of the political parties in our study, some of which ruled for more than 40 years. However, these parties were eventually removed from power: In India and Israel, Congress and Mapai were both unseated in 1977. In Italy, the DC was forced to disband in 1992, reverting back to the name its predecessor, Italian People¶s Party (PPI). In Sweden, the SDP was removed from power in 1976. Of the other parties being studied, Botswana¶s BDP was still in power in 2005, while the ANC continued to establish itself as a dominant party after it won South Africa¶s third elections held in 2004, and hence these two do not form part of this chapter.

The focus of this chapter will be on the factors that culminated in these parties losing power. Some factors identified differ from party to party, while others are common to some parties The following factors have been identified: leadership battles leading to schisms (factionalism), authoritarian and oligarchical tendencies, corruption, failure to resolve socioeconomic problems, loss of support from a strong socioeconomic bloc, consequences of war, environmental and economic issues, and an opposition that finally could offer a viable alternative to the voters.

It is important to note here that the absence of factors in a particular party will be explained. However, because the two factors responsible for the SDP¶s loss of dominance are unique to it, and not present in the other parties, they will not be included in the factors not discussed in reference to the other parties. These factors differ from those that affected the other parties, such as authoritarian and oligarchical tendencies, corruption, socio-economic problems, factionalism and the consequences of war. The SDP did not experience these problems. 6.1 Indira Gandhi and the crisis within Congress 6.1.1 Introduction

From winning India¶s first elections in 1952, Congress, under the leadership of Nehru, remained a well-organised, united and monolithic party without any insurmountable problems. Whatever problems arose were attended to and resolved. Nehru, according to Candland (1997:23), not only had firm command of the organisation, but also facilitated the settling of functional conflicts within the party. The Indian masses were united behind Congress, as it had won them their independence. However, all this ended with his death in 1964. As Nehru was the glue that held the party together, his death exposed it to factionalism that was a result of leadership battles for control of Congress.

Under the leadership of Nehru, Congress scored comfortable electoral victories over the divided opposition in the country¶s first three elections after independence. According to Chatterji (1971:3), until the fourth general elections in 1967 Congress enjoyed an enviable position as its supremacy had never been challenged since the dawn of freedom. The fortunes of the party were to undergo a change under the leadership of Indira Gandhi who came to power in 1966. In the first election in 1967 under Gandhi as leader of the party, Congress fared badly, with its representation in parliament being reduced from 73 to 55 per cent. The party¶s problems increased after this, resulting in it splitting into two factions in 1969. It was eventually removed from power when it lost the 1977 elections to a resurgent opposition coalition. With this, the party lost its position as the single most important political organisation in India after 97 years of existence.

This defeat of Congress is generally attributed by numerous authors such as Hardgrave Jr (1980), Park and de Mesquita (1979), Chaudhuri (1978) and Morris- Jones (1977), to the authoritarian leadership style of Gandhi. However, Candland (1997:25) deviates from this general view pointing out that ³it may be more convincing, however, to relate the decline of the Congress party to unprecedented economic challenges and to Congress¶s unfulfilled promises of social and economic reform, than to attribute it solely to one woman¶s style of leadership´. There is no doubt that during Gandhi¶s tenure of leadership, India experienced a myriad of economic and other problems related to the war with its fierce neighbour and enemy, Pakistan.

As much as the socioeconomic problems the country experienced had a hand in the defeat of the party, the blame is usually laid at the door of Gandhi. This refutes the claim by Candland that Gandhi could not be held responsible for the demise of Congress. Gandhi was largely responsible for its demise. The following are the factors that resulted in the defeat of Congress: leadership battles leading to schisms (factionalism), authoritarianism and oligarchical tendencies, corruption, failure to resolve socioeconomic problems, loss of support from a strong socioeconomic bloc, consequences of war, and a revived and organised opposition that offered voters an alternative.

6.1.2 First leadership battle and appearance of schisms within Congress

Protected by the strong and unifying leadership of Nehru, Congress did not concern itself with the problem of who would succeed him. It was only after he suffered a stroke in January 1964 that this question came to the fore. The party realised its vulnerability and according to Hardgrave Jr (1980:156), it was only then that the question, ³After Nehru, who?´ was asked more poignantly than ever before. His death on 27 May of the same year started a succession battle that saw cracks appearing for the first time within the party.

The leadership battle to succeed him involved Lal Bahudar Shastri and Morarji Desai, both veterans of the nationalist period. Shastri was appointed to succeed Nehru after Desai had been persuaded to stand down (Hardgrave Jr 1980:156). Park and de Mesquita (1979:123) point out that Nehru¶s death coupled with the selection of Shastri, ³greatly reduced the Congress Party mystique, opening the way for much more vociferous criticism of the government¶s policies than had occurred during Nehru¶s lifetime´. The party had hardly recovered from that leadership battle when it was faced with a similar experience. This was sparked by the death of Shastri in January 1966 and it involved Indira Gandhi and Desai. Desai, who was not entirely satisfied after having stood down in favour of Shastri, was determined not to repeat the same mistake and contested Gandhi. He lost the succession battle when Gandhi received 355 votes to his 169 votes (Hardgrave Jr 1980:157). Gandhi¶s candidature was supported by the Syndicate, a group of old Congress men from the states who wielded enormous influence within the party and who were regarded as the political bosses (Park & de Mesquita 1979:122). The succession battle revealed deep divisions within the party leaving some of its members disaffected.

No sooner had Gandhi won the battle for the leadership of the party and country than she went out of her way to assert her authority. She freed herself of the Syndicate who was responsible for her success over Desai. She did not want to be seen to be at their beck and call or to be accountable to them. She wanted to take the initiative on issues affecting the party and country. Gandhi sought to establish the dominance of the Prime Minister within the party (Hardgrave Jr 1980:159). She adopted an aggressive style of leadership and made common cause with the younger progressive members of the party who were inclined towards socialism. Gandhi started espousing populism and adopted a radical economic policy which entailed the following (Hardgrave Jr 1980:159):

‡ nationalisation of major commercial banks ‡ effective implementation of land reforms ‡ placing a ceiling on urban income properties ‡ placing curbs on industrial monopolies ‡ initiating an effective land reform action

Desai, her old nemesis, was sacked from his position as Minister of Finance for not showing enthusiasm for her radical economic plan. Desai was against the centralisation of the banks and the economy (Hardgrave Jr 1980:159). Gandhi had to fight an election soon after her ascension to power. The 1967 elections were an acid test for her new rule. The succession battles had a negative effect on the party with despondency among members creeping in. In addition to problems within the party, the country was experiencing both external and internal problems. External problems related to the ongoing animosity between India and Pakistan that culminated in war between the two states in 1965; and internal problems related to economic problems that the country was experiencing (Park & de Mesquita 1979:123). Hence, the 1967 elections were conducted amidst an atmosphere of frustration, agitation, despondency, strikes that were caused by food shortages, rising food prices and near famine in Bahir (Hardgrave Jr 1980:158).

6.1.3 Second leadership battle and Congress split

In 1969, Congress experienced yet another leadership battle. Unlike the previous two battles this proved to be the worst, as it resulted in a split giving rise to two Congresses that fought over the use of the name. The leadership battle arose as a result of a vacancy for the presidency of the country. The two candidates for this position were the Acting-President, VV Giri and the Speaker of Parliament, Sanjiva Reddy. Gandhi, according to Chatterji (1971:7), was not prepared to support the candidature of Reddy. The Syndicate had on the other hand endorsed the candidature of Reddy. Although Gandhi had instructed Congress to vote according to their consciences, she chose to support Giri who emerged victorious over Reddy.

The Syndicate was displeased by this and suspended Gandhi for having violated party policy (Park & de Mesquita 1979:124), simultaneously instructing the party in parliament to suspend Gandhi and elect a new leader. This instruction was rebuffed as the majority stood by Gandhi (Hardgrave Jr 1980:160). The leadership battle deepened tensions within the party leaving it in disarray. Gandhi¶s supposed suspension started a battle for control of the party between her faction and the Syndicate, who resorted to the courts for the use of the name. The outcome was that both factions ended up using the same name after the court ruled only that they should not use the Congress Party¶s electoral symbol of two yoked bullocks. This effectively meant that both groups represented new parties. However, according to Park and de Mesquita (1979:124), Gandhi¶s Congress was regarded as authentic by the public. It took the name Congress (R) (the ³5´ stood for ruling), while the other one was referred to as Congress (O), for opposition. Gandhi, who received the support of 226 Congress members in parliament, headed a minority government, as 65 other members aligned themselves with Congress (O), which was led by Desai (Chaudhuri 1978:305). As its working majority in parliament was lost, Congress had to rely on the support of the Communist Party of India (CPI) to be able to pass votes and support its policies and help the government to survive.

In order to prove herself as the unchallenged leader of Congress, Gandhi called for an election in 1971. This was ostensibly to renew her mandate. This shrewd move by Gandhi paid dividends as her version of Congress scored a resounding victory over the opposition, including her rival, Congress (O). The victory served to restore legislative authority to Gandhi (Innaiah 1981:22). Congress (R) achieved a two-thirds majority in the Lok Sabha which Gandhi took as a mandate for her rule, giving her the right to pursue her policies. Gandhi received a further boost when India defeated Pakistan in a war which resulted from Pakistan¶s invasion of East Bengal. This resulted in thousands of people from that area fleeing into India, creating a refugee problem. The state of Bangladesh was formed after this victory over Pakistan (Hardgrave Jr 1980:161).

6.1.5 Emergence of authoritarian and oligarchical tendencies Gandhi exploited her success in the 1971 elections to entrench herself and stamp her authority, which had seemed to be on the wane after the split of the organisation. She started to rule with an iron fist. She assumed full control of Congress, centralising and personalising authority and decision making in her hands. She frequently shuffled top government positions and most of the key portfolios were under her control. Cabinet positions were regularly changed in order to keep any possible rival off balance. Some of the Congress members owed their positions to the loyalty they had shown her. There was also a high turnover of the presidents of the party as she frequently changed them. From 1969 to 1977, the party had five presidents (Hardgrave Jr 1980:162). According to Brass (1990:40), Gandhi established personal control, the dominance of the ministerial wing of the party over the organisation, centralised direction of lower units, and authoritarian rather than democratic procedures for recruitment of party officers.

Gandhi¶s authoritarianism led to resentment and restlessness within the party and the country. Her appointees were challenged by disgruntled members of the party. Gandhi reacted angrily to members of the party who were disenchanted with her authoritarian leadership and denounced them. According to Hardgrave Jr (1980:163), ³she viewed criticism from within as traitorous and criticism from the opposition as anti-nationalist and fascist, or being foreign inspired. She took attacks on inept and often corrupt state officials as a personal affront. Gandhi came to rely more and more on coercion in having her way within the party´.

Popular discontent also started emerging from within the country. The economic hardship which the country was experiencing led to agitation, unrest, protests and demonstrations as the country grew restless. Campuses were torn by ill discipline and disturbances closed universities for weeks at a time. Each year recorded an increase in the number of riots and incidents of violence. Opposition to Gandhi became more vocal as the opposition parties coalesced across ideological affiliations. Their differences were submerged in common opposition to Gandhi¶s authoritarianism (Hardgrave Jr 1980:164).

While this discontentment was growing, Gandhi suffered another setback when she was found guilty of a minor violation of election legislation during her triumphant 1971 elections. The High Court declared her election invalid and she was ordered to resign from office and banned from holding office for six years. She also lost her seat in parliament (Hardgrave Jr 1980:165). Gandhi¶s response to this was to impose a state of emergency on 26 June 1975. Morris-Jones (1977:25) points out that this was solely her decision as ³cabinet, as such, was not so much consulted as informed´. He adds that the state of emergency was understandable as a consistent expression of Mrs Gandhi¶s political style, and as such a continuation of her tendency to concentrate power on her person and in the office with which she had come to completely identify with her person. According to Chaudhuri (1978:304), the decision to impose the state of emergency was taken outside the cabinet and simply communicated to its members.

The state of emergency claimed many casualties as most of the population was affected by it. However, the target was India¶s elite which included politicians, business people and academics. Those arrested not only included members of the opposition, but even those from her own party who were perceived as her enemies or were not well disposed towards her. Thousands of people were arrested without being brought to trial, including journalists, MPs, leaders of political parties and trade unionists (Chaudhuri 1978:306). Among those detained was Desai, her old adversary. Many others went into hiding. Press censorship was imposed forcing newspapers to close down. Those media that were not closed, became no more than the mouthpiece of government.

During the period of the state of emergency, India¶s poor community was traumatised and angered by a programme of forced sterilisation which was undertaken by Sanjay Gandhi, Indira¶s son ņ who was seen as heir apparent to his mother. The forced sterilisation was unpopular and left many communities scarred. According to Chaudhuri (1978:308), what was a good programme was carried out with the women being dishonoured and the men humiliated. He points out that stories of excesses travelled like wildfire across the plains of northern India and created a scare.

6.1.5 Corruption

Corruption in India was accepted as a way of life, with government officials and ordinary citizens engaging in it. According to Hardgrave Jr (1980:76), a survey revealed that most government officials were corrupt. Government ministers were growing wealthy in office through kickbacks. Much as the public decried corruption and the government instituted anti-corruption campaigns, it continued to be a major problem. Corruption was encouraged by the low salaries which the civil servants received. The civil servants, according to Hardgrave Jr (1980:76), had power in excess of their income. The public paid ³speed money´ in order to expedite transactions at government offices. This speed money was paid by the poor, who could least afford it.

6.1.6 Failure to resolve socioeconomic problems

When India gained independence its new leaders were optimistic that they would steer India away from poverty. Congress committed itself to eradicating poverty and promised a better life to the inhabitants of the country. To this extent, it initiated numerous five-year economic plans. One of the priorities of the government plans was the economic development of the country. However, India remained poor despite the valiant efforts of its leaders. Brass (1990:160) expresses the view that poverty gripping India does not simply affect a small disadvantaged segment of the population, but virtually half of the citizens of this vast country.

The socioeconomic problems facing India intensified in the middle of the 1960s and the poor performance of Congress in the 1967 elections is attributed to this factor. Compared to other elections, this was the party¶s worst performance since it came to power as it captured only 40,8 per cent of the votes, gaining 283 seats. Park and de Mesquita (1979:123) attributes the party¶s poor performance to the government¶s failure to prevent famine, and the general inability of Congress to keep the many promises it had made over the years. This aspect lessened the people¶s confidence in the party. Brass (1990:260) reveals that there was a commitment by the government in the early 1970s to reduce poverty through state-led programmes. However these programmes were not successful. Throughout the 1970s there was a deterioration in the economic situation of the country. This was caused by a drought, the cost of the war with Pakistan and the 1973 world energy crisis, which resulted in food shortages and high prices. In 1973-1974, food shortages and rising prices, combined with local political grievances led to major public demonstrations that turned violent in some of the states. The government also had to contend with demonstrations which led to rioting as the frustrated members of the community released their pent-up emotions. The government adopted harsh measures to stop these disturbances. This led to police firing into crowds resulting in fatalities (Brass 1990:40ņ41).

6.1.7 Consequences of war

The 1947 partition of India did not bring to an end the country¶s problems with Pakistan. Tension continued after the independence of both countries and this resulted in war breaking out between the two countries in 1965. Although India was able to defeat Pakistan, the victory was not decisive and, according to Park and de Mesquita (1979:123), did not inspire confidence in Congress. The Indian people questioned the ability of Congress to provide leadership in foreign policy.

In 1971 conflict in Pakistan flowed over into India, creating socioeconomic problems for Congress. India was faced with a crisis on its borders when the Pakistan government started massacring East Pakistanis on 26 March 1971. According to Sen (1974:129), by 28 March it became obvious that Pakistan was in the throes of a civil war as the government was annihilating people, particularly intellectuals, on the eastern side of the border. This resulted in tens of thousands of people fleeing from the war crossing the border into India. This impacted negatively on India, which was not an affluent country. Given its own problems, it simply could not accommodate and feed people who did not belong within its borders (Sen 1974:131). The refugee movement caused a situation which was economically, socially and politically unacceptable for India (Hardgrave Jr 1980:241). The Indian government was forced to use funds from the Central Exchequer in order to provide for the refugees and it had no choice but to reverse the flow of refugees by attacking Pakistan. India emerged victorious, but this came at a high price as the country¶s meagre resources were utilised.

6.1.8 Emergence of an organised opposition and the end of Congress dominance

Confident that the state of emergency had served a useful purpose, Gandhi lifted it on 18 January 1977 and called for an election which she thought Congress would win. This was because she thought that the state of emergency had wide support, particularly in the rural areas, and also that the opposition would not have enough time to organise itself to pose a strong challenge to Congress. However, Gandhi had miscalculated the anger of the people caused by her authoritarianism, the state of emergency, the forced sterilisation and the deteriorating economic situation (Hardgrave Jr 1980:164).

As explained in Chapter 4, India¶s opposition parties initially were as such not against forming an opposition alliance to challenge Congress, but they never seriously considered it. However, around 1976, with Gandhi faltering and angering the entire community, the moment was opportune for them to form an alliance against Congress. Four opposition parties came together to form the Janata Party which was led by her arch rival, Morarji Desai (Chaudhuri 1978:309). Going to the elections, Gandhi suffered a setback when a senior cabinet minister, Jagjivan Ram, resigned and formed the Congress for Democracy, which joined the other opposition parties in Janata. Ram was the leader of India¶s one million untouchables. Chaudhuri (1978:309) expresses the view that the resignation of Ram from Congress with his record of lifelong service was a bombshell which even Mrs Gandhi found hard to take in her stride.

The consolidation of the opposition was an important factor in the defeat suffered by Congress as it prevented the splitting of the non-Congress votes. The opposition came together across ideological differences and included Congress (O), the Congress for Democracy, the Socialist Party, the ethnic-oriented Jana Sangh and the Bharatiya Lok Dal. India¶s two communist parties did not join the opposition alliance. While Janata took 41,3 per cent of the votes, which gained it 295 seats, Congress could only manage to win 34,2 per cent giving it 154 seats. The defeat ended the proud history of Congress which started in 1885 when it was founded. And the blame for this was laid at the door of Gandhi.

6.1.9 Summary

Nehru, who was the hero of the nationalist struggle against Britain, continued to lead Congress after India gained independence. His presence was enough to bring order and stability to the party. But his sudden death exposed schisms within the party which was a result of leadership battles. The battle for the leadership of the party brought to the surface simmering tensions within the party. Indira Gandhi ascended to power during one of these leadership battles. One of these battles resulted in the party eventually splitting in 1969, bringing into existence two factions of Congress. Gandhi, who on assuming the leadership of Congress, flexed her muscles, gradually became authoritarian. This authoritarianism and her leadership style alienated members of the party and the community, as she was running the party to the exclusion of the other senior members of the party. The decision to impose a state of emergency was her personal decision, after which she merely informed other senior party members. There was no leader strong enough to stand up to her as she replaced the leadership of Congress at will.

Corruption ate at the moral fibre of Indian society. With Congress occupying the central role in the bureaucracy, the party became tainted with corruption. Since India¶s independence, Congress had not been able to improve the living standards of the people of India who remained poor. The ongoing hostility with Pakistan also caused social and economic problems as the country had to accommodate refugees from the war. This led to people losing confidence in the ability of Congress to provide for them and ensure their security from external forces. As a result of this, the party lost the support of the masses, its strongest socioeconomic bloc. Congress also lost the support of senior members who defected to the opposition or formed their own parties. The opposition converged into the Janata Party which contested and defeated Congress in the 1977 elections, ending its 25 years of dominance.

Factor not discussed Congress recruited to its ranks diverse groups of the Indian across racial, ethnic, language and professional divides. Throughout its dominance of Indian politics it relied on these groups for support. Thus, it cannot be said that it lost the support of a particular, strong socioeconomic bloc.

6.2 Loss of dominance by Mapai/Labour Alignment

6.2.1 Introduction

Mapai assumed the name Labour Alignment when it formed an alliance with other labour-oriented parties in 1965. The name that will be used in this section will be Mapai/Labour Alignment. After being in the forefront of the founding of the state of Israel and the shaping of its destiny when it ascended to power in 1949, Mapai as part of the Labour Alignment lost its dominant position in the politics of the country when it was defeated in the 1977 elections. The Mapai/Labour Alignment suffered its greatest setback when it could only win 24,6 per cent of the vote and 32 seats, compared to the 51 that it held in parliament in 1973 after polling 39,7 per cent of the votes. For the first time in 28 years it was not called upon to form a government coalition, something which the party had regarded as its prerogative and had taken for granted (Katz 1980:110).

During the party¶s long stay in power, the Mapai/Labour Alignment was at the heart of each and every government that was formed in Israel. It provided the country with all its prime ministers during this period and was also in charge of the senior cabinet positions such as defence, foreign affairs, education and finance, while allocating less important portfolios to its junior coalition partners (Katz 1980:81). During the party¶s rule, it met most of the serious challenges it faced such as the successful defence of the country against hostile Arab states opposed to the establishment of the state of Israel, the economic development and the absorption of immigrants. This enhanced the stature of the organisation making it possible for it to win successive elections.

Before the 1977 elections that eventually ended its dominance, the Mapai/Labour Alignment experienced factionalism. The country was also faced with socioeconomic problems which impacted negatively on the party (Katz 1980:131). Added to this was the fact that it was experiencing a loss of support due to what was perceived as authoritarian tendencies within the party (Aronoff 1990:268). The support which it received from the labour union, Histadrut, also started dissipating. On the other hand, the opposition parties were moving closer to one another and ended up forming an alliance (Frankel 1980:50). The following factors resulted in the Mapai/Labour Alignment¶s defeat in the 1977 elections: leadership battles leading to schisms within the party, appearance of authoritarian tendencies, corruption, failure to resolve socioeconomic problems, loss of support from a strong socioeconomic bloc, consequences of the war with Arabs and alliance formation by the opposition.

6.2.2 Leadership battles and appearance of schisms within the Alignment

The leadership battles within Mapai/Labour Alignment could be traced to the collapse of Israel¶s seventeenth cabinet formed in 1974 which was led by Golda Meir. The government collapsed after the army was blamed for the country¶s defeat during the Yom Kippur War of 1973 (Katz 1980:102). As the defeat was blamed on the defence force, many citizens expected Moshe Dayan, the Minister of Defence, to take responsibility for this and resign. However, Dayan refused to do so. It was Golda Meir who instead resigned and in the process brought down the government (Katz 1980:103).

Golda Meir left the government and announced her unavailability to form another one. This caused a crisis for the Mapai/Labour Alignment and precipitated a leadership battle which placed Itzak Rabin, who was a former Minister of Labour and former ambassador to Washington, against Shimon Peres, a former Minister of Communications and Information. This was the first of their two clashes over who should lead the party and the country. Rabin, who was chosen by the Central Committee as its choice for Prime Minster in 1974, won the contest (Katz 1980:103).

The second battle occurred in 1977 when some members of the party challenged Rabin¶s leadership, preferring Peres. Peres challenged Rabin for the premiership at the party¶s convention. Again Rabin won this contest when he was nominated to lead the party to the forthcoming elections and to be its candidate for the second term as Prime Minister (Katz 1980:108). There was an uneasy truce between the factions supporting the two leaders, however, the party remained divided and there was bad blood between Peres and Rabin. Katz (1980:108) postulates the view that the dissension within the party signalled serious trouble for its future.

While the party was still battling to come to terms with the leadership battles, it was jolted by the surprise resignation of Rabin, barely three months before the 1977 elections. Rabin¶s resignation followed after he was investigated on charges of corruption. Rabin was succeeded by Peres, his rival. However, there was a faction within the party which was opposed to him leading the party since they perceived him to be hawkish, particularly on issues relating to the annexation of territory and relations with the Arabs (Katz 1980:109). He was, however, the best available candidate. The party went to the election divided and lacking in confidence. It was shaken by the leadership battles, allegations of corruption and Rabin¶s sudden resignation and was less certain about its prospects of victory.

6.2.3 Emergence of authoritarian and oligarchical tendencies

After being undefeated for almost three decades, authoritarian tendencies became noticeable within Mapai (Aronoff 1990:268). The party was losing touch with ordinary grassroots supporters and was becoming insensitive to and unconcerned about their needs. This, according to Aronoff (1990:269), coincided with growing arrogance at the top by national leaders who became preoccupied with the perpetuation of their rule. The elite dominated party structures where they were overrepresented while other groups were underrepresented. This elite was responsible for decision making and democratic procedures were no longer followed.

Recruitment to higher levels of the party became dependent on loyalty to the elite rather than the display of independence and initiative. This led to widespread dissatisfaction among the lower-level leaders, and grassroots members of the party. However, criticism of the elite and its policies was suppressed. Amidst this, protests were launched by extraparliamentary groups operating outside the confines of party discipline. The disaffection directly led to the erosion of Mapai/Labour Alignment¶s legitimacy and dominance (Aronoff 1990:269). While this was happening, the top leadership of the party became tainted with corruption which is discussed below. According to Shalev (1990:116), the happenings in the party reflected ³what is commonly known as the arrogance of power, a thesis which in essence lays the blame on the party leadership´.

6.2.4 Corruption

The party¶s problems were worsened by charges of corruption being investigated against some of its leaders in 1975 (Katz 1980:107). One of the people being investigated was Asher Yadlin, who was nominated to the position of governor of the Bank of Israel. He was investigated in 1976 on charges of land fraud and accepting US$32 000 in bribes. Another was Abraham Ofer, Minister of Housing, who was accused of 32 charges of corruption. He later committed suicide. But the biggest surprise was the 1976 investigation of Rabin, who was the Prime Minister, on charges of corruption. Rabin and his wife were investigated on allegations of having an illegal bank account in Washington in excess of US$10 000. While Rabin was cleared, his wife was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine (Katz 1980:109).

6.2.5 Failure to resolve socioeconomic problems

From its difficult beginnings, Israel led by Mapai had become an almost self-sufficient welfare state. Israel experienced a phenomenal growth of 11,1 per cent per annum between 1950 and 1960. This dropped to 8,7 per cent per annum between 1965 and 1972. From 1973 onwards, Israel¶s economy stagnated as it experienced no growth (Arian 1991:84). The country then started experiencing economic problems which were aggravated by the worldwide increase in the price of oil. The 1973 Yom Kippur War also added to the country¶s problems (Katz 1980:131). The country was faced with increasing unemployment and inflation and the government was forced to introduce austerity measures such as budgetary cuts for social welfare and education and a halt to government subsidies for basic food commodities. There was an increase in the price of fuel, cooking gas, water and electricity. This did not go down well with the poor segments of society as they were the most affected and had to bear the brunt of the austerity measures (Katz 1980:107).

6.2.6 Loss of support from strong socioeconomic bloc

The role of Histadrut in mobilising support for Mapai was discussed in detail in Chapter 3. However, there is a need to recapitulate on this in order to show how Mapai benefitted from its relationship with Histadrut, and how this dependency was later to prove costly to the party. Histadrut was formed at more or less the same time as Mapai. The two movements were the pioneering organisations in the pre- statehood period and wielded much influence as they organised the new political system. The two organisations had at one time or another shared officials. Ben- Gurion, who became Israel¶s first Prime Minister, was the secretary of Histadrut (Arian 1985:73). The close relationship that existed between the two organisations from the pre-statehood era continued into the statehood period benefiting Mapai over the other political parties. Shalev (1990:106) puts forward the view that Histadrut was a critical component of Mapai¶s political hegemony, particularly in strengthening the bonds between individual workers and the party. Histadrut enterprises also contributed funds to Mapai. Histadrut controlled a large slice of Israel¶s economy and was hence able to provide employment to the destitute and traumatised immigrants who arrived in the country at the end of World War II. As Histadrut was close to Mapai, these workers chose it as their political home.

With the passing of time and changing circumstances, there was a steady erosion of the influence that Histadrut exercised over the labour force. Those people who joined Mapai after being offered employment in Histadrut enterprises were later to develop their own personal and political choices (Shalev 1990:115). Israel¶s growing economy opened up other avenues for employment making it possible for Mapai¶s supporters to be employed outside Histadrut-owned enterprises (Shalev 1990:122). Senior executives, who were the products of Histadrut, also started asserting their independence from the organisation. This they did by establishing ties with other large concerns affiliated to different ownership sectors (Shalev 1990: 123). Some of these managers had actually joined the newly formed Democratic Movement for Change (DMC), which challenged the Mapai/Labour Alignment in the fateful 1977 elections.

6.2.7 Consequences of war with the Arabs

Two other events had a profound effect on the party and further affected its electoral chances. These were the war with three Arab states and the formation of a National Unity Government (NUG). The war, which featured Israel and the states of Egypt, Syria and Jordan, is generally referred to as the Arab-Israeli conflict. As war with the Arab states became imminent, the Israeli public suggested that a unity government should be formed. This led to the formation of the NUG in 1966. This government included most of Israel¶s parties with the exception of the Communist Party. Begin¶s right-wing party was for the first time included in a coalition government and this served to legitimise Begin. The Arab states went to war with Israel in June 1967. This war lasted barely six days with the Jewish state emerging victorious and capturing a swathe of Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian territory. The country was euphoric over the victory, which benefited the Mapai/Labour Alignment as it boosted morale and the economy of the country also improved. The country stood united behind the unity government (Katz 1980:98). During the war, Israel occupied territory which belonged to the three Arab countries. This was Sinai, the Golan Heights, Gaza and the West Bank. The seizure of the territory became a divisive issue within the Mapai/Labour Alignment as some members were in favour of the occupation, while others were uncomfortable with it (Aronoff 1990:270). The party was uneasy with being associated with the occupation of Arab territory. It offered to withdraw to the international boundaries recognised before the war in exchange for peace with the Arabs. This peace offer was rebuffed by the Arabs who made it known that they were not going to negotiate with Israel, recognise the Jewish state or make peace with it.

The Arab states, represented by the Arab League, wanted a complete withdrawal by Israel from the territories it occupied. The occupation of territory was uncomfortable for the Mapai/Labour Alignment as it conflicted with its liberal values. On the other hand, the religious and nationalist parties had no qualms in holding on to the occupied territories. The Mapai/ Labour Alignment was caught in the middle and was gradually drifting to the right as it had to endorse militant right-wing policies. This blurred the distinction between itself and the right, and displeased its supporters (Aronoff 1990:269).

6.2.8 Herut and the formation of an opposition alliance

Herut was one of Israel¶s opposition parties that was classified as being nationalist and belonging to the right. Its leader was Menachin Begin. Among the party¶s members were underground fighters who had fought the British during the period of the Mandate (Kraines 1961:80). During the early years of independence, the Mapai/Labour Alignment succeeded in denying legitimacy to Herut (Arian 1985:82). Its leader, Ben-Gurion, used every opportunity to delegitimate it. Begin¶s conduct ņ both inside and outside parliament ņ did not help his course, making him and Herut an easy target for delegitimation. According to Arian (1985:82), Begin was provocative, had an antagonistic and disrespectful attitude towards the state, which he referred to as totalitarian. There was no love lost between him and Ben-Gurion who called him a fascist and refused to address him by his name in parliament.

Begin was a radical, right-wing nationalist who adopted a hard-line stance towards the Arabs. He was not impressed with the conciliatory attitude of the Mapai/Labour Alignment government towards them (Arabs). To him the only way to solve the issue of Israel¶s sovereignty was to wage war with the Arabs. Begin asserted the right of the Jewish people to the land of Israel and was prepared to go to war in defence of this right (Kraines 1961:80). Ben-Gurion warned of the overwhelming danger to the state and nation posed by Herut and Begin (Levite & Tarrow 1983:302).

The simmering tension between the Arab states and Israel gave rise to a decision that a national unity government should be formed. Begin supported the idea and played a constructive role towards its realisation, even going to the extent that it should be headed by Ben-Gurion, his archenemy (Levite & Tarrow 1983:304). He adopted a conciliatory stance and did away with his radical rhetoric. When the NUG was formed and it included Herut. Begin served as Minister without Portfolio in the NUG between 1967 and 1970. Aronoff (1990:269) expresses the view that the participation of Begin and his colleagues in the government until their resignation in August 1970 firmly established their legitimacy and paved the way for their ascension to power in 1977. Begin also softened his hard-line position and started looking for alliances. While Herut was undergoing a change, forging political alliances and becoming an acceptable political entity, the Mapai/Labour Alignment on the other hand was fragmenting. The Mapai/Labour Alignment suffered a setback with the formation of the Democratic Movement for Change (DMC) just before the 1977 elections. This party appealed to the same constituency as the Labour Alignment. The DMC comprised intellectuals, academics, businessmen and ordinary people who left the Labour Alignment as they had become disillusioned with the party (Katz 1980:108). The DMC put up a good performance in the 1977 elections, winning15 seats. This was done at the expense of the Mapai/Labour Alignment as it siphoned off of its supporters. According to Katz (1980:110), there were large-scale defections to the DMC.

The defeat of the Labour Alignment was not unexpected owing to the problems the party had encountered. Senior party member, Peres, attributed the defeat to the following factors: party bickering; failing to explain its stance sufficiently to the public; the poor economic conditions prevailing; and widespread corruption and scandal involving party members (Katz 1980:110).

6.2.9 Summary

Mapai played a pivotal role in the foundation and defence of the state of Israel. In addition to this, it brought prosperity to the country. For this it was rewarded with electoral support which saw it winning successive elections for 28 years and being called upon to form numerous governments. However, the party was later to experience problems when a battle over the leadership of the party ensued. This ultimately led to the resignation of Rabin a few months before the 1977 elections. This was a severe blow for the party as it was left leaderless at such a crucial period.

Authoritarian tendencies crept into the party leaving members dissatisfied. The leaders of Mapai were accused of being remote from the ordinary members of the party. They took decisions without taking into consideration the views of the other members. The leaders of the party were also accused of corruption which had a negative effect on the party. The deteriorating state of the economy due to the increase in the price of oil and the Yom Kippur War did not help matters for the party as the citizens bore the brunt of austerity measures. Pivotal to the election victories of Mapai was the support it received from Histadrut. In Israel the majority of workers were members of Histadrut, but, with the passing of time, the support which the party received from Histadrut waned as workers freed themselves from its influence.

The imminent threat of war with the surrounding Arab states compounded the problems of the Mapai/Labour Alignment as it served with religious and right-wing parties in the NUG, which compromised its policies. The opposition managed to form a right-wing alliance to challenge the Mapai\Labour Alignment and this was facilitated by Begin¶s change of attitude in moderating his right-wing, revolutionary rhetoric making it easier for other opposition parties to form an alliance with Likud. Prior to the 1977 elections some members of Mapai\Labour Alignment left it to form a new political party, splitting support for the party. All this made it easy for the opposition to defeat the Labour Alliance in those elections.

6.3 Italy: the Christian Democratic Party (DC), the Mafia and corruption

6.3.1 Introduction After ascending to power in 1948, the DC played a commanding role in Italian politics, consolidating its position in the postwar period. Being the best-supported party in the country, it was almost unassailable. The DC warded off the challenge from both the Communist and Socialist Parties and was never in danger of losing its dominant position, even though its share of the votes hovered around the 34 per cent mark. However, as it never attained a clear majority of votes, it was forced to enter into a coalition with other smaller parties in order to govern the country. It included the Socialist Party for the first time in the coalition government, but kept out the Communist Party, its ideological rival. The two parties ņ DC and Socialist ņ according to Sassoon (1997:243) were tied together by the virtual assurance that they could not be electorally defeated.

With the guaranteed strong support of the Catholic Church, the DC seemed destined to rule Italy forever. By 1988, the DC was still in control of the country¶s political system. It remained at the head of 49 of the country¶s 52 governments and held the highest number of cabinet posts in all of them (Mignone 1995:37). Sassoon (1997:240) writes that until 1992 the Italian state coincided with one specific party, the DC. However, all this came to an end when the party was plunged into a crisis which saw its share of the votes in the 1992 elections falling below 30 per cent, which was its lowest since it came to power. Even though this was the single highest percentage between the parties and the DC was able to form a government, the election marked a turning point in the fortunes of the party (Furlong 1996:65).

The situation the party found itself in turned from bad to worse after this, as it suffered misfortunes which were of its own making, resulting in the party dissolving itself on 18 January 1994 and reverting to the Italian People¶s Party, which was the original name of the party when it was founded in 1919 (Furlong 1996:69). This marked the ignominious end of the party which throughout its dominance of Italian politics was engulfed by controversy. The following factors were responsible for the party¶s decline and loss of dominance: leadership battles leading to schisms, corruption and the party¶s link to organised crime, failure to resolve socioeconomic problems, loss of support from a strong socioeconomic bloc and the consequences of war.

6.3.2 Appearance of schisms within the DC

While it was at the helm of the political system in Italy the DC was a party fraught with factions. However, to its credit these did not manifest themselves in splits that destabilised the party. However, things took a bad turn towards the end of the 1980s when the party¶s problems intensified. This came about when some leaders became involved in corruption and were associated with the Mafia. This displeased some party members who left to form their own organisations. Between 1991 and 1993, the party experienced the following splits (McCarthy 1996:17): In 1991, disgusted with the party¶s ties to the Mafia, the ex-DC mayor of Palermo, Leoluca Orlando, left and formed a small anti-Mafia party in Sicily, the headquarters of the organisation. He was able to attract significant votes winning 12 parliamentary seats in the 1992 elections. In 1993, the DC split into three groups. The largest group rallied around the party¶s secretary, Martinazzoli, who was unsuccessful in cleaning up the DC, and reverted to the organisation¶s first name , PPI; another faction left with Mario Segni and formed an alliance with the PPI under the name Patto Segni; a third group abandoned Martinazzoli and, when Silvio Berlusconi entered politics, joined him and ran under the name Centro Cristiano Democratico (CCD); a fifth faction took the name Cristiano Sociali and ran as part of a left-wing coalition (Sassoon 1992:244). After dissolving itself, the party contested the 1994 elections as the PPI. Some of the splinter groups took part in these elections facing their former party comrades.

6.3.3 Corruption and the DC¶s link to organised crime

Although operating in other countries including the United States, the Mafia, an organised criminal group, is synonymous with Sicily from where it originated. Like political organisations in Italy, the Mafia also bore the brunt of Mussolini¶s fascist dictatorship. Mussolini set out to destroy it when he issued an order that hundreds of its members should be arrested. Not only were they arrested, some were tortured and even killed (Jamieson 2000:14). Mussolini took this step because he viewed the Mafia as a threat to public order (Mignone 1995:68). Throughout the duration of Fascist rule, the Mafia was rendered ineffective.

The organisation resurfaced towards the end of World War II when it became part of the Resistance Movement fighting the Fascist regime. This it did by joining the Separatist Movement in Sicily. This won the movement the support of the Allied Forces. The organisation provided intelligence to the Allied Forces. The Mafia gained respectability for this role and some of its members served in the administration of the regional government of Sicily (Jamieson 2000:14). This brought the organisation into contact with the DC, which was the dominant political force on the island of Sicily after the war. According to Jamieson (2000:16), a new relationship developed between the Mafia and the dominant political class, with the former no longer mediating between two sectors of society, but bargaining on its own behalf.

Mignone (1995: 69) points out that until the 1970s the Mafia prospered within the DC system. It was at the service of the politicians, delivering votes and financing their political campaigns. In exchange, the organisation obtained local contracts and was allowed to develop protection rackets. The Mafia grew big and extended its influence throughout the country. However, feuds developed between various clans of the Mafia resulting in violence. Worried by the violence and spreading influence of the organisation, the authorities tried to bring it to heel. The organisation fought back, killing those who were tasked with reigning it in. McCarthy (1996:74) writes that while in the 1980s the Mafia killed isolated representatives of the state who had threatened it, in the 1990s it conducted a war. The Mafia placed bombs in Milan, Rome and Florence. The organisation was also accused of having assassinated two top anti- Mafia investigators, Giovanni Falcone and a judge, Paolo Borsellino, in 1992 (Gundle & Parker 1996:3).

For an organisation that enjoyed a close relationships with the church, it would have been expected of the DC to keep its distance from a criminal organisation such as the Mafia. However, this was not the case, as some senior members of the party had close ties with the Mafia, which was involved in all kinds of criminal activities and did not have any qualms about taking people¶s lives, including government officials, judges, magistrates and the police. The suspicion that some DC officials were conniving with the Mafia proved costly to the party, both in terms of the lives of some officials as well as its reputation among ordinary Italians. According to Mignone (1995:72), the Mafia was living within the walls of government. It infiltrated and controlled the nerve centre of the regional government in Sicily.

For its involvement with the Mafia the DC paid a heavy price. Salvo Lima, the ex- mayor of Palermo, was killed by the Mafia during the 1992 elections campaign. The Mafia was suspected of being responsible for Lima¶s death. According to McCarthy (1996:74), Lima was viewed as one of the chief intermediaries between the DC and the Mafia. He was killed because he had failed to deliver on his promise to deliver the acquittal of Mafia members facing trial. Another example of the DC¶s involvement with organised crime is given by Pasquino (1994: 27) who points out that Andreotti, a former Prime Minister, was accused of collusion with the Mafia and of having ordered the killing of a journalist investigating the killing of Prime Minister Aldo Moro in 1978.

Apart from their links with the Mafia, DC officials were also involved in corruption which was an ³open´ secret in Italy. McCarthy (1996:61) recounts various brazen incidences of corrupt practices. He writes that

« of all the examples (of corruption) the one that aroused the most passion was the practice of Francesco De Lorenzo, Minister of Health in the 1989 ņ1992 Andreotti government. He had systematically taken bribes from drug companies that wished to have their medicines certified by the government and hence put on sale. He had also taken a 5 per cent cut on contracts awarded to companies that built new facilities in a hospital intended for AIDS patients.

The Italian public, according to McCarthy (1996:141), was not mindless of the corruption taking place in the country. Reports of corruption by government officials were carried regularly by the country¶s newspapers. These were not occasional articles, but a deluge of them. The public was angered by the corruption which involved government officials and influential business people. According to Sassoon (1992:244), when those who continued to vote for the DC were asked what it was they liked the least about their party most said it was corruption.

The Italian government was not seen to be taking firm action against corruption. McCarthy (1996:5) attributes this to the fact that magistrates had formed alliances with the factions of the political class. Many of the magistrates had actually been accused of complicity in corruption. This was one of the reasons why, initially, there was a half-hearted approach by government officials and the magistrates to stop corruption. When the investigation on corruption started, however, it quickly gained momentum and resulted in the arrest of hundreds of senior government officials, business people and some elements of the Mafia (Gundle & Parker 1996:5).

The investigation, which was carried out by magistrates and started in Milan, revealed the involvement in corruption by DC officials and their links to the Mafia. The investigation which was aptly named ņ Clean Hands ņ started in 1992. Among those arrested were deputies who were elected in the 1992 elections. Most of them belonged to the DC and its ally, the PSI. This, according to Sassoon (1992:244), led to the irreversible crisis of the DC and in the 1992 local elections the party could muster only 20 per cent of the vote. The DC was affected by the revelations of the magistrates which reinforced the public¶s perception that the party was corrupt. The magistrates¶ investigations shed new light on the complicity of politicians in organised crime (Mignone 1995:75).

6.3.4 Failure to resolve socioeconomic problems

Italy made a remarkable recovery from the devastation which it suffered during World War II. This enabled the DC government to improve the lives of Italian citizens. However, at the beginning of the 1990s, the country experienced economic problems. There was an increase in debt with inflation running at 6,2 per cent per annum, and declining exports resulted in rising unemployment. Between 1992 and mid-1993, unemployment rose from 11,1 to 13,1 per cent of the economically active population. Companies reduced the number of people employed and the number of hours they worked (McCarthy 1997:146). With reports of corruption being carried daily in newspapers, the irritation of voters was exacerbated by the state of the economy (McCarthy 1996:148). 6.3.5 Loss of support from a strong socioeconomic bloc

Through its myriad structures throughout Italy, the Catholic Church actively participated in recruiting support for the DC. The Italian public was receptive to requests from the Church that they should vote for the DC, thus the DC was assured of this support, which was one of the factors responsible for its dominance. A decline in the number of people attending church, which is referred to as desecularisation, had an effect on the support that the DC had taken for granted. Whereas in the early postwar years, 70 per cent of Italians attended Sunday mass, by the mid-1980s that figure had declined to 25 per cent. McCarthy (1996:18) points out that in addition to this fewer Catholics were heeding the church on how to vote and exercised their own choice.

6.3.6 Consequences of the end of the Cold War

The collapse of the Soviet Union towards the end of the 1980s, which brought an end to the Cold War, impacted negatively on the DC. After the war, the DC received the backing of the United States and other Western countries such as Britain and France that were opposed to communism and the expansionist ambitions of the Soviet Union. Italy¶s Communist Party was the strongest in Europe and emerged with credit at the end of the war due to its role in the Resistance Movement. Italy became the bulwark against communist incursion in Western Europe. The end of the Cold War, according to McCarthy (1997:2), freed voters from the DC, who started voting for other parties. Communism was demythologised and was no longer regarded as a foreign ideology. The DC could also no longer delegitimise the Communist Party. The United States also ended its patronage of the DC, which was now forced to compete with the other parties under its own auspices.

Factors not discussed Authoritarian and oligarchical tendencies The DC has been characterised as a weak and faction-riddled party by Adams and Barile (1966) and Pasquino (1980). Feuds and factionalism within the party rendered it weak and made the existence of authoritarian and oligarchical tendencies impossible. Adams and Barile (1966:154) state that the DC was an amorphous party. It was a loosely knit organisation of local bosses who represented various discordant and mutually incompatible interests. Pasquino (1980:89) points at the existence of factions within the party competing with one another. He muses that ³what has been pathological about the DC, has been sheer number of factions´. De Gasperi who was responsible for the postwar revival of the party was challenged and defeated by a faction within the party in 1953 (Pasquino 1980:90). The factions within the party were geographically based, hierarchically structured, rotating around a leader of national visibility, each faction had individual headquarters, owned a news agency, and was able to draw resources from outside party channels through privileged connections with flanking organisations (Pasquino 1980:90). Because of this, authoritarian and oligarchical tendencies could not have manifested themselves within the DC.

6.3.7 Summary

The DC started its dominance of Italian politics with the assistance of the Catholic Church on whom it relied for support. As it did not gain enough votes to rule on its own, the DC was forced to invite other smaller parties to join it in forming a government. During its four-decade stay in power, the DC was faced with major problems, the most serious being corruption and the party¶s link to organised crime in the form of the Mafia. The Mafia was a ruthless organisation that was disliked by the majority of the Italian public. Some members of the party were associated with the Mafia and by extension corruption. The party also provided the Mafia with protection from prosecution.

The involvement of the party with the Mafia did not go down well with some senior members of the party who left it. The public was frustrated by the government¶s inability to stop the Mafia¶s criminal activities. This frustration was heightened in the early 1990s by the state of the economy which impacted negatively on their standard of living when austerity measures were implemented. The party¶s problems took a turn for the worse when it lost the support of the Catholic congregants as they no longer felt bound to heed the advice of the church on how to vote. The end of the Cold War also dealt the party a blow as it was no longer seen as being in the frontline of the fight against communism. The Communist Party was no longer seen as being an appendage of the Soviet Union. The investigation into corruption by the magistrates, which resulted in the arrest of scores of senior members of the party sounded its death knell and it went out without a fight as it disbanded, ending four decades of domination of the Italian political system.

6.4 Sweden: the Social Democratic Party¶s welfare success and the 1976 electoral defeat

6.4.1 Introduction

From a difficult start when it first ascended to power in 1932, the SDP developed Sweden into a prosperous nation and in the process achieved one of the highest standards of living in the world. By 1977 Sweden, according to Scott (1977:544), had virtually eradicated poverty and had almost full employment with the government adequately catering for the needs of all of the country¶s citizens. Scott (1977) further adds that ³as an institution, the welfare state was in the 1970s functioning very well. It was efficient, honest, all embracing. The trains ran on time, the streets were kept clean, poverty and slums were eliminated. Material well-being was provided in exceptional measure´.

All of the above were made possible by the extensive social welfare policies that were introduced by the SDP throughout its long stay in power. The successful implementation of the social welfare system and the prosperity which the country enjoyed ensured the party¶s long stay in power. However, it was this success which was later to prove detrimental to the fortunes of the party. The party¶s loss of power could be sought, ironically, in the success that it brought the Swedish nation. The party became a victim of its own success.

It is difficult to comprehend how a party which brought economic success to a country could be defeated at the polls in the same way as a party whose performance was unsatisfactory. The prosperity which Sweden attained produced the two factors which are generally held to be responsible for the SDP¶s loss of power after 44 years in office. The first of these factors was the demand by the trade union federation, the LO, a strong ally of the SDP, to have a say and share in the control of the economy of the country. The second was the country¶s high consumption of energy which was caused by the good standard of living enjoyed by the Swedish citizens. An impressive economic growth impacted on the consumption of energy. The personal consumption of energy started at a modest volume, but climbed to 40 per cent of total energy consumption, eventually reaching 70 per cent in the 1970s (Lewin 1988:240).

These two issues came to the fore in the period leading up to the 1976 elections. Korpi (1983:143) expresses the view that issues of nuclear power and state intervention in the economy were the two attitude dimensions most clearly associated with changes in the party choice between 1973 and 1976. However, he points out that the nuclear power issue was more important in influencing the party choice of voters than the intervention in the economy sought by the LO. The two issues were unintended consequences which caught the party off-guard. According to Krauss and Pierre (1990:234), the party had no answers to them and could not give guidance to its members.

6.4.2 Labour union¶s ambition to wrest control of the proceeds of the economy

On assuming power in 1932, the SDP eschewed Marxist socialism and instead encouraged private ownership of property. It wanted to make private ownership of property, and concomitantly capitalism, efficient (Lewin 1988:275). It fashioned a unique economic system which had elements of both socialism and capitalism and avoided nationalisation. This resulted in the establishment of the country¶s highly acclaimed social democracy and the successful implementation of the social welfare system.

Throughout the SDP¶s stay in power, Sweden became a highly prosperous state with those owning the means of production prospering. However, the LO was concerned with the concentration of wealth in a few hands. Its ambition was to wrest control from the entrepreneurs, business people and industrialists (Esping-Andersen 1990:54). It hoped that this would result in the distribution of the wealth of the country to all of its citizens. To this end, the LO commissioned Meidner, its chief economist, to investigate how this could be made possible (Scott 1977:522).

Meidner¶s proposal was for the gradual acquisition by the LO of the ownership of the Swedish economic structure in order to benefit the entire Swedish community which would amount to an equalisation of wealth The workers would gain ownership of the means of production, effectively making them their own employers (Scott 1977:523). This was to be done through the taxation of profit which was to be reallocated to investment funds, collectively owned by the workers with the intention that in more than four or five decades they (workers) would control a majority share of Swedish enterprises (Esping-Andersen 1990:54). This was a disguised method of socialising the economy. The introduction of an employee investment fund was described as a ³technique for successively transferring the ownership of productive capital from private owners to the employee collective´ (Lewin 1988:278).

The nonsocialist parties were not per se opposed to this idea arguing that granting employees a share in company profits was reconcilable with a nonsocialist view of society and supported the idea (Lewin 1988:278-279). This, they argued, would actually make them allies of capital which would in turn serve to undermine the socialist class struggle. However, they were in favour of a partnership as opposed to control by labour unions. The nonsocialists wanted the growing national wealth of Sweden to be spread to as many people as possible through shareholding (Lewin 1988:279). Meidner¶s proposal was tabled at the LO¶s congress of 1976 where it was enthusiastically received and was adopted after a lively debate (Lewin 1988:280). However, it needs to be added that some members of the labour union were uneasy with it. It was presented to the SDP which during this period had no view on the issue. Lewin (1988) points out that while this issue was being debated by the LO and the nonsocialist parties, the SDP was reluctant to discuss it. He adds that there was a deafening silence from the SDP with Olaf Palme, the leader of the party, avoiding the issue completely. The SDP felt uncomfortable with the proposal and did not want to commit itself to it (Korpi 1978:330). Some members of the LO were also not at ease with the proposal. As this issue became prominent during the last few months leading up to the 1976 elections, it left the two allies with insufficient time to discuss it and to reach consensus. Hence, according to Lewin (1988:281), two branches of the Swedish labour movement pursued two different strategies in the 1976 elections campaign. The SDP¶s election defeat in 1976 was attributed to its indecisiveness in taking a clear-cut decision on this issue. This served to confuse members of the party who, without guidance from the leaders, were left to make up their own minds.

6.4.3 Success of social welfare programme and the nuclear power crisis

During the 1950s and 1960s, the creation of a nonmilitary atomic power industry was a non-issue in Sweden and there was no opposition to it. Following on this, in 1970 and 1971, parliament unanimously approved the construction of 11 nuclear reactors (Lewin 1988:239). However, this changed two years later when opposition to the idea surfaced. This opposition was led by the Centre Party through its chairman, Thorbjorn Falldin, after he was persuaded of the ³hazardous´ nature of nuclear power (Lewin 1988:239). He started a crusade to stop the march into a nuclear power society. The Center Party was soon joined by extraparliamentary groups, which included those concerned with the environment such as the Friends of the Earth, the Environmental Centre, the Field Biologists and Alternative City (Lewin 1988:239). A powerful opposition to Sweden¶s nuclear programme came into existence. The controversy over the construction of nuclear power divided allies. The nonsocialist opposition, which always voted together, split, with the moderates and liberals throwing in their weight behind the ruling party. The Communist Party which usually voted with the SDP in parliament, abandoned it and supported the Center Party. This issue gave rise to the emergence of conflict within Sweden¶s politics of compromise and consensus, which was a hallmark of the country¶s politics (Lewin 1988:239).

The issue over nuclear power is traceable to Sweden¶s prosperity. Following the Middle East oil crisis at the beginning of the 1970s, Sweden needed an alternative source of energy. It previously used coal for this purpose before substituting it with oil. Nuclear energy was seen as a strong counterbalance to the strong dependence of the Swedish economy on oil (Korpi 1997:331). The energy consumption of Sweden climbed by four and five per cent annually in the 1950s and 1960s during the country¶s economically most successful years (Lewin 1988:240). This was the price that Sweden had to pay for its impressive economic growth and the improved living standard of its citizens. The Swedish government was forced to explore other avenues to substitute the use of oil as a source of energy. A suggestion to reduce the consumption of energy from four and five per cent to two per cent per annum was rejected as it would have adversely impacted on the growth of the economy. Hydroelectric power could also not be used because it would have affected the environment, particularly the rivers. Nuclear power was seen as the next best alternative (Lewin 1988:242).

Opposition to the construction of nuclear power plants came to the fore, as it was argued that it was dangerous and a safety hazard. The Center Party called for the phasing out of nuclear power by 1985. Falldin said the concern was not about the safety of the current generation but about future generations (Lewin 1988:247). Through Falldin, the party expressed the view that it was not possible to overcome the safety hazards arguing that ³whatever the hazards, large or small is indifferent, because the consequences are terrible´. Falldin stood firm in the demand to phase out the nuclear programme arguing that he would not serve in a government which supported it.

On the other hand, Palme, while acknowledging the dangers posed by nuclear power, argued that they were minor. This view was also shared by the Moderate Party. The SDP regarded nuclear power as an engine of the country¶s economic development. It was opposed to stopping the programme, pointing out that it would have an adverse effect on social welfare, employment and economic growth, thus damaging the prosperity of Sweden. It argued that there was a correlation between energy consumption, economic growth and an improved standard of living for Swedish society (Lewin 1988:245). The Moderate Party (formerly Conservative Party) on the other hand, while agreeing to a reduction of two per cent in the consumption of energy, expressed the opinion that this should not be done at the cost of employment, social welfare and the economy.

The SDP did not take the Center Party¶s determination on this issue seriously with Palme expressing the opinion that Falldin was bluffing. The chairman of the moderates expressed the view that calling for the phasing out of nuclear power was nuclear opportunism (Lewin 1988:245). The SDP had hoped that the Center Party would back-pedal and not insist on the phasing out of the nuclear programme. There was a lull in this issue, but it later came back to haunt the SDP during the last months of the 1976 elections and it proved to be its downfall (Lewin 1988:245).

When the nuclear debate started it was not an election issue, as this occurred some time before the Swedes were due to go to the polls. Other issues such as the economy, employment and social welfare on which the SDP took a strong stance, were debated. However, towards the last months of the 1976 elections campaign, this issue suddenly reappeared. Whether this was by accident or design will never be known. It came back to occupy centre stage when Falldin gave a press conference, which was broadcast on radio, where he revealed a far-reaching programme to save energy that would make it possible to phase out nuclear power by 1985 (Lewin 1988:255). This captured the imagination of the Swedes as the issue became more topical. It was discussed widely in the media during the remaining weeks of the election campaign (Korpi 1997:330).

The nuclear issue became the trump card of the Center Party. Lewin (1988:256) expresses the opinion that the Center Party¶s timing in bringing it forward at such a crucial time in the election campaign was excellent. Falldin also publicly made a binding commitment on the nuclear power issue and he was not about to backtrack. According to Korpi (1997:331), this endeared the Center Party to the electorate. The secretary of the party pointed out that the issue was saved until the right moment.

The binding commitment by Falldin had a maximum effect because the issue were preceded by a long period of silence. Esping-Andersen (1990:54) argues that the SDP was caught unprepared for the backlash that would follow its support of nuclear power. It was vulnerable on this issue and lost considerable support in the 1976 elections. Korpi (1997:331) points out that opponents of the SDP were able to utilise the widespread fear of nuclear power for their purposes. Although in that election the gains of the nonsocialist parties were not far greater than the losses of the SDP, the latter could not form a government as it did not have a majority. Its share of the votes was 42,7 per cent which entitled the party to 152 seats. The nonsocialist parties then formed a coalition government after attaining the following votes: Centre Party (24,8 per cent), Moderate Party (15,5 per cent) and Liberal Party (11,6 per cent) which amounted to just over 50 per cent.

Factors not discussed Sweden was a model state which adhered to the tenets of democratic rule. During the party¶s long stay in power it was not accused of corruption, did not suffer from factionalism, authoritarianism or oligarchical tendencies. The reasons for the absence of factionalism within the SDP are the same as those advanced for all of Sweden¶s parties (refer to Chapter 5). The SDP catered adequately for the needs of the Swedish people. All this was due to the fact that the SDP was a well-organised party with structures that gave party members representation. Board (1970:90) points out that the parties in Sweden are democratic and more disciplined than their counterparts in the United States. The SDP was efficiently run with a low leadership turnover. The party¶s closest encounter with war was during World War II when it opted to remain neutral and formed a government of national unity.

The opposition in Sweden was not overly keen on forming an alliance against the SDP. While it was in agreement about opposing the LO¶s attempts to have a stake in the economy of the country, it was divided on the nuclear issue. The opposition did not form an alliance prior to the elections, only after the SDP failed to secure enough votes to form a government.

6.4.4 Summary

Having been in power for 44 years, and during this period bringing prosperity to the country, the SDP could justifiably claim to have been hard done by its unexpected defeat. The two issues which led to the electoral defeat of the party were unforeseen and were not as crucial as those in which it did well, such as the growth of the economy and the provision of employment and a social welfare system equal to none. The ambitions of the LO to wrest control of the economy and the nuclear power issue took the party by surprise and it was unprepared to give proper leadership on the issues to its supporters.

The LO was a strong ally of the SDP, and its support was of vital importance for the party. The two organisations were in agreement on the country¶s socialist welfare policies. The SDP was taken by surprise when the LO decided to go it alone, demanding that the workers should get a share of proceeds accruing from the country¶s wealth. The SDP was uncomfortable with this new initiative of the LO, however, it failed to convince the LO to rethink its position on this crucial issue. The party¶s intervention on this issue was not strong enough, leaving its members undecided.

The SDP was again caught off-guard by the nuclear issue. When the nuclear power issue was first raised, it was not crucial enough to pose a threat to the dominance of the SDP. To indicate how minor it was, it ceased being contentious and was followed by a lull. The SDP did not seriously apply its mind to this issue hoping that it would fade away. However, it was revived a few months before the 1976 elections. With the SDP not having a firm position on it, the Centre Party used it effectively to campaign for the elections and it became the party¶s trump card of the party. These two issues were generally regarded as being responsible for the demise of the SDP.

6.5 Conclusion

After having been in power for 25 years and longer, the four parties in our study lost their domination when they were eventually defeated in their country¶s elections. The following factors were identified as being responsible for the decline and eventual loss of power of these parties: leadership battles leading to factionalism within the party, authoritarian and oligarchical tendencies, corruption, failure to resolve socioeconomic problems, loss of support from a strong socioeconomic bloc, consequences of war, environmental and economic issues, and an opposition that finally could offer a viable alternative to the voters. Factionalism Factionalism appeared within the ranks of Congress, Mapai and DC. It was most serious in Congress where it first divided the party and eventually resulted in a split, leading to the existence of two Congress parties. Although factionalism occurred within Mapai, this did not result in a split. However, it left the party divided on the eve of the 1977 elections, which it consequently lost. Factionalism within the DC was caused by the association of some of the party¶s leaders with organised crime in the form of the Mafia. This relationship did not please some members of the party who left to form their own organisations.

Authoritarian and oligarchical tendencies Indira Gandhi¶s authoritarianism and oligarchical tendencies not only affected the opposition, but were also felt by members of her own party, who became embittered at her leadership style. The imposition of the state of emergency and forced sterilisation worsened the anger between the party supporters and the larger Indian society. The emergence of oligarchical tendencies within Mapai had negative consequences for the party. The leaders of Mapai antagonised ordinary members of the party when they excluded them from the decision-making process. When it became apparent to them that the party was being run by a clique, they organised themselves and staged protests.

Corruption While in Israel and Italy corruption was a cause of concern and was also responsible for the demise of the ruling parties, in India even though it was regarded as a way of life, it made life difficult for the impoverished community who had to pay in order to receive service from government officials. Peres, who was the leader of Mapai, referred to it when he gave reasons for the party¶s defeat in the 1977 elections. McCarthy (1997:145) said corruption was the catalyst of a greater anger among the voters in Italy, and it proved to be costly for the DC. Failure to attend to socioeconomic problems. The failure to resolve socioeconomic problems had serious consequences for Congress, Mapai and the DC. India was already a poor country and the efforts by Congress to improve the living conditions of the masses made little impact. In Israel and Italy socioeconomic problems led to austerity measures being imposed and this affected the ordinary people. The parties experienced socioeconomic problems when they were also faced with internal problems. The failure by the parties to attend to these problems contributed to their eventual electoral defeat.

Loss of support strong from a socioeconomic bloc Mapai, DC and the SDP owed their electoral success to the support they received from strong socioeconomic blocs. With the passing of time, the support which Mapai received from the Histadrut and the DC from the Catholic congregants dissipated. People who were previously influenced by these institutions to vote for Mapai and DC, switched their votes to other parties. On the other hand the support which the SDP received through the labour union became dispersed due to the lack of agreement on economic issues.

Consequences of war India¶s limited resources were depleted when it got involved in war with Pakistan. Although it emerged victorious after the war, India paid dearly as its economy suffered. This was aggravated by the fact that it also had to take care of the refugees who were fleeing from war. The end of two wars had unforeseen consequences for both Mapai and DC. With Arab states threatening war against Israel, Mapai acceded to the suggestion that a government of national unity should be formed. This compromised the Mapai as it found itself side by side with right-wing, conservative and religious parties. To its members the party seemed to be embracing the policies of these parties. Meanwhile the end of the Cold War meant that communism ceased to be viewed as a threat by the Western world, and this affected the fortunes of the DC. The DC could no longer claim to be a defender of democracy against communism. The Italian Communist Party was no longer demonised and people could vote for it without equating it with a foreign power. Environmental and economic issues Having improved the fortunes of the Swedish population, the SDP¶s rule was never really threatened. It was ironically the success that the party had brought the country that resulted in its downfall. The party was confronted with two issues resulting from the country¶s economic success that it had not anticipated. Attempts by the labour federation to wrest control of the economy and the nuclear issue initially did not seem to pose a serious threat to the party. However, these issues aroused strong feelings among the Swedish people. The party did not take these issues seriously and paid dearly for this when it lost the 1976 elections primarily because of them.

Opposition alliance The defeat of Congress, Mapai and SDP came about as a result of the opposition forming an alliance. Initially the opposition in India and Sweden never seriously considered the prospects of forming an alliance. In Israel it was never even raised as a suggestion. The opposition in Sweden only came together when the SDP failed to secure enough votes to rule on its own. The three parties then came together and formed the government, replacing the SDP after 44 years as the opposition. CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

This chapter brings to a conclusion the study on one-party dominance. As was argued in the previous chapters, one-party dominance means that the same party remained in power for at least 25 years. However, the length of time in which a party has to be in power to be regarded as dominant has not been specified by scholars writing on this theme. Dominance is a deviation from the norm, an unusual occurrence which has been experienced, thus far, only by the five parties in our study. Under normal circumstances, alternation between parties in government occurs frequently. Much as there is alternation between parties, it is rare for a party to be returned to power after winning four or more elections.

The main purpose of the study was to identify the circumstances that result in a party being continuously elected to power. We discovered that in the five parties in the study, unusual circumstances prevailed in their states prior to them winning the elections that led to their ascension to power. These parties played an important role in the resolution of these unusual circumstances, which gave them an advantage over the other parties. However, over and above this advantageous start, there were other factors which also assisted them in retaining and expanding their support.

The underlying aim of the study was to identify and analyse these factors and to determine their role in leading the parties to dominance, and if they were common to all five parties. If this is the case, this would bring political science closer to anticipating the likely occurrence of one-party dominance. However, this would only be possible after the parties have won a number of elections, concurring with the assertion by Pempel (1990:341) that dominance cannot be predicted when a party initially assumes power. He points out that dominance is more easily recognisable in the cycle of its continuance than in the seeds of its regeneration.

The findings of this study are now being be drawn together. In Chapter 2 it was argued that unusual circumstances that existed within the states of the parties in the study played a major role in their ascension to power. The BDP, Congress, Mapai, the DC and the SDP were confronted with the challenge of intervening in the unusual circumstances that prevailed in their countries and bringing normality to their societies. Their involvement was successful and this led to political stability in their countries.

In Botswana the BDP was in the forefront of negotiations which led to the independence of the country. Congress was at the head of a nationalist movement that challenged the British colonial authorities to grant India independence. Mapai played a leading role in the formation of the state of Israel. The DC was instrumental in the restoration of democracy in Italy after the authoritarian rule of Mussolini. However, during the fight against fascism, the contribution of the DC was equal to that of the other parties and organisations which took in the Resistance Movement. The SDP resolved Sweden¶s economic and unemployment crisis which beset the country after the Great Depression.

At the helm of these parties were individuals who made an immense contribution to the resolution of these unusual circumstances. The inspirational leadership of these individuals was recognised by the citizens of their countries. Through their leadership during the period of the crisis they endeared themselves to their people. These individuals were Sir Seretse Khama (Botswana), Nehru and Gandhi (India), Ben- Gurion (Israel) and De Gasperi (Italy). In Italy, De Gasperi is credited with having reorganised the DC as well as having introduced a new democratic political order which replaced Mussolini¶s authoritarian system. In Sweden this factor did not have any influence, as there is no single individual who stood out among the rest of the leadership of the SDP. It was a collaborative effort on the part of the entire leadership that rescued the country from the effects of the Depression.

The argument in Chapter 3 is that, having ascended to power, the parties could not continue to rely on the unusual circumstances that first brought them to victory. They had to devise other means to ensure that they continued receiving the support of the voters. This was also responsible for the increase in the support they received in subsequent elections. The factors used by the parties to consolidate their positions were argued. These factors were by far the most important. The following six factors were identified: organisational strength of the party, continued support of a socioeconomic bloc, penetration of society, pragmatism, patronage and the symbolism of the role the parties and their leaders played in the resolution of the unusual circumstances.

The parties were well organised with their support spread throughout the country. The retention of the support of a strong socioeconomic bloc was crucial to the parties¶ continued electoral success. While the support for Congress came from all sectors of the Indian population spread throughout the country, it was also supported by INTUC and commercial and industrial associations with large support. Mapai continued its close association with the labour federation, Histadrut, which was in control of the country¶s economy. The DC was always assured of the support of the Catholic bloc in all the postwar elections. The SDP continued to receive the unwavering support of the LO, its strongest ally.

The penetration of society by the parties brought them increased support as they took over societal organisations and formed their own. All the parties displayed some dexterity in accommodating different sectors of society with conflicting interests, even if it meant compromising their principles. Having control of government resources these parties could afford to dispense patronage in order to buy support as we have argued. In Sweden the effect of patronage in garnering support was underplayed, but it was also a contributory factor to the SDP¶s electoral success.

The focus of chapter 4 was the performance of government. The performance of a party as government also influenced voters on whether or not to continue voting for it. My argument was that if a party does not fulfil the promises it made to the people when it campaigned for votes during elections, they are likely to discard it unless there are other persuasive reasons. If, however, the party satisfies the aspirations of the voters and is responsible for an improvement in their standard of living and for bringing prosperity to the nation, then the likelihood of it being voted out of office becomes minimal. Macroeconomic indicators were used in this study to measure the performance of the parties. These indicators are the growth of the economy, the provision of employment, budgetary allocation for social welfare including health and education, infant mortality and life expectancy. The research is inconclusive about the effect of government performance on electoral support.

With the exception of Congress, the other four parties made strides in improving the living conditions of their people. The BDP, Mapai, the DC and the SDP did well in improving the living conditions of the citizens of their respective countries. However the continued re-election of Congress in India disproved the thesis that a party¶s performance influences electoral support. The majority of the country¶s citizens continued to live in abject poverty under the government of Congress. In Botswana as well, not all the citizens of the country benefited from the wealth that accrued after the discovery of diamonds. The rural peasants who constituted the backbone of the BDP¶s support saw very little of the country¶s economic success.

Although Mapai and the DC showed good progress in improving the standard of living of the communities in their countries, this was not reflected in the votes they received. The number of votes the two parties received was average and not outstanding, given their performances. However, this could be attributed to the proportional representation electoral system used in their countries. There was also a proliferation of parties in these countries and the electoral system made it possible for them to be represented in parliament. Both parties ruled with the assistance of other parties.

In Chapter 5, the role of the opposition as, ironically, a contributory factor to one- party dominance was argued. Here it was argued that the weakness of the opposition also made dominance possible. The focus of scholars writing about one- party dominance such as Kochanek (1968) and Leonardi and Wertman (1989) was more on the dominant party and does not include the opposition. However, on the whole, other writings featuring dominance in all of the five states included a discussion on the opposition. A strong opposition party acts as a bulwark against the domination of the political system by one party. Without a strong opposition party, voters will not have the incentive to transfer their votes from the ruling party, even if they are not satisfied with its performance. The opposition parties in the study were marked by weakness, with a much smaller support base than the ruling party.

The opposition parties in our study were in general weak and were not a serious threat to the well-organised dominant parties. This resulted in them not attracting support away from the dominant parties. The reasons for the weakness of the opposition parties were spelled out in the chapter. Some of the parties, such as the BPP, Swatantra, Mapam, PCI and the Sweden¶s Communist Party had what could be considered as inappropriate ideologies, while others had similar policies to those of the ruling party. Others such as Social Party, Mapam and the PSI were riddled with factionalism. In Sweden the weakness of the opposition parties was attributed to the existence of a good relationship between them and the ruling party. Some of the parties such as Jana Sangh and Swatantra in India appealed to a particular group within society. In Botswana the poverty of the opposition parties prevented them from even nominating candidates in all of the country¶s constituencies. In all these states, the opposition parties did not seriously consider the possibility of forming an alliance against the ruling parties. This only happened later in India and Israel.

In Chapter 6 the argument revolved around the loss of dominance by the parties. The stranglehold which some of these parties had over the politics of their countries eventually came to an end. The only party which was still in power at the time of writing (2005) was the BDP. The DC was not as such removed from power, but dissolved in 1992 as a result of internal problems. Congress and Mapai lost their dominance in 1977 and the SDP in 1976. With the exception of the SDP, the demise of the parties was preceded by internal problems which eventually led to factionalism. Apart from factionalism, the other problems that affected these parties were the appearance of oligarchical and authoritarian tendencies, corruption, failure to attend to socioeconomic problems, loss of support from a strong socioeconomic bloc and the consequences of war. The loss of a strong socioeconomic bloc severely affected the support of Mapai and the DC.

The end of the SDP¶s dominance was not foreseen as it had not been experiencing any internal problems. Unforeseen factors within the environment led to its defeat. One of these unforeseen circumstances was created by its strongest ally, the labour union, which caused confusion within the party¶s supporters. The decision by the opposition to form alliances in India and Israel also contributed to the demise of the opposition. In Sweden the opposition formed an alliance and took over power as the number of votes the SDP received were less than all of theirs combined.

It was also demonstrated in the study that the ascendancy to power of the ANC was also assisted by the role it played in the resolution of unusual circumstances which existed in South Africa. The ANC was acknowledged as having played a far more prominent role than other parties during the struggle against the policies of the previous South African government. When the organisation was eventually unbanned, it played a leading role in the CODESA negotiations to establish a new political order. The party was led by Nelson Mandela during these negotiations. Through his drive, commitment and charisma and the respect that he commanded, Mandela was credited with the party¶s victory in the 1994 elections. The party also received the support of a strong socioeconomic bloc in the form of COSATU. This was in addition to the fact that it commanded the support of the strong African socioeconomic bloc.

However, on assuming power, the party also devised means similar to those of the other parties in this study to consolidate its support. This was done within the country¶s democratic political system. Although the ANC has made some progress in improving the lives of its largely African constituency, it still has a long way to go towards achieving what it promised them during election campaigns. This has not deterred them from voting for the party in increasing numbers in succeeding elections. The party is assured of the continued support of this socioeconomic bloc. However it does not take it for granted and went out of its way to retain and increase it.

A weak opposition also made the ANC¶s three election victories possible. South Africa has a plethora of political parties which contested all three elections. The three leading opposition parties appealed to a particularistic support base. Some of them were also still being associated with the discredited apartheid ideology and, as a result, they could not make inroads into the ANC¶s predominantly African constituency which suffered the most during the apartheid era.

This research supports the main argument of the study which holds that the successful involvement of the political parties in the resolution of unusual circumstances in their states gave them a head start over the other parties, and supported a long stay in office. It also showed that over and above this, there were also other factors responsible for the continued stay in power of the parties . These factors were identified and discussed in the preceding chapters and summarised above. The study also showed that electoral success is not necessarily influenced by the good socioeconomic performance of the ruling party. as shown by the good support which Congress and the ANC received.

This study makes a contribution towards establishing the basis on which one-party dominance could be anticipated by political scientists. Much as studies on one-party dominance have been embarked upon, they do not identify and discuss all the factors showing their commonality. This can only be done in a comparative study. The common factors were argued above and in the preceding chapters. While the study does not claim to have established a new theory on one-party dominance, its importance lies in the fact that it has identified factors that make it possible to anticipate one-party dominance and its possible demise. One can therefore, from a political science point of view, present the following expectation.

In states where there is an acute socioeconomic and political crisis, the party that resolves this crisis may be expected to be a dominant party for a number of consecutive elections. This has to be supported by the following favourable factors: organisational strength, penetration of society, pragmatism, patronage and the symbolism of having been at the forefront of resolving the political crisis. Government¶s performance would seem to play a marginal role in assuring the party of continued loyal support. The weakness of the opposition is also a factor that facilitates dominance.

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