171 Cote Divoire
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CÔTE D’IVOIRE: IS WAR THE ONLY OPTION? Africa Report N°171 – 3 March 2011 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. DECIPHERING A DISASTER ........................................................................................ 3 A. WHO WON? THE ELECTORATE’S VERDICT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL’S CHOICE ........ 3 B. A CONSTITUTIONAL AND MILITARY COUP ................................................................................... 6 III. THE BALANCE OF FORCES AND POSSIBLE SCENARIOS ................................ 10 A. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE TWO RIVALS ................................................................. 10 B. THE SCOPE FOR INFLUENCE BY EXTERNAL AFRICAN ACTORS ................................................... 12 C. SOMBRE PROSPECTS .................................................................................................................. 14 1. Deterioration, division and decline ............................................................................................ 14 2. Civil war .................................................................................................................................... 15 3. A social crisis and popular insurrection with unpredictable political consequences ................. 16 IV. TO PREVENT THE DISINTEGRATION OF CÔTE D’IVOIRE ............................ 18 A. A CHANGE OF ATTITUDE IS REQUIRED AT UNOCI .................................................................... 18 B. MAINTAIN SANCTIONS AND BUILD A UNITED AFRICAN FRONT .................................................. 20 C. PROPOSE AN AGREEMENT ON RECONCILIATION WITHOUT GBAGBO .......................................... 21 D. DEPLOY AN ECOWAS MILITARY MISSION ............................................................................... 22 V. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 24 APPENDICES A. MAP OF CÔTE D’IVOIRE ................................................................................................................... 25 B. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................................. 26 C. DECISION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL OF CÔTE D’IVOIRE .................................................... 27 Africa Report N°171 3 March 2011 CÔTE D’IVOIRE: IS WAR THE ONLY OPTION? EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS Côte d’Ivoire is on the verge of a new civil war between To secure its hold on power, the regime has accompanied the army loyal to the defiant Laurent Gbagbo, who refuses brazen manipulation of state institutions with a strategy of to acknowledge he lost the November 2010 presidential terror designed to brutally stifle any challenge from the election, and the “Forces nouvelles” (FN), the ex-insurgency coalition supporting Ouattara. According to the UN, the now supporting the winner, Alassane Ouattara. The vote human toll already exceeds 300 dead, in addition to dozens should have ended eight years of crisis, but Gbagbo, of rapes and an unknown number of abductions and dis- staged a constitutional coup and resorted to violence to appearances by security forces. keep power. The result is a serious threat to peace, security and stability in all West Africa. The African community Gbagbo’s power grab was clearly premeditated. He de- should not be influenced by the support that Gbagbo en- clared a curfew on the eve of the run-off, a forerunner of the joys from a part of the population that has been frightened lockdown on Abidjan, the centre of power; recalled from by the ultra-nationalist propaganda and threats of chaos of the northern and central regions for no reason before the a militant minority. It must act decisively, not least to de- voting ended 1,500 soldiers whom he had deployed by fend the principle of democratic elections, but key countries decree to maintain electoral security; and obstructed the show signs of dangerous disunity. Any proposal to endorse work of the independent electoral commission (Commis- Gbagbo’s presidency, even temporarily, would be a mis- sion électorale indépendante, CEI). Having campaigned take. His departure is needed to halt a return to war. on the slogan “we win or we win”, he and his inner circle had no intention of relinquishing the presidency, regard- The November election was intended as the culmination of less of the vote count. Driven by a political mysticism a painstaking peace process that began after the September that blends nationalist discourse, virility and religiosity, 2002 rebellion and was endorsed by many agreements, Gbagbo is relying primarily on blackmail and targeted the latest being the Ouagadougou Political Agreement violence against civilians perceived as Ouattara support- (OPA) of March 2007. Gbagbo, like all other candidates, ers to remain president, even if his authority is unlikely to took part in the election on the basis of a series of compro- extend beyond the country’s southern third. mises reached on all aspects of organisation and security. The international community needs to realise that the ille- There is no doubt Ouattara won the run-off. The candi- gitimate president is prepared to fight to the end, even if it date of the Union of Houphouetists for Democracy and means throwing Côte d’Ivoire into anarchy and economic Peace (Rassemblement des Houphouétistes pour la démoc- disaster. If he succeeds, he will take with him all hope of ratie et la paix, RHDP) had a greater than 350,000-vote good neighbourly relations, stability and economic pro- margin over Gbagbo’s The Presidential Majority (La ma- gress in West Africa. Apart from the need to respect the jorité présidentielle, LMP) in a credible election certified will of Ivorians, the stakes include the security and well by the UN, as provided for in the agreement Gbagbo him- being of millions in the region and whether peaceful, self signed in 2005 and that several UN Security Council democratic transfer of power is to be safeguarded on a resolutions confirmed. In an attempt to reverse the result, continent where eleven elections are scheduled in 2011. however, the Constitutional Council – the country’s high- Neither Gbagbo’s obsession with power nor Ouattara’s est court but entirely controlled by the Gbagbo camp – presidential ambition can justify the potential costs. But claimed to have discovered widespread violence and fraud while the one made a decision that was accompanied by a – largely imaginary – in seven departments of the north- campaign of terror he knew would bring his country to ern and central regions where Gbagbo had received less the brink of civil war, the other won a fair election with than 10 per cent of the votes in the first round. It thus the support of a political and social coalition that is more cancelled more than 660,000 second-round votes, enough representative of the country’s diversity. to raise his total from 45.5 per cent to 51.4 per cent. Côte d’Ivoire: Is War the Only Option? Crisis Group Africa Report N°171, 3 March 2011 Page ii The African Union (AU) panel of five heads of state – rep- To outgoing President Laurent Gbagbo: resenting each region of the continent – seeks a peaceful solution to the crisis but is in dangerous disagreement. 2. Accept electoral defeat, step down and do not oppose The AU, the Economic Community of West African States an LMP-RHDP dialogue for an agreement that could (ECOWAS) and the UN have all recognised Ouattara as also guarantee you a dignified exit and personal safety. president-elect and asked Gbagbo to leave. South Africa, supported by Angola, however, has put forward power- To Prime Minister and Defence Minister sharing proposals that are dangerous because they con- Guillaume Soro: tradict the original African consensus. Their positions on a crisis whose complexity they appear not to have fully 3. Instruct the Forces nouvelles to respect the ceasefire grasped are compromising their credibility on the conti- throughout the country. nent and beyond and undermining trust between ECOWAS and the AU. Gbagbo is the undisputed sole architect of To former President Henri Konan Bédié, Côte d’Ivoire’s desperate situation. That and the need to member of the RHDP: achieve the installation of Ouattara must be the fundamen- 4. Reaffirm full support for President Ouattara and par- tal starting points of the search for a successful strategy ticipate in the negotiation of a political agreement for and implementing tactics. national reconciliation. The most likely scenario in the coming months is armed conflict involving massive violence against civilians, Ivorian To the Chief of General Staff of the Army and foreign alike, that could provoke unilateral military (FDS-CI), the Chief of Staff and Commanders of intervention by neighbours, starting with Burkina Faso. the Forces nouvelles (FAFN) and Commanders It is ECOWAS territory, not southern Africa, that faces a of All Other Military Forces: serious threat. The regional organisation must reclaim the 5. Recall they will be held responsible for serious crimes responsibility for political and military management of the committed by their forces, including crimes against crisis, with unequivocal AU and UN support. Meanwhile, humanity, war crimes and other violations of interna- Ouattara should take